

REINFORCEMENT LEARNING ADVERSARIAL LEARNING

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Aggregation of experts

▷ Compare to: Best arm, Best convex combinations, Best sequence, Best recurring sequence.

Adversarial bandits

- ▷ Exp3, Exp4
- ▷ Best of both world

Min-max games

- ▷ Bandits and Nash equilibrium

Risk-aversion

- ▷ CVaR, EVaR, etc.

Robust planning

- ▷ Autonomous vehicles.

MOTIVATION

AGGREGATION OF EXPERTS

FROM FULL TO PARTIAL INFORMATION


GAMES

RISK-AVERSION

ROBUST LEARNING


MANY MODELS?

- ▷ Observe a signal $y_1, \dots, y_t \in \mathcal{Y}$



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
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- ▷ Goal: Predict observation at time $t + 1$?

- ▷ **Many** available models:

- ◇ *I.i.d.*: $[0, 1]$ -bounded ?
- ◇ *Parametric*: $y_t = \langle \theta, \varphi(t) \rangle + \xi_t$ for φ : polynomials, wavelets, etc. ?
- ◇ *Markov*: $y_t \sim P(\cdot | y_{t-1})$, *k-order Markov*: $y_t \sim P(\cdot | y_{t-1}, \dots, y_{t-k})$?
- ◇ *States*: representation maps $\psi(h_t) = s_t$ for observation history h_t ?

Which model is best?

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

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



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


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
MANY MODELS?

- ▷ Sample a signal $y_1, \dots, y_t = (a_t, r_t) \in \mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{A} \times [0, 1]$, $r_t \sim \nu_{a_t}$.



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
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- ▷ Goal: choose $a_t \in \mathcal{A}$ to maximize rewards.
- ▷ Many available algorithms:
- ◇ *Bandits*: UCB? UCB-V? KL-UCB? TS?
 - ◇ *Structured bandits*: OFUL, GP-UCB? IMED?
 - ◇ *MDPs*: UCRL? Q-learning? DQN?

Which algorithm is best?

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 - ◇ $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{Y}$, $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{Y})$, $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{A}$.

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- ◇ Quadratic: $\ell(x, y) = \frac{(x-y)^2}{2},$
- ◇ Self-information: $\ell(x, y) = -\log(x(y)),$
- ◇ Reward: $\ell(x, y) = 1 - y(x)$

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▷ Q: in Expectation? High probability?

- ▷ Say after playing x_t , you **observe** y_t (more generally ℓ_t). Then, you can compute $\ell_t(x)$ for all other choice.

Full information

- ▷ In bandit, only $\ell_t(x_t)$ is observed, but ℓ_t is **unknown**:

Partial information: Bandit feedback

- ▷ Intermediate settings: e.g. Classification $\ell(x, y) = \mathbb{I}\{x \neq y\}$.
(Only) If I receive **loss 0**, then, I know y , hence I can compute $\ell(x, y)$ for all x .

Semi-bandit Feedback

In the sequel, we first consider **full information**.

$$\text{Minimize } \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_t(x_t) \dots$$

w.r.t.

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▷ Goal 1: **best model** (Model **selection**) ?

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A simple aggregation strategy

Simple aggregation, revisited

Best convex combinations

Best sequence: Fixed Share

Few recurring experts: Freund, MPP

FROM FULL TO PARTIAL INFORMATION

GAMES

- ▷ You are given a **set** \mathcal{M} of models.

At each time step,

- ▷ You maintain some **distribution** $p_t \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})$ on the set of models.
- ▷ You receive **recommendation** $x_{t,m}$ from each model $m \in \mathcal{M}$.
- ▷ You use them in order to output some **decision** x_t .
- ▷ You incur the corresponding **loss** $\ell_t(x_t)$, and receive **feedback**.

▷ Choose x_t as a convex combination of the $(x_{t,m})_{m \in \mathcal{M}}$? or sample $x_t \sim p_t$?

$$x_t = \sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} p_t(m) x_{t,m} \text{ where } p_t \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}).$$

⇒ Assuming that $\ell_t(\cdot) = \ell(\cdot, y_t)$ is **convex**, convex combination is better:

$$\ell_t(x_t) \leq \sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} p_t(m) \ell_t(x_{t,m}) = \mathbb{E}_{M \sim p_t}[\ell_t(x_{t,M})]$$

Technical property (Hoeffding Lemma for bounded random variables)

Let r.v. X s.t. $a \leq X \leq b$ a.s. then

$$\forall \eta \in \mathbb{R}^+, \quad \mathbb{E}[X] \leq -\frac{1}{\eta} \log \mathbb{E}[\exp(-\eta X)] + \eta \frac{(b-a)^2}{8}.$$

⇒ Assuming that ℓ is **bounded** by 1, then

$$\mathbb{E}_{M \sim p_t}[\ell_t(x_{t,M})] \leq -\frac{1}{\eta} \log \sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} p_t(m) e^{-\eta \ell_t(x_{t,m})} + \frac{\eta}{8}.$$

For **Bounded, convex** loss:

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▷ Hence $\sum_{t=1}^T \ell_t(x_t) \leq \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_t(x_{t,m^*}) + \frac{\log(|\mathcal{M}|)}{\eta} + \frac{\eta T}{8}.$

This leads to the following strategy

- 1: Let $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, w_1(m) = 1$
- 2: **for** $t = 1, \dots$ **do**
- 3: Receive $x_{t,m}$ from each model $m \in \mathcal{M}$.
- 4: Let $p_t(m) = \frac{w_t(m)}{\sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} w_t(m)}$.
- 5: Choose $x_t = \sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} p_t(m) x_{t,m}$
- 6: Receive loss function ℓ_t .
- 7: **Update** $w_{t+1}(m) = w_t(m) e^{-\eta \ell_t(x_{t,m})}$ for each m ,
 Equivalently, $w_{t+1}(m) = \exp(-\eta L_{t,m})$
- 8: **end for**

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- Choose $x_t = \sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} p_t(m) x_{t,m}$ where $p_t(m) = \frac{w_t(m)}{\sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} w_t(m)}$,
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Theorem (Cesa-Bianchi, Lugosi 2006)

Assume that ℓ_t is **convex** and **bounded** by 1, then this strategy satisfies:

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- In particular for the choice of parameter $\eta = \sqrt{8 \log(|\mathcal{M}|) / T}$,

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Using $\eta_t = \sqrt{8 \log(|\mathcal{M}|)/t}$ at time t , one can show (more involved):

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- ▷ Examples of convex/bounded losses?

$$L_T - \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} L_{T,m} \leq \sqrt{\frac{T}{2} \log(|\mathcal{M}|)}$$

- ▷ **No statistical assumption** on y_t : ℓ_t only convex and bounded!
- ▷ Logarithmic in $|\mathcal{M}|$: Can handle a large amount of models!

Questions

- ▷ Anytime **tuning** of η ($\eta = \eta_t$) ?
Using $\eta_t = \sqrt{8 \log(|\mathcal{M}|)/t}$ at time t , one can show (more involved):

$$L_T - \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} L_{T,m} \leq 2\sqrt{\frac{T \log(|\mathcal{M}|)}{2}} + \sqrt{\frac{\log(|\mathcal{M}|)}{2}}$$

- ▷ Examples of convex/bounded losses?
- ▷ Simplify this assumption, cf. Technical property ??

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We only used this:

$$\ell_t(\underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{M \sim p_t}[x_{t,M}]}_{x_t}) \leq -\frac{1}{\eta} \log \mathbb{E}_{M \sim p_t} \exp(-\eta \ell_t(x_{t,M})) + \frac{\eta}{8}$$

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Ok for **quadratic** loss, pb for **self-information**: not bounded when x small!
- ▷ What about dropping $\eta/8$ term?
Equivalent to $\exp(-\eta \ell_t(\cdot))$ is concave: **η -exp-concavity**.
 - ◇ **Self-information** loss is 1-exp-concave (with $=$ instead of \leq)
 - ◇ **Quadratic** loss is η -exp-concave for $\eta \leq \frac{1}{2(b-a)^2}$ on $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{Y} \subset [a, b]$.
 - ◇ **Absolute** loss $\ell(x, y) = |x - y|$ is not exp-concave for any η .

A SECOND LOOK AT ASSUMPTIONS

▷ Interpretation of $-\frac{1}{\eta} \log \mathbb{E}_{M \sim p_t} \exp(-\eta \ell_t(x_{t,M}))$?

Entropy formula:

$$-\frac{1}{\eta} \log \mathbb{E}_{M \sim p} \exp(-\eta X_M) = \inf_{q \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})} \mathbb{E}_{M \sim q}[X_M] + \frac{1}{\eta} \text{KL}(q, p).$$

- ▷ Interpretation of $-\frac{1}{\eta} \log \mathbb{E}_{M \sim p_t} \exp(-\eta \ell_t(\mathbf{x}_t, M))$?

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- ▷ Hence, η -exp-concavity becomes:

η -exp-concavity

A loss ℓ is η -exp-concave if $\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}^M, p \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}), \forall y \in \mathcal{Y}$,

$$\ell(\mathbb{E}_{M \sim p}[\mathbf{x}_M], y) \leq \inf_{q \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})} \mathbb{E}_{M \sim q}[\ell(\mathbf{x}_M, y)] + \frac{1}{\eta} \text{KL}(q, p)$$

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- ▷ Further, infimum obtained for $q(m) = \frac{\exp(-\eta X_m) p(m)}{\sum_{m' \in \mathcal{M}} \exp(-\eta X_{m'}) p(m')}$.

Generalization: we don't need that $x_t = \mathbb{E}_{M \sim p_t}[x_{t,M}]$.

η -mixability

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$[\mathbf{x}], \mathbf{p} \mapsto \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{p}}$ is called the **substitution function**.

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- ▷ η -exp-concave loss is η -mixable with $\mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{x},p} = \mathbb{E}_{M \sim p} \mathbf{x}_M$.
- ◇ **Quadratic** loss is η -exp-concave for $\eta \leq \frac{1}{2}$ on $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{Y} \subset [0, 1]$, but η -mixable for η up to $\eta \leq 2$!

- Consider an η -mixable loss ℓ , and let $p_1 = \text{Uniform}(\mathcal{M}) \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})$.

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- ▷ Receive y_t and update

$$p_{t+1} = \operatorname{argmin}_{q \in \mathcal{P}_{\mathcal{M}}} \mathbb{E}_{M \sim q} [\underbrace{\ell(\mathbf{x}_{t,M}, y_t)}_{\ell_{t,M}}] + \frac{1}{\eta} \text{KL}(q, p_t).$$

Theorem

Assume that ℓ_t is η -mixable, then after T time steps, this strategy satisfies:

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- ▷ Still for arbitrary $y_t \in \mathcal{Y}$.
- ▷ **Independent** on T !
- ▷ Only for **specific**, possibly small η (all $\eta' \leq \eta$, but not larger).

We can actually get a stronger result:

Theorem (Aggregation of experts)

Assume that ℓ_t is η -mixable, then after T time steps, the aggregation strategy with $p_1 = \pi$, satisfies

$$\forall q \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}) \quad L_T - \mathbb{E}_{M \sim q} [L_{T,M}] \leq \frac{1}{\eta} \left(\text{KL}(q, \pi) - \text{KL}(q, p_{T+1}) \right).$$

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- ▷ In particular for $q = \delta_{m^*}$ (Dirac mass at m^*), we deduce

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- We can move from finitely many to **countably** many experts:

$$\pi(m) = \frac{1}{m(m+1)}, \quad \pi(m) = \log(2) \left(\frac{1}{\log(m+1)} - \frac{1}{\log(m+2)} \right).$$

- ▷ **Bregman** divergence generalizes KL:

$$\mathcal{B}(p, q) = \psi(p) - \psi(q) - \langle p - q, \nabla \psi(q) \rangle$$

($\psi(p) = \sum_i p_i \log(p_i)$ gives KL as a special case.)

- ▷ Assumption: ℓ is **η -Bregman-mixable** w.r.t. Bregman divergence \mathcal{B} :

$$\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}^M, p \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}), \exists \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{x}, p} \in \mathcal{X}, \ell(\mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{x}, p}) \leq \min_{q \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})} \langle q, \ell_{\mathbf{x}} \rangle + \frac{1}{\eta} \mathcal{B}(q, p).$$

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- ▷ Other interpretation: Use Legendre-Fenchel dual objective function, perform gradient descent!

When the best expert has **small loss**, we may prefer to express regret bounds on terms of this loss:

▷ Consider a loss **convex and bounded** in $[0, 1]$, then:

$$L_T - L_T^* \leq \left(\frac{\eta}{1 - \exp(-\eta)} - 1 \right) L_T^* + \frac{\log(M)}{1 - \exp(-\eta)}$$

where $L_T^* = \min_{m \in \mathcal{M}} L_{t,m}$

Proof: One can show that any loss ℓ convex and bounded in $[0, 1]$ satisfies the following extension of η -mixability property:

$$\ell(\mathbb{E}_{M \sim q}(x_M)) \leq -\frac{\eta}{1 - \exp(-\eta)} \frac{1}{\eta} \ln \left(\mathbb{E}_{m \sim q} \exp(-\eta \ell(x_M)) \right).$$

(almost η -mixable!) The rest is obtained by following the initial derivation.

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▷ best **combination** of models (Model aggregation)?

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- ▷ Right is **harder**: $\ell_t(\mathbf{q} \cdot \mathbf{x}_t) \leq \mathbf{q} \cdot \ell_t$ by convexity.

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- ▷ ! From set of experts \mathcal{M} (finite) to set of experts $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})$ (continuous) !

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- ▷ ! From set of experts \mathcal{M} (finite) to set of experts $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})$ (continuous) !
- ▷ If ℓ is η -exp-concave on \mathcal{X} , then $\bar{\ell} : \mathbf{q} \rightarrow \ell_t(\mathbf{q} \cdot \mathbf{x}_t)$ is η -exp-concave on $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})$.

AGGREGATION OVER $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})$: STRATEGY

▷ $\bar{p}_1(q) = \frac{1}{\text{vol}(\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M}))} = M!, p_1 = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|} \mathbf{1}.$

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- ▷ Update $p_{t+1} = \mathbb{E}_{q \sim \bar{p}_{t+1}}[q]$.

$$L_T - \inf_{q \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})} \sum_{t=1}^T \bar{\ell}_t(q) \leq \frac{M}{\eta} \left(1 + \log \left(1 + \frac{T}{M} \right) \right).$$


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AGGREGATION OVER $\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})$: PERFORMANCE

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- ▶ Proof technique: Similar +



- ▶ Consider Binary prediction and self-information loss ℓ .

EXAMPLE OF UNIVERSAL PREDICTION

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- ▷ Called "Universal prediction". Extends to all Markov models of arbitrary order.

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FROM FULL TO PARTIAL INFORMATION

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▷ So far, we only considered **fixed** experts:

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- ◇ Difficulty: Concentrating mass **exponentially fast** to a single expert means putting near 0 on others.
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
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
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Fixed-share solution


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Fixed-share solution

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For all sequence $q_1, \dots, q_T \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{M})$ with at most k switches,

$$L_T - \sum_{t=1}^T q_t \ell_t \leq \frac{\log(M)}{\eta} + \frac{k}{\eta} \log\left(\frac{M}{\alpha}\right) + \frac{T - k - 1}{\eta} \log\left(\frac{1}{1 - \alpha}\right).$$

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▷ α going to 0 but not exponentially fast.

Let us consider \tilde{p}_t obtained from p_t as $\tilde{p}_{t+1}(\cdot) = \sum_{m' \in \mathcal{M}} \theta(\cdot|m') p_{t+1}(m')$, from a Markov chain with initial law ω and **transition matrix** θ .

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- ▷ Variable share, sleeping experts, etc.

Note: even though huge amount of experts $O(M^T)$ they share a **rich structure**. This enables to have an efficient strategy maintaining only few quantities $O(MT)$.

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▷ Best **sequence** of experts:

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- ▷ Best sequence of experts with **few good** experts:

$$\min_{m_1, \dots, m_T \in \mathcal{S}_k(\mathcal{M}_0)} \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_t(x_t, m_t) \text{ where } \mathcal{M}_0 \subset \mathcal{M} \text{ unknown but small.}$$

- ◇ Intuition: the good experts should be good in the recent past.

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▷ In particular:

◇ Hedge: $\beta_{t+1}(t') = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } t' = t \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$

◇ Fixed share: $\beta_{t+1}(t') = \begin{cases} 1 - \alpha & \text{if } t' = t \\ \alpha & \text{if } t' = 0 \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$

◇ ...

Assume ℓ is η -mixable. For all sequence $(q_t)_{t \in \mathcal{T}}$ with k switches between at most n values,

$$L_T - \sum_{t=1}^T q_t \cdot \ell_t \leq \frac{n}{\eta} \log(|\mathcal{M}|) + \frac{1}{\eta} \sum_{t=1}^T \log\left(\frac{1}{\beta_t(\tau_t)}\right).$$

where τ_t is last $\tau < t$ such that $q_\tau = q_t$ (or 0 if first occurrence).

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- ▷ ...

Most results are minimax-optimal, valid for any input sequence.

This contrasts with typical results for bandits: instance-optimal, for stochastic sequence.

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- ▷ Computationally efficient algorithms, leveraging structure of experts.

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FROM FULL TO PARTIAL INFORMATION

GAMES

RISK-AVERSION

ROBUST LEARNING

MOTIVATION

AGGREGATION OF EXPERTS

FROM FULL TO PARTIAL INFORMATION

Aggregation in the bandit world

Exp3

Exp3 variants

Exp4

Stochastic or Adversarial ?

Best of both world strategies

GAMES

Adjusting for the differences:

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- ▷ Can only output an arm $A_t \in \mathcal{A}$ (not a combination):
 $x_t = \sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} p_{t,m} x_{t,m}$ becomes $x_t = x_{t,m_t}$ with $m_t \sim p_t$.
 - ◇ Less good, but ok as long as \mathbb{E} performance.

Problem: we only observe the reward of A_t (i.e., only r_{t,A_t}) !!

Partial information: We don't observe $r_{t,a}$ for all arms.

Terminology: Adversarial setup. We want guarantees against arbitrary (bounded) sequence of rewards/losses.

- ▷ Output $m_t \sim p_t$ where $p_t(m) = \frac{w_t(m)}{\sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} w_t(m)}$,
- ◇ $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, w_1(m) = 1$ and $w_{t+1}(m) = w_t(m) \exp(-\eta \ell_{t,m})$.

$\ell_{t,m}$ is not available for all arms!

$$\ell_{t,m} = 1 - r_{t,a}?$$

We can use **importance sampling**

$$\hat{\ell}_{t,m} = \begin{cases} \frac{\ell_{t,m}}{p_t(m)} & \text{if } m = m_t \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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Why it may be a bad idea:

- ▷ $p_{t,m}$ typically small for bad arms, hence this estimates has large variance for bad arms!

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- ▷ Exp3 has a small regret **in expectation**
- ▷ Exp3 might have large deviations with **high probability** (ie, from time to time it may **concentrate \hat{p}_t on the wrong arm** for too long and then incur a large regret)

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Theorem

If Exp3 is run with $\gamma = \eta$, then it achieves a regret

$$R_T = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{t=1}^T r_{t,a} - \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T r_{t, A_t} \right] \leq (e-1)\gamma G_{\max} + \frac{A \log A}{\gamma}$$

with $G_{\max} = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{t=1}^T r_{t,a}$.

Theorem

If Exp3 is run with

$$\gamma = \eta = \sqrt{\frac{A \log A}{(e-1)T}}$$

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$$R_T \leq O(\sqrt{TA \log A})$$

Comparison with online learning (convex, bounded):

$$R_T(\text{Exp3}) \leq O(\sqrt{T A \log A})$$

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Intuition: in online learning at each round we obtain A feedbacks, while in bandits we receive 1 feedback.

$$R_T(\text{Exp3}) = \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{t=1}^T r_{t,a} - r_{t,a_t} \right) \leq \frac{\log(A)}{\eta} + \frac{A}{2} \eta T.$$

Further, For any non-increasing sequence $(\eta_t)_t$:

$$R_T(\text{Exp3}) = \mathbb{E} \left(\sum_{t=1}^T r_{t,a} - r_{t,a_t} \right) \leq \frac{\log(A)}{\eta_T} + \frac{A}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T \eta_t.$$

Step 1. $\mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}} \tilde{\ell}_t(a) = 1 - r_{t,a_t}$ and $\mathbb{E}_{a_t \sim p_{t,\eta}} \tilde{\ell}_t(a) = 1 - r_{t,a}$. Thus:

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{A}, \quad \sum_{t=1}^T r_{t,a} - r_{t,a_t} = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}} \tilde{\ell}_t(a) - \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}_{a_t \sim p_{t,\eta}} \tilde{\ell}_t(a).$$

Step 2. The random variable $X = \tilde{\ell}_t(a)$, is positive. By Hoeffding's lemma,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}} (\tilde{\ell}_t(a)) &\leq -\frac{1}{\eta} \log \left(\mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}} \left[\exp(-\eta \tilde{\ell}_t(a)) \right] \right) + \frac{\eta}{2} \mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}} (\tilde{\ell}_t(a)^2) \\ &= -\frac{1}{\eta} \log \left(\frac{\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} e^{-\sum_{s=1}^t \eta \tilde{\ell}_s(a)}}{\sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} e^{-\sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \eta \tilde{\ell}_s(a)}} \right) + \frac{\eta}{2} \mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}} (\tilde{\ell}_t(a)^2). \end{aligned}$$

Step 3. Thus,

$$\sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}}(\tilde{\ell}_t(a)) \leq -\frac{1}{\eta} \log \left(\frac{1}{A} \sum_b \exp \left(-\sum_{t=1}^T \eta \tilde{\ell}_t(b) \right) \right) + \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{\eta}{2} \mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}}(\tilde{\ell}_t(a)^2).$$

Since the reward function is bounded by 1 we have:

$$\mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}}(\tilde{\ell}_t(a)^2) = \mathbb{E}_{a \sim p_{t,\eta}} \left(\frac{(1 - r_{t,A_t})^2}{p_t^2(A_t)} \mathbb{I}\{A_t = a\} \right) \leq \frac{1}{p_t(a_t)}.$$

Step 4. Using the fact that the sum of positive terms is bigger than any of its term,

$$-\frac{1}{\eta} \log \left(\sum_b \exp \left(-\sum_{t=1}^T \eta \tilde{\ell}_t(b) \right) \right) \leq \sum_{t=1}^T \tilde{\ell}_t(a) \text{ for each } a \in \mathcal{A}.$$

Taking expectations, it comes for all $a \in \mathcal{A}$,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T r_{t,a} - r_{t,a_t} \right] \leq \frac{\log(A)}{\eta} + \underbrace{\sum_{t=1}^T \frac{\eta}{2} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{1}{p_t(a_t)} \right]}_A.$$

MOTIVATION

AGGREGATION OF EXPERTS

FROM FULL TO PARTIAL INFORMATION

Aggregation in the bandit world

Exp3

Exp3 variants

Exp4

Stochastic or Adversarial ?

Best of both world strategies

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Using importance sampling is bad as generates large variance, especially for arms with low probability of being chosen (bad arms).

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- ▶ Exp3.P (Auer et al. 2002): $\tilde{r}_{t,a} = r_{t,a} + \frac{\beta}{p_{t,a}}$
- ▶ Exp3-IX (Kocak et al, 2014; Neu 2015): $\tilde{\ell}_{t,a} = \frac{\ell_{t,a}}{p_{t,a} + \gamma}$.

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- ▶ Exp3-IX (Kocak et al, 2014; Neu 2015): $\tilde{\ell}_{t,a} = \frac{\ell_{t,a}}{p_{t,a} + \gamma}$.
- ▶ Many other variants.

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- ▷ Decisions are **distributions** on arms $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$.

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- ▷ **Loss** of expert $m \in \mathcal{M}$: $\ell_{t,m} = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \xi_{t,m}(a) r_t(a)$ (Instead of reward)
- ▷ Case when $|\mathcal{M}| \gg |\mathcal{A}|$?

Exponential-weight algorithm for exploration and exploitation using expert advice.

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- ▷ $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, w_1(m) = 1.$
- ▷ Output $a_t \sim p_t \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})$ where $p_t(a) = (1 - \gamma) \frac{w_t(m) \xi_{t,m}(a)}{\sum_{m \in \mathcal{M}} w_t(m)} + \frac{\gamma}{|\mathcal{A}|}$

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- ▷ Receive r_{t,a_t} , build $\hat{\ell}_t(a) = \begin{cases} \frac{1-r_t(a)}{p_t(a)} & \text{if } a = a_t \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$

Exponential-weight algorithm for exploration and exploitation using expert advice.

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- ▷ Update $\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, w_{t+1}(m) = w_t(m) \exp(-\eta \hat{\ell}_{t,m})$. where $\hat{\ell}_{t,m} = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \xi_{t,m}(a) \hat{\ell}_t(a).$

Theorem

If Exp4 is run with $\gamma \in [0, 1]$, then it achieves a regret

$$R_T = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{t=1}^T r_{t,a} - \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T r_{t, A_t} \right] \leq (e-1)\gamma G_{\max} + \frac{A \log M}{\gamma}$$

with $G_{\max} = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \sum_{t=1}^T r_{t,a}$.

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- ▷ $\Phi : \mathcal{H} \rightarrow \mathcal{D}$, mapping from set of histories to some set \mathcal{D} , such that $h_1 \sim h_2$ iff $\Phi(h_1) = \Phi(h_2)$ defines **equivalence relation**; let $[h]$ the equivalence class of h .

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- ▷ Φ -constrained policy is $\pi : \mathcal{H}/\Phi \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$.
- ▷ Examples:
 - ◇ $\Phi(h) = 1$ gives constant experts.
 - ◇ $\Phi(h) = (a_{-1}, \dots, a_{-m})$ last m actions, gives experts depending on last m actions only.
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 - ◇ $\Phi(h) = |h| \bmod k$ gives periodic experts.
- ▷ We define the **Φ -constrained** regret:

$$\mathcal{R}_T^\Phi = \sup_{\pi: \mathcal{H}/\Phi \rightarrow \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T r_{t, \pi([h_t])} \right] - \mathbb{E} \left[\sum_{t=1}^T r_{t, a_t} \right]$$

More challenging than best constant expert.

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- ▷ We can define a version of Exp4 for Φ -constrained policies.
- ▷ We simply **contextualize** Exp4 by indexing losses, weights, parameters η by the equivalence classes, and computing the current active class $c_t = \Phi(h_t)$.
- ▷ Result (M. Munos, 2011)

$$\mathcal{R}_T^\Phi \leq \sum_{c \in \mathcal{H}/\Phi} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{A\eta_c}{2} T_c + \frac{\log(A)}{\eta_c} \right].$$

where T_c is number of activation times of class c until time T .

- ▷ We consider we have a **set** $(\Phi_\theta)_{\theta \in \Theta}$ of **constrained strategies**.

POOL OF CONSTRAINED STRATEGIES?

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- ▷ One Φ_θ -Exp3 strategy for each θ : see them as different **experts**?
- ▷ Run Exp4 with all these base experts: Φ_1 -Exp3, \dots , Φ_p -Exp3 ?

Difficulty: The experts are **learning** algorithms. Their performance depends on the observations they received.

We are in **partial feedback**: When Φ_p -Exp3 recommends to play action a , Exp4 may **instead** play (and received reward from) action b . Hence Φ_p -Exp3 not only faces **partial feedback**, but also it does **not** observe the reward corresponding to what it decides.

Double-bandit feedback.

Theorem (M. Munos, 2011)

In the double-bandit feedback setup, Exp4, run on $(\Phi_\theta\text{-Exp3})_{\theta \in \Theta}$ strategies with appropriate parameter tuning satisfies

$$\mathcal{R}_T = O\left(T^{2/3}(A \log(A)C)^{1/3} \log(|\Theta|)^{1/2}\right) \text{ with } C = \max_{\theta \in \Theta} |\mathcal{H}/\Phi_\theta|.$$

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- ▶ Strategies for **Stochastic** bandits: UCB, KL-UCB, etc.
 $\log(T)$ regret bounds when stochastic model, but strong assumptions on signal.
- ▶ Strategies for **Adversarial** bandits: Exp3, Exp4, etc.
 \sqrt{T} regret bounds with little assumption on model, but perhaps too conservative.

Can we have the best of both worlds?

Several works on the topic

- ▶ Bubeck&Slivkins 2012, Auer&Chiang, 2016.
- ▶ Zimmert-Seldin 2018.

Idea: **Online Mirror Descent** regularized by **Tsallis Entropy**.

α -**Tsallis** entropy:

$$H_{\alpha}(x) = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \left(1 - \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} x_a^{\alpha} \right)$$

- ◇ $\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1} H_{\alpha}(x) = \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} x_a \log(x_a)$
- ◇ $\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 0} H_{\alpha}(x) = - \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \log(x_a)$

Let us consider the potential:

$$\psi_{t,\alpha}(q) = - \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \frac{q^\alpha(a)}{\alpha}$$

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▷ Choose

$$p_t = \operatorname{argmin}_{q \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{A})} \langle q, \hat{L}_{t-1} \rangle + \frac{1}{\eta_t} \psi_\alpha(q)$$

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- ▷ Sample $a_t \sim p_t$
- ▷ Observe ℓ_{t,a_t} then build $\hat{\ell}_t$ as unbiased estimate of ℓ_t , then $\hat{L}_t = \hat{L}_{t-1} + \hat{\ell}_t$.

	Regime	$\frac{\text{Upper bound}}{\text{Lower bound}}$	Learning rate
$\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 0}$	Sto	$O(1)$	$\Theta(\Delta_a)$
	Adv	$O(\sqrt{\ln(T)})$	$\Theta\left(\frac{\ln(t)}{\sqrt{t}}\right)$
$\alpha = \frac{1}{2}$	Sto&Adv	$O(1)$	$\frac{1}{\sqrt{t}}$
$\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow 1}$	Sto	$O(\ln(T))$	$\Theta\left(\frac{\ln(t)}{\Delta_a t}\right)$
	Adv	$O(\sqrt{\ln(A)})$	$\Theta\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{t}}\right)$

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 - ◇ **Constant** expert, **combination of loss** of experts. Convex and bounded or η -mixable loss.
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- ▶ Useful in **games**.

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- ▷ Best of both world: Exact stochastic optimality? Estimation of loss?
- ▷ Mixed world bandit: Some arms are stochastic, others are arbitrary bounded?

MOTIVATION

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GAMES

RISK-AVERSION

ROBUST LEARNING

- ▷ A two-player **zero-sum** game

	A	B	C
1	30, -30	-10, 10	20, -20
2	10, -10	-20, 20	-20, 20

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Nash equilibrium:

A set of strategies is a **Nash equilibrium** if **no player** can do better by **unilaterally changing** his strategy.

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Nash equilibrium:

Red: take action **1** with **prob. 1**

Blue: take action **B** with **prob. 1**

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Nash equilibrium:

Value of the game: $V = -10$ (reward of **Red** at the equilibrium)

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	A	B
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Nash equilibrium:

Red: take action **1** with **prob. 7/12** and action **2** with **prob. 5/12**

Blue: take action **A** with **prob. 7/12** and action **B** with **prob. 5/7**

A two-player zero-sum game

	A	B
1	-2, 2	3, -3
2	3, -3	-4, 4

Nash equilibrium:

Value of the game: $V = 1/12$ (reward of Red at the equilibrium)

At each round t

- ▶ Row player computes a mixed strategy $\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t = (\hat{p}_{1,t}, \dots, \hat{p}_{N,t})$
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Value of the game

$$V = \max_{\mathbf{q}} \min_{\mathbf{p}} \bar{\ell}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q})$$

with

$$\bar{\ell}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^M p_i q_j \ell(i, j)$$

Question: what if the two players are both bandit algorithms (e.g., Exp3)?

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Row player: a bandit algorithm is able to minimize

$$R_n(\text{row}) = \sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{I_t, J_t} - \min_{i=1, \dots, N} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{i, J_t}$$

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Col player: a bandit algorithm is able to minimize

$$R_n(\text{col}) = \sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{I_t, J_t} - \min_{j=1, \dots, M} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell_{I_t, j}$$

Theorem

If both the row and column players play according to an **Hannan-consistent** strategy, then

$$\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell(I_t, J_t) = V$$

Theorem

The **empirical distribution** of plays

$$\hat{p}_{i,n} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \mathbb{I}_{I_t = i} \quad \hat{q}_{j,n} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \mathbb{I}_{J_t = j}$$

induces a product distribution $\hat{\mathbf{p}}_n \times \hat{\mathbf{q}}_n$ which converges to the **set of Nash equilibria** $\mathbf{p} \times \mathbf{q}$.

Since $\bar{\ell}(\mathbf{p}, J_t)$ is linear, over the simplex, the minimum is at one of the corners
[math]

$$\min_{i=1,\dots,N} \frac{1}{N} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell(i, J_t) = \min_{\mathbf{p}} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \bar{\ell}(\mathbf{p}, J_t)$$

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We consider the empirical probability of the row player **[def]**

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Elaborating on it **[math]**

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{\mathbf{p}} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \bar{\ell}(\mathbf{p}, J_t) &= \min_{\mathbf{p}} \sum_{j=1}^M \hat{q}_{j,n} \bar{\ell}(\mathbf{p}, j) \\ &= \min_{\mathbf{p}} \bar{\ell}(\mathbf{p}, \hat{\mathbf{q}}_n) \\ &\leq \max_{\mathbf{q}} \min_{\mathbf{p}} \bar{\ell}(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) = V \end{aligned}$$

By definition of Hannan's consistent strategy **[def]**

$$\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell(I_t, J_t) = \min_{i=1, \dots, N} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell(i, J_t)$$

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Then

$$\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell(I_t, J_t) \leq V$$

If we do the same for the other player **[zero-sum game]**

$$\limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell(I_t, J_t) \geq V$$

Question: how fast do they converge to the Nash equilibrium?

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Answer: it depends on the specific algorithm. For EWA(η), we now that

$$\sum_{t=1}^n \ell(I_t, J_t) - \min_{i=1, \dots, N} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell(i, J_t) \leq \frac{\log N}{\eta} + \frac{n\eta}{8} + \sqrt{\frac{n}{2} \log \frac{1}{\delta}}$$

Generality of the results

- ▶ Players do not know the payoff matrix

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- ▶ Players do not even observe the action of the other player

External (expected) regret

$$\begin{aligned} R_n &= \sum_{t=1}^n \bar{\ell}(\hat{\mathbf{p}}_t, y_t) - \min_{i=1, \dots, N} \sum_{t=1}^n \ell(i, y_t) \\ &= \max_{i=1, \dots, N} \sum_{t=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^N \hat{p}_{j,t} (\ell(j, y_t) - \ell(i, y_t)) \end{aligned}$$

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Internal (expected) regret

$$R_n^I = \max_{i,j=1, \dots, N} \sum_{t=1}^n \hat{p}_{j,t} (\ell(i, y_t) - \ell(j, y_t))$$

Internal (expected) regret

$$R_n^I = \max_{i,j=1,\dots,N} \sum_{t=1}^n \hat{p}_{j,t} (\ell(i, y_t) - \ell(j, y_t))$$

Intuition: an algorithm has **small internal regret** if, for each pair of experts (i, j) , the learner does not regret of not having followed expert j each time it followed expert i .


Theorem

Given a K -person game with a set of correlated equilibria \mathcal{C} . If all the players are internal-regret minimizers, then the **distance** between the **empirical distribution** of plays and the set of **correlated equilibria** \mathcal{C} converges to 0.

A powerful model for **sequential** games

- ▶ Checkers / Chess / Go
- ▶ Poker
- ▶ Bargaining
- ▶ Monitoring
- ▶ Patrolling
- ▶ ...

NASH EQUILIBRIA IN EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES



MOTIVATION

AGGREGATION OF EXPERTS

FROM FULL TO PARTIAL INFORMATION


GAMES

RISK-AVERSION

ROBUST LEARNING

- ▷ We considered adversarial setup. One way to address risk.
- ▷ Other ways: **Risk-aversion** (model), **Robust** strategies (min-max).


ILLUSTRATION OF RISK-AVERSION.



▷ Choice for 1 sample ? For 1000 samples?

BANDIT STRATEGY FOR RISK AVERSION

- ▷ DSSAT simulator: 30y of agronomy expertise, climate, ground, plant growth, etc.
- ▷ Distribution of yields for 4 different **planting date** (action) using **DSSAT**



- ▷ May not want best expectation, but rather **risk-averse** criterion.

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
RISK-AVERSION

Conditional Value At Risk


Entropic Value At Risk

ROBUST LEARNING


- ▷ Novel bandit strategy for **Conditional Value at Risk** (CVaR)
- ▷ **Provably** optimal (regret bound matches lower bound).
- ▷ Based on novel statistical estimation tools. Performance (blue) against Sota:




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- ▶ Consider a **Gain** (reward): We are interested in **risky (low) gains**.



Maximize gain in worst-case situations

- ▶ Formally, for given $\alpha \in [0, 1]$:

$$\text{CVaR}_\alpha(\nu_k) = \sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}} \left\{ x - \frac{1}{\alpha} \mathbb{E}_{X \sim \nu_k} \left[(x - X)^+ \right] \right\}. \quad (1)$$

- ▶ For **continuous** distributions, $\text{CVaR}_\alpha(\nu_k) = \mathbb{E}_{X \sim \nu_k} [X | X \leq q_\alpha(\nu_k)]$, where $q_\alpha(\nu_k) = \inf\{x : \mathbb{P}(X \leq x) > \alpha\}$ is the quantile at level α .

- ▷ $\alpha = 1$ is the **expectation**, $\alpha = 0$ is very risk-averse (extreme).
- ▷ It is a **coherent** risk measure (Rockafellar, Acerbi et al.): many good properties.
- ▷ Rich literature on CVaR in finance.
- ▷ Parameter α is **easy to interpret** for many practitioners.

- Unknown arm distributions $\boldsymbol{\nu} = (\nu_1, \dots, \nu_K)$, given risk-level α .
- We write $c_k^\alpha = \text{CVaR}_\alpha(\nu_k)$.
- Best arm is the one with the **largest** CVaR.
- The CVaR regret of a sequential sampling strategy $\mathcal{A} = (A_t)_{t \in \mathbb{N}}$ is

$$\mathcal{R}_\nu^\alpha(T) = \mathbb{E}_\nu \left[\sum_{t=1}^T \left(\max_k c_k^\alpha - c_{A_t}^\alpha \right) \right] = \sum_{k=1}^K \Delta_k^\alpha \mathbb{E}_\nu [N_k(T)],$$

where $\Delta_k^\alpha = \max_{k'} c_{k'}^\alpha - c_k^\alpha$ is the CVaR gap.

- Algorithms: UCB style, we need upper confidence bounds for CVaR; TS, we need sampling scheme.

- ▷ **Concentration**: Brown 2007, Thomas and Learned-Miller 2019.
- ▷ **Bandits**: Agrawal et al. 2020, Galichet 2013, Tamkin et al. 2020, etc.
- ▷ **MDPs**:

Optimizing the CVaR via Sampling, Tamar et al. 2014

Risk-Sensitive and Robust Decision-Making: a CVaR Optimization Approach, Chow et al. 2015

Definition

For any $\nu \in \mathcal{C}$ and $c \in \mathbb{R}$, we define

$$\mathcal{K}_{\inf}^{\alpha, \mathcal{C}}(\nu, c) := \inf \{ \text{KL}(\nu, \nu') : \nu' \in \mathcal{C}, \text{CVaR}_{\alpha}(\nu') \geq c \}.$$

Theorem (Regret Lower Bound in CVaR bandits)

Let $\alpha \in (0, 1]$. Let $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathcal{F}_K$ be a set of bandit models $\nu = (\nu_1, \dots, \nu_K)$ where each ν_k belongs to the class of distribution \mathcal{F}_k . Let \mathcal{A} be a strategy satisfying $\mathcal{R}_{\nu}^{\alpha}(\mathcal{A}, T) = o(T^{\beta})$ for any $\beta > 0$ and $\nu \in \mathcal{F}$. Then for any $\nu \in \mathcal{D}$, for any sub-optimal arm k , under the strategy \mathcal{A} it holds that

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow +\infty} \frac{\mathbb{E}_{\nu}[N_k(T)]}{\log T} \geq \frac{1}{\mathcal{K}_{\inf}^{\alpha, \mathcal{F}_k}(\nu_k, c^*)},$$

where $c^* = \max_{i \in [K]} \text{CVaR}_{\alpha}(\nu_i)$.

- ▷ One can rewrite the CVaR in terms of the **CDF** $F(x) = \mathbb{P}(X \leq x)$.

$$\text{CVaR}_\alpha(\nu) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \int g_\alpha(F_\nu(x)) dx$$

for some monotonic function g_α . Also, it holds


$$|\text{CVaR}_\alpha(\nu) - \text{CVaR}_\alpha(\nu')| \leq \frac{1}{\alpha} \|F_\nu - F_{\nu'}\|_\infty$$

- ▷ Main tool is Massart's version of Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality:


$$\forall \delta_0 \in [0, 0.5) \quad \mathbb{P}\left(\sup_{x \in \mathbb{R}} F_\nu(x) - F_n(x) > \sqrt{\frac{\ln(1/\delta_0)}{2n}}\right) \leq \delta_0.$$

where F_n is empirical CDF.


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ROBUST LEARNING

- We want to **control** how big/small can a random variable be

$$\mathbb{P}\left[X \geq \dots\right] \leq \delta \quad (2)$$

$$\mathbb{P}\left[X \leq \dots\right] \leq \delta \quad (3)$$

- Quantiles, expectiles, expected shortfall, value at risk.

- We want to **control** how big/small can a random variable be

$$\mathbb{P}\left[X \geq \inf_{\lambda > 0} \left\{ \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \mathbb{E} \exp(\lambda X) + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\lambda} \right\}\right] \leq \delta \quad (4)$$

$$\mathbb{P}\left[X \leq \sup_{\lambda > 0} \left\{ -\frac{1}{\lambda} \log \mathbb{E} \exp(-\lambda X) - \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\lambda} \right\}\right] \leq \delta \quad (5)$$

(by Markov's inequality, whenever $\log \mathbb{E} \exp$ is defined near 0)

For all $\lambda > 0$,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{P}[X \geq \varepsilon] &= \mathbb{P}[\exp(\lambda X) \geq \exp(\lambda \varepsilon)] \\ &\leq \mathbb{E}[\exp(\lambda X)] \exp(-\lambda \varepsilon) \\ &= \exp\left(-\lambda\left(\varepsilon - \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \mathbb{E} \exp(\lambda X)\right)\right)\end{aligned}$$

For $\varepsilon = \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \mathbb{E} \exp(\lambda X) + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\lambda}$, we get

$$\mathbb{P}\left[X \geq \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \mathbb{E} \exp(\lambda X) + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\lambda}\right] \leq \delta.$$

$$\kappa_{\lambda,\nu} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \mathbb{E}_{\nu} \exp(\lambda X), \quad (6)$$

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- ▶ more than one century year old,
- ▶ at the heart of many key-results and tools in statistical theory (Cramer-Chernoff method, Chernoff transform, log-Laplace transform)
- ▶ $\kappa_{-\lambda,\nu}$ is a key quantity to control the **probability that X is small**.

EXAMPLE: GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTIONS.

- ▶ Let $\{Z_k\}_{k=1,\dots,t}$ i.i.d. from $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$.

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- ▶ $\lambda = \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(1/\delta)}{\sigma^2 t}}$ optimizes (4) and (5) and gives the familiar

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=1}^t Z_k - \mu \geq \sigma \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(1/\delta)}{t}}\right) \leq \delta$$

$$\mathbb{P}\left(\mu - \frac{1}{t} \sum_{k=1}^t Z_k \geq \sigma \sqrt{\frac{2 \log(1/\delta)}{t}}\right) \leq \delta.$$

- We introduce the **mixability gaps** (always non negative):

$$m_{\lambda,\nu}^+ = \kappa_{\lambda,\nu} - \mathbb{E}_{\nu}[X] \text{ and } m_{\lambda,\nu}^- = \mathbb{E}_{\nu}[X] - \kappa_{-\lambda,\nu} .$$



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- Now equations (4) and (5) rewrite more compactly as

$$\mathbb{P}\left[X - \mathbb{E}_\nu[X] \geq \inf_{\lambda>0} \left\{ m_{\lambda,\nu}^+ + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\lambda} \right\}\right] \leq \delta, \quad (7)$$

$$\mathbb{P}\left[\mathbb{E}_\nu[X] - X \geq \inf_{\lambda>0} \left\{ m_{\lambda,\nu}^- + \frac{\log(1/\delta)}{\lambda} \right\}\right] \leq \delta. \quad (8)$$

Entropic Value At Risk

- Control of the upper/lower tails involves $\kappa_{\lambda,\nu}/\kappa_{-\lambda,\nu}$.

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- ▶ General interpretation as **penalty**

$$\kappa_{-\lambda,\nu} = \inf_{\nu' \in \mathcal{M}(\mathbb{R})} \left\{ \mathbb{E}_{\nu'}(X) + \frac{1}{\lambda} \text{KL}(\nu' || \nu) \right\} \leq \mathbb{E}_{\nu}[X]. \quad (9)$$

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- ▶ Natural **measure of risk-aversion**.

Setting: Unknown real-valued distributions $\{\nu_a\}_{a=1,\dots,A}$. At each t , we choose $A_t \in \{1, \dots, A\}$, receive reward $Y_t \sim \nu_{A_t}$.

The **expected regret** $\bar{\mathcal{R}}_T$ gives **no information on the risk** of the strategy and of pulling one arm (no control on the tails):

$$\bar{\mathcal{R}}_T = \sum_{a' \in \mathcal{A}} \left(\max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}_{\nu_a}[X] - \mathbb{E}_{\nu_{a'}}[X] \right) \mathbb{E}[N_{T,a'}],$$

where $N_{T,a'} = \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbb{I}\{A_t = a'\}$.

We are given some λ .

We define the **optimal arm** a^* as the one maximizing the **risk aversion** at level λ

$$a^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{a=1,\dots,A} \kappa_{-\lambda, \nu_{a^*}}.$$

Example: For $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$ distributions $\kappa_{-\lambda, \nu_{a^*}} = \mu_a - \frac{\lambda \sigma_a^2}{2}$.

In general it holds $\kappa_{-\lambda, \nu_{a^*}} \leq \mathbb{E}_{\nu_a}[X]$.

- The **empirical regret** $\mathcal{R}_T(\lambda)$ of π with respect to the strategy \star that constantly pulls arm a^\star is:

$$\mathcal{R}_T(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=1}^T X_{i,a^\star} - \sum_{a=1}^A \sum_{i=1}^{N_{T,a}^\pi} X_{i,a}, \quad (10)$$

where $X_{i,a}$ denotes the i^{th} (i.i.d) sample from arm a .

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- ▶ The **risk-averse regret** $\overline{\mathcal{R}}_T(\lambda)$ is defined by

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{\mathcal{R}}_T(\lambda) &= \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(\kappa_{-\lambda, \nu_{a^\star}} - \kappa_{-\lambda, \nu_a} \right) \mathbb{E}[N_{T,a}] \\ &= \sum_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \Delta_a \mathbb{E}[N_{T,a}] \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

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- ▶ We study both (10) and (12) since they offer interesting and easy interpretations.

Tradeoff between
being risk-averse versus **targeting high reward**:

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being risk-averse versus **targeting high reward**:

- ▶ If **“not enough”** risk-averse (protect against light lower tails only but arms have fat lower tails),
⇒ we may get **high-regret**.
- ▶ If **“too much”** risk-averse (protect against fat lower tails but all arms have light lower tails),
⇒ a less cautious algorithm can (e.g. UCB) get better rewards.

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We want to defeat e.g. not-enough cautious algorithms in hard environments.

Risk-aversion for a fixed λ (often justified in practical applications).

- ① Decompose **empirical regret** with number of pulls of sub-optimal arms (allows **robust** analysis).
- ② Introduce RAUCB for risk-aversion.
- ③ Get numerically efficient dual formulation.
- ④ Control both **risk-averse** and **empirical regret**.

1. EMPIRICAL REGRET DECOMPOSITION

Theorem (Generic decomposition of the empirical regret)

Let the event that strategy π **does not pull sub-optimal arms too often** be (for some non-negative constants $\{u_a\}_{a=1,\dots,A}$):

$$\Omega \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \exists a \neq a^* : N_{T,a} > u_a \right\}.$$

For all $\delta \in (0, 1)$, with probability higher than $1 - \delta - \mathbb{P}(\Omega)$, the **empirical regret** of π is upper bounded by

$$\mathcal{R}_T(\lambda) \leq \sum_{a \neq a^*} \Delta_a u_a + \left(\dots \mathbf{m}_{\lambda, \nu_{a^*}}^- + \frac{\dots}{\lambda} \right) + \inf_{\lambda' > 0} \left\{ \dots \mathbf{m}_{\lambda', \nu_{a^*}}^+ + \frac{\dots}{\lambda'} \right\}.$$

- ▶ **First** term: essentially **risk-averse regret**.
- ▶ Other terms: tails.

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$$U_t(a) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sup_{\nu \in \mathcal{P}(\mathbb{R}_B)} \left\{ \kappa_{-\lambda, \nu} : \mathbf{K}(\hat{\nu}_t(a), \kappa_{-\lambda, \nu}) \leq \frac{f(t)}{N_{t,a}} \right\},$$

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with parameter $f(t) \simeq \log(t)$ and where we introduced

$$\mathbf{K}(\hat{\nu}_t(a), r) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \inf_{\nu \in \mathcal{M}(\mathbb{R}_B)} \left\{ \text{KL}(\hat{\nu}_t(a) \parallel \nu) : \kappa_{-\lambda, \nu} \geq r \right\}.$$

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- ▶ **Note 1:** Using mean-based confidence bounds is **useless** here.
- ▶ **Note 2:** Similarly to bandits, we **do not need** to estimate $\kappa_{-\lambda, \nu_a}$ (+ it would too loose here).

3. COMPUTING THE BOUND

$\mathbf{K}(\hat{\nu}_t(a), r)$ and then $U_t(a)$ can be **solved numerically** (deeply linked to numerically efficient dual formulation considered for standard MAB, e.g. [Borwein-Lewis, 91](#), [Harari-Kermadec, 06](#)):

Lemma (Dual formulation)

Let $\hat{\nu}_n$ be an empirical distribution built with n atoms $\{x_i\}_{1 \leq i \leq n}$. Then the following dual formulation holds

$$\mathbf{K}(\hat{\nu}_n, r) = \max_{0 \leq \gamma^* \leq \frac{\lambda}{1 - e^{-\lambda(B-r)}}} \left\{ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \log \left(1 - \frac{\gamma^*}{\lambda} \left(1 - e^{-\lambda(x_i - r)} \right) \right) \right\}.$$

4. REGRET GUARANTEE (SEE FULL RESULT IN THE PAPER)

Theorem (Regret of RAUCB)

The **expected regret** of RAUCB (for suitable f), is bounded by

$$\overline{\mathcal{R}}_T(\lambda) \leq 5 \sum_{a \neq a^*} \frac{(1 + \varepsilon_a) \Delta_a}{\mathbf{K}_a} \log(T) + O(1).$$

The **empirical regret** of RAUCB is bounded with high probability, for sub-Gaussians distributions of rewards (includes bounded as special case) and risk-aversion

$\lambda = \Theta(\log(T)^{-1/2})$ as

$$\mathcal{R}_T(\lambda) \leq 5 \sum_{a \neq a^*} \frac{(1 + \varepsilon_a) \Delta_a}{\mathbf{K}_a} \log(T) + O\left(\sqrt{\log(T)}\right).$$

- ▶ RAUCB tuned with **known horizon T** (not anytime).

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- ▶ Ratio $\frac{\Delta_a}{K_a} \log(T)$ similar to best known bounds for the expected regret
Burnetas-Katehakis, 96; Cappe et al, 2013,

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Burnetas-Katehakis, 96; Cappe et al, 2013,
- ▶ Choice of λ not too critical: still get $O(\log(T))$ for any λ not depending on T .

- ▶ Sani, A., Lazaric, A., Munos, R. *Risk-aversion in multi-armed bandits*. In NIPS 2012 (pp. 3275-3283).
- ▶ Maillard, O-A. *Robust risk-averse stochastic multi-armed bandits* ICML 2013. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
- ▶ Galichet, N. PhD. Thesis, Torossian L., PhD. Thesis : Several risk measures (quantiles, expectiles, etc.)
- ▶ Baudry, Dorian, et al. *Optimal Thompson Sampling strategies for support-aware CVaR bandits*. International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021.

MOTIVATION

AGGREGATION OF EXPERTS

FROM FULL TO PARTIAL INFORMATION

GAMES

RISK-AVERSION

ROBUST LEARNING

Slides Edouard:

<https://eleurent.github.io/robust-beyond-quadratic/paper/oral>

- ▷ **Full** information vs **Partial** information (Bandit, semi-bandit)
- ▷ Objectives: Best model vs Best combination of losses vs Best combination of models vs Best sequence
- ▷ Convex losses
- ▷ Exponential weights, Hedge strategy
- ▷ Self-information loss
- ▷ Exp-concavity, mixability
- ▷ Entropy formula
- ▷ Bregman aggregation
- ▷ Fixed-share strategy
- ▷ Markov-Hedge
- ▷ Mixing past posteriors
- ▷ Exp3, Importance sampling, Exp3-P, Exp3-IX, Exp4
- ▷ Tsallis entropy
- ▷ Nash equilibria, Hannan consistency
- ▷ Conditional value at risk, mixability gap
- ▷ Robust learning

“The more applied you go, the stronger theory you need”

MERCI

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