Sequoidal Categories and Transfinite Games: A Coalgebraic Approach to Stateful Objects in Game Semantics

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John Gowers and James Laird

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
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We want to find a way to *encapsulate* an explicit state in a systematic category-theoretic way.


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Then encapsulation means plugging an unbounded number of boxes together:

