


A Fully Abstract Game Semantics for Countable Nondeterminism

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Abstract

The concept of fairness for a concurrent program means that the program must be able to exhibit an unbounded amount of nondeterminism without diverging. Game semantics models of nondeterminism show that this is hard to implement; for example, Harmer and McCusker's model only admits infinite nondeterminism if there is also the possibility of divergence. We solve a long standing problem by giving a fully abstract game semantics for a simple stateful language with a countably infinite nondeterminism primitive. We see that doing so requires us to keep track of infinitary information about strategies, as well as their finite behaviours. The unbounded nondeterminism gives rise to further problems, which can be formalized as a lack of continuity in the language. In order to prove adequacy for our model (which usually requires continuity), we develop a new technique in which we simulate the nondeterminism using a deterministic stateful construction, and then use combinatorial techniques to transfer the result to the nondeterministic language. Lastly, we prove full abstraction for the model; because of the lack of continuity, we cannot deduce this from definability of compact elements in the usual way, and we have to use a stronger universality result instead. We discuss how our techniques may also be applied to yield a proof of computational adequacy for a model of PCF with unbounded nondeterminism, based on the construction by Hyland and Ong.

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1 Introduction

Picture two concurrent processes P and Q with shared access to a variable v that holds natural numbers and is initialized to 0. The execution of P consists in an infinite loop that increments the value of v at each iteration. Meanwhile, Q performs some computation A , and then prints out the current value of v and terminates the whole program. Since we

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cannot predict in advance how many cycles of the loop in P will have elapsed by the time the computation A has completed, the value that ends up printed to the screen may be arbitrarily large. Furthermore, under the basic assumption that the task scheduler is *fair*; i.e., any pending task must eventually be executed, our program must always terminate by printing out some value to the screen.

We have therefore built an *unbounded nondeterminism* machine, that can print out arbitrarily large natural numbers but which never diverges. This is strictly more powerful than finitary choice nondeterminism.² What we have just shown is that if we want to solve the problem of building a fair task scheduler, then we must in particular be able to solve the problem of building an unbounded nondeterminism machine.

This is an important observation to make about concurrent programming, because the task of implementing unbounded nondeterminism is difficult – indeed, considerably more so than that of implementing bounded nondeterminism. Dijkstra argues in [7, Ch. 9] that it is impossible to implement unbounded nondeterminism, showing that the natural constructs from which we construct imperative programs satisfy a *continuity* property that unbounded nondeterminism lacks. For semanticists, this lack of continuity is a problem in itself, since the standard proofs of computational adequacy and full abstraction typically make use, implicitly or otherwise, of the fact that composition within the model is continuous with respect to some ordering.

We shall explore some of the problems relating to unbounded nondeterminism, and how they may be solved, using game semantics to give a fully abstract model of a simple stateful language – Idealized Algol – enhanced with a countable nondeterminism primitive. We begin with a pair of examples that will illustrate the lack of continuity, from a syntactic point of view. Let \mathbf{nat} be our natural number type and consider a sequence of functions $\langle n : \mathbf{nat} \rightarrow \mathbf{nat} \rangle$, where $\langle n \ k \rangle$ evaluates to 0 if $k < n$ and diverges otherwise. In that case, the least upper bound of the $\langle n \rangle$ is the function that combines all their convergent behaviours; i.e., the function $\lambda k.k; 0$ that evaluates its input and then returns 0. If $? : \mathbf{nat}$ is an unbounded nondeterminism machine, then function application to $?$ is not continuous; indeed, $\langle n \ ? \rangle$ always has the possibility of divergence – since $?$ may evaluate to $m + 1$, say. But $(\lambda k.k; 0) \ ?$ always converges to 0.

Lack of continuity is a problem because fixed-point combinators are typically built using least upper bounds, and proving adequacy of the model typically requires that these least upper bounds be preserved. In a non-continuous situation, we will need to come up with new techniques in order to prove adequacy without using continuity.

A closely connected problem with unbounded nondeterminism is that it leads to terms that may be distinguished only by their *infinitary* behaviour. A program that flashes a light an unboundedly nondeterministic number of times cannot reliably be distinguished in finite time from a program that flashes that light forever: however long we watch the light flash, there is always a chance that it will stop at some point in the future. From a game semantics point of view, this corresponds to the observation that it is not sufficient to consider sets of finite plays in order to define strategies: we must consider infinite sequences of moves as well.

² Using recursion, we can build a program out of finite nondeterminism that can produce arbitrarily large natural numbers; however, this program also admits the possibility of divergence.

1.1 Related Work

Our game semantics model bears closest resemblance to that of Harmer and McCusker [8], which is a fully abstract model of Idealized Algol with *finite* nondeterminism. Indeed, our work can be viewed as an extension of the Harmer-McCusker model with the extra information on infinite plays that we need to model countable nondeterminism.

The idea of adding infinite traces into strategies in order to model unbounded non-determinism goes back to Roscoe's work on CSP [16], and is very similar to work by Levy [13] on game semantics for a higher order language. In particular, we will need something similar to Levy's *liveliness* condition on strategies, which is a way of saying that a strategy is a union of deterministic strategies – something that is not automatic when we start tracking infinite plays.

An alternative approach to the game semantics of nondeterminism can be found in Tsukada and Ong's sheaf model of nondeterministic PCF [17] and in the more general work on concurrency by Winskel et al. (e.g., see [18] and [5]), in which there is a very natural interpretation of nondeterminism. Although we are able to give a model of Idealized Algol with countable nondeterminism in the more traditional Harmer-McCusker style, it seems necessary to introduce this extra machinery in order to model stateless languages such as PCF (and certainly to model concurrency). In the last section of this paper, we will show how our methods can be applied under very general circumstances, and in particular to these models of nondeterministic stateless languages.

Related work by Laird [11, 12] discusses a semantics for PCF with unbounded non-determinism based on sequential algorithms and explores the role played by continuity; however, this semantics is not fully abstract. Laird's work is interesting because it shows that we can obtain a traditional adequacy proof for a semantics with one-sided continuity: composition is continuous with respect to functions, but not with respect to arguments.

The idea of using some constrained version of continuity to prove adequacy for countable nondeterminism goes back to Plotkin's work on power-domains [4]. A crucial observation in both [4] and [11] is that this sort of proof requires a Hoare logic in which we can reason about all the countable ordinals. We cannot use these techniques here, however, because our composition is not continuous on either side.

1.2 Contributions

The main concepts of game semantics and the steps we take to establish full abstraction are well-established, with a few exceptions. The idea of including infinitary information in strategies is not new, but this particular presentation, though closely related to that of [13], is the first example of using the technique to establish a full abstraction result for may and must testing.

There are two points in the traditional Full Abstraction proof that depend on composition being continuous, and we have had to come up with ways of getting round them. The easier of the two is that continuity is necessary for the usual proof that we can derive Full Abstraction from definability of compact strategies; in order to get around this, we have had to appeal instead to the stronger *universality* result of [10], that says that every *recursive* strategy is definable.

For the proof of adequacy, we have had to come up with a new technique, which can be thought of as a kind of synthesis between the two usual methods of proving adequacy – one involving logical relations and the other using more hands-on operational techniques. We do this by separating out the deterministic, continuous part of the strategy from the

nondeterministic, discontinuous part. Using the stateful language, we can simulate individual evaluation paths of a nondeterministic program using a deterministic device that corresponds to the idea of ‘mocking’ a random number generator for testing purposes. This allows us to appeal to the adequacy result for deterministic Idealized Algol. We then rely on more combinatorial techniques in order to factor the nondeterminism back in.

This new technique is actually very generally applicable. In the last section of the paper, we show that it may be used to prove adequacy for models of nondeterministic PCF under very mild assumptions. The Tsukada-Ong model, for example, satisfies these assumptions, allowing us to obtain an adequacy result for PCF with countable nondeterminism.

2 Idealized Algol with Countable Nondeterminism

We describe a simple type theory and operational semantics for Idealized Algol with countable nondeterminism. This is similar to the approach adopted in [8], which extends Idealized Algol with *finite* nondeterminism. The types of our language are defined inductively as follows:

$$T ::= \mathbf{nat} \mid \mathbf{com} \mid \mathbf{Var} \mid T \rightarrow T.$$

Meanwhile, the terms are those given in [3], together with the nondeterministic choice:

$$\begin{aligned} M ::= & x \mid \lambda x.M \mid M M \mid \mathbf{Y}_T \mid \\ & \mathbf{n} \mid \mathbf{skip} \mid \mathbf{suc} \mid \mathbf{pred} \mid \\ & \mathbf{If0} \mid _ ; _ \mid _ := _ \mid \\ & @ \mid \mathbf{new}_T \mid \mathbf{mkvar} \mid ?. \end{aligned}$$

The typing rule for $?$ is $\Gamma \vdash ? : \mathbf{nat}$. We shall use the letter v to range over variables of type \mathbf{Var} .

We define a small-step operational semantics for the language; this presentation is equivalent to the big-step semantics given in [8], except with a different rule for the countable rather than finite nondeterminism.

First, we define a Felleisen-style notion of *evaluation context* E inductively as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} E ::= & _ \mid EM \mid \mathbf{suc} E \mid \mathbf{pred} E \mid \mathbf{If0} E \mid \\ & E; _ \mid E := _ \mid @E \mid \mathbf{mkvar} E \mid \mathbf{new}_T E \end{aligned}$$

We then give the appropriate small-step rules in Figure 1. In each rule, $\langle s, M \rangle$ is a *configuration* of the language, where M is a term, and s is a *store*; i.e., a function from the set of variables free in M to the set of natural numbers. If s is a store and v a variable, we write $\langle s \mid v \mapsto n \rangle$ for the state formed by updating the value of the variable v to n .

If $\langle \emptyset, M \rangle$ is a configuration with empty store, we call M a *closed term*. Given a closed term M of ground type \mathbf{com} or \mathbf{nat} , we write that $M \Downarrow x$ (where $x = \mathbf{skip}$ in the \mathbf{com} case and is a natural number in the \mathbf{nat} case) if there is a finite sequence $M \rightarrow M_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow M_n = x$. If there is no infinite sequence $M \rightarrow M_1 \rightarrow M_2 \rightarrow \dots$, then we say that M *must converge*, and write $M \Downarrow^{\text{must}}$. In general, we refer to a (finite or infinite) sequence $M \rightarrow M_1 \rightarrow \dots$ that either terminates at an observable value or continues forever as an *evaluation* π of M . Since the only case where we have any choice in which rule to use is the application of the rule for $?$, π may be completely specified by a finite or infinite sequence of natural numbers.

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{}{\langle s, (\lambda x.M) N \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, M[N/x] \rangle} \qquad \frac{}{\langle s, \mathbf{Y}_T M \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, M(\mathbf{Y}_T M) \rangle} \\
\frac{}{\langle s, \mathbf{suc} \, n \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, n + 1 \rangle} \quad \frac{}{\langle s, \mathbf{pred} \, n \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, 0 \sqcup (n - 1) \rangle} \quad \frac{}{\langle s, \mathbf{If0} \, 0MN \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, M \rangle} \\
\frac{}{\langle s, \mathbf{If0} \, (n + 1)MN \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, N \rangle} \quad \frac{}{\langle s, \mathbf{@}(\mathbf{mkvar} \, MN) \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, M \rangle} \\
\frac{}{\langle s, (\mathbf{mkvar} \, MN) := L \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, N \, L \rangle} \quad \frac{}{\langle s, v := n \rangle \longrightarrow \langle \langle s \mid v \mapsto n \rangle, \mathbf{skip} \rangle} \\
\frac{s(v) = n}{\langle s, \mathbf{@}v \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, n \rangle} \quad \frac{}{\langle s, \mathbf{skip}; M \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, M \rangle} \\
\frac{}{\langle s, \mathbf{new}_T \lambda v.M \rangle \longrightarrow \langle \langle s \mid v \mapsto 0 \rangle, M \rangle} \quad \frac{\langle s, M \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, M' \rangle}{\langle s, E[M] \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, E[M'] \rangle} \\
\frac{}{\langle s, ? \rangle \longrightarrow \langle s, n \rangle} \quad n \in \mathbb{N}
\end{array}$$

■ **Figure 1** Small-step operational semantics for Idealized Algol with countable nondeterminism

160 Let T be an Idealized Algol type, and let $M, N : T$ be closed terms. Then we write
 161 $M \sqsubseteq_{m\&m} N$ if for all compatible contexts $C[-]$ of ground type we have

$$\begin{array}{l}
162 \quad C[M] \Downarrow V \Rightarrow C[N] \Downarrow V \\
163 \quad C[M] \Downarrow^{\text{must}} \Rightarrow C[N] \Downarrow^{\text{must}} \\
164
\end{array}$$

165 We write $M \equiv_{m\&m} N$ if $M \sqsubseteq_{m\&m} N$ and $N \sqsubseteq_{m\&m} M$.

166 3 Game Semantics

167 We will use the Hyland-Ong version of Game Semantics, as in [3].

168 3.1 Arenas

169 An *arena* is given by a triple $A = (M_A, \lambda_A, \vdash_A)$, where

- 170 ■ M_A is a countable set of moves,
- 171 ■ $\lambda_A : M_A \rightarrow \{O, P\} \times \{Q, A\}$ designates each move as either an *O-move* or a *P-move*, and
 172 as either a *question* or an *answer*. We define $\lambda_A^{OP} = \text{pr}_1 \circ \lambda_A$ and $\lambda_A^{QA} = \text{pr}_2 \circ \lambda_A$. We
 173 also define $\neg : \{O, P\} \times \{Q, A\} \rightarrow \{O, P\} \times \{Q, A\}$ to be the function that reverses the
 174 values of *O* and *P* while leaving $\{Q, A\}$ unchanged.
- 175 ■ \vdash_A is an *enabling relation* between $M_A + \{*\}$ and M_A satisfying the following rules:
 176 ■ If $a \vdash_A b$ and $a \neq b$, then $\lambda_A^{OP}(a) \neq \lambda_A^{OP}(b)$.
 177 ■ If $* \vdash_A a$, then $\lambda_A(a) = OQ$ and $b \not\vdash_A a$ for all $b \in M_A$.
 178 ■ If $a \vdash_A b$ and b is an answer, then a is a question.
- 179 We say that a move $a \in M_A$ is *initial* in A if $* \vdash_A a$.

180 Our base arenas will be the *flat arenas* for the types **nat** and **com**. Given a set X , the
 181 flat arena on X is the arena with a single *O-question* q and a *P-answer* x for each $x \in X$,

where $* \vdash q$ and $q \vdash x$ for each x . The denotation of the type **nat** will be the flat arena \mathbb{N} on the set of natural numbers, while the denotation of the type **com** will be the flat arena \mathbb{C} on the singleton set $\{a\}$.

We shall assume that our arenas are *enumerated*; that is, that the set M_A comes equipped with a partial surjection $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow M_A$. We assume that this enumeration is defined on the flat arenas and extended to the connectives in a natural way.

Given an arena A , a *justified string* in A is a sequence s of moves in A , together with *justification pointers* that go from move to move in the sequence. The justification pointers must be set up in such a way that every non-initial move m in s has exactly one justification pointer going back to an earlier move n in s such that $n \vdash_A m$. We say that n *justifies* m . It is easy to see that every justified string must begin with an initial move, and hence with an O -question.

A *legal play* s is a justified string in A that strictly alternates between O -moves and P -moves and is such that the corresponding QA -sequence formed by applying λ_A^{QA} to moves is well-bracketed. We write L_A for the set of legal plays in A .

3.2 Games and strategies

We follow the approach taken by Abramsky and McCusker [3] – a middle road between the *arenas* of Hyland and Ong and the *games* of [2] that makes the linear structure more apparent.

Let s be a legal play in some arena A . If m and n are moves in s such that there is a chain of justification pointers leading from m back to n , we say that n *hereditarily justifies* m . Given some set S of initial moves in s , we write $s|_S$ for the subsequence of s made up of all those moves hereditarily justified by some move in S .

A *game* is a tuple $A = (M_A, \lambda_A, \vdash_A, P_A)$, where $(M_A, \lambda_A, \vdash_A)$ is an arena and P_A is a non-empty prefix-closed set of legal plays in that arena such that if $s \in P_A$ and I is a non-empty set of initial moves in s , then $s|_I \in P_A$.

Our base games will be the games \mathbb{N} and \mathbb{C} on the arenas of the same names, where $P_{\mathbb{N}} = \{\epsilon, q\} \cup \{qn : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$ and $P_{\mathbb{C}} = \{\epsilon, q, qa\}$.


3.2.1 Connectives

Let A, B be games. Then we may define games $A \times B$, $A \otimes B$, $A \multimap B$ and $!A$ as in [3]. As an example, we give the definition of $A \multimap B$:

$$\begin{aligned} M_{A \multimap B} &= M_A + M_B. \\ \lambda_{A \multimap B} &= [\neg \circ \lambda_A, \lambda_B]. \\ * \vdash_{A \multimap B} n &\Leftrightarrow * \vdash_B m. \\ m \vdash_{A \multimap B} n &\Leftrightarrow \begin{aligned} &m \vdash_A n \text{ or } m \vdash_B n \\ &\text{or (for } m \neq *) * \vdash_B m \text{ and} \\ &* \vdash_A n. \end{aligned} \\ P_{A \multimap B} &= \{s \in L_{A \multimap B} : s|_A \in P_A \text{ and } s|_B \in P_B\}. \end{aligned}$$

3.2.2 Modelling countable nondeterminism

Our definition of a strategy will be modelled upon that given in [8]. We model nondeterministic computations by relaxing the determinism constraint on strategies – so player P may have multiple replies to any given O -move.



■ **Figure 2** Finite plays alone are not sufficient to distinguish between terms of a language with countable nondeterminism.

In addition, we have to keep track of any possible divergence in the computation; this is so we can distinguish terms such as

$$\text{If } 0 ? \Omega \ 0 \qquad 0,$$

where the term on the right must converge (to 0), while the term on the left has a possible divergence. The traditional way of representing divergences in game semantics is by a partiality in the strategy; i.e., an O -move to which P has no reply, but this doesn't work here: $\text{If } 0 ? \Omega \ 0$ and 0 both denote the strategy with maximal play $q \ 0$; the partiality in the former is 'hidden' by the move 0.

To fix this problem, we follow [8] by modelling a strategy as a pair (T_σ, D_σ) , where T_σ is a nondeterministic strategy in the usual sense and D_σ is a set of O -plays after which there is a possibility of divergence.

Tracking divergences explicitly in this way requires some care when we compose strategies using 'parallel composition plus hiding'. Specifically, we need to be able to add new divergences into strategies when they arise through 'infinite chattering' or *livelock*. For example, the denotation of the term

$$M = \mathbf{Y}_{\text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat}}(\lambda f. \lambda n. n; (fn))$$

is given by a total strategy, without divergences: namely the strategy μ with plays of the form shown in Figure 2(a). However, when we compose this strategy with any total strategy for \mathbb{N} on the left, we expect the resulting strategy to contain divergences, since the term Mn diverges for any n . Semantically, this corresponds to the fact that we have a legal interaction $q \ q \ n \ q \ n \ \dots$ with an infinite tail in \mathbb{N}_1 ; when we perform 'hiding' by restricting the interaction to \mathbb{N} , we have no reply to the initial move q .

The approach adopted in [8] is to check specifically for infinite chattering between strategies $\sigma: A \multimap B$ and $\tau: B \multimap C$ by checking whether there is an infinite increasing sequence of interactions between σ and τ with an infinite tail in B . If there is such a sequence, then it restricts to some O -position in $\sigma; \tau$ and we add in a divergence at that position.

Harmer and McCusker's approach works very satisfactorily for finite nondeterminism, but not at all for countable nondeterminism. To see why, consider the term

$$N = \mathbf{Y}_{\text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat} \rightarrow \text{nat}}(\lambda g. \lambda mn. \text{If } 0 \ m \ 0 \ n; (g \ (\text{pred } m) \ n))?$$

This term first chooses a natural number m , and then reads from its input n for a total of m times before eventually returning 0. Thus, its denotation is the strategy ν with maximal

plays of arbitrary length of the form shown in Figure 2(b). Note that this strategy strictly contains the strategy μ that we considered before, and therefore that the denotation of

$\text{If } 0 ? MN$

has the same denotation as N , even though for any n , $Mn \not\Downarrow^{\text{must}}$, while $Nn \Downarrow^{\text{must}}$. Moreover, if we try to compose $\llbracket N \rrbracket$ with the strategy on \mathbb{N} that always returns 1, then we end up with an infinite increasing sequence of positions, which triggers the introduction of a divergent play into the composite strategy – even though no divergence occurs in the evaluation of N .

Aside from showing that this model cannot possibly be sound, this example actually leads to composition not being associative if we naively extend the Harmer-McCusker model from finite to infinite nondeterminism (e.g., see [9, 4.4.1]).

Somehow, the crucial point is that we need to distinguish between terms like M , which contain infinite sequences of moves, and terms like N , which contain arbitrarily large finite sequences of moves. The way that we do this is by making the infinite sequences of moves explicit in our strategies, in the style of [16] and [13]. When we use this technique, the denotation of M will contain an infinite sequence, while the denotation of N will contain arbitrarily long finite sequences, but no infinite sequences.

The games in our model are the same as those that we considered in the last section, but our definition of a strategy will change.

3.2.3 Strategies

Given an arena A , we define an *infinite justified string* in the obvious way. We say that such a string is *recursive* if it corresponds, via the enumeration on M_A to a recursive function $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$.

We define $\overline{P_A}$ to be P_A together with the set of all those recursive infinite justified sequences that have all finite prefixes in P_A .

We deliberately ignore any non-recursive infinitary behaviours, since these cannot be detected by computable contexts.

Let A be a game. A *strategy* σ for A is a pair (T_σ, D_σ) , where:

- T_σ is a non-empty prefix-closed subset of $\overline{P_A}$ such that if $s \in T_\sigma$ is a P -position and $sa \in P_A$ then $sa \in T_\sigma$.
- $D_\sigma \subset \overline{P_A}$ is a postfix-closed set of plays in $\overline{P_A}$ that either end with an O -move or are infinite. We require D_σ to obey the following rules:

Divergences come from plays If $d \in D_\sigma$ then there exists some $s \sqsubseteq d$ such that $s \in T_\sigma \cap D_\sigma$.

Diverge-or-reply If $s \in T_\sigma$ is an O -position, then either $s \in D_\sigma$ or $sa \in T_\sigma$ for some legal play sa .

Infinite positions are divergent If $s \in T_\sigma$ is infinite, then $s \in D_\sigma$.

3.2.4 Composition of strategies

Given games A, B, C , we define a justified string over A, B, C to be a sequence \mathfrak{s} of moves with justification pointers from all moves except the initial moves in C . Given such a string, we may form the restrictions $\mathfrak{s}|_{A,B}$ and $\mathfrak{s}|_{B,C}$ by removing all moves in either C or A , together with all justification pointers pointing into these games. We define $\mathfrak{s}|_{A,C}$ to be the sequence formed by removing all moves from B from \mathfrak{s} and all pointers to moves in B , *unless* we have a sequence of pointers $a \rightarrow b \rightarrow c$, in which case we replace them with a pointer $a \rightarrow c$.

286 We call the sequence \mathfrak{s} a *legal interaction* if $\mathfrak{s}|_{A,B} \in P_{A \multimap B}$, $\mathfrak{s}|_{B,C} \in P_{B \multimap C}$ and $\mathfrak{s}|_{A,C} \in$
 287 $P_{A \multimap C}$. We write $\text{int}_\infty(A, B, C)$ for the set of (possibly infinite) legal interactions between
 288 A , B and C .

289 Now, given strategies $\sigma: A \multimap B$ and $\tau: B \multimap C$, we define

$$290 \quad T_\sigma \| T_\tau = \{ \mathfrak{s} \in \text{int}_\infty(A, B, C) : \mathfrak{s}|_{A,B} \in T_\sigma, \mathfrak{s}|_{B,C} \in T_\tau \},$$

291 and then set

$$292 \quad T_{\sigma;\tau} = \{ \mathfrak{s}|_{A,C} : \mathfrak{s} \in T_\sigma \| T_\tau \}.$$

293 As for divergences in $\sigma; \tau$, our approach is actually simpler than that in [8]; we set

$$294 \quad D_{\sigma;\tau} \not\sqsubseteq D_\tau = \left\{ \mathfrak{s} \in \text{int}_\infty(A, B, C) \left| \begin{array}{l} \text{either } \mathfrak{s}|_{A,B} \in D_\sigma \text{ and } \mathfrak{s}|_{B,C} \in \\ T_\tau \\ \text{or } \mathfrak{s}|_{A,B} \in T_\sigma \text{ and } \mathfrak{s}|_{B,C} \in D_\tau \end{array} \right. \right\}.$$

295 We then set

$$296 \quad D_{\sigma;\tau} = \text{pocl}_{A \multimap C} \{ \mathfrak{s}|_{A,C} : \mathfrak{s} \in D_{\sigma;\tau} \},$$

297 where $\text{pocl } X$ denotes the *postfix closure* of X ; i.e., the set of all O -plays in $P_{A \multimap C}$ that have
 298 some prefix in X .

299 Note that there is no need to consider separately, as Harmer and McCusker do, divergences
 300 that arise through ‘infinite chattering’: in our model, a case of infinite chattering between
 301 strategies σ and τ is itself an (infinite) legal interaction between the two strategies, which is
 302 necessarily divergent (because it is infinite) and therefore gives rise to some divergence in
 303 $\sigma; \tau$.

304 We need to impose one more condition on strategies:

305 ► **Definition 1.** Let σ be a strategy for a game A . We say that σ is *complete* if $T_\sigma = \overline{T_\sigma}$;
 306 i.e., T_σ contains an recursive infinite play s if it contains every finite prefix of s .

307 Any finite-nondeterminism strategy in the sense of [8] may be interpreted as a complete
 308 strategy by enlarging it with all its infinite limiting plays. However, when we introduce
 309 countable nondeterminism, we also introduce strategies that are not complete. For example,
 310 the strategy ν that we mentioned above has an infinite increasing sequence of plays $q0 \sqsubseteq$
 311 $q0q0 \sqsubseteq \dots$, but has no infinite play corresponding to its limit. Nonetheless, we do not want
 312 to allow arbitrary strategies: for example, the strategy μ above should include the infinite
 313 play $qq0q0\dots$; the strategy μ° formed by removing this infinite play has no meaning in
 314 our language. Indeed, if we compose μ° with the strategy 0 for \mathbb{N} on the left, then the
 315 resulting strategy does not satisfy diverge-or-reply. The difference with ν is that every play
 316 $qq0\dots q0 \in T_\nu$ may be completed in ν by playing the move 0 on the right. In other words, ν
 317 is the union of complete strategies, while μ° is not.

318 ► **Definition 2.** Let σ be a strategy for a game A . We say that σ is *locally complete* if it
 319 may be written as the union of countably many complete strategies; i.e., there exist σ_n such
 320 that $T_\sigma = \bigcup T_{\sigma_n}$ and $D_\sigma = \bigcup D_{\sigma_n}$.

321 Henceforth, we use ‘strategy’ to mean *locally complete strategy*.

322 We need to show that the composition of locally complete strategies is locally complete.
 323 Note that the composition of *complete* strategies is not necessarily complete: for example,
 324 our term N above can be written as $N'?$, where N' is a deterministic term with complete

denotation ν' . Then we have $\nu = \top_{\mathbb{N}}; \nu'$, but ν is not complete. However, we can show that the composition of *deterministic* complete strategies is complete; since a locally complete strategy may always be written as the union of complete deterministic strategies, this is sufficient to show that the composition of locally complete strategies is locally complete.

► **Definition 3.** We say that a strategy σ for a game A is *deterministic* if

- it is complete;
- whenever sab, sac are P -plays in T_σ we have $b = c$ and the justifier of b is the justifier of c ;
- If $s \in D_\sigma$ then either s is infinite or there is no a such that $sa \in T_\sigma$.

► **Lemma 4.** Let A, B, C be games and let $\sigma: A \multimap B$, $\tau: B \multimap C$ be deterministic complete strategies. Then $\sigma; \tau$ is complete.

Proof. The proof relies on a lemma from [10] that states (in our language) that if σ and τ are deterministic strategies and $s \in T_{\sigma; \tau}$ then there is a unique minimal $\mathfrak{s} \in T_\sigma \| T_\tau$ such that $\mathfrak{s}|_{A,C} = s$. That means that if $s_1 \sqsubseteq s_2 \sqsubseteq \dots$ is an infinite increasing sequence of plays in $T_{\sigma; \tau}$, with infinite limit s , then there is a corresponding infinite increasing sequence of legal interactions $\mathfrak{s}_1 \sqsubseteq \mathfrak{s}_2 \sqsubseteq \dots$. Then the limit of this sequence is an infinite legal interaction \mathfrak{s} and we must have $\mathfrak{s}|_{A,B} \in \sigma$, $\mathfrak{s}|_{B,C} \in \tau$ by completeness of σ and τ . Therefore, $s = \mathfrak{s}|_{A,C} \in T_{\sigma; \tau}$. ◀

► **Corollary 5.** The composition of strategies $\sigma: A \multimap B$ and $\tau: B \multimap C$ is a well-formed strategy for $A \multimap C$.

Proof. The only tricky point is establishing that diverge-or-reply holds for $\sigma; \tau$. Again, it is sufficient to prove this in the case that σ and τ are deterministic and complete. Then it essentially follows from the argument used in [1] that shows that a partiality at an O -position $s \in T_{\sigma; \tau}$ must arise either from a partiality in T_σ or T_τ or from ‘infinite chattering’ between σ and τ . In the first case, the diverge-or-reply rule for σ and τ gives us a divergence at s in $\sigma; \tau$. In the second case, an infinite chattering between σ and τ corresponds to an infinite interaction $\mathfrak{s} \in \text{int}(A, B, C)$ ending with infinitely many moves in B such that $\mathfrak{s}|_{A,C} = s$. Completeness for σ and τ tells us that $\mathfrak{s}|_{A,B} \in D_\sigma$ and $\mathfrak{s}|_{B,C} \in D_\tau$ and therefore that $\mathfrak{s}|_{A,C} \in D_{\sigma; \tau}$. ◀

Our proof for Corollary 5 really makes use of the fact that a locally complete strategy is *lively* in the sense of [13]; i.e., locally deterministic. Our definition is slightly stronger than liveliness, because it insists that the union of complete strategies be *countable*. This will be essential to our definability result.

3.2.5 Associativity of composition

In fact, the proof of associativity of composition is pretty much the same in our model as it is in any other model of game semantics if we treat infinite plays the same as finite ones. However, it is worth saying a few words about associativity, since the model obtained by naively extending the Harmer-McCusker model to unbounded nondeterminism does not have an associative composition. The point is that there is not really a problem with associativity itself, but rather that this naive model gives the wrong result for the composition of strategies with infinite nondeterminism. For example, if ν is the strategy we defined above, and 0 is the ‘constant 0’ strategy on \mathbb{N} , then $0; \nu$ has a divergence in the naive model, because the strategies 0 and ν appear to be engaged in infinite chattering. In our model, we have fixed

that problem, because the strategy ν contains no infinite plays, and so no divergences arise in the composition.

3.3 A symmetric monoidal closed category

Given a game A , we define a strategy id_A on $A \multimap A$, where T_{id_A} is given by

$$\{s \in P_{A_1 \multimap A_2} : \text{for all even-length } t \sqsubseteq s, t|_{A_1} = t|_{A_2}\},$$

where we distinguish between the two copies of A by calling them A_1 and A_2 , and where D_σ is the set of all infinite plays in T_σ . This is an identity for the composition we have defined, and so we get a category \mathcal{G}_{ND} of games and nondeterministic strategies. Moreover, the connectives \otimes and \multimap exhibit \mathcal{G}_{ND} as a symmetric monoidal closed category.

\mathcal{G}_{ND} has an important subcategory \mathcal{G}_D of deterministic complete strategies; this category is isomorphic to the category considered in [3].

3.4 A Cartesian closed category

We follow the construction given in [3], using the connectives $!$ and \times to build a Cartesian closed category $\mathcal{G}_{ND}^!$ from \mathcal{G}_{ND} whose objects are the well-opened games in \mathcal{G}_{ND} and where a morphism from A to B in $\mathcal{G}_{ND}^!$ is a morphism from $!A$ to B in \mathcal{G}_{ND} .

This is very similar to the construction of a co-Kleisli category for a linear exponential comonad, but certain technical issues relating to well-openedness prevent us from presenting it in this way.

3.5 Constraining strategies

Given a non-empty justified string s in an arena A , we define the P -view $\ulcorner s \urcorner$ of s inductively as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} \ulcorner sm \urcorner &= m, & \text{if } m \text{ is initial;} \\ \ulcorner sntm \urcorner &= \ulcorner s \urcorner nm, & \text{if } m \text{ is an } O\text{-move and} \\ & & n \text{ justifies } m; \\ \ulcorner sm \urcorner &= \ulcorner s \urcorner m, & \text{if } m \text{ is a } P\text{-move.} \end{aligned}$$

We say that a play sm ending in a P -move is P -visible if the justifier of m is contained in $\ulcorner m \urcorner$. We say that a strategy σ for a game A is *visible* if every P -position $s \in T_\sigma$ is P -visible. It can be shown that the composition of visible strategies is visible, and that we can build a Cartesian closed category using our exponential.

The resulting category $\mathcal{G}_{D,vis}^!$ of games and deterministic visible strategies is a fully abstract model of Idealized Algol [3].

3.6 Recursive strategies

Most full abstraction results go via a definability result that says that all *compact* strategies are definable [6]. However, deducing full abstraction from compact definability makes essential use of continuity properties that are absent when we deal with countable nondeterminism. We will therefore need to appeal to a stronger result – that of *universality*, which states that *every* strategy is definable. Clearly, universality does not hold for any of our categories of games – for example, there are many non-computable functions $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$. However, Hyland and Ong proved in [10] that every *recursively presentable* innocent strategy is PCF-definable.

401 If σ is a complete strategy for a game A , we say that σ is *recursive* if $T_\sigma \cap P_A$ and $D_\sigma \cap P_A$
 402 are recursively enumerable subsets of ω^ω (under the enumeration of M_A). Here, we have
 403 thrown away the infinite plays in T_σ and D_σ , but we do not lose any information because σ
 404 is complete.

405 If σ is locally complete, we say that σ is *recursive* if σ is the union of complete strategies
 406 $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots$, where the σ_i are recursive and the map $i \mapsto \sigma_i$ is a recursive function $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow (\mathbb{N} \rightarrow$
 407 $\mathbb{N}) \rightarrow 2$.

408 In the case that σ is recursive and *deterministic*, we can prove the following result.

409 ► **Proposition 6** (Recursive Universality for Idealized Algol). *Let S be an Idealized Algol type*
 410 *and let $\sigma: \llbracket S \rrbracket$ be a recursive deterministic strategy. Then there exists a term $M: S$ of*
 411 *Idealized Algol such that $\sigma = \llbracket M \rrbracket$.*

412 **Proof.** We use the ‘innocent factorization’ result of [3] to reduce to the innocent case and
 413 then proceed in a manner similar to the argument used in [15]. ◀

414 Note that Proposition 6 is sharper than the result in [10], which only proves that every
 415 recursive strategy may be defined *up to observational equivalence*. Idealized Algol allows
 416 us to store variables and then use them multiple times without having to read them again,
 417 which allows us to define all recursive visible strategies exactly. Compare with [15], which
 418 proves a similar result for *call-by-value* PCF.

419 3.7 Deterministic Factorization

420 Our definability results will hinge on a *factorization theorem*, showing that every non-
 421 deterministic strategy may be written as the composition of a deterministic strategy with
 422 the nondeterministic ‘oracle’ $\top_{\mathbb{N}}$. We can then deduce universality from universality in the
 423 model of deterministic Idealized Algol.

424 Note that our result is a bit simpler than the corresponding result in [8]; this is because
 425 it is easier to model a countable source of nondeterminism than a ‘finite but arbitrarily large’
 426 source.

427 ► **Proposition 7.** *Let $\sigma: I \rightarrow A$ be a strategy for a game A in \mathcal{G}_{ND} . Then we may write σ*
 428 *as $\top_{\mathbb{N}}; \text{Det}(\sigma)$, where $\text{Det}(\sigma): !\mathbb{N} \rightarrow A$ is a deterministic strategy and $\top_{\mathbb{N}}$ is the strategy for*
 429 *! \mathbb{N} that is given by*

430 ■ $T_{\top_{\mathbb{N}}} = P_{!\mathbb{N}}$.

431 ■ $D_{\top_{\mathbb{N}}}$ is the set of infinite positions in $T_{\top_{\mathbb{N}}}$.

432 **Proof.** We begin by fixing an injection code_A from the set of P -moves in A into the natural
 433 numbers. In the enumerated case, this is given to us already.

434 We first assume that the strategy σ is complete. Then the strategy $\text{Det}(\sigma)$ is very easy to
 435 describe. For each O -position $sa \in T_\sigma$, we have some set B of possible replies to sa , which
 436 we order as b_1, b_2, \dots , where $\text{code}_A(b_1) < \text{code}_A(b_2) < \dots$. We insert a request to the oracle
 437 for a natural number; then, depending on her answer j , we play the next move as follows:

438 ■ If $0 < j \leq \text{code}_A(b_1)$, then play b_1 .

439 ■ If $\text{code}_A(b_n) < j \leq \text{code}_A(b_{n+1})$ then play b_{n+1} .

440 ■ If $j = 0$ and $sa \in D_\sigma$, then play nothing, and put the resulting play inside $D_{\text{Det}(\sigma)}$.

441 Otherwise, play b_1 .

442 Lastly, we close under limits to make the strategy $\text{Det}(\sigma)$ complete. $\text{Det}(\sigma)$ is clearly
 443 deterministic. Checking that $\top_{\mathbb{N}}; \text{Det}(\sigma) = \sigma$ is easy for finite plays; for infinite plays, it
 444 follows by completeness of σ .

Lastly, if σ is the union of complete strategies $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots$, we insert an additional request to the oracle immediately after the very first move by player O ; after receiving a reply k , we play according to σ_k . ◀

Note that in the recursive case, $\text{Det}(\sigma)$ is clearly recursively presentable if σ is. Furthermore, if σ is visible, then so is $\text{Det}(\sigma)$.

4 Full abstraction

4.1 Denotational Semantics

The category in which we shall model our language is the category $\mathcal{G}_{ND,vis}^!$ – the Cartesian closed category of (enumerated) games with nondeterministic visible strategies. We have a natural embedding $\mathcal{G}_{D,vis}^! \hookrightarrow \mathcal{G}_{ND,vis}^!$, and we know that $\mathcal{G}_{D,vis}^!$ is a universal and fully abstract model of Idealized Algol.

Any term $M : T$ of Idealized Algol with countable nondeterminism may be written as $M = C[?]$, where C is a multi-holed context not involving the constant $?$. Then the term $\lambda n.C[n]$ is a term of Idealized Algol, and therefore has a denotation $!N \rightarrow \llbracket T \rrbracket$ as in [3]. We define the denotation of M to be given by the composite

$$I \xrightarrow{\top_N} !N \xrightarrow{\llbracket \lambda n.C[n] \rrbracket} \llbracket T \rrbracket.$$

In other words, we interpret the constant $?$ using the strategy \top_N for N .

4.2 Computational Adequacy

The *computational adequacy* result for our model can be stated as follows.

► **Proposition 8** (Computational Adequacy). *Let $M : \text{com}$ be a closed term of Idealized Algol with countable nondeterminism. $M \Downarrow \text{skip}$ if and only if $qa \in T_{\llbracket M \rrbracket}$. $M \Downarrow^{must}$ if and only if $D_{\llbracket M \rrbracket} = \emptyset$.*

Traditional proofs of computational adequacy using logical relations make essential use of the continuity of composition with respect to a natural ordering on strategies (see, for example, [8] and [9] for the finite nondeterminism case). In our case, since composition is not continuous in the language itself, we cannot use this technique. In order to prove adequacy, we use a new technique that involves using a deterministic stateful construction to model the nondeterminism inside a deterministic world in which continuity holds. To do this, we shall return to the concept of an *evaluation* π of a term as a sequence of natural numbers that we use to replace the constant $?$.

► **Lemma 9.** *Let $M = C[?]$ be a term of type com , where $C[-]$ is a multi-holed context of Idealized Algol. Write σ_M for the denotation of the term $\lambda n.C[n]$.*

- *If $M \Downarrow \text{skip}$ then there exists some total deterministic strategy $\sigma : !N$ such that $qa \in T_{\sigma; \sigma_M}$.*
- *If $M \not\Downarrow^{must}$ then there exists some total deterministic strategy $\sigma : !N$ such that $D_{\sigma; \sigma_M} \neq \emptyset$.*

Proof. Let n_1, \dots, n_k, d be a finite sequence of natural numbers. We define an Idealized Algol term $N_{n_1, \dots, n_k, d} : (\text{nat} \rightarrow \text{com}) \rightarrow \text{com}$ to be the following.

$$\lambda f. \text{new}_{\text{nat}}(\lambda v. f(v := (\text{suc } @v); \text{case}_{k+1} @v \Omega n_1 \dots n_k d)).$$

Here, $\text{case}_{k+1} a n_0 \dots n_k d$ is a new shorthand that evaluates to n_i if a evaluates to i , and evaluates to d if a evaluates to $j > k$. This term adds an extra variable v to the program;

each time f is called, it increments the value of v and maps its value to one of the n_i . The result is that when f calls its argument, it will receive n_1 the first time, n_2 the second and so on.

Now let π be a finite evaluation of $\langle s, C[?] \rangle$ that converges to **skip**. Encode π as a sequence n_1, \dots, n_k . Let d be some arbitrary number. Then we can show that the following term also converges to **skip** in the same way:

$$N_{n_1, \dots, n_k, d}(\lambda n. C[n]).$$

The idea here is similar to one used in testing; we want to test the behaviour of a non-deterministic program, and to do so we *mock* the random number generator in order to simulate a particular evaluation path using purely deterministic programs.

If instead π is a finite evaluation of $\langle s, C[?] \rangle$ that diverges (but nevertheless only involves finitely many calls to the nondeterministic oracle), then the term $N_{n_1, \dots, n_k, d}(\lambda n. C[n])$ will diverge according to the same execution path.

Digging into the construction of **new** within Idealized Algol, as given in [3], we see that for any term F of type **nat** \rightarrow **com** the denotation of $N_{n_1, \dots, n_k, d}F$ is given by the composite

$$I \xrightarrow{\text{cell}_0} !\text{Var} \xrightarrow{![\lambda v. v := (\text{succ } @v); \text{case}_{k+1} @v \Omega n_1 \dots n_k d]} !\mathbb{N} \xrightarrow{[F]} \mathbb{C}.$$

We set σ_π to be the composite of the left two arrows. Observe that σ_π is the strategy with unique maximal infinite play as follows.

$$q \ n_1 \ \dots \ q \ n_k \ q \ d \ q \ d \ \dots$$

Setting $F = \lambda n. C[n]$, we see that $[F] = \sigma_M$. So, by adequacy for the Idealized Algol model, $qa \in T_{\sigma_\pi; \sigma_M}$ if and only if we have $N_{n_1, \dots, n_k, d}(\lambda n. C[n]) \Downarrow \text{skip}$, which is the case if and only if $M \Downarrow \text{skip}$ along the evaluation π . Similarly, $D_{\sigma_\pi; \sigma_M} \neq \emptyset$ if and only if $N_{n_1, \dots, n_k, d}(\lambda n. C[n])$ diverges, which is equivalent to saying that M diverges along the evaluation π .

Lastly, we need to deal with the case that there is an infinite evaluation $\pi = n_1, n_2, \dots$ of M that consults the nondeterministic oracle infinitely often. In this case, M must certainly diverge along the evaluation π . For each j , we define $\pi_n^{(j)}$ to be the strategy for $!\mathbb{N}$ corresponding to the term $N_{n_1, \dots, n_j, \Omega}$. So $\pi_n^{(j)}$ has a unique finite maximal play

$$q \ n_1 \ q \ n_2 \ \dots \ q \ n_j \ q,$$

at which point the strategy has a partiality.

Evaluation of the term $N_{n_1, \dots, n_j, \Omega}(\lambda n. C[n])$ must diverge, since it will proceed according to the evaluation π and eventually reach the divergence (since π consults the oracle infinitely often). This implies that $D_{\sigma_\pi^{(j)}; \sigma_M} \neq \emptyset$ for all j .

We define σ_π to be the least upper bound of the $\sigma_\pi^{(j)}$ (e.g., in the sense of [8]). Since composition is continuous for deterministic (!) strategies, we deduce that $D_{\sigma_\pi; \sigma_M} \neq \emptyset$.

σ_π has plays of the form

$$q \ n_1 \ q \ n_2 \ \dots,$$

and so it is total. ◀

From the proof of this result, we can establish the converse, which we will also need.

► **Lemma 10.** *Let $M = C[?]$ be as before. Let $\sigma: !\mathbb{N}$ be a total deterministic strategy.*

■ *If $qa \in T_{\sigma; \sigma_M}$ then $M \Downarrow \text{skip}$.*

524 ■ If $D_{\sigma; \sigma_M} \neq \emptyset$ then $M \Downarrow^{must}$.

525 **Proof.** Since σ is total and deterministic, it must have a maximal infinite play s_σ of the form

526 $q \ m_1 \ q \ m_2 \ \dots$,

527 where m_1, m_2, \dots is some infinite sequence of natural numbers. If the strategy σ_M contains
 528 some play \mathfrak{s} such that $\mathfrak{s}|_{\mathbb{N}} = s$, then $\sigma = \sigma_\pi$ for some infinite evaluation π of M . Otherwise,
 529 let t be the maximal sub-play of s such that $\mathfrak{s}|_{\mathbb{N}} = t$ for some $\mathfrak{s} \in \sigma_M$. Then, if we replace
 530 σ with the strategy σ' that plays according to t and subsequently plays $q \ d \ q \ d \ \dots$ for our
 531 fixed value d , we will have $\sigma'; \sigma_M = \sigma; \sigma_M$. In either case, $\sigma' = \sigma_\pi$ for some evaluation π of
 532 the term M .

533 Now suppose that there exists $\sigma: !\mathbb{N}$ such that $qa \in T_{\sigma; \sigma_M}$. We may assume that $\sigma = \sigma_\pi$
 534 for some evaluation π of M . Therefore, $qa \in T_{\sigma_\pi; \sigma_M}$, which means that $M \Downarrow \text{skip}$ along
 535 the evaluation π . The corresponding statement for must convergence follows in the same
 536 way. ◀

537 Note that these last two lemmas may be cast entirely in the model of Idealized Algol
 538 given in [3], since they only refer to the denotations of deterministic terms. We can therefore
 539 prove a more general version of Proposition 8.

540 ► **Definition 11.** Let $\sigma: A \rightarrow B$ be a (deterministic) strategy. We say that σ is *winning* if
 541 every play in σ may be extended to a play that ends with a P -move in B ; i.e., σ is total and
 542 contains no sequences having an infinite tail in A .

543 This definition is intimately connected to Lemmas 9 and 10 in the following sense: if
 544 $\sigma_M: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ is a strategy, then there exists some σ such that $D_{\sigma; \sigma_M} \neq \emptyset$ if and only if σ is
 545 not winning.

546 The following is now an easy corollary of Lemmas 9 and 10.

547 ► **Corollary 12.** Let \mathcal{C} be a Cartesian closed category that admits a faithful Cartesian functor
 548 $J: \mathcal{G}_{vis}^! \hookrightarrow \mathcal{C}$. Let $\top_{\mathbb{N}}: 1 \rightarrow J\mathbb{N}$ be a morphism in \mathcal{C} and use it to extend the semantics of
 549 Idealized Algol of $\mathcal{G}_{vis}^!$ to a semantics of nondeterministic Idealized Algol, as in Section 4.1.

550 Suppose we have two predicates $\Downarrow \text{skip}$ and \Downarrow^{must} defined on strategies $1 \rightarrow JC$ in \mathcal{C}
 551 satisfying the following rules for all strategies $\sigma: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ in $\mathcal{G}_{vis}^!$.

552 ■ $(\top_{\mathbb{N}}; J\sigma) \Downarrow \text{skip}$ if and only if there is some $s \in \sigma$ such that $s|_{\mathbb{C}} = qa$.

553 ■ $(\top_{\mathbb{N}}; J\sigma) \Downarrow^{must}$ if and only if σ is winning.

554 Then the semantics of nondeterministic Idealized Algol inside \mathcal{C} is adequate in the following
 555 sense. For all terms M of nondeterministic Idealized Algol of type com :

556 ■ $M \Downarrow \text{skip}$ if and only if $\llbracket M \rrbracket \Downarrow \text{skip}$.

557 ■ $M \Downarrow^{must}$ if and only if $\llbracket M \rrbracket \Downarrow^{must}$.

558 We can then deduce Proposition 8 by verifying that the following predicates on strategies
 559 $\sigma: 1 \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ in the category $\mathcal{G}_{ND, vis}^!$ satisfy the conditions of Corollary 12.

560 ■ $\sigma \Downarrow \text{skip} \Leftrightarrow qa \in T_\sigma$.

561 ■ $\sigma \Downarrow^{must} \Leftrightarrow D_\sigma = \emptyset$.

562 4.3 Intrinsic Equivalence and Soundness

563 We define *intrinsic equivalence of strategies* as follows. If σ, τ are two strategies for a game A ,
 564 we say that $\sigma \sim \tau$ if for all test morphisms $\alpha: A \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ we have $\sigma; \alpha = \tau; \alpha$. Having defined
 565 this equivalence, we may prove *soundness* in the usual way.

► **Theorem 13** (Soundness). *Let M, N be two closed terms of type T . If $\llbracket M \rrbracket \sim \llbracket N \rrbracket$ then $M \equiv_{m\&m} N$.*

For proving full abstraction, it is necessary to take the intrinsic quotient in order to identify, for example, the denotations of $\lambda n. \Omega$ and $\lambda n. \text{If } 0 \ n \ \Omega \ \Omega$ of type $\mathbf{nat} \rightarrow \mathbf{nat}$. These terms are clearly observationally equivalent, but their denotations are not equal; for example, $q \in D_{\llbracket \lambda n. \Omega \rrbracket}$, but $q \notin D_{\llbracket \lambda n. \text{If } 0 \ n \ \Omega \ \Omega \rrbracket}$.

The point here is that even though q is not explicitly a divergence in the second case, it is nonetheless impossible to prevent the strategy from eventually reaching a divergence.

Given a nondeterministic strategy σ for a game A , we may treat σ as a game in its own right (a sub-game of A). Moreover, for any $s \in T_\sigma$, we have a particular branch of that game in which play starts at s . We say that s is *unreliable* if player P has a strategy for the game starting at s that ensures that play eventually ends up in D_σ .

We then say that a strategy σ is *divergence-complete* if every unreliable point of σ is contained in D_σ . Every strategy σ can clearly be extended to a minimal divergence-complete strategy $\text{dc}(\sigma)$; Murawski's explicit characterization of the intrinsic collapse [14], which may be applied to our model, essentially says that $\sigma \sim \tau$ if and only if σ and τ have the same complete plays and $\text{dc}(\sigma) = \text{dc}(\tau)$.

An important fact about intrinsic equivalence is the following Lemma, whose proof makes use of the fact that the infinite plays in our strategies are given by recursive functions.

► **Lemma 14.** *Let σ, τ be strategies for a game A . Suppose that $\sigma; \alpha = \tau; \alpha$ for all recursive strategies $\alpha: A \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$. Then $\sigma \sim \tau$.*

4.4 Universality

Let S, T be Idealized Algol types and let $\sigma: S \rightarrow T$ be a recursive morphism in $\mathcal{G}_{ND,vis}^1$. We want to prove that σ is the denotation of some term.

By our nondeterministic factorization result, we know that $\sigma = \top_N; \text{Det}(\sigma)$, where $\text{Det}(\sigma)$ is a deterministic recursive strategy. By universality for $\mathcal{G}_{D,vis}^1$, we know that $\text{Det}(\sigma) = \llbracket M \rrbracket$ for some closed term $M: S \rightarrow T$. Then $\sigma = \top_N; \text{Det}(\sigma) = \llbracket ? \rrbracket; \llbracket M \rrbracket = \llbracket M ? \rrbracket$.

4.5 Full abstraction

► **Theorem 15** (Full abstraction). *Let M, N be two closed terms of type T . If $M \equiv_{m\&m} N$ then $\llbracket M \rrbracket \sim \llbracket N \rrbracket$.*

Proof. Let $A = \llbracket T \rrbracket$. Suppose that $\llbracket M \rrbracket \not\sim \llbracket N \rrbracket$; so there is some strategy $\alpha: A \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ such that $\llbracket M \rrbracket; \alpha \neq \llbracket N \rrbracket; \alpha$. By Lemma 14, we can choose α to be recursively presentable; by universality, we have $\alpha = \llbracket P \rrbracket$ for some closed term P of type $T \rightarrow \mathbf{com}$. Then we have $\llbracket M \rrbracket; \llbracket P \rrbracket \neq \llbracket N \rrbracket; \llbracket P \rrbracket$; by computational adequacy, it follows that $M \not\equiv_{m\&m} N$. ◀

5 Conclusion

We conclude by making a few remarks about the situation when our base deterministic language is PCF rather than Idealized Algol.

The principal difficulties in modelling nondeterministic stateless languages were made by Tsukada and Ong in [17], where they discovered how to define an innocent nondeterministic strategy by retaining ‘branching time information’ in strategies. An additional benefit of the retention of branching time information is that we no longer need to keep track of infinite

plays in order to model unbounded nondeterminism. The model given in [17] is not sound for must-equivalence, but the authors make the claim that it their model may be easily modified to yield a model that *is* sound for this type of equivalence, using the same techniques from [8] that we have used.

However, since there is no such model in the literature at the moment, we shall have to be a bit more general in examining how our techniques can be used to model nondeterministic PCF. Our main new contribution is the proof of adequacy, and our methods can be applied to PCF as well. Indeed, Corollary 12 can easily be modified to apply to PCF, even though we have used Idealized Algol terms in the proof. Corollary 12 reduces the proof of adequacy to a combinatorial check on morphisms from $\mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{C}$ on strategies in the well-known category $\mathcal{G}_{vis}^!$.

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