


**S.M. SUKHOROLSKA, O.I. FEDORENKO**

# **METHODS OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS**



**FOR STUDENTS AND  
RESEARCHERS**

**Міністерство освіти і науки України  
Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка**

**Стефанія Сухорольська,  
Ольга Федоренко**

# **МЕТОДИ ЛІНГВІСТИЧНИХ ДОСЛІДЖЕНЬ**

**НАВЧАЛЬНИЙ ПОСІБНИК  
ДЛЯ СТУДЕНТІВ, АСПІРАНТІВ І НАУКОВЦІВ**

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У підручнику висвітлюється методика сучасного мовного аналізу та основні продуктивні мовознавчі ідеї.

Основні завдання посібника — допомогти студентам оволодіти методологічними основами мовознавства, подати найважливіші відомості з мовознавчої науки, ознайомити з основними поняттями і термінами, тим самим підготувати до наукового вивчення англійської мови, а також виробити уміння самостійно аналізувати мовний матеріал.

Для студентів філологічних факультетів вузів, аспірантів, науковців, викладачів.

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
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## ПЕРЕДМОВА

Підготовка спеціалістів у вищій школі передбачає єдність навчальної і наукової роботи студентів та посилення індивідуальної роботи з ними. Науково-дослідна діяльність студентів має бути невід'ємною складовою навчального процесу.

Інтенсифікувати наукову роботу студентів можна лише за умови ознайомлення їх із найважливішими процедурами сучасного лінгвістичного аналізу.

За традицією студентів мовознавчих спеціальностей знайомлять із методикою наукового дослідження у межах декількох профілюючих теоретичних дисциплін: структурними методами студенти оволодівають у курсах теоретичної фонетики і граматики, методи семантичного аналізу побіжно засвоюють у курсі лексикології, порівняльний і контрастивний аналіз посідає значне місце у курсах історії мови, контрастивної лінгвістики та перекладознавства.

Така практика фрагментарного аналізу мовних явищ, безперечно, сприяє поглибленню вивченням певних аспектів мовної системи, проте не забезпечує належного уявлення про її цілісність, про різноманіття концептів і алгоритмів дослідження та відповідного їм інструментарію.

Заповнити цю прогалину має на меті даний навчальний посібник, у якому хронологічно подано огляд найпоширеніших методів, від найдавнішого порівняльного аналізу до корпусних досліджень.

Від аналогічних праць він відрізняється своїм комплексним, синтезуючим характером. Це перший в Україні підручник, у якому з позицій сучасної науки про мову систематизовано розглянуто її методологію. Враховано найновіші гіпотези, сформульовані у межах когнітивної лінгвістики, прагмалінгвістики, комунікативної та комп’ютерної лінгвістики тощо.

У роботі над посібником автори намагалися поспільсно дотримуватися принципів наступності та спадкоємності у науці, тому кожен розділ завершується розглядом переваг та обмежень відповідного методу.

У посібнику зосереджено різноплановий мовний матеріал, і укладений він таким чином, аби допомогти студентам самостійно та шляхом опису, аналізу й зіставлення конкретних мовних фактів розбратися в основах науки про мову і виробити

необхідні навички лінгвістичного аналізу. До кожного розділу

**запропоновано серію практичних завдань на практикування, опис, аналіз, характеристику, узагальнення мовних явищ.** Деякі вправи укладено з використанням дисертаційних досліджень аспірантів кафедри англійської філології Львівського національного університету імені Івана Франка. До найважчих завдань подано відповіді в окремому розділі, що дає змогу студентам контролювати свою самостійну роботу.

Посібник укладений на базі найсучаснішої автентичної вітчизняної і англомовної літератури, оскільки спрощений підхід до творчої науково-дослідної роботи студентів значно знижує науковий потенціал дослідника.

Навчальний посібник призначено для студентів випускних курсів англійської філології, його можна використовувати у курсі "Основи наукових досліджень", у магістерських спецкурсах "Англійське наукове письмо" та "Методи наукових досліджень".

Автори висловлюють вдячність рецензентам посібника — доктору філологічних наук, професору Р.П. Зорівчак (Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка), доктору філологічних наук, професору М.М. Поляжину (Ужгородський національний університет), доктору філологічних наук (Росія), доценту В.В. Михайленко (Чернівецький національний університет імені Юрія Федьковича), кандидату філологічних наук, професору Л.І. Булатецькій (Волинський державний університет імені Лесі Українки) — за цінні критичні зауваження і конструктивні пропозиції, які допомогли суттєво поліпшити текст і зміст пропонованої праці.

**PART I****METHODS OF COMPARATIVE STUDY  
OF LANGUAGES****Unit 1****THE COMPARATIVE METHOD****1.1. THE ORIGIN OF COMPARATIVE LINGUISTICS**

According to modern calculations, the number of living languages exceeds 2,500.

The human mind has been speculating on the origin and relationship of languages for hundreds of years. Many scholars pointed out some common (mainly lexical) features of different languages. This idea also germinated in the minds of the first Europeans who visited India. In the sixteenth century, an Italian missionary Filippo Sassetti noted the similarity between the Italian numerals from six to nine — *sei, sette, otto, nove*, and their Sanskrit counterparts — *śaś, saptá, aṣṭāú, náva*.

In the history of language, the discovery of Sanskrit is often compared to the discovery of America in the history of humankind. It altered the whole field of linguistic research.

The languages of the Angles and the Saxons did not come out of thin air; they evolved from Proto-Germanic, the language of a tribe that occupied much of northern Europe in the first millennium B.C. The western branch of the tribe split into groups that gave us not only Anglo-Saxon, but German and its offshoot Yiddish, and Dutch and its offshoot Afrikaans. The northern branch settled Scandinavia and came to speak Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, and Icelandic. The similarities in vocabulary among these languages are visible in an instant, and there are many similarities in grammar as well, such as forms of the past-tense ending -ed [Pinker, 1995: 251].

The ancestors of the Germanic tribes left no clear mark in written history or the archeological record. But they did leave a

special mark on the territory they occupied. That mark was discerned

in 1786 by Sir **William Jones**, a British judge stationed in India, in one of the most extraordinary discoveries in all scholarship. W. Jones had taken up the study of Sanskrit, a long-dead language, and pointed out in the form of a rigorously grounded scientific hypothesis that Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Germanic and some other languages of India and Europe had sprung from the same source which no longer existed. W. Jones announced clearly the relationship between three of the great languages of antiquity — Sanskrit, Greek and Latin — and at the same time anticipated the reconstruction of the parent Indo-European language itself.

Here are the kinds of affinities that impressed W. Jones:

English:	<i>brother</i>	<i>mead</i>	<i>is</i>	<i>thou bearest</i>	<i>he bears</i>
Greek:	<i>phrater</i>	<i>methu</i>	<i>esti</i>	<i>phereis</i>	<i>pherei</i>
Latin:	<i>frater</i>	—	<i>est</i>	<i>fers</i>	<i>fert</i>
Old Slavic:	<i>bratre</i>	<i>mid</i>	<i>yeste</i>	<i>berasi</i>	<i>beretu</i>
Old Irish:	<i>brathir</i>	<i>mith</i>	<i>is</i>	—	<i>beri</i>
Sanskrit:	<i>bhrater</i>	<i>medhu</i>	<i>asti</i>	<i>bharasi</i>	<i>bharati</i>

Such similarities in vocabulary and grammar are seen in an immense number of modern languages. Among others, they embrace Germanic, Greek, Romance, Slavic, Celtic, and Indo-Iranian languages. Subsequent scholars were able to add Anatolian (extinct languages spoken in Turkey), Armenian, Baltic (Lithuanian and Latvian), and Tocharian (two extinct languages spoken in China). The similarities are so pervasive that linguists have reconstructed a grammar and a large dictionary for a hypothetical common ancestor language, Proto-Indo-European, and a set of systematic rules by which the daughter languages changed [Pinker, 1995: 252].

Some ancient tribe must have taken over most of Europe, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, northern India, western Russia, and parts of China. The idea has excited the imagination of a century of linguists and archeologists, though even today no one really knows who the Indo-Europeans were. Ingenious scholars have made guesses from the reconstructed vocabulary. Words for metals, wheeled vehicles, farm implements, and domesticated animals and plants suggest that the Indo-Europeans were a late Neolithic people. The ecological distributions of the natural objects for which there are Proto-Indo-European words — *elm* and *willow*, for example, but not *olive* or *palm* — have been used to place the speakers somewhere in the territory from inland northern Europe to southern Russia. Combined with words for *patriarch*, *fort*, *horse*, and *weapons*, the

reconstructions led to an image of a powerful conquering tribe spilling out of an ancestral homeland on horseback to overrun most of Europe and Asia. The word "Aryan" became associated with the Indo-Europeans, and the Nazis claimed them as ancestors. More sanely, archeologists have linked them to artifacts of the Kurgan culture in the southern Russian steppes (modern Ukraine) from around 3500 B.C., a band of tribes that first harnessed the horse for military purposes [Pinker, 1995: 253].

Archeologist Colin Renfrew [1987] argues that the Indo-Europeans lived in Anatolia (part of modern Turkey) on the flanks of the Fertile Crescent region around 7000 B.C., where they were among the world's first farmers. Archeologists agree that farming spread in a wave that began in Turkey around 8500 B.C. and reached Ireland and Scandinavia by 2500 B.C. Geneticists recently discovered that a certain set of genes is most concentrated among modern people in Turkey and becomes progressively diluted as one moves through the Balkans to northern Europe [Pinker, 1995: 253].

Linguistics as a science was created in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially comparative linguistics. The first of the great pioneers in comparative linguistics in Western Europe was the Danish **Rasmus Kristian Rask** (1787—1832). His major work *Investigation on the Origin of Old Norse or Icelandic* (1818) may be called a comparative Indo-European Grammar. In this book Rask clearly demonstrated the significance of laws of sounds as a proof of linguistic kinship, although he added that they were especially convincing when supported by grammatical similarities. Thus in Rask we find the whole kernel from which modern linguistic comparative methods have been developed.

Even without the use of Sanskrit, Rask hit upon the two sound shifts in the history of the Germanic languages. It should be added that he did not see the complete regularity of the development of sounds. For example, he did not look for the reasons for the exceptions to his main rules.

Important contribution to the development of comparative linguistics was made by the German scholar **Franz Bopp** (1791—1867) who wrote a book *Über das Konjugationssystem der Sanskrit Sprache* ("On the Conjugation System of Sanskrit") (1816) comparing this subject with the conjugation of verbs in Greek, Persian, and German languages, and virtually creating the science of comparative linguistics. Sanskrit, supposed to be a more primitive language than Greek or Latin, became from then on the mainspring of linguistic

research. The merit of his book lies in the study of inflections; his main contribution was systematic comparison of the inflectional

endings of all the Indo-European languages. F. Bopp's essay is regarded as the beginning of **comparative grammar**.

By comparing forms in kindred languages, linguists reveal the system of phonetic correspondences characterizing one language or group of languages within the family in reference to another language or group of languages.

It was the German philologist **Jacob Grimm** (1785—1863) who established the principle of the **sound shift** in the phonetic history of the Germanic group of languages or, as he called it, *the Lautverschiebung* in his book *Deutsche Grammatik* ("German Grammar") (1819). In his opinion, there were two sound-shifts. The first occurred before the 4<sup>th</sup> century; the second was completed by the 8<sup>th</sup> century. The first relates to the Low German group; the second to the High German.

These shifts may be shown by the following chart:

Indo-European	Low German	High German
bh	b	p(b)
dh	d	t
gh	g	k(g)
<hr/>		
b	p	ff (f)
d	t	zz (z)
g	k	hh (h)
<hr/>		
p	f	
t	th	
k	h	

In 1877 the Danish linguist **Karl Verner** (1846—1896) added to Grimm's Law a supplementary law that has become known by his name. He explained certain irregularities in the Grimm series with reference to the position of accent in the Indo-European word. For example, in Sanskrit the accents in the words for "father", "mother" and "brother" fell as follows: *pitár*, *mátar*, *bhrátar*. In the first two words the accent comes after the *t*; in *bhrátar* it comes before. The development of *bhrátar* was therefore regular: according to Grimm's Law *t* shifted to *th* in Anglo-Saxon *bróþor*, English *brother*. In cases where the accent occurred after the *t*, however, a further shifting took

place; the *t* became *d* instead of *th*, giving the Anglo-Saxon *fæder* and *mōdor*. Verner's Law explained other peculiarities of Anglo-Saxon phonetics and grammar.

The phonetic correspondences revealed by R.K. Rask, J. Grim and K. Verner became the foundation of the **comparative phonetics** of Indo-European languages.

Comparative linguistics is an impeccably precise domain of scholarship, where radical divergences between related languages over centuries or a few millennia can with great confidence be traced back step by step to a common ancestor [Pinker, 1995: 255]. Linguists raised in this tradition carefully trace sound-changes, similarities in vocabulary, grammar and reconstruct proto-languages. Their aim is to reconstruct the fundamental forms and meanings which have not come down to us.

Comparative linguistics has developed along several discernible trends: historical comparative linguistics, areal comparative linguistics, typological comparative linguistics, contrastive comparative linguistics.

- **Task 1.** What grounds do we have for saying that linguistics as a science was created in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially comparative linguistics? Who were the great pioneers in comparative linguistics? Discuss these questions with your partner.

## 1.2. HISTORICAL COMPARATIVE METHOD

Comparative method employed to investigate genealogically related languages is known as **historical comparative method**. It developed in connection with the comparative observations of languages belonging to the Indo-European family, and its appearance was stimulated by the discovery of Sanskrit.

The historical comparative method is a system of analytical procedures applied to the study of languages in their historical development. It tries to reconstruct certain features of the language spoken by the original single language community, on the basis of resemblances in the descendant languages. The purpose of this reconstruction is to establish general laws governing the development of these languages, from their common source onwards. The term **cognates** used in comparative linguistics refers specifically to words which have survived in various languages from a common original language. It means "born together".

Let us take the word *mother*. This word certainly existed in

Indo-European, probably in a form something like \*māter (the asterisk is intended to indicate that this form is reconstructed). Latin has preserved it intact. The Greek *mētēr* is not much different, nor Old Irish *māthir* or the Slavonic *mati*. The Proto-Germanic form must have been something like \*modor, judging from the appearance of the word in Old High German and Old Norse; the German *Mutter* and the English *mother* have developed from the Old High German *muother* and the Anglo-Saxon *mōðor* respectively. So, modern equivalents of *mother*, like the French *mere*, the German *Mutter* and the Spanish *madre* are cognates.

While dealing with the reconstruction of the Proto (Common) Indo-European language (Proto- applies only to the ancestral language as reconstructed by the comparative method) we can rely only on those cognates from the related languages whose origin from this language is supported by sound laws and general tendencies in the development of their meaning, and the possibility of chance must be ruled out. Occasionally, resemblance in meaningful forms is purely coincidental.

One plain example of chance is the English *bad* and the Persian *bad*, both of which have the same meaning, though the words are not related in origin. With a slight shift of sound, we have the Italian *donna* and the Japanese *onna*, both of which mean "woman", or the Russian *khoróshiy* and the Japanese *yoroshii*, both of which mean "good".

A charitable observer can always spot similarities in large vocabulary lists, but that does not imply that they descended from a common lexical ancestor. It could be a coincidence, like the fact that the word for "blow" is *pneu* in Greek and *pniw* in Klamath (an American Indian language spoken in Oregon), or the fact that the word for "dog" in the Australian aboriginal language Mbabararam happens to be *dog*. Another serious problem is that languages can resemble each other because of lateral borrowing rather than vertical inheritance, as in the recent exchanges that led to *her negligee* and *le weekend* [Pinker, 1995: 255-256].

Vocabulary is therefore a very shaky criterion on which to base language kinship, though it may be observed that there are certain basic words, like names of family relationships and numerals, which are hardly ever borrowed. Numerals are especially reliable in obtaining information about the close genetic kinship of certain languages within a linguistic group.

Mere coincidences of related words are not enough to prove their close kinship. William Jones pointed out as long ago as 1786 that grammatical forms had to be taken into consideration because *only resemblances in the grammatical forms and the meaning expressed by them are absolutely reliable*. Grammatical forms, as a rule, are never borrowed by one language from another. If the same grammatical meanings are expressed in the same grammatical forms in the compared languages, we can be sure of their close relationship. Take, for instance, the verb *to take* in related languages, in the form "they take":

Ukrainian	Old Slavonic	Sanskrit	Greek	Latin	Gothic
<i>berút'</i>	<i>berot</i>	<i>bharanti</i>	<i>pheronti</i>	<i>ferunt</i>	<i>bairand</i>

This example shows that the endings *-ut'*, *-ot*, *-anti*, *-onti*, *-unt*, *-and* are equivalent and come from the same source. The importance of grammatical criteria is supported by the fact that words can be borrowed, but grammatical forms cannot.

As far as the meaning of the reconstructed words is concerned, they need not coincide exactly; they can diverge according to the laws of polysemy, as the following example shows:

Sanskrit	<i>kravis</i>	Russian	<i>krov'</i>
Greek	<i>kréas</i>	Old High German	<i>hrēo</i>
Latin	<i>cruor</i>	Anglo-Saxon	<i>hrā</i>
Lithuanian	<i>kraujas</i>	English	<i>raw</i>
Old Slavonic	<i>къвъ</i>		

On the basis of these forms, it can be assumed that in the Indo-European parent language there was a root *\*kreu* which could assume different, though related, meanings in all these languages: "blood" in Russian, "meat" in Greek, "raw" in English.

There exists an indisputable linguistic testimony to close contacts between prehistoric Ukrainians and Indian Arians. This can be seen from many Sanskrit words having common roots and very similar or identical lingual form expressing one and the same meaning in Ukrainian. For example [Korunets', 2003: 26]:

Nouns: *māmáρ* — матір/mother, *deeaár* — дівер/brother-in-law, *бэрামа* — брат/brother, *сесаár* — сестра/sister, *сэáсура* — свекор/father-in-law, *відгáва* — вдова/widow, *нас* — Ніс/nose.

Adjectives: *наев* — новий/new, *кriшна* — красний, *гарний*/beautiful, *рудгírá* — червоний (cf. *рудий*)/red, *лағý* — легкий/light.

Numerals: *адi* — один/one, *двáу* — два/two, *трáяс* — три/three, *кameáрас* — четыри/four, *дáса* — десять/ten.

Pronouns: my — ти/you, свій — свій/one's, твай — твій/your.

Verbs: *плавати* — плавати/swim, *рудати* — ридати/sob, *смаяти* — сміятися/laugh, *казати* — казати/say, tell.

Adverbs: *нүнам* — нині /now, *тада* — тоді/then, *гат* — геть/away, out, *sadivas* — сьогодні/today.

The comparative method has been thoroughly applied to the reconstruction of Proto-Indo-European, Proto-Romance, Proto-Germanic, Proto-Celtic, and Proto-Slavonic. Rather less thorough use of the method has been made in reconstructing Proto-Semitic, Proto-Finno-Ugric, and Proto-Bantu.

- Task 2. One can be certain that words similar in form are cognates if they express material phenomena like "night", "star", "snow", "wind", "thunder"; animals like "hound", "goat", "ox", "deer"; parts of a house like "door", "timber"; parts of the human body like "ear", "tooth", "heart", "foot"; and most significant of all, words which express family relationships like "father", "mother", "brother" and "sister". Fill in empty columns with corresponding cognates in the tables given below.

#### a) Words expressing family relationships

Sanskrit	pitār	mātar	bhrātar	duhitār
Old Slavonic	—	mati	brat(r)ъ	dъshти
Greek	patēr	mētēr	phrātōr	thygátēr
Latin	pater	māter	frāter	—
German (Gothic)	fadar	*mōdar	brōthar	dauhtar
Modern English				
Modern German				
Modern French				
Other languages				

#### b) Numerals

Sanskrit	dvāu	trayas	catvāras	daśa	śatam
Old Slavonic	d(u)va	tri	četyre	desaťъ	sъsto
Greek	dýo	treis	tettares	deka	hè-katon
Latin	duo	trēs	quattuor	decem	centum
German (Gothic)	twai	threis	fidwōr	taihun	hund
Modern English					
Modern German					
Modern French					
Other languages					

### 1.3. AREAL COMPARATIVE METHOD

**Areal comparative method** is used when studying languages *bordering geographically*. Such languages maintaining contact reveal common features, which constitute the so-called secondary affinity. The properties of time, place, migration serve as criteria for the comparative areal method. Rasmus Rask examined all the languages bordering geographically on Norse to discover whether they were related, and where he found a relationship he followed it up. He was the first to recognize the relationship between the languages now called Germanic. The scheme of genetic relations between these languages which Rask drew up was quite correct.

- **Task 3.** Give examples of borrowings in some pairs of languages bordering geographically, for instance: 1) Ukrainian (Western regional dialect) and Polish; 2) Ukrainian (trans-Carpathian) and Hungarian; 3) Polish and German; 4) French and English.

### 1.4. TYPOLOGICAL COMPARATIVE METHOD

Alongside of historical and comparative study, **typological investigations** were born, which are concerned with both related and non-related languages. They are based on the notion of linguistic isomorphism, abstract systems of linguistic invariants necessary for the establishment of language universals.

**Typology** is a branch of linguistics which aims at establishing general linguistic categories serving as a basis for the classification of languages of different types [Korunets', 2003: 13].

**Isomorphic** features are common features or phenomena in languages under contrastive analysis (*isomorph* is something identical with or similar to something else in form or structure).

**(Absolute) universals** are features or phenomena of language characteristic of any language of the world.

As far as **historical outline of typological investigations** is concerned, one of the first linguists who made a scientific approach to the regular comparative study of structurally different languages was **Frederick Schlegel** (1772—1829). On the ground of a thorough study of ancient Indian and modern Chinese, Polynesian, Turkic, and the major West-European languages he singled out two clearly distinguishable groups: 1) **affixal languages** in which the form-building of words is realized through affixes added to the amorphous

(invariable) root morphemes; these languages were Turkic,

Polynesian and Chinese; 2) **inflectional languages**, which included among others all Semitic languages and also, to his mind, French as well as the Georgian language.

**August Schlegel** (1767—1845) perfected his brother's first attempt of typological classification of languages in the history of European linguistics. He singled out, on the basis of the same morphological criterion, three typologically common groups of languages: 1) those without any grammatical structure, as they were called; 2) the affixal languages; and 3) the flexional languages.

A decisive step forward in the typological classification of languages on the basis of the same morphological criterion was made by **Wilhelm Humboldt** (1767—1835), who is considered to be the father of typology as a new branch of linguistics. The scientist studied a great number of languages including those of Polynesia and American Indians. Having taken into account the morphological divergences in a large number of languages, he offered a much more embracing typological classification of languages than those suggested by his predecessors.

Thus, Wilhelm Humboldt grouped all known to him languages into the following four classes: 1) **the isolating languages** (like Chinese), which are devoid of the form-building morphemes and in which grammatical relationships are indicated chiefly through word order; 2) **the agglutinative languages** (like those of the Turkic group) which are characterized by agglutination, i.e. a process of word formation in which morphemes, each having one relatively constant shape, are combined without fusion or morphophonemic change, and in which each grammatical category is typically represented by a single morpheme in the resulting word, especially such a process involving the addition of one or more affixes to a base, as in Turkish, in which *ev* means "house", *ev-den* means "from a house", and *ev-ler-den* means "from houses"; 3) **the Inflectional languages** (like the Indo-European and Semitic languages) characterized by the use of inflection, especially morphemic fusion or irregular morphophonemic alternation; 4) **the incorporating languages** of the American Indians characterized by the inclusion of the object or object reference within the inflected verb form as a type of word-formation.


A prominent place among the charactereological typologists of the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century belongs to **Franz Bopp** (1791—1867) who elaborated and widely implemented the comparative/ contrastive

method of investigation. F. Bopp had introduced a hitherto unknown approach to the typological investigation of languages on the basis of their syllabic root morphemes structure. On the ground of this criterion he singled out three typologically distinguishable language types, namely: 1) the language type with the root morpheme consisting of one syllable only (the so-called monosyllabic languages); 2) the language type in which the root morpheme can combine with other roots and affixal morphemes (like in most Indo-European languages); 3) the language types with disyllabic and even trisyllabic root word-structures (as in Semitic languages).

Investigation of syntactic connections in different languages, initiated by W. Humboldt's disciple and adherent **H. Steinthal** (1823—1899) was an exception to the general trend of classifying typology. This was a new object of typological investigation. It was followed by one more new typologically relevant criterion, namely the placement of syntactically principal parts in the sentence. Thus, the predicate always follows the subject in statements of such analytical languages as English, Swedish, Norwegian, etc., whereas in Turkic languages it mostly occupies the closing position.

The 20<sup>th</sup> century typological investigations have been marked by some new approaches to the contrastive study of languages and their classification. One of the best-known trends is connected with the name of the prominent American linguist **Edward Sapir** (1884—1939) who criticized the 19<sup>th</sup> century typological classifications of languages. E. Sapir came to the conclusion that some languages, distant in location, could in the course of their development acquire common features and thus move to a common model and language type. He was also the first to treat a language material as a system.

E. Sapir distinguished four basic types of languages: 1) the type of simple purely relational languages in which the syntactic relations are realized without the help of affixal morphemes (as in Chinese); 2) the complicated purely relational type languages in which the syntactic relations can be realized with the help of affixes and without their help (as in Turkish); 3) the simple mixed-type relational languages, realizing their syntactic connections both by means of agglutination or by means of fusion (as in French); 4) the complex mixed relational type languages in which the meanings of root morphemes may be changed with the help of affixes or inner alterations (like in Latin or in present-day English). On the ground of these three far from all-embracing and quite clear criteria E. Sapir singled out twenty-one different language types.



made by the **Prague school linguists V. Skalicka, V. Mathesius, I. Levy, N.S. Trubetskoy** and others, who carried on their major investigations in the domain of charactereological typology. These scholars considered the essential features of a language to have been prearranged. Hence, the type of a language was identified as a unity of its characteristic features and phenomena. N.S. Trubetskoy has elaborated typology of phonemic and morphophonemic systems of languages based on oppositions.

During the late 1950s and in the 1960s and 70s a series of international and national symposia, congresses and scientific conferences were held (Oslo (1957), Bucharest (1967), Moscow (1963, 1964, 1974), etc., at which the elaboration of new principles and more efficient methods of typological investigation were discussed. Of special attention were also questions concerning the classification of language universals, the typological study of lexicon, the aims and principles of historical typology, ways of contrasting the micro-systems of related and non-related languages, as well as approaches to the typological analysis of the corresponding level units, the definition of a language type (V.D. Arakin), the constants of dominant features and tendencies in the contrasted languages (G.P. Melnikov) and others.

Many of the then problems have been solved already. Thus, the "type" of a language is identified today on the basis of its dominants in the systems of phonetic/phonological, morphological or syntactic level units. On this ground there can be distinguished the following types of languages: a) consonantal, vocalic (after A.V. Isachenko); b) agglutinative (like Turkic); c) synthetic or more exactly — predominantly or mainly synthetic (like Ukrainian or Russian); d) analytical i.e. predominantly analytical, like English, etc. Typologically relevant may equally be some dominant prosodic and other features in a language or group of languages. But the structural type of a language can not be identified on the basis of a coincident isomorphic feature within a certain micro-system of a language. For instance, the rigid order of words in Chinese and English affirmative sentences can not testify to these two languages being of one and the same language type [Korunets', 2003: 32-33].

The principles of typological comparative method have played an important role in the linguistic enquiries looking for **language universals** (also called linguistic universals), i.e. traits or properties of a language that exist, or have the potential to exist, in all

languages which are visible only from the vantage point of a comparative linguist.

In 1963 linguist Joseph Greenberg [1963] examined a sample of 30 far-flung languages from five continents, including Serbian, Italian, Basque, Finnish, Swahili, Nubian, Masaai, Berber, Turkish, Hebrew, Hindi, Japanese, Burmese, Malay, Maori, Mayan, and Quechua (a descendant of the language of the Incas). Joseph Greenberg just wanted to see if any interesting properties of grammar could be found in all these languages. In his first investigation, which focused on the order of words and morphemes, he found no fewer than forty-five universals.

Since then, many other surveys have been conducted, involving scores of languages from every part of the world, and literally hundreds of universal patterns have been documented. Some hold absolutely. For example, no language forms questions by reversing the order of words within a sentence, like *Built Jack that house the this is?* Some are statistical: subjects normally precede objects in almost all languages, and verbs and their objects tend to be adjacent. Thus, most languages have SVO or SOV order; fewer have VSO; VOS and OVS are rare (less than 1%); and OSV may be nonexistent (there are a few candidates, but not all linguists agree that they are OSV) [Pinker, 1995: 233-234].

The following **grammatical universals** are commonly distinguished:

1. Every language has a grammatical system, and a grammatical patterning is hierarchical.
2. Every language has deictic elements ("substitutes", in L.Bloomfield's terminology): in English, personal pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, and proadverbs. Among the deictic elements of every human language there is one that denotes the speaker and one that denotes the addressee.
3. Every language has some elements that denote nothing, but that make a difference in the denotation of the composite forms in which they occur. Such elements are markers: e.g., English *and*: *match and book* denote something different from *match or book*, but *and* denotes nothing.
4. Every human language has proper names.

5. In every human language there are at least two basic orders of magnitude in grammatical patterning. Where there are just two, the traditional terms "morphology" and "syntax" do very well. When the morphology — syntax boundary appears fuzzy, closer scrutiny often

reveals a separate order of magnitude of grammatical patterning sandwiched between.

6. No human language has a grammatically homogeneous vocabulary. A major form-class distinction reminiscent of "noun" versus "verb" is universal, though not always at the same size level.

7. Every language has a common clause type with bipartite structure in which the constituents can be termed *topic* and *comment*. The order of constituents varies. Typically in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, English, and many others, one first mentions something that one is going to talk about, and then says something about it.

8. Every language has a distinction between one referent and two referent predators. In *Mary is singing*, the predator *is singing* is of the one-referent sort (*Mary* is the referent). In *John struck Bill*, the predator is of two-referent sort.

The largest number of universals involve implications: if a language has X, it will also have Y. A typical example of an implicational universal is as follows: if the basic order of a language is SOV, it will usually have question words at the end of the sentence, and postpositions; if it is SVO, it will have question words at the beginning, and prepositions. Universal implications are found in all aspects of language, from phonology (for instance, if a language has nasal vowels, it will have non-nasal vowels) to word meanings (if a language has a word for "purple", it will have a word for "red"; if a language has a word for "leg", it will have a word for "arm") [Pinker, 1995: 234].

- Task 4\***. In aspects of grammar English has changed from a free-word-order, highly inflected, topic-prominent language, all in less than a millennium. Complete the following list of the most conspicuous typological characteristics of present-day English [Pinker, 1995: 232-233].

1. English is an "isolating" language, which builds sentences by rearranging immutable word-sized units, like *Dog bites man* and *Man bites dog*. Other languages express who did what to whom by modifying nouns with case affixes, or by modifying the verb with affixes that agree with its role-players in number, gender, and person. One example is Latin, an "inflecting" language in which each affix contains several pieces of information; another is Kivunjo, an "agglutinating" language in which each affix conveys one piece of information and many affixes are strung together.

2. English is a "fixed-word-order" language, where ...
3. English is an "accusative" language, where ...
4. English is a "subject-prominent" language in which ...
5. English is an "SVO" language, with the order ...

6. In English, a noun can ...

- **Task 5\*.** Some basic typological properties of other types of languages are found in English and the supposedly distinctive typological traits of English can be found in other languages. Complete the following sentences.

1. English, like the inflecting languages it supposedly differs from, has ... And like agglutinating languages, it has ...
2. English, like free-word-order languages, has ...
3. English, like ergative languages, marks ...
4. English, like topic-prominent languages, has ...
5. Like SOV languages, not too long ago English availed itself of an SOV order, which is still interpretable in ...
6. Like classifier languages, English insists upon ...

- **Task 6\*.** Every human language has a phonological system, and phonological patterning is always hierarchical. Vowels and consonants, word stress and utterance stress, intonation are **phonological universals**. Point out other phonological universals.

- **Task 7.** Read the following summary of Stephen Ullmann's article "Semantic Universals" [1963: 172-207] and define which typological investigations in the field of semantics can be carried out. If a coordinated research program could be organized to explore general tendencies in semantics, what, to your mind, should an order of priorities be? What are semantic universals?

### **SEMANTIC UNIVERSALS**

The quest for universals has played a vital part in the development of semantic studies. It was accepted as axiomatic that, as O. Jespersen put it, there are universal laws of thought which are reflected in the laws of change of meaning.

#### **Transparent and opaque words**

There are two types of words: conventional and motivated. The meaning of some words is arbitrary, based on a social convention, while other words have their meaning by virtue of an intrinsic correspondence between form and sense.

The existence of two types of words is a semantic universal.

Words can be motivated in three different ways. The verbs *swish*, *sizzle*, and *boom* are **phonetically motivated** because the sounds are a direct imitation of the sense.

A compound like arm-chair and a derivative like thinker are

**morphologically motivated:** whoever knows their components will understand them at once.

Finally, figurative expressions like *the bonnet of a car* or *the pivot on which a question turns* are **semantically motivated:** they are derived, by transparent metaphor, from *bonnet* "head-dress" and *pivot* "shaft or pin on which something turns".

Ferdinand de Saussure distinguished between two kinds of languages: the **lexicological type**, where conventionality is prevalent, and the **grammatical type** which prefers motivated words. English is far less transparent than German.

There are numerous cases where English and French have an opaque term corresponding to a transparent compound in German:

English	French	German
skate	patin	Schlittschuh
chive	cive	Schnittlauch
glove	gont	Handschuh
hippopotamus	hippopotame	Nilpferd
phonetics	phonétique	Lautlehre
hydrogen	hydrogène	Wasserstoff

It might be possible to devise some statistical test for these relative frequencies. Collection of reliable statistics, the ease with which examples can be multiplied is symptomatic of the preferences of various languages.

It is common knowledge that onomatopoeic terms, however conventionalized, often show striking similarities in different languages, e.g. the cuckoo should have closely similar and distinctly onomatopoeic names in many languages: English *cuckoo*, French *coucou*, Spanish *cucillo*, Italian *cuculo*, Rumanian *cucu*, German *Kuckuck*, Greek *kýkkyx*, Russian *kukushka*, Hungarian *kakuk*, Finnish *käki*.

It is only natural that verbs for snoring should in many languages contain an [r] sound: English *snore*, German *schnarchen*, Dutch *snorken*, Latin *stertere*, French *ronfler*, Spanish *roncar*, Hungarian *horkolni*, Ukrainian *kraspyti*.

Motivation in its various aspects can suggest several promising lines of research which may lead to the discovery of linguistic or stylistic universals.

#### Particular and general terms

Some languages are rich in **words with specific meanings**, while others utilize **general terms** and neglect unnecessary details.

French is usually regarded as a highly "abstract" language, while German is fond of concrete, particular terms. In some cases, German has three or four specific verbs corresponding to one generic term in French:

German	French
gehen, reiten, fahren	aller

<i>stehen, sitzen, liegen, hängen</i>	<i>etre</i>
<i>stellen, setzen, legen, hängen</i>	<i>mettre</i>

If a sufficient number of languages were examined from this point of view, the relative frequency of particular and general terms might become a useful criterion in linguistic typology.

It has often been asserted that the languages of "primitive" races are rich in specific and poor in generic words. E.g. the speaker in the Zulu language has separate words for *red* and *white* cow. The Eskimo and the Lapps have a variety of terms to distinguish between different kinds of snow.

It would be most desirable to organize a large-scale research project on the question of relations between vocabulary and culture, with special reference to the use of particular and general terms at different levels of civilization and in different environments.

### Synonymy

**Synonyms** and **antonyms** are defined as semantic universals.

It is true that we automatically tend to discriminate between synonyms, that we tend to assume that two or more words different in form cannot mean exactly the same thing, or cannot mean it in exactly the same manner. Differentiation may work in a variety of ways: it may affect the actual content of the words involved, their emotive overtones, social status, or stylistic register.

Another general principle of synonymy is "**the law of synonymous attraction**". It has been found that subjects prominent in the interests and activities of a community tend to attract a large number of synonyms. For instance, in *Beowulf* there are 37 words for *hero* or *prince*, and at least a dozen for *battle* and *fight*, and 17 expressions for *sea*.

It would be interesting to find out how widespread these processes are in different languages.

### Polysemy

**Polysemy** is in all probability a semantic universal inherent in the fundamental structure of the language. The process of civilization makes it necessary not only to form new words but also to add fresh meanings to old ones. Polysemy will arise more often in generic words, than in specific terms.

The relative frequency of polysemy in various languages may provide a further criterion for semantic typology. There is a direct relationship between the number of different meanings of a word and its relative frequency of occurrence.

The broader correlation between polysemy and word-frequency deserves to be carefully tested in different languages.

### Homonymy

Unlike polysemy, **homonymy** is not necessarily an unrestricted universal. One could easily imagine a language without any homonyms.

Some homonyms arise through **diverging sense-development**: different meanings of the same word move so far away from each other that

they come to be regarded as two separate terms. For example, English

*flower* and *flour*: from a synchronic point of view they are two distinct words though historically they have a common origin.

The great majority of homonyms arise by **converging sound-development**. Thus OE *mete* and *mētan* have converged and become homonymous in ModE: *meat* and *meet*.

Languages where short words abound will obviously have more homonyms than those where longer words are prevalent. Hence, the relative frequency of homonyms in English and French is higher, as compared, for example, to German or Italian.

Homonyms are sometimes differentiated by formal means: gender (French *le vase* "vase, vessel") — *la vase* "mud"); or inflection (English *ring*, *rang* — *ring, ringed*).

English and French suggest that languages rich in monosyllables, and therefore in homonyms, tend to retain a non-phonetic mode of spelling, and it would not be difficult to establish whether this is a general tendency.

### Semantic typology

Motivation, generic versus specific terms, polysemy, homonymy — may, if studied on a suitable scale, yield criteria for linguistic typology.

All these typological criteria, except, perhaps, motivation, have a direct bearing on the semantic autonomy of the word, the degree to which the hearer/ reader will depend on the context for understanding it.

Languages where generic terms, polysemy and homonymy are prevalent will be relatively "context-bound".

### Metaphor

Since metaphor is based on the perception of similarities, it is only natural that, when an analogy is obvious, it should give rise to the same metaphor in various languages. Hence the wide currency of expressions like *the foot of a hill* or *the leg of the table*.

Some parallel developments are not confined to metaphor: certain metonymic associations can be widespread. Thus, the use of the word *tongue*, the organ of speech, in the sense of "language" is common to many Indo-European languages: English *tongue*, Latin *lingua*, Greek *glōssa*, Russian *jazyk*, etc. It is also found in a number of Finno-Ugrian languages, Turkish, in some African languages, and elsewhere. The collection of such parallel metaphors and metonymies would be of value since the association on which they are based seem to be largely independent of culture and environment.

### Taboo

The term *taboo* is of Polynesian origin.

Language taboos seem to spring from three main causes. Firstly, there are those inspired by **fear**, or "**holy dread**": religious restrictions on the use of the name of God, and also superstitious avoidance of any direct

reference to the dead, to the devil, and to evil spirits, and varied taboo on animals.

A second group is dictated by a sense of delicacy, e.g. *imbecile* (Latin *imbecillus* "weak, feeble") instead of *mad*.

Thirdly, taboo bans may result from a sense of decency and propriety: references to sex, names of certain parts and functions of body, and swear-words.

The growth and decay of the various forms of taboo, in relation to social and cultural development, could be systematically studied in different languages.

#### Universal principles in the structure of vocabulary

A comparative study of a wide variety of languages would show whether there is such a thing as a "lexical constant": an object, event or other feature of such fundamental importance that it must somehow be expressed in any language. We may assume, for example, that the idea of fatherhood is a "lexical constant".

If a list of constants could be established this would be of great interest to comparative linguistics.

#### Lexical fields

Examples of lexical fields are: the system of colours, the network of family relations, the terms for intellectual qualities, ethical and aesthetic values, religious expressions.

Beneath all the diversity, there is likely to be an underlying unity which a systematic comparison of these fields would reveal. We are told of striking differences between the number and nature of colour distinctions. It would be equally interesting to know whether there are any elements common to all classifications of colours.

- **Task 8\*.** Verbs for *whispering* contain sounds [s], [ç] or [tç]. Give examples from languages familiar to you. Consult dictionaries.
- **Task 9\*.** The semantic structure of the bulk of English nouns is different from that of the Ukrainian nouns. Give English equivalents for the following Ukrainian words: *рука*, *нога*, *подорож*, *щє*.
- **Task 10.** In slang there are characteristic clusters of synonyms, many among them jocular or euphemistic, for the ideas of *stealing*, *drunkenness*, and *death*. Give English and Ukrainian synonyms of the notions mentioned above. Consult corresponding dictionaries.

## 1.5. CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE

### COMPARATIVE METHOD

Comparative linguistics which studies the correspondences between languages that have a common origin has played an important role in the development of a scientific approach to historical language study.

The methods applied consisted in observation of speech, mostly written, collection and classification of data, hypotheses, and systematic statements. Particular stress was put on the refinement of methods for collecting and classifying facts. The study of languages became scientific [Arnold, 1986: 274].

19<sup>th</sup> century comparative philology insisted on regarding the descriptive statements as subordinate, not worth making for their own sake. Its aim was to reconstruct the fundamental forms and meanings which have not come down to us. With the use of sets of phonetic correspondence philologists explored and proved genetic relationships between words in different languages. They rejected prescriptive trends characteristic of the previous stage. It was realized that the only basis for correctness is the usage of the native speakers of each language. They destroyed the myth of a Golden Age when all the words had their primary "correct" meaning and when the language was in a state of perfection from which it has deteriorated. It became clear from intensive work on the great historical dictionaries that multiple meaning for words is normal, not an "exception". Comparative studies showed that, save for specific technical terms, there are no two words in two languages that cover precisely the same area [Arnold, 1986: 274].

The greatest contributions, as far as English is concerned, were the Oxford English Dictionary and linguistic research on the English language in works by H. Sweet, O. Jespersen, H. Poutsma, G.O. Curme and E. Kruisinga. Most of these were published in the 20<sup>th</sup> century but the main principles on which they were based were worked out in the 19<sup>th</sup>.

Thus at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century language study was still mainly concentrated on historical problems. The very titles of many publications of the period are sufficient proof of this approach. A wide historical context was, in its turn, found indispensable in explaining vocabulary changes. In the process of studying some word or words, the linguist collected accurately chosen examples of usage, and arranged them according to the periods of language history (for Old and Middle English, according to dialects). These

data were compared. As to conclusions about the meaning, they were drawn from the context and from what was known about the realia of the period. Comparing words and morphemes with those from which they were derived it was possible to describe the processes at work in vocabulary development. Several lexicological monographs concentrated attention on the etymological ties of vocabulary units. Correct reconstruction helped to understand the real etymology of words.

The importance of the comparative method in linguistics has been justified by discoveries made in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Nevertheless, the comparative method has its deficiencies. The methods of comparative linguistics have been severely criticized for a confusion of linguistics and history, linguistics and psychology and for their "atomistic" approach (i.e. focusing on the history of separate lingual elements and losing sight of their interrelations in the system of language).

The historical comparative method, for instance, has the following limitations:

1. It is limited by the material it can use.

2. It is difficult and sometimes impossible to define the time, and even the relative chronology of lingual changes.

3. It can be chiefly applied to languages having a long written tradition or "history".

4. It is applied only to the comparative study of related languages; but to understand the innermost nature of language, all languages must be studied in comparison. To bridge this gap, modern linguistics has developed the typological study of languages.

Notwithstanding these limitations, many linguists still pursue this historical interest [Ruhlen, 1987; Shevoroshkin, Markey, 1986; Shevoroshkin, 1990; Wright, 1991; Ross, 1991].

Joseph Greenberg and his associate Merritt Ruhlen are joined by a school of Russian linguists (Sergei Starostin, Aharon Dogopolsky, Vitaly Shevoroshkin, and Vladislav Illich-Svitych) who lump languages and seek to reconstruct the very ancient language that would have been the progenitor of each lump. They discern similarities among the proto-languages of Indo-European, Afro-Asiatic, Dravidian, Altaic, Uralic, and Eskimo-Aleut, as well as the orphans Japanese and Korean and a few miscellaneous language groups, reflecting a common ancestor proto-proto-language they call Nostratic. Nostratic would have been spoken by a hunter-gatherer population, for there are no names of domesticated species among

the 1,600 words the linguists claim to have reconstructed. The

Nostratic hunter-gatherers would have occupied all of Europe, northern Africa, and northern, northeastern, western, and southern Asia, perhaps 15,000 years ago, from an origin in the Middle East.

V. Shevoroshkin [1990], M. Ruhlen [1987], and others have been trying to reconstruct the vocabulary of the language of "Proto-World". Some linguists find the Proto-World hypothesis especially suspect. It is not that they doubt that language evolved only once, one of the assumptions behind the search for the ultimate mother tongue. It is just that one can trace words back only so far. Most linguists believe that after 10,000 years no traces of a language remain in its descendants. This makes it extremely doubtful that anyone will find extant traces of the most recent ancestor of all contemporary languages, or that that ancestor would in turn retain traces of the language of the first modern humans, who lived some 200,000 years ago.

The language we speak now is the result of historical movement and of many changes over many thousands of years; language may be defined in a genetic way (taking into account, first, the extinct forms, and secondly, allied languages, both living and dead), and this necessitates historical comparative research.

A different direction, however, has become increasingly important, and widespread. After Ferdinand de Saussure an entirely new approach to language had been evolved: it had come to be understood as a system of synchronous symbols deriving their meaning and significance from differences and oppositions within this system. The centre of interest has shifted to the synchronic level, the spoken utterance and structure.

The new trend has received the name of **structural** (also called **descriptive** or **synchronic**) **linguistics**. It deals with the study, classification, and arrangement of the features of a language at a given time, without reference to the history of the language or comparison with other languages.

## Unit 2

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### CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS

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#### 2.1. CONTRASTIVE COMPARATIVE METHOD AND CONTRASTIVE LINGUISTICS

Typological comparative method proper differs from **contrastive comparative method (contrastive analysis)**. The former is used with the aim of setting up categorical features necessary for defining language types (of certain groups of languages). The latter is employed in contrastive analysis mainly of two languages both common and divergent (isomorphic and allomorphic) features of which are described [Виноградов, 1988: 40].

Contrastive analysis is the main method of **contrastive linguistics** which is one of the youngest branches of linguistics. It was formed in the 1930s-40s [Кочерган, 2001: 3].

**Contrastive linguistics** attempts to find out similarities and differences in both philogenically related and non-related languages at all levels of their structure. As a rule, it entails a synchronic approach to the study of languages without reference to their origins.

Contrastive linguistics originated in the field of applied linguistics since it was assumed that the most effective teaching materials were those based upon a scientific description of the target language carefully compared with a parallel description of the native language of the learner.

In fact, contrastive analysis grew as a result of practical demands of language teaching methodology where it was empirically shown that errors which are made recurrently by foreign language students can be often traced back to the differences in the structure of the target language and the learner's mother tongue.

The procedures of contrastive analysis were formulated by Robert Lado in his book *Linguistics Across Cultures: Applied Linguistics for Language Teachers* published in 1957. R. Lado's point of view is that learning a 2nd language constitutes a very different task from learning the 1st language. The basic problems arise not only out of any essential difficulty in the features of the new language but primarily out of the special "set" created by the 1st language habits. He was the first to grasp the significance of these facts. His

## ~~Principle of how to achieve progress in mastering a foreign language is~~

*comparison of 2 languages + comparison of 2 cultures* to discover and describe the problems that the speakers of one of the language will have in learning the other.

R. Lado's book presented a fairly new field of linguistics. Two years later work was started on the *Contrastive Structure Series* edited by Charles A. Ferguson under the auspices of the Centre of Applied Linguistics of the Modern Languages Association of America in Washington, D.C. The series had as its aim the description of differences and similarities between English, French, German, Italian, Russian, and Spanish.

Besides works on language teaching, works on typological classification of languages also influenced the development of contrastive linguistics. These two sources of contrastive linguistics may still be traced in it at present [ЛЭС, 1990: 239].

Ilko Korunets' [2003: 14] defines the aims of contrastive typological investigation: 1) to identify and classify the main isomorphic and allomorphic features characteristic of languages under investigation; 2) to draw from the common and divergent features respectively the isomorphic regularities and the allomorphic singularities in the languages contrasted; 3) to establish on the basis of the obtained isomorphic features the typical language structure.

Ukrainian linguists L. Bubleinyk [1966] and V. Manakin [1994] set up major principles of contrastive lexicology: systemic approach, bilateral (mutually directed) comparison, unilevel comparison, hierarchical comparison of differential features.

Cognitive-semantic sphere of human language constitutes the background of contrastive comparison of languages [Кочерган, 2001: 4].

Contrastive study of the Ukrainian and English languages was initiated by Yuriy Zhuktenko in his *Comparative Grammar of the English and Ukrainian Languages*, published in 1960. It was followed by a number of fundamental works in the 1970s-90s [Швачко et al., 1977; Нариси з контрастивної лінгвістики, 1979; Порівняльні дослідження з граматики, 1981; Korunets', 1995, 2003].

In 1992 Kyiv State Linguistic University started publishing a series of collections of scientific papers edited by M. Kocherhan in which various aspects of contrastive study of Ukrainian and other languages have been treated [Проблеми зіставної семантики, 2001].

Yu. Zhuktenko's ideas were developed by Ilko Korunets' whose book *Contrastive Typology of the English and Ukrainian Languages* [2003] has been the first ever published comprehensive contrastive study of the two languages on the phonological, morphological, syntactic and lexical levels.

The typological investigation of phonetic/ phonological features of English and Ukrainian undertaken by I. Korunets' involves a contrastive study of the sounds and phonemes, vowel and consonantal systems, syllable generation and syllable division, word-stress and utterance stress, intonation/ prosody.

Typology of the lexical systems comprises semantic classes of words, word-forming means, structural models of words and stylistic peculiarities of their usage, lexico-semantic groups of words, set and idiomatic expressions in English and Ukrainian.

Morphemic structure of the word, lexico-grammatical classes of words and their categorial features, syntactic relations, phrase structure, structural types of sentences, principal and secondary parts of the sentence, composite sentence (complex and compound) are the objects of contrastive analysis on the grammatical level of both languages.


Contrastive study of English and Ukrainian is further developed in *Contrastive Lexicology of the English and Ukrainian Languages* by L. Verba [Верба, 2003].

The aim of contrastive analysis is to discover some specific characteristics of the contrasted languages and reveal the peculiarities of one language system in comparison with the other [Жлуктенко, 1979: 5-6].

**Contrastive analysis** as a method of research is a complicated procedure which is usually divided into **several stages** [Жлуктенко, 1979: 6-11]:

1. An indispensable condition of successful contrastive analysis is availability of detailed and accurate descriptions of the language systems to be investigated. These descriptions are then contrasted with one another and contrastive conclusions are drawn in the process of comparison.

2. Contrastive analysis of elements taken from different languages aims to establish certain similarities or analogies between them which are termed **correspondences**. Correspondences are established on the basis of a certain common feature. Elements of different language systems which have a certain relation to this feature are considered comparable. Thus, comparability is a constant



*footage of correspondences in different languages (cf. English foot/leg and Ukrainian нога or English foot and Ukrainian п'ям).*

Correspondences are often established empirically (i.e. in terms of researchers' language experience). Later they are verified and extended in the process of contrastive analysis. Some types of correspondences (e.g. types of actual division of the sentence) are not so obvious. They are arrived at hypothetically and later defined by means of additional analytical operations.

3. While studying interlingual correspondences researchers assess and select language material for contrastive analysis. Different language units which are not comparable and do not make up correspondences (e.g. English *tree* and Ukrainian *сьогодні*) cannot be studied by means of contrastive analysis.

Among substantial numbers of language correspondences only those must be selected which have considerable theoretical and practical (applied) value.

4. Contrastive study of the elements chosen for analysis presupposes selection of the basis of comparison, the so-called **tertium comparationis** (t.c.) [Жлуктенко, 1979: 7].

When a language L1 is studied, then another language L2 is necessary to formulate the results of the investigation of L1. L1 is object-language, and L2 is termed metalanguage. In contrastive analysis there are two object-languages (L1 and L2), consequently one more language is used as metalanguage (e.g. Latin) [Жлуктенко, 1979: 7].

Very often one of the contrasted languages is used as **tertium comparationis**, i.e. the yard stick to measure the characteristics of correspondences in L2.

There also exists an opinion that the best basis for comparison (t.c.) of the elements in different languages is their meaning.

5. Contrastive analysis aims to get an exhaustive characteristic of the contrasted language elements which are correspondences. The aim is to study not only differences but also similarities between two language elements. Only after studying both similar and dissimilar features researchers can conclude what is different about the contrasted elements.

6. Study of correspondences is closely connected with determining the degree of their **equivalence**.

The notion of **equivalence** in works on contrastive analysis is equivocal. Some authors equate equivalence of language elements with their identity, sameness. It is apparent that the idea of sameness

of two elements in different languages is a chimera. Equivalence should be understood as similarity of functions of language units. Equivalent units are said to render the same amount of information (have the same semantic content) but differ in ways of expressing this content. Cf. *Ask me another.* — *Спитай мене інший.* — Я не знаю. *He will do his best.* — *Він буде робити своє найкраще.* — *Він зробить усе можливе.* *I'll give you a piece of advice.* — *Я дам тобі шматок поради.* — *Я дам тобі одну пораду.*

Another criterion of equivalence is the criterion of translatability: equivalent units are those which at least sometimes are used to translate one another in two languages.

Different types of equivalence are distinguished: phonological, lexical, grammatical, referential, connotative, textual, structural and semantic equivalence, formal and functional equivalence, etc.

**Congruence** is defined as (functional) equivalence of elements in different languages which coincide in their form (structure). Such type of equivalence is rare, e.g. *day and night* — *день і ніч*, *day by day* — *день за днем*.

- **Task 11.** It is common knowledge that comparison is the basic principle in historical comparative method, typological comparative method and contrastive comparative method (contrastive analysis). Working in small groups, discuss the similarities and differences of underlying principles of comparison in comparative philology (historical or diachronic linguistics), language typology and contrastive linguistics. What does contrastive linguistics aim at? What are its main problems?
  
- **Task 12\*.** Analyze the following pairs of Ukrainian and English idiomatic (set) expressions and define whether they are
  - 1) congruents (demonstrating absolute degree of similarity: the same meaning, number of components, distributional structure);
  - 2) absolute equivalents (allowing of some structural or lexical differences peculiar of the language, e.g. the use of articles in English);
  - 3) partial equivalents with different a) componential or grammatical structure; b) denotational figurativeness; c) functional stylistic connotation; or d) expressive emotional connotation [Зорівчак, 1979: 62].

1) блудний син — prodigal son; 2) дати ногам знати — to take to one's heels; 3) бути в чиєсь шкірі — to be in one's shoes; 4) грatisя з вогнем — to play with fire; 5) чим більше, тим краще — the more, the

better; 6) куй залізо, поки гаряче — strike the iron while it is hot; 7) Рим був

побудований не за один день — Rome was not built in one day; 8) [Слава тобі, Шафарiku.] Вовики і вікі! (Шевченко) — Forever and ever; 9) лихий іх знає — the devil knows; 10) [Царівною називають, Очей не спускають з моого цвіту, Дивуються,] Не знають де діти (Шевченко) — hold me in esteem; 11) хто рано встає, тому Бог дас — the early bird catches a worm; 12) не чіпай лиха, поки тихо — let sleeping dogs lie.

## 2.2. APPLICATIONS OF CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS

Contrastive analysis can be carried out at three linguistic levels: phonology, grammar (morphology and syntax) and lexis (vocabulary). In what follows we shall try to give a brief survey of contrastive analysis at the levels of lexis and grammar.

On the **level of lexis**, contrastive analysis is applied to reveal the features of sameness and difference in lexical meanings and semantic structures of correlated words in different languages.

It should be borne in mind that, though the objective reality exists outside human beings and irrespective of the language they speak, every language classifies this reality in its own way by means of vocabulary units. In English, for example, the word *foot* is used to denote the extremity of the leg. In Ukrainian there is no exact equivalent for *foot*. The word *нога* denotes the whole leg including the foot [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 178].

Contrastive analysis brings to light what can be labelled as **problem pairs**, i.e. words that denote two entities in one language and correspond to two different words in another language. Compare, for example, *годинник* in Ukrainian, and *clock, watch* in English, *художник* in Ukrainian and *artist, painter* in English.

We also find it natural that kinship terms should reflect the difference between male and female: *brother* or *sister*, *father* or *mother*, *uncle* or *aunt*, etc. Yet in English we fail to make this distinction in the case of *cousin* (cf. Ukrainian — *двоюрідний брат, двоюрідна сестра*).

Contrastive analysis also shows that correlated polysemantic words of different languages are not, as a rule, co-extensive. For example, to native speakers of English it is self-evident that one should be able to use the word *head* to refer to the head of a person, match, bed, table, coin, organization, cane, etc., whereas in Ukrainian different words have to be used: *голова, узголів'я, сторона, головка*, etc.

Contrastive analysis occupies itself with sets of semantically related words: synonyms, constituents of lexical fields, members of word-families, etc.

In the English **synonymic set** *brave, courageous, bold, fearless, audacious, valiant, valorous, doughty, undaunted, intrepid* each word differs in certain components of meaning from the others: *brave* usually implies resolution and self-control in meeting, without flinching, a situation that inspires fear, *courageous* stresses stout-heartedness and firmness of temper, *bold* implies either a temperamental liking for danger or a willingness to court danger or to dare the unknown; etc. Comparing the corresponding Ukrainian synonymic set *хоробрий, безстрашний, сміливий, мужній, відважний*, etc. we see that the Ukrainian word *сміливий*, e.g., may be considered as a correlated word to either *brave, valiant* or *valorous* and also that no member of the Ukrainian synonymic set can be viewed as an exact equivalent of any single member of the English synonymic set in isolation, although all of them denote "having or showing fearlessness in meeting that which is dangerous, difficult, or unknown". Different aspects of this quality are differently distributed among the words making up the synonymic set [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 180].

The problem under discussion may be also illustrated by the analysis of the **members of correlated word-families**, e.g., cf.: *голова, головка*, etc. with *head, heady*, etc. which are differently connected with the main word of the family in each of the two languages and have different denotational and connotational components of meaning.

This can be easily observed in words containing diminutive and endearing suffixes, e.g., the English words *head, grandfather, girl* and others do not possess the connotative component which is part of the meaning of the Ukrainian words *голова, голівка, голівонька, дідусь, дідуньо*, etc.

Difference in the lexical meaning (or meanings) of correlated words accounts for difference of their **collocability** in different languages. Thus, for example, the English adjective *new* and the Ukrainian adjective *новий*, when taken in isolation, are felt as correlated words as in a number of cases *new* stands for *новий*, e.g., *нова сукня* — a *new dress*, *Новий рік* — *New Year*. In collocation with other nouns, however, the Ukrainian adjective cannot be used in the same meaning in which the English word *new* is currently used, e.g., *new potatoes* — *молода картопля*; *new bread* — *свіжий хліб*.

Not only notional words but also function words in different



example, the meanings of the Ukrainian preposition *до* and its equivalents in the English language: (*він працює*) *до 5 години* — till 5 o'clock; (*це було*) *до війни* — before the war; (*він дійшов*) *до розя* — to the corner.

Contrastive analysis on the **level of grammatical meaning** reveals that correlated words in different languages may differ in the grammatical component of their meaning. To take a simple instance, Ukrainians are liable to say the *\*news are good*, *\*the money are on the table*, etc. as the words *новини*, *громі* have the grammatical meaning of plurality in the Ukrainian language.

Of particular interest in the contrastive analysis are the **compulsory grammatical categories** which foreign language learners may find in the target language and which are different from or non-existent in their mother tongue. These are meanings which the grammar of the language "forces" us to signal, whether we want it or not. One of the compulsory grammatical categories in English is the category of **definiteness/ indefiniteness**. We know that English signals this category by means of articles.

Another difficulty for Ukrainian learners of English is presented by the fact that Ukrainian is a synthetic language (characterized by a relatively widespread use of inflections, rather than separate words, to express syntactic relationships) while English is analytic (characterized by a relatively frequent use of function words, auxiliary verbs, and changes in word order to express syntactic relations, rather than of inflected forms).

Contrastive analysis reveals that **analytical tendency in modern English** manifests itself in various language phenomena: 1) morphological forms: *have done*, *will play*; 2) quasi-morphological forms: *be going to + infinitive*, *used to + infinitive*; 3) non-finite forms of the verb and complexes with them; 4) phrasal verbs: a) V + post position (adverb): *give up*, *give in*; b) V + vN: *give a look*; V + N: *make a remark*; 5) analytical means of denomination: *railway station*, *lady visitor*; 6) analytical predicate: a) compound nominal predicate; b) compound verbal predicate; 7) analytical lexical units of the type *let go*, *make believe*, *get rid*.

**Analytical lexical units** constitute one of the typological characteristics of English. They are formed by a functional-semantic model and are characterized by structural-semantic and functional integrity, functional differentiation of components (functional and

notional), contact position of their constituents, their ability to enter into synonymous/ anonymous series alongside with monolexemic verb, e.g. *let go* = *release*, *make believe* = *pretend*, *make do* = *manage*, *let slip* = *omit*, *let fly* = *discharge*, *get rid* = *disembarrass*, *get set* = *resolve*. Analytical lexical units have derivational paradigm, e.g. *let go* (v), (n); *make-believe* (v), (n), *make-believer* (n), *make-believing* (n), *make-believe* (adj). Analytical verbs are realized in all the morphological (paradigmatic) forms.

Due to the analytical character of English (scarcity of inflections) the verb in it is to a great extent synsemantic, i.e. at least part of its lexico-grammatical meaning is expressed not within the verb itself, but is redistributed on to a larger context.


Unlike synthetic languages, English has no morphological markers for the category of **transitivity/ intransitivity**, which is closely related to the notion of **ergativity** (Greek *ergates* 'performer').

Verbs which can have the same thing as their object, when transitive, or their subject, when intransitive, are called ergative verbs [Collins Grammar, 1990: 156]. The list of such verbs includes more than 600 items [Петрик, 2001: 9].

Ergativity is one of the typological features of English. Ergative typology of a language is based on the semantic opposition of the Agent and the Factitive, contrary to the opposition of the Subject and the Object in Nominative typology.

Contrastive analysis also brings to light **structural difference of word-groups** commonly used to denote identical entities. For example, a typical Ukrainian word-group used to describe the way somebody performs an action has the structure that may be represented by the formula *an adverb followed by a finite form of a verb* (or a *verb + an adverb*), e.g., *він міцно спить*, *він швидко (повільно) говорить*, etc. In English we can also use structurally similar word-groups and say *he smokes a lot*, *he learns slowly (fast)*, etc. The structure of the majority of English word-groups, however, is different. The formula of this word-group can be represented as *an adjective + a deverbal noun*, e.g., *he is a heavy smoker*, *a poor learner*, *a slow starter*. Another English word-group used in similar cases has the structure *the verb to be + an adjective + an infinitive*, e.g., *he is quick to realize*, *he is slow to cool down*, etc., which is practically non-existent in the Ukrainian language. Commonly used English words of the type (*he is*) *an early-riser*, *a music-lover*, etc. have no counterparts in Ukrainian and, as a rule, correspond to phrases of the type *він рано встає*, *він любить музику*, etc.

at least the contrastive analysis deals with the



meaning and use of **situational verbal units**, i.e. words, word-groups, sentences which are commonly used by native speakers in certain situations. For instance, when somebody apologizes for inadvertently pushing you or treading on your foot and says "Вибачте!" ("I beg your pardon" or "Excuse me") a Ukrainian speaker in reply to the apology would probably say — "Нічого, будь ласка", whereas the verbal reaction in English would be different — "It's all right". "It does not matter". "Nothing" or "please" in this case cannot be viewed as words correlated with "Нічого, будь ласка".

- Task 13.** Give examples of problem pairs, i.e. words that denote two entities in one language and correspond to two different words in another language.
- Task 14.** Employing contrastive analysis, prove that correlated polysemantic words in English and Ukrainian are not co-extensive. Can the analysis show the teacher where to expect an unusual degree of learning difficulty?
- Task 15.** Compare the constituents of the lexico-semantic group for evaluating mental aptitude (*apt, bright, brilliant, clever, cunning, intelligent, shrewd, sly, dull, stupid, slow, foolish, silly, etc.*) in English with the corresponding Ukrainian semantic field of mental aptitude (здібний, хитрий, розумний, дурний, тупий, etc.). Are they the same or different? Are there instances of one-to-one correspondence or is the meaning of each word slightly different?
- Task 16.** With regard to collocations, learners seem to rely on a 'hypothesis of transferability'. The majority of collocational errors can be traced to L1 influence: \**make attention at* (from French *faire attention*) instead of *pay attention to*; \**win money* (from Bulgarian *печеля пари*) instead of *make money*; \**finish a conflict* (from German *einen Konflikt beenden*) instead of *resolve a conflict*. For this reason, it is argued that teaching and learning collocations can be facilitated by a contrastive approach to the concept of lexical collocation [Bahns, 1993: 58]. It is necessary to distinguish such collocations which the learner with a particular L1 background 'knows already' (because they are fully equivalent in his or her L1 and in English), from those collocations which are language-specific and which the learner really has to learn.

Divide collocations with *give* into fully equivalent in Ukrainian and English as to their structure, partially equivalent (in one of their components), and language specific.

**Medium-strength 'give+noun' collocations  
in English and Ukrainian: a contrastive view**

Fully Equivalent Collocations	Partially Equivalent Collocations	No Verbo-Nominal Equivalent
<i>to give advice</i> <i>дати пораду</i>	<i>to give accent</i> <i>робити наголос</i>	<i>to give a smile</i> <i>посміхнутися</i>
<i>to give orders</i> <i>давати накази</i>	<i>to give a glance</i> <i>кинути погляд</i>	
<i>to give a promise</i> <i>дати обіцянку</i>		
<i>to give a signal</i> <i>дати сигнал</i>		

**Summary of the common collocates for *give*  
in medium-strength 'verb + noun' collocations**

1	Nouns pertaining to communication by speaking or by means other than speech, as by writing, signs, signals or sounds	<i>account, admonition, advice, answer, assurance, caution, command, confirmation, description, directions, explanation, guarantee, hint, instructions, notice, oath, order, promise, recommendation, reply, report, response, suggestion, warning, indication, sign, signal</i>  <i>bark, buzz, call, cheer, chuckle, cough, crack, croak, cry, giggle, groan, growl, grunt, hiss, laugh, knock, moan, peep, ring, roar, scream, shout, shriek, sigh, sneeze, tap, whistle, yap, yell, yelp</i>
2	Nouns denoting feelings	<i>comfort, courage, delight, discomfort, excitement, feeling, fright, hope, joy, love, pain, pleasure, relief, sadness, satisfaction, scare, shock, thrill</i>
3	Nouns denoting mental activity	<i>attention, application, care, consideration, heed, mind, thought, credence, credit</i>
4	Nouns denoting physical actions	<i>beating, flogging, slating, smacking, thrashing, bang, blow, jerk, kick, knock, nudge, punch, shove, hug, press, squeeze, turn, twist, wrench, wring, pull, pluck, push, tug, tow, nip, pinch, touch, brush, clean, dust, rinse, rub, scrape, scrub, shake, shave, soak, souse, stir, spin, sweep, swill, wash</i>

	Nouns denoting movement	futter, jerk, shake, shiver, shryu, shudder, start, quiver, twitch, wag, wave, bounce, hop, jump, leap, lurch, pitch, roll
6	Nouns of visual perception	gaze, glance, look, leer, peek, stare, frown
7	Nouns denoting physiological actions	smile, grin, leer, sneer, blink, wink

□ **Task 17.** Give examples of analytical constructions of different language levels. What are their counterparts in Ukrainian?

□ **Task 18.** Compare analytical and synthetic ways of expressing similar ideas in the following sentences. Translate the sentences.

1) ... when his brother let go of his hand (Parker). — The mother Superior released her hand (Maugham). 2) The dog-musher let go of him (London). — For one instant she clung to him more closely ... and she released him (Maugham) 3) ... and now he let go the artillery of his rage (Fitzgerald). —... she released all her emotions in prayer healing (O'Connor). 4) The oxygen of the acid combined with the carbon ... let go a quantity of caloric (NED). — ... she plunged the needle into the tiny cavity, released the opium (Green). 5) ... it would not astonish her if that commenced to let fall the bombs (Fitzgerald). — ... the aeroplanes at some prearranged signal began to release their bombs (Fitzgerald). 6) ... she let fall a five-dollar bill (Styron). — ... he stopped and dropped a bill on the counter (Robbins). 7) I thought they would not let slip a chance like this (Pinto). — ... to miss an opportunity (NED). 8) ... they make-believe to believe (Jespersen). — I came down here full of formulae, the things that everybody believes or pretends to believe (Cronin). 9) I made believe to read my French book (Jespersen). — He sat in one of the window seats glumly pretending to read (Huxley).

□ **Task 19.** Read the following sentences. Comment on the ways of translating analytical lexical units into Ukrainian and Russian.

1) She let go of his hand (Fowles). — Вона вивільнила руку. 2) I therefore let go the cord (Swift). — Я кинув свої шворки. 3) He had to let go of her hand (Fowles). — Девідові довелось відпустити Діанину руку. 4) ... upon this ladder one of them mounted, and let fall plumb-line from my collar to the floor (Swift). — Вони приставили до моєї ший драбину і, вилізши на верхній її щабель, спустили від мого коміра до підлоги важок на мотузку. 5) ... that a prince should from a nice unnecessary scruple let slip an opportunity put into his hands (Swift). — Монарх з якоїсь непотрібної, недоречної вибагливості відмовляється від що найпевнішої нагоди стати

цілковитим володарем життя, волі й майна. 6) ... and you have to keep making believe you give a damn if the football team loses (Salinger). — ... да еще вечно притворяются, что им очень важно, проиграть их футбольная команда или нет. 7) Inside me ... I've been making believe I was a little girl (Saxton). — Где-то в глубине души я стараюсь внушить себе, что я снова стала ребенком. 8) He seemed unaware of the irony: that he still had not managed to make do with one (Fowles). — Він, здавалося, не відчув іронії власних слів: сам він і досі не погоджувався на одну. 9) I dropped about a thousand hints, but I couldn't get rid of him (Salinger). — Я раз сто намекал ему, но никак не мог от него отделяться. 10) She was trying to get rid of her, you could tell (Salinger). — Было видно, что она старается поскорей от нее избавиться. 11) The worthless ones were to be got rid of (London). — Выбывших из строя собак нужно было сбить с рук. 12) Shall I get rid of Strickland for you? (Maugham). — Хочешь, я сейчас пойду и выгоню Стрикленда?. 13) When he had got rid of his last match he said ... (Green). — Позбувшись останнього, він сказав ... . 14) When I made you get rid of your little secretary on the magazine I ought to have known you'd get rid of me the same way (Hemingway). — Когди я змусила тебе спекатися тієї твоєї секретарочки, мені слід було б подумати, що так само колись ти спекаєшся ї мене. 15) I had discovered that was the best way to get rid of friends (Hemingway). — Я давно впевнився, що так найкраще спроваджувати друзів. 16) I know. But I can't get started (Hemingway). — Та знаю. Але я ніяк не зберуся: 17) On other days they were unable to get started at all (London). — ... а бывало и так, что вовсе не могли tronуться с места.

- Task 20. Read the following sentences and describe the properties of analytical lexical units. Think of the possible ways of rendering their meaning into synthetic languages.

**Model 1: *let + Vinf (go, fall, fly, drop, pass, rip, run, slip)***

A. 1) Margaret let go of his jacket (Parker). 2) Christopher has not let go of Jina's hand (Claman). 3) In the end they would be let go. (London). 4) I didn't let go though (Salinger). 5) I offered him a cigarette and he had some difficulty in lighting it without letting go of his hat (Maugham). 6) If Stan lets go will you promise not to make any noise? (Hailey). 7) If one let go — and, in the relaxation from strain, he felt an alarming impulse to let go — one died very quickly and painlessly (Fitzgerald). 8) The hairy man could spring up into the trees and travel ahead as fast as on the ground, swinging by the arms from limb to limb, sometimes a dozen feet apart, letting go and catching, never falling, never missing his grip (London). 9) Of course, he'll never let go (Aldridge). 10) No, let go of me, let go of me, Bill (Cheever).

B. 1) I say you are not going to let rip among them with a shot gun (Doyle). 2) But when she let fly with that, I thought to myself, 'All right, my baby, now this time you've gone a bit too far (Priestley). 3) Surely, I thought,

they would not let slip a chance like that (Pinto). 4) But sitting there — desolate, weak beyond description, terrified, utterly lost — I knew that I had

let slip all my underpinnings ... (Styron). 5) She may have let slip something (Christie). 6) Let me not let pass occasion which now smiles (Milton). 7) Find its Latitude by letting fall the perpendicular (NED). 8) Seimour's election was let fall (NED). 9) Having let run their sheets and halyards ... (NED). 10) You'll not let drop a word ... (Jespersen). 11) ... as though there were a name she had forgotten and yet was lurking near her tongue, and then suddenly lifted, to let rise a memory not so grand but full of mellowing joy (Snow).

#### Model 2: *make + Vinf (believe, do)*

1) He makes believe to work a little now and then (NED). 2) ... the puppy rushed at the stick and made believe to worry it (Carrol). 3) We will make believe that there are fairies in the world (NED). 4) I was just making believe that ... (Kirchner). 5) Your highness is to be made believe that ... (Kirchner). 6) He had to make believe he was looking at something at Linda's side (Selby). 7) I can make do with a good deal of what we've got for my bedroom (Maugham). 8) And stuck in the void with me were maybe eight million other souls, whirling around, making believe the void didn't exist (Shaw). 9) If Solomon sinned not in making believe he would do that which was unlawful to be done (NED). 10) Just make believe to yourself that he's choppin' out on you at the trainin' quarters (London).

#### Model 3: *get + Ven (rid, left, shut, set, started, stuck)*

A. 1) You mean she'll get rid of the gun? (Gardner). 2) Trudy bore these knives and forks into the dining room with a sense of having been got rid of with a view to being talked about (Spark). 3) When he had got rid of his last match he said ... (Green). 4) Get rid of it, Georgie, before it gets rid of you (Priestley). 5) Nobody could understand why we did not get rid of the dog (Thurber). 6) It's why I'm getting rid of you (Hailey). 7) But they have got rid of me (Styron). 8) I first visited Italy shortly after the Second World War, when we in Britain had still not entirely shaken off our habit of thinking of Italy as a country ground down by a fascist dictator who would never be got rid of (Morning Star). 9) The main factor in getting rid of irregularities is group influence, or analogy (Sweet). 10) Women are always telling me how men follow them in the streets ... . Sometimes, they have an awful bother getting rid of them (Maugham). 11) I had discovered that was the best way to get rid of friends (Hemingway). 12) It's high time we got rid of the cane (Green).

B. 1) A piece of fat bacon got stuck to the sole of my shoe (O'Brien). 2) I guess I'll get started pretty soon (Styron). 3) Miss P. got left as she'd make chums only with the second officer and he wasn't allowed ashore (Waugh). 4) So they've got set to defend themselves if necessary (Leinster). 5) I was glad in a way to get shut of such blood money (Styron). 6) ... it was a choice between using their cached sand cars or getting stuck in the noonday sun (Heinlein). 7. Get started (Claman).

**take care**

1) I more or less take care of this place (Styron). 2) I was certain that Silk would take care of him (Robbins). 3) Please don't think I'm taking care of these arrangements for the sake of your brother (Snow). 4) He ... had taken care each time to arrive back home as late as possible (Prieslley). 5) I never knew who took care of the children (Lee). 6) ... that at least was taken care of (Fowles). 7) We'll take care of everything (Salinger). 8) Well, it meant the next six years taken care of five of them without expenses (Wyndham). 9) She promised to take care of me (O'Brien). 10) ... and he found himself taking care of ordinary involuntary physical acts (Snow). 11) I'm tired of just going to the theatre and taking care of myself (Maugham). 12) Take care of Scout, you hear (Lee).

**get hold**

1) Get hold of Billy (Spark). 2) I don't seem to have any success in getting hold of it (O.Henry). 3) He gets hold of the idea and than alters every situation to fit the idea (Green). 4) It was hard to get hold of anything (Abrahams). 5) Oh, I'll get hold of that daughter of mine (Priestley). 6) But this time I had got hold of a pair of binoculars (Clarke). 7) He got hold of the nurse in the corridor (Spark). 8) They've got hold of one scientist (Snow).

□ **Task 21.** Linking verbs can be found in English, French, Ukrainian, etc. Linking verbs having the meaning "change, become" are differently represented in each of the languages. In English, e.g., *become, come, fall, get, grow, run, turn*, in German — *werden*, in French — *devenir*, in Ukrainian — *становитися*. The task set before the linguist engaged in contrastive analysis is to find out which semantic and syntactic features characterize: 1) the English set of verbs (cf.: *grow thin, get angry, fall ill, turn traitor, run dry*); 2) the French (Ukrainian, German, etc.) set of verbs; 3) how the sets compare. Cf. the English word-groups *grow thin, get angry, fall ill* and the Ukrainian verbs *схуднути, почевоніти, захворіти*. Read the following sentences. Comment on the ways of translating simple verbal predicates in Ukrainian into English.

1) Заснув він, коли вже розвиднілось (Хвильовий). — He fell asleep after it became completely light. 2) А туча розросталась, навколо посутеніло (Гончар). — The black storm cloud grew, it became dark all around. 3) Тобі страшенно везе. — You're terribly lucky. 4) Може мене млостить від цього (Гончар). — Maybe it makes me sick. 5) Дніпро брудніте, від гуркоту машин глухнете (Гончар). — You're polluting the Dnipro, growing deaf from the clatter of machinery. 6) Час ущільнюватиметься, віки старітимуть, а мистецтво молодітиме вічно (Гончар). — Time will become condensed, the ages will grow old, but art will remain young forever. 7) Крізь смагу поблід (Гончар). — He grew pale under his tan.

- Task 22\*. Think of the ways of translating the following monolexemic verbs into English: *задуматися, замовіннути, посивіти, побіліти, помолодшати, полисіти, змерзнуть, спізнатися, помудрішати, заснути, почервоніти, нудігувати, помилятися.*
- Task 23. Read the following pairs of sentences. Compare the transitive and intransitive uses of ergative verbs. Comment on their semantico-syntactic structure. How is the category of ergativity rendered in Ukrainian?

1) When I opened the door, there was Laverne. — Suddenly the door opened. 2) He was slowing his pace. — She was aware that the aircraft's taxiing pace had slowed. 3) An explosion shook the room. — The whole room shook. 4) I shattered the glass. — Wine bottles had shattered all over the pavement. 5) He should have closed the beaches. — The street markets have closed. 6) She had crashed the car twice. — Pollock's car crashed into a clump of trees.

- Task 24\*. Ergative verbs in their transitive and intransitive uses fill in the position of the simple verbal predicate. The change-of-state ergative verbs denoting change/position in space (*swing, blow, fly, flash, drop, flutter, slide, fall, roll, hang, yawn, jump*), production of sound (*click, snap, slam, clang, crack, crash, pop, bang, hiss*) destruction (*break, tear, bust, crack, burst, rip, smash*) are used in the function of the link verb in the compound (double) predicate, collocating with the predicative adjectives *open, shut, loose, short*, etc. Comment on the structure of the compound predicates in the following sentences. Think of adequate ways of translating them into Ukrainian. What is the meaning of the pattern *verb + adjective + (object)?*

A 1) He rang the bell and the door swung open (Maugham). 2) The curtains swung open (Golding). 3) The door sprang open (Golding). 4) The door swung shut (Hornby). 5) The door clicked shut (Golding). 6) The lid snapped shut (Longman). 7) ... and find only Willis with his mouth hanging open (Golding). 8) She heard the door bang shut (Steinbeck). 9) Then the door jumped open again (Brush). 10) His mouth dropped open, but he couldn't find any words (Robbins). 11) The gate slid open at the push of a button (Robbins). 12) Her eyes fluttered open (Robbins). 13) When the small green door yawned open he sighed deeply (Brush). 14) You crazy? All hell is ready to burst open under you and you're grinning (Robbins). 15) About midnight the doors flew open and at once was pushed shut (Brush). 16) She

uttered a fore-shortened scream ... realizing as her eyes popped open that her hand had grazed the chin of an antlered stag (Styron). 17) I heard the clank of chains as the gate rolled open (Robbins).

B 1) He pushed open the door (Coppard). 2) He drew open the door of the dining-room (Murdoch). 3) She sat up in bed, tore open the letter, and read (Mansfield). 4) The stewardess flung open the door (Cheever). 5) "What a trip!" I crowed, cutting open another can of beer (Styron). 6) ... and the wind had blown open a window (Shaw). 7) ... after prying open a stuck cigarette box, you would find an old shirt button (Cheever).

**Task 25.** Supplement the following sentences with the transitive (intransitive) counterpart.

1) Two girls got out and slammed the door. 2) I stopped him right in midsentence. 3) She broke hearts right and left. 4) She moved my hand from her cheek. 5) That afternoon the doctor closed her mother's eyes for good. 6) She moved to the other side of the headstore. 7) The sun shone on the same parasols, but everything had changed. 8) The twilight deepened.

**Task 26.** Make up sentences in which the following ergative verbs are used transitively and intransitively: *bake, begin, blacken, boil, brighten, burn, burst, cook, darken, deepen, defrost, fry, lessen, play, rest, sharpen, soften, strengthen, turn*.

### 2.3. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CONTRASTIVE ANALYSIS


The contrastive linguistic method (contrastive analysis) is helpful for the establishment of structural or semantic isomorphisms and allomorphisms in the contrasted languages. The object of contrastive analysis in general is the meaning, form and functioning of certain language units, their features or phenomena.

Contrastive analysis aims at providing an exhaustive account of the differences and similarities between the languages. It provides a model for comparison, defining such notions as *correspondence, equivalence, congruence, tertium comparationis*.

It is now universally recognized that contrastive linguistics is a field of particular interest to teachers of foreign languages.

It is common knowledge that one of the major problems in learning a foreign language is the interference caused by the

difference between the learner's mother tongue and the target



language. All the problems of foreign language teaching will certainly not be solved by contrastive linguistics alone. There is no doubt, however, that contrastive analysis has a part to play in evaluation of errors, in predicting typical errors and thus must be seen in connection with overall endeavours to rationalize and intensify foreign language teaching.

Contrastive analysis cannot be overestimated as an indispensable stage in preparation of teaching materials, in selecting lexical items to be extensively practised and in predicting typical errors. It is also of great value for an efficient teacher who knows that, in order to have a native-like command of a foreign language, to be able to speak what we call idiomatic English, words, word-groups and whole sentences must be learned within the lexical, grammatical and situational restrictions of the English language [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 184].

Nevertheless, a number of important issues concerning the status, methodology of contrastive analysis, its application remain disputable, engendering a skeptical attitude towards contrastive linguistics as a branch of linguistics [Виноградов, 1988: 39].

As indicated above, contrastive analysis can be carried out at three linguistic levels: phonology, grammar (morphology and syntax) and lexis (vocabulary). However, if contrastive analysis is to be carried to its logical conclusion, we cannot stop there: we must base our ultimate comparison on the culture.

Robert Lado [1957] was of the opinion that in order to compare two languages it was necessary to consider not only narrow linguistic features but a wide selection of social-cultural features in which the languages operate. The plan of his book rests on the assumption that we can predict and describe the patterns that will cause difficulty in learning and those that will not cause difficulty, by comparing systematically the language (sound-systems, grammatical structures, vocabulary systems, writing systems) and culture to be learned with the native language and culture of the student.

"Culture" is synonymous with the "ways of people". Cultures are structured systems of patterned behaviour, i.e. all these historically created designs for living explicit, implicit, rational, irrational and non-rational which exist at any given time as potential guides for the behaviour of men [Lado, 1957].

However, we need far more sophisticated techniques for cultural analysis and comparison than have yet been developed.

Divergent features and phenomena in the languages under contrastive linguistic investigation are considered to be irregularities or exceptions to some general rules. The aim of contrastive linguistics has never been to establish systemic relations on a global scale, or to establish universal features [Korunets', 2003: 23].

Despite all this, the contrastive linguistic method, when employed both synchronically and diachronically, provides the establishment of valuable theoretical and practical results providing the reliable data on various aspects of languages under investigation. Contrastive linguistics contributes greatly both to the aspect and characterological typologies of the investigated languages [Korunets', 2003: 23-24].

- **Task 27.** Contrastive analysis helps to distinguish cultural and implicit components of meaning which can be established only by means of contrastive analysis. Contrast the meanings of the Ukrainian verb *ceucmimy* and the corresponding English verb *to whistle*. Can you trace any differences in their evaluative connotations?



## STRUCTURAL METHODS OF ANALYSIS



### Unit 3

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#### OPPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS

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##### 3.1. THE ORIGIN OF OPPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS

Oppositional analysis is connected with the Prague School that created functional linguistics. The Prague School was founded in 1929 by Czech and Russian linguists V. Mathesius, B. Trnka, Nikolay Trubetzkoy, Roman Jakobson and others.

The main contribution of early Praguians to modern linguistics is the technique for determining the units of the phonological structure of languages. The basic method is the use of oppositions (contrasts) of speech-sounds that change the meaning of the words in which they occur.

**Oppositional analysis** was first introduced by Nikolay Trubetzkoy (1890—1938) who presented an important survey of the problem of phonology in his *Grundzüge der Phonologie* ("The Fundamentals of Phonology") published in Prague in 1939.

At the heart of oppositional analysis lies the well-known principle suggested by Ferdinand de Saussure who maintained that the system of language is to be studied on the basis of the oppositions of its concrete units.

In terms of N.S. Trubetzkoy's theory, **opposition** is defined as a functionally relevant relationship of partial difference between two partially similar elements of language. The common features of the members of the opposition make up its basis, the features that serve to differentiate them are distinctive features.

For example, in English the phoneme [b] is characterized by voicing, stop articulation (that is, it involves a complete closure as contrasted with various types of fricatives), and it is oral, that is non-

nasal. There is another phoneme [p] in English which shares all of those characteristics except voicing. In general, the features of a particular phoneme are not unique and the entire set consists of varying combinations of the same small inventory of features.

A phoneme is distinguished from all the other phonemes by a set of distinctive (differential) features, e.g. [p] is distinguished from [b] as a voiceless sound, from [t] as a bilabial, from [m] as having no nasalisation, etc. Thus any phoneme is defined as a set or 'bundle' of differential (distinctive) features.

The basic definitions are given by N. Trubetzkoy [1960: 53]:

1. If in a language two sounds occur in the same position and can be substituted for each other without changing the meaning of the word, such sounds are **optional variants of one and the same phoneme**. One and the same speaker of English, for instance, may pronounce one and the same voiceless plosive ([p], [t], [k]) in absolutely identical positions with a varying force of aspiration.

2. If two sounds occur in the same position and cannot be substituted for each other without changing the meaning of the word or distorting it beyond recognition, these two sounds are **phonetic realizations of two different phonemes**. Such are, for instance, the sounds [p] and [b] in the minimal pair of English words [pæk] (pack) and [bæk] (back).

3. If two similar sounds never occur in the same position, they are **positional variants of the same phoneme**. For example, the [k] sounds in the English words [ku:l] (cool), [sku:l] (school) and [lukɪt] (looked) are different from one another from an articulatory and therefore acoustic point of view, being respectively, aspirated, unaspirated and plosionless (unexploded). Each of these similar speech sounds occurs in a definite position in which no other of these sounds can ever occur; in other words they are mutually exclusive.

N.S. Trubetzkoy developed an elaborate set of contrast criteria for the identification (recognition) and classification of phonological oppositions.

Later on other researchers proved that the notion of opposition can be applied to elements of different linguistic status: phonemes, morphemes, words, word-forms, phrases, sentences, etc.

To grasp the idea of a **phonological opposition**, consider the relationship between minimally distinct phonemes [t] and [d], [s] and [z] or [f] and [v]. The members of these oppositions are distinguished from each other by absence vs. presence of sound (voiceless vs. voiced consonants).

Girl and girlish are members of a **morphemic opposition**.



They are similar as the root morpheme *girl* is the same. The distinctive feature is the suffix *-ish*. Due to this suffix the second member of the opposition belongs to a different part of speech.

*Man* and *boy* are members of a **lexical opposition** which is defined as the semantically relevant relationship of partial difference between two partially similar words [Arnold, 1986: 14]. In the opposition *man* :: *boy* the distinctive feature is the semantic component of age.

**Morphological (formal) opposition** may be well illustrated by the pair *play* :: *plays* which represents the opposition between the third person singular present tense, on the one hand, and the other persons of the singular plus those of the plural, on the other. In literary English, however, it also represents an opposition on a different plane: the form without *-s* is known as the Subjunctive, the one with *-s* as the Indicative, and the difference is said to be one of Mood. The meaning of each necessary grammatical abstraction makes itself clear in the course of actual usage [Rayevska, 1976: 61].

**Oppositional relations on the sentence level** are most obvious in the correlation between *Peter plays* and *Peter does not play* which gives the opposition *affirmation* :: *négation*. Correlation between *Peter plays* and *Does Peter play?* illustrates the opposition *declarative* :: *interrogative sentence* [Rayevska, 1976: 173].

It has become customary to designate opposition with the signs + or ::, e.g. *skilled* + *unskilled*, *skilled* :: *unskilled*. It may also be represented as a fraction, e.g.

$$\frac{\text{skilled}}{\text{unskilled}}$$

Linguistic elements may enter into several types of **oppositions** with other cognate elements.

1. **Oppositions between the members of the opposition:** *privative*, *gradual*, and *equipollent*.

The most widely known is the binary **privative opposition** in which one member of the contrastive pair is characterized by the presence of a certain feature which is lacking in the other member (hence 'privative', i.e. indicating negation or absence). The feature is said to mark the opposition. The element possessing the feature in question is called the **marked (strong) member of the opposition**, the other is called the **unmarked (weak) member of the opposition**. For example, the presence of voice marks the privative opposition [b] :: [p], the marked member of the opposition

characterized by this minimal distinctive feature being the phoneme [b]. In the privative opposition *boy* :: *lad* the distinctive feature is that of stylistic colouring of the second member. In morphology, privative oppositions may be illustrated by *book* :: *books*, *play* :: *is playing*, etc.

**Gradual opposition** is formed by a contrastive group of members which are distinguished not by the presence or absence of a feature, but by the degree of it. For example, phonemes [i:] :: [ɪ] :: [e] :: [æ] are differentiated by the degree of their openness. The verbs *affect* :: *torment* :: *torture* are distinguished by the degree of intensity implied in the inflicted suffering. In morphology, it is a minor type of oppositions, e.g. *strong* :: *stronger* :: *the strongest*.

In an **equipollent opposition** the members are logically equal. They may differ according to changes in their common distinctive feature. For example, [m] and [b] are both bilabial consonants, i.e. they have one distinctive feature in common. The members of the opposition *kid* "a child or young person" and *kid* "leather made from the skin of a kid or goat, used in making shoes and gloves" are transferred variants of *kid* "a young goat", but the transfer of meaning is of different type: in the first case, it is a metaphoric transfer based on similarity, in the second — metonymic transfer based upon the association of contiguity. Any string of stylistic synonyms may serve as an example of an equipollent opposition, e.g. *girl* :: *maiden* :: *lass*. In this case the basis of the opposition is the common feature "a young woman" and stylistic colouring is a differential feature. In morphology, it is a minor type of oppositions confined to formal relations only, e.g. opposition of the person forms *am* :: *is* :: *are*.

## 2. Oppositions defined with respect to the whole system of oppositions: proportional, isolated, and multi-dimensional.

**Proportional opposition** is based on **correlation** between sets of binary oppositions. It is composed of two subsets formed by the first and the second elements of each couple, i.e. opposition. Each element of the first set is coupled with exactly one element of the second set and vice versa. Each second element may be derived from the corresponding first element by a general rule valid for all members of the relation, e.g. [p] :: [b] = [t] :: [d] = [k] :: [g] = [f] :: [v] = [s] :: [z] = [θ] :: [ð].

Proportional oppositions allow researchers to discover some linguistic regularities. Observing the proportional opposition *child* :: *childish* = *woman* :: *womanish* = *monkey* :: *monkeyish* = *book* :: *bookish* it is possible to conclude that there is in English a type of

derived adjective consisting of a noun stem and the suffix *-ish*.

~~Opposition also shows that the stems are mostly those of animate nouns, and permits researchers to define the relationship between the structural pattern of the word and its meaning. Any word built according to this pattern contains a semantic component common to the whole group, namely, "typical of, or having the bad qualities of".~~

nouns, and permits researchers to define the relationship between the structural pattern of the word and its meaning. Any word built according to this pattern contains a semantic component common to the whole group, namely, "typical of, or having the bad qualities of".

**Isolated opposition** is limited to one pair of words only and there is no other pair the members of which have the same relations, e.g. *wit* :: *witness*, where the noun stem of the first member combined with the native English suffix *-ness* forms the name of the person, whereas in the majority of cases the suffix *-ness* is attached to adjectives and participles, forming abstract nouns denoting quality or state, e.g. *dark* :: *darkness* = *good* :: *goodness* = *kind* :: *kindness* = *obliging* :: *obligingness* = *prepared* :: *preparedness*.

When the basis of similarity is not limited to the members of one opposition but comprises other elements of the system, linguists call the opposition **poly-dimensional**. The presence of the same basis or combination of features in several words permits their grouping into a subset of the vocabulary system, i.e. lexical group.

An opposition existing between two elements may under certain conditions become irrelevant. This seems to be a universal feature in language development.

In various contextual conditions, one member of an opposition can be used in the position of the other, exemplifying the cases of **oppositional reduction** or **oppositional substitution**.

**Reduction** points out the fact that the opposition is cancelled, losing its formal distinctive force.

**Substitution** shows the very process by which the opposition is reduced, namely, the use of one member instead of the other. This kind of oppositional reduction (i.e. suspension of otherwise functioning opposition) is referred to as **neutralization of opposition**. The position of neutralization is filled in by the weak member of the opposition.

Examples of **neutralization** of oppositions on the phonemic level (the loss of a distinctive feature of one of a pair of phonemes that are otherwise differentiated on the basis of that feature) may be found in numbers. Phonological neutralization in English may be well illustrated by the absence of contrast between final *s* and *z* after *t*. Similarly, though we distinguish the English phonemes *p* and *b* in *pin*, *bin*, there is no such opposition after *s*, e.g. *split*, *splint*, *spray*.

Extending the concept of neutralization to the other levels of structure seems fully justified as having a practical value in the study of language both in general linguistics and with regard to English particularly. Neutralization of opposition in grammar may be illustrated by the sentence *I have no brother* (cf. *no brothers*). In *Man conquers nature* we observe generic use of *man* to denote "people in general, the human race, humankind", thus the weak member of the lexical opposition is used instead of the strong *mankind*.

In morphological derivation the opposition of animate personal nouns to all other nouns is in some cases sustained by such suffixes as *-or/-er, -ard/-art* (*braggart, novelist*) and a few others, but most often neutralized. Neutralization, as in the word *cultivator*, is also observed with such suffixes as *-ant, -er* that also occur in agent nouns, both animate and inanimate. Cf. *accountant* "a person who keeps accounts" and *coolant* "a cooling substance"; *fitter* "mechanic who fits up all kinds of metal-work" and *shutter* "a device regulating the exposure to light of a plate of film".

Another kind of reduction, by which one of the members of the opposition is placed in contextual conditions uncommon for it, is **transposition** based on the contrast between the members of the opposition. As a rule, transpositionally employed is the strong member of the opposition. For example, in *He is constantly complaining of something* the Present Continuous is used instead of the Present Indefinite to show the frequentative character of the action. Its use is stylistically marked: by exaggeration, it intensifies the implied disapproval of the man's behaviour.

- Task 28. Find privative, gradual, and equipollent oppositions in the following examples.

1) [p] :: [t], [f] :: [k], *sky* :: *heavens* :: *firmament* :: *welkin*, *make* :: *realize*, *differentiate* :: *divide*;

2) [t] :: [d], [k] :: [g], [p] :: [b], *strong* :: *weak*, *high* :: *low*, *able* :: *unable*, *girl* :: *lass*, *go* :: *went*;

3) [a] :: [o] :: [u], *dislike* :: *hate* :: *detest*, *good* :: *better* :: *the best*, *hot* :: *warm* :: *cold*, *white* :: *grey*;

- Task 29. Point out some linguistic regularities which can be disclosed by means of the following proportional oppositions.

1) *able* :: *unable* = *afraid* :: *unafraid* = *ashamed* :: *unashamed* = *changed* :: *unchanged* = *fair* :: *unfair* = *hurt* :: *unhurt*;

2) narrow :: narrowness = shallow :: shallowness = long :: length = .

wide :: width = deep :: depth = big :: size;

3) count :: countess = heir :: heiress = host :: hostess;

4) inconvenience (v) :: inconvenience (n) = pain (v) :: pain (n) =  
disgust (v) :: disgust (n) = anger (v) :: anger (n) = delight (v) :: delight (n);

5) eve :: evening = ire :: anger = maiden :: girl = main :: ocean =  
morn :: morning = slay :: kill = steed :: horse.

### 3.2. APPLICATIONS OF OPPITIONAL ANALYSIS

N.S. Trubetzkoy has stressed the fact that his technique of oppositional analysis may be used in other domains of linguistics. The method of oppositions has been successfully extended to grammar and semantics. It is equally effective on different linguistic levels (phonology, lexis, morphology, and syntax).

The principle of binary oppositions is especially suitable for describing **morphological categories**. As I.B. Khlebnikova [1964: 150] rightly points out, binary relations penetrate practically every plane of language — phonological, morphological, and syntactic, but are especially evident on the morphological level, which better than any other reflects the structural organization of a particular language, its intricate correlations and the interdependence of its units.

The principle of privative oppositions has been used by Roman Jakobson for describing the morphological categories of the Russian language. One of the most interesting examples is the description of the Russian case system in terms of binary privative oppositions. R. Jakobson proposed the following three distinctive features: A — direction, B — objectiveness, C — periphery. The result is represented in the following table where + (plus) means the presence of the feature in question, thus characterizing the corresponding case as the marked member of the opposition, and - (minus) indicates the absence of the feature in question, thus characterizing the corresponding case as the unmarked member of the opposition [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 32]:

Cases	Distinctive features	A	B	C
Nominative		—	—	—
Genitive		—	+	—
Dative		+	—	+

·Accusative	+	-	-
Instrumental	-	-	+
Prepositional	-	+	+

Thus the three rather abstract distinctive features proposed by R. Jakobson form 'bundles' one and only one of which is typical of each of the 6 Russian cases.

The principle of privative oppositions can be easily applied to English morphology.

The structure of a language is to a large extent conditioned by its system of formal oppositions proceeding from which we generally identify the morphological classes of words [Rayevska, 1976: 60-61]. In English the formal oppositions may be well illustrated by such pairs as *girl* :: *girls*, *girl* :: *girl's*; *I* :: *we*, *I* :: *me*, and the set of three *he* :: *she* :: *it*. It is around such oppositions (also called *opposemes*) that the grammatical system of the language is to a large extent built up. Similar formal oppositions among the verbs are *play* :: *plays* and *play* :: *played*. Cf. also the set of three *am* :: *is* :: *are*.

The general notions of grammar which determine the structure of language and find their expression in inflection and other devices are generally called **grammatical categories**.

In studying grammatical categories, researchers often have to resort to oppositions, that is, pairs of grammatical forms opposed to each other in some way. As is known, a grammatical category is generally represented by at least two grammatical forms, otherwise it cannot exist. A simple case of oppositions in pairs of grammatical forms will be found, for instance, between the Singular and the Plural in nouns, or, say, between Active and Passive in verbs.

In dealing with grammar it is often useful to observe such contrasts in terms of marked and unmarked members.

In binary oppositions between pairs of categories one member (the marked member) signals the presence of a general or overall meaning, while the unmarked member may either signal absence of the marked meaning or else be noncommittal as to its absence or presence. Thus *love* and *loved* are in contrast as present and past but only the latter is actually marked as such; *love* is unmarked and as such may be much more widely used than merely as a present in contrast with *loved*.

From the point of view of form, the passive voice is the marked member of the opposition: its characteristic is the pattern *be + participle II*, whereas the active voice is unmarked: its characteristic is the absence of that pattern.

It is fairly common that of two members of an opposition one has a definite meaning whereas the meaning of the other is less

definite, or vague. Prof. B.A. Illyish [1965: 99] points out that the opposition between perfect and non-perfect forms is shown to be that between a marked and an unmarked item, the perfect forms being marked both in meaning (denoting precedence) and in morphological characteristics (*have + participle II*), and the non-perfect forms — unmarked both in meaning (precedence not implied) and in morphological characteristics (purely negative characteristic: the collocation *have + participle II* not used).

The problem of oppositions on the morphological level has not been completely solved as yet and remains a source of constant interest in modern language studies.

The principle of privative oppositions was used to represent the traditional **sentence-parts** of the basic (independent declarative non-emotional) two-member sentence type. The parts of such a sentence type are defined by their position in the structure of the sentence: the subject to the left of the verb-predicate, the object to the right of the verb, the adverbial modifier to the right of the object (if any); the attribute, which may appear as an optional sentence-part, occupies the position in contact to the noun.

The syntactic relations of the sentence parts are characterized by three distinctive features: A — subordination, B — predicativeness, and C — objectiveness — feature connected, but not without reservation, with the possibility of changing the active to the passive construction. Thus we have [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 34]:

Sentence-parts	Distinctive features	A	B	C
Subject		—	—	—
Predicate		—	+	—
Attribute		+	—	—
Object		+	+	+
Adverbial modifier		+	+	—

An application of the oppositional method has also been extended to describe different **types of simple sentences and variants of one and the same sentence**.

Different sentence-types (the opposites) are those that cannot be substituted for each other without changing the structural meaning of the sentence. Here belong [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 33-35]:

1. Two-member sentences as against one-member sentences, e.g. *John worked* as against *John!* or *Work!*

2. Sentences differing in the arrangement of the main constituents in basic sentences, e.g. *We saw a river there* as against *There is a river there.*

3. Sentences differing in the case-form of the subject-noun, e.g. *Mary was a happy girl* as against *Mary's was a happy life.*

Variants of one and the same sentence-type are those that can be substituted for each other without changing the structural meaning of the sentence or distorting it beyond recognition. The following variants are recognized:

a) **Positional variants** — context sensitive sentences in which one of more elements are left out but can be unambiguously inferred from the preceding sentence. There are two kinds of positional variants: included and adjoined.

**Included positional variants** — such as can be placed in the position occupied in the preceding sentence by a question word or a word which is repeated in the positional variant, e.g. *Who gave you that?* — Soames. *Where did she see him?* — *In the park.* *What do you think I am made of?* *Leather?* Soames gave it her. — *Who?*

**Adjoined positional variants** — can be optionally added to the preceding sentence, e.g. *I am leaving. Tonight. Immediately.*


b) **Optional variants** — extended sentences as against unextended sentences, the unextended sentences being understood as having objects, etc., in accord with the valence of the verb (necessary to make the sentence complete), e.g. *She saw him* and *She saw him yesterday in the park.* *Put these things on the table* and *Put these things on the table immediately.*, etc.

c) **Stylistic variants**, which may be **emotional**, e.g. *I saw her!* *She is such a darling!* and **colloquial**, e.g. *Father in town?* *Lost my job, Vic. Ever had practice? Where from?*

Sentence-types in which one or more elements seem to be left out but cannot be unambiguously inferred from the context are different sentence-types, e. g. *Nothing to complain of.* — *There is nothing to complain of.* *We (I) have nothing to complain of.* *A change coming.* — *There is a change coming.* *A change is coming.*

- **Task 30.** Illustrate with your own examples the role of oppositions in the description of morphological categories in English (e.g. case, tense, aspect, time correlation, voice, mood, person, number, etc.).

- Task 31. Find the positional variants of simple sentences in the following examples [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 39-40].



1) "Tom!" — No answer. 2) She shuddered. "Horrible weather," she commented. 3) "Whatever induced him to do such a dreadful thing?" — "The climate." 4) "Water! For Heaven's sake, water!" 5) A knock at the door. "Your hot water." 6) "Do you want roast beef or tongue?" — "Roast beef." 7) "Who told you that? Harold?"

- Task 32. Find the colloquial stylistic variants in the following examples [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 40].

1) "It's getting dark," she said. "Be dark in half an hour," Harry said. 2) "I've never been there, you know." — "Been in India?" 3) "Being noble now, Owen? You needn't, you know."

- Task 33. Find the included and the adjoined positional variants in the following sentences [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 40].

1) "So here I am. For a few days," he added. 2) "Where do you come from?" — "Paris." 3) "I may get married." — "To Celeste?" — "Yes, to Celeste." 4) "What am I? Her uncle?" 5) "Where is he?" — "Here." 6) "Harold was always very abstentious." — "Here," said the widow. "Did he drink?" — "Like a fish." 7) "Did you come to see your aunt?" — "No, to see my uncle." 8) "This so-called town of yours hasn't any width. Just length." 9) "Do you like Bart, dear?" — "Like him? We have nothing in common." 10) "What do you do when you are on leave? Play golf? Sail a boat? Go fishing?"

### 3.3. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF OPPOSITIONAL ANALYSIS

Oppositional analysis has proved to be relevant and helpful in linguistics. This principle of opposition is of paramount importance because no unit has any linguistic significance by itself. Its significance can arise only out of its contrast with other units in the structural patterns of a particular language system.

The following quotation summarizes the Prague School conception of structuralism and the significance of oppositional analysis in linguistics [Arnold, 1986: 276]: every concept in a given system is determined by all other concepts of this system and has no significance in itself alone; it does not become unequivocal until it is

integrated into the system, the structure of which it forms part, and in which it has a definite fixed place.

The most-favoured principle of the Prague School is the **principle of binarity**, according to which the whole of language should be reducible to sets of binary oppositions. Perhaps the best known advocate of the theory of binary oppositions is R. Jakobson, who has applied this kind of analysis to the Russian system of case, to the Russian verb system, and even to the English verb system [Rayevska, 1976: 27-28]. In these studies, R. Jakobson analyzes grammatical concepts in terms of sets of two mutually opposite grammatical categories, one of which is marked while the other is unmarked or neutral.

The principle of binarity and the type of binary oppositions have been severely criticized for simplified representation of linguistic reality. But, as I.V. Arnold [Арнольд, 1991: 38] points out, simplification is inevitable in any modelling or abstraction.

Notwithstanding the criticism, oppositional analysis is especially useful in studying language as a system and making classifications of various types [Арнольд, 1991: 39].

Oppositional analysis combines well with almost all other methods of linguistic analysis, e.g. with distributional, componential and contextual analyses.

- **Task 34.** Any linguistic phenomenon — phoneme, morpheme or word — gets its function from being in contrast with other comparable phenomena in the system. Linguistic elements are opposed to each other, and each of the distinctive features involves a choice between two terms of an opposition that displays a specific differential property, diverging from the properties of all other oppositions. Supply your own examples to prove this statement.

## Unit 4

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### DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS

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#### 4.1. DEFINING DISTRIBUTION AND DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The term **distribution** is used to denote the possible variants of the immediate lexical, grammatical and phonetical environment of a linguistic unit (phoneme, morpheme, word, etc.).

According to Z. Harris [1961: 15-16], the distribution of an element is the total of all environments in which it occurs, i.e. the sum of all the (different) positions (or occurrences) of an element relative to the occurrence of other elements.

By the term *distribution* we understand the occurrence of a linguistic unit relative to other units of the same level (words relative to words, morphemes relative to morphemes, etc.).

The distributional value of the verb *get*, for instance, may be shown by the following examples:

get + N	(notional verb)	get a book
get + A	(copula-type verb)	get cool
get + V <sub>inf</sub>	(semi-auxiliary verb of aspect)	get to think
get + V <sub>ing</sub>	(semi-auxiliary verb of aspect)	get thinking
get + prep + V <sub>ing</sub>	(semi-auxiliary verb of aspect)	get to thinking
get + N + V <sub>inf</sub>	(causative verb)	get him to work
get + N + V <sub>ing</sub>	(causative verb)	get the watch going
get + N + V <sub>en</sub>	(causative verb)	get it done
get + V <sub>en</sub>	(the so-called passive auxiliary)	get killed
have got + V <sub>inf</sub>	(modal verb)	it has got to be done
get + V <sub>en</sub>	(function verb of an analytical lexical unit)	get rid

Distribution is a factor of linguistic context, it implies the position of an element and its combinability with other elements in this or that particular context [Morokhovska, 1993: 54].

**Distributional analysis** aims at analyzing linguistic elements in terms of their distribution. It is directed at the setting up of elements and the statement of the distribution of these elements relative to each other [Rayevska, 1976: 29].

Distributional analysis was recognized as primary in importance in structural (descriptive) linguistics in the 1930s-50s.

Descriptive linguistics deals with the regularities in the distributional relations among the elements of speech, i.e. their occurrence relatively to each other within utterances. The approach to the problem is consequently based on the principles of distributional analysis. Great contribution to distributional analysis was made by L. Bloomfield, Z.S. Harris, R.S. Wells, Ch.F. Hockett, W. Francis, Ch. Fries and other linguists.

Distributional analysis was not something quite novel in English linguistic theory. Occurrence of an element relative to other elements, now generally referred to as *distribution*, has been involved in almost every grammatical statement since antiquity. But the difference between the traditional and structural approaches consists in that the former did not rely upon this method as part of an explicitly formulated theory, whereas modern linguistics has given recognition, within the theory of grammar, to the distributional principle, by which traditional grammarians were always guided in practice [Rayevska, 1976: 30]. Distributional analysis in its various forms is commonly used nowadays by linguists of different schools.

Defining word classes for distributional analysis depends on the structural use of the word in the sentence.

Observation is facilitated by **coding**. In this, words are replaced by conventional word-class symbols. Each analyst suggests some variant suitable to his/her particular purpose. A possible version of notation is N for nouns and words that can occupy in the sentence the same position, such as personal pronouns. To indicate the class to which nouns belong subscripts are used, so that  $N_p$  means a personal noun,  $N_m$  — material noun,  $N_{abstr}$  — an abstract noun, etc. V stands for verbs,  $V_{aux}$  — auxiliary verb,  $V_{mod}$  — modal verb,  $V_{link}$  — link verb, etc. A — stands for adjectives and their equivalents, D — for adverbs and their equivalents, prep — for prepositions, d — for determiners, etc. Prepositions and conjunctions are sometimes not coded [Arnold, 1986: 279].

Observation is further facilitated by simplifying the examples so that only words in direct syntactic connection with the head-word remain. Thus, when studying the verb *to make*, for example, *The old man made Henry laugh aloud* may be reduced to *The man made Henry laugh* [Arnold, 1986: 280]. Until recently the standard context was taken to be the sentence, now it is often reduced to a phrase, so that this last example may be rewritten as *to make somebody laugh*.

When everything but the head-word of the phrase is coded we obtain the **distributional formula**: *make +  $N_p$  + V*.

The examples collected are arranged according to their

distributional formulas, and the analyst receives a complete idea of the environments the language shows for the word in question. The list of structures characteristic of the word's distribution is accompanied by examples:

make + a + N	<i>make a coat, a machine, a decision</i>
make + (the) + N + V	<i>make the machine go</i>
make + A	<i>make sure</i>
make + a + A + N	<i>make a good wife</i>

Distribution is the matter of speech, it is describable in terms of positions and in terms of positional classes (distributional classes) of fillers for these positions. Therefore, the distribution of an element is given by the **distributional formula** which is the contextual pattern of the environment characteristic of the concrete occurrence of a linguistic unit. For procedural purposes the element whose distribution is under analysis remains unsymbolized in order that the concrete environment of a concrete element should be outlined and patterned. The contextual positions in the environment of the unit under consideration are identified as function-slots which can be filled with the elements of the appropriate fillers-class. Each positional slot of the pattern should be symbolized accordingly. For this purpose conventional symbology is commonly used [Morokhovska, 1993: 54].

A phrase, all elements of which, including the head-word, are coded, is called a **distributional pattern**, for instance *to make somebody laugh* — to  $V_1 N_p V_2$ .

The subscripts 1, 2, etc. show the order of appearance of different members of the same class. The coding helps researchers to be on the alert for the distinction between classes (e.g. noun, verb), subclasses (e.g. personal noun, transitive verb) and class-members or elements (e.g. *make, somebody, laugh*).

It must be noted that in each of the above examples the meaning of the verb *make* is different. Some of these patterns, however, may be used for several meanings of the word *make*, so that the differentiation of meanings is not complete. Compare, for instance, the following sentences, where the pattern *make + N* remains unchanged, although the meaning of *make* is not the same: *60 minutes make an hour, 60 people make a decision*. To verify this difference of meaning, a substitution test may be used. *To make a decision* can be substituted by *to decide*, so that *60 people make a decision* → *60 people decide*. No such substitution is possible for the first example.

Looking for the condition on which such difference is based, linguist collects further examples, and finally states that the difference depends on the class of the noun which follows the verb *make*. When it is an abstract noun *make* has a very general meaning and serves as a function verb. If, on the other hand, it is a noun denoting some unit of measurement (in a very broad meaning of the word), *make* is synonymous with *compose*.

Three types of distribution are commonly distinguished in distributional analysis: *complementary*, *contrastive* and *non-contrastive* [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 51].

**Complementary distribution** is said to take place when two linguistic variants cannot appear in the same environment. Two units are said to be in complementary distribution if only one of them normally occurs in certain environments and only the other normally occurs in other surroundings. Thus, stems ending in consonants take as a rule the suffix *-ation* (e.g. *liberation*); stems ending in *pt*, however, take *-tion* (e.g. *corruption*) and the final *t* becomes fused with the suffix. Positional variants of the morpheme *-(e)s* [z], [s], [iz] are also in complementary distribution, cf.: *rooms*, *books*, *boxes*, etc.

**Contrastive distribution** is understood as a difference of two linguistic units occurring in the same environment and changing one linguistic form into another linguistic form, e.g. the zero suffix as against the *-s* suffix: *pen* — *pens*, *book* — *books*, etc. Different linguistic units may be characterized by contrastive distribution, i.e. if they occur in the same environment they signal different meanings, e.g. *measurable* — *measured*.

**Non-contrastive distribution** is understood as a difference of two linguistic units occurring in the same environment without changing one linguistic form into another linguistic form, e.g. *hoofs* — *hooves*, *wharfs* — *wharves*, etc.

- **Task 35.** Comment on the distributional value of the verb *get*. Identify its distributional formulas and lexical meaning in each of the following sentences [Starikova, Alova, 1980: 18].

1) I got to take care of myself (Lewis). 2) "And, uh, say, doctor, be sure and get Mr. Eathorne to come." (Lewis) 3) "Well, put on the gloves some time and see", Martin said with a smile. — "Sure, as soon as I get that laundry going." (London) 4) He suddenly seemed a man to contrive, to direct, to get things done (Lewis). 5) "Don't get too worried, take life like it comes." (Maltz) 6) I got to thinking: Lilla's a fine, big-hearted woman and she'll understand that Paul's had his lesson now (Lewis). 7) "If you're ready, darling", he said, "let's get going." (Lyon) 8) "I'm a fool, but I'm not such a bad

cuss, get to know me." (Lewis) 9) "I'll only get caught," Bironski said dully

~~in the trial I've got an idea, (Lewis)~~

- 11) At every street corner National Service posters proclaim that "we've got to be prepared", so we are getting ready (Jagger). 12) I must get him another shirt and a jacket for the winter (Hemingway). 13) Josephine got very red when this happened (Mansfield). 14) Your job was to get killed if the enemy attacked (Aldington). 15) You want to do something interesting and get paid for it (Dreiser). 16) He was worrying over how to get started (Maltz).

- **Task 36\***. Illustrate the distributional value of the verbs *come*, *go*, *take*, *talk* and *tell* in Modern English.
- **Task 37.** Define the type of distribution prefixes *in-*, *im-*, *ir-*, *il-* are characterized by. Their form depends on the initials of the stem with which they will assimilate: *im-* occurs before bilabials *b*, *m*, *p* (*imbalance*, *immoral*, *impossible*), its allomorph *ir-* before *r* (*irregular*). *il-* before *l* (*illegal*, *illiterate*), it is *in-* before all other consonants and vowels (*inability*, *indirect*, *inexpensive*, *invariable*).

#### 4.2. APPLICATIONS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Distributional analysis is widely applied for different purposes: to find out typical, most commonly used collocations, investigate the possibility or impossibility of certain types of meaning in definite types of collocations, differentiate between synonyms, classify word-groups, identify class-membership and functions of linguistic units, etc.

It is observed that in a number of cases words have different lexical meanings in different distributional patterns. Compare, for example, the lexical meaning of the verb *treat* in the following:

treat + N + D	<i>to treat somebody well</i> "to act or behave toward (a person) in some specified way"
treat + N + prep + N,	<i>to treat somebody to ice-cream</i> "to provide food, drink, entertainment at one's own expense"

The interdependence of distribution and meaning can be also observed at the level of word-groups. It is only the distribution of otherwise completely identical lexical units that accounts for the difference in the meaning of *water tap* and *tap water*. Thus, as far as

words are concerned the meaning by distribution may be defined as an abstraction on the syntagmatic level [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 192].

Distributional analysis is mainly applied by linguists to find out **sameness or difference of meaning**. It is assumed that the meaning of any lexical unit may be viewed as made up by the lexical meanings of its components and by the meaning of the pattern of their arrangement, i.e. their distributional meaning.

In a great number of cases the semantic difference between two or more synonyms is supported by the difference in distribution. **Distributional oppositions between synonyms** have never been studied systematically, although the amount of data collected is very impressive. The difference in distribution may be syntactical, morphological, lexical, and surely deserves more attention than has been so far given to it. It is, for instance, known that *bare* in reference to persons is used only predicatively while *naked* occurs both predicatively and attributively. The same is true about *alone*, which, irrespectively of referent, is used only predicatively, whereas its synonyms *solitary* and *lonely* occur in both functions. The function is predicative in the following sentence: *If you are idle, be not solitary, if you are solitary, be not idle* [Arnold, 1986: 182].

It has been repeatedly mentioned that *begin* and *commence* differ stylistically. It must be noted, however, that their distributional difference is not less important. *Begin* is generalized in its lexical meaning and becomes a semi-auxiliary when used with an infinitive, e.g. *It has begun to be done*. It follows naturally that *begin* and not *commence* is the right word before an infinitive even in formal style. *Seem* and *appear* may be followed by an infinitive or a *that*-clause, whereas *look*, which is stylistically equivalent to them is never used in these constructions. *Aware* and *conscious* are followed either by an *of*-phrase or by a subordinate clause, e.g. *to be aware of one's failure, to be aware that ones failure is inevitable*. Their synonym *sensible* is preferably used with an *of*-phrase [Arnold, 1986: 182].

Very often the distributional difference between synonyms concerns the use of prepositions: e.g. *to answer a question*, but *to reply to a question*. The adjectives *anxious* and *uneasy* are followed by the preposition *about*, their synonym *concerned* permits a choice and is variously combined with *about, at, for, with*.

An example of lexical difference in distribution is offered by the verbs *win* and *gain*. Both may be used in combination with the noun *victory*: *to win a victory, to gain a victory*. But with *war* only *win*

~~is possible~~; to win a war. We are here trespassing on the domain of

set expressions. It will suffice to point out that the phraseological combining possibilities of synonyms are extremely varied.

Distribution defined as occurrence of a lexical unit relative to other lexical units can be interpreted as co-occurrence of lexical items and the two terms can be viewed as synonyms.

Distributional analysis is of great significance for the study of **syntactical combinability** and **lexical collocability** in word-groups.

Lexical collocability is distinct from syntax in that one is concerned in collocation with each word as an individual lexical item in the company of other words as individual lexical items, and not, as in syntax, with words as members of classes in relation to other words also as members of classes (e.g. V + N, A + N, etc.). Speakers become accustomed to the collocations of words and the mutual expectancies that hold between them in utterances irrespective of their grammatical relations as members of word classes or as parts of speech. A rather obvious example is co-occurrence of a lexical item *perform* with *operation* or *commit* with *crime*.

While investigating lexical collocability of the verb *support* A.A. Loshakova [Лошакова, 1979], for instance, divides the process into the following stages:

1. Defining syntactical combinability of the verb *support* by establishing the main distributional patterns of this verb, e.g. N<sub>1</sub> (subject) + V + N<sub>2</sub> (object), etc.

2. Classification of lexical items which collocate with the verb into lexico-semantic groups, e.g. abstract nouns in the object position may denote: a) feelings (*alarm, antipathy*); b) belief or judgement (*opinion, motion, point of view, argument*); c) result of scientific research (*finding, data, information*); d) human activities (*meeting, strike, fight, struggle, campaign, attempt, effort*), etc.

3. Analysis of semantic peculiarities of these lexical items and establishment of some regularities of lexical collocability.

Of great importance is investigation of lexical restrictions in collocability that are of purely intralinguistic nature and cannot be accounted for by logical considerations. This can be, perhaps, best illustrated by comparing the collocability of correlated words in different languages. In English, for example, the verb *seize* may be combined with nouns denoting different kinds of emotions: *I was seized with joy, grief, etc.*, whereas in Ukrainian one can say *мене нудьга* (*відчай, сумнів*) *бере*, but the collocations *мене радістъ*

(надія) бере are impossible, i.e. the Ukrainian verb *брати* cannot be combined with nouns denoting pleasurable emotions.

The **classification of word-groups** is a much neglected subject. Most syntactic descriptions of a language distinguish different types of word-groups without making a systematic attempt to classify them. They usually distinguish the so-called subject-predicate group, the coordinative group, and a variety of others, such as verb-object, prepositional phrase, etc.

In his book *Language* [1933] Leonard Bloomfield presented the following classification, illustrated by means of examples taken from English: 1) endocentric constructions: coordinative (or serial), and subordinative (or attributive); 2) exocentric constructions.

L. Bloomfield's classification was made by means of criteria of distribution, i.e. syntactic use, in about the following way.

A group is called **coordinative**, if it has the same distribution as two or more of its members: *boys and girls*, *bread and butter*, *coffee, tea, and milk*.

A group is called **subordinative**, if it has the same distribution as one of its members: *fresh milk*, *very fresh*. In *fresh milk* the member *milk* is called the "head", and *fresh* the "adjunct".

Coordinative and subordinative groups are **endocentric**.

A group is called **exocentric** if it has a distribution different from either of the members, e.g. *John ran*; *with John*.

It is one of the merits of L. Bloomfield to have shown the importance of distribution as a criterion for classifying word-groups.

It is readily observed that a certain component of the word meaning is described when the word is identified distributionally. For example, in the sentence *The boy — home* the missing word is easily identified as a verb — *The boy went (came, ran, etc.) home*. Thus, the component of meaning that is distributionally identified is actually the part-of-speech meaning but not any individual lexical meaning of the word under analysis. It is assumed that sameness/ difference in distribution is indicative of sameness/ difference in the part-of-speech meaning [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 191].

Some linguists prefer to avoid the traditional terminology and establish a **classification of parts of speech** based only on the distributional analysis, i.e., their ability to combine with other words of different types. Thus, for instance, the words *and* and *but* will fall under one group, while *because* and *whether* are referred to as belonging to another group [Rayevska, 1976: 69].

The application of two methods of structural linguistics, distributional analysis and substitution, made it possible for Charles

Fries [1963: 94-100] to dispense with the usual eight parts of speech. He classified words into four *form-classes*, designated by numbers (class 1, class 2, etc.), and fifteen *groups of function words*, designated by letters. His classification is based on the assumption that all the words which can occupy the same "set of positions" in the patterns of English single free utterances without change of structural meaning must belong to the same class or group.

The classes suggested by Ch. Fries are based on distribution, i.e. they are syntactic positional classes.

Class I	Class II	Class III	Class IV
(The) concert	was	good	(always)
(The) team	went		there

In the four large classes, lexical meanings of words depend on the arrangement in which these words appear. In function-words it is usually difficult if not impossible to indicate a lexical meaning apart from the structural meaning which these words signal.

The form-classes correspond roughly to what most grammarians call nouns and pronouns, verbs, adjective and adverbs, though Ch. Fries especially warns the reader against the attempt to translate them into the old grammatical terms. The group of function words contains not only prepositions and conjunctions, but also certain specific words that most traditional grammarians would class as a particular kind of pronouns, adverbs and verbs.

Thus, the analysis of the distributional conditions in which linguistic elements occur is essential for the identification of their class-membership and for the identification of their functions in relation to other elements of the context.

- **Task 38.** Analyze and illustrate with examples the following distributional formulas: 1) (d) house + V; 2) d + house + N; 3) V + (d) house; 4)  $V_{obj}$  + prep + (d) house; 5) V + prep + house; 6) N + house + N<sub>1</sub>; 7) N + house + N<sub>1</sub> + prep + N<sub>2</sub>. Indicate the meaning of the element house depending upon the distribution of the latter.
  
- **Task 39\*.** Compare the meaning of the adjective *ill* in different distributional structures, e.g. ill + N: *ill look*, *ill luck*, *ill health*, etc. and V + ill: *fall ill*, *be ill*, etc.

- **Task 40.** Analyze the meanings the verb *put* may have in the pattern *put + N + prep + N<sub>1</sub>*. Indicate distributional classes of fillers for the N and N<sub>1</sub> slots. Comment on the factors which influence the realization of the verb's meanings [Morokhovska, 1993: 58].

1) Put your books on the desk. 2) Put the knob to the door. 3) Put your things in order. 4) Put this poem to music. 5) Put an end to the quarrel. 6) Put the defendant to prison. 7) Put this idea into your own words. 8) Put the girl to shame.

- **Task 41.** The meaning of the lexical units *smiler* (e.g. *She is a charming smiler*), *pullethood* and *henhood* (e.g. *Tiny — and in their own way lovely — balls of fluff [chickens] passed on into semi-naked pullethood and from that into dead henhood*) is easily understood on the analogy with other words having the same distributional pattern. Point out these distributional patterns and supply your own examples to illustrate them.

- **Task 42.** Comment on the grammatical idiomatism of the following word-groups, state factors influencing the realization of this or that meaning. Use word-groups accordingly [Morokhovska, 1993: 59].

to remember + V <sub>inf</sub>	to want + V <sub>inf</sub>	to stop + V <sub>inf</sub>
to remember + V <sub>ing</sub>	to want + V <sub>ing</sub>	to stop + V <sub>ing</sub>

- **Task 43.** Illustrate distributional oppositions between synonyms with your own examples.

- **Task 44\*.** Analyze lexical collocability of the verb *move*. Divide the process into the following stages: 1) defining the main distributional patterns of the verb *move*; 2) semantic classification of the lexical items which collocate with the verb *move* in the distributional pattern VN; 3) analysis of semantic peculiarities of the verb *move* in collocations with these lexical items.

1) His eyes moved slowly from the detectives. 2) Don't move that hand. 3) He kept moving his feet about. 4) He moved from side to side. 5) He moved in the direction of London. 6) He moved nervously about while Carry looked at him. 7) He moved towards the door. 8) Her hands aimlessly moved objects around. 9) I didn't move a muscle. 10) Life moves too fast. 11) She didn't move from the window. 12) The cry of the girl moved the father deeply. 13) The story moved us deeply. 14) The tale of tragedy moved her. 15) The youth moved sideways. 16) They moved from Tennessee to Texas.

- **Task 45\***. Analyze lexical collocability of the adjective *blind*. Divide the process into the following stages: 1) defining the main distributional patterns of the adjective *blind*; 2) lexico-semantic classification of the lexical items which collocate with this adjective in the distributional pattern AN; 3) analysis of semantic peculiarities of the adjective *blind* in collocations with these lexical items.

1) a blind ad (signed only with a box number); 2) a blind corner; 3) a blind man; 4) a blind mountain pass; 5) a blind passage; 6) a blind purchase; 7) a blind stupor; 8) blind chance; 9) blind faith; 10) blind flying; 11) blind fury; 12) blind handwriting; 13) blind love; 14) blind passion; 15) blind reasoning; 16) blind tenacity; 17) blind to arguments; 18) blind to danger; 19) blind type; 20) blind with rage; 21) legally blind; 22) to be blind.

- **Task 46.** *Cold water* is an endocentric construction, since it functions as would the noun *water*. *Greenhouse* is an endocentric compound, since it is a noun as is its head *house*. *In the garden* is an exocentric construction, since it does not function in the same way as the noun *garden*. The noun *bittersweet* is an exocentric compound, since it is a noun but its elements are both adjectives. Supply your own examples of endocentric and exocentric word-groups and compounds.

- **Task 47\***. It is quite clear that the distribution of a linguistic element helps us to identify the class-membership and the function of an element in the concrete conditions of its actual environment. Identify the word *question* in its class-membership, state its function, combinability and distribution [Morokhovska, 1993: 57].

1) No other question was so disputable than the one about food supplies. 2) The officer questions the prisoner in due time. 3) The path in question led up behind the house. 4) His wife at once questioned him. 5) I question the educational value of teaching a second language in primary schools. 6) I don't think there is anything more in question. 7) It was, beyond question, a magnificent performance. 8) He knew he should not put the question, but he could hold it back no longer. 9) She thought about a trip to Spain but dismissed it as out of the question. 10) The exchange of courtesies seemed to answer the questions that troubled me. 11) Andrew had discovered something about Noah which, ugly and unpleasant, brought into question the older man's competence to practice medicine. 12) "There is", he said, "the question of my equipment". 13) By the way, if it's not too personal a question, do you have fifty thousand dollars? 14) In recent times this kind of approach has been questioned. 15) It is assumed without question by

most constitutional writers and authorities. 16) A well-guarded secret on Mr Nixon's schedule was his visit to the Commons during question time.

### 4.3. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS

Distributional studies enable researchers to state a great deal about the total functioning and use of elements in a language. Especially with the development and use of the so-called **distributional-statistical analysis** [Супрун, Плотников, 1971; Шайкевич, 1976; Плотников, 1979, 1984] considerable precision and exhaustiveness, not available otherwise, seem within reach.

Distributional analysis is of great practical importance both in foreign language teaching and in computer-aided translation. The identification of the necessary meaning is based on the corresponding distribution that can signal it and must be present in the memory either of the pupil or the machine [Arnold, 1986: 176].


The weakness of distributional analysis, however, is that difference in distribution is not always indicative of difference in meaning and, conversely, sameness of distribution is not an absolutely reliable criterion of sameness of meaning.

Generally speaking, distribution is mainly the *result* of two factors: the meaning of the given word or group, and the semantic structure of the sentence, the "sentence-pattern", in the given language. The word or word-group is useable, or not useable, or useable under certain conditions only, as a certain member of a certain sentence pattern, if its meaning agrees with the semantic function of that member. The key fits, or does not fit, into the lock.

Distribution is not a reliable indicator of meanings, or of similarities and dissimilarities between meanings, because it is not only the result of meaning and sentence-pattern, but also of "disturbing factors", such as arbitrary idiom, and what may be called "personal idiom", as poetical licenses [Groot, 1975: 72-73].

- **Task 48.** Not all words that have the same syntactic distribution have the same meaning, and, conversely, not all words with different distribution have a different meaning. Illustrate this with your own examples.

#### 4.4. DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND VALENCY



By taking into consideration not only classes of words but subclasses as well distributional analysis becomes a tool of considerable accuracy and forms the basis for the development of a more elaborate and exact procedure called **valency analysis** [Arnold, 1986: 281].

M.D. Stepanova [Степанова, 1973] considers valency analysis to be a particular type (or subtype) of distributional analysis. Other researchers consider them to be two separate methods of linguistic research. According to I.V. Arnold [Арнольд, 1991: 45] valency analysis has much in common with distributional analysis, although it was developed independently and, unlike distributional analysis, it has no connections with structural (descriptive) linguistics.

The term **valency** (derived from Latin *valentia* "strength", "worth") was borrowed from chemistry. In chemistry, it reflects the number of bonds an atom can form. It denotes the relative combining capacity of an atom or group compared with that of the standard hydrogen atom. Hydrogen (H) always has valence 1, so other elements' valences equal the number of hydrogen atoms they combine with. Thus, oxygen (O) has valence 2, as in water ( $H_2O$ ); nitrogen (N) has valence 3, as in ammonia ( $NH_3$ ).

In linguistics, the term **valency** is used to denote potential combining power or typical co-occurrence of a linguistic element, i.e. the types of other elements of the same level with which it can occur.

The notion of valency was introduced into linguistics in 1934 by Lucian Tesnière. He defined valency as the ability of the verb to govern a number of other words in the sentence. A great contribution to valency analysis was made by S.D. Katsnelson, M.D. Stepanova, B.M. Leikina, and G. Helbig.

S.D. Katsnelson [Кацнельсон, 1948: 132] defined valency as the property of a word to be realized in a particular way in the sentence and enter into combinations with other words. Later he simplified this definition: valency is the ability of certain classes of words to attach other words. S.D. Katsnelson [Кацнельсон, 1987: 20] claimed that valency could be understood as a property of word meaning in which there are, figuratively speaking, "empty spaces" or "blanks" which have to be filled in combinations with other words. Thus, valency is the implicit indication contained in the word that points out that the word has to be combined with other words of certain types in the sentence.

Valency is illustrated by S.D. Katsnelson [Кацнельсон, 1987: 20] with examples from syntax. Valency of a predicate verb is characterized by the number of its open positions which necessarily have to be filled. Intransitive verbs denoting events such as *fall* and *drown*, for instance, are one-valent (univalent). In sentences, they have to be combined with the subject. Other examples of one-valent verbs are: *laugh*, *cry*, *jump*. Bivalent verbs *kill*, *find*, *catch* have the potential ability to combine with the subject and direct object. Trivalent verbs *give* and *present* have the ability to combine with the subject, direct object and indirect object.

Valency should be distinguished from the notions of *combinability*, *distribution* and *context*.

Since valency of linguistic units is their potential combining ability, it should be actualized in speech. This takes place in speech communication whenever linguistic units occur in actual speech units (utterances). The actualization of valency is achieved through the concrete **combinability** of linguistic units in quite concrete cases of their occurrence in speech units. The correlation of valency and combinability as linguistic potentiality and its actualization reflect the dichotomy of language and speech.

Combinability of linguistic elements is actualized in speech in a certain linguistic environment which is called *context*. The sum of all environments in which the given linguistic element occurs makes up its *distribution*. It follows that the actualization of valency is regulated and conditioned, in all respects, by contextual conditions, by the distributional conditions in particular.

E.J. Morokhovska [1993: 54] claims that the role of distribution in providing contextual conditions for the actualization of linguistic valency should, by no means, be underestimated. Such distributional conditions can be favouring and non-favouring for the actualization of the regular combining power (valency) of linguistic units and forms.

Several **types of valency** are commonly distinguished by linguists: 1) categorial (characteristic of the whole class of words) and individual; 2) grammatical, or syntactical, and lexical; 3) left-hand and right-hand; 4) obligatory and optional; 5) active (ability of head-components to attach dependent components in word combinations) and passive (ability of syntactically dependent components to be attached to head-components); 6) external (of notional words) and internal (of stems and affixes).

Categorial valency is specified by the categorial valent

properties of linguistic units. Their interaction makes the unit active in its syntagmatic behaviour when its valency is realized. Evidently, every lexico-grammatical class of notional words possesses categorial and subcategorial valency [Morokhovska, 1993: 51].

Due to their central role in the sentence notional verbs are the most syntagmatically active elements which realize their active valency functioning as "heads" in syntactic constructions of nominal and adverbial complementation: V + N and V + D.

According to their categorial valency substantive elements display patterning with the qualitative elements (adjectives) which are designed to denote qualities of objects and phenomena: *strong body, fruitful results, profound silence, sharp knives, prominent scholars*.

The noun possesses the strongest categorial valency as it has the potential ability to combine with almost all word classes forming both left-hand and right-hand connections with them.

The categorial valency of qualifying elements (adjectives and adverbs) is not strong, they pattern regularly with degree adverbs: *too imposing, very short, extremely difficult, easily enough*.

**Subcategorial and individual valencies** are in full accord with the categorial valency of linguistic units.

**Grammatical valency** of linguistic units reveals their potential ability to pattern with particular grammatical forms.

The term **lexical valency** denotes the potential capacity of words to occur with other words of certain lexical meanings by the distributional conditions in particular. Different lexico-semantic variants of the same word have different lexical valencies.

Grammatical valency of verbs presupposes their potential ability to combine with concrete nouns V + N: *to read a book, to eat a book, to write a letter, to write a fish*, etc. Acceptability of such word combinations from the point of view of grammatical valency is beyond dispute [Аракин, 1972: 9]. But in speech such combinations as *to eat a book* and *to write a fish* are felt to be totally unacceptable. This can be explained by extralinguistic reasons: in reality such phenomena simply do not take place. Such examples prove that words besides their grammatical valency are characterized by their potential ability to selectively combine with other words with certain lexical meanings, i.e. lexical valency.

**External valency** is characteristic of notional words. Valent properties of morphemes (stems or affixes) within the morphological structure of a notional word are qualified as **internal valency** of the

word. External valency of morphemes is realized through their combinability. For example, analysis of the derivational pattern  $N + -ish \rightarrow A$  shows that the suffix *-ish* is practically never combined with noun stems which denote units of time and space (*\*hourish*, *\*mileish*, etc.). The overwhelming majority of adjectives in *-ish* are formed from noun stems denoting living beings (*wolfish*, *clownish*, *boyish*, etc.) [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 196].

**Valency analysis is divided into the following stages** [Арнольд, 1991: 44-45; Милютина, 1982: 101]:

1. First of all, researchers make up a list of linguistic elements (e.g. words) the valency of which is going to be studied, define the types of texts to be used for collecting sample material and delimit the size of the corpus.

2. Then they study the collected examples. In some cases, all the elements which have no syntactic connections with the investigated unit in these examples (the so-called "optional linguistic environment") are discarded.

3. After that linguists may study the semantic structure of these linguistic units and establish sets of valencies (valency sets).

Valency is usually defined with the help of case roles, such as Agent, Experiencer, Instrument, Object, based on the semantic relationship of noun phrases to verbs. Grammatical relations, as subject and direct object, are derived from these case roles.

The average number of roles, as a rule, does not exceed three or four. Linguistic units are then characterized as trivalent or quadrivalent, respectively.


Research results provided below illustrate the valency set of English transitive verbs *break*, *fill*, *open*, *choose*, *strengthen*, *dry*, *quicken*. Semantic structure of these verbs reveals the following valencies: *Agent*, *Patient*, *Cause*, *Instrument*, *Content* [Милютина, 1982: 101]:

Agent	Patient	Instrument
<u>Portia was drying the dishes with a towel.</u>		

Cause	Patient	Content
<u>David's triumphs filled him with anticipatory sense of uneasiness.</u>		

In accord with their semantic valencies, these verbs in the predicate position may form syntactic structures of the following types: 1) subject — predicate — direct object — prepositional object; 2) subject — predicate — direct object; 3) subject — predicate — prepositional object; 4) subject — predicate.

An interesting regularity observed while studying sample material lies in the fact that right-hand syntactic positions of these



verbs correlate directly with the elements of their semantic structure (direct object — Patient, prepositional object — Instrument or Content), whereas left-hand connections may express all kinds of semantic valencies of these verbs (subject — Agent, Patient, Cause, Instrument, Content) as can be seen from the examples above.

Valency analysis has a wide field of application. It was applied to define valency sets of words belonging to various parts of speech [Степанова, Хельбиг, 1978; Милютина, 1982; Фролова, 1986; Фролов, 1987]. It was used to show the interdependence of denotational and connotational components of word meaning [Шаховский, 1984]. It was also applied to word-formation in studying the valencies of affixes and stems.

Valency analysis of both notional words and morphemes is of great importance in linguistics.

To describe the system of a given vocabulary one must know the typical patterns on which its words are coined. To achieve this it is necessary not only to know the morphemes of which they consist but also to reveal their combining power (valency) and the relationship existing between them. This approach ensures a rigorously linguistic basis for the identification of lexico-grammatical classes within each part of speech.

The study of the lexical system must also include the study of the words' combinatorial possibilities — their valency or capacity to combine with one another in groups of certain patterns, which serve to identify meanings [Arnold, 1986: 15-16].

The establishment of syntagmatic relations between words is conditioned by the valent properties of the units entering into the syntagmatic relation. The valency of notional units is their potential ability to get into syntagmatic relations and to pattern with the units of appropriate types. The character of valency is predetermined by the semantic specialization and by the semantic completeness of the unit: the more specialized a notional element is the less valent it is [Morokhovska, 1993: 54].

Valency (both grammatical and lexical) is an important characteristic of the word, it is included into lexical paradigmatics.

But the word, being a unit of lexical paradigmatics, also functions as a member of various word combinations in speech. This ability belongs to lexical syntagmatics which may be defined as the realization sphere of lexical connections in their functioning. These

connections may be realized only in speech, i.e. in actual word combinations. This is no longer a potential ability characteristic of the word as a unit of lexical system but a concrete realization of this ability in speech which receives the name of **lexical combinability (collocability)** [Аракин, 1972: 11]. Valency is the characteristic of the language, collocability is the characteristic of speech.

The notion of *combinability* in linguistics is considered to be broader than that of *valency*. Combinability is believed to embrace both valent and non-valent connections (e.g. contextual and nonce usage). Valency embraces only subordinate connections of words, combinability implies both subordinate and coordinate.

Most modern research in linguistics emphasises **the importance of studying combinability, not valency**. In recent years there has been increased interest in targeting what is variously known as collocations, fixed expressions, formulaic sequences, multi-word units, chunks, lexicalized phrases [Wray, 2000: 463]. This research shows that combinability of linguistic units plays an important part in almost every linguistic issue.

- **Task 49.** Collect some instances to illustrate the realization of the combining power (valency) of the verbs *break*, *fill*, *open*, *choose*, *strengthen*, *dry*, *quicken*. Outline the field of valency in each particular case.
  
- **Task 50.** Give your own examples of sentences in which valency does not account for actual combinability.

## Unit 5

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### IMMEDIATE CONSTITUENTS (IC) ANALYSIS

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#### 5.1. THE THEORY OF THE IC (PHRASE GRAMMAR) AND IC ANALYSIS

The **method of Immediate Constituents (IC)** was originally elaborated as an attempt to determine the ways in which lexical units are relevantly related to one another. It was discovered that combinations of such units are usually structured into hierarchically arranged sets of binary constructions. For example, in the word-group *a black dress in severe style* we do not relate *a* to *black*, *black* to *dress*, *dress* to *in*, etc. but set up a structure which may be represented as *a black dress / in severe style*. Thus, the fundamental aim of IC analysis is to segment a set of lexical units into two maximally independent sequences or ICs, thus revealing the hierarchical structure of this set.

An **Immediate Constituent (IC)** is a group of linguistic elements which functions as a unit in some larger whole.

The division of a construction begins with the larger elements and continues as far as possible. Successive segmentation results in **Ultimate Constituents (UC)**, i.e. two-facet units that cannot be segmented into smaller units having both sound-form and meaning. The Ultimate Constituents of the word-group analyzed above are: *a / black / dress / in / severe / style*.

The sentence *My younger brother left all his things there* will be analyzed as follows [Rayevska, 1976: 188]:

My younger brother / left all his things there.  
My // younger brother / left all his things // there.

and so on until we receive the minimum constituents which do not admit further division on the syntactic level

left // all his things // there.  
My // younger // brother / left // all // his things // there.  
left // all // his // things // there.

An English sentence is not just a collection of words. Rather

it is a series of groupings of words, the series of constructions that cluster and nest inside other constructions. A basic sentence pattern consists first of all of a subject and a predicate. These are the immediate constituents of the sentence. They are constituents in the sense that they constitute, or make up, the sentence. They are immediate in the sense that they act immediately on one another: the whole meaning of the one applies to the whole meaning of the other.

The concept of IC analysis was first introduced by Leonard Bloomfield and later on developed by Rulon S. Wells and other linguists K.L. Pike, S. Chatman, E.A. Nida, R.S. Pittman.

It is well known that in his book *Language* L. Bloomfield insisted on the analysis based on the principle of immediate constituents, but he failed to provide any criteria for correct division of linguistic material into immediate constituents. L. Bloomfield wrote but little about specific procedures and techniques of analysis. The task of elaborating suitable means of analysis was carried out by his followers and pupils [Burlakova, 1971: 82].

Rulon S. Wells succeeded in making the principles of IC analysis more precise and comprehensible. R.S. Wells is true to the structuralistic principle of making practically no difference between combinations of morphemes forming words and combinations of words forming phrases, clauses and sentences.

R.S. Wells [1947: 18] states that the fundamental aim of IC analysis is to analyze each utterance and each constitute into maximally independent sequences preserving the same meaning. Phrased differently, it is necessary to decide how to break up sequences into adequate parts.

R.S. Wells points out that IC analysis can be based not only on the principle of expansion but that there are also two other principles of patterning: the principle of choosing ICs that will be as independent of each other in their distribution as possible, and the principle that word division should be respected.


R.S. Wells uses the term *constituents* for the ICs of a sentence, and the ICs of those ICs, and so on down to the morphemes and conversely the term a *constitute* for a sequence constituted by two or more ICs. He emphasizes the fact that every word is a constituent (unless it is a sentence by itself) and also a constitute (unless it is a single morpheme). For him one of the prime functions of analysis into ICs is to reveal a formal difference correlated with the semantic one. Thus, he shows that *The King of England's people* has two meanings, and correspondingly two ICs

Living off Funland's people (this analysis shows

analyses: 1) *the King of England's people* that we are speaking about "the King of a certain people, viz the English") and 2) *The King of England's people* which has a different meaning "the people of a certain King, viz the King of England". Thus, a correct ICs analysis helps to understand the real relations of elements constituting the sequence.

IC analysis is based on the assumption that despite the apparent simple linear progression language consists of layer upon layer of structure, each layer having its internal structure ignored and being treated as a single unit as it enters into the next layer of structural relationship [Burlakova, 1971: 81].


How this method works can be illustrated by a diagram in which the sentence *The very poor duchess ran to the house* is analyzed [Pike, 1948: 70]:



In this diagram, Roman numerals indicate successive layers of structure; lines show the division into ICs; Arabic numerals indicate the order in which forms will be discussed. M marks a constituent in a morphological construction.

The analysis is begun with the largest IC and comes down to the smallest phrases. If the sentence is complex the largest IC are the clauses included into the complex construction.

The diagramme may be drawn somewhat differently without changing its principle of analysis. Such a diagramme is called a **candelabra diagramme** [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 60]:



When the analytical IC model was created and diagrammed there was left only one step to its understanding as a generative model, a model by which sentences can be built (or generated).

The messianic figure was **Noam Chomsky** and the starting-point his book *Syntactic Structures* (1957). He sought a simple linguistic theory which would generate all the sequences of morphemes (or words) that constitute grammatical English sentences. For him a **constituent analysis** of the sentence has the following representation [Chomsky, 1957].

1. Sentence → NP + VP
2. NP → T + N
3. VP → Verb + NP
4. T → the
5. N → man, ball, etc.
6. Verb → hit, etc.

Every sentence (S) or syntactic construction is built up of two immediate constituents: the noun phrase (NP) and verb phrase (VP). The noun phrase consists of two IC: the determiner (T) and noun or its equivalent (N). The verb phrase consists of the verb (V) and its noun phrase (NP). Symbolic representation of constituents is very explicit. It is now widely used in modern linguistics for the sake of economy and clarity.

Using the IC model we may work out rigid rules for generating (building up) sentences. The set of rules showing how a sentence is generated are called **rewrite rules**. In each rule above → represents the word *rewrite*, and each statement is an instruction of the type *rewrite X as Y*. Given the set of rules one can generate an English sentence or a number of sentences changing only the N and the transitive V, in accord with the situation. The generation of the sentence must proceed with the change of only one element at the application of each rule.

The following series shows what happens to the sentence *The man hit the ball* if it is rewritten in terms of the IC grammar given above. The procedure of generating is as follows:

2. Sentence
- Applying rule 1: NP + VP
- Applying rule 2: T + N + VP
- Applying rule 3: T + N + Verb + NP
- Applying rule 4: the + N + Verb + NP
- Applying rule 5: the + man + Verb + NP
- Applying rule 6: the + man + hit + NP


For the second NP the same rules are applied

Applying rule 2: the + man + hit + T + N


Applying rule 4: the + man + hit + the + N

Applying rule 5: the + man + hit + the + ball

This generation of a sentence, or **derivation**, as N. Chomsky called it, can be represented by a **derivation tree diagram**, which is as follows [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 70]:



A **derivation tree diagramme** is fit not to analyze sentences, but shows how a sentence is derived (or built, or generated) from the IC. The derivation tree is drawn as two branches forking out from the sign S (sentence). Each branch has nodes (joints or knots) in it from which smaller branches fork out. Each node corresponds to a phrase, the two forking branches correspond to the IC of the phrase. The diagramme below is a derivation tree for generating simple sentences with a transitive verb [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 70].



The generating of the sentence involves first only the classes of words and the function words. Only on the lowest level (the morphemic level) we choose the concrete lexical elements.

From such elementary rules and diagrams has emerged a school of grammar that has shaken the foundations of traditional grammar. IC analysis which brings forth the mechanism of generating

sentences has contributed greatly to the development of **generative grammar** — a linguistic theory that attempts to describe the tacit knowledge that a native speaker has of a language by establishing a set of explicit, formalized rules that specify or generate all the possible grammatical sentences of a language, while excluding all unacceptable sentences.

In place of the widespread idea that to shape and express a thought it is sufficient to string together words in accordance with a syntactic pattern and rules, i.e. to combine words into a sentence, **generative linguistics** has come up with a completely different and much more complex theory of generation of meaning.

**Generative grammar** developed by N. Chomsky is summed up in a line from the Joyce Kilmer's poem: "Only God can make a tree" [Pinker, 1995: 97–98]. A sentence is not a chain but a tree. In a human grammar, words are grouped into phrases, like twigs joined in a branch. The phrase is given a name — a mental symbol — and little phrases can be joined into bigger ones.

A set of rules like the ones listed above — a "**phrase structure grammar**" — defines a sentence by linking the words to branches on an inverted tree.

The geometry of phrase structure trees is not just playing with notation; it is a hypothesis about how the rules of language are set up in our brains, governing the way we talk [Pinker, 1995: 108].

Each language has its own system of structural grouping and the signals of the groups (or phrases). In English there are generally two IC in a phrase. English has dichotomous phrase structure, which means that the phrase in English can always be divided into two elements (constituents). One of the signals of the group boundaries is the function word-preposition.

In oral speech the structural groupings (phrases) are shown by intonation and pauses.

- **Task 51.** Point out the boundaries between IC groupings with lines in the following sentences.

- 1) He ate his dinner. 2) The man descended the steep stairs slowly.
- 3) The old man who lives there has gone to his son's house.

- **Task 52.** Draw the candelabra diagramme for the following sentences, then turn it upside down and draw the derivation tree for each sentence [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 65].

1) The man laughed. 2) The woman sniffed the rose. 3) John did the

work very well.

- Task 53.** Write down a set of IC rules for generating the following sentences [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 75].

1) The boy saw an arrow. 2) The teacher taught the boy a new rule.

- Task 54.** Cut each of the following sentences into its immediate constituents. Construct derivation tree diagrammes.

1) The young woman heard a wonderful song there. 2) He raised his eyes questioningly. 3) The waiter returned with a jug of iced water. 4) He asked me a few interesting questions about my holidays. 5) Val looked at the fellow with renewed suspicion.

## 5.2. APPLICATIONS OF IC ANALYSIS

The concept of immediate constituents (ICs) is important both in morphology and syntax.


The study of syntax is greatly facilitated by studying the types of immediate constituents which occur.

The analysis into immediate constituents is also used to study the morphemic structure of words and provides the basis for further word-formation analysis.

To arrive at the complete structural meaning of a sentence, to know how the sentence is built (constructed) we must determine how the separate units of the sentence, its constituents, are grouped.

IC analysis is of particular value when **one sentence has two meanings** (corresponds to two distinct thoughts), even if each individual word has only one meaning. Steven Pinker [1995: 102-103] shows the following example: *Tonight's program discusses stress, exercise, nutrition, and sex with Celtic forward Scott Wedman, Dr. Ruth Westheimer, and Dick Cavett.*

The two meanings in this sentence come from the different ways in which the words can be joined up in a tree. For example, in *discuss sex with Dick Cavett*, the writer put the words together according to the tree at the left (PP means prepositional phrase); sex is what is to be discussed, and it is to be discussed with Dick Cavett.



The alternative meaning comes from our analyzing the words according to the tree at the right: the words *sex with Dick Cavett* form a single branch of the tree, and *sex with Dick Cavett* is what is to be discussed. Phrase structure, clearly, is the kind of stuff language is made of [Pinker, 1995: 103].

It is mainly to discover the derivational structure of words that the IC analysis is used in lexicological investigations. For example, the verb *denationalize* has both the prefix *de-* and the suffix *-ize*. To decide whether this word is a prefixal or a suffixal derivative we must apply the IC analysis. The binary segmentation of the string of morphemes making up the word shows that \**denation* or \**denational* cannot be considered independent sequences as there is no direct link between the prefix *de-* and *nation* or *national*. In fact, no such sound-forms function as independent units in Modern English. The only possible binary segmentation is *de / nationalize*, therefore we may conclude that the word is a prefixal derivative [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 190].

There are also numerous cases when the identical morphemic structure of different words is an insufficient proof of the identical pattern of their derivative structure, which can be revealed only by the IC analysis. Thus, comparing, e.g., *snow-covered* and *blue-eyed* we observe that both words contain two root morphemes and one derivational morpheme. The IC analysis, however, shows that, whereas *snow-covered* may be treated as a compound consisting of two stems *snow* + *covered*, *blue-eyed* is a suffixal derivative as the underlying structure, as shown by the IC analysis, is different, i.e. *(blue+eye)+-ed* [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 190].

It may be inferred from the examples discussed above that ICs represent the word-formation structure while UCs (Ultimate Constituents) show the morphemic structure of polymorphic words.

The whole procedure of the analysis into immediate constituents is reduced to the recognition and classification of the

same and different morphemes and the same and different word

patterns. This is precisely why it permits the tracing and understanding of the vocabulary system [Arnold, 1986: 40].

- **Task 55.** Here are some sentences with two meanings that accidentally appeared in newspapers [Pinker, 1995: 102]. Employing the IC method, single out these ambiguities. What are the two possible ways of cutting these sentences into immediate constituents?

1) Yoko Ono will talk about her husband John Lennon who was killed in an interview with Barbara Walters. 2) Two cars were reported stolen by the Groveton police yesterday. 3) The license fee for altered dogs with a certificate will be \$3 and for pets owned by senior citizens who have not been altered the fee will be \$1.50. 4) We will sell gasoline to anyone in a glass container. 5) For sale: Mixing bowl set designed to please a cook with round bottom for efficient beating. 6) One witness told the commissioners that she had seen sexual intercourse taking place between two parked cars in front of her house.

- **Task 56\*.** Applying IC analysis, decide whether the word *untruly* is a prefixal or a suffixal derivative (*un-* + *truly* or *untrue* + *-ly*) and whether *ceiling* is a root word or a derived word (does it contain one morpheme or two: *ceiling* or *ceil* + *ing*?).

### 5.3. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF IC ANALYSIS

To show the importance of the IC analysis Ch. Fries [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 58-59] compares the phrase grammar with the mathematical grouping of the items in a problem. He shows that the answer to a very trivial problem such as "five plus four times six minus three" will vary with each different grouping of the constituents, although there will be each time the same items: 5, 4, 6, and 3 and the same three operations: addition, multiplication and subtraction. Depending on different grouping there may be four different answers:  $(5+4)(6-3)=27$ ;  $5+(4 \times 6)-3=26$ ;  $5+4(6-3)=17$ ;  $[(5+4) \times 6]-3=51$ . This problem shows how important the grouping of the constituents is.

The practical value of the IC theory is great, because it gives correct division of speech into phrases that signals the meaning of the syntactic constructions and gives the speech its natural rhythm.

It is a well-known fact that a speaker of a foreign language who has a perfect command of the sounds, but whose phrase pauses are wrong, cannot be understood by native listeners. This proves the practical value of the phrase grammar and suggests teaching the phrase grammar together with the rhythmical division of the chunks of speech [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 59].

**IC analysis** seems to extend and deepen our understanding of phrase structure: it shows how to break up constructions and means of building them up.

The IC theory (or grammar), or the phrase theory (grammar) was the first modern grammar fit for generating sentences.

There were two grammar theories which sought to teach how a sentence is generated. These are the **Linear grammar** and the **Immediate Constituent grammar** (IC grammar, phrase grammar).

The linear theory taught that a sentence is generated on a very simple model consisting of three elements: S+V+O. This grammar may be traced in the *Essentials of English Grammar* by Otto Jespersen. This model is quite familiar to the English teachers who begin their first lessons explaining that in the English sentence subject stands first, then it is followed by a verb (or predicate) and then by an object.

The linear theory (or model) is rather trivial as it has no power to generate different sentence structures but the simplest. It cannot even do this properly as it does not indicate the groupings of the sentence. What is meant is as follows: it may be easy to fill in the word *John* in the S-position, or *took* in the V-position, but it will be wrong to fill in *book* in the O-position, because an NP, not a word must stand here, e. g. *a book*, or *the book*, or *my book*, etc. If a sentence is complex, the linear theory will fail to construct it although the sentence has but three elements: S—V—O and their groups of the constituents.

The IC model has certain advantages as a generating model because it indicates the groupings of the IC and it shows the order in which the generating of a sentence must proceed.


In spite of its merits the IC model also has some **demerits**.

1. Its sphere of application is limited to generating only simple sentences. If the sentence is expanded, then the rewrite rules become too numerous to hold and the generation of the sentence hinders. The interrogative and passive sentence-structures must have different set of rules which are difficult or impossible to work out on the dichotomous scheme.

## 2. The meaning of the sentence, word-group, etc. and IC

binary segmentation are interdependent. For example, *fat major's wife* may mean that either "the major is fat" or "his wife is fat". The former semantic interpretation presupposes the IC analysis into *fat major's / wife*, whereas the latter reflects a different segmentation into ICs: *fat / major's wife*. It must be admitted that this kind of analysis is arrived at by reference to intuition and it should be regarded as an attempt to formalize one's semantic intuition [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 190]. Its weakness is that it depends on intuition about grammatical acceptability.

3. The IC model cannot sometimes show that the relations between the elements of the two sentences are different, i.e. it cannot sometimes resolve ambiguity in homonymic patterns, e.g. *John is easy to please* and *John is eager to please* have the same derivation tree showing the IC of the sentences [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 71]:



Only the transformations of the two sentences can show the difference of the relations of their elements, that is that *John* is subject of *please* in *is eager to please* but object in *is easy to please*. The following transformations will prove it:

John is easy to please. → It (easily) pleases John. We can (easily) please John. For us to please John is easy.

*John is eager to please. → John eagerly pleases everybody.  
John can please people. For John to please people is pleasure.*

Noam Chomsky tried to formalize **immediate constituents** description and for this purpose he examined the descriptive adequacy of this theory. He found that phrase structure grammars based on IC analysis were **inadequate** in a number of ways. First, the structural descriptions provided were not able, in an enormous number of cases, to provide an account of the kinds of structural

information available to the native. Second, when an effort was made to actually provide an enumeration of a wide variety of sentence types, the complexity involved in phrase structure description proved truly extraordinary: many simple and easily discovered regularities were excluded, many essentially identical parts of the grammar had to be repeated several times, and so forth [Burlakova, 1969: 90-91]. Consideration of these limitations on the part of phrase structure led N. Chomsky, building on insights of Z.S. Harris, to the formulation of a new conception of grammatical theory in which phrase structure rules were supplemented by new, more powerful devices called **transformations**.

- Task 57. Construct the derivation trees for the following sentences [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 75]. Show the ambiguity (the difference of the relations of the elements) in the sentences by means of transformations.

1) Ted is anxious to learn. Robert is difficult to teach. 2) Mary is curious to know. Kitty was happy to love. 3) She made him a good husband. She made him a good wife. She made him a good dinner. 4) He looked at the fellow with suspicion. He looked at the fellow with a stick. 5) The police shot the man in the red cap. The police shot the man in the right arm.

## Unit 6

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### TRANSFORMATIONAL ANALYSIS

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#### 6.1. THE ORIGIN OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

The theory of the IC which in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century fascinated the minds of the linguists has only been obscured by **Transformational grammar (TG)**, a new linguistic theory which appeared in the 1950s.

Transformational grammar was first proposed by Zellig S. Harris as a method of analyzing the 'raw material' (concrete utterances) and was later elaborated by Noam Chomsky as a synthetic method of 'generating' (constructing) utterances. Both these grammarians belonged to the Descriptive School of American linguistics. Thus, we may say that Transformational grammar as a new method of linguistic analysis was born inside the Descriptive linguistic trend.

A number of concepts and provisions developed by this school (deep and surface structures, transformations, etc.) have become common currency in linguistic literature today.

Noam Chomsky called attention to two fundamental facts about language [Pinker, 1995: 22-24]. First, virtually every sentence that a person utters or understands is a brand-new combination of words, appearing for the first time in the history of the universe. Therefore a language cannot be a repertoire of responses; the brain must contain a recipe or program that can build an unlimited set of sentences out of a finite list of words. That program may be called a **mental grammar** (not to be confused with pedagogical "grammars", which are just guides to the etiquette of written prose).

The way the language works, then, is that each person's brain contains a lexicon of words and the concepts they stand for (a mental dictionary) and a set of rules that combine the words to convey relationships among concepts (a mental grammar).

The second fundamental fact is that children develop these complex grammars rapidly and without formal instruction and grow up to give consistent interpretations to novel sentence constructions that they have never before encountered. Therefore, N. Chomsky argued, children must innately be equipped with a plan common to

the grammars of all languages, a Universal Grammar, that tells them how to distill the syntactic patterns out of the speech of their parents.

Linguists and psychologists have been puzzling over the phenomenon of young children's ability to learn their native language at an early age and with no tuition; and some children do more than this. If their homes are bilingual, they learn two languages. And this is done in spite of the tremendous diversity of sentence structures.

When we look at this immense complexity of language we wonder how anyone can be bright enough or have a powerful enough memory to learn a language and use it. Yet all people do this. People master all the grammar of their native language (though of course not all of its vocabulary) and they achieve this without conscious study at a very early age.

If there is any explanation at all, it must be that language structure is not really as complicated as it looks at first. There must be some system to it simple enough to be grasped and held by any human mind, however ordinary.

The main assumption of Transformational grammar is that any language consists of a limited number of kernel (basic) sentences and an unlimited number of other sentence structures derived or generated from them. They are generated by means of transformations which constitute the transformational mechanism, a very important area in a language system.

As defined by Z.S. Harris [1957: 6], the approach of transformational grammar presents each sentence as derived in accordance with a set of transformational rules from one or more (generally simpler) sentences, i.e. from other entities of the same level, e.g. the sentence *Good tests are short* is made up from two simple kernel sentences: *Tests are short* and *Tests are good*.

A language is then described as consisting of specified sets of kernel sentences and a set of transforms generated from these kernel sentences by certain transformational rules which are not very numerous or difficult.

The two fundamental problems of Transformational grammar are: the establishment of the domain of the kernel sentences (the set of kernel or basic structures), and the establishment of the set of transformation rules for deriving all the other sentences as their transforms. Thus, a fundamental distinction is made between two kinds of sentences: kernel sentences and transforms.

Some transformations are operated not upon one of the kernel sentences, but they may be operated upon some underlying

sentence which is a transform of the kernel sentence. Thus, a third important problem of Transformational grammar is the establishment of the order in which the transformations occur.

**Kernel sentences** are the basic elementary sentences of the language from which all other sentences are made. They are simple, active, declarative, unextended sentences that may be used in making more elaborate sentences.

For English Z.S. Harris [1957: 6] lists seven principal patterns of kernel sentences:

1. N V: *The team went there.*
2. N V N: *We'll take it.*
3. N V Prep N: *The teacher looked at him.*
4. N is N: *He is an architect.*
5. N is A: *The girl is pretty.*
6. N is Prep N: *The paper is of importance.*
7. N is D: *The man is here.*

Z.S. Harris also includes a few minor constructions into the set, such as *N is between N and N* and some insert constructions which hardly enter into transformations, e.g. *N!* (a call), *Yes.*

He also makes an important observation that a different set of kernel sentences may be yielded but this will not in the least make a difference for the picture of the structure of language in general.

A similar list of patterns is recommended to language teachers under the heading *These are the basic patterns for all English sentences* [Bertsch, 1962]:

1. *Birds fly.*
2. *Birds eat worms.*
3. *Birds are happy.*
4. *Birds are animals.*
5. *Birds give me happiness.*
6. *They made me president.*
7. *They made me happy.*

Six major structural patterns are identified in terms of sentence elements, their function and position in *Structural Syntax of English* edited by L.L. Iofik [Структурный синтаксис, 1976: 65]:

1. Subject+Predicate: *The bird sings.*
2. Subject+Predicate<sub>copula</sub>+Complement: *He is a boy/young.*
3. Subject+Predicate+Object<sub>1</sub>: *The hunter killed a bear.*
4. Subject+Predicate+Object<sub>1</sub>+Object<sub>2</sub>: *She gave him a book.*
5. Subject+Predicate+Object<sub>1</sub>+Complement: *He painted the door white. They elected him president.*

6. *There+Predicate+Subject: There is a book on the table.*

J. Hook and E. Mathews in *Modern American Grammar and Usage* [1956] give only five major patterns which over ninety per cent of sentences follow. The five patterns described in this grammar are determined only by the position of the major components of a sentence. If the position of one of the major components is altered, the sentence follows a minor, rather than a major pattern. The five major patterns are:

1. Subject+Verb: *Women applauded.*
2. Subject+Verb+Object: *We ate hamburgers.*
3. Subject+Verb+Predicate Nominative: *Husbands are nice.*
4. Subject+Verb+Predicate Adjective: *Helen is beautiful.*
5. Expletive+Verb+Predicate Adjective+Subject: *It is easy to swim.*

S. Potter [1960: 82] reduces the number of kernel sentences to three:

1. *The sun warms the earth.*
2. *The sun is a star.*
3. *The sun is bright.*

More extensive and accurate is the tabulated survey of 39 types of kernel sentences given by G.G. Pocheptsov [Почепцов, 1971: 106-108]. Based on certain assumptions about the kinds of processes that exist in language and the manner in which they correlate this survey presents a major linguistic interest.

The problem of transformations must begin with the definition of the term *transformation*, *transform* and *transformational rule*.


**Transformation** is the changing of a sentence, phrase or formula according to a prescribed model and following certain rules. The change is controlled with respect to morphemic composition and the meaning of the phrase [Arnold, 1986: 281].

The possibility of transformation is called the **transformation potential**. The result of transformation is called a **transform**.

**Transforms** are syntactic constructions (sentences and phrases) derived from the kernel sentences retaining their grammatical and semantic relations, but having an additional grammatical meaning of their own. According to the additional grammatical meaning transforms may be affirmative, interrogative, imperative, exclamatory, negative, passive, compound, complex, etc.

To give an example, the sentence *Was the sky overcast?* is a transform derived from the kernel sentence *The sky was overcast*. The grammatical meaning of the kernel sentence is the relation "thing

and its state". This meaning is carried over into the transform, but the



transform also contains the additional question asking for confirmation of this relation.

Transforms are derived from kernel sentences by certain **transformational rules**.

**A transformational rule** is a rule which requires or allows us to perform certain changes in the kernel structure. It tells us *how* to derive something from something else by switching things about, putting things in or leaving them out, and so on.

Transformational rules may also be called **derivation rules** because they tell us *how* a variety of sentence structures and nominal structures are derived or generated from the kernel sentences [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 78].

Transformational rules may concern the introduction of new elements into kernel sentences or kernel formulas (e.g. negatives, adjectives), the rearrangement of their elements (e.g. to produce a negative or interrogative sentence) or both (e.g. transformation into passive) [Arnold, 1986: 281].

The following are examples of transformational rules:

1.  $NP_1 + V + NP_2 \rightarrow NP_2 + Aux + V_{en} + by + NP_1$

*The dog chased the man → The man was chased by the dog*

This rule will generate all regular active-passive sentences.

Four separate operations are recognized here: 1) the first noun phrase in the active sentence ( $NP_1$ ) is placed at the end of the passive sentence; 2) the second noun phrase in the active sentence ( $NP_2$ ) is placed at the beginning of the passive sentence; 3) the verb ( $V$ ) is changed from past tense to past participle ( $V_{en}$ ), and an auxiliary verb ( $Aux$ ) is inserted before it; 4) preposition *by* is inserted between the verb and the final noun phrase [Poluzhyn, 2004: 135].

2.  $NP$  is  $A \rightarrow TAN$  ( $T$  is a determiner)

*The girl is pretty → the pretty girl*

*The man is kind → the kind man*

According to this transformational rule, nominal structures are derived from kernel sentences. The operations applied to the kernel sentence are: 1) deletion of the verb; 2) embedding  $A$  into  $NP$  between  $T$  and  $N$  [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 99].

3.  $NP$  is  $A \rightarrow TN/A$  of  $NP$  ( $N/A$  is an  $N$  derived from  $A$ )

*The task was difficult → the difficulty of the task*

*The day was lovely → the loveliness of the day*

This transformational rule is also used to derive nominal structures from kernel sentences. The operations applied to the

sentence are performed on two levels: on the morphemic level the N is derived from the A by means of certain suffix transformations; on the syntactic level the NP of the kernel sentence is connected with TN/A by means of preposition of [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 100].

As can be seen, a **transformational rule has two parts:** **structural analysis (SA)** — it is used to determine sentence constituents (constituent structure) of the input string and **structural change (SC)** — it specifies how to change the original structure to get the derived structure [Poluzhyn, 2004: 135].

**Transformational rules are studied in three sets**, indicated by Z.S. Harris [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 79-80]:

1. Transformations of kernel sentences into other simple sentences ( $S \rightarrow S$ ).
2. Transformations of simple sentences into NP — nominalization ( $S \rightarrow NP$ ).
3. Transformations of two or more simple sentences into a complex or compound sentence ( $S_1 + S_2 \rightarrow S_3$ ).

**Transformations in simple sentences usually imply the transformation of:**

- **affirmation (T-A):** *I love summer.* → *I do love summer. I've been there.* → *But I have been there.*
- **negation (T-NOT):** *She saw him.* → *She did not see him. Somebody saw that.* → *Nobody saw that.*
- **general question (T-Q):** *She loves summer.* → *Does she love summer? Mary is not your friend.* → *Is Mary not your friend?*
- **tag-question (T-TAG):** *She loves sweets.* → *She loves sweets, doesn't she?*
- **special question (T-W):** *Peter has come.* → *Who has come? Do you know the song?* → *What do you know?*
- **exclamation (T-EX):** *The girl is pretty.* → *How pretty the girl is! He is a boy.* → *What a boy he is!*
- **command or request (T-I):** *You must be quiet.* → *Be quiet! Do be quiet! Let's be quiet! Please be quiet!*
- **the passive (T-PASS)** can be applied only to sentence structures containing certain subclasses of verbs: *He put the book aside.* → *The book was put aside. The woman gave the child a chocolate.* → *A chocolate was given the child.* → *The child was given a chocolate.*
- **preposition introduction (T-PREP):** *He gave his mother some money.* → *He gave some money to his mother. Mother bought Jonny a toy.* → *Mother bought a toy for Jonny.*

- **permutation (T-PERM)** involves changing the order of elements: *The pencil is here* → *Here is the pencil*. *The piano stood in the corner*. → *In the corner stood a piano*. *She turned on the radio*. → *She turned the radio on*.

*The man appeared in the corridor*. → *There appeared a man in the corridor*. *Winter*. → *It is winter*.

• **reduction (T-RED)** consists in omitting the elements which do not destroy the meaning of the sentence: *Do you like it?* → *Like it?* *How nicely she sings!* → *How nicely!* *Be quiet!* → *Quiet!*

**Transformational procedures in simple sentences are carried out by means of:**

• expansion of VP or NP: *His dreams came true*. → *All his dreams came true at last*.

• permutation (change of the word-order): *He is here*. → *Is he here?*

• introduction of functional words: *He came*. → *Did he come?* *Ted is clever*. → *How clever is Ted!*

• use of introducers (*there*, *it*): *The boy is here*. → *There is a boy here*.

• omission of the elements in the sentence, which does not affect its grammatical meaning: *Do you like it?* → *Like it?* *Would you like a cup of tea?* → *A cup of tea?*

• change of the intonation contour: *He was there*. → *Was he there?* *You know it*. → *You know it?*

**Transformation of nominalization** converts the kernel sentence into a noun-phrase (NP) retaining the same semantic relations, e.g. *The seagull shrieks* → *the shriek of the seagull*. The newly derived transform retains the semantic relations of the kernel sentence *actor-action*.

**Nominalization implies the following procedures:**

• deletion of the verb: *The sea is rough*. → *the rough sea*. *The girl is near the window*. → *the girl near the window*.

• introduction of prepositions: *The man is wise*. → *the wisdom of the man*. *My wife is like an angel*. → *my angel of a wife*.

• introduction of the -'s element between the two NP: *The man has a son*. → *the man's son*.

• permutation of NP<sub>1</sub> and NP<sub>2</sub>: *The bowl is for sugar*. → *a sugar bowl*. *The cup is for coffee*. → *a coffee cup*.

• derivation of the corresponding N from V: *The bird sang*. → *the song of the bird*. *He loves pictures*. → *his love for pictures*.

- transformation of V-finite into  $V_{\text{ing}}$  and  $V_{\text{to}}$ : *The bird sings.* → *the singing of the bird / the bird's singing / for the bird to sing.*

N-transforms can be used in NP positions in other sentences to expand them:

**N-subject position:** *The shriek of the seagull startled me.*  
*Where is my angel of a wife? The girl's dancing was beautiful.*

**N-object position:** *I heard the shriek of a seagull. He called her his angel of a wife. We all admired the girl's dancing.*

**N-predicative position:** *The sound was the shriek of a seagull. This is my angel of a wife. The best thing was the girl's dancing.*

The study of nominalization also shows that nominalized transforms may be classed into three groups: 1) NP fully nominalized, that is consisting of two N, without any V; 2) those containing a V as  $V_{\text{ing}}$ ,  $V_{\text{to}}$  or  $V_{\text{en}}$ ; 3) the third type must be added here, it is a clause with a finite V capable of standing in an NP positions in some other sentences, e.g. *What he brought is here*, but more appropriately this transformation is included into 'sentence-sequence' T-grammar.

Thus three degrees of nominalization are distinguished [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 98]: 1) the slightest degree when the only trait of nominalization is the capability of standing in the NP position (N-clauses); 2) the lower degree when the transform capable of standing in the NP position still have a V, but it is non-finite (semiclauses); and 3) the higher degree of normalization, N structures without V.

It will be of interest to seek out the reason why native speakers of English generate N-transforms and extensively use them. The first reason is that no lexicon can be large enough to contain names for all the things about which at some time or other we shall speak and for which we must have distinct names, e.g. not *the shriek of a seagull* but *the shriek of an engine*, and the like. The second reason for using N-transforms, especially those with  $V_{\text{to}}$  and  $V_{\text{ing}}$ , is that they make English sentences more compact as compared with the complex sentences. This fact has been mentioned by many English and American grammarians [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 98].

**Transformations of two or more simple sentences into a complex or compound sentence** are defined as two-base transformations or transformations in sentence sequences [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 79].

An utterance may consist of two or more sentences. They are not isolated sentences but **sequences of independent**

~~sentences~~, which are consecutive within an utterance. They form a

syntactic unit termed a **super-sentential structure SS**. Independent sentence sequences occurring within a super-sentential structure always show signals of connection. The simplest example of a super-sentential structure is the 'question — answer' arrangement: *Did John come? — Yes, he did.*

In any sentence sequence in a super-sentential structure the first sentence is a situation or a leading one, the second is a sequential sentence, e.g. *He's just been over there* (situation sentence). — *So have I* (sequential sentence).

Many sentences which have what might be called complex structures can be analyzed as containing a sequence of two or more sentences or sentence structures, some or all of which have special forms. In all these cases the sections with special forms can be shown to be transforms of ordinary independent sentences [Irtenyeva et al., 1969: 119].

In other words, any compound or any complex sentence is also a sentence sequence.

Transformations in sentence sequences reveal the mechanism by which two or more sentences can be joined into one larger structural pattern:  $S_1 + S_2 \rightarrow S_3$ , where  $S_1$  is a matrix sentence;  $S_2$  is an insert sentence.

Two kernel sentences may be joined together into a **compound sentence** by means of:

- the procedure of **conjunction** (*but*, *and*, etc.): *The man came to the window. The detective saw him.* → *The man came to the window and the detective saw him.*

- **conjunction, substitution** (sometimes **permutation**) in the second sentence: *We asked for the book. He gave us the book.* → *We asked for the book and he gave it to us.*

- **conjunction, V-substitutes, permutation, addition of function words** (*so*, *neither*, etc.): *I shall do it tomorrow. He will do it tomorrow.* → *I shall do it tomorrow and so will he.*

Kernel sentences may be joined together into a **semi-compound sentence**.

If  $NP_1$  in the two sentences are identical, the identical element in the second sentence is zeroed (deleted); the operation is **conjunction**: *The car rounded the corner. The car stopped.* → *The car rounded the corner and stopped.*

Two sentences may be joined into a **complex sentence** by means of:

• **wh-substitutes** (*who, which, etc.*): *Here is a man. The man is waiting for you.* → *Here is the man who is waiting for you.*

• **embedding**, accompanied by **introducing a conjunctive**: *I know it.* → *What I know isn't important. He explained to me what I know.* The insert clause *What I know* may be embedded in the NP position of any matrix sentence.

• **embedding and adjustment**: *He asked me where I lived.*

• **addition** of subordinators (*when, because, as, etc.*): *He did not come. He was busy.* → *He did not come because he was busy.*

Two sentences may be joined into a **semi-complex sentence** by means of **word-sharing** if they contain a word in common. The shared word may be:

a) different in grammatical status in both sentences: *I saw him. He was crossing the street.* → *I saw him crossing the street.*

b) similar in grammatical status in both sentences: *He was there. He was working.* → *He was there working. Here is a bus. The bus goes in this direction.* → *Here is a bus going in this direction.*

**Task 58.** Represent the following kernel sentences in symbols.

- 1) The idea was original. 2) The bookshop is nearby. 3) He smiled.
- 4) The room has two windows. 5) The novel is of interest. 6) The pupil forgot the rule.
- 7) The library was across the street. 8) The librarian handed me the book.
- 9) Paul stood by the window. 10) She glanced at Max furtively.
- 11) The waitress brought our tea.
- 12) We fixed the picture on the wall.

**Task 59.** Write the following kernel sentence structures as actual sentences of your own.

- 1) N V;
- 2) N V N;
- 3) N V Prep N;
- 4) N V N N;
- 5) N V N D;
- 6) N is N;
- 7) N is A;
- 8) N is Prep N;
- 9) N is D.

**Task 60.** Transform the following simple sentences and explain the procedures required.

**T-A**

- 1) The shop was open.
- 2) That was a very nice trick.
- 3) He parked his car at the entrance.
- 4) He saw his chance.
- 5) She seemed calmer.
- 6) I'm going to stay.
- 7) They have started on their plan.

**T-NOT**

- 1) He is a slow reader.
- 2) She can be happy.
- 3) All of them were against.
- 4) Why did you tell me that?
- 5) He saw the point.
- 6) He knows her very well.
- 7) It sounds familiar.



1) Her breath was uneven. 2) That is the truth. 3) That was a week ago. 4) Rose looked meaningfully at Esther. 5) Everybody was laughing. 6) The play will be telerecorded. 7) The computer saves time.

#### **T-TAG**

1) It's just a routine house rule. 2) He wasn't nervous. 3) It isn't that. 4) You've had a good journey. 5) He was wearing his Sunday best. 6) They did a few other quick jobs. 7) They will wait by the ticket-barrier.

#### **T-W**

1) The night was nasty. 2) The coat is size 48. 3) Uncle Jake was a gardener. 4) That was Casey. 5) Ten minutes elapsed. 6) The children were out-of-doors. 7) Forty dollars is not the price.

#### **T-EX**

1) I am busy. 2) The storm was raging fiercely. 3) The story was a lie. 4) The tree was graceful. 5) Fred was a figure-skater. 6) The question sounded silly. 7) He felt angry.

#### **T-I**

1) You must be ready by five. 2) You must be objective in your decision. 3) We must be together on the week-end. 4) You must be back in a week. 5) You must be kind to him. 6) You must not be so stiff. 7) We must go through the rule again.

#### **T-PASS**

1) The call surprised me. 2) They asked me to dinner. 3) The guests proposed many toasts. 4) They told me it on the phone. 5) The crowd surrounded him. 6) He handed me the paper. 7) People talked about the picture exhibition a lot.

#### **T-PREP**

1) He made me a book-shelf. 2) Bring us your lecture-notes. 3) Buy the child a toy. 4) Johnny handed the teacher his day-book. 5) Call me a taxi.

#### **T-PERM**

1) They gave up their intention. 2) Your tea is here! 3) Will you try on the water-proof? 4) We must sum up the results. 5) The grocery was down the street. 6) The bus goes there.

#### **T-IN**

1) The desk is in the corner. 2) Many guests will be at the reception. 3) A crowd gathered at the entrance. 4) Spring.

#### **T-RED**

1) Why should we argue about such a trifle? 2) Will you wait a minute? 3) Give me your hand! 4) How skilfully she does it! 5) Why shouldn't we accept it? 6) Are you doing your maths? 7) Are you hungry?

- **Task 61.** Nominalize the following sentences in various ways possible. Use the derived N-transforms in the NP positions in sentences of your own.

e.g. The bird sings. → the song of the bird  
                                  the bird's song  
                                  the singing of the bird  
                                  the singing bird  
                                  the bird's singing  
                                  for the bird to sing

#### A: Sentences with BE

- 1) Her husband is a brute.
- 2) This reminder is of importance.
- 3) His language was noble.
- 4) Her will was strong.
- 5) The girl is in the right hand corner of the room.
- 6) The tyre was flat.
- 7) The girls were from Manchester.
- 8) The man is wearing a navy blue suit.
- 9) The man was like a great lump.
- 10) Mrs. Brown was head-teacher.

#### B: Sentences with HAVE

- 1) The writer has much imagination.
- 2) Mr. Gray has a sewing-machine.
- 3) These birds have no wings.
- 4) The girl has a talent for painting.
- 5) The hall has no lamps in it.
- 6) The boy has a strong will.
- 7) The room has one window.
- 8) The child had the appearance of being half-starved.
- 9) The dictionary has 30,000 words.
- 10) The girls had no gloves on.

#### C: Sentences with VI

- 1) The car hooted.
- 2) The lightning flashed.
- 3) The sun set.
- 4) The bird sings.
- 5) The plane flies.
- 6) The ship sank.
- 7) The shop-assistant smiled.
- 8) The tree fell.
- 9) The storm approached.
- 10) The leaves rustled.

#### D: Sentences with VT

- 1) He plays football.
- 2) He drinks coffee.
- 3) He writes short stories.
- 4) They tell jokes.
- 5) He produced a new film.
- 6) Bell invented the telephone.
- 7) He manages the bank.
- 8) They witnessed the accident.
- 9) He sings pop songs.
- 10) They agreed on this.

- **Task 62.** Denominalize the following transforms.

e.g. The stormy sea → The sea is stormy

- 1) the stormy sea, the tea for two, the desk for writing, the broken heart, the washing machine, a sugar bowl, a hiding place, an angel of a wife, a miracle of a man, a room in good taste, smoky colours, the wool skirt, the pleated skirt, muffled voices, a board for ironing, a friend in trouble, a button of a nose, a skeleton of a tree, the difficulty of the problem;

2) red-rimmed eyes, a red-cheeked little girl, the car with a spacious

boot, a tree with young green leaves, our vacuum-cleaner, the novel with a happy end, the man with a scar, a bottle with a long neck, the problem without a solution;

3) a thundering sea, the fall of Paris, a winding road, a sleeping dog, her mocking eyes, the blooming orchard, the death of the gladiator, the cheering of the crowd, John's answer, the arrival of the doctor;

4) the reception of the guests, a seller of vegetables, the correction of the papers, the reciting of the poems, a story-teller, the discoverer of America, the visitors of the gallery, a tamer of tigers, the breaking of diplomatic relations, a container of coal, the disagreement on the issue, their acquaintance with the subject;

5) a carpet of fallen leaves, a novel by Christie, the revised edition, the flowers picked by the children, the word never pronounced, the tense never used, the rule misunderstood, the two-tone sweaters sold out, the peeled potato, dog-eared pages, a thought-out answer, beaten meat.

**Task 63.** Define the procedures that yielded the following sentences.

1) They warned me of the possible consequences but I paid no attention to their warning. 2) Her hair was parted severely down the middle and one half of it was black and the other white. 3) When the mother hen sits on her eggs, she keeps them warm. 4) Anybody can go to a bakery and buy a loaf. 5) This summer has been very warm, which is unusual in this country. 6) There was such a thunderstorm as happens only on dark nights. 7) They insist that the boy should go through the exercise once again.

**Task 64.** Join the following pairs of sentences into compound ones and explain the transformational procedures.

1) He was telephoning the Vet. He was out on another case. 2) The breeze was fresh. The yacht sailed on well. 3) The moon did not rise now. He could not judge the time. 4) It was getting into the afternoon. The boat still moved on steadily. 5) His left hand was still cramped. He was unknotting it slowly. 6) It was cold now. The glow of Havana was not so strong. 7) The drawing-room door was opened from within. Some couples came in.

**Task 65.** Trace the following compound sentences back to the initial kernel sentences.

1) His family had closed up the house and gone to the country, so he was living temporarily at the Yale Club. 2) Odd things happened to him

and he told them with infectious laughter. 3) She was not angry but she was terribly sorry. 4) One evening after a dance they agreed to marry, and he wrote a long letter about her to his mother. 5) The words ran together, her heart pounded. 6) The old man felt faint, nor could he see well. 7) Ruth was watching him but he turned his eyes away.

**Task 66.** Join the following into semi-compound sentences and explain the transformational procedures involved.

1) They now gulped thirstily. They now gulped greedily. 2) Aunt Kate frowned severely. Aunt Kate nodded her head at every word. 3) The soldier worked his dry throat. The soldier could not speak. 4) The fish was silvery. The fish floated with the waves. 5) Old people liked him. Young people liked him. 6) He creaked up the stairs. He creaked across the landing.

**Task 67.** Join the following sentences into complex sentences using the subordinators *before*, *because*, *as if*, *when*, *though*, *than*, *if*.

1) The men went back to the shore. The training for each day was finished. 2) He did not answer. He did not hear the question. 3) She shook the carpet. The carpet was dusty. 4) He went back to his native town. His brother fell seriously ill. 5) He was always ready to help his friends. He was often very busy. 6) The students finished the test. The bell went. 7) He spoke loudly. Nobody seemed to hear him.


**Task 68.** Join the following into semi-complex sentences and explain the transformational procedures.

1) I have a friend. He lives in New York. 2) He stood. He was tired. 3) She stood. She was waiting for the trolley bus. 4) The phrase sounded. The phrase was ominous to me. 5) Waves of excitement went round the theatre. Waves of excitement swept round the theatre. 6) The noise of the band blew back. The noise of the band was strong on her. 7) There are silver birches. The birches line the concrete highway.

**Task 69.** Show different connections for the following sentences.

1) She heard the car. The car ground into second gear. 2) Snow melts. Snow changes into water. 3) We saw the children. The children were drawing animals. 4) She waited. The door opened. 5) There was a sound. The sound came from the ruins. 6) Thick dust clouded over. The dust choked them all.

**Task 70.** Give all possible transforms to each of the following



sentences. Complete the task.

- 1) She escaped the danger by a miracle. 2) The raincoat smelled of rubber. 3) The race-boat was roaring along the shore. 4) The grapefruit tastes exquisite. 5) The road runs straight. 6) She hesitated.

## 6.2. WHAT TRANSFORMATIONAL ANALYSIS IS: RULES AND TYPES OF TRANSFORMATIONS

Transformational grammar is a system of grammatical analysis, a form of generative grammar, that uses transformations to express the relations between equivalent structures.

Transformational analysis is used to identify syntactic and semantic similarities and differences between language units through similarities and differences in their transformation sets [Бацевич, 2004: 20].

An elementary example will show the essence of the procedure [Arnold, 1986: 282]: *monthly* → *occurring every month*, *hourly* → *occurring every hour*, *yearly* → *occurring every year*.

*Gentlemanly* does not show this sort of equivalence, the transform is obviously impossible, so we write: *gentlemanly* ≠ \**occurring every gentleman*.

The above procedure of showing the process of word-formation is an elementary case of transformational analysis, in which the semantic similarity or difference of words is revealed by the possibility or impossibility of transforming them according to a prescribed model and following certain rules into a different form, called their transform. The conditions of equivalence between the original form and the transform are prefixed. In our case the conditions to be fulfilled are the sameness of meaning and of the kernel morpheme.

The rules of transformational analysis, therefore, are rather strict and should not be identified with paraphrasing in the usual sense of the term. There are many restrictions both on the syntactic and the lexical level.

**The most commonly used transformational procedures in transformational analysis are:**

1. **Permutation** — repatterning of the kernel transform on condition that the basic subordinative relationships between language units are not changed. In the following example, the basic

relationships between the lexical units and the stems of notional words are essentially the same — cf.: *his work is excellent* → *his excellent work* → *the excellence of his work* → *he works excellently*.

**2. Replacement** (or **substitution**) — is testing of similarity by placing language units into identical environment: *It is reddish* → *It is somewhat red*.

A component of the distributional structure may be substituted by a member of a certain strictly defined set of lexical units, e.g., replacement of a notional verb by an auxiliary or a link verb, etc. Thus, in the two sentences having identical distributional structure — *He will make a bad mistake* and *He will make a good teacher* — the verb *make* can be substituted for by *become* or *be* only in the second sentence (*he will become / be a good teacher*) but not in the first (*\*he will become a bad mistake*), which is a formal proof of the intuitively felt difference in the meaning of the verb *make* in each of the sentences. In other words, the fact of impossibility of identical transformations of distributionally identical structures is a formal proof of difference in their meanings.

Substitution is also useful in determining classes of words. Thus, the words *family*, *boy* and *house* belong to different classes of nouns because they are differently substituted: *I like this family* → *I like them*. *I like this boy* → *I like him*. *I like this house* → *I like it*.

**3. Addition** (or **expansion**) — may be illustrated by application of the procedure of addition to the classification of adjectives into two groups — adjectives denoting inherent and non-inherent properties. For example, if to the two sentences *John is happy* (*popular*, etc.) and *John is tall* (*clever*, etc.) — we add, say, in *Moscow*, we shall see that *\*John is tall (clever, etc.) in Moscow* is utterly nonsensical, whereas *John in happy (popular, etc.) in Moscow* is a well-formed sentence. Evidently, this may be accounted for by the difference in meanings of adjectives denoting inherent (*tall*, *clever*, etc.) and non-inherent (*happy*, *popular*, etc.) properties.

**4. Deletion** (or **zeroing**) — a procedure which shows whether one of the words is semantically subordinated to the other or others, i.e. whether the semantic relations between words are identical. For example, the word-group *red flowers* may be transformed into *flowers* without making the sentence nonsensical. Cf.: *I love red flowers* → *I love flowers* — whereas *I hate red tape* cannot be transformed into *\*I hate tape*.

**Types of transformation** differ according to purposes for which transformations are used.

The concept of grammatical transformations was first

formulated by Z. Harris. He introduced transformations as statements of rules relating different constructions containing the same or nearly the same co-occurrence classes. With him transformation analysis and substitution have much in common. Thus, his often quoted example showing the difference in the meaning of *made* in *she made him a good husband by making him a good wife*: 1) *she made him a good wife* → *she made a good wife for him*; 2) *she made him a good husband* ≠ *she made a good husband for him*; 3) *she made him a good husband* → *she made a good husband of him*.

**Syntactic transformations** consist in substituting a grammatical configuration by one member of a word class which plays in the given sentence the same syntactic role.

A paraphrase of a sentence in which some word is replaced by its semantic equivalent or definition is a **lexical transformation**, e.g. *(This novel is) a best-seller* → *(This novel is) a book that has one of the biggest sales of the season*. A lexical transformation keeps the meaning unchanged.

G.G. Potcheptsov [Почепцов, 1987: 63-73] in his book *Communicative Aspects of Semantics* distinguishes several types of **communicative transformations** (also called **performative**), e.g. order → request, request → entreaty, request → invitation, threat → promise, request → gratitude, invitation → gratitude.

- Task 71. Supply your own examples to illustrate a) commonly used transformational procedures; b) different types of transformations.

### 6.3. APPLICATIONS OF TRANSFORMATIONAL ANALYSIS

The value of transformational analysis reveals itself in the observation of the synsemantic character of phrases and sentences.

It is used as a means 1) to explicate the implicit structural meanings of the IC's of the phrase or of the sentence, e.g.: *my sister's arrival* → *my sister arrived*; *the criminal's arrest* → *X arrested the criminal*; 2) to identify the syntactic functions of various phrases, e.g. *to make a mistake*, *to give a laugh*, *to write a good hand*, etc.

Transformational analysis is most helpful in the observations on synonymous forms of expression, in studying style from the grammatical point of view [Starikova, Alova, 1980: 13].

Transformational method is helpful when identifying the nature of some language unit in a contrasted language [Korunets', 2003: 22-23].

Transformational analysis may be defined as repatterning of various distributional structures in order to discover difference or sameness of meaning of practically identical distributional patterns [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 198].

Transformational analysis is mainly used to set forth differences in meaning and usage.

As distributional patterns are in a number of cases polysemantic, transformational procedures are of help not only in the analysis of semantic sameness or difference of the linguistic units under investigation but also in the analysis of the factors that account for their polysemy.

The distributional formula of *make* in the following two sentences is exactly the same; to reveal the difference in meaning a transformation introducing the preposition *for* is attempted, as follows [Arnold, 1986: 282]:

*He made the boy a pipe.* → *He made a pipe for the boy.*

*He made the girl a film star.* ≠ *He made a film star for the girl.*

In the first case transformation is possible and the meaning of the transform does not differ from that of the original utterance. In the second case transformation is impossible. The meaning of the transform is different from that of the original utterance, which shows that we have two different variants of *make* in the examples quoted.

If we compare the two compound words *dogfight* and *dogcart*, we shall see that the distributional pattern of the stems is identical and may be represented as N + N. The meaning of these words, broadly speaking, is also similar as the first of the stems modifies, describes the second and we understand these compounds as "a kind of fight" and "a kind of cart" respectively. The semantic relationship between the stems, however, is different and, hence, the lexical meaning of the words is also different. This can be shown by means of a transformational procedure which reveals that a *dogfight* is semantically equivalent to "a fight between dogs", whereas a *dogcart* is not "a cart between dogs" but "a cart drawn by dogs" [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 198].

Word-groups of identical distributional structure, when repatterned, also often show that the semantic relationship between words and, consequently, the meaning of word-groups may be different. For example, in word-groups consisting of a possessive

pronoun followed by a noun his car, his failure, his arrest, his

goodness, etc., the relationship between *his* and the following nouns is, in each instance, different, which can be demonstrated by means of transformational procedures:

*his car* (*pen, table, etc.*) may be repatterned into *He has a car* (*a pen, a table, etc.*), or in a more generalized form may be represented as *A possesses B*.

*his failure* (*mistake, attempt, etc.*) may be represented as *He failed* (*was mistaken, attempted*), or *A performs B*.

*his arrest* (*imprisonment, embarrassment, etc.*) may be repatterned into *He was arrested* (*imprisoned and embarrassed, etc.*), or *A is the goal of the action B*.

*his goodness* (*kindness, modesty, etc.*) may be represented as *He is good* (*kind, modest, etc.*), or *A has the quality of B*.

It can also be inferred from the above that two phrases which are transforms of each other (e.g., *his car* → *he has a car*; *his kindness* → *he is kind*, etc.) are correlated in meaning as well as in form. Regular correspondence and interdependence of different patterns is viewed as a criterion of difference or sameness in meaning.

Transformational analysis also enables us to show the relationship between sentences that have the same meaning but are of different grammatical form, e.g. the link between active and passive sentences.

Transformational procedures bring to light the so-called **sentence paradigm**, or, to be more exact, different ways in which the same message may be worded in Modern English [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 201].

It is argued that certain paired sentences, one containing a verb and the other containing an adjective, are understood in the same way, e.g., sentence pairs where there is form similarity between the verb and the adjective. Cf.: *I desire that ... — I am desirous that ...; John hopes that ... — John is hopeful that ...; His stories amuse me — are amusing to me; Cigarettes harm people — are harmful to people*. Such sentence pairs occur regularly in Modern English and are used interchangeably in many cases.

It is also argued that certain paired sentences, one containing a verb and the other — a deverbal noun, are also a common occurrence in Modern English, e.g. *I like jazz → my liking for jazz; John considers Mary's feelings → John's consideration of Mary's feelings*.

Several commonly used structures with similar meanings make up what can be described as a sentence paradigm just as a set of forms (e.g., *go* — *went* — *gone*, etc.) makes up a word paradigm. Thus, the sentence of the type *John likes his wife to eat well* makes up part of the sentence paradigm which may be represented as follows: *John likes his wife to eat well* → *John likes his wife eating well* → *what John likes is his wife eating well*, etc. — as any sentence of this type may be repatterned in the same way [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 202].

Francis Liefrink [1973: 42] argues that every single verb in English (with the exception of the set of prime verbs) is relatable to one or more group expressions. In principle, every single verb in English can be related to two group expressions, one analytic, the other periphrastic [Liefrink, 1973: 47].

This three-fold surface syntactic manifestation of one underlying semantico-syntactic representation makes up a paradigm:

- |            |  |
|------------|--|
| Sentence → | a) analytic ( $V_{\text{prime}} + S_c$ )         |
|            | b) synthetic ( $V_{sc}$ )                        |
|            | c) periphrastic ( $V_{\text{prime}} + N_{Vsc}$ ) |

Consider the following examples:

a) *Mary was giving the baby food with a bottle.* b) *Mary was bottlefeeding the baby.* c) *Mary was giving the baby a bottlefeed.*

a) *Mother is making the oven clean.* b) *Mother is cleaning the oven.* c) *Mother is giving the oven a clean.*

a) *We have put the furniture in a store.* b) *We have stored the furniture.* c) *We have put the funrniture in storage.*

Methods of subclassifying parts of speech based on syntax are now extended to a point where lexical items are grouped so that they fall into classes with similar distributional and substitutional properties and a similar transformation potential [Arnold, 1986: 283]. Thus, nouns denoting state (*despair*, *disgrace*, *love*, *rage*, etc.) may be used in the formula  $V+in(to)+N_v$ , where  $N_v$  is a noun with a verbal stem: e.g. *to be in despair*, *to fall into disgrace*, *to fall in love*, *to fly into a rage*.

Since one can say *the state of despair*, *the state of disgrace*, etc. all these nouns can be substituted into the formula *the state of +N<sub>v</sub>*: *the state of despair* (*disgrace*, *fear*, *love*, *rage*). Nouns denoting processes (*fall*, *run*, *break*) behave differently. It is possible to use them in the first formula  $V+ in(to)+ N_v$  (*break into a run*), but not in the second formula: we can't say \**the state of run*.

□ **Task 72.** Adjectives *womanly* and *monthly* built on the pattern Noun

+ *ly* differ in their meaning. Confirm this point by resorting to transformational analysis.

□ **Task 73.** Using transformational procedures, demonstrate the difference in meaning in the following items: *birthday card*, *business card*, *credit card*, *graduation card*, *health card*, *identity card*, *invitation card*, *library card*, *playing card*, *postcard*, *visiting card*.

□ **Task 74.** Transformational analysis seems helpful for establishing the meanings rendered by the *N*'s form in the pattern *N*'s + *N*. Analyze the combinability and meaning of the genitive case form *sister's* with different fillers for the *N* position of the word group.

- 1) her sister's coat; 2) her sister's arrival; 3) her sister's suggestion;
- 4) her sister's article; 5) her sister's work; 6) her sister's arrest; 7) her sister's generosity; 8) her sister's group; 9) her sister's friend; 10) her sister's love.

□ **Task 75.** Comment on the transformational potential of adjective subclasses denoting inherent (*tall*, *clever*, etc.) and non-inherent (*happy*, *popular*, etc.) properties.

□ **Task 76.** Employing transformational procedures, write the syntactic paradigms of the following kernel sentence structures.

- 1) The room was darkish. 2) Bill joked. 3) William felt slightly uncomfortable. 4) He went downtown. 5) Paul loved winter evenings. 6) The passenger showed the inspector his ticket.

#### **6.4. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR**

Transformational grammar symbolized a new stage in the living languages and their syntax investigation. It opened up the most extensive field for linguistic investigations, which demonstrated a new view on language and its structure. Transformational grammar was the subject of scientific debates and even now there are alternative theories, which emerged in response to scientific ideas put forward by N. Chomsky [Poluzhyn, 2004: 125].

The work of Noam Chomsky meant a fundamental breakthrough in the development of linguistic theory in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Chomsky pleads for a dynamic approach as represented by his theory of Transformational and Generative Grammar, emphasizing that linguistic theory is, mentalistic, concerned with discovering a mental reality underlying actual behaviour. Linguistic theory should contribute to the study of human mental processes and intellectual capacity. The aim of Transformational and Generative Grammar was higher than that of any other previous group of linguists. N. Chomsky called for the grammar of a particular language to be supplemented by a Universal Grammar. The main task of Linguistics must be to develop an account of linguistic universals, that is principles valid for all (or majority of) languages [Poluzhyn, 2004: 122-123].

Since the Chomskyan revolution scientists are dazzled by the creative power of the mental grammar, by its ability to convey an infinite number of thoughts with a finite set of rules. There has been a book on mind and matter called *Grammatical Man*, and a Nobel Prize lecture comparing the machinery of life to a generative grammar [Pinker, 1995: 126].

By performing painstaking technical analyses of the sentences ordinary people accept as part of their mother tongue, Chomsky and other linguists developed theories of the mental grammars underlying people's knowledge of particular languages and of the Universal Grammar underlying the particular grammars. Early on, Chomsky's work encouraged other scientists, among them Eric Lenneberg, George Miller, Roger Brown, Morris Halle, and Alvin Liberman, to open up whole new areas of language study, from child development and speech perception to neurology and genetics. By now, the community of scientists studying the questions he raised numbers in the thousands.

Nevertheless, the attitude to transformational analysis is far from being unanimous [Трансформационный метод, 1964; Трансформационно-генеративная грамматика, 1980]. Some critics blame N. Chomsky that his **apparatus of the formal analysis of syntax is too complicated**.

Much ground has been lost and many fine minds blunted on the complications of Transformational grammar. Chomsky's writings are "classics" in Mark Twaine's sense: something that everybody wants to have read and nobody wants to read [Pinker, 1995: 103].

Some investigators criticize N. Chomsky for his **exclusion of**

**semantics from transformational analysis.**

James D. McCawley [1968: 132] turns to the question of **selectional restrictions**. In most of the published literature on transformational grammar, selectional restrictions are treated as within the domain of the base component of a grammar ('syntactic selectional restrictions'). For example, the treatment of selectional restrictions in N. Chomsky [1965] goes roughly as follows: the base component contains rules which add 'inherent' features such as [+animate] or [-animate], [+human] or [-human], to each noun node; those rules are followed by rules which mark each verb node with features such as [animate subject], [nonhuman subject], and so on, depending on what features have been added to the noun node of the subject, and similarly for direct object, and other constituents, and then under each complex of features is inserted a lexical item whose feature composition does not contradict any of the features in the feature complex under which it is inserted.

James D. McCawley [1968: 132] presents an argument that an adequate account of selection must be in terms of **semantic selectional restrictions** and that there is no reason to have the 'syntactic selectional features' of N. Chomsky nor the complicated machinery for creating 'complex symbols' which the use of such features entails.

As evidence for his assertion, he points out that on any page of a large dictionary one finds words with incredibly specific selectional restrictions, involving an apparently unlimited range of semantic properties; for example, the verb *diagonalize* requires as its object a noun phrase denoting a matrix (in the mathematical sense), the adjective *benign* in the sense 'noncancerous' requires a subject denoting a tumor, and the verb *devein* as used in cookery requires an object denoting a shrimp or prawn.

James D. McCawley [1968: 134-135] maintains that **only semantic information plays a role in selection** and the various nonsemantic features attached to nouns, for example, proper versus common, grammatical gender, grammatical number, and so on, play no role in selection. For example, the verb *name* might at first glance seem to have a selectional restriction involving the feature [proper], cf. *They named their son John* and \**They named their son that boy*. However, there are in fact perfectly good sentences with something other than the proper noun in the place in question: *They named their son something outlandish*. The selectional restriction is thus that the

second object denote a name rather than that it have a proper noun as its head.

Regarding grammatical number, verbs such as *count* might seem to demand a plural object, cf. *I counted the boys* and *\*I counted the boy*. However, there are also sentences with grammatically singular objects: *I counted the crowd*. The selectional restriction on *count* is not that the object be plural but that it denotes a set of things rather than an individual.

It should also be noted that there are co-occurrence restrictions which differ radically from what has hitherto been understood by 'selection'. First, there appears to be no nonarbitrary way of deciding which of the elements in question determines the choice of the other.

N. Chomsky spoke about "the creative aspect of language use". Proceeding to explain what this means, he says that much of what we say in the course of normal language use is entirely new, not a repetition of what we have heard before and not even similar in pattern to sentences or discourse that we have heard in the past.

It should be noted that, although a new thought does require a new sentence for its expression, the latter is not completely new, contrary to what N. Chomsky said. Every new sentence is built to a ready-made pattern (model or structural formula) known to the speaker and the listener and filled by concrete words. Such patterns underlie all grammatically correct sentences, representing their internal organization, or structure. New sentences are understood since they reproduce patterns already existing in a language. The patterns, being filled with new words, give a common "pattern-determined" meaning to a variety of new sentences. This common meaning is known to the speaker and the listener, it is part and parcel of linguistic competence.

Modern computational linguistics claims that a person's knowledge of language is representable as a stored set of patterns, overlearned through constant repetition and detailed training, with innovation being at most a matter of analogy.

Attempts have been made to prove that many relevant and systematic phenomena of language are properties of discourse and cannot be described by **transformational grammar**. The existing types of structural and generative-transformational grammars are, at least in practice, limited to the formal enumeration and structural description of the sentences of a language and therefore are equated with sentence grammars.

## Text grammars accounting for the formal structure of texts

are expected to provide a more adequate framework for the description of many problematic phenomena dealt with in modern linguistics. Moreover, they have to provide an explicit basis for the study of all types of texts as they manifest themselves in processes of verbal communication.


Text grammars attempt to gain explicit insight into structures 'beyond the sentence'. The importance of text grammars is most obvious in determining a typology of texts, in establishing formal criteria for degrees of interpretability of sentences.

Problems of text grammar figure quite prominently in linguistic investigations of recent years. Attention of scholars is concentrated on such problems as syntax of the text, style of the text, text coherence, the main units of the text and others. Important observations in the theory of text grammar are made by T. A. Van Dijk [1985] who tries to prove that some important problems of transformational-generative grammar can be reformulated in terms of text grammar and shows that only in such a framework can these problems be expected to get satisfactory, i. e. sufficiently general and consistent, solutions.

Specific character of American linguistics is that periodically it changes methods and objects of study. Soon it became obvious that theoretical attire of transformational grammar is too tight for linguistics. Immediately after the publication in 1965 of the fundamental work by Noam Chomsky which completed theoretical substantiation of the so-called standard theory of transformational generative grammar, ideas which were at variance with the main postulates of T-grammar started to be expressed. American linguistics of the 1960s and 70s is characterized by active reevaluation of the possibilities of Transformational grammar, by the search of more adequate models of language description, and by desire to change the object of study and to shift the accent on semantics. The new trends were represented by **generative semantics** (G. Lakoff, McCawley) and **case grammar** (Ch. Fillmore).

## PART III

### METHODS OF SEMANTIC ANALYSIS



#### Unit 7

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### COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS

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#### 7.1. DEFINING THE SCIENCE OF MEANING: SEMASIOLOGY OR SEMANTICS?

The study of meaning is a permanent interest of scholars. It has been pursued in all the languages of the major civilizations and in ancient times, especially in Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin. The disciplines and techniques of linguistics are directed at investigating meaning. Indeed, the main concern of descriptive linguistics is to make statements of meaning [Firth, 1991: 70-71].

The branch of linguistics concerned with the meaning of words is called **semasiology**. The name comes from the Greek *sēmasia* 'signification' (from *sēma* 'sign' and *sēmantikos* 'significant').

The **main objects of semasiological study** are as follows: semantic development of words (i.e. change in meaning), its causes and classification, relevant distinctive features and types of lexical meaning, polysemy and semantic structure of words, semantic grouping and connections in the vocabulary system, i.e. synonyms, antonyms, terminological systems, etc. [Arnold, 1986: 112].

The two terms, **semasiology** and **semantics**, are sometimes used indiscriminately as synonyms referring to the science of meaning. According to Prof. J.R. Firth, the English word for the historical study of change of meaning was *semasiology*, until the new term *semantics* was introduced into linguistic studies.

As far back as the 1820s German classicist C.Chr. Reisig set up *semasiology* as an independent division of linguistics, and suggested that it should investigate the conditions governing the development of meaning.

In 1883 the French philologist Michel Bréal published an



article on what he called the "intellectual laws of language". He argued that, alongside of phonetics and morphology, the study of the formal elements of human speech, there ought also to be a science of meaning, which he proposed to call *la sémantique*, by a word derived from the Greek *sēma* 'sign'. The branch of study advocated in this article was not entirely new; yet it was mainly M. Bréal's generation, and in the first place M. Bréal himself, who established semantics as a discipline in its own right. In 1897 he published his *Essai de sémantique* which saw many subsequent editions. Three years after its publication, M. Bréal's *Essai* was translated into English under the title *Semantics: Studies in the Science of Meaning*, and although the term had been used in English a few years earlier, this translation played a decisive role in the diffusion of the new science and its name [Ullmann, 1975: 9].

The term *semantics* has become highly ambiguous. It is used to cover several different meanings. It is used to refer to the study of meaning in linguistics. It is also used to denote the meaning or an interpretation of the meaning of a word, sign, sentence, etc. There are also other meanings, not sufficiently divorced from linguistics and apt to create confusion. Academic *semantics*, also called *pure semantics*, is a branch of symbolic or mathematical logic originated by Rudolf P. Carnap. It aims at developing an abstract theory of relations between signs and what they denote. It is a branch of semiotics — the study of signs and languages in general, including all sorts of codes, such as military signals, traffic signals, etc. Unlike linguistic semantics which deals with real languages, pure semantics has as its subject formalized language and has very little in common with the homonymous science practised by philologists.

Thus for some linguists the term *semasiology* is preferable for the science of word meaning because it is less ambiguous. The only meaning it has is that stated in the definition above.


As *semasiology* deals with lexical meaning only, it may be regarded as a branch of **linguistic semantics** which deals with all kinds of linguistic meaning (i.e. meaning of all kinds of units — words, morphemes, grammatical forms, word combinations, sentences).

The fundamental term of semantics, **meaning**, is ambiguous and difficult to define. C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards devoted to this problem their famous book on semantics, *The Meaning of Meaning* first published in 1923. Here they listed no less than sixteen different

definitions of the term — or twenty three if each subdivision is counted separately [Ullmann, 1973: 5].

The study of the lexical meaning of the word and its semantic structure is especially difficult due to the complexity of the process by which language and human conscience serve to reflect outward reality and to adapt it to human needs.

The definition of lexical meaning has been attempted more than once in accordance with the main principles of different linguistic schools. The disciples of Ferdinand de Saussure consider meaning to be the relation between the object or notion named, and the name itself [Arnold, 1986: 113]. This is known as **analytical or referential-denotational concept of meaning** which is schematically represented below [Ullmann, 1973: 6].



In this diagram, the *name* denotes the phonetic and graphic form of the word; the *sense* is the information conveyed by the name (concept); the *thing* is the non-linguistic phenomenon to which the word refers (**denotatum** or **referent**). The dotted line suggests that there is no immediate relation between the word and the referent: it is established only through the concept.

Since the 'thing' is non-linguistic, it has no place in a purely linguistic analysis. Linguists can confine their attention to one side of the triangle: the line connecting the name with the sense. Between the two terms, there exists a reciprocal and reversible relationship: the name calls up the sense and vice versa, the sense makes us think of the name. It is this reversible and reciprocal relationship between name and sense — or between *signifiant* ('the signifier') and *signifié* ('the signified'), in Saussure's terminology — that linguists call the **meaning** of the word [Ullmann, 1973: 6-7].

Descriptive linguistics of the Bloomfieldian trend defines the meaning as the situation in which the word is uttered and the response which it calls forth in the hearer [Bloomfield, 1933: 139; Ullmann, 1973: 7; Arnold, 1986: 113-114].

## Both ways of approach afford no possibility of a further

investigation of semantic problems in strictly linguistic terms, and therefore, if taken as a basis for general linguistic theory, give no insight into the mechanism of meaning [Arnold, 1986: 113-114].

According to Stephen Ullmann [1973: 7], the heel of Achilles of the analysis of meaning is what has been called the 'sense' in the diagram presented above. There is an obvious need to distinguish between the sense and the 'referent', the extra-linguistic phenomenon to which the word refers. Our words — except proper names — stand for classes, not individual items; as L. Bloomfield [1933: 141; Ullmann, 1973: 7] put it, 'we must discriminate between *non-distinctive* features of the situation, such as the size, shape, colour, and so on of any one particular apple, and the *distinctive*, or *linguistic meaning* (the *semantic features*) which are common to all the situations that call forth the utterance of the linguistic form'.

It is precisely these distinctive features which make up the sense, the information communicated by the name. The trouble is that the sense thus conceived is an abstract, intangible mental entity, accessible only through introspection. As a critic of the theory has pointed out, 'an empirical science cannot be content to rely on a procedure of people looking into their minds, each into his own' [Haas, 1954: 74; Ullmann, 1973: 7].

Some of L. Bloomfield's successors went so far as to exclude semasiology from linguistics on the ground that meaning could not be studied objectively, and was not part of language but an aspect of the use to which language is put. This point of view was never generally accepted. The more general opinion is well revealed in R. Jakobson's pun. He said: "Linguistics without meaning is meaningless" [Arnold, 1986: 114].

The majority of linguists agree in one basic principle: they all point out that lexical meaning is the realization of the notion by means of a definite language system. It has also been repeatedly stated that the plane of content in speech reflects the whole of human consciousness, which comprises not only mental activity but emotions as well [Arnold, 1986: 114].

The notional or conceptual content of a word is expressed by its **denotative meaning** (also called **referential**) which may be of two types, according to whether the word's function is significative and evokes a general notion or demonstrative, i.e. identifying and denotes an actually existing individual thing.

The emotional content of the word is its capacity to evoke or directly express speaker's feelings and attitude. It is rendered by the emotional or expressive counterpart of meaning, also called **emotive charge, expressive, affective, or connotative meaning**. The expressive counterpart of meaning is optional.

Within the affective connotations of a word researchers distinguish its capacity to evoke or directly express: a) emotion, e.g. *daddy* as compared to *father*; b) evaluation, e.g. *clique* as compared to *group*; c) intensity, e.g. *adore* as compared to *love*; d) stylistic colouring, e.g. *slay* as compared to *kill* [Arnold, 1986: 115].

Thus, the **complexity of word meaning** is manifold. Apart from the lexical meaning including denotative and connotative meaning it is always combined with the grammatical meaning which is defined as an expression in speech of relationship between words based on contrastive features of arrangements in which they occur [Arnold, 1986: 115]. Lexical meaning of every word is strongly dependent upon the grammatical meaning. Consequently, the lexical meaning of every word depends upon the part of speech to which the word belongs. Every word may be used in a limited set of syntactical functions, and with a definite valency. It has a definite set of grammatical meanings, and a definite set of forms.

To illustrate this I.V. Arnold [1986: 115] considers the word *adored* in the following epigram by Oscar Wilde: *Men can be analyzed, women — merely adored*. Here *adored* has a lexical meaning and a grammatical meaning. The grammatical meaning is that of a participle II of a transitive verb. The denotational counterpart of the lexical meaning realizes the corresponding notion, and consists of several components, namely — feeling, attachment, intensity, respect. The connotational component is that of intensity and loftiness. The definition of *adore* is 'to feel a great attachment and respect, to worship'.

Such complexity of word meanings, however, is surely no sufficient reason for excluding the semantic side of language from the field of linguistics.

Some linguists insist that we are not ready for semantic studies, and that the only features which are of any real importance are the formal, structural ones. To this objection, E.A. Nida [1985: 91] makes three replies: 1) the practical requirements of our work as linguists force us to do something about semantics; 2) structural analyses, made on any practical level, must take meaning into consideration in the very definition of a morpheme as 'a minimal unit

of phonetic-semantic distinctiveness, and 3) there must be some describable relationships between the linguistic signals and the cultural features which are signaled. If this is not true, then speech is idle babbling [Nida, 1985: 88-89].

According to Stephen Ullmann [1975: 19-20], some of the reluctance to tackle problems of meaning undoubtedly is connected with the fact that semantic phenomena cannot usually be described with the same scientific rigour as the formal elements of language, and to many linguists scientific rigour is the supreme test of scholarship, even if the subject matter would invite a different method of approach. This attitude explains why semantics was virtually ostracized by extreme structuralists.

Whereas the phonological and even the grammatical resources of a language are closely organized and limited in number, the vocabulary is a loose assemblage of a vast multitude of elements. The numerical contrast is striking: there are forty-four or forty-five phonemes in English while on the other hand the Oxford Dictionary is said to contain over 400,000 words: a ratio of nearly 1 to 10,000. But there is an equally sharp contrast in cohesion and stability. The phonological and grammatical system, though subject to long-term changes, is relatively stable at a given moment, whereas the vocabulary is in a perpetual state of flux. New words are continuously formed or borrowed from outside sources to fill a genuine gap or to suit the whims of the speaker; new meanings are attached to old words [Ullmann, 1975: 11-12].

It is clear, then, that the vast, unstable and loosely organized congeries of words which we call vocabulary cannot be analyzed with the same scientific rigour and precision as the phonological and grammatical system of a language. This does not mean, however, that words are not amenable to any kind of linguistic analysis. In the search for such methods of analysis, some linguists and other scholars have evolved, since the early 1930s, a number of different techniques from which a new, structurally oriented semantics has begun to emerge [Ullmann, 1975: 12]. This applies not only to semantics in the wider sense but also to the study of word meanings.

The problems of semasiology have come to the fore in the research work of linguists of different schools of thought and a number of attempts have been made to find efficient procedures for the analysis and interpretation of word meaning. An important step forward was taken in the 1950s with the development of **componential analysis**.

Linguists are becoming increasingly aware of the necessity of treating semantic problems as they are related to various systems of description. Purely structural studies have their place, but they are incomplete without recognition and adequate treatments of the semantic factors involved, not only in the data of the language, but in the process by which such data are classified and described [Nida, 1985: 88].

- **Task 77.** When was semantics established as a self-contained branch of linguistics? How can you account for the reluctance of structural linguists to deal with the problems of meaning?
- **Task 78.** Discuss and illustrate with your own examples different types of word meaning: grammatical and lexical, denotative and connotative.

## 7.2. WHAT COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS IS

**Componential analysis** is one of the modern methods of semantic research. It attempts to reduce meaning to its smallest components. Hence the term *componential analysis*.

Componential approach to meaning has a long history in linguistics. The first researchers who suggested and developed the method of componential analysis of word meaning were American anthropologists-linguists F.G. Lounsbury and W.H. Goodenough who studied the American Indian languages. Their particular interest lay in studying kinship terms of various Amerindian tribes.

In the 1950s-80s there appeared a sizable linguistic literature of articles and book-length monographs devoted to componential analysis. A lot of linguists were concerned with componential analysis, among them J.J. Katz, J.A. Fodor, E.A. Nida, A.J. Greimas, B. Pottier, Yu.D. Apresyan, I.V. Arnold, R.S. Ginzburg, E.M. Mednikova, O.N. Seliverstova, I.A. Sternin and others.

Special procedures of componential analysis have been developed to determine the components of each meaning and represent this as a combination of elementary senses.

To illustrate what is meant by this we can take a simple example, used for this purpose by many linguists [Arnold, 1986: 283]. Consider the following set of words: *man, woman, boy, girl, bull, cow*. We can arrange them as correlations of binary oppositions *man ::*

*woman = boy :: girl = bull :: cow.* The meanings of words man, boy,

*bull* on the one hand, and *woman*, *girl* and *cow*, on the other, have one semantic component in common. In this case the semantic distinctive feature is that of sex — male or female. Another possible correlation is *man :: boy = woman :: girl*. The distinctive feature is that of age — adult or non-adult. If we compare this with a third correlation *man :: bull = woman :: cow* we obtain a third distinctive feature contrasting human and animal beings. Therefore the meaning of *man* can be described as {male [adult (human being)]}, *woman* as {female [adult (human being)]}, *boy* as {male [non-adult (human being)]}, *girl* as {female [non-adult (human being)]}, *bull* as {male [adult (animal being)]}, *cow* as {female [adult (animal being)]}.

Componential analysis is the analysis of a set of related linguistic items, especially word meanings, into combinations of features in terms of which each item may be compared with every other. Componential analysis is thus an attempt to describe the meaning of words in terms of a universal inventory of semantic components and their possible combinations.

There are several varieties, American and European, described by their practitioners as componential analysis [Ullmann, 1973: 34-36].

The best-known experiment in this kind of analysis is the theory of **American linguists** J.J. Katz and J.A. Fodor, which is designed to provide the semantic component of a transformational-generative grammar. This was first put forward in 1963 but has since undergone several modifications. The essential feature of the Katz-Fodor scheme is that it breaks down each meaning of a word into a series of elementary components arranged in such a way that they progress, like a tree diagram, from the general to the particular. In other words, it is assumed that any item can be described in terms of categories arranged in a hierarchical way; that is, a subsequent category is a subcategory of the previous category.

Semantic features are classified into **semantic markers** — semantic features which are present also in the lexical meaning of other words and **distinguishers** — semantic features which are idiosyncratic (i.e. which do not recur in the lexical meaning of other words). Markers refer to features which the item has in common with other items, distinguishers refer to what differentiates an item from other items. Not every lexical meaning has a distinguisher; if there is one, it always stands at the end of the series. There is also a third

type of component: a **syntactic marker** specifying the part of speech to which the word belongs.

The following examples may illustrate the procedure. The meaning of *boy* may be analyzed as involving the following components, the first of which is a syntactic marker while the rest are semantic markers: 'noun — countable noun — human — young — male'. *Girl* will have the same components, except that here we shall have 'female' instead of 'male': 'noun — countable noun — human — young — female'. *Woman* will also have the same components with the exception of 'female' instead of 'male' and 'adult' instead of 'young': 'noun — countable noun — human — adult — female'.

Componential analysis of the word *spinster*, on the other hand, runs: 'noun — countable noun — human — adult — female — who has never married' [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 204-205].

'Noun' is the syntactic marker specifying the part of speech; 'countable noun' is a semantic marker, it represents a subclass within nouns and refers to the semantic feature which the word *spinster* has in common with all other countable nouns but which distinguishes it from all uncountable nouns; 'human' is also a marker which refers the word *spinster* to nouns denoting human beings; 'adult' is another marker pointing at a specific subdivision of human beings into adults and young, or not grown up. The word *spinster* possesses still another marker — 'female' — which it shares with such words as *woman*, *widow*, *mother*, etc., and which represents a subclass of adult females. At last comes the distinguisher 'who has never married' which differentiates the meaning of the word from other words which have all other common semantic features. Thus, the componential analysis may be represented as a hierarchical structure with several subcategories each of which stands in relation of subordination to the preceding subclass of semantic features.

**European semanticists** using very different methods, have also been trying to reduce meaning to minimal components or, as they call them, **semes**. A seme is an elementary constituent of meaning comparable in function to distinctive features in phonology. Just as the phoneme [b] in *bale* differs from the [p] in *pale* in respect of voice, the meaning of *boy* differs from that of *girl* in respect of sex. The opposition between [b] (voiced) and [p] (voiceless) corresponds to that between *boy* (male) and *girl* (female): 'male' and 'female' are therefore 'semes' — in Katz-Fodor's terminology, semantic markers [Ullmann, 1973: 37].



B. Pottier has given an illuminating

example of the distinctive function of semes by analyzing the meaning of four French words for various kinds of seats [Ullmann, 1973: 37-38].

	to sit upon	with leg(s)	for one person	with a back	with arms
<i>canapé</i> 'sofa'	+	+	-	(+)	(+)
<i>fauteuil</i> 'armchair'	+	+	+	+	+
<i>chaise</i> 'chair'	+	+	+	+	-
<i>tabouret</i> 'stool'	+	+	+	-	-

No two words have exactly the same components. The first two semes, however, are shared by all four terms, and it so happens that there exists a word in French, *siege* 'seat', whose meaning consists of these two components and no others.

In European tradition componential analysis also proceeds from the assumption that word meaning is not an unanalyzable whole but can be decomposed into elementary semantic components called **semes**. It is also assumed that these basic semantic elements can be classified into several subtypes thus ultimately constituting a highly structured system.

Different authors give different names and classifications of **semes**. Alongside the term **seme** researchers use the following terms to refer to the minimum elements of lexical meaning: *semantic component*, *semantic multiplier*, *semantic parameter*, *semantic function*, etc. The following types of semes are distinguished by the majority of scholars [Основы компонентного анализа, 1969; Арнольд, 1991: 55]:

- **classeme** — categorial **seme** which refers the word to a certain lexico-grammatical class of words (part of speech), i.e. the general semantic characteristic of the class. Classemes are semantic features of higher order. They regulate the realization of the categorial valencies of notional units.

- **archeseme** — the most basic, principal generic **seme** in units of a certain class reflecting their common categorial features, e.g. in kinship terms *father*, *mother*, *son*, *daughter*, etc. the archeseme is 'a person who is related by blood or marriage, relative';

- **differential semes** — specific semes that differentiate the meaning of a word from other words, e.g. kinship terms *father* and *mother* have differential semes 'male' and 'female' respectively, *father* and *son* — 'parent' and 'offspring', *father* and *uncle* — 'direct lineality' and 'indirect lineality'.

- **integrative semes** — common semes that do not differentiate the meaning of a word from other words within some thematic group, e.g. for kinship terms *daughter* and *son* the same 'direct lineality' is differential because it is the basis for the opposition *son* — *nephew*, *daughter* — *niece*, but for the kinship term *children* it is integrative since there is no single word for *niece* and *nephew* opposed to *children* in English.

**Archisemes** and **differential semes** are in hyperonymic-hyponymic relations (relations of inclusion). That is why they are also termed hypersemes and hyposemes by some authors:

- **hypersememe** — thematic seme referring the word to a certain lexico-semantic field or thematic group;
- **hyposemes** — semes which are subcategories of a more general thematic seme.

Another distinction is made between **denotative semes** and **connotative semes**. Denotative semes belong to the denotative component of meaning. Connotative semes are additional semantic components which represent the connotative component of meaning.

The meaning of many words is subject to complex associations originating in habitual contexts, verbal or situational, of which the speaker and the listener are aware, and which form the connotational component of meaning. In some words denotative meaning is accompanied by additional stylistic characteristics revealing the speaker's attitude to the situation, the subject-matter, and to the interlocutor [Arnold, 1986: 114-115].

There are three major types of commonly recognized **connotative meaning**:

1) **emotive (affective)** expressing emotions or feelings, e.g. *to shudder* is to tremble with horror, fear, disgust, etc.; *to glare* is to look in anger, rage, etc.;

2) **evaluative (attitudinal)** rendering some widespread attitude to the referent, e.g. *famous* refers to someone or something having a widespread reputation of a favorable nature; a *famous writer*, a *famous lighthouse*;

3) **associative** consisting of the stereotypical expectations

rightly or wrongly associated with the referent, e.g. a possible connotation of *home* is 'a place of warmth, comfort, and affection'.

Researchers also distinguish **contextual (connotative nonce) semes** defined as occasional figurative meaning of a word originated in a certain context [Арнольд, 1991: 55]. The poem by W.H. Oden entitled *Thank You, Fog* serves to illustrate the contextual seme 'human being' realized in the noun *fog* in the poem

Distinction is also made between **implicit (potential)** and **explicit semes**. Implicit semes become explicit only in word combinations. The adjective *pretty*, for instance, when combined with nouns denoting human beings presupposes in these nouns the semes 'youth' and 'female', e.g. a *pretty girl*. Combinability with nouns denoting men of old age is not natural, e.g. \**a pretty old man*. Thus **implicit (potential) meaning** is given to a word by the meaning of some other word with which it collocates to form a commonly-used phrase. Presupposed implicit meaning arises from co-occurrence restrictions, i.e. restrictions on what other word or expression we expect to see before or after a particular lexical unit.

The term **seme** identifies any minimal feature of meaning, i.e. any minimal feature of the semantic structure of a word. One should not confuse a seme with a single complete sense of a word which is called a **sememe**.

Semes are realized as components of a sememe which is defined as an elementary meaning or lexico-semantic variant of a word. Unlike semes, sememes are units of a higher status in the plane of content.


Lexicographic definitions lend themselves as suitable material for the analysis of lexical groups in terms of a finite set of semantic components. Componential analysis is currently carried out on the basis of **dictionary definitions** [Арнольд, 1991: 53], i.e. it is combined with the so-called **definitional analysis**. For example, in *Advanced Learner's Dictionary* by A.S. Hornby the definition of the noun *hum* runs 'a continuous murmuring sound'. It gives us two semes: 'sound' and 'continuity'. The word *murmur* in the definition of the noun *hum* denotes a complex notion and requires a further explanation. The number of such recurrent explanations taken from the same or a different dictionary is called **definition depth**. The definition of *murmur* in the same dictionary is 'a low continuous sound, vague or indistinct'. This gives us two more semes: 'lowness'

and 'indistinctness'. Definition depth in this case equals 2 (we had to consult the dictionary two times).

**Basic steps of componential analysis are:** 1) determining the limits of a 'closed corpus' of data; 2) defining the terms as precisely as possible on the basis of the objects involved; 3) identifying the distinctive features; 4) mapping the semantic space.

Componential analysis is, as a rule, formalized only as far as the symbolic representation of meaning components is concerned. Thus, in the analysis of kinship terms, the component denoting sex may be represented by A — male, A — female, B may stand for one generation above ego, B — for the generation below ego; C — for direct lineality, C — for indirect lineality, etc. Accordingly, the clusters of symbols ABC and ABC represent the semantic components of the words *mother* and *father* respectively.

- **Task 79.** Point out some kinship terms with the following semantic markers: a) 'a person related by blood/marriage, relative'; b) 'male'; c) 'female'; d) 'one generation above ego'; e) 'one generation below ego'; f) 'two generations above ego'; g) 'two generations below ego'; h) 'direct lineality'; i) 'indirect lineality'.
  
- **Task 80.** Fill in empty spaces with corresponding semantic components in the diagrams below representing componential analysis of the words *woman*, *spinster* and *widow*. Point out semantic markers, distinguishers, and syntactic markers.



Draw similar graphic representations of componential analysis of the words: a) *man*, *bachelor*, *widower*; b) *girl*, *schoolgirl*, *girl-friend*.



**Task 81.** Point out distinguishers in the meaning of the following adjectives denoting a) patterns: *checked, patterned, plaid, plain, polka dot, striped*; b) shape: *circle, diamond, heart, octagon, oval, pentagon, rectangle, square, triangle*. Do all adjectives denoting patterns and shape have a distinguisher?

- **Task 82.** Illustrate and comment on the distinctive function of semes by analyzing the meaning of the following English words for various kinds of movement: *limp, hobble, amble, stroll, wander, stride, strut, march, pace, stamp*.
- **Task 83\*.** The verbs *glare, glower, gloat* all have connotations of emotion that accompany an intense gaze. Point out these connotative semantic components.
- **Task 84\*.** Complete the following scheme introducing connotative components in the semantic structure of words [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 70]. Point out the type of connotative meaning.

	Denotative components	Connotative components	
<i>lonely, adj.</i>	→ alone, without company	+	
<i>notorious, adj.</i>	→ widely known	+	
<i>celebrated, adj.</i>	→ widely known	+	

- **Task 85.** Point out and comment on the implicit (potential) semes in the meaning of the following English words for various kinds of outer covering of certain fruit, vegetables, or seeds: *husk, peel, pod, rind, shell, skin*.
- **Task 86.** Basing on dictionary definitions, analyze the meaning components of the following English nouns: a) *clamour, clatter, murmur, racket*; b) *bark, croak, growl, grunt, hiss, roar, snarl, squeak, squeal, whine*; c) *gasp, giggle, groan, laugh, moan, sigh, sneeze, sniff, snort, sob, whistle*.

- **Task 87.** Consider the meaning of the following words: *basin, beaker, bowl, cup, dish, glass, mug, plate, saucer*. Contrasting one object with another, search for differences in meaning. Consider the following semantic features in relation to these words: 'material', 'flatness', 'handles', 'shape', 'use', 'position' [Lewis, 1993: 79, 81].

### 7.3. APPLICATIONS OF COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS

Componential analysis was developed as a method of semantic research to study the meaning of words. In its classical form it was applied to the so-called closed subsystems of the vocabulary, mostly to kinship and colour terms. Componential analysis was also successfully applied in the analysis of polysemantic words, synonyms, hyponymic groups, thematic classification of vocabulary, etc.

Componential analysis is most widely used with lexical words, denoting combination of qualities, cultural words (*realia*). Componential analysis can be used to differentiate also synonyms, conceptual terms, neologisms, etc. Componential analysis is a method of bridging many lexical gaps, both linguistic and cultural.

Componential analysis also found application in other branches of linguistics, for instance, in phonology (e.g. 'componential analysis' of segmental phonemes into their distinctive features or components on the basis of their binary oppositions) [Арнольд, 1991: 49]. It is a valuable tool in morphology [Гулыга, Шендельсь, 1976] and syntax [Гак, 1972; Апресян, 1974].

It should be pointed out that componential analysis deals with individual meanings. Different meanings of **polysemantic words** have different componential structure. For example, the comparison of two meanings of the noun *boy* (1. a male child up to the age of 17 or 18, and 2. a male servant (any age) esp. in African and Asian countries) reveals that though both of them contain the semantic components 'human' and 'male' the component 'young' which is part of one meaning is not necessarily to be found in the other [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 203].

No two meanings of the same word will have identical semantic components, so that componential analysis may help in the removal of ambiguities [Ullmann, 1973: 35].

Componential analysis is also used in investigation of the semantic structure of **synonyms**. There is always a certain

component of meaning which makes one member of the synonymous

set different from any other member of the same set.

For example, *brave*, *courageous*, *valiant*, *fearless*, *gallant*, *audacious* refer to confident bearing in the face of difficulties or dangers. *Brave* is the most comprehensive: it is especially used of that confident fortitude or daring that actively faces and endures anything threatening: *her brave fight against cancer*. *Courageous* implies a higher or nobler kind of bravery, especially as resulting from an inborn quality of mind or spirit that faces or endures perils or difficulties without fear and even with enthusiasm: a *courageous speech against the dictator*. *Valiant* implies a correspondence between an inner courageousness and external deeds, particularly of physical strength or endurance: a *valiant soldier*. *Fearless* implies unflinching spirit and coolness in the face of danger: a *fearless soldier*. *Gallant* implies a chivalrous, impetuous, or dashing bravery: a *gallant knight*, a *gallant rescue attempt*. *Audacious* implies extreme boldness or daring, reckless bravery: an *audacious explorer*.

In a number of cases this distinctive semantic component may be hard to define, nevertheless intuitively it is felt by all native speakers. For instance, that is how the difference in the meaning components of the words *like*, *enjoy*, *appreciate*, etc. is described. Analyzing the difficulty of finding an adequate translation for *John appreciates classical music, he doesn't appreciate rock R.* Quirk [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 206] argues that *appreciate* is not quite the same as *enjoy* or *like* or *admire* or *take an interest in* though quite a number of semantic components making up their meanings are identical. To *appreciate* is to be attuned to the real virtue X is presupposed to have and *not to appreciate* is to fail to be attuned. It is not to deny that X has virtues. In short, *appreciate* seems to presuppose in the object qualities deserving admiration in a way that *like*, *admire*, and so on do not.

Componential analysis may be used in the analysis of **hyponymic groups**.

**Hyponymy** involves the notion of inclusion in the sense that *tulip* and *rose* are included in *flower*, and *lion* and *elephant* in *mammal* or perhaps *animal*. Similarly *scarlet* is included in *red*. Inclusion is thus a matter of class membership [Palmer, 1976: 216].

J.Lyon's [1968] term for the relation of inclusion is **hyponymy**. The 'upper' term that denotes a general class under which a set of subcategories is subsumed is the **superordinate (hyperonym)**, e.g. *child* is the superordinate of *girl* and *boy*. The

'lower' term that denotes a subcategory of a more general class is the **hyponym**, e.g. *chair* and *table* are hyponyms of *furniture*.

In the semantic analysis of hyponymic groups researchers find that they constitute a series with an increasingly larger range of inclusion. For example, *bear*, *mammal*, *animal* represent three successive markers in which *bear* is subordinated to *mammal* and *mammal* to *animal*. As one ascends the hierarchical structure the terms generally become fewer and the domains — larger, i.e. the shift is from greater specificity to greater generic character. Words that belong to the same step in the hierarchical ladder are of the same degree of specificity and all of them have, at least, one marker — one component of meaning in common. They constitute a series where the relationship between the members is essentially identical [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 205].

Generally speaking, practically all classifications of lexical units implicitly presuppose application of the theory of semantic components. For instance, the classification of nouns into animate — inanimate, human — non-human proceeds from the assumption that there is a common semantic component found in such words.

**Thematic classification** of vocabulary is also based on componential analysis. Thus, we can observe the common semantic component 'foodstuffs' in the lexico-semantic group made up of such words as *sugar*, *pepper*, *salt*, *bread*, etc., or the common semantic component 'non-human living being' in *cat*, *lion*, *dog*, *tiger*, etc.

One of the most fruitful concepts evolved in structural semantics is that of the '**lexical (or semantic) field**'. The concept of lexical field first arose in the 1920s and was developed by Prof. Jost Trier in his famous monograph on German terms for intellectual qualities which appeared in 1931. Close study of the history of intellectual terminology in Old and Middle High German convinced J.Trier that it was fundamentally wrong to consider words in isolation: they must be viewed within the context of the lexical field to which they belong.

A **lexical field** is a closely organized and integrated sector of the vocabulary, whose elements fit together and delimit each other and derive their significance from their place within the system as a whole [Ullmann, 1975: 41].

To take a trivial example, military ranks and ranks of any strictly hierarchical organization of people in relationship of seniority, command, and subordination are examples of a culturally produced field that is closely delimited and ordered. Part of the meaning of any

military rank word (*major*, *captain*, *corporal*, etc.) is the product of the

whole system of such terms in the relevant part of the language and

of the exact place of each in relation to the others [Robins, 1975: 50]. The meaning of *captain*, for instance, is defined by its position in the military hierarchy between *lieutenant* and *major*.

Examples of lexical fields are: the system of colours, the network of family relations, or, among abstract experience, the terms for intellectual qualities, ethical and aesthetical values, religious and mystical experiences [Ullmann, 1975: 41].

In each field some sphere of experience is analyzed, divided up and classified in a unique way. In this sense, the vocabulary of every language embodies a peculiar vision of the universe; it implies a definite philosophy of life and hierarchy of values which is handed down from one generation to another [Ullmann, 1975: 16-17].

How differently the raw material of experience is elaborated by various languages can be seen even in such a preeminently concrete field as the scale of colours. The spectrum is a continuous band, without any sharp boundaries, the number and nature of colour distinctions is therefore largely a matter of habit and convention.

It is well known that languages do not correspond in their most used colour vocabulary. Welsh *gwydd*, *glas*, and *llwyd* roughly cover the same colour range as English *green*, *blue*, *grey*, and *brown*, but do not have the same approximate boundaries. The same surfaces designated *green*, *blue* and *grey* in English might all be called *glas* in Welsh. Likewise in Japanese the adjective *aōi* refers to much of the range of colour distinguished in English by *blue* and *green* [Robins, 1975: 49-50; Ullmann, 1973: 28].

A wide variety of lexical fields have been investigated employing componential analysis: aesthetic, moral and religious terms, those denoting hostile attitudes, the terminology of dwelling, cooking, and domestic animals, verbs of motion, adjectives for 'old' and 'young', and other spheres [Ullmann, 1975: 32].

Componential analysis of **syntactic units** yields some interesting observations about the regularities of functioning of words in speech and their syntagmatic and collocational properties. The following rules were discovered as a result of componential analysis of word groups and sentences:

- **selection restriction rules** showing the kind of items with which a word in a particular meaning may combine: thus the adjective *honest* in the old sense of 'chaste' would have the selection restriction 'female' (J.J. Katz, J.A. Fodor);

- **rules of interaction of lexical meanings** highlighting non-additive character of summation of lexical meanings of words in some word combinations: thus in some word combinations the meanings of the constituents add up in creating the meaning of the whole, e.g. *green field*, *to live in the forest*; in some combinations the meaning of the whole is not a mere sum of its elements, e.g. *cruel kindness*, *to make haste slowly* (Yu. D. Apresyan).

- **rules of semantic agreement** showing obligatory repetition of certain components of meaning in the constituents of word combinations: thus in *The bird flew to its nest* the seme 'fly' is present in the verb *fly* and the noun *bird* (V.G. Gak).

The advocates of a componential approach to the meanings of lexically compatible words reveal "shared semantic components" in them and formulate the fundamental semantic law governing the correct understanding of a text by a listener: such an interpretation of a sentence is chosen as to ensure a maximum recurrence of its semantic elements [Апресян, 1974: 14]. Yu.D. Apresyan writes that this law is a strict formulation of the old principle that the wanted meaning of a polysemantic word is made clear by the context.

These rules establish certain conditions of correct choice of words in word combinations which depend on the presence of some common seme in their constituents and absence (cancellation) of contradicting semes in one of the components. Syntagmatic conjunction of two or more words without common semantic component(s) is likely to be incomprehensible or downright nonsensical, although its grammatical composition may be unexceptional. The classic example of such a grammatical but nonsensical sentence is *Colourless green ideas sleep furiously* suggested by Noam Chomsky [Pinker, 1995: 88].

Other trivial examples of nonsensical word combinations are \**to eat a book* and \**to write a fish* [Аракин, 1972: 9]. The verb *write* can combine only with nouns *book*, *letter*, *text*, *telegramme*, etc. which share the seme 'written or printed communication'. The verb *eat* can combine only with nouns denoting foodstuffs (i.e. 'things that are edible').

In some cases such incompatibility of semantic components leads to the formation of figurative meaning (in tropes, as metaphor, metonymy, simile, synecdoche, oxymoron, personification, etc.): *joyous alarms*, *eyeless road*, *white sleep*, *breasted tree*, *yesterday's silences are much louder*, *a poem should be wordless*, etc. In tropes (figures of speech) words are used in other than their ordinary

combinations and in other than their literal sense, in order to suggest

a picture or image or for other special effect.

Thus, in syntagmatics semes are minimal features of combinability. Repetition of semes is an important means of constructing utterances similar in function to other syntagmatic means of the language.

- **Task 88.** Analyze two or three meanings of any polysemantic word in terms of their componental structure. How does componential analysis help to point out the difference in meaning?
- **Task 89.** *Piece, slice and lump* are synonyms. How can componential analysis help to differentiate between them?
- **Task 90.** *Look, gape, gaze, glance, glare, glower, gloat, glimpse, goggle, leer, peek, peep, peer, squint, stare* are synonyms. Each member of the set has a component of meaning not to be found in any other member of this set. Point out these components on the basis of lexicographic definitions (definitional analysis).

*to stare:*

to look	+	steadily, lastingly	+	in surprise, curiosity, etc.
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*to glare:*

to look	+	steadily, lastingly	+	in anger, rage, fury
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- **Task 91.** Analyze the meaning of words in the following hyponymic group. What common component(s) do they share?  
footwear: *flats, high heels, loafers, moccasins, pumps, sandals, tennis shoes*
- **Task 92.** Analyze the meaning of the following co-hyponyms: *bottle, box, can, carton, crate, jar, jug, pack, packet, pitcher, pot, tube*. Point out their common superordinate term (hyperonym).
- **Task 93.** Analyze the componential structure of the following words belonging to one thematic (lexico-semantic) group: *bagel, bread, bun, cake, muffin, pie, sandwich, tart, waffle*.

*cornbread, croissant, dinner roll, hamburger bun, hot dog bun, loaf, pretzel, rye bread, sourdough bread.* Point out their common semantic component(s).

- **Task 94.** Point out common semantic components (semes) in the following word combinations: a) *dark night, bright sunshine, dim twilight, white snow, clandestine secret, empty house;* b) *to sweep the floor, to slice meat, to tell a tale, to write a letter, to write with a pencil, to pay a dollar;* c) *happenings occur, the sun shines, the storm raged, time passes, the wind is blowing.*
  
- **Task 95.** Explain why the following sentences are incomprehensible although their grammatical composition is unexceptional.
  - 1) Harry drank a piece of paper.
  - 2) A hammer broke the glass with a chisel.
  - 3) She smelled the situation to see if it was fresh.
  - 4) The table had breakfast of bacon and eggs.

#### **7.4. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF COMPONENTIAL ANALYSIS**

Componential analysis is of direct relevance to the structure of vocabulary. It proves to be very efficient for certain linguistic issues and finds an ever-widening application, providing researchers with a deeper insight into some aspects of language.

Componential analysis is indispensable to lexicography as a means to refine and improve definitions of words in dictionaries. It is also widely used in preparation of teaching materials.

Nevertheless, componential analysis also has its deficiencies and has prompted severe critical discussions.

Componential analysis tries to break down meaning into its minimal components. A critic of this method has actually characterized this approach as an 'atomization of meaning' [Bolinger, 1965: 555-573].

In criticizing this approach, the English linguist Prof. W. Haas [Arnold, 1986: 284] argues that componential analysis looks very plausible if one has carefully selected examples from words entering into clear-cut semantic groups, such as terms of kinship or words denoting colours. It is less satisfactory in other cases, as there is no linguistic framework by which the semantic contrasts can be limited.

Stephen Ullmann [1973: 35-36] points out several weaknesses of the Katz-Fodor theory of componential analysis: the

number and order of semantic markers is somewhat arbitrary, the presence or absence of distinguishers is unpredictable; there is no provision in the theory for derived and metaphorical meanings; no distinction is made between 'fortuitous homonymy and lexicologically interesting polysemy'. Nor is it easy to see how this model of meaning can be reconciled with the theory of lexical fields. N. Chomsky himself has recognized this difficulty and has mentioned colour as an example of a field property that cannot be described naturally in terms of separate lexical entries, though it obviously plays a role in semantic interpretation.

According to E.A. Nida [1975], componential analysis can be employed to analyze the meaning of related words provided that the relationship of words are based on certain shared contrasted features (e.g. *father* :: *mother*). Componential analysis has the following limitations: 1) it is applicable to a limited series of terms; 2) many supplementary features are disregarded, e.g. emotive meaning in *mother* in contrast with *cousin*; 3) native speakers do not think about componential features.

F.A. Nida also discussed the figurative extension of meaning. For example, it is not difficult to define the word *dog* in terms of componential analysis but we are lost when we branch into figurative extensions: *he is a dirty dog*; *constellations the Great Dog*; *the Little dog*; *he went to dogs*, etc. Extension of meaning often produces heavy semantic load. The supplementary components may become diagnostic in certain contexts (e.g. *mule* — 'stubborn', 'obstinate').

The most important drawback is that componential analysis is aimed mainly or exclusively at investigating the denotation component of the lexical meaning. It brings to light a set of semes which make up the denotative meaning of lexical units. The analysis of differences of the connotative meaning is very hard since the nuances are often slight, difficult to grasp and do not yield themselves to objective investigation and verification.

Various attempts have been made to get round this limitation, including an experiment to 'measure' meaning, or more precisely to quantify people's reactions to the emotive overtones of certain concepts. It was developed by a group of American psycholinguists C.E. Osgood, G.J. Suci and P.H. Tannenbaum [1965]. They set up a technique known as the **method of semantic differential** by means of which, as they claim, meaning can be measured. It is perfectly

clear, however that what semantic differential measures is not word meaning in any of the accepted senses of the term but the connotational component of meaning or, to be more exact, the emotive charge.

Their technique requires informants to judge a series of concepts with respect to a set of bipolar (antonymic) adjective scales. For example, a concept like *horse* is to be rated in terms of the degree to which it is good or bad, fast or slow, strong or weak, etc. [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 209].

	<b>horse</b>							
	+							
<b>good</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	bad
	+							
<b>fast</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	slow
	+							
<b>strong</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	weak
	+							
<b>hard</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	soft
	+							
<b>happy</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	sad

The meanings of the seven divisions (taking as an example the first of the scales represented above, from left to right) are: extremely good, quite good, slightly good, neither good nor bad (or equally good and bad), slightly bad, quite bad, extremely bad.

*Horse* is described as neither good nor bad, extremely fast, quite strong, slightly hard, equally happy and sad.

The responses of informants produce a semantic profile representing the emotive charge of the word. The degree of agreement between the answers is treated as a significant and reliable factor.

It may be argued that the data with which they deal in such investigations are essentially subjective. Objectivity, however, depends on the observer. In other words, each informant records his or her own, entirely subjective reactions, but by the time the analysis has been completed the result will represent a kind of semantic average reached by purely objective statistical methods.

## Comparison of responses by native speakers of different languages

languages to denotationally 'equivalent' words reveals that they have different semantic profiles. Hence, learners of a foreign language can hardly expect that words will have the same connotation for them as they do for native speakers. This naturally concerns, first of all, the emotive charge of lexical units. Thus, e.g., it has been found that the word *rain* tends to be described as *rather happy* by all the informants of the Southwest Indian groups. The same word was described as *rather sad* by the overwhelming majority of English informants.

The method of semantic differential is regarded as an interesting attempt to get a better insight into the problem of connotational meaning. This method, however, has not been as yet properly elaborated or extended to an adequate sample of vocabulary and, consequently, is of little use in lexicological analysis.

In spite of these and other limitations, componential analysis has played a valuable part in the development of structural semantics. It was the first detailed and explicit semantic theory to be put forward in linguistics for a long time; it focused attention on the semantic component of a transformational-generative grammar, and gave rise to a lively and searching discussion of a number of fundamental semantic problems [Ullmann, 1973: 36].

- **Task 96.** Ask your friends to judge a series of concepts (e.g. *mouse*, *elephant*, etc.) with respect to a set of bipolar adjective scales. Collect these characteristics and try to prepare a semantic profile representing the denotative (referential) meaning and emotive charge of these words.

## Unit 8

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### SEMANTICO-SYNTACTIC ANALYSIS

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#### 8.1. CASE GRAMMAR AS ONE OF THE APPROACHES IN SEMANTICO-SYNTAX

There is no aspect of linguistic study more subject to confusion and more in need of clear and careful formulation than that which deals with the points of connection between syntax and semantics [Chomsky, 1965: 93].

One of the shortcomings of a number of representatives of transformational generative linguistics is their understanding of sentence constituents as purely relational entities.

Charles Fillmore proposed a substantive modification to the theory of transformational grammar. It amounts to a reinforcement of the deep structure of the sentence, i.e. its semantic level on which we reveal the content of the sentence.

In Ch. Fillmore's view, the deep structure of the sentence is the **role structure of the predicate**. These semantic roles (basic categories in deep structure representing participants of the situation) are termed **cases**. Main bearers of role meanings are noun groups.

In his paper *The Case for Case*, Ch. Fillmore [1968: 2-3] pleads that the grammatical notion case deserves a place in the base component of the grammar of every language. In the past, research on case has amounted to an examination of the variety of semantic relationships which can hold between nouns and other portions of sentences; it has been considered equivalent to the study of semantic functions of inflectional affixes on nouns or the formal dependency relations which hold between specific nominal affixes and lexical-grammatical properties of neighbouring elements; or it has been reduced to a statement of the morphophonemic reflexes of a set of underlying syntactic relations which themselves are conceived independently of the notion case. Ch. Fillmore argues that valid insights on case relationships are missed in all these studies, and that what is needed is a conception of base structure in which case relationships are primitive terms of the theory and in which such concepts as *subject* and *direct object* are missing. The latter are



regarded proper only in relation to the surface structures of some languages.

**Case grammar** as a form of generative grammar views case roles (as Agent, Experiencer, Instrument, Object, etc.) based on the semantic relationship of noun phrases to verbs, to be basic categories in deep structure and derives grammatical relations, as subject and direct object, from these case roles.

Two assumptions are essential to the development of **case grammar conception**: 1) the centrality of **syntax** (not morphology of various classes of words); and 2) the importance of **covert categories** (grammatical properties lacking obvious morphemic realization but having a reality that can be observed on the basis of selectional constraints and transformational possibilities) most directly associated with the concept of deep structure.

One example of covert grammatical distinction can be seen in the following sentences: 1) *John ruined the table* and 2) *John built the table* [Fillmore, 1968: 4-5]. Note that in one case the object (*the table*) is understood as existing antecedently to John's activities, while in the other case its existence resulted from John's activities.

The distinction is purely a semantic one, one which the grammar of English does not force us to deal with. Our ability to give distinct interpretations to the verb-object relation in these two sentences has no connection, we might feel, with a correct description of the specifically syntactical skills of a speaker of English. The distinction does have syntactic relevance, however. The *effected object* (denoting something produced by an action) does not permit interrogation of the verb with *do to*, while the *affected object* (denoting something acted upon, subjected to the action) does. Thus one might relate sentence 1, but not sentence 2, to the question *What did John do to the table?* Furthermore, sentence 1, unlike sentence 2, has the following paraphrase: *What John did to the table was ruin it.* Cf. \**What John did to the table was build it.*

Ch. Fillmore [1968: 21] suggests that there are many **semantically relevant syntactic relationships involving nouns and the structures that contain them**, that these relationships — like those seen in sentence 1 and 2 above — are in large part covert but are nevertheless empirically discoverable, that they form a specific finite set, and that observations made about them will turn out to have considerable cross-linguistic validity. Ch. Fillmore refers to these as **case relationships**.

He uses the term **case**, in a clearly understood deep-structure sense, to identify the underlying syntactic-semantic relationships, and the term **case form** to mean the expression of a case relationship in a particular language — whether through affixation, suppletion, use of clitic particles, or constraints on word order [Fillmore, 1968: 21].

The deep structure (proposition) of every simple sentence is an array consisting of a V plus a number of NP's holding special labeled relations (cases) to the sentence [Fillmore, 1968: 31-32]. In other words, the sentence in its basic structure consists of a verb and one or more noun phrases, each associated with the verb in a particular case relationship. For example, in the sentence *John broke the window* the subject is in an Agent relation to the verb. In *A hammer broke the window* the subject is an Instrument and in *John broke the window with a hammer* both Agent and Instrument appear in the same sentence, but in this case it is the Agent which appears as the subject, not the Instrument [Fillmore, 1968: 24].

That the subjects *John* and *hammer* are grammatically different explains the fact that the combined meaning of the two sentences is not produced by conjoining their subjects. Thus the sentence *John and a hammer broke the window* is unacceptable. Only noun phrases representing the same case may be conjoined.

Similarly, the fact that only one representative of a given case relationship may appear in the same simple sentence, together with the generalizations on subject selection and the redundancies which hold between cases and lexical features (for example, between Agent and animateness), explains the unacceptability of the sentence *\*A hammer broke the glass with a chisel*. It is unacceptable, in particular, on the interpretation that both *hammer* and *chisel* are understood instrumentally. It cannot represent a sentence containing an Agent and an Instrument, since the noun *hammer* is inanimate.

The case notions comprise a set of universal, presumably innate, concepts which identify certain types of judgements human beings are capable of making about the events that are going on around them, judgements about such matters as who did it, who it happened to, and what got changed [Fillmore, 1968: 24-25].

Deep structure cases (semantic roles) that appear to be needed include [Fillmore, 1968, 1977; Starikova, Alova, 1980: 14-15; Иванова et al., 1981: 244-246]:

- **Agentive/Agent (A)**, the case of the typically animate instigator of the action identified by the verb. Agent denotes an

animate being that purposefully and intentionally performs or causes

an action expressed by the verb, as *the police* in *The car was found by the police*. In the surface structure Agent fills the position of the subject or the object, e.g. *I read the note. A note was read by me.*

Agent can be further subdivided into:

a) **Agent causative** denoting an animate agent that causes (makes) the object to fulfill an action, e.g. *John threw the stone.*

b) **Agent permissive**, denoting an animate agent that gives possibility to an object to fulfill an action removing all obstacles, e.g. *John dropped the stone.*

- **Nominative (N)** denotes an object from which in reality or as a result of the manner of describing the situation comes an action, e.g. *His eyes twinkled. Mountains frightened him.* An action connected with Nominative is neither intentional nor purposeful.

Nominative can be expressed by an inanimate object and an animate one (and its part), e.g. *The wind was freshening. He dozed off. His heart sank.*

In the surface structure Nominative is expressed by the subject and the object introduced by *with* and *by*, e.g. *A sudden pity seized me. He was killed by a fly-wheel. The ground was covered with snow.*

Subject-Nominative has as its predicate only non-actional verbs, unlike subject-Agent having as its predicate only verbs expressing actions which can be used in the Imperative Mood, e.g. *Hit the ball!* and in the Progressive Aspect, e.g. *He was hitting the ball continuously.* Cf.: Nominative *I like the country.* \**Like the country.* \**He is liking the country.*

- **Instrumental/Instrument (I)**, the case of the inanimate force or object causally involved in the action or state identified by the verb. Instrument indicates the inanimate, nonvolitional, immediate cause of the action expressed by a verb, as *the rock* in *The rock broke the window* or in *I broke the window with the rock.*

The semantic role of Instrument is a distinctive feature of sentences with Agent causative. Sentences with Agent permissive do not allow of Instrument in their semantic structure. Cf. *John threw a stone with a sling* and \**I dropped a stone with a sling.* Noun phrase with *N* is common in sentences with Agent permissive but its semantic role is different. It is termed *comitative*, e.g. *John dropped a stone with a stick (= a stone and a stick).*

- **Dative (D)**, the case of the animate being affected by the state or action identified by the verb. *John* is Dative in *John believed*

that he would win as well as in We persuaded John that he would win and It was apparent to John that he would win.

- **Factitive (F)**, the case of the object or being resulting from the action or state identified by the verb, or understood as a part of the meaning of the verb. Factitive indicates the result of the action, as king in They made him king or hole in The boy dug the hole.

- **Locative (L)**, the case which identifies the location or spatial orientation of the state or action identified by the verb, as hole in He got into a hole or home in Tell him I'm not at home.

- **Temporative (T)** identifies the time of the state or action identified by the verb, as the summer in to stay during the summer.

- **Objective/Object (O)**, the semantically most neutral case, the case of anything representable by a noun whose role in the action or state expressed by the verb is identified by the semantic interpretation of the verb itself; conceivably the concept should be limited to things which are affected by the action or state identified by the verb. The term should not to be confused with the notion of direct object, nor with the name of the surface case synonymous with accusative. Object denotes the entity that moves or changes or whose position or existence is in consideration, e. g. John broke the window. The stone fell.

- **Experiencer (E)** is the semantic role of a noun phrase that indicates the perceiver of the action or state of affairs specified by the verb, as the boy in The boy was warm or in The fly annoyed the boy. Experiencer is the entity which receives or accepts or experiences or undergoes the effect of an action.

- **Patient (P)** denotes an object (never the source) undergoing an action (opposed to agent). Patient is expressed by animate and inanimate nouns, e.g. He accuses Pete of it. The window broke. On the surface structure it often corresponds to the object or the subject of the passive construction, e.g. He bit his hand. The yard was not overlooked.

Patient should not be mixed up with Factitive. Cf. The boy dug the ground (Patient) and The boy dug the hole (Factitive). Only the first sentence allows the question What did the boy do to N?

- **Benefactive/Beneficiary (B)** is the case, or semantic role, that denotes the person or persons for whom an action is performed, as for his son in He opened the door for his son. Beneficiary is a person receiving something as the result of the action produced by the Agent, e.g. John sold them the book. He taught us French. Jane has a car.

- **Manner (M)** as a semantic role is close to that of

Instrument, e.g. *John broke the window with a sling by a quick movement*. Semantic role Manner is used in structures with Agent causative and Agent permissive.

- **Cause (C)** denotes a person or thing that acts, happens, or exists in such a way that some specific thing happens as a result; the producer of an effect, e.g. *The news excited great interest*.

- **Counter-Agent (CA)** denotes the force or resistance against which the action is carried out, e.g. *They repulsed an attack*.

- **Source (S)** denotes any thing or place from which something comes, arises, or is obtained, e.g. *Peaches come from trees*. *Good results do not come from careless work*.

The inventory of cases in its plentitude has not yet been established. Other authors [Chafe, 1970; Гак, 1969; Апресян, 1974: 125-126; Падучева, 1974; Сусов, 1974; Богданов, 1977; Соляник, 1985; Старикова, 1985] point out some more semantic roles in the deep structure of the sentence, such as Content (*He knows it*), Condition, Destination (*They made an attempt on his life*), Complement (*Mary sang a song*, *The book weighs a pound*), Result/Resultative (*John wrote a letter*), Perceptive (*Can't you imagine the house?*), Compositive (*In a vacant chair beside him he placed a little black leather bag*), Onomasiative (*Father calls me Sissy*), Descriptive (*The young girl was very beautiful*), etc.

In the works of some authors [Liefrink, 1973; Сусов, 1974] case grammar notions (Agent, Patient, Instrument, etc.) are referred to as elementary **syntactical-semantic units**, units of the deepest level of **semantic syntax**. The essence of these units is their reference to one of the elements of a situation. We construe some aspect of the world as an event or state involving several participants that affect one another. Phrases refer not just to single things or actions in the world but to sets of players that interact with each other in a particular way, each with a specific role.

Deep structure is regarded not as an intermediate level between semantic and surface but as a level of description which is simultaneously **syntactic and semantic** [Liefrink, 1973: 4].

Deep structure categories are semantic categories at the same time as being syntactic categories. They remain syntactic because they are established on the basis of partly overt but mainly covert syntactic similarities and differences [Liefrink, 1973: 7].

The connection between deep syntax and semantics is that deep syntax is semantic. This hypothesis that deep structure is

simultaneously syntactic and semantic is referred to as the **semantico-syntactic hypothesis**. Deep structure is termed **semantico-syntax** and deep structure categories are called **semantico-syntactic categories** [Liefrink, 1973: 8].

Cases are deep structures which are converted into surface representations of sentences. The various mechanisms of convertibility involve selection of overt case forms (by suppletion, affixation, addition of prepositions or postpositions), registration of particular elements in the verb, subjectivalization, objectivalization, sequential ordering and nominalizations [Fillmore, 1968: 32].

A surface case system may be related to the set of underlying cases in a variety of ways. Two deep cases may be represented in the same way in the surface structure, as when Dative and Objective direct objects are both represented with the accusative case in many languages (where the determining factor may be occurrence immediately after the verb at some stage of derivation). Agent and Dative may be represented by the same overt form, where the determining factor may be case-linked animateness.

The rules for English prepositions may look something like this: the Agent preposition is *by*; the Instrument preposition is *by* if there is no Agent, otherwise it is *with*; the Objective and Factitive prepositions are typically *zero*; the Beneficiary preposition is *for*; the Dative preposition is typically *to*; the Locative and Temporal prepositions are either semantically nonempty (in which case they are introduced as optional choices from the lexicon), or they are selected by the particular associated noun (*on the street*, *at the corner* (=intersection of two streets), *in the corner* (of a room), *on Monday*, *at noon*, *in the afternoon*). Specific verbs may have associated with them certain requirements for preposition choice that are exceptions to the above generalization [Fillmore, 1968: 34].

It is important to notice that none of the cases can be interpreted as matched by the surface-structure relations which include the subject, the object, the attribute, and adverbial adjuncts in any particular language [Fillmore, 1968: 24-25]. Thus, *John* is Agent in *John opened the door* as much as in *The door was opened by John*. *The key* is Instrument in *The key opened the door* as well as in *John opened the door with the key* or *John used the key to open the door*. *Chicago* is Locative in both *Chicago is windy* and *It is windy in Chicago*. In such cases we observe indirect correlation between the surface and deep structures of the sentence.

So, one and the same part of the sentence may express

different roles, and one and the same role may be expressed by different parts of the surface structure. The Agent, for instance, may be expressed by the syntactic subject, syntactic object and syntactic attribute. Cf. *Mary is coming. I see Mary coming. Mary's coming was unexpected* [Starikova, Alova, 1980: 15].

The set of semantic roles defined by the lexico-grammatical meaning of the verb makes up the **role structure of this verb**. Role structure of the verb *show*, for instance, includes Agent, Beneficiary and Patient, e.g. *They showed him the jewels*. Role structure is transcribed in the following way: *show* [ \_\_\_\_ Agent Beneficiary Patient], where \_\_\_\_ represents the action the wording of which is given outside the brackets.

The verb's **role-players** are usually called "**arguments**". It is the term used in logic and mathematics for a participant in a relationship [Pinker, 1995: 107].

Verbs may be subclassed according to the case environments which accept them. Ch. Fillmore [1968: 26] suggested that verbs are selected according to the case environments (array of cases) the sentence provides — what he refers to as the "case frame". The verb *open*, for example, can occur in the following frames: [ \_\_\_\_ O], as in *The door opened*; [ \_\_\_\_ O+A], as in *John opened the door*; [ \_\_\_\_ O+I], as in *The wind opened the door*, and [ \_\_\_\_ O+I+A], as in *John opened the door with a chisel*.

The frame feature for *open* may thus be represented as [ \_\_\_\_ O (!) (A)] (optional elements are indicated by parentheses). Other verbs having this same feature are *turn*, *move*, *rotate*, and *bend*.

The verb *run* may be inserted into the frame [ \_\_\_\_ A], verbs like *remove* and *open* into [ \_\_\_\_ O+A], verbs like *murder* and *terrorize* (that is verb requiring animate subject and animate object) into [ \_\_\_\_ D+A], verbs like *like* and *please* into [ \_\_\_\_ O+D], verbs like *give* and *present* into [ \_\_\_\_ O+D+A] and so on.

Since one of the cases may be represented by an embedded sentence (S), verbs are also subclassified in terms of whether the O element is a sentence. By convention O in frame features is used to indicate NP's, and the symbol S indicates an O to which an S has been embedded. The frame feature [ \_\_\_\_ S] characterizes such verbs as *true*, *interesting*, and so forth; the feature [ \_\_\_\_ S+D] is common to such verbs as *want* and *expect*; verbs like *say*, *predict* and *cause* appear in the frame [ \_\_\_\_ S+A]; and verbs like *force* and *persuade* are insertable into the frame [ \_\_\_\_ S+D+A].

Case grammar is a method of linguistic analysis employed to describe the semantics of a sentence (with the exception of modal and performative elements) as a system of semantic valencies through the connections of the verb with semantic roles (cases) dictated by the meaning of this verb and performed by nominal elements in the sentence [ЛЭС, 1990: 357].

The first base rule in case grammar is *sentence* → *modality + proposition*. The proposition (deep structure) is a tenseless set of relationships involving verbs and nouns. The modality constituents include such modalities of the sentence as a whole as negation, tense, mood, and aspect.

The next rule expands the proposition as a verb plus one or more case categories with the provisos that at least one case category must occur and that no case category may occur more than once. This is recognized in the general formula *proposition* → *verb + case<sub>1</sub> + ... + case<sub>n</sub>*, which summarizes specific formulas such as *proposition* → *verb + Agentive*; *proposition* → *verb + Objective + Agentive*; *proposition* → *verb + Dative*; *proposition* → *verb + Objective + Instrumental + Agentive*, etc.

For each of these cases a latter rule provides the categorial realization as noun phrase: *case* → *K + NP*, where *K* stands for case forms of noun phrases in surface structure, signaled through suppletion, affixation and presence of pre- and post-positions. The nature of *K* depends on the case category, e.g. the typical *K* for Objective is *ø*, for Dative is *to* and for Agentive is *by*.

In terms of these rules a sentence like *John gave the book to my brother* would be assigned the following deep structure representation:

past + verb + Objective + Dative + Agentive  
past + give + ø+the book + to+my brother + by+John

Charles Fillmore supplies transformational rules by means of which each of the noun phrases in the example sentence above can be subjectivized to give either *The book was given to my brother by John* in which the Agentive NP is the subject of the surface sentence, or *My brother was given the book by John* in which the Dative NP is the subject [Liefrink, 1973: 13-14].

- **Task 97.** Analyze the following sentences in terms of the role structure of the predicate. Point out Agent, Experiencer, Beneficiary, Patient, Location, Instrument, Cause and other roles.

- 1) George ruined the table. 2) John built the house. 3) He received a blow. 4) George loves her. 5) He has black hair. 6) John broke the window



with a hammer. 7) Mary received a gift. 8) John expected to receive a prompt reply. 9) A hammer broke the window. 10) Bill seemed to be convinced by this argument. 11) They showed him the jewels late at night in a small café near the bridge.

- Task 98\***. Identify the case relation the noun in bold type holds with the rest of the sentence.

1) Stirred and moved, Ashurst squeezed the hand and went downstairs. 2) He took Jennie to a watering-place for ten days to help her recover her spirit. 3) Robert had things very much in his own hands now. 4) Because he wanted to fall into their clutches, they seemed to regard him as a king who could do no wrong. 5) When he started to collect dry moss he found he could not rise to his feet. 6) The old man was afraid he (the fish) could cut the line with his tail. 7) Bob Tidball replaced the spoil in the bag and tied the mouth of it tightly with a cord. 8) In the Vale of Tawasentha, in the green and silent valley, by the pleasant water courses, dwelt the singer Nawada. 9) Who was Naomi Brocklehurst? — The lady who built the new part of this house. 10) It was cold after the sun went down. 11) Danger comes from unexpected places. 12) The ruin of the empire was caused by the loss of freedom and the growth of despotism. 13) They couldn't resist the chocolates. 14) A light thunder rolled through the woods, and in the perilous quiet of its wake Buck and Little Homer burst upon the path like charging cavalry.

- Task 99\***. One and the same noun or noun group may have different semantic roles in different sentences. Define the semantic roles of the noun *book* in the following sentences [Почепцов, 1979: 44].

1) The book excited great interest. 2) The book lies on the table. 3) The book fell down onto the floor. 4) Having nothing else at hand for self-defense, he grasped the book and hit him with it. The book painfully struck the hand.

- Task 100\***. In case of indirect correlation between the syntactic and semantic levels of the sentence the subject may express different roles. Define the semantic roles of the subjects in the following sentences.

- 1) John broke the window with a stone. 2) The stone broke the window. 3) The rain prevented us from going there. 4) The room sleeps three persons. 5) The door opened.

- Task 101\***. Indicate some case frames into which verbs *jump*, *see*, *know*, *like*, *please*, *show*, *hear*, *listen*, *look*, *team* may be inserted. Give comments on their role structure.

## 8.2. SYNTAXEME AS A UNIT OF SEMANTICO-SYNTACTIC ANALYSIS

A great contribution to the development of semantic syntax was made by A.M. Mukhin [Мухин, 1961, 1976, 1980] who elaborated the procedure of **syntaxemic analysis**.

On the basis of deep cases theory, which allows to depict extralinguistic situation by means of linguistic semantic models, the scholar introduces the new term **syntaxeme** and correspondingly gives birth to the new semantico-syntactic analysis which he calls **syntaxemics** [Мухин, 1961: 59].

Language as a system presupposes the existence of syntagmatic and paradigmatic aspects. In the sphere of sentence structure it brings us to the differentiation of two types of elementary syntactic units forming surface and deep structures of the sentence [Мухин, 1961: 59].

Elementary units of the first type are components of the sentence that are distinguished within the limits of syntactic contrasts of one sentence (primary and secondary members of the sentence). Elementary units of the second type are syntaxemes that are singled out in the system of oppositions by confronting the elements of different sentences.

**Syntaxeme** is defined as an elementary unit (invariant) of grammatical syntactic meaning that has a system of variants. These variants may be expressed either by a separate lexeme, or by combinations of lexemes with functional elements, prepositions including. In other words, the syntaxeme is a complex of essential semantico-syntactic features, common to all its variants as well as their combinations. Due to these content features systematic relations of elementary units of the deep structure of the sentence can be established.

Researchers distinguish **categorial** and **non-categorial**

syntaxemes.

**Categorial semantico-syntactic features** are believed to be the most common, and in compliance with them the following categories of syntaxemes are singled out: substantive, qualificative and processual.

Categorial semantico-syntactic features are usually revealed in the combination of substantive, qualificative and processual syntaxemes as well as in their distributive peculiarities such as location and position ability. Substantive, qualificative and processual syntaxemes are expressed by different parts of speech, none of them possessing the unique means of expression. For example, qualificative semantico-syntactic feature can be expressed not only by an adjective, but also by a noun, a pronoun, an adverb, etc.

- **Substantive syntaxemes** denote "substance" in the most general meaning of the word. If the syntaxeme contains the substantive semantico-syntactic feature, it can combine with pronouns and adjectives.

- **Processual syntaxemes** denote a dynamic process and can combine with adverbial elements, e.g. *He emphasized his point by thumping heavily with his walking-stick*.

- Qualificative categorial feature shows that the syntaxeme denotes some characteristics (qualifications). This feature is testified through the opposition with the substantive categorial feature: *Neither of them really care for her* (substantive syntaxeme). *The result in neither case is lasting* (qualificative syntaxeme).

In addition to categorial semantico-syntactic features, there is also a numerous class of non-categorial ones. The most frequent of them are the following:

- **Agentive** — denotes the animate initiator of the action, e.g. *You have bound many wounds and softened torments for me*.

- **Nominative** — denotes the inanimate initiator of the action, e.g. *The fierce lights had bleached all the tones from her skin*.

- **Bearer of quality**, e.g. *The effort she made was somewhat palpable*. → *the effort ... was palpable* (the predicate denotes the quality of the subject).

- **Bearer of state**, e.g. *She saw that Idgie had broken everything in the room* (the predicate denotes the state of the object).

- **Qualitative** — denotes qualitative characteristics of the objects, processes, phenomena, e.g. *As if the strength of her feeling had carried her far*. → *her feeling was strong*. It is a peculiar feature

of qualitative syntaxeme to combine with the syntaxeme of the bearer of quality (*of her feeling*).

- **Causative** — denotes the cause; the feature is revealed through the transformations with the conjunctive words *because of, thanks to, owing to, due to, by reason of*, e.g. ... *wall of the room would rattle under the wind*.

- **Active** — denotes the syntaxeme marked by the feature of activity. It often combines with the agentive syntaxeme, e.g. *Peter made his comment* → *he commented*.

- **Stative** — denotes the state of the object; the feature is revealed by means of transformation with the link verbs *to be/to feel + adjective or word combination 'in the state of S'*, e.g. *Her shyness made her seem foreign*. → *she was shy* → *she felt shy*.

- **Vocative** — denotes the addressee of the speaker, e.g. *Make me another drink, my love. Hello, there.* Love is a substantive vocative syntaxeme since it combines with the pronoun (*my*), while *there* is deprived of the categorial semantico-syntactic feature of substantivity since it combines neither with pronouns, nor with adjectives.

- **Final** — denotes the purpose of the action. This feature is tested through the transformation with the phrases *in order to, with intention, for the purpose of*, e.g. *She could suggest any seasonal things for my protection and comfort*. → *in order to protect and comfort me*.

- **Locative** — denotes the place where the object is situated, or the action (process) is taking place, e.g. *Tom swirled the ice in the highball glass*

- **Identifying** — shows that the investigated elements presuppose the existence of each other and are interpreted through one another, e.g. *It is your duty to give evidence*. → *to give evidence ... is your duty*.

- **Objective** — denotes the object of the action. Transformation of passivization reveals this type of semantico-syntactic feature, e.g. *He could take any action*. → *Any action could be taken*.

- **Instrumental** — denotes an instrument, tool or any other object with the help of which the action is performed, e.g. *He allowed her to lash him with her tongue*.

- **Possessive** — indicates possession, ownership, e.g. *The door led from the verandah to the doctor's consulting room*.

- **Comitative** — denotes the attending circumstances of the action, indicates accompaniment, e.g. *She woke up with a scream.*

- **Resultative** — denotes the final result of the action, e.g. *She turned into an ugly old witch.*

- **Gradual** — denotes the degree of the quality, e.g. *Neither Noble nor Dr. Michaels had had any idea why someone would freeze a head to that degree and then discard it.*

- **Temporal** — denotes time. e.g. *I stopped him right in midsentence.*

- Syntaxeme of **manner** — denotes a way of doing, or happening, mode of action, occurrence, e.g. *The water and press of time revived him quickly. She broke hearts right and left.*

Syntaxemes usually combine several semantico-syntactic features and may be of different subtypes.

- **Agentive:**

- agentive causative syntaxeme, e.g. *Her eyes were veiled by some thought.* → *Her eyes were veiled because of some thought.*

- agentive instrumental syntaxeme, e.g. *War is not won by victory.* → *War is not won by means of a victory.*

- agentive emphatic syntaxeme, e.g. *It was she who arranged that.*

- agentive possessive syntaxeme, e.g. *It was the day of Nan's departure.*

- **Bearer of state:**

- generalized syntaxeme of the bearer of state, e.g. *An accidental overdose and a person would suffocate very quickly.*

- indefinite syntaxeme of the bearer of state, e.g. *And something else crashed against the door.*

- definite syntaxeme of the bearer of state, e.g. *She threw something that crashed against the door.*

- **Bearer of quality:**

- resultative indefinite syntaxeme of the bearer of quality, e.g. *She had ossified into something elemental and really scary.*

- objective indefinite collective syntaxeme of the bearer of quality, e.g. *This news brightened everything.*

- **Temporal:**

- temporal final, e.g. *That afternoon the doctor closed her mother's eye's for good.*

- temporal frequentative, e.g. *The train slowed again.*

- **Locative:**

a) locative allative (denotes the destination point), e.g. *I returned to my room.*

b) locative ablative (denotes the starting point), e.g. *She emerged from the hall.*

c) locative mediative (expressed by the combinations *through S*, *along S*, *down S*, *up S*, *by way of S*), e.g. *She vanished through the doors.*

A certain semantico-syntactic feature is not rendered by one syntaxeme only, but is also revealed in other syntaxemes. This is the fundamental principle of systemic investigation that should be followed in syntaxemic analysis [Мухин, 1980: 184].

□ **Task 102\***. Define the type of the agentive syntaxemes.

1) Along Copacabana Beach the salesmen were flying their festival kites above the heads of the footballers (Ballard). 2) Two girls got out and slammed the door (Flagg). 3) Hands seized my shoulders and dragged me from the cabin (Ballard). 4) Sister, don't you peck my toes, girl, or I'll fry you up with dumplings (Flagg). 5) Neither Commander Noble nor Dr. Michaels had had any idea why someone would freeze a head to that degree and then discard it (Folsom). 6) I woke to the brown tape unwinding silence (Karr). 7) I racked them extra tight, my fingertips wedged in the plastic triangle so not one loosened a notch when I finally raised the rack (Karr). 8) But her struggle only strengthened Vera's resolve (Folsom). 9) Your mother's threat of homicide will flat dampen down your spirits (Karr). 10) McVey's showing up had tightened the screw (Folsom). 11) McVey looked over his shoulder at Littbarski, who tightened his grip on the shotgun and nodded (Folsom).

□ **Task 103\***. Define the type of the bearer of quality syntaxemes. Identify semantico-syntactic features of these syntaxemes by means of transformations.

e.g. *His voice hardened.* → *His voice became/is hard.*

... *neither rain nor bad eye could dampen his drive.* → *He was driving. His drive was damp.*

1) Drapers and hangings softened the atmosphere (Wright). 2) This news brightened everything (Ballard). 3) I briskly passed riotous clumps of tall grasses and brush as the shadow of mountain ranges deepened over water (Cornwell). 4) We hit a long stretch of roadside bluebonnets that broadened to a meadow (Karr). 5) The weather was wretched but neither rain nor bad eye could dampen his drive (Stone). 6) His voice hardened (Stone). 7) He selected a Norman town called La Roche-Guyon, located where the Seine widened into a great stream (Stone). 8) "You've identified

who it was?" McVey brightened (Folsom). 9) Cleo waved to him, and he

gave her a friendly but quick smile, lengthened his stride, and moved away from us (Ballard). 10) Ahead of them the sky was brightening (Folsom).

**Task 104\*.** Define the type of the nominative syntaxemes.

1) The surface ice was beginning to melt and the lakes were changing shape as the snow retreated to the original shorelines (Ballard). 2) But the fear of death and the effort of calling out had picked up his heart rate and sharpened his senses (Folsom). 3) The train leaned into a curve and increased its speed (Folsom). 4) The pinnacle of everything, sat gently swaying in the white case on the seat beside him. Its presence lightened his heart and gave him courage (Folsom). 5) Anton treated the young man to several bottles of champagne, which loosened their tongues and gave them an evening of laughter (Stone). 6) Von Holden rubbed its head and tousled its ears, smiling the same warm, loving smile that had melted her heart the first day she had seen him (Folsom). 7) The shrill whistle of that kettle woke any sleeper within range into a wincing misery (Karr).

**Task 105.** State the type of syntaxemes used in the position of modifiers of verbo-nominal phrases.

1) emphatic; 2) quantitative / quantitative of degree; 3) objective: 4) qualitative / qualitative of degree; 5) negative; 6) syntaxeme of degree; 7) indeterminative; 8) possessive; 9) comparative / superlative of degree; 10) determinative.

e.g.: He came over to me and gave me (objective syntaxeme)  
these (determinative syntaxeme) two (quantitative syntaxeme)  
playful (qualitative syntaxeme) as hell (comparative syntaxeme)  
slaps on both cheeks (Salinger).

1) The change in the weather had given him sweet absolution (Cheever). 2) Baba gave a cheeky knock on the chromium knocker (O'Brien). 3) She gave me this terribly dirty look (Salinger). 4) He gave them one look (Priestley). 5) She took two steps at a time (O'Brien). 6) He had to make a number of adjustments to the system (Asimov). 7) Oh, well, had a bit of quarrel, eh? (Priestley). 8) Does this girl of yours take much notice of you? (Priestley). 9) She took a couple of swings at me (Robbins). 10) So I started taking this long walk (Salinger). 11) And now he went to all that trouble giving me that advice (Salinger). 12) Don't make such a palaver about it (Salinger). 13) But I had no desire to extract it from her then (Lee). 14) Alfie Mennem gave his nightly report (Parker). 15) Professor made one of his rare mistakes (Clarke). 16) He did not want to make any mistake (Hemingway). 17) There must be some way to make some sort of guess as to the direction (Asimov). 18) There's something that gave me more trouble

then hydroxyl could (Asimov). 19) There were few people in London who had less influence than himself (Priestley). 20) It might be because they took so many hot baths (Cheever). 21) He might want to have a slightly intellectual conversation (Salinger). 22) The Professor gave a rather crooked smile (Clarke). 23) They took so many hot baths she could not understand why they were not neurasthenics (Cheever). 24) She gave the most faithful imitation of a cat's electric purr (Styron). 25) He gave the snowman a shake (Salinger). 26) She'd give Alice or I a push or something (Salinger). 27) And she gives her father and a room a jaded look (Cheever).

**Task 106\***. Define the type of the following syntaxemes.

1) She said to own a pure-bred pig is a mark of distinction for you and your community and will start you on the road to prosperity (Flagg). 2) ... it would be good news that would change her life (Flagg). 3) The fierce lights had bleached all the tones from her skin (Ballard). 4) ... the pressure ceased (Folsom). 5) Alice and Lucy ran towards me, figures in an overexposed film, all expression blanched from their faces as they played in their snow palace (Ballard). 6) ... loving smile that had melted her heart the first day she'd seen him (Folsom). 7) Nostrils quickened in the drifting smoke and engine fumes (Ballard). 8) Within ten minutes I had loosened the first brick (Ballard). 9) ... the research broadened to include more wayward forms of sexual activity (Ballard). 10) The old people need to see children every once in a while. It lifts their spirit (Flagg).

**Task 107\***. Define the type of the following syntaxemes.

1) It would break your heart to look at her (Flagg). 2) But Dick had been adamant that I change nothing (Ballard). 3) Tugging backwards on the cord, she extended Avril's arm to its full length (Folsom). 4) ... it would be good news that would change her life (Flagg). 5) She took the stand and almost broke the jury's heart (Flagg). 6) ... and his back burned and peeled off in sheets, then burned again until it finally darkened to the color of cane syrup (Karr). 7) I racked them extra tight, my fingertips wedged in the plastic triangle so not one loosened a notch when I finally raised the rack (Karr). 8) My spine instinctively stiffened at the sight (Karr). 9) She'd harden into whatever shape survival required (Karr). 10) Osborn felt his face redden with anger (Folsom).

**Task 108\***. Define the type of the following syntaxemes.

1) The cigarette brightened for a moment as he drew on it (Karr). 2) I myself harden into a person that I hardly notice (Karr). 3) She had awokened with a scream (Hersey). 4) Sipsey said that half the people over

.there in Troutville would have frozen or starved to death if it hadn't been for Railroad Bill (Flagg). 5) Big George woke with a start (Flagg). 6) I lock all my

scaredness down in my stomach until the fear hardens into something I hardly notice (Karr). 7) Ruth leaned down and whispered in her ear (Flagg). 8) When I reached out to reassure him, touching his wrist, he pulled away from me and I saw that he had replaced the black king (Ballard). 9) I was hardening up inside for another tough-bucking ride (Karr).

### 8.3. APPLICATIONS OF SYNTAXEMIC ANALYSIS

Syntaxemic analysis is considered to be the most suitable method of investigation in the field of semantic syntax. Employing syntaxemic analysis researchers gain wider possibilities to study the syntactic system.

Syntaxemic analysis is widely used to establish syntactic semantics of the units in the sentence, i.e. their semantico-syntactic content. Syntaxemes serve as a background for investigation of elementary units of the deep structure of the sentence. Syntaxemic analysis allows to substantiate semantico-syntactic classification of sentences. The differentiation of syntaxemes also allows researchers to study systemic relations in the realm of syntax. Syntaxemic analysis can be combined with other methods of research, modelling and experiment in particular.

In what follows, syntaxemic analysis is employed to expose semantico-syntactic content of prepositional-nominal phrases.

Among variants of syntaxemes, alongside case forms, A.M. Mukhin [Мухин, 1980] distinguishes prepositional combinations, i.e. combinations of functional and notional lexemes. Notional lexemes are usually nouns or pronouns (substantive or pronominal lexemes). The role of the preposition as a functional element in the deep structure of the sentence is to form a variant of the syntaxeme. Substantive lexemes serving as a part of a prepositional combination can be different.

Analyzing *at*-phrases, L.A. Glazacheva [Глазачева, 1985: 10] distinguishes three categorial semantico-syntactic features, namely substantive, processual and qualificative, that can be taken as a basis for the investigation of syntaxemes in *at*-phrases. The linguist does not neglect, however, non-categorial semantico-syntactic features, as purely substantive, processual or qualificative syntaxemes are rarely encountered.

As a result of analysis of categorial semantico-syntactic features together with non-categorial ones, the following syntaxemes were distinguished:

**1) substantive temporal [SbTm]:** *The firing continued but at dawn it stopped.*

**2) substantive temporal active [SbTmAc]:** *At MacGruder's approach, Nick rose his eyes.*

**3) substantive temporal locative [SbTmLc]:** *He testified at the trial.*

This syntaxeme is defined as substantive temporal locative and not purely substantive locative, due to the transformation of substitution in which *there* and *then* can be used: *He testified at the trial.* → *He testified there.* *He testified then.* *There* possesses a feature of location, while *then* has temporal indication. The syntaxeme includes both semantico-syntactic features.

**4) substantive temporal causative [SbTmCs]:** *I felt slightly outraged at his lack of spirit.*

**5) substantive temporal causative active [SbTmCsAc]:** *She lost her temper at his persistence.*

**6) substantive locative [SbLc]:** *She had run into him at the office.*

**7) substantive locative active [SbLcAc]:** *He is at his ploughing.*

The semantico-syntactic feature of activeness can be defined by transformation of substitution. The given syntaxeme can be substituted for processual active syntaxeme expressed by the corresponding verb: *He was ploughing.*

**8) substantive quantitative [SbQn]:** *There was food, albeit at exorbitant prices.*

**9) substantive objective [SbOb]:** *She nodded at the object within the linen cloth.*

**10) processual active [PrAc]:** *In the gutters more children were at play.*

**11) qualificative stative [QlfSt]:** *I was talking to him for a moment, but his mind was at rest and he heard nothing.*

**12) qualificative locative [QlfLc]:** *An argument reminds me my headmaster at school.*

This type of syntaxeme should not be confused with the substantive locative one. We can substitute *headmaster at school* by *school headmaster*, but cannot do the same with, for example, *two men at the counter* → *\*the two counter men.* In the former example,

~~We observe the indication of a characteristic feature of an object by~~

naming the place.

All the examples given above include at least one of the categorial semantico-syntactic features. There are, however, such syntaxemes which comprise only non-categorial features. Among them are the following:

**13) objective (pronominal) [Ob]:** *He stared at me without a slightest movement.*

This kind of syntaxeme is termed *objective pronominal* because preposition *at* is followed by the pronoun. This syntaxeme may also be referred to those of the substantive series, because, according to A.M. Mukhin [1980], not only the noun, but also the pronoun and the adverb can form substantive syntaxemes.

**14) temporal [Tm]:** *He returned at 7 when everybody was having supper.*

**Task 109\*.** Analyze *at*-phrases semantics in terms of syntaxemes.

1) Do you think it's likely that a man will do any good when he starts at your age (Maugham). 2) For the last year I've been going to some class at night (Maugham). 3) They were as silent as relations at the reading of the will (Hunt). 4) I learned German at school, but forgot every word of it (Hunt). 5) King grumbled when he answered the phone and he grumbled even more at the prospect of a 9:00 a.m. breakfast (Hunt). 6) A cold sweat overspread her at his news (Maugham). 7) Peyton clapped her hands at the unexpected appearance of John's and Mandie's names (Hunt). 8) If he continued to frequent the same cafe as when he had stayed at the hotel, it was probably because it was the most convenient (Maugham). 9) Peyton saw grieving people everywhere on the shuttles, walking through air sides, standing at the windows, their hands pressed to the glass (Hunt). 10) Peyton rolled her eyes at the bemused waitress (Hunt). 11) It was interesting enough while we were at phonetics (Hunt). 12) We found him at work (Maugham). 13) The woman reminds me of my teacher at school (RHWCD). 14) The two nations were at war with each other (RHWCD). 15) He peered at her out of the corner of his eyes (Maugham). 16) He arrives at six (RHWCD).

**Task 110\*.** Define the type of syntaxemes expressed by prepositional phrases in the following sentences.

A 1) He went with John. 2) He remained with John. 3) He hit with a bat. 4) She saw a monster with six heads. 5) He stocked the stream with fish. 6) She sang with unexpected enthusiasm. 7) Makintosh was suddenly seized with fear.

B 1) Jiggs was immediately seized by the stranger. 2) I imagined that my arrival had taken them by surprise. 3) The days dwindled minute by minute. 4) You'll prevent cancer by psychiatry. 5) They went out by the gate. 6) He forced my brother to draw upon him and fallen by my brother's sword.

C 1) William freed himself from Troy's embrace. 2) Surely Irmgard would recover from her infatuation. 3) Sanskrit and Greek have deviated from each other. 4) I just got back from New York. 5) I hope you return from the war with all your faculties intact. 6) One of the horses died from the thistles. 7) When you had suffered from her clumsiness she exasperated you. 8) There was an envelope from Schmidt. 9) For five generations we've carried on the same trade, from father to son. 10) She had done her marketing from day to day.

#### 8.4. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CASE GRAMMAR

Case grammar and semantico-syntax shifted the accent on the role of semantics in grammar. The main asset of case grammar is that it is strongly motivated by semantic considerations.

Case grammar aims at discovering a semantically justified universal syntactic theory along the lines suggested by Ch. Fillmore.

The research in this area was intended primarily to improve and extend transformational-generating theory. The need to recognize grammatical categories which are more abstract than those immediately apparent on the surface structure of language material (subject, object, attribute, etc.) may be taken as established beyond doubt. The distinction between surface structure and deep structure — whatever the nature of deep structure may be — must be accepted in any grammatical descriptive study, transformational-generative or not [Liefrink, 1973: 3].

The question of what is the nature of deep structure categories is thus a general linguistic question.

The study of syntactic semantics is of great importance at least for the following two reasons:

1. Communication is not put into effect with the help of separate words, but merely due to utterance and sentences. Correspondingly, the sentence is not a mechanical totality of separate meanings, but a qualitatively new unit with a certain set of semantic quantities. Cognition of the language communication is impossible without investigation of sentence semantics.

## 2. The study of the semantic aspect in the syntactic

construction is important for understanding peculiarities and conformities of human ability of apprehension. Therefore, semantics of language is as much crucial as the forms of language.

Nevertheless, there is a considerable residue of unresolved problems in the grammatical description of language phenomena which remain unresolved under the formulation of case grammar: numerous problems associated with coordinate conjunction of NP's and the so-called comitative case (Cf. *He and his wife are coming* and *He is coming with his wife*), nominal predicates, and cognate objects [Fillmore, 1968: 81].

Case grammar cannot suggest a way of providing for sentences of the *N be N* type. It is clear that they represent a distinct sentence type from those involving any of the case relations discussed by Ch. Fillmore, though more than one case relationship may be involved in these sentences (the terms *essive* and *translative* come to mind.) [Fillmore, 1968: 84].

A difficulty of another sort is presented by the so-called 'cognate object' constructions. These are constructions in which, at the very least, there is a high selectivity between a specific verb V and an 'object' N, and in which the V+N combination in one language might well be matched by a V alone in another.

There are many other issues for which case grammar cannot even pretend to see solutions [Fillmore, 1968: 86]: the extreme variety of surface realizations of the same meaning; apparent dependency relations that exist among cases, to name just a few.

Whether the cases should be represented as categories dominating NP's or in some other way is an issue which seems to be fairly wide open.

There are no distinct criteria of establishing the cases; their status in the derivation of sentences, their number and the demarcation line between roles and other elements of the sentence are not clear [ЛЭС, 1990: 357].

Several scholars criticized Charles Fillmore for the use of the word *case*. The question is whether he is justified in using the term *case* for the kind of semantico-syntactic relations that are at issue. There is among many scholars a strong belief that the term should be used only where clear case morphemes are discoverable in the inflection of nouns. To O. Jespersen, it is wrong to speak of 'analytic' cases because cases are one thing and preposition-plus-object constructions are another.

Case grammar cannot account for the relationship between analytic and synthetic sentences [Liefink, 1973: 28-29]. In case grammar the sentence *Mother put the gherkins in a bottle* will be analyzed as:

put the gherkins in a bottle by mother  
verb + Objective + Locative + Agentive

In this sentence Agent is subjectivized, in *The gherkins were put in a bottle by mother* which is an alternative surface manifestation of the same sentence, Objective is subjectivized.

Sentence *Mother bottled the gherkins* is intuitively semantically equivalent (in one of its interpretations) to *Mother put the gherkins in a bottle*, and should therefore be assigned an identical deep structure description. Case grammar requires that it be given a different deep structure description:

bottled the gherkins by mother  
verb + Objective + Agentive


In this description the case category Locative is absent.

These sentences present a problem in so far as it is arguable that *bottle* is equivalent to *put in a bottle*. Case grammar requires two different deep structure representations for semantically equivalent sentences. The sentences in each of the paraphrase pairs that have been offered above are virtually identical in meaning, they must, therefore, be assigned virtually identical deep structure representations. Case grammar is incapable of doing this and it would appear therefore that a different hypothesis is required [Liefink, 1973: 30].

It will be possible to assign virtually identical deep structure representation to the sentences in the paraphrase pairs if it is assumed that the deep structure of these sentences contains semantic elements which are manifested in surface structure now as a prime (semantically simple synthetic) verb plus a separate sentence constituent (or constituents), now as a single semantically complex verb. Case categories may be manifested as (prepositional) noun phrases in the surface structure of analytic sentences, e.g. *Mother put the gherkins in a bottle*. In the surface structure of the corresponding synthetic sentences the case categories may be analyzed as incorporated in the single (synthetic) verb, e.g. *Mother bottled the gherkins* [Liefink, 1973: 31].

On this level of linguistic analysis due attention is reasonably paid to the so-called **lexical incorporation**. This is a common

phenomenon for various classes of words, such as, for instance,



incorporation is opaque rather than transparent, e.g.: *to flood ← water*; *to pepper ← pepper*; *to salt ← salt*; *to wash ← water*, etc.

In verbs of location the locative container is frequently incorporated into the verb. It is by this process that a sentence like *He put the groceries into a bag* becomes *He bagged the groceries*. *He put the oranges into a box*. — *He boxed the oranges*.

The commonest of the denominal verbs are those whose parent nouns denote instruments, e.g. *to bicycle* — *to go by bicycle*, *to nail* — *to fasten with nails*, *to pin* — *to fasten, join, transfix by or with a pin*.

Denominal verbs of various semantic types merit at this point special consideration.

E. Clark and H. Clark [1985] distinguish several semantic types of denominal verbs formed by conversion. The classification applies to the paraphrases of these verbs. The paraphrases themselves are then classified on the basis of the case role that the parent noun plays in them.

1. **Objective (locatum) verbs** are ones whose parent nouns are in the objective case in clauses that describe the location of one thing with respect to another. *to blanket* is such a verb, as shown by the paraphrase *Jane blanketed the bed*. — *Jane did something to cause it to come about that [the bed had one or more blankets on it]*.

2. For **location verbs** the parent nouns are in the locative case: *Kenneth kennelled the dog*. — *Kenneth did something to cause it to come about that [the dog was in a kennel]*.

3. With **agent verbs**, the parent nouns are in the agentive case: *John butchered the cow*. — *John did to the cow the act that one would normally expect [a butcher to do to a cow]*.

4. **Experiencer verbs** are apparently rare. Witness the *accident* is classified that way on the premise that witnesses do not watch accidents, but see them.

5. For the **goal verbs**, the parent nouns are in the goal case: *Edward powdered the aspirin*. — *Edward did something to cause it to come about that [the aspirin was powder]*.

6. For **source verbs**, the parent nouns are in the source case: *piece the quilt together* is classified as a source verb on the basis of the paraphrase *do something to cause it to come about that [the quilt is together out of pieces]*. Here *piece* denotes the substance from which the quilt is formed, and is therefore in the source case.

7. The commonest of the denominal verbs are **instrument verbs** whose parent nouns denote instruments: *John bicycled into town.* — *John caused it to come about that he was in town by doing the act one would normally expect [one to do with a bicycle].*

Thus, it is argued that the semantics associated with Fillmore's case categories is not only manifested in the noun phrase, as Charles Fillmore proposes, but may also be realized in the verb [Liefrink, 1973: 14].

In order to overcome these shortcomings of case grammar an alternative hypothesis has been developed, in which the deep structure of sentences is specified in terms of semantico-syntactic categories (features) of which cases are examples and in which these semantico-syntactic categories are manifested in surface structure in the form of (combinations of) surface syntactic categories, of which verb and (prepositional) noun phrase are examples [Liefrink, 1973: 33].

Case grammar fails to account for such relations which allow one and the same lexeme in the semantic structure of the sentence to be the bearer of several semantic features that qualify it simultaneously to several 'cases', 'roles' or 'arguments'. From this point of view, syntaxemic analysis suggested by A.M. Muhkin can be valuable for linguistic investigation.

- Task 111\***. Analyze the following semantically equivalent analytical and synthetic sentences. Are they assigned different deep structure descriptions in case grammar? Which case categories are missing?

1) Many mothers bottlefeed their babies. 2) Many mothers feed their babies with a bottle. 3) Many mothers give their babies food with a bottle.

- Task 112\***. Identify the semantic types of the following denominal verbs formed by conversion.

1) picture the walls, jewel her hands, ring the fingers; 2) shelve the books, jail the prisoner, house the people; 3) author a book, tailor a suit, chairman the department, fox the people; 4) witness the accident, boycott foreign products; 5) fool the man, widow the woman, baby the student, group the actors, parade the troops, bundle the clothes; 6) word the sentence, letter the sign; 7) hammer the nail, knife the man, bomb the village, rope the calf.

## Unit 9

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### CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

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#### 9.1. CONTEXT AND MEANING

The method of contextual analysis is closely connected with the corresponding linguistic theory, in this case the theory of context and contextual semantics [Арнольд, 1991: 46].

The term **context** (derived from Latin *contextus* "a joining together, scheme, structure") implies any environment and medium, lingual (verbal) and extralingual (non-verbal), in which an element functions in the process of speech communication and which actualizes its meaning [Morokhovska, 1993: 210-211].

The **context** of an utterance can mean two different things. It can refer to the situation in which the utterance is produced; this is the *situational context*. It can refer to the linguistic environment — the surrounding language; this is the *linguistic context*. Both types of context influence the choice of language forms and therefore have an effect on output [Lewis, 1993: 80].

The concept of context as extralinguistic environment in which linguistic units function appeared earlier than the concept of linguistic context which lies at the heart of contextual analysis.

The founder of the theory of context was **John Rupert Firth** (1890—1960), the first Professor of General Linguistics in Great Britain and the head of London School of Linguistics. J.R. Firth was concerned with stating meaning in terms of the linguistic and non-linguistic context in which language is used.

Contextual theories were also advanced by other scholars, among them N.N. Amosova, V.I. Kodukhov, G.V. Kolshanskiy. They made a notable contribution to the development of **contextology**, i.e. the branch of linguistics that attempts to characterize and classify contexts and studies the actualization and contextualization of linguistic units in speech.

In developing his general theory which may be called the **contextual theory of language**, J.R. Firth drew on the work of anthropologists, particularly that of Polish-born anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, who, faced with the task of translating native words and sentences in ethnographic texts from the Trobriand

Islands into comprehensible English, developed his **theory of context of situation**, whereby the meanings of utterances (taken as the primary data) and their component words and phrases were referred to their various functions in the particular situational contexts in which they were used

For instance, B. Malinowski recorded a boast by a canoeist which he translated, "We-run front-wood ourselves ... we-turn we-see companion ours he-runs rear-wood". This, he argued, made sense only if the utterance was seen in the context in which it was used where it would become clear that, for instance, *wood* referred to the paddle of the canoe. Living languages must not be treated like dead ones, torn from their context of situation, but seen as used by people for hunting, cultivating, looking for fish, etc. [Palmer, 1991: 89].

B. Malinowski's arguments were primarily based on his observation of the way in which the language of the people he was studying fitted into their everyday activities, and was thus an inseparable part of them. But he noted also that there is, even in our own more sophisticated society, a special significance of expressions such as *How do you do?* *Ah, here you are,* which are used to establish a common sentiment. This aspect of language he called "phatic communion", where the words do not convey meaning but have a purely social function (a type of speech in which ties of union are created by a mere exchange of words) [Palmer, 1991: 89].

B. Malinowski's remarks about language as a mode of action are useful in reminding us that language is not simply a matter of stating information.

J.R. Firth took a more accurate and precise linguistic approach to the problem of context. He preferred to see context of situation as part of linguistic analysis of language and he suggested the following categories with the help of which contexts of situation could be grouped and classified [Palmer, 1991: 90]:

A. The relevant features of the participants: persons, personalities.

- (i) The verbal action of the participants.
- (ii) The non-verbal action of the participants.

B. The relevant objects.

C. The effects of the verbal action.

As an example of context of situation J.R. Firth considered a typical Cockney event with the sentence *I'm going to get one for Bert.* "What," he asks, "is the minimum number of participants? Three? Four? Where might it happen? In a pub? Where is Bert? Outside? Or

playing darts? What are the relevant objects? What is the effect of

the sentence? 'Obvious!' you say."

We notice meaning of words by watching what happened before, during, and after the words were spoken, by noticing the part played by words in what was going on. The people, their specific behaviour, the relevant things, events, and the words are all component terms in what may be called the **context of situation**. Meaning is best regarded in this way as a complex of relations of various kinds between the component terms of a context of situation [Firth, 1991: 62]. In other words, meaning is a property of the mutually relevant people, things, events in the situation.

J.R. Firth and his followers also stressed the need to investigate words in their linguistic contexts to determine the meaning of the investigated units. J.R. Firth argued that each word when used in a new context is a new word.

J.R. Firth treated all linguistic description as the statement of meaning, thereby stretching the application of the equation '**meaning is function in context**' to cover grammatical and phonological analysis. The move away from the identification of meanings simply as what is 'stood for' or referred to (since with many words no such referent is readily available), towards the interpretation of meaning as function in context (how words and combinations of words are used) is considered to be one of the most valuable contributions to semantics made by J.R. Firth.

B. Malinowski and J.R. Firth believed that the description of a language could not be complete without some reference to the context of situation in which the language operated. A more extreme view sees the meaning of the linguistic elements as totally accounted for in terms of the situation in which it is used [Palmer, 1991: 92].

This is behaviourism, associated first in linguistics with **Leonard Bloomfield** (1887–1949). He defined the meaning of a linguistic form as the situation in which the speaker utters it and the response it calls forth in the hearer. This is going much further than either B. Malinowski or J.R. Firth. They made statements of meaning in terms of the situation. L. Bloomfield is essentially defining meaning as the situation.

L. Bloomfield illustrated his views with a now famous account of Jack and Jill [Palmer, 1991: 92-93]. Jill is hungry, sees an apple and with the use of language gets Jack to fetch it for her. If she had been alone (or if she had not been human) she would have first

received a stimulus (S) which would have produced a reaction (R) — she would have made a move to get the apple:

$$S \longrightarrow R$$

Since, however, Jack was with her, the stimulus produced not the reaction R, but a linguistic reaction (r), that of speaking to Jack. The sound waves resulting from this in turn create a stimulus for Jack, a linguistic stimulus (s), which results in his non-linguistic reaction R of getting the apple:

$$S \longrightarrow r \dots s \longrightarrow R$$

Meaning, according to L. Bloomfield, consists in the relation between speech (which is shown by r ... s and the practical events (S) and (R) that precede and follow it.

Moreover, he included in the situation all the relationships that hold between Jack and Jill. Jill might not have acted in the same way if she had been bashful, and Jack might not have fetched the apple if he had been ill-disposed towards her. This means that the speech and the practical events depend upon predisposing factors which consist of the entire life history of the speaker and hearer.

"When I use a word," said Humpty Dumpty, "it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less." Some linguists, in their eagerness to underline the importance of context and to demolish the belief that there is a 'proper' meaning inherent in each word, go almost as far as Humpty Dumpty in their dogmatic utterances: the word exists only through the context and is nothing in itself [Ullmann, 1975: 26].

Such statements in which the meaning of a word is equated with its use in the language (operational concept of meaning) are neither accurate nor realistic. While it is perfectly true, and even a truism, that words are almost always found embedded in specific contexts, there are cases when a term stands entirely by itself, without any contextual support, and will still make sense. A one-word title such as Tolstoy's *Resurrection*, Ibsen's *Ghosts* or Jane Austen's *Persuasion* can be heavily charged with meaning, and even such elliptical titles as Kipling's *If* and Henry Green's *Nothing* will conjure up some sort of idea. In everyday life one is often asked: 'What does word so-and-so mean?' or 'How would you say word so-and-so in French?', and while in some cases it is difficult or even impossible to answer, in others one can do so without a moment's hesitation; no one knowing French would have any difficulty in giving the equivalent

of an adjective like yellow, a verb like write, a concrete noun like



outside contexts it would be impossible to compile a dictionary [Ullmann, 1975: 26-27].

There is no getting away from the fact that single words have more or less permanent meanings, that they actually do refer to certain referents, and not to others, and that this characteristic is the indispensable basis of all communications. This has been confirmed by experimental data. A series of tests designed to study the influence of context has shown that there is usually in each word a hard core of meaning which is relatively stable and can only be modified by the context within certain limits [Ullmann, 1975: 27].

At the same time no one would deny the **crucial importance of context in the determination of meaning**. As far as the role of verbal context is concerned, this was already recognized as fundamental by some of the pioneers of modern semantics. Modern linguists, however, have not only placed greater emphasis on context but have considerably broadened its scope and have also probed more deeply into its influence on meaning.

**Linguistic or verbal context** is defined as the stretch of text separated and integrated by the language element which functions in it uncovering its meaning [Кодухов, 1973: 19]; immediate syntactical environment of the word capable of the realization of its meaning [Amosova, 1968: 21]; the minimum stretch of speech necessary and sufficient to determine which of the possible meanings of a polysemantic word is used, cf. *blue eyes* and *to feel blue* [Arnold, 1986: 17-18]. Thus, linguistic (verbal) context may be presented by the formula "text fragment minus the investigated unit". Examples of verbal contexts for the word *cat* are: *The — caught the mouse. I bought fish for my —*. These sentences explain its meaning.

Not all linguistic units have verbal contexts and can be part of this context. Only units which can be used independently have contexts. These are lexemes and nominative word combinations (i.e. synthetic and analytical nominative units), sentences and phrases. Phonemes, letters, stems and affixes (suffixes or prefixes) are not context forming elements in the text.

The lingual or verbal context is, in fact, given by the language matter itself, by the discourse. It has been found that lingual contexts can be characterized as **lexical, grammatical and stylistic contexts** in accordance with the peculiarities of contextual phenomena [Morokhovska, 1993: 213].

**The lexical context** (also lexico-semantic or semantic) is represented by the denotative units in the environment of the element under consideration, of a lexeme and of a categorial form either. The semantics (i.e. the meanings) of the units in the environment of the given element or form is relevant for the actualization of its meanings, lexical and grammatical too.

The verb *take*, for instance, is of very general semantics which is of significative character. The meaning of this verb in concrete cases of its occurrence is predetermined by its combinability with different nouns in the subject and in the object positions. Compare [Morokhovska, 1993: 213-214]:

	N <sub>transport</sub> :	<i>cab, tube, ship, train, taxi</i>
	N <sub>location</sub> :	<i>room, flat, lodgings, villa</i>
take +	N <sub>direction</sub> :	<i>rout, way, direction, path, turning</i>
	N <sub>instruction</sub> :	<i>lesson, course, lecture</i>
	N <sub>illness</sub> :	<i>fever, pneumonia</i>

Similarly, the meanings of the N's form are different in the following examples because this form patterns with the nouns of different types: *a lion's paw, a lion's share*.

Lexical context determines the meaning of the adjective *black* in the following examples. *Black* denotes colour when used with a key-word naming some material or thing, e.g. *black velvet, black gloves*. When used with keywords denoting feeling or thought, it means "sad", "dismal": *black thoughts, black despair*. With nouns denoting time, the meaning is "unhappy", "full of hardships": *black days, black period*.

**The grammatical context** which is given by the grammatical environment in which the given unit occurs is, of course, of greater significance for the actualization of grammatical meanings. The following examples illustrate the immediate grammatical context of the verb *stop*:

stop + V<sub>ing</sub>: *She even stopped shivering for a moment.*

stop + V<sub>inf</sub>: *The waiter stopped to take their order.*

The lexical and grammatical meanings of the verb *stop* are dependent upon the grammatical environment (micro grammatical contexts V<sub>ing</sub> and V<sub>inf</sub>) in which the verb occurs. If it patterns with the V<sub>inf</sub> it maintains its regular denotative meaning of "to stay". On the contrary, the gerund (V<sub>ing</sub>) which follows the verb *stop* converts it into a phase-verb synonymous with the verbs like *finish, cease* [Morokhovska, 1993: 220-221].

If the indicative power belongs to the syntactic pattern and

not to the words which make it up, the context is called **syntactic**, e.g. *make* means "to cause" when followed by a complex object: *I couldn't make him understand a word I said*.

A purely syntactic context is rare. As a rule the indication comes from syntactic, lexical and sometimes morphological factors combined. Thus *late*, when used predicatively, means "after the right, expected or fixed time", as *to be late for school*. When used attributively with words denoting periods of time, it means "towards the end of the period", e.g. *in late summer*. Used attributively with proper personal nouns and preceded with a definite article, *late* means "recently dead".

The range of verbal context has been widened in several directions. Verbal context is no longer restricted to what immediately precedes and follows linguistic units, but may cover the whole passage, and sometimes the whole book, in which the word occurs. This tendency is particularly noticeable in stylistics where it has often been found that the complete significance of an important term can be grasped only in the light of the work as a whole [Ullmann, 1975: 27]. To accommodate this fact the term **stylistic context** was coined and put to use.

In some cases the **microcontext**, i.e. that of a single sentence or phrase, is not sufficient, and a broader context, or **macrocontext** (e.g. that of a paragraph) is necessary. **Megacontext** is the context of a book chapter, a story or the whole book. For instance, in *The Posthumous Papers of the Pickwick Club* by Charles Dickens, we come across the phrase: *There were Blue shops and Buff shops, Blue inns and Buff inns*, to understand it the reader must know that the Blues and the Buffs were the two rival leading parties of the town, and interpret this as an allusion to the two main English political parties of the time — the Tories and Whigs (Liberals) [Arnold, 1986: 18].

In addition to linguistic (verbal) context, the linguist must also pay attention to the so-called **context of situation (non-linguistic or extra-linguistic)** — the totality of extralinguistic features having relevance to a communicative act. It means in the first place the actual situation in which an utterance occurs, but leads on to an even broader view of context embracing the entire cultural background against which a speech event has to be set.

Non-linguistic context also has a part to play; we use different language in different situations, with different people. Most of us can

greet our friends with a simple *Hi!* but could not use this to the Duke of Edinburgh with the same meaning (though perhaps his friends can). That language used in that situation would still have meaning, but not the same meaning. Language means different things depending upon the situation of use.

The interrogative sentence *Are the windows open?*, for instance, may be treated as a request to open or close the windows depending on the temperature inside and outside, loud shouting or noises in the street, etc.

Context of situation is the central concept of linguistic pragmatics. It is represented by the social and cultural conditions of communication. The social status of the communicants, their culture and philosophical outlook are the background factors which lay constraints on the communicative use of language.

Verbal context is opposed to **non-verbal context** which includes nonverbal, usually unconscious, communication through the use of postures, gestures, facial expressions, body movements. Non-verbal context always accompanies verbal context and sometimes replaces it. Non-verbal context is essential in understanding the meaning of **deictic elements** specifying identity or spatial or temporal location from the perspective of one or more of the participants in an act of speech or writing, in the context of either an external situation or the surrounding discourse, as *we*, *you*, *here*, *there*, *now*, *then*, *this*, *that*, *the former*, or *the latter*. For example, a selecting gesture, as in *This is my coat and this one is Amy's* specifies the meaning of demonstrative pronouns.

Another distinction is made between **explicit and implicit context**. Explicit context may be expressed both by verbal and non-verbal means. Implicit context embraces presuppositions and background knowledge of the participants in the communicative act. Thus, the utterance *It has grown cold in the evening* contains the implicit context *It was warm during the day*.

This widening of contexts has opened new horizons for the study of meaning.

- Task 113.** Define if these statements about context are true or false.

1) A linguistic context is the encirclement of a language unit by other language units in speech. Such encirclement is especially important in case with polysemantic words. 2) It is often impossible to answer the question *What does word so-and-so mean?* 3) A dictionary gives the real meaning of a word. 4) Language does not exist except in a social context. 5) Placing

linguistic elements outside their normal context can produce humorous

effects. 6) Context can only refer to time and place. 7) Contextualizing can help to clarify an item of communication.

- **Task 114.** Working in small groups, discuss different types of contexts: linguistic (verbal) and non-linguistic context or context of situation. Note the difference between lexical and grammatical contexts and their role in differentiating the meanings of polysemantic words.
  
- **Task 115.** Discuss the types of contexts essential for determining the meanings of:
  - a) such words as *do* and *make*; *cucumber* and *potato*;
  - b) lexical homonyms *bear* "carry" and *bear* "animal", *row* "line" and *row* "argument";
  - c) lexico-grammatical homonyms resulting from conversion *doctor* and *to doctor*, *stone* and *to stone*;
  - d) verbs *to stop* and *to remember*;
  - e) sentences *Come here* and *You can't tell him anything*;
  - f) sentences *This is my sister* and *this is my cousin* and *This suit fits better than this one*;
  - g) sentences *He has given up smoking* and *Beat the egg white well this time*.

- **Task 116.** Explain the meaning of the following phrases in bold type. Discuss the type of context essential for determining their meaning.

1. She brought the car to a standstill, and they all got out. The off hind tyre was right down. "Pipe to!" said Hilary, taking his coat off. "Jack her up; Adrian. I'll get the spare wheel off." Fleur's head was lost in the tool-box, but her voice was heard saying: "**Too many cooks**, better let me!" (Galsworthy)

2. "Anyhow, Mr. O'Neil, I'm sure your grandmother came from a goodclass family. That does make a difference." "No, as a matter of fact she was my grandfather's wife's amah." While this sank in there was another silence, broken only by **the rattling of skeletons in the cupboard** — two skeletons now, the twin skeletons of Chinese blood and illegitimacy (Mason).

3. "You don't think there's any truth in her pernicious gabble, do you?" "I don't know. **Smoke and fire**, you know. Why shouldn't it be true?" (Aldington)

- Task 117. Discuss the type of context necessary to determine the meaning of the title in the article by Thomas Wilson, a theoretical physicist at NASA in Houston. Read the article and try to interpret the title, which expresses the main idea.

### WHY ET HAS NO HAIR

What is the probability of finding intelligent life in the Universe? Most people involved in the search for extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI) start from the probability  $p = N/N^*$ , where  $N$  is the number of galactic civilizations capable of communication, and  $N^*$  is the number of suitable stars in the Galaxy. They then argue about the exact value of  $N$ , in an attempt to find out if the number  $p$  is large enough to make the search worthwhile.

But this is a very limited approach. SETI enthusiasts are using what is known as an *a priori* probability ( $p = N/N^*$ ). This number is a scalar; it is just a number and cannot point, because it has no direction. So how could it help astronomers point their telescopes? The answer is that it couldn't.

To solve this problem, I introduced a probability which is a vector in probability space, or phase-space. I did this by using the probability known as the *a posteriori* probability, and proving that it has direction.

The beauty of this approach is that it gives an equation in which the probability of finding intelligent life is constantly changed as the results of searches come in. What is more, the researchers will be able to assess just which of the stars within the beam of their telescope is the most likely source of their signal. As a single cluster of stars can contain several hundred stars, this could prove useful.

The second point the SETI enthusiasts ignore is that intelligent life may have no wish to communicate with us. We live in a "star wars" era on our own planet, and it is quite possible that galactic civilizations are going to fight one another. Any aliens are going to be very cautious about using telecommunication systems which might threaten their security because the signals could be picked up by remote surveillance systems elsewhere.

To accommodate this factor, I have introduced a "no hair" theorem (теорема умовчання) for some galactic civilizations. We can imagine communication systems which are impossible to "tap" or eavesdrop on, particularly if they are halfway across the Galaxy. Remote surveillance is a form of remote measurement, and "no hair" theorems occur when it is not possible to distinguish an object from ordinary matter by means of remote measurement. The analogy in physics is "no hair" theorems for black holes.

SETI, to date, is a classic case of repeated failure. But the failures have never persuaded the enthusiasts that their arguments are false. In many ways, SETI is similar to the search for the Loch Ness monster. No search has ever found the monster but many people still believe that it exists.

## 9.2. WHAT CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS IS

Contextual analysis is a method of observing words in actual speech, as well as their influence on one another in speech [Amosova, 1968: 5].

Two notions, *context* and *distribution*, must be differentiated because the context implies any environment, lingual (verbal) and extralingual (non-verbal), in which an element functions in the process of speech communication. The distribution is conversely characterized as the factor of lingual environment only. The notion is applicable to the position and combinability of linguistic elements occurring in the environment of other speech elements. Distribution is only one aspect of the contextual characteristics of speech elements.

Nevertheless, the **contextual analysis** is based on the principles of distributional analysis because the distribution of an element, its position in the utterance, regulates its syntagmatic behaviour. Thus, the lingual context represented by the distributional conditions in which an element occurs turns out to be the decisive factor governing the actualization of language-forms in speech [Morokhovska, 1993: 211].

**Contextual analysis** (the contextual method) is close to distributional analysis and valency analysis since all of them are aimed at studying certain linguistic units through their linguistic environment, i.e. their syntagmatic neighbours. But they differ in some of their aspects.

The contextual method, which holds its own place alongside structural developments, is not formalized. Like structural methods (distributional analysis), it is based on the assumption that difference in meaning of linguistic units is always indicated by a difference in environment. Its results, however, are more like a large collection of neatly organized examples, supplemented with comments about these examples. In some respects it is more rigorous than the structural procedures, because it strictly limits observation to actually recorded material. No changes, whether controlled or not, are permitted in linguistic data observed, no conclusions are made unless there is a considerable number of examples to support their validity [Arnold, 1986: 285].

**Contextual method has several varieties:** 1) contextual analysis of meaning based on the assumption that the meaning of linguistic units is determined by the context; 2) operational analysis (developed by J.R. Firth); 3) quantitative contextual analysis which is based upon the frequency of occurrence of certain linguistic

environment and aims at establishing typical contexts of use (developed by N.N. Amosova).

1. **Contextual analysis** which concentrates its attention on determining the minimal stretch of speech and the conditions necessary to reveal in which of its individual meanings the word in question is used has a long history in linguistics and can be traced back to ancient times.

Generally speaking, it is common knowledge that context is a powerful preventive against any misunderstanding of meanings. For instance, the adjective *dull* if used out of context, would mean different things to different people or nothing at all. It is only in combination with other words that it reveals its actual meaning: a *dull pupil*, a *dull play*, a *dull razor-blade*, *dull weather*, etc. [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 71].

A lexicographer, for instance, will start by collecting a number of representative contexts in which a particular word appears. When further collections of examples cease to yield any fresh information, the analytical phase begins: he will extract from his contexts the meaning — or meanings — of the word. To quote Bertrand Russell: "A word has a meaning, more or less vague; but the meaning is only to be discovered by observing its use; the use comes first, and the meaning is distilled out of it" [Ullmann, 1973: 9].


In studying the interaction of the word with the syntactic configuration and lexical environment contextual analysis is more concerned with specific features of every particular language than with language universals [Arnold, 1986: 285].

Semantic structure of a word is analyzed in its linear relationship with neighbouring words in connected speech. In other words, the semantic characteristics of the word are observed, described and studied on the basis of its typical contexts.

2. The English group of linguists sometimes called the London School of Linguistics, or the School of John R. Firth call their method of contextual analysis **operational**, which means that they show the operations by which the units can be taken from the text and analyzed.

The two main ways of operational analysis are segmentation and substitution, especially contrastive substitution. All units are defined by placing them into larger units. It is not the occurrence of parts with respect to other parts that is of importance but the occurrence within a significant utterance. The principle is to make

suppositions about meaning controllable (verifiable) and to work according to a strict schedule of procedures.



The representatives of the London school discard the dualist distinction between form and content and regard the meaning as a complex of functions that a unit can possess. To discover this meaning of a form, then, it is placed in a wider context and the word is observed in its relation to other words. This contextual approach has been widely used by English scholars in discovering the peculiar features of languages, as they are interested not in universals of all languages but in specific features of each [Arnold, 1986: 278].

To illustrate this point, I.V. Arnold [1986: 278] takes the analysis Prof. W. Haas makes to distinguish the meaning of the homophones *sow* and *sew*, which are both pronounced [sou].

To show the difference in meaning, he finds them in contexts, and sees that the first can occur before such words as *carrots*, *onions*, *radish* and other words denoting vegetables, whereas the second, i.e. *sew*, may be followed by *dresses*, *blouses*, *shirts* and other words denoting articles of clothing:

*sow — carrots, onions, radish*  
*sew — dresses, blouses, shirts*

The difference is confirmed by adverbial modifiers. It is possible to expand the first series by such a phrase as *six inches apart*, but this phrase cannot be introduced into the second series. The analysis is completed by showing that the difference is not due to the meaning and peculiarities of the noun (e.g. *carrot*, *onion*), but lies in the meaning of the verb. To this end further contextual evidence is found:

<i>sowing carrots, onions</i>	<i>but:</i>	<i>sewing dresses, blouses</i>
<i>cooking carrots</i>		<i>washing dresses</i>
<i>harvesting carrots</i>		<i>mending dresses</i>

The procedure is thus based on establishing a sort of associated paradigm for the unit analyzed.

On the whole, the recognition of a particular set of words in which the lexical item occurs as stimulating the selection of the specific meaning, is common to all branches of structural linguistics, even though in many other respects structuralists are as divided as non-structuralists, and perhaps more.

3. Another variety of contextual analysis was developed by N. Amosova while studying phraseological units, i.e. word-groups

which are characterized by stability of structure and transferred meaning, e.g. *to take the bull by the horns*, *birds of a feather*, etc.

Prof. N. Amosova [Амосова, 1963] suggested the procedure of **contextual analysis** as the most objective way of separating phraseological units from free phrases and traditionally stereotyped phrases. The notion of context is specially developed and specially defined as the combination of the indicating minimum (i.e. minimum stretch of speech) with the semantically dependent word (a dependent) [Amosova, 1968: 35].

N. Amosova defines phraseological units as units of **fixed context**, and considers the branch of linguistics studying it a separate independent science. **Fixed context** is defined as a context characterized by a specific and unchanging sequence of definite lexical components, and a peculiar semantic relationship between these. Units of fixed context are subdivided into two types called phrasemes and idioms.

Phrasemes are always binary, e.g. in *to grind one's teeth*, one of the components (*to grind*) has a phraseologically bound meaning, the other (*one's teeth*) serves as the determining context. Also cf. *to knit one's brews*, *small hours*, *small talk*, *beef tea*, *husband's tea*.

The other type, i.e. idioms, differs from phrasemes because they cannot be separated into determining context and components with phraseologically bound meaning. The new meaning, the meaning of the idiom, is created by the unit as a whole though every element keeps its usual value, e.g. *a mare's nest* "nonsense, a discovery which exists only in the imagination of the finder". A *mare* "a female horse" has obviously no nest. The word *mare* is monosemantic, and so does not need any determining context. The word *nest* is polysemantic; besides its main meaning "the place made by birds for laying eggs and sheltering their young", it may also mean by metonymy "a brood" or metaphorically "lodging" and "bed" and even "haunt of robbers", etc. None of these, however, is connected with the word *mare* and they do not occur together in a free phrase. Thus both words keep their usual meanings while the combination as a whole possesses a special meaning.

Phrasemes and idioms are both subdivided into *movable* and *immovable*. These qualities are very much dependent upon their structure. A phraseme may be movable due to its variable element: *the apple of (his, her, mother's) eye* "that which is especially precious to one".

Combinations like to pay a *visit*, call, *homage*, *compliments*,

respects, reverence, (*one's*) devotions, cult, (*one's*) addresses somebody) cannot fit into the scheme of phraseological combinations, because the determining minimum on which the meaning of the verb pay depends is not constant. On the other hand, the combination is not free either, because the group of nouns possible as the second component is not limited by the character of the designata but by stylistic tradition. It is, for instance, impossible to pay seeing off, celebration, welcome or greetings. Some of these combinations are morphologically rigid (e.g. to pay addresses but not an address). N. Amosova suggests the term **semi-fixed context** or **traditionally fixed context**.

N. Amosova also distinguishes lexical, syntactic, morpho-syntactic, constructive and mixed contexts depending on which level the indication takes place.

If lexical contextual indicators, providing indicatory minimum, are placed in the immediate syntactic connection with the word under study, it is lexical **context of the first degree**, e.g. the hand of a clock (hand is a dependant and clock is the indicator), to blow a horn (horn serves as a lexical indicator for the realization of the preceding word), etc.

Sometimes, however, such a minimum context fails to reveal the meaning of the word, and it may be correctly interpreted only through what N. Amosova termed a **second-degree context** in which there is no direct syntactical connection between its principal elements though they belong to one and the same sentence. In the example *The man was large, but his wife was even fatter*, the word *fatter* (in indirect syntactic connection with *large*) serves as a kind of indicator pointing that *large* describes a stout man and not a big one.

The merit of N. Amosova's contextual theory lies in the fact that she regarded and studied context as the unity of the word and its indicatory minimum, i.e. took into consideration their interaction.

**Task 118.** Study the following representative linguistic contexts of the word *chair* collected by E. Nida [Palmer, 1991: 94] and try to distinguish between its different meanings.

- 1) sat in a chair; 2) the baby's high chair; 3) the chair of philosophy;
- 4) has accepted a University chair; 5) will chair the meeting; 6) the electric chair; 7) condemned to the chair.

- **Task 119.** Contextual analysis proves that words do not have an absolute meaning. Shades of meaning emerge with variation in context. If we express our feelings to a sexual partner using the verb *love*, that word means something quite different from *love* used to express our feelings to a two-year old child. The context is different and that affects the meaning of the verb. Comment on and illustrate other meanings of the verb *love* in different contexts, e.g. *All her pupils love her. He loves music. Plants love sunlight. I'd love to stay with you. We loved each other all night long.*
  
- **Task 120.** Following the procedures of operational analysis, show the difference in meaning between two homonyms by finding them in contexts. Use your home-reading material or dictionaries.
  
- **Task 121.** Analyze the following sentences from the contextual point of view. Find instances of lexical context of the first and second degree [Amosova, 1968: 103-104].
  - 1) In his blind haste, he almost ran into the river. 2) By the way, here is the key of Louise's jewel case. 3) "You have none of you been brought in contact with a case of murder before?" 4) No, it was easier to shift the responsibility to Aunt Pitty who after all was the head of the house, the chaperon and the arbiter of morals. 5) And then ... she began her letters, five, six, seven perhaps to be answered, all written in that same curious, slanting hand I knew so well. 6) She was so fair that without her make-up she would have seemed bleached. 7) *The doctor, I believe, is* a very good shot. 8) My only enemy was the clock on the dash-board, whose hands would move relentlessly to one o'clock.
  
- **Task 122.** Give your own examples of phraseological units of fixed context. Subdivide them into two types: phrasemes and idioms (after N. Amosova).

### 9.3. APPLICATIONS OF CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

Contextual analysis is used in lexicology to study word meaning and syntagmatic relationships between words, i.e. their combinability or collocability.

The implementation of the method of contextual analysis can be efficient for grammar too. Contextual analysis can provide an explanation for actualization of grammatical categories.

Broadly speaking there are two kinds of contextual

**Influences on word meaning:** those which affect any word, and those which affect some words more than others.

Every word, no matter how precise and unambiguous, will derive from the context a certain **determinateness** which, by the very nature of things, can arise only in specific utterances. Even proper names, the most concrete of all words, have a variety of aspects only one of which will be relevant to a particular situation; only the context will show whether when speaking of Queen Victoria, we are referring to the young Queen advised by Lord Melbourne, to the aged monarch reigning at the time of the Boer War, or to any other stage in the 82 years of her life.

Another factor which depends largely on the context is the **emotive side of word-meaning**. In principle, practically any term may acquire emotive overtones in a suitable context; conversely even words with a strong emotional charge may on occasion be employed in a purely objective manner. *Home*, for example, is one of the great emotional words of the language, and is used that way in many contexts (*Home, sweet home. England, home and beauty. Home is the sailor, home from the sea, etc.*), but it is stripped of all emotion in *Home Office* or *B.B.C. Home Service*.

Apart from this general influence, context may also play a vital part in **fixing the meaning of words which are too vague or too ambiguous to make sense by themselves**. To take an extreme case, the verb *do* has such a wide variety of uses that it is virtually meaningless in itself. It is interesting to note, however, that in less advanced cases of ambiguity there is sometimes a kind of hierarchy between the various meanings, which is largely independent of context. Recent experiments have shown, for example, that when German speakers were asked to make up a sentence containing the word *Nagel*, all the subjects automatically took it in the sense of "metal nail"; apparently it did not even occur to them that it also means "finger-nail, toe-nail".

Another type of ambiguity which only the context will dispel is found in **words belonging to more than one word-class**: This is particularly common in English where words can pass freely — by a process known as *conversion* — from one class to another. Here too there is no doubt a hierarchy of functions: *fire* is primarily a noun, though it can be used as a verb; *have* is first and foremost a verb though it becomes a noun in the haves and the have-nots.

Context is essential in the case of **homonyms**. It would obviously be meaningless to ask someone to find the equivalent of the English word *sole* in a foreign language, one would first have to specify which of the three soles *is* meant — the adjective, the fish, or the bottom of the foot — not to mention *soul* which, though spelt differently, is pronounced in the same way.

The role of context is even more essential in the case of **deictic elements**. **Deixis** as a linguistic term is borrowed from the Greek word for pointing or indicating, and entails the use of demonstratives (*this, that*), first and second person pronouns (*we, you*), tense, specific time and place adverbs (*now, then, here, there*), and a variety of other grammatical features tied directly to the circumstances of utterance.

Essentially, deixis concerns the ways in which languages encode features of the context of utterance or speech event, and thus also concerns ways in which the interpretation of utterances depends on the analysis of that context of utterance. Thus the pronoun *this* does not name or refer to any particular entity on all occasions of use; rather it is a variable or place-holder for some particular entity given by the context (e.g. by a gesture).

The importance of context for the interpretation of deictic elements is perhaps best illustrated by what happens when such context is lacking. Consider, for example, finding the following notice on someone's office door. *I'll be back in an hour*. Because we don't know when it was written, we cannot know when the writer will return. Or, imagine that the lights go out as Harry has just begun saying: *Listen, I'm not disagreeing with you but with you, and not about this but about this*. Or, suppose we find a bottle in the sea, and inside it a message which reads: *Meet me here a week from now with a stick about this big*. We do not know who to meet, where or when to meet him or her, or how big a stick to bring [Levinson, 1985].

There has been considerable linguistic interest in **deictic** or **indexical** elements that have this context-dependent property. The traditional categories of deixis are:

- **person deixis** which concerns the encoding of the role of participants in the speech event in which the utterance in question is delivered: the category first person is the grammaticalization of the speaker's reference to himself, second person the encoding of the speaker's reference to one or more addressees, and third person the encoding of reference to persons and entities which are neither speakers nor addressees of the utterance in question. Familiar ways

in which such participant-roles are encoded in language are of

course the pronouns and their associated predicate agreements.

- **place deixis** which concerns the encoding of spatial locations relative to the location of the participants in the speech event. Probably most languages grammaticalize at least a distinction between proximal (or close to speaker) and distal (or non-proximal, sometimes close to addressee); but many make much more elaborate distinctions. Such distinctions are commonly encoded in demonstratives (as in English *this* vs. *that*) and in deictic adverbs of place (like English *here* vs. *there*).

- **time deixis** which concerns the encoding of temporal points and spans relative to the time at which an utterance was spoken (or a written message inscribed). Thus, just as place deixis encodes spatial locations on coordinates anchored to the place of utterance, so time deixis encodes times on co-ordinates anchored to the time of utterance. Time deixis is commonly grammaticalized in deictic adverbs of time (like English *now* and *then*, *yesterday* and *this year*), but above all in tense.

To these traditional categories, researchers [Levinson, 1985] now add:

- **discourse deixis** which has to do with the encoding of reference to portions of the unfolding discourse in which the utterance (which includes the text referring expression) is located. Instances of discourse deixis are the use of *that* and *this* in the following sentences: *Puff puff puff: that is what it sounded like. This is what phoneticians call creaky voice* Other examples of discourse-deictic items are *however, moreover, besides, anyway, well, still, furthermore, although, oh, so*

- **social deixis** which concerns the encoding of social distinctions that are relative to participant-roles, particularly aspects of the social relationship holding between speaker and addressee(s) or speaker and some referent. In many languages, distinctions of fine gradation between the relative ranks of speaker and addressee are systematically encoded throughout, for example, the morphological system, in which case we talk of honorifics; but such distinctions are also regularly encoded in choices between pronouns, summons forms or vocatives, and titles of address in familiar languages. Examples of socially deictic items when used in address are *sir, madam, mate, your honour, sonny, hey, oi*.

It is essential to distinguish different kinds of **deictic usage** of **deictic expression**, namely gestural usage and symbolic usage.

Terms used in a **gestural** way can only be interpreted with reference to an audio-visual-tactile, and in general a physical, monitoring of the speech event. Instances would be demonstrative pronouns used with a selecting gesture, as in *This one's genuine, but this one is a fake* or second or third person pronouns used with some physical indication of the referent (e.g. direction of gaze), as in *He's not the Duke, he is. He's the butler.*

In contrast, **symbolic usages** of deictic terms require for their interpretation only knowledge of (in particular) the basic spatio-temporal parameters of the speech event (but also, on occasion, participant-role and discourse and social parameters). Thus it is sufficient to know the general location of the participants in order to interpret *This city is really beautiful* and to know the set of potential addressees in the situation in order to interpret *You can all come with me if you like* and to know when the interaction is taking place in order to know which calendar year is being referred to in *We can't afford a holiday this year.*

These two kinds of deictic usage contrast with the non-deictic usage of the same words. Some examples will help to make the three-way distinction clear: *You, you, but not you, are dismissed* (gestural deictic usage). *What did you say?* (symbolic usage). *You can never tell what sex they are nowadays* (non-deictic usage).

The many facets of deixis are so pervasive in natural languages, and so deeply grammaticalized, that it is hard to think of them as anything other than an essential part of semantics. However, deixis belongs within the domain of pragmatics, because it directly concerns the relationship between the structure of languages and the contexts in which they are used. The grammatical category of deixis will probably be found to straddle the semantics/pragmatics border.

The notion of **transposition** underlies any procedure of contextual analysis. The term *transposition* in the general meaning of the word, implies the placement of a language unit or form into the speech environment (context) which may not be typical of its regular and neutral occurrence [Morokhovska, 1993: 54].

The transposition of an element into an incompatible contextual environment may lead to the neutralization of the regular meaning of the unit or form and cause semantic shift. As a result, the element loses its regular meaning and acquires another, usually connotative, meaning characteristic of the given element in the particular case of its occurrence [Morokhovska, 1993: 54].

## When linguistic elements occur in transposition, i.e. under

conditions of relative contextual semantic incompatibility, their potential semantic features are being actualized. This is best illustrated by any expressive use of language, as a metaphor, simile, metonymy, personification, or oxymoron, in which words are used in other than their literal sense, or in other than their ordinary combinations, in order to suggest a picture or image or for other special effect (stylistic transpositions of special connotative value in expressive language), e.g. metonymy *count heads* (or *noses*) for "count people", oxymoron *cruel kindness*.

The term *transposition* is applied in grammar rather to the result of placement than to the placement of elements itself. And even more exactly, transposition always implies certain semantic shifting. Sometimes the environment appears incompatible semantically with the regular meanings which this or that unit or form can render. The incompatible context into which the given element is transposed interacts with the regular semantics of that element and may cause semantic changes, e.g.:

- a) the use of the Present Indefinite and Present Continuous to signal immediate futurity, e.g. *His ship sails tomorrow. The doctor is coming soon.*
- b) the use of the Present Indefinite in subordinate clauses of time, condition, and concession when the action refers to the future, e.g. *When the spring comes, the swallows will return. If you send me a line to my club, it'll be forwarded at once.*

c) the use of the Present Indefinite with past time reference: *Fancy, I come home yesterday and find her letter on my table.*

- Task 123. How can you illustrate the influence of context on meaning?
- Task 124\*. Contextual analysis is helpful in decoding the meaning of neologisms. Before translating a new word, its structure should be analyzed to discover its meaning. The next step is to study the word in its textual environment or context. Working with your partner, explain the meaning of the following blends (shortened words with the first constituent represented by a stem whose final part may be missing, and the second constituent by a stem of which the initial part is missing) which are not registered in dictionaries, paying special attention to their contexts.

- 1) Another major enterprise in France was a 100-mile wall of resorts, towns, motels, and boatels along the Mediterranean coast. 2) A

containerport at Port Newark is at a standstill as a result of strike. 3) Some kind of "bus-napper" must be hard at work in the district. We should like to know what they do with the kidnapped buses. 4) Beefish is just one product that is starting on the long path to the market. 5) A research team in Geneva has "mated" lift to an escalator and produced a remarkable hybrid device with the advantages of both. The new escalift will hoist large numbers fast. 6) Mr. Alexander Wozniak was making good progress today in his 260 miles "walk" on the river Thames. He is using skinoe and hopes to introduce skinoeing into Britain as a sport. 7) To eat the food they frequently are crammed on the benches at narrow tables as they try to cut meat, scoop up soup or wind up spaghetti with a spork. 8) As prices for petroleum products rise the economics should become favourable for gasohol and for the diesel fuel-ethanol combination called diesohol. 9) Most believe that if the globs of oil, called oilbergs because most of their mass is below the surface, continue to move east, the damage will be held to minimum. 10) The downturn was described by such words as *inflationary recession*, stagflation or even slumpflation. 11) An experimental product called glassphalt uses finely ground glass granules to replace the rock aggregates now used as a construction material for highways.

- **Task 125.** Identify gestural deictic usages, symbolic deictic usages, and non-deictic usages of the same words in the sentences below.

1. a) This finger hurts. b) This city stinks. c) I met this weird guy the other day.
2. a) Push not now, but now. b) Let's go now rather than tomorrow.
- c) Now, that is not what I said.
3. a) Not that one, idiot, that one. b) That's a beautiful view. c) Oh, I did this and that.
4. a) Move it from there to there. b) Hello, is Harry there? c) There we go.

- **Task 126.** Point out linguistic elements which occur in transposition in the following sentences. Comment on the semantic shift in their meaning.

- 1) He became addicted to the bottle. 2) John will never be a Shakespeare. 3) Make haste slowly. 4) She wanted to go away to college, and her parents gave her her head. 5) One more day has died. 6) The Pacific Ocean has a cruel soul. 7) The president will put the ship of state on its feet. 8) The school went to the zoo. 9) There were rivers of tears, rivers of words. 10) While England slept, Germany prepared for war.

□ **Task 127.** Read the following sentences. Consider carefully the

verb forms, stating their actual meanings in the contexts they occur. Indicate contextual factors causing transposition of the given forms.

1) I must have the doctor handy, in case she feels worse. 2) Can you tell me what time the game starts today, please? 3) Denis is buying me a new coat for my birthday. 4) Do you hear me? 5) He will announce the guests as they arrive. 6) I hear you're moving to a new job. 7) I hope we win. 8) I start work next month. 9) I'll have dinner whenever it's ready. 10) It's time to sleep. Down you get! 11) I'm not going away. I'm staying here and I'm going to do what I think is right. 12) Last week I'm in the sitting-room with my wife, when the chap next door staggers past and in a drunken fit throws a brick through our window. 13) My father was sending me to the monastery to put on the lama's robe and learn the sacred books. 14) She is always following him about. 15) You are always wasting your money on something.

#### **9.4. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS**

The study of linguistic context is of interest to semantics for two reasons. First, by looking at the linguistic contexts of words we can often distinguish between different meanings. Dictionaries, especially the larger ones, quite rightly make considerable use of this kind of contextualization.

Secondly, contextual analysis concerns itself with the study of word collocability and collocations. This was strongly emphasized by J.R. Firth and British linguists influenced by his ideas.

The task of distinguishing between different meanings of a word and different variations of combinability (or, in a traditional terminology, different usages of the word) is actually a question of singling out different denotations within the semantic structure of the word. Cf.: 1) a sad woman; 2) a sad voice; 3) a sad story; 4) a sad scoundrel (= an incorrigible scoundrel); 5) a sad night (= a dark, black night). Obviously, the first three contexts have the common denotation of sorrow, whereas in the fourth and fifth contexts the denotations are different. So, in these five contexts we can identify three meanings of *sad*.

All this leads us to the conclusion that context is not the ultimate criterion for meaning and it should be used in combination with other criteria [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 72].

The principles of contextology appear most valuable and explanatory for the analysis of the actualization of grammatical

categories. The elaboration of text-linguistics and the speech-act theory makes it evident that the principles of contextual analysis can be effectively used whenever the functional aspects of linguistic forms come into focus. However, comparatively little progress has been achieved in grammar as far as the typology of contexts is concerned. Some attempts to characterize and to classify contexts have been undertaken but the principles on the basis of which these were made are hardly acceptable for the grammatical contextology which aims at the analysis of the actualization of grammatical phenomena in speech. It does not mean at all that grammarians ignore contextological principles but they resort to them yet too occasionally [Morokhovska, 1993: 210].

One more conclusion, perhaps, should be that we need far more sophisticated techniques for context of situation than have yet been developed [Palmer, 1976: 92; Арнольд, 1991: 46].

Contextual analysis suggests important pedagogical strategies. It raises the embarrassing question of what language means when it is used only for the purpose of practising language, for example, the decontextualized examples of a grammar exercise. Frequently it does not mean anything. Some applied linguists have gone so far as to deny that such language is language at all, coining instead the phrase "language-like behaviour" [Lewis, 1993: 80-81].

In general, de-contextualized lexical items — words and phrases — retain the codified element of their meaning; fully grammaticalized sentences, other than those used as lexical items, are wholly devoid of meaning when de-contextualized. Context — situation, participant and purpose — are not optional extras in the creation of meaning; they are intrinsic to it. This has important implications for what actually constitutes a language practice.

In the 1950s and 60s, orthodoxy dictated that the drilling of grammatical patterns was a useful, indeed indispensable, activity. Nobody thought this sequence remotely odd [Lewis, 1993: 81]:

- T: He's a big man, isn't he?
- S: Yes, he's the biggest man I know.
- T: He's a tall man, isn't he?
- C: Yes, he's the tallest man I know.
- T: That's a weird idea, isn't it?
- C: Yes, it's the weirdest idea I know.

Nowadays, such drilling of wholly de-contextualized sentences is taboo.

**Instead of teaching and listing isolated words and sentences**

it makes considerable pedagogic sense to present them in context, to work with them with their context, and finally — and this for many is an important step forward — to devise recording formats for new language which reflect the importance of context. Such recording formats will take the importance of context into account, in a way which no linear, item by item listing in the vocabulary book ever could. Examples of such recording patterns are collocation boxes, pattern displays and discourse structures [Lewis, 1993: 126].

- Task 128.** What classroom activities can you suggest which will help learners to practice new language in context?

PART IV  
**METHODS OF SITUATIONAL  
 STUDY OF LANGUAGE**



**Unit 10**

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**PERFORMATIVE ANALYSIS  
 AND PRAGMATIC  
 THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS**

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**10.1. DEFINING PRAGMATICS**

The modern usage of the term **pragmatics** (Greek *prägnatikós* 'practical' equivalent to *prägnat-* (stem of *prägma*) 'deed', 'state business' derivative of *prässein* 'to do') is attributable to the philosopher Charles Morris [1938] who was concerned to outline the general shape of a science of signs, or semiotics. Within semiotics, Morris distinguished three distinct branches of inquiry: syntax, being the study of formal relation of signs to one another, semantics, the study of the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable, and pragmatics, the study of the relation of signs to interpreters.

Charles Morris first used the term *pragmatics* in 1938, as the title of one of the sections of semiotics. At the beginning of the 1960s-70s pragmatics became part of linguistics. The first representatives of linguistic pragmatics were the authors of the speech act theory John Austin and John Searle. A lot of scholars were concerned with the problems connected with pragmatics and functioning of speech, among them B. Fraser, K. Bach, R.M. Harnish, H.P. Grice, G. Gazdar, R.C. Stalnaker, S.C. Levinson, G.N. Leech, I.P. Ivanova, G.G. Pocheptsov.

**Pragmatics** as a branch of linguistics studies the functioning of language units in speech. The aim of pragmatic research is realized within the frames of functional approach to language study.

## Linguistic pragmatics studies functional characteristics of

linguistic units in a particular context of utterance. Context must be understood here as the **situational context** within which utterances are made. Pragmalinguists have defined context as the set of background assumptions that are necessary for an utterance to be intelligible [Searle, 1979: 125], including the knowledge, beliefs and assumptions of the speaker and the relation between the speaker and listener (social status, identity, role, location, etc.).

Jenny Thomas [1995: 22] defines pragmatics as the study of 'meaning in interaction' with the special emphasis on the interrelationship between the speaker, hearer, utterance and context.

Linguistic expressions (sentences) having overtly the same structure may be functionally different (i.e. have different communicative functions) depending on the situational contexts in which they were uttered. For instance, *Come with no delay* can imply order, command, a polite request, or a kind favour. *You will remember it* may have indicative modality and future time relevance or the modal meaning of strong presumption. *What are you doing?* may be a question or a strong warning. *I'll watch you* may state the fact as well as express a threat or a promise. These overtly the same sentences are different in their pragmatic aspect.

Grammar is concerned with the context-free assignment of meaning to linguistic forms, while pragmatics is concerned with the further interpretation of these forms in context of use. Thus it may be quite clear what *Shut the door* means, but not yet at all clear on the further point as to whether as uttered at a certain time in a certain contextually caused situation it was an order, an entreaty or whatnot. In this respect, linguistic pragmatics is often understood as a theory of contextual disambiguation.

Semantic structure of a linguistic expression in actual speech cannot be reduced only to lexical and grammatical information realized in it (semantic content of the utterance). The pragmatic component (intentional or pragmatic meaning) which affects the functional side of it also needs to be taken into account.

Orientation towards the literal meaning which arises from the language meaning of the components of the utterance may result in the so-called pragmatic failure in conversational interaction. What the speaker means by an utterance is not necessarily closely related to the literal meaning of the utterance at all. There can be interesting discrepancies between speaker-meaning and sentence-meaning. For example, '*Linguistics is fascinating*' said ironically may be intended

by the speaker to communicate 'Linguistics is deadly boring' [Levinson, 1985: 17]. The difference between literal and intended meaning is one of the central problems of pragmatics.

Joanna Channel [1994: 31] setting out her approach to pragmatics, gives the axiom: **semantics + pragmatics = meaning**. Pragmatics studies those aspects of meaning which arise from language use in context and situation, with particular reference to the assumptions and inferences which participants make and the purposes for which they use particular utterances.

In accounting for language understanding, we should possibly be more interested in pragmatics than in grammar, on the basis of evidence that hearers deploy non-grammatical inferences of the type: 'What could this speaker possibly, and reasonably, mean, in this context?' before they deploy the full range of relevant semantic and syntactic rules [Channell, 1994: 31].

Understanding an utterance involves a great deal more than knowing the meanings of the words uttered and the grammatical relations between them. Above all, understanding an utterance involves the making of inferences that will connect what is said to what is mutually assumed by speakers or what has been said before [Levinson, 1985: 20].

Stephen Levinson [1985: 47-48] provides the following example which serves to indicate the general nature of the phenomena that pragmatics is concerned with. Here is the exchange:

A: *So can you please come over here again right now.*

B: *Well, I have to go to Edinburgh today sir.*

A: *Hmm. How about this Thursday?*

In understanding such an exchange we make a great number of detailed pragmatic inferences about the nature of the context in which the exchange can be assumed to be taking place.

For example, we infer the following facts:

1. It is not the end of the conversation (nor the beginning).

2. A is requesting B to come to A at (or soon after) the time of speaking; B implies he can't (or would rather not) comply; A repeats the request for some other time.

3. In requesting, A must (a) want B to come now, (b) think it possible that B can come, (c) think B is not already there, (d) think B was not about to come anyway, (e) expect that B will respond with an acceptance or rejection, and if B accepts, then A will also expect B to come, (f) think that his (A's) asking may be a possible motive for B to

come, (g) not be, or be pretending not to be, in a position to order B

to come.

4. A assumes that B knows where A is; A and B are not in the same place; neither A nor B are in Edinburgh; A thinks B has been to A's place before.

5. The day on which the exchange is taking place is not Thursday, nor Wednesday (or, at least, so A believes).

6. A is male (or so B believes); A is acknowledged by B to have a higher social status than B (or to be playing the role of a superior).

These communicated inferences are not part of the semantic content of the three sentences. Rather, they reflect our ability to compute out of utterances in sequence the contextual assumptions they imply: the facts about the spatial, temporal and social relationships between participants, their beliefs and intentions in undertaking certain verbal exchanges.

In order to participate in ordinary language usage, one must be able to make such calculations, both in production and interpretation. This ability is independent of idiosyncratic beliefs, feelings and usages (although it may refer to those shared by participants), and is based for the most part on quite regular and relatively abstract principles. Pragmatics can be taken to be the description of this ability, as it operates both for particular languages and language in general. Such a description must certainly play a role in any general theory of linguistics [Levinson, 1985: 53].

Dealing with the scope of pragmatics, Stephen Levinson [1985: 27] provides a list of phenomena for which a pragmatic theory must account (central topics in pragmatics). In his opinion, pragmatics is the study of speech acts, conversational implicature, presupposition, deixis and aspects of discourse structure.

Although much of pragmatics is based on discussion of spoken language, there is equally a pragmatics of written language.

- **Task 129.** 'Context' has been defined in many ways by scholars with different backgrounds and various aims in mind. From a purely linguistic point of view, context has been regarded as the linguistic material (parts of a written or spoken statement) preceding and following a word or sentence, usually influencing its meaning or effect. Discuss the notion of 'context' in pragmatics.

- Task 130. Each of the sentences given below might have the pragmatic meaning of warning in the appropriate context of utterance. Reflect upon such appropriate situational contexts. Discuss your ideas with a partner or in a small group and support them with appropriate arguments.

1) Be careful! 2) Be quick to promise and quick to perform! 3) Do you mean that! 4) Beware of the train! 5) Handle with care! 6) Hold your horses! 7) Hold your tongue! 8) How difficult you can be! 9) If you do that again! You can't expect me to agree with that! 10) Mind your head! 11) Run! 12) Mr. Jones is here! 13) Say one more word and off you go! 14) Touch me, touch me! 15) Trespassers will be prosecuted. 16) You are not going to deceive me any longer! 17) What are you doing!

- Task 131\*. Pragmatic meanings (e.g. agreement, approval, gratitude, request, etc.) can be expressed by different language means, both verbal and non-verbal. Verbal means include lexicogrammatical classes of words (nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs), idiomatic phrases, and syntactic constructions. Non-verbal means fall into prosodic (the stress and intonation patterns of an utterance), kinesic (body motions as blushes, shrugs, or gestures), mimic (facial expressions and eye movement), proxemic (spatial arrangements and variations in distance).

In the following sentences find means expressing approval and disapproval and define their status.

E.g.: They stared at him during a long pause. The circle grew tighter. They slowly sipped their drinks and admired their hero (Grisham).

hero – 'a person who is admired'



to admire – 'to regard sb with respect, pleasure, or approval'

verbal means (noun): *hero ↔ admire ↔ approval*

1) "Don't pull up," he said, sharply (Weldon). 2) "I don't imagine Western Kentucky is much of an academic school," Lamar blurted with a stupid grin and immediately wished he could take it back. Lambert and McKnight frowned and acknowledged the mistake (Grisham). 3) He didn't like her expression much either — it was scary and odd (Cheek). 4) Don't do that! (Weldon) 5) Guy's a real pain. Everybody's sick of him (Grisham). 6) He squeezed her bottom as they walked back to the car and said, "A very nice little outfit, my dear." (Grisham) 7) He watched most of the heads shake in agreement (Grisham). 8) He turned and walked slowly to Adam's end of the table and took a seat. "I like this idea," he said very quiet and composed, "it

is worth a try." (Grisham) 9) How could you speak to me like that? (Weldon)

10) I think maybe he's reading some stuff that isn't on the approved list (Grisham). 11) La Monette hated all lawyers and all things related to them (Grisham). 12) Lon Dell possessed the power to approve what they were about to do (Grisham). 13) No junior could leave the wing without prior approval from the judge Harkin (Grisham). 14) Rohr was a local legend. Fitch cursed him from the back row (Grisham). 15) Sure, it's a deal (Grisham). 16) The defence will accept number one (Grisham). 17) The Colonel grunted with disgust, and opened a newspaper (Grisham). 18) The wife of Herman Grimes sat midway back, beaming with pride in the fact that her husband had been elected to such a lofty position (Grisham). 19) Then maybe he should keep his mouth shut (Grisham). 20) He's lying; I tell you. He's lying. The son of a bitch is lying (Grisham). 21) Those silly women with their hairy legs. She shivers at the thought (Grisham). 22) Voyles leaned into his face. "You're a traitor, Ross. The lowest form of scum, I can't believe it." (Grisham) 23) What could possibly induce his sister to ask this disagreeable young woman to dinner? (Weldon) 24) You'd better get out or things will turn really sour for you (Weldon). 25) And Bella spoke at last, "Children? So what? They would grow up to be criminals and murderers like their parents. Fire, Baf! What's the matter? Chicken? (Weldon) 26) Chloe is astonished. This seems rather draconian to her (Cheek). 27) He thinks of nothing but that damned law firm (Grisham).

- Task 132. Find pragmatic means expressing approval or disapproval in the following situations and define their status.

1

"May I ask a question?" Mitch asked.

"Certainly."

"Sure."

"Anything."

"Why are we interviewing in this hotel room? The other firms interview on campus through the placement office."

"Good question." They all nodded and looked at each other and agreed it was a good question (Grisham).

2

"Practice. What's a practice? Why do lawyers practice? Why can't they just work like everyone else? Do plumbers practice? Do truck drivers practice? No, they simply work. But not lawyers." (Grisham)

3

"So you've found a job?" Mrs. Sutherland asked.

"Yes. I start a week from Monday. I'll be teaching third-grades at St. Andrew's Episcopal School."

"Teaching doesn't pay much," her father blurted (Grisham).

4

Sam nodded, and said, "Nice to meet you."

"My pleasure. I'm sure you knew my predecessor."

"Ah yes, the Right Reverend Rucker. Where is he now?"

"Retired."

"Good. I never cared for him. I doubt if he makes it to heaven."

"Yes, I've heard he wasn't too popular."

"Popular? He was despised by everyone here. For some reason we didn't trust him." (Grisham)

5

"Answer the question, smartass. Do you, with all your training, experience, and judicial brilliance, seriously expect this governor to entertain ideas of granting me clemency?"

"Maybe."

"Maybe my ass. You're stupid."

"Thank you, Sam." (Grisham)

## 10.2. THE ORIGIN OF PERFORMATIVE ANALYSIS


Of all the issues in the general theory of language usage, pragmatic theory of speech acts (**speech act theory**) has probably aroused the widest interest. Among the most significant contributors to this communication field of study was John Langshaw Austin, who developed the first systematic theory of utterance as human actions and originated the term *speech act*.

J.L. Austin pioneered the method of **performative analysis** which aims at explaining the meaning of linguistic expressions in terms of their use in performing various speech acts (e.g., admonishing, asserting, commanding, exclaiming, promising, questioning, requesting, warning, etc.).

In the set of lectures that were posthumously published as *How to Do Things with Words* J.L. Austin [1962] stated that certain utterances are acts in themselves as opposed to utterances which are statements about something, for example: *I give my word. I warn you. I apologize. I object. I bet you six pence that it will rain tomorrow. I declare war on Zanzibar. I sentence you to ten years of hard labour.*

The peculiar thing about these sentences is that they are not used just to say things, i.e. describe states of affairs, but rather actively *do* things. They perform an act by the very fact of being uttered, e.g. *I promise* performs the act of promising.

J.L. Austin termed these speech acts **performative speech**



acts (**performatives**) and contrasted them to **constatives**, which describe

a state of affairs which he called **constatives**.

J.L. Austin then went on to suggest that unlike constatives, performatives cannot be true or false. Yet they can go wrong. He then set himself the task of cataloguing all the ways in which they can go wrong, or be 'unhappy', or infelicitous as he put it. For instance, suppose the speaker says '*I christen this ship the Imperial Flagship Mao*', he may not succeed in so christening the vessel if, for instance, it is already named otherwise, or he is not the appointed namer, or there are no witnesses, slipways, bottles of champagne, etc.

Successfully naming a ship requires certain institutional arrangements, without which the action that the utterance attempts to perform is simply null and void. On the basis of such different ways in which a performative can fail to come off, J.L. Austin produced a typology of conditions which performatives must meet if they are to succeed. He called these conditions **felicity conditions**, and he distinguished three main categories [Levinson, 1985: 229]:

1. There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect. The circumstances and persons must be appropriate, as specified in the procedure.

2. The procedure must be executed correctly and completely.

3. Often, the persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the procedure, and if consequent conduct is specified in the procedure, then the relevant parties must do so.

As evidence of the existence of such conditions, consider what happens when some of them are not fulfilled. For example, suppose, a British citizen says to his wife '*I hereby divorce you*'. He will not thereby achieve a divorce, because there simply is no such procedure whereby merely by uttering the sentence divorce can be achieved. In contrast, in Muslim cultures there is such a procedure, whereby the uttering of this sentence three times consecutively does thereby constitute a divorce [Levinson, 1985: 229-230].

J.L. Austin notes that these violations are not all of equal status. Violations of A and B conditions give rise to misfires, as he puts it, i.e. the intended actions simply fail to come off. Violations of C conditions, on the other hand, are abuses, not so easily detected at the time of the utterance in question, with the consequence that the action is performed, but infelicitously or insincerely.

On the basis of these observations J.L. Austin [Levinson, 1985: 230-231] declares that a) some sentences, performatives, are special; uttering them does things, and does not merely say things (report states of affairs); and b) these performative sentences achieve their corresponding actions because there are specific conventions linking the words to institutional procedures. Performatives are just rather special sorts of ceremony. And unlike constatives, which are assessed in terms of truth and falsity, performatives can only be assessed as felicitous or infelicitous, according to whether their felicity conditions are met or not.

- Task 133\*. Which of the four sentences in each group below is a performative? Give other examples of performative speech acts.

A 1) I bet you five pounds it'll rain tomorrow. 2) I am betting you five pounds it'll rain tomorrow. 3) I did bet you five pounds it would rain tomorrow.  
4) He bets you five pounds it'll rain tomorrow.

B 1) John and Sue married each other. 2) I now pronounce you husband and wife. 3) The rabbi married John and Sue. 4) The rabbi pronounced John and Sue husband and wife.

C 1) I baptize you. 2) Father Pagliari baptized my son. 3) I am baptizing you. 4) They baptized the new baby.

D 1) I wish you wouldn't leave. 2) He left music to study law. 3) I left my wallet home. 4) I order you not to leave.

E 1) She promised to come tomorrow. 2) Will you promise to write every week? 3) I promise I'll buy anything Jeff wants. 4) I don't promise that I will come.

### 10.3. SPEECH ACT THEORY

J.L. Austin began by distinguishing *performatives* from other utterances describing a state of affairs which can be true or false termed *constatives*. But going beyond that, he argued that any utterance can be considered as a speech act.

From the original distinction between constatives and performatives J.L. Austin [1972] came to the view that there is a whole family of speech acts of which constatives and the various performatives are each just particular members.

There are two reasons for this substantial change of opinion [Levinson, 1985: 235]. First, the class of performatives has been slowly extended to include implicit performatives, so that the utterance 'Go!', for example, may be variously performing the giving of advice, or an order, or doing entreating, or daring, according to

context. Second, constatives also may have a performative aspect.

For example, '*I warn you the bull will charge*' seems simultaneously to perform the action of warning, and to issue a prediction which can be assessed as true or false.

The dichotomy between performatives and constatives is thus rejected in favour of a general full-blown theory of speech acts.

Pragmatic theory of speech acts claims that all utterances, in addition to meaning whatever they mean, perform specific actions (or 'do things') through having specific forces, as J.L. Austin [1970: 251; Levinson, 1985: 236] was fond of saying:

- Locutionary force pertaining to the act of conveying semantic content in an utterance, considered as independent of the interaction between the speaker and the listener (out of context).
- Illocutionary force pertaining to a linguistic act performed by a speaker in producing an utterance, as suggesting, warning, promising, or requesting.

Illocutionary force is rightly considered a category of non-literal meaning. It characterizes the speaker's intention behind the utterance (what sort of thing the speaker intended to do in making the utterance) and belongs firmly in the realm of communicatively functional characteristics of the utterance.

Linguistic expressions may have two or more different illocutionary forces. Thus, for instance, *Mr. Brown is here* may be used to express a statement, a greeting or a warning.

Utterances like *I warn you*, in which the locutionary force is equivalent to illocutionary force (here the utterance is itself an act of warning) are called *performatives* and the verb *warn* is a *performative verb*. The most transparent way to signal an illocutionary force is to use a performative verb. These are verbs like *order, promise, accuse, pledge, urge, baptize* and so on [Downes, 1998: 379].

• Perlocutionary effect of a speech act entails achievement of the communicative intention of the speaker in recipients, producing an effect upon the listener, as in persuading, frightening, amusing, or causing the listener to act.

For instance, the utterance of '*You can't do that*' may have the illocutionary force of protesting, but the perlocutionary effects of checking the addressee's action, or bringing him to his senses, or simply annoying him [Levinson, 1985: 237].

Thus, J.L. Austin [1970: 251-252] isolates three basic senses in which in saying something one is doing something, and hence three kinds of acts that are simultaneously performed:

- **Locutionary act** characterized by locutionary force is the utterance of a sentence with determinate sense and reference (act of uttering the words).

- **Illlocutionary act** characterized by illocutionary force is the making of a statement, offer, promise, accusation, etc. in uttering the words, by virtue of the conventional force associated with it.

- **Perlocutionary act** is the bringing about of effects on the audience by means of uttering the words, such effects being special to the circumstances of utterance.

The main distinction of illocutionary act from other semantic characteristics is that it meets a certain convention or social agreement between the members of one speech group. The illocutionary act is what is directly achieved by the conventional force associated with the issuance of a certain kind of utterance in accord with a conventional procedure, and is consequently determinate. In contrast, a perlocutionary act is specific to the circumstances of issuance, and is therefore not conventionally achieved just by uttering that particular utterance, and includes all those effects, intended or unintended, often undeterminate, that some particular utterance in a particular situation may cause [Levinson, 1985: 237].

It is of course the second kind, the illocutionary act, that is the focus of pragmatics, and indeed the term *speech act* has come to refer exclusively to that kind of act that may be performed by a speaker in making an utterance, as asking, advising, warning, considered in terms of the content of the message, the intention of the speaker, and the effect on the listener [Finegan, 1999: 299].

Much of speech act theory has been concerned with classifying speech acts and defining felicity conditions for different types of speech acts [Searle, 1969, 1976, 1979; Hare, 1970; Schiffer, 1972; Sadock, 1974; Stalnaker, 1978; Bach, Harnish, 1979; Hancher, 1979; Gazdar, 1981].

J.R. Searle [1976: 4-24], for instance, proposes that there are just five basic kinds of action that one can perform in speaking, by means of the following five **types of speech acts**:

- **representatives (assertives)**, in which the speaker believes that the proposition expressed represents an actual state of affairs and has grounds for so doing (explanation, classification, characterization, description, assertion, statement);

- **directives**, in which the speaker attempts to get the hearer to carry out an action (request, question, order, advice, instruction);

- **commissives**, which commit the speaker to some future

course of action (promise, vow, pledge, guarantee, threat, offer);

- **expressives**, in which the speaker expresses some psychological state, feelings or attitudes, about a given state of affairs (praise, apology, compliment, complaint, thanks, welcoming, congratulating, greeting, well-wishing, pity, sorrow, anger, entreaty, sympathy, reproach);

- **declaratives**, which effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions (excommunicating, declaring war, christening, firing from employment, will, renunciation).

There are now available a great many other rival classificatory schemes.

Sentence types do not unambiguously signal illocutionary forces. Any of the illocutionary forces can be conveyed by any of the sentence types. Conversely, any one of the sentence types can convey many and various illocutionary forces. To demonstrate this, William Downes [1998: 381-382] considers the directive class, the case of getting someone to do something. The imperative is only one rather specialized way of performing this act. It is clear that all the sentence types are used: declaratives (*I order you to eat*), imperatives (*Eat your lunch!*) and interrogatives (*Are the letters typed yet? [type the letters]* *When are you coming home?* *[come home]*).

Taking this into account, another distinction has been made between **direct** and **indirect speech acts** [Searle, 1975; Downes, 1998: 381; Finegan, 1999: 300].

Because of its form a sentence literally conveys the illocutionary force conventionally associated with its sentence type: declarative = assertive force, interrogative = question force, imperative = directive force, exclamative = exclamative force (surprise at truth of proposition). If the language structure coincides with the communicative intention of the speaker, it is the **direct speech act**. The speech act is **indirect** in case the illocutionary act is represented in quite a different form.

Indirect speech acts, which are built by means of transposition of utterances into unusual sphere of usage, are very frequent.

A: *You do not mention a country house.*

B: *I forgot it, but I've got one.*

In this example there is the transposition of constative into directive illocutionary force. The speaker actually means: *Have you got a country house?*

- **Task 134\*.** Comment on the locutionary force, illocutionary force and perlocutionary effect of the utterance 'Shoot her!'.
- **Task 135\*.** It is widely observed that interrogative sentences may express in different situations a whole variety of illocutionary forces: disbelief, surprise, uncertainty, doubt, supposition, disagreement, refusal, dissatisfaction, annoyance, disapproval, agreement, consent, offer, suggestion, invitation, request, command, threat, greeting, etc. Comment on the pragmatic variation of the following interrogative sentences.


1) Any more bright ideas? 2) Anything else you'd like? 3) Aren't you smart? 4) Are you mad? 5) Can a duck swim? 6) Can I carry your bag upstairs? 7) Can it be true? 8) Have my wishes anything to do with it? 9) Haven't you any eyes in your head? 10) How about a game of cards? 11) How are you? 12) How do I know? 13) I suppose you don't want to go? 14) Look at the children, won't you? 15) Shall I get you a chair? 16) Shall we listen to music? 17) Want to make something of it? 18) What are you doing tonight? 19) What can I say? 20) What do you think you're doing? 21) What the hell do you think you are? 22) What! Are you here? 23) What's all this? 24) What's your poison? 25) Why don't you call on me tomorrow? 26) Will you be quiet! 27) Would he please go down into the garden? 28) Would you like to come with me?

- **Task 136\*.** Imperative sentences may also express various pragmatic meanings: command, request, advice, warning, threat, gratitude, well-wishing, apology, reproach, assurance, disagreement, refusal, invitation, surprise, dissatisfaction, annoyance, etc. Comment on the pragmatic meanings realized in the following sentences.

1) Act/be your age! 2) Be careful of your clothes. 3) Behave yourself! 4) Be my guest. 5) Believe me. 6) Do that, and I'll tell your mother. 7) Don't be a fool. 8) Don't be crazy. 9) Don't forget your wallet. 10) Don't just stand there! Do something! 11) Don't make me laugh. 12) Don't mention it. 13) Don't you dare tell lies. 14) Enjoy yourself! 15) Follow me. 16) Get out! 17) Grow up! 18) Have a nice time. 19) Imagine that! 20) Just you wait! 21) Let's not waste time. 22) Look out! 23) Look who's here. 24) Mark my words. 25) Make yourself at home. 26) Never mind. 27) Please hurry up. 28) Pardon my French. 29) Sleep well. 30) Suit yourself. 31) Take my word for it. 32) Watch it. 33) Watch your step.

- **Task 137.** The kinds of sentences that are employed to issue requests in English are very varied. For example, an indefinitely

long list of sentences could be constructed expressing ways of requesting an addressee to shut the door [Levinson, 1985: 204].



- 1) I want you to close the door.
- 2) Please shut the door.
- 3) You please shut the door.
- 4) I ask you to please shut the door.
- 5) I want you to please close the door.
- 6) Close the door, if you can.
- 7) I'd be much obliged if you'd close the door.
- 8) Can you please close the door?
- 9) Can you close the door?
- 10) Are you able by any chance to close the door?
- 11) Would you close the door?
- 12) Would you please close the door?
- 13) Won't you close the door?
- 14) Will you please close the door?
- 15) Would you be willing to close the door?
- 16) Would you mind closing the door?
- 17) You ought to close the door.
- 18) It might help to close the door.
- 19) Hadn't you better close the door?
- 20) May I ask you to close the door?
- 21) Would you mind awfully if I was to ask you to close the door?
- 22) I am sorry to have to tell you to please close the door.
- 23) Do us a favour with the door, love.
- 24) Did you forget the door?
- 25) How about a bit less breeze?
- 26) Now Johnny, what do big people do when they come in?
- 27) Okay, Johnny, what am I going to say next?

Try to think of a similar list of ways of requesting an addressee a) to do the washing up; b) to lift that suitcase down; c) to lend you some cash. Think of appropriate situational contexts for these sentences.

#### 10.4. APPLICATION OF PERFORMATIVE ANALYSIS IN PRAGMATIC SYNTAX

A sentence is a means of realizing different speech acts which correspond to different communicative intentions of the speaker. The study of sentences in the perspective of their speech act characteristics and the correlation of their pragmatic and structure-semantic features are the central problems of **pragmatic syntax**.

Pragmatic syntax makes a distinction between a sentence as a language unit and a sentence as a component of a speech act. The former preserves the term *sentence*, the latter is termed *utterance*.

The **distinction between sentence and utterance** is of fundamental importance to both semantics and pragmatics. The sentence is the highest structure and the main communicative language unit given by its semantic and structural sentence type. It is actualized in speech by the utterance which appears as actual sentence [Morokhovska, 1993: 409].

The utterance is defined as the issuance of a sentence, a sentence-analogue, or sentence-fragment, in an actual context [Levinson, 1985: 236].

The sentence may be properly described without going out of the language as a system limits, while the utterance would need the survey of the relations and interconnections existing between the utterance and other components of the speech act, primarily the addresser and addressee [Иванова et al., 1981: 268].

Analyzing pragmatic types of utterances by utilizing the basic notions of pragmatic speech act theory, researchers [Иванова et al., 1981: 272-278; Morokhovska, 1993: 417-435; Finegan, 1999: 300] make a distinction between:

**a) Representatives:**

- **actional utterances**, which characterize the subject as an active agent of the action (in active constructions) or as a patient who/ which is acted upon (in passive constructions): *He arrived early at the theatre. When they had penetrated into the castle they were received courteously by an old servant.*

- **performative utterances**, used to denote an act which can be carried out by speaking only in the process of communication (the action is not so much nominated and denoted by the verb in the statement as performed by the speaker with the help of the statement): *I promise to come soon. I announce the meeting open. I order a cup of tea. I warn you that your friend will not stand for you.*

- **constative utterances**, presenting the subject of speaker's thoughts or stating his attitude and estimation of what he speaks of: *The Earth is round. That's a beautiful park. This at last was love!*

- **characterizing utterances**, in which the functional design of the predicate is to characterize the subject either qualitatively or quantitatively; accordingly characterizing utterances fall into **qualifying** and **quantifying**: *You are old and wrinkled and ugly. He was four feet long and God knows how heavy.*

- **equational utterances**, with the equational relationship between the subject and the predicate fall into **classifying** and **identifying**: *She is a doctor. They had decided that Phillis was the key to the problem.*

- **existential and existential-locative utterances**, indicating the reality/ existentiality and localization of the object or phenomenon spoken of: *This is the police station. Here is your money. In the middle of the lake there was what appeared to be an island.*

**b) Directives:**

- **directive utterances**, which compell a hearer to an action are subdivided into **injunctive** and **requestive**: *I order you to leave the room. Get out! Please, leave me alone.*

- **quesitive utterances**, compelling a hearer to speaking:

*Haven't you any overcoats, you boys? Aren't you young to smoke?*

**c) Commissives:**

• **promissive utterances**, in which the speaker guarantees that what he or she promises will be true: *I'll come some time. I'll write regularly, once a month.*

• **menace utterances**, in which the speaker menaces the event the realization of which doesn't depend upon him or her: *You've hurt me in my insides and I'll hurt you back. I'll report you if you do that.*

**d) Expressives:**

• **expressive utterances**, expressing the psychological state of the speaker, showing the attitude toward the events that are connected either with the speaker or with the addressee: *Hallo, George! My God! Terrible moment! Our daughter, our only daughter! Jimmy, too late, too late! Oh, heavens! Oh, what happiness! I congratulate you. I am very sorry, but I don't know her.*

In some functional classifications expressive utterances are not represented as a separate type. In these classifications the utterances of this kind are termed *constative* [Morokhovska, 1993: 433-435] or *performative* [Иванова et al, 1981: 271].

The study of pragmatic types of utterances is of great importance. To know language means not only to make up sentences according to grammar rules, but to use them correctly in speech and achieve the necessary communicative-functional effect.

- Task 138\***. Classify the following sentences according to their pragmatic types. Be ready to discuss your functional classification.

1) Answer it, answer it! 2) Best wishes for your holiday. 3) Come in here both of you. I want to speak to you. 4) Congratulations on your engagement. 5) Don't you dare tell lies. 6) Don't talk like that! 7) Get out of here, get out of here before I call the police! 8) Give us five dollars, Miss. 9) Good luck! 10) He is getting a little old. 11) Have a good time at the theatre. 12) He paused. 13) He was a department manager. 14) Here is your overcoat. 15) His eyes grew strangely bright. 16) I asked an obvious question. 17) I beg your pardon. 18) I promise it won't hurt. 19) I warn you it's going to be foggy. 20) I'll let you know tomorrow. 21) If you are not careful, than pan will catch fire. 22) I'm very sorry but I don't know her. 23) Oh, Clark, I love you, and I love Joe here, and Ben Arrot, and you-all. 24) He is sorry to have missed the show. 25) Stop eating those sweets, or I'll take them away. 26) She sat very silent again. 27) She thought, he is a very clean man, very neat and spruce. 28) The accommodation was satisfactory. 29) The audience laughed at his joke. 30) Thank you. 31) There were broad red steps that came into view. 32) This at last was true love! 33) To me, it's amazing that so many passengers were

unhurt. 34) Well done! 35) Yes, they did that! 36) You won't lose money, I promise you.

### **10.5. CONTRIBUTIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF PERFORMATIVE ANALYSIS: BEYOND THEORIES OF SPEECH ACTS**

The studies of various sorts of pragmatic meanings of utterances in a way pertinent to pragmatic theories of speech acts reveal important aspects of speech communication, the specific features of direct and indirect nomination, yield conclusions relevant to the problem of meaning and use.

There are, however, some compelling reasons to think that speech act theory may slowly be superseded by much more complex multi-faceted pragmatic approaches to the functions that utterances perform [Levinson, 1985: 278-282].

The first set of these reasons has to do with the internal difficulties that any speech act theory faces. Any theory of speech acts is basically concerned with mapping utterances into speech act categories. The problem then is that either this is done by fiat, or an attempt is made to predict accurately the functions of sentences in context. But if the latter is attempted, it soon becomes clear that the contextual sources that give rise to the assignment of function or purpose are of such complexity and of such interest in their own right that little will be left to the theory of speech acts.

There is extensive work that shows how the functions that utterances perform are in large part due to the place they occupy within specific conversational (or interactional) sequences. In this way, speech act theory is being currently undermined from the outside by the growth of disciplines concerned with the empirical study of natural language use.

Apart from the important work in **conversation analysis**, there are two major traditions that concern themselves with the details of actual language use. One is the **ethnography of communication**, which has been concerned with the cross-cultural study of language usage.

This approach was disseminated by Deil Hymes [1972: 35-72] who introduced a three-fold **classification of speech communication**:

- **speech situations**, such as ceremonies, sports events, bus

trips, evenings out, which are not only governed by rules of speaking but provide a wider context for speaking:

- **speech events**, such as conversations, lectures, political debates, interviews, negotiations, trials, press conferences which are purely communicative activities, i.e. governed by rules of speaking (in these activities speech plays a crucial role in the definition of what is going on and if we eliminate speech, the activity cannot take place);

- **speech acts**, such as order, greeting, summonses, compliments, which are the smallest units of the set; a speech act may involve more than one move from only one person, e.g. greetings usually involve a sequence of two moves.

D. Hymes' basic unit of analysis is the **speech event**, i.e. a culturally recognized social activity in which language plays a particularly important, and often rather specialized, role like teaching in the classroom, participating in a church service, political rally or debut, a public speech, a disk jockey 'Top 40 count down', etc.

D. Hymes [1972: 35-72] distinguished a **set of components of speech events**: 1) *situation* (physical, temporal psychological setting defining the speech event); 2) *participants* (e.g. speaker, addressee, audience); 3) *ends* (outcomes and goals); 4) *act sequence* (form and content); 5) *key* (manner or spirit of speaking, e.g. mock, serious, perfunctory, painstaking); 6) *instrumentalities* (channels, e.g. spoken, written and forms of speech, e.g. dialects, codes, varieties, registers); 7) *norms of interaction* (e.g. organization of turn-taking and norm of interpretation, conventionalized ways of drawing inferences); 8) *genres* (e.g. casual speech, commercial messages, poems, myths, proverbs).

A speech event, in contrast to speech act, is restricted to activities or aspects of activities that are directly governed by rules or norms for the use of speech [Downes, 1998: 304]. Some linguists make these rules and norms the principal problem of their investigation. For example, Emmanuel Schegloff [1979] has studied the speech event of phone calls while Ian Hutchby [1999] has studied the speech event of talk radio shows, etc.

Speech events need not involve speaking: personal letters, short stories, shopping lists, office memos, and birthday cards are also speech events [Finegan, 1999: 307].

Speech events constrain the use of language. Consider the following question asked towards the end of a job interview [Levinson, 1985: 279]:

Interviewer: *Would you like to tell us, Mr. Khan, why you have applied to Middleton College in particular?*

Such a leading question does not anticipate replies like '*There weren't any other jobs going*', but rather, by reference to interview conventions, fishes for compliments on the institution's behalf. Cross-cultural misunderstandings can result from not knowing such conventions.

Similarly, utterances that initiate certain kinds of proceedings achieve their effectiveness through assumptions about the nature of those proceedings: hence '*Well, we all seem to be here*' may serve to constitute the beginning of a committee meeting, of the sort that awaits the arrival of a full complement of personnel, while some scheduled activity, like a lecture, may be begun by reference to the appropriate schedule: '*It's five past twelve*' [Levinson, 1985: 280].

All these utterances seem to owe their decisive function in large part to the framework of expectations about the nature of the speech event to which they are contributions. Not only are expectations about the purpose and conduct of the proceedings relevant to this attribution of function, but also, it can be argued, knowledge of social roles. Thus, the utterance '*Can we move the fridge?*' said by one of a pair of students to their landlady may serve as a request for permission, but said by the landlady to the students may be a request for action [Levinson, 1985: 280].

Basing on such examples, some researchers deny that there is any small set of functions or speech acts that language may perform; rather, there are as many such acts as there are roles in the indefinite variety of speech events that humans can invent.

The interpretive corollary of the notion of speech event is the cognitive notion of inferential schema, or **frame**, now widely current in interactional sociolinguistics and cognitive linguistics [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 205].

A frame is a body of knowledge that is evoked in order to provide an inferential base for the understanding of an utterance. The frame of shopping, for instance, includes at least four cognitive categories, namely a *buyer*, a *seller*, *goods* and *money*. Linguists suggest that in the comprehension and the attribution of force or function to utterances, reference is made, as relevant, to the frames for teaching, shopping, participating in committee meetings, lecturing, and other speech events [Levinson, 1985: 281].

The second major empirical tradition that takes us well beyond speech acts narrowly conceived, is the **study of language**

acquisition. Despite much use of the terms speech act and

*performative*, recent work on language acquisition does not really support the importance of the concept of speech act at all; rather it emphasizes the essential roles that communicative intention, utterance function and the interactive context play in the acquisition of language. Thus, there is little reason to isolate out a level of illocutionary force that is distinct from all the other facets of an utterance's function, purpose or intent [Levinson, 1985: 282].

Secondly, the idea of the speech event and its associated interpretive frame seems very relevant: progress in language acquisition can be seen as the acquisition of additional speech events and interpretive frames, extending in a sequence well into adulthood [Griffiths, 1979; Keenan, 1979].

Thus, the study of language acquisition, while addressing the issues that lie at the heart of speech act theory, also takes us well beyond it. The theory of speech acts is likely to continue to play a role, though not necessarily a central one, in general theories of language usage, giving way to more empirical lines of investigation of the sort briefly outlined above.

- Task 139. Speech events are purely communicative activities, i.e. they are governed by rules and norms for the use of speech. Thus, most people would be surprised if a teacher cursed and swore in the classroom, or a customer when talking to close friends in a pub opened his mouth and sounded like an MP arguing for increased tax reductions for stock-owners. Likewise many eyebrows would be raised if a BBC reporter sounded like a football player entering the locker-room after a rough game on a rainy Saturday in November.

Give examples of some norms or rules for the use of speech which may have to be observed in the following speech events: a) teaching in the classroom; b) job interviews; c) everyday conversations; d) public speeches on serious occasions; e) personal letters; f) business correspondence; g) research projects.

## Unit 11

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### FRAME ANALYSIS

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#### **11.1. DEFINING COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS**

Frame analysis belongs to the domain of cognitive (i.e. related to mental processes of perception and reasoning) linguistics.

**Cognitive linguistics** is an approach to language that is based on our experience of the world and the way we perceive and conceptualize it [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: x].

Cognitive linguistics is today represented by three main approaches: the experiential view, the prominence view and the attentional view of language [Ungerer, Scmid, 1996: x-xiv].

The main claim of the **experiential view** is that instead of postulating logical rules and objective semantic features on the basis of theoretical considerations, a more practical and empirical path should be pursued. For example, one can ask language users to describe what is going on in their minds when they produce and understand words and sentences. As experiments have shown, people will not only state that a car has a box-like shape, that it has wheels, doors, and windows, that it is driven by an engine and equipped with a steering wheel, an accelerator and brakes, and that it has seats for the driver and the passengers. More likely than not, it will also be mentioned that a car is comfortable and fast, that it offers mobility, independence and perhaps social status. Some people may connect the notion of car with their first love affair, or with injury if they were once involved in an accident.

By adding these attributes, people include associations and impressions which are part of their experience. While the last two items ('first love affair', 'injury') point to a very personal, subjective experience, attributes like 'comfort', 'speed', 'mobility' and 'independence' seem to be part of our communal experience of cars. These attributes collected from laypersons seem to reflect the way we perceive the world around us and interact with it.

Cognitive linguists believe that our shared experience of the world is also stored in our everyday language and can thus be gleaned from the way we express our ideas. In order to open this mine, however, we have to examine figurative language, especially

 metaphors. Looking again at the example *Our car has broken down*,

it is evident that a car does not really break down just like a chair collapses so that its parts come apart. Nevertheless, the conceptual background of this expression is clear. Since most of us do not know an awful lot about cars and how they work, we use our knowledge of chairs or other equally familiar objects collapsing to understand what happens when the car's engine suddenly stops working.

This transfer of our experience of well-known objects and events is even more important where abstract categories like emotions are involved. Imagine that someone describes the car owner's reaction to the breakdown of his car with the words '*Dad exploded!*' In order to get a full grasp of this utterance and the notion of anger expressed, we will call up our knowledge of actual explosions of gas stoves, fireworks and even bombs.

Experiential view implies that metaphors are no longer regarded as ornamental figures of speech (as in traditional stylistics), but are understood as important cognitive tools for our conceptualization of abstract categories. This means that metaphors are not just a way of presenting ideas by means of language, but a way of thinking about things [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 118].

George Lakoff and Mark Johnson [1980: 7], for instance, argue that we do not just exploit the metaphor *+TIME is MONEY+* linguistically, but we actually think of, or conceptualize, the so-called 'target' category TIME via the 'source' category MONEY, i.e. a valuable commodity and limited resource, when we use the following English phrases: *You're wasting my time. Can you give me a few minutes? How do you spend your time? We are running out of time. Is that worth your while?*

The basic assumption behind the writing of cognitive authors is that although metaphor is a conceptual phenomenon, we have access to the metaphors that structure our way of thinking through the language we use. The category-structuring power of metaphors is not restricted to lexical categories (they are not only used to structure categories underlying certain abstract words), but can also contribute to our understanding of complex scientific, political and social issues. Cognitive linguistics also investigates these more general effects of conceptual metaphors.

As Richard Boyd [1993; Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 147] and others have shown, metaphors are omnipresent in science. This seems to be especially true of most metaphors used in computer science. Thus many user-friendly programs provide a surface screen

which establishes a metaphorical link with the category OFFICE. The screen is a desktop that can be tidied up, there are folders for filing items, a clipboard where items can be temporarily stored, windows that can be opened and closed, and a trash can into which superfluous items are dropped, it is only when we compare these simple but rich explanations of programming functions with the kind of non-metaphorical, often abbreviated commands employed in specialist programs (e.g. CLS for 'clear screen', MD for 'make directory' or RD for 'remove directory') that the pedagogic value of the metaphor +COMPUTER WORK IS OFFICE WORK+ becomes really obvious. In addition to metaphors based on the office context, computer programmers make use of animal and illness metaphors, e.g. COMPUTER MOUSE and COMPUTER VIRUS.

Another cognitive approach is concerned with the selection and arrangement of the information that is expressed. For example, consider the sentence *The car crashed into the tree* which might be a description of the circumstance's that led to the car's breakdown. This sentence seems to describe the situation in a fairly natural way. In comparison, other ways of relating the accident such as *The tree was hit by the car* seem somehow strange and unnatural. The reason is that the moving car is the most interesting and prominent aspect of the whole situation and, therefore we tend to begin the sentence with the noun phrase *the car*. The selection of clause subject is determined by the different degrees of prominence carried by the elements involved in a situation. This prominence is not just reflected in the selection of the subject as opposed to the object and the adverbials of a clause, but there are also many other applications of what may be called the **prominence view** of linguistic structures.

The prominence view provides one explanation of how the information in a clause is selected and arranged. An alternative approach is based on the assumption that what we actually express reflects which parts of an event attract our attention, and it can therefore be called the **attentional view**. Returning once more to the road accident, the sentence *The car crashed into the tree* selects only a small section of the event that we probably conjure up in our minds: how the car started to swerve, how it skidded across the road and rumbled onto the verge. Although all this happened before the car hit the tree, it is not mentioned because our attention is focused on the crucial point where the path of the car ended. Analyzing the sentence in terms of attention allocation, the attentional view explains why one stage of the event is expressed in the sentence and why

other stages are not. Taken together, prominence and attention

allocation seem to be no less relevant for syntactic analysis than the rule-based description of logical grammars.

- Task 140.** Ask your friends and family to characterize the categories provided below by attributes relating to their form, size, material, parts, functions, and the like associations and emotions they call up, e.g., DOG — *dogs have a tail they wag when they are happy, they like to be stroked, they all bark, all of them like to chase cats and postmen*, etc. Collect these attributes and try to distinguish between objective properties and subjective associations.

MAN, WOMAN, BOY, GIRL, BACHELOR, SPINSTER;  
 MANSION, PALACE, COTTAGE, CASTLE;  
 BICYCLE, MOTORBIKE, CAR, VAN, LORRY;  
 JEANS, TUXEDO, TAILCOAT, MINISKIRT;  
 DOG, CAT, OSTRICH, ELEPHANT, MOUSE, WHALE;  
 APPLE, PEACH, GRAPE, LEMON.

- Task 141.** Ask your friends for their personal attributes of the basic cognitive event categories LECTURE and EXAMINATION.
- Task 142\*.** Look at the following example illustrating the conception of metaphor [Lakoff, Turner 1989: 11].

The human life cycle is conventionally conceptualized as starting with *arriving* in the world, *going through life* and *leaving* or *departing* at the time of one's death. This means that we think of our life in terms of three journeys: when we are born we arrive from our first journey, our entire life is the second journey in the world, and when we die we set out on our last journey. The first and the last metaphorical journeys are reflected in language by expressions such as *the baby is on the way, the baby has arrived, we bring babies into the world, and he is still with us, they brought him back, he is gone, he has departed, he has passed away*. What we are really interested in, however, is the middle journey, our journey through life.

Give examples to illustrate that through the language we use, we show that we conceptualize LIFE in terms of a JOURNEY.

- Task 143.** According to N. Quinn [1987] the main metaphors with which Americans conceptualize MARRIAGE are:
  - 1) + MARRIAGE IS A MANUFACTURED PRODUCT+, e.g. *we want to work hard at making our marriage strong*; 2) + MARRIAGE IS AN ONGOING

JOURNEY+, e.g. *we went in common direction*; 3) + MARRIAGE IS A DURABLE BOND BETWEEN TWO PEOPLE+, e.g. *they are tied to each other*.

Find other linguistic expressions which reflect these metaphors.


## 11.2. WHAT FRAME ANALYSIS IS

The main descriptive devices of **frame analysis** are the notions of 'frame' and 'perspective'.

The notion of **frame** was introduced into linguistics by Charles Fillmore in the middle of the 1970s. We will look at Ch.Fillmore's classic example of the 'commercial event' frame.


To start with, Ch. Fillmore [1977b: 104] considers the aspects of the situation described by the English verb *buy*. In the initial state, a person A owns money and another person or institution D owns some goods that A wants to have. Taking for granted that the two participants come to an agreement on the price of the goods, person A gives a certain sum of money to D and D surrenders the goods. The final state is that A owns the goods and D owns the money. Leaving the agreement aside as some sort of prerequisite, one could then say that the action category **BUY** includes a reference to at least four other categories: a **BUYER**, a **SELLER**, **GOODS** and **MONEY**.

This configuration of interacting cognitive categories — **the frame of BUY** — is summarized below [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 207].



Frames are viewed as specific unified frameworks of knowledge, or coherent schematizations of experience [Fillmore, 1985: 223]; cognitive structures knowledge of which is presupposed for the concepts encoded by the words [Fillmore, Atkins, 1992: 75]; cognitive models which represent the knowledge and beliefs pertaining to specific and frequently recurring situations [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 211].

Basically, a frame is an assemblage of the knowledge we



have about a certain situation, e.g. buying and selling.





Postulating a frame for *buy* seems to offer at least two advantages [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 206-207]: a single frame can account for various clause patterns and it can be applied to different (though related) verbs like *sell*, *cost* or *charge*.

First, consider the following sentence which exemplifies a syntactic pattern in which *buy* may occur: *David bought an old shirt from John for ten pounds*. In this sentence all four components of the [BUY] frame are rendered linguistically, each in a different syntactic slot: the BUYER (*David*) as subject, the GOODS (*an old shirt*) as direct object, the SELLER (*John*) as the first adverbial and the MONEY (*ten pounds*) as the second adverbial. Friedrich Ungerer and Hans-Jörg Schmid [1996: 207] call this assignment of syntactic roles, which is of course to a large extent governed by the choice of the verb *buy*, the syntactic perspective of the sentence.

The perspective of the above example largely hinges upon the syntax of the verb *buy*. It is possible to put a different syntactic perspective on the same frame by using the verbs *sell*, *cost* and *charge*. For example, choosing the verb *sell* would allow us to put the categories SELLER and GOODS into perspective as subject and object, with the possibility of referring to the BUYER as an indirect object, as in *John sold an old shirt to David for ten pounds*. The verb *charge* perspectivizes the SELLER and BUYER as subject and object as in *John charged David ten pounds for an old shirt*, and the verb *pay* the BUYER and MONEY, with an option to introduce the SELLER as indirect object as in *David paid ten pounds to John for an old shirt*.

The [BUY] frame is not just a useful tool for the syntactic description of the verb *buy*, but it can also be applied to the verbs *sell*, *charge* and *pay*. In terms of the frame notion, the difference between the four verbs is simply a change of perspective within the same frame. This difference can be indicated by highlighting those components of the frame that make up the subject and object for each verb. This is illustrated below [Ungerer, Shcmid, 1996: 208].

The four diagrams show that the two verbs *buy* and *pay* describe the commercial event from the BUYER'S perspective, while *sell* and *charge* perspectivize the situation from the SELLER'S point of view. In addition to the choice of subjects and objects, the prepositions that are used in the adverbials are also included into analysis. This is a sign that the frame analysis also pays attention to the less prominent parts of sentences like adverbials.




Quite obviously, the notion of perspective relies on the principle of prominence (which indicates that different facets of an action can be highlighted by choosing certain linguistic structures), but it includes more than that.

The frame notion has a wider scope, because indirect objects and adverbials are also addressed. In other words, the principle of prominence applies to those elements in a sentence that attract the main part of our attention and are therefore prominent; the frame notion, however, also has something to say about linguistic items that attract only a small portion of our attention potential.

The wider scope of the frame approach shows up in the fact that the [COMMERCIAL EVENT] frame even captures cognitive categories whose prominence is so low that they are not expressed on the linguistic surface at all. Two verbs where this is the case are *spend* and *cost*, as used in examples *David spent ten pounds on an old shirt* and *The old shirt cost David ten pounds*.

Both verbs imply a SELLER who cannot be rendered

linguistically (and is therefore put in brackets). Instead the perspective directs the attention to the BUYER and the MONEY when *spend* is used, and to the GOODS when the verb *cost* is chosen [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 211].



Every sentence evokes a certain cognitive perspective on a situation by the choice of the verb and the particular syntactic pattern that it governs.

Accepting that perspective is a cognitive rather than a syntactic notion, F. Ungerer and H.J. Schmid [1996: 210] explain what lies behind it. The basis for perspective is mainly provided by the cognitive ability of **directing one's attention**. Among other things, the perspective from which we view a situation depends on what attracts our attention. Thus, we use the verb *buy* in order to describe a commercial event, when we want to direct the hearer's attention to the BUYER and the GOODS, and the verb *sell* when the focus of our attention is on the SELLER and the GOODS.

Depending on where we direct our attention, we can select and highlight different aspects of the frame, thus arriving at different linguistic expressions.

- Task 144.** Which of the following verbs fit Ch. Fillmore's commercial transaction frame and which perspective do they represent? Draw your own schematic representations. Does the frame have to be changed for some of these verbs?

*leave (to one's heir), inherit, auction off, pawn, distribute, receive*

### 11.3. APPLICATIONS OF FRAME ANALYSIS

Frames can provide valuable tools for the linguistic and conceptual analysis. Frame analysis has been successfully applied to research into semantic and grammatical (mainly syntactic) issues as well as some important problems in contrastive linguistics, translation studies, artificial intelligence and text comprehension studies.

Researchers working in the frame paradigm are interested in problems related to the **meaning of the verbs** that belong to a frame. Thus, the frame notion has already been used for detailed semantic analyses of a number of verbs (e.g. see Dirven et al. [1982] on *speak*, *talk*, *say* and *tell* and Fillmore and Atkins [1992] on *risk*) and this has developed into the project of a frame-based dictionary.

The frame approach presents a unified view of **syntactic patterns**. A sentence can be analyzed as an instance of the **event-frame (event-frame analysis)** [Talmy, 1991].

Leonhard Talmy [1991] dealt with conceptualization of various types of events and the language we use to talk about them.

For instance, six cognitive components are distinguished in the conceptual structure of a **motion event**, namely FIGURE, GROUND, PATH, MOTION, MANNER and CAUSE. All these components occupy typically specific positions in sentences, as shown in the following examples [Talmy, 1985: 61; Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 20].

FIGURE	MOTION MANNER	PATH	GROUND
<i>The pencil</i>	<i>rolled</i>	<i>off</i>	<i>the table.</i>
<i>The pencil</i>	<i>lay</i>	<i>on</i>	<i>the table.</i>

FIGURE	MOTION CAUSE	PATH	GROUND
<i>The pencil</i>	<i>blew</i>	<i>off</i>	<i>the table.</i>
<i>The pencil</i>	<i>stuck</i>	<i>on</i>	<i>the table</i>

As suggested in these examples, *the pencil* functions as FIGURE and *the table* as GROUND in all four sentences. The MOTION component is expressed in the verbs: *roll* and *blow* refer to a 'true' motion, *lie* and *stick* to the special case of zero-motion, i.e. locatedness. PATH is rendered by prepositions, with *off* denoting a real course through space and *on* denoting a stable location in space. Finally, the reference to the two components MANNER and

CAUSE is incorporated into the verbs. Here *roll* and *lie* indicate the cause of the movement which block and stick denote the cause.




The six components are not of equal importance. It is perfectly possible to conceptualize a motion event whose CAUSE is unknown. Similarly, and of course this is particularly frequent for locative events, the MANNER, in which an object moves often is not expressed. By contrast, it is impossible to think of a motion event without invoking each of the other four components, FIGURE, GROUND, PATH and MOTION. The outcome of these observations is that FIGURE, GROUND, PATH and MOTION are felt to belong together as the central and defining elements of the motion event.

L. Talmy extends this idea of an identifying core structure of an event to other event types and arrives at the definition of the notion of **event-frame**: a set of conceptual elements and relationships that are evoked together or co-evoke each other can be said to lie within or constitute an event-frame, while the elements that are conceived of as incidental whether evoked weakly or not at all — lie outside the event-frame [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 20].

On the basis of this definition, L. Talmy has identified the following five types of event-frames: motion event-frames, causation event-frames, cyclic event-frames, participant-interaction event-frames and interrelationship event-frames.

In sentences, L. Talmy observes a cognitive process of foregrounding certain portions of an event-frame which he calls **windowing of attention**. The reverse process, in which conceptual material which makes up part of an event frame is backgrounded, is labelled **gapping**.

For the foregrounded portions of a PATH, for instance, three positions along the path can be distinguished: **initial**, **medial** and **final windowing** [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 224].



How these three positional types of windows can be expressed on the linguistic surface is illustrated with the following sentences [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 225].

<i>The crate that was in the aircraft's cargo bay fell —</i>	
1. Single windows:	
a: initial windowing:	— <i>out of the airplane.</i>
b: medial windowing:	— <i>through the air.</i>
c: final windowing:	— <i>into the ocean.</i>
2. Combined windows:	
a+b: initial and medial windowing:	— <i>out of the airplane through the air.</i>
a+c: initial and final windowing:	— <i>out of the airplane into the ocean.</i>
b+c: medial and final windowing:	— <i>through the air into the ocean.</i>
a+b+c: maximal windowing over the whole PATH	— <i>out of the plane through the air into the ocean.</i>

These sentences demonstrate the linguistic means by which the windowing and gapping processes are achieved: quite simply, a speaker may foreground, or 'window for attention', certain portions of the PATH by explicitly using linguistic expressions that refer to them. Conversely, if a conceptual element that is part of the event-frame is not explicitly referred to, it is backgrounded by exclusion, or 'gapped'.

On the hearer's side one may assume that, given sufficient context, the gapped portions of an event-frame can always be reconstructed. This means that no matter how many portions of it are windowed for attention, the PATH is always conceptualized in its entirety. In terms of cognitive processing, the whole PATH is cognitively represented, but the foregrounded chunks of conceptual content are treated with the increased processing capabilities of the attentional system, and this leads to more elaborated and fine-grained cognitive representations [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 224].

Three types of PATHS that an object, in its function as FIGURE, may follow can be distinguished: **open paths**, **closed paths** and **fictive paths**. The *crate* example above belongs to the first type (open path), which is defined as a path whose beginning point and ending point are at different locations in space [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 225]. Schematically these paths can be imagined as one-way arrows from one point to another.

Closed paths are the same as open paths, except that they should be imagined as circular arrows. In other words, the starting and the end point of closed paths coincide at the same location in

Illustration of this type of path with windows in space. A diagram showing a vertical path with windows in different positions is given in the following example [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 226].

<i>I need the milk.</i> —	
1. Single windows:	
a: initial windowing:	— *Go.
b: medial windowing:	— Get it out of the refrigerator.
c: final windowing:	— Bring it here.
2. Combined windows:	
a+b: initial and medial windowing:	— Go get it out of the refrigerator.
a+c: initial and final windowing:	— Go bring it here.
b+c: medial and final windowing:	— Get it out of the refrigerator and bring it here.
a+b+c: maximal windowing over the whole PATH	— Go get it out of the refrigerator and bring it here.

In this example the figure is not explicitly mentioned. It is represented by the person at whom the imperatives (*Go* and *get*, etc.) are directed. This person probably starts out from the table, moves to the refrigerator and returns to the table, thus completing a circular path.

With the exception of single initial windowing, all positions and combinations of windows are possible in this example.

In the third type of paths in motion-events, fictive paths, locative relations that are normally understood as unchanged through time are conceptualized as involving an imaginary path [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 226].

As an example, consider a situation in which a friend asks you to lend him your bike. Imagine further that at the time of your friend's request you are in a building and the bike is locked up at a certain place in the street, so that you have to describe its precise location to your friend using a sentence like '*My bike is across the street from the bakery*'. The main locative relation in this sentence (*be across*) lends itself to an interpretation in terms of a fictive path. This can best be seen when we put ourselves in the position of the language recipient: having taken in the sentence, the hearer will respond by first directing his mind's eye to the reference point (*the bakery*) and then constructing a mental, or fictive, path *across the street*. It is at the end of this path where he or she will think the bike has been placed [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 227].

A linguistic illustration of the way in which the cognitive process of path-windowing is at work in this type of path is given in the following example [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 227].


<i>Where is your bike? —</i>	
1. Single windows:	
a: initial windowing:	— <i>It is across from the bakery.</i>
b: medial windowing:	— <i>It is across the street.</i>
c: final windowing:	— * <i>It is leaning against the lamppost across.</i>
2. Combined windows:	
a+b: initial and medial windowing:	— <i>It is across the street from the bakery.</i>
a+c: initial and final windowing:	— <i>It is leaning against the lamppost across from the bakery.</i>
b+c: medial and final windowing:	— <i>It is leaning against the lamppost across the street.</i>
a+b+c: maximal windowing over the whole PATH	— <i>It is leaning against the lamppost across the street from the bakery.</i>

One important point is that with fictive PATH windowing the order of the linguistic constituents does not necessarily follow the direction of the PATH: the final portion of the fictive PATH is rendered by the first adverbial, i.e. *against the lamppost*, and the initial portion of the PATH by the last adverbial (*from the bakery*).

Another type of windowing involves **causal-chain event-frames** [Talmy, 1976, 1991]. A cognitive analysis of the causative event shows that it consists of several subevents, each being linked to the next by a causal relation ('causal-chain event') [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 230].

#### The stages of causal event-frames

Stages of causal event-frames	John broke the window with a stone
1. Agent intends to act.	1. The agent makes up his mind that he is going to break the window.
2. Agent sets parts of his body or his whole body in motion and thereby initiates the causative event.	2. He bends his knees, moves his hand to the ground to grasp a stone, releases the stone from his hand thus propelling it forward.
3. Intermediate subevent(s) which are causally related to each other (optional).	3. The stone sails through the air.

4. Penultimate subevent =  <i>immediate cause of final result</i>	4. The stone forcefully makes contact with the window,
5. Final resulting subevent = <i>agent's intended goal.</i>	5. The window breaks.

Just as in the case of motion event-frames, the most interesting aspect of causal-chain event-frames is again their potential for the windowing of attention. Putting the sentence *John broke the window* in relation to the structure of the causal-chain event-frame we realize that stage 1 (the agent) and stage 5 (the final result) are windowed for attention, while the medial stages are gapped. That this kind of 'discontinuous' windowing over agent and result is the most natural way of describing a causal event is not surprising, because it answers the two most important questions 'what happened?' and 'who initiated the event?' [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 230-231].

Apart from the initiating agent and the final result, the penultimate event (stage 4) is certainly the most significant aspect in a causal-chain event-frame, because it refers to the immediate cause of the final result. The cognitive significance of stage 4 is reflected in the English language by the fact that one of the main agentive-causative constructions, the *by*-phrase, is reserved for the penultimate subevent. This clearly emerges from the following examples which list *by*-phrases expressing the various stages of a causal-chain event-frame: *I broke the window* — a) \**by grasping a stone with my hand*; b) \**by lifting a stone with my hand*; c) \**by swinging a stone with my arm*; d) \**by propelling a stone through the air*; e) \**by throwing a stone towards it*; f) ?*by throwing a stone at it*; g) *by hitting it with a stone*.

In this collection of examples only the last variant, the phrase *by hitting it with a stone*, is fully acceptable because only this variant represents the penultimate event. As is indicated by the question-mark, example (f) is also found acceptable by some speakers who seem to infer from the sentence that the stone actually hits the window. This means that in effect they treat the phrase as referring to the penultimate event.

Thus, frame-based analysis of sentences can be extended beyond 'traditional' position. In this view, the directing of attention is more or less restricted to the choice of subject and object as required by certain verbs. L. Talmy's notions of event-frames and windowing, however, widen the investigation towards the previously neglected adverbials and other less prominent parts of the clause structure. His

approach also takes account of so-called 'blocked complements', i.e. those aspects of event-frames which cannot be expressed on the linguistic surface (e.g. *The book cost ten pounds \*to John/ \*from Sue*). Talmy's approach thus provides a comprehensive cognitive view of how real-world situations are processed in our mind and are rendered linguistically [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 231].

Although elementary types of frames, for instance the 'motion event-frame', are presumably universal (i.e. shared by all human beings), they are expressed in different ways in different languages.


As illustrated by event-frame analysis [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 236], PATH is one of the central elements of the motion event. It is the PATH that ultimately establishes a relation between FIGURE, GROUND and MOTION, therefore it makes sense to think of PATH as the most important element in the frame and to claim that PATH performs a **framing function** for the motion event.

One way of expressing the framing function of PATH is through the verb, as in French *entrer* and Spanish *entrar*. In view of this, French and Spanish can be called **verb-framed languages** [Talmy, 1985, 1991]. Conversely, PATH can be rendered by a preposition, as in English *go into*, or by a verbal prefix, as in German *hineingehen*. To capture the common function of these last two elements they have been subsumed in one grammatical category, labelled **satellites**. Hence, English and German can be called **satellite-framed languages**.

L. Talmy [1985, 1991] has argued that probably all languages of the world can be categorized in terms of verb-framing and satellite-framing. The group of verb-framed languages includes all Romance languages, Semitic languages (e.g. Arabic and Hebrew), Japanese and many others. Satellite-framed languages besides English and German are all Indo-European languages (apart from the Romance languages), Finno-Ugric languages and Chinese.

The cross-linguistic differences in the expression of PATH which gave rise to the distinction between verb-framed and satellite-framed languages seem to coincide with the way the MANNER element is expressed. And indeed, when L. Talmy [1985, 1991] investigated a range of languages, this impression was confirmed. As a result, he integrates the contrastive findings on the expression of PATH and MANNER into one general picture. Figure below which provides such a unified view, is a slightly simplified version of a digram used by L. Talmy to summarize his results [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 238].

## English: satellite-framed



## Spanish: verb-framed

While the typological differences discovered by L. Talmy are interesting in themselves from a syntactic point of view, they also have far-reaching consequences for the **narrative style** typical of the two groups of languages. Researchers note some stylistic differences between English and Spanish focusing on the two major aspects that have emerged, namely that in verb-framed languages the **MANNER** of a motion event usually has to be added to a clause as a separate adverbial, and that in satellite-framed languages the **PATH** needs to be expressed in a preposition or similar element [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 238; Slobin, 1997].

Basically, a verb-framed language like Spanish often needs more linguistic material to express the **MANNER**, of a motion event than a satellite-framed language such as English. In order to supply the same quantity and specificity of information that is contained in English motion + manner verbs, Spanish speakers often need an elaborate paraphrase. Verbs like *bolt*, *dart*, *scamper*, *scurry*, *scuttle*, *scramble*, *slither*, *slide*, *sidle*, *slink* represent just the tip of the iceberg, and all of them are virtually 'unrenderable' in Spanish. When it comes to translating, Spanish translators are thus confronted with the problem of how to cope with this difference.

By applying event-frame analysis to the comparison between different languages and between different narrative texts researchers make some interesting observations. Apparently, a satellite-framed language such as English is better suited for descriptions of **MANNER**, and elaborate **PATH** descriptions including dynamic descriptions of locations along the **PATH**. The reasons are that in satellite-framed languages **MANNER** is often incorporated in the verb meaning, and the

information on the PATH and setting can be expressed in the same clause as the motion event by opening attentional windows. Since Spanish is a verb-framed language, descriptions of motion events tend to be restricted to the motion itself. Often the description of MANNER is only possible at the cost of extended and rather awkward constructions. Similarly, if details of the PATH and the setting are to be given, they are expressed in additional clauses. As this will sometimes slow down the pace of narratives considerably, Spanish speakers may opt for fewer MANNER and PATH details in favour of a more vivid MOTION description [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 245-246].

Linguistics is not the only discipline where frame analysis has been applied with quite impressive results. Another important field of research has been **artificial intelligence** that studies the ability of computers to behave like human beings. Here, the frame notion has been used in a more general, though also more technical, way than in linguistics. In this use of the term, the relevance of frames extends over the boundaries of single sentences to much larger linguistic and cognitive units [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 211].

As an attempt to equip computers with the necessary world knowledge, the notion of frame was introduced into artificial intelligence. The computer scientist Marvin Minsky [1975: 212] defined a **frame** as 'a data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation'. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary.

The idea is that a cognitive category PLANE, for example, would activate a whole bundle of other categories which belong to the same [FLYING ON A PLANE] frame, for example PILOT, FLIGHT ATTENDANT, LIFE VEST, SAFETY BELT, FIRST CLASS, ECONOMY CLASS, SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS and so on. All these categories and the specific relations that exist between them are part of the frame and must somehow be fed into the computer. In addition to this rather general frame there are many so-called subframes which capture the knowledge of still more specific situations of a flight, e.g. [EATING], [WATCHING THE MOVIE] and [GOING TO THE TOILET]. In view of the complexity of many everyday situations, M. Minsky [1975: 227; Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 212] suggested that our knowledge should be represented in complex 'frame-systems'.

The [FLYING ON A PLANE] frame exhibits a very predictable temporal structure in which one stage is often a prerequisite for the next stage. If we view the flight from such a sequential perspective, we go beyond simple frames and move into the so-called **scripts**, i.e.

knowledge structures that are particularly designed for frequently

recurring event sequences [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 213-214].

The notion of script was introduced to account for knowledge structures that represent larger sequences of events connected by causal chains. The table below gives a rough summary of the [FLYING ON A PLANE] script [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 213].

### **The [FLYING ON A PLANE] script**

<b>1. Pre-flight stage</b>	go to airport → look for check-in counter → check in → go through customs (on international flights) → look for gate → wait for flight to be called
<b>2. The flight</b>	<b>Pre-take-off stage</b> board plane → look for seat → stow away hand luggage → sit down and buckle up safety belt → listen to safety instructions → take-off  <b>Flight stage</b> get drinks → get meal → talk to neighbour, sleep, read, watch movie etc. → go to toilet → buckle up safety belt → land  <b>Post-landing stage</b> unbuckle safety belt → get up → get hand luggage
<b>3. Post-flight stage</b>	get off the plane → get luggage → go through customs (on international flights) → get out of airport

The most famous script in the literature, the [RESTAURANT] script was developed by the computer scientist Roger Schank and the social psychologist Robert Abelson [Schank, Abelson, 1977: 42]. On a general level the [RESTAURANT] script can be divided into four scenes, namely entering, ordering, eating and exiting.

The entering scene: the customer enters the restaurant, looks for a table, decides where to sit, walks to the table and sits down on a chair. Each of these actions is a prerequisite for the next to be performed, and the whole scene taken together is necessary for the ensuing scene in which the meal is ordered.

When the ordering scene begins, three states of affairs are possible: there may be a menu on the table, the waiter may bring the menu or the customer may ask the waiter to bring the menu. Depending on which of these three states applies, the script runs along three different paths, which should however all end with the customer having the menu. Once the customer has the menu in hand, the next step is the choice of food, which is communicated to the waiter, who walks into the kitchen and informs the cook of the

order. After that, again two paths are possible: the cook may prepare the food and in so doing create the precondition for the eating scene. Alternatively, the cook may signal the waiter that the desired food is not available. When this happens, there are again two alternative continuations of the script. Either the customer makes another choice of food or the customer decides to leave the restaurant. In the second case the script jumps to the exiting scene or, more specifically, to the variant of the exiting scene in which the customer leaves the restaurant without paying.

The eating and the exiting scene can also be represented in the script format in a similar way [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 215-216].

F. Ungerer and H.J. Schmid [1996: 216] point out that the contents of the [RESTAURANT] script may seem fairly banal, the whole business of writing scripts ultimately coming down to translating things that we all know into a special format. Although it is true that we are all familiar with the information stored in scripts, such a view misses the point; it disregards the fact that when we produce or listen to language we unconsciously fill in an incredible amount of information taken from frames and scripts. And what is more, without supplying this information we would certainly not be able to understand even the most simple pieces of discourse.

To show that this is true, F. Ungerer and H.J. Schmid [1996: 216] consider two stories, taken in adapted versions from R. Schank and R. Abelson [1977: 38]:

1. *John went into a restaurant. He asked the waitress for coq au vin. He paid the bill and left.*
2. *John went into a restaurant. He saw a waitress. He got up and went home.*


Although the two stories roughly give the same amount of information, the first is perfectly understandable, while the second does not seem to make sense. The reason for this discrepancy is that the first story fits our internalized script of a meal in a restaurant, and therefore we have no difficulty in filling in the missing parts, e.g. that John presumably looks at the menu before he orders and that he eats his meal before he pays and leaves. Indeed the script may be so powerful that when we form a mental representation of the story we do not even notice that the important eating scene is not expressed linguistically. The potential of scripts, and incidentally also frames to ensure that the right inferences are made is especially important in face-to-face conversation. Here speakers often rely very much on the

Speaker's knowledge of a script when they leave out details or whole

stages in their description of an event.

In contrast to the first story, the second does not correspond to the script expectations called up by the initial sentence. When they are processed, the three sentences merely describe a collection of situations which do not combine to build a coherent whole. This means that unless links are provided by a script, the events cannot be brought into a meaningful causal chain.

- Task 145.** R. Dirven et al. [1982] use the notions of frame and perspective to describe the difference between *say*, *tell* and *talk*. Study the representation for the verb *say* below and complete similar diagrams for *tell* and *talk* [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 217].



- Task 146.** Analyze the following sentences as instances of motion event-frames [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 232].

1) We flew from Strasbourg to London. 2) Sir Edmund Hillary climbed to the top of Mount Everest in 1953. 3) The train goes from Brussels through the Channel to London. 4) The Northern Line will take you from Edgware via Charing Cross to Wimbledon.

- Task 147\*.** Decide which of the following sentences represent closed and which open paths and describe these paths [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 232].

1) We are moving to London. 2) Could you empty the waste paper basket, please? 3) I'll go and get the newspaper from the newsagent's. 4) Shall I fetch the dictionary from the study? 5) The bus to the City Hall goes via Regency Terrace. 6) They arrived from New York last night.

- Task 148\***. Which positional windows are 'opened' in the following sentences [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 232].

1) The apple fell from the tree to the ground. 2) The space shuttle was launched from the space centre at Cape Canaveral. 3) The parachutists glided from the aeroplane through the clouds to the landing-place on the airfield. 4) Amundsen went across the Antarctic to the South pole.

- Task 149.** The following examples can all be understood as being based on fictive paths. In each case, give a description which follows the course of the fictive path and contrast it with the arrangement of the elements in the sentence [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 232-233].

1) You'll find the matches on the cupboard in the corner behind the kitchen door. 2) The book on Chinese porcelain is on the third shelf from the top in the white bookcase. 3) (Are you looking for your car keys?) I think they're among the groceries on the back seat of the car. 4) I think I parked the car on the third level somewhere to the right of the entrance. 5) I remember the disco is on the right-hand side just after the second traffic lights down Market Street.

- Task 150\***. Analyze the situation of a hunter shooting a rabbit with his gun as an instance of causal-chain event-frame and decide which of the following *by*-clauses are acceptable [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 233].

The rabbit was killed ... 1) by Peter's taking his gun along. 2) by Peter's raising his gun. 3) by Peter's aiming at the rabbit. 4) by Peter's pulling the trigger. 5) by Peter's shot. 6) by the bullet.

- Task 151.** Analyze the following English sentences and their French counterparts [Vinay, Darbelnet 1975: 106; Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 246] in terms of the motion event-frame.

1) She tiptoed down the stairs. — *Elle descendit l'escalier sur la pointe des pieds.* ('She descended the stairs on the tip of the feet') 2) He crawled to the other side of the road. — *Il gagna en rampant l'autre côté de la route.* ('He gained crawling the other side of the road')

- Task 152.** Look up the following English verb + satellite constructions in a bilingual Spanish or French dictionary and discuss how they are rendered: *hop in, squeeze into, creep in, tread in, pour in, flow in, break into*. In some cases it may be helpful to

countercheck the equivalents that are given [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 246].

- **Task 153.** Look at the following English-French examples [Vinay, Darbelnet 1975: 106; Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 246-247]. Discuss how many clauses are needed for the description of the event and how PATH and MANNER are expressed in the two languages.

Through the wide open window streamed the sun onto the yellow varnished walls and bare floor. — *Par la fenêtre grande ouverte, le soleil entrait à flot et inondait les murs vernissés en jaune et le parquet sans tapis.* ('Through the wide open window, the sun entered floating and inundated the walls varnished in yellow and the parquet without carpet')

- **Task 154.** Try to write the scripts [AT THE LESSON] and [IN THE CINEMA]. What are the obligatory elements of these scripts, which optional aspects (e.g. 'buy chocolates') can be integrated?
- **Task 155.** Here are two little stories which call up the [ORAL EXAM] script. Explain why the first seems to make sense whereas the second does not, although both give roughly the same amount of information [Ungerer, Scmid, 1996: 218]:

1. Before her oral exam Jane was very nervous. Nevertheless she managed to answer all questions. When the professor told her that she had passed, she jumped in the air.

2. Before her oral exam Jane was very nervous. Nevertheless she talked for some time to a professor. When she went home, she was very sad.

#### **11.4. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF FRAME ANALYSIS**

Frame analysis is viewed as a cognitive attempt to widen the scope of lexical and grammatical analysis.

Most of the issues addressed by frame analysis are not altogether new, but have a much earlier origin. Yet they have all benefited from being put on a cognitive basis and are now flourishing all the more. What frame analysis seems to offer is a promising new perspective on many of the essential questions that linguists and people interested in language have always been asking.

As confirmed by stylistic manuals [Vinay, Darbelnet 1975; Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 237-238], it is certainly quite possible to describe the cross-linguistic differences in the use of motion verbs in traditional terminology. However, these traditional accounts tend to neglect an important point: when we watch a moving object or person, the path of the movement and the manner in which it is performed are not separate aspects of the situation, but clearly related to each other, at least perceptually. This is why a unifying cognitive view, as is implied in L. Talm's event-frame analysis, promises a more convincing explanation.

Within frame analysis, the use of syntactic structures is largely seen as a reflection of how a situation is conceptualized by the speaker, and this conceptualization is governed by the attention principle. Salient participants, especially agents, are rendered as subjects and less salient participants as objects; verbs are selected which are compatible with the choice of subject and object, and evoke the perspective on the situation that is intended; locative, temporal and many other types of relations are highlighted or 'windowed for attention' by expressing them explicitly as adverbials.

What the words of a given language mean and how they can be used in combination depends on the perception and categorization of the real world around us. Since we constantly observe this world and play an active role in it, we know a great deal about the entities it consists of, and this experience and familiarity is reflected in the nature of language [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 278].

To a large extent, the explanatory power of the frame analysis lies in the fact that it captures only the more general elements of situations (e.g. of buying and selling). Thus the frame contains no information as to the people who participate in the commercial event, the kind of goods that are purchased and the particular sum of money that changes hands. Nevertheless, the information provided by the frame is still fairly specific.

In more general terms, frames are cognitive structures that are context- and culture-dependent. For example, the everyday practices of paying by credit card or by cheque would require an alteration of the original frame. In cultures where goods are traded for other goods rather than sold for money, the frame would not be valid at all. This means that textual and situational factors external to the frame have to be taken into account for a proper frame or event-frame analysis [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 236].

Ultimately, frame-system theories do not solve the 'frame

problem'. They do not tell us how we are constrained in ordinary conversation to assess *just the correct background knowledge*, nor how hypotheses might be formed on the basis of past experience [Downes, 1998: 366].

Nevertheless, there are continuous developments in cognitive science. Whatever the outcome of further research, the notion of frames is crucial for interpretative approaches to text [Downes, 1998: 366-367]

Many fascinating aspects of frames and event-frames have not been touched yet and it is a question of real linguistic importance to investigate these aspects.

- **Task 156.** Just like other types of cognitive models, frames and especially scripts are culture-dependent. To show this, discuss how your model of a child's birthday party differs from the following one, which is given by M. Minsky [1975: 243; Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 218]:

dress	Sunday best
present	must please host, must be bought and gift-wrapped
games	hide and seek, pin tail on donkey
decor	balloons, favours, crepe-paper
party meal	cake, ice-cream, soda, hot-dogs
cake	candles, blow-out, wish, sing birthday song
ice-cream	standard three flavour

## PART V

### METHODS OF TEXTUAL STUDY



#### Unit 12

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#### DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

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##### 12.1. DEFINING DISCOURSE AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

**Discourse** (from Latin *discursus* "argument", French – "speech") has been variously defined. The following definitions may be considered typical:

- Discourse is a succession of related sentences, as in a conversation or text [Pinker, 1994: 475].
- Discourse is language above the sentence or above the clause [Stubbs, 1983: 1].
- With the sentence we leave the domain of language as a system of signs and enter into another universe, that of language as an instrument of communication, whose expression is discourse [Benveniste, 1971: 110].

E. Benveniste was one of the first to impart the word *discourse* (which in French linguistic tradition meant speech in general, text) a terminological meaning, having designated with it speech assumed by a speaker (e.g. various genres of oral communication, letters, memoirs and others) [Poluzhyn, 2004: 144].

- Discourse is verbal communication; talk, conversation, a formal treatment of a subject in speech or writing, such as a sermon or dissertation, a unit of text used by linguists for the analysis of linguistic phenomena that range over more than one sentence [Poluzhyn, 2004: 145].
- The study of discourse is the study of any aspect of language use [Fasold, 1990: 65].

The analysis of discourse is necessarily the analysis of language in use.

language in use. As such, it cannot be restricted to the description of linguistic forms independent of the purposes or functions which these forms are designed to serve in human affairs [Brown, Yule, 1983: 1]

- Discourse is more than just language use: it is language use, whether speech or writing, seen as a type of social practice [Fairclough, 1992: 28].

- Discourse constitutes the social. Three dimensions of the social are distinguished — knowledge, social relations, and social identity. Discourse is shaped by relations of power and invested with ideologies [Fairclough, 1992: 3].

Discourse is a thoroughly linguistic and social and cognitive affair [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 9].

Consider the following simple instance, reconstructed from a real social event [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 9]. The person called 'Mother' is the mother of the 8-year-old child, called 'Rebecca'. The person called 'Mrs Thomson' is employed as a domestic cleaner by the family in which 'Mother' is the mother. Mrs Thomson's first-name is 'Margaret'. Mrs Thomson has just come in through the front door, having rung the doorbell first, and Mother speaks first, calling downstairs to her daughter:

[The front door bell rings.]

Mother: *Open the door, darling. Who is it?*

Rebecca: *It's only Maggie.*

Mother (looking sheepish): *Oh hello, Mrs Thomson.*

Mrs Thomson (smiles): *Hello.*

In this piece of situated social interaction there is a measure of discomfort, signalled by the interpretation of Mother's facial expression as 'sheepish'. A likely explanation is that Mother is embarrassed by her daughter, a child, referring to Mrs Thomson by an overly familiar expression — using her first name *Maggie*, all of that being witnessed by Mrs Thompson.

This inference seems to rely, in part, on there being a social consensus about how children usually do, or ought to, talk to adults. More particularly, some of the social sensitivity in the exchange hinges on the child using a first name not only in reference to an adult, but to an adult employed as a cleaner. There are particularly strong reverberations of social class and economic power behind this exchange, and they certainly make up an element of its 'meaning'. However, bringing these underlying political and economic assumptions to the surface is a social taboo, and it is Rebecca's

unwilling breaking of this taboo that probably also causes her mother's embarrassment.

In the other direction, there is an element of 'understanding' suggested in Mrs Thomson's smile, perhaps implying she appreciates that Rebecca is not fully able to judge the social conventions or rules for addressing adults. The smile may be an attempt to mitigate the discomfort Mother is feeling. On the other hand, Mrs Thompson's smile could also be an accommodating reaction to Rebecca's remark. For her to react in a different way and signal indignation would mean breaking another taboo. In any case, note how 'child' and 'cleaner', not to mention 'mother' and 'daughter', are linguistic labels for social categories with predictable social qualities and expectations attached to them. Note that our access to the meaning of the interaction depends on how we hang these labels on individuals, and on people's labelling of others. Note how we have to make inferences about people's intentions, and how those intentions are perceived and evaluated by others.

The general point is that, in social interaction, speakers are achieving meaning at many levels. They are exchanging information between them and negotiating particular relationships between them as individuals. But at the same time their talk is filling out and confirming wider patterns of social organization (social order), for example, in running through predictable patterns of greetings exchange which is considered a cultural convention, or a mini-ritual of social interaction.

Thus, at the most basic level, discourse is definable as language in use, but many definitions stress that discourse is beyond language in use. Discourse refers to language in use, as a process which is socially situated. Discourse is language use relative to social, political and cultural formations. It is language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order, and shaping individuals' interaction with society [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 3].

If discourse is the set of social practices which 'make meaning', then many of the texts produced in this process are **multimodal** [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 7], that is, they make use of more than one semiotic system (e.g. visual images and linguistic text in a school textbook). Linguistics is mainly concerned with discourse as spoken and written linguistic interaction, because this is where the preponderance of research has been done.

Texts often show **multiple voicing** or **heteroglossia** [Bakhtin, 1981, 1986] — they reflect and recycle different voices,

which may be realized through different modalities or a single

modality, and addressing one or many audiences.

For example, David Graddol's [1996; Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 8] study of a wine label illustrates how the label, consists of different sub-texts, realized in different visual fonts and layout. The sub-texts are a description of the type of wine and its qualities, a health warning, and a bar and numerical code. Many of them realize different voices — consumerist, legal, commercial. They address potentially different audiences — consumers, health promoters, retailers and for different reasons. We might think of these voices as fragments of different discourses — socially organized ways of thinking, talking and writing about wine and food, with value systems built into these familiar patterns of expression.

For Mikhail Bakhtin [1981, 1986], all discourse is multi-voiced, as all words and utterances echo other words and utterances derived from the historical, cultural and genetic heritage of the speaker and from the ways these words and utterances have been previously interpreted. In a broader sense then, 'voices' can be interpreted as discourses — positions, ideologies or stances that speakers and listeners take in particular instances of co-constructed interaction [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 7].

Despite important differences of emphasis, discourse is an inescapably important concept, for understanding society and human responses to it, as well as for understanding language itself. This is the key factor explaining why so many academic disciplines see discourse as the focus of their own investigations. Discourse falls within the interests not only of linguists (pragmalinguists in particular), literary critics, and communication scientists, but also of geographers, philosophers, anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists, social psychologists, and many others [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 3].

**The study of discourse is an interdisciplinary project.** Most disciplines, and certainly all of the human and social sciences, need to deal with the interrelations between discourse and concepts such as social structure, social relations, conflict, ideology, selfhood, postmodernity and social change.

The dominant traditions in linguistics until at least the 1970s were particularly narrow, focusing on providing good descriptions of the grammar and pronunciation of utterances at the level of the sentence. Considerations of meaning in general, and particularly of how language, meaning and society interrelate are still quite recent

concerns. Discourse analysis is therefore a relatively new area of importance to linguistics, which is moving beyond its earlier ambitions to describe sentences and to gain autonomy for itself as a scientific area of academic study [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 4].

Discourse analysis has gained importance through at least two different, concurrent developments — a shift in the general theorizing of knowledge and a broadening of perspective in linguistics [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 4]. Other general trends — growth in communications media, such as satellite and digital television and radio, desktop publishing, telecommunications (mobile telephone networks, video-conferencing), e-mail, internet-mediated sales and services, information provision and entertainment — have also promoted interest in discourse.

Several early approaches to discourse, such as the work of the Birmingham school linguists who developed analyses of classroom discourse [Sinclair, Coulthard, 1975], had mainly descriptive aims. They introduced an elaborate hierarchical framework for coding teachers' and pupils' discourse 'acts', 'moves' and 'transactions' in classroom talk. The intention was to provide an exhaustive structural model of discourse organisation, from the (highest) category, 'the lesson', down to the (lowest) category of individual speech acts.

A lot of scholars were concerned with discourse analysis, including W. Labov, D. Fanshel, M.M. Bakhtin, A. Bell, D. Edwards, N. Fairclough, J.J. Gumperz, S. Mills, D. Schiffrin and others.

One prominent instance is the work of **Teun van Dijk** who has been more responsible than any other person for integrating the field of discourse analysis [see, for example, van Dijk, 1977, 1984, 1988, 1991, 1992].

**Discourse analysis (DA)** is defined as the study of the rules or patterns characterizing units of connected speech or writing longer than a sentence; the study of the rules governing appropriate language use in communicative situations.

DA employs the following procedures: a) the isolation of a set of basic categories or units of discourse; b) the formulation of a set of concatenation rules stated over those categories, delimiting well-formed sequences of categories (coherent discourses) from ill-formed sequences (incoherent discourses) [Levinson, 1985: 286].

There is also a tendency to take one or a few texts (often constructed by the analyst) and to attempt to give an analysis in



'what is really going on') [Levinson, 1985: 286].

Discourse analysis is centrally concerned with giving an account of how coherence and sequential organization in discourse is produced and understood.

Discourse analysis is a methodology developed primarily for textual study [Downes, 1998: 392]. The focus of discourse analysis will usually be the study of particular texts (e.g., conversations, interviews, speeches, etc., or various written documents), although discourses are sometimes held to be abstract value systems which never surface directly as texts.

As this implies, the focus for a particular analysis can be either very local — analyzing a particular conversation between two people or a single diary entry — or very global and abstract — critical analysis of ideology and access to discourse networks.

In this latter tradition, the theoretical work of Michel Pecheux [1982] has been very influential. Pecheux introduces the link between discourse and ideology and develops a theory of how societies are organized through their ideological struggles, and how particular groups (e.g. social class groups or gender groups) will be either more or less privileged in their access to particular discourse networks.

- Task 157\***. Give examples of social conventions or rules for the following conversational interactions: a) introductions; b) greetings; c) taking leave.
  
- Task 158.** Find a car advertisement in any English newspaper or magazine. Study the advertisement and comment on different modalities and voices realized in it. Write a short report of your analysis.

A hypothetical car advertisement may embody a number of 'real' or 'implied' voices, addressing readers in a multitude of roles — as drivers, passengers, car experts, status-seekers, parents concerned over their children's safety, overseers of family budgets, etc. Some of these voices may be competing with each other or representing conflicting interests or ideologies (e.g., safety vs. speeding). The different voices to be heard (or seen) in this context can be realized via written language, e.g., a matter-of-fact commentary on the merits of the car, such as its safety, its comfort or its favourable price. They may appear through written/ visual signs, e.g., the company's logo or the advertisement's small print. Visual images will also be present, e.g., photographs representing selected features of the car's design

or its appearance and performance on the road, and so on [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 8-9].

## 12.2. CENTRAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH AREAS

**Discourse analysis is mainly concerned with the following issues:**

- structure of conversations, stories and various forms of written text;
- meaning-making and meaning-inferring generated through interaction; how people creatively interact in the task of making and inferring meaning;
- meaning and context in discourse;
- the subtleties of implied (hidden) meanings;
- cohesion and coherence; how one communicative act or text depends on previous acts or texts;
- text-to-text comparison tracing the influence of one sort of text or genre upon another (intertextual approach to discourse analysis);
- how various forms of discourse and their associated values and assumptions are incorporated into a particular text, why and with what effects (intertextual approach to discourse analysis);
- how language, in the form of speech interacts with non-linguistic (e.g. visual or spatial) communication;
- nonverbal means of communication, which accompany or replace speech or writing including the use of postures, gestures, facial expressions, and the like, e.g. body language;
- broader social characteristics of communication; a way of speaking or writing of different social institutions, e.g. political, religious, or academic discourse;
- ideological use of language associated with power relations and social discrimination, e.g. racist discourse, sexist discourse, linguistic and textual manipulation (critical discourse analysis);
- discourse as social and cultural practice; intercultural interaction (communication across cultures).

Telling stories is a human universal of discourse [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 29-32]. **Stories or narratives** are discursive accounts of factual or fictitious events which take, or have taken or will take place at a particular time. We construct narratives as structured representations of events in a particular temporal order.



Sometimes, the ordering of events is chronological (e.g. most fairy stories) although some plays, novels or news stories may move backwards and forwards in time, for particular reasons and effects.

Narratives can be verbal (spoken or written), musical, mimed or pictorial, e.g. in children's picture books. Sometimes a story can be narrated in a single visual image, a painting or a photograph, implying a temporal succession of events.

Narratives often combine different modalities and many voices in a single storytelling event. For example, recounting a family holiday may involve several family members presenting their versions of events, to which the participating audience may add questions and comments. It may involve showing souvenirs, photographs, a video, or even sampling foods brought home from the trip. This can turn the narrative into a multi-modal, multi-voiced text, including the gustatory (taste) and olfactory (smell) channels. Sometimes, different voices are introduced into a story by a single narrator, for example by introducing quotations as direct speech, perhaps marked by changes in pitch or body posture.


The functions of storytelling are quite varied. Some stories are primarily informative (e.g. news stories), others are used for self-presentation (e.g. during a medical examination), for entertainment (e.g. sex narratives), for strengthening in-group ties (e.g. gossip), in therapy or problem-solving (e.g. life-stories told in counselling sessions or in problem-sharing among friends), and so on.

Although narratives vary greatly in their form (including their length) and function, all verbal narratives share a basic structure [Labov, 1972; Bell, 1998].

William Labov's study of oral narratives was based on data he collected in New York City, in response to the interview question 'Were you ever in a situation where you were in a serious danger of being killed?' [Labov 1972]. W. Labov [Labov 1972: 363] formulated the following **structural features of narratives**, although it is clear that some narratives do not display all of these properties: 1) abstract (for example, '*My brother put a knife in my head*'); 2) orientation ('*This was just a few days after my father died*'); 3) complicating action ('*I twisted his arm up behind him ...*'); 4) evaluation ('*Ain't that a bitch?*'); 5) result or resolution ('*After all that I gave the dude the cigarette, after all that*'); 6) coda ('*And that was that*').

One element that is common to all narratives is of course the plotline, or what the story is about. Plot is most commonly associated with narratives found in various literary genres (e.g. novels, ballads,

fairy tales) and its structure has indeed been extensively studied within a sub-branch of discourse analysis which may be called literary stylistics. One example of how this type of work may be applied to the study of non-literary texts is given by T. Vestergaard and K. Schroeder [1985] in their study of the language of advertising. They distinguished the following six paired roles: *subject – object*, *helper – opponent*, *giver – receiver*. The relationships between those roles is presented diagrammatically below [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 31].



A realization of this model can be found in many fairy tales. Consider Michael Toolan's [1988: 93-94; cite Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 31] 'generic' summary:

The subject or hero, perhaps a young man of lowly origin, seeks marriage to a beautiful princess (object), in which case the man will also be beneficiary (possibly the princess and the country will too). In his quest he is helped generously but with limited success by a friend or relative (helper), but their combined efforts count for little in the struggle against some opponents (wicked uncle of the princess, some other eligible but ignoble suitor), until a sender (better, a superhelper), such as the king or God, or some individual with magical powers for good, intervenes.

Narratives are not at all objective or impartial ways of representing events. This is immediately clear with regard to narratives which are works of fiction (fairly tales, detective stories, etc.). But even 'factual' narratives are intimately tied to the narrator's point of view, and the events recounted in a narrative are his/ her reconstructions rather than some kind of objective mirror-image of reality. The first instance of the narrator's subjectivity is present in what s/he chooses to narrate, what s/he finds 'tellable' or 'reportable'. Furthermore, as E. Goffman [1974: 504; Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 32] explains, the meaning of the narrative is jointly constructed by the selectively filtering actions of both speaker and listener. A tale or anecdote, that is, a replaying, is not merely any reporting of a past event in the fullest sense; it is such a statement couched from the personal perspective of an actual or potential participant who is located so that some temporal, dramatic development of the reported event proceeds from that starting point. A replaying will therefore

incidentally be something that listeners can empathetically insert

themselves into, vicariously re-experiencing what took place. A replaying, in brief, recounts a personal experience, not merely reports on an event.

In sum, narrative analysis is an important tradition within discourse analysis. It deals with pervasive genre of communication through which we enact important aspects of our identities and relations with others. It is partly through narrative discourse that we comprehend the world and present our understanding of it to others [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 32].

The meaning of an event or of a single utterance is only partly accounted for by its formal features (that is, by the literal meaning of the words used). The **social significance of discourse** lies in the relationship between linguistic meanings and the wider context (i.e. the social, cultural, economic, demographic and other characteristics of the communicative event) in which interaction takes place [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 13].

As a form of social behaviour, language also negotiates relationships. Through ways of speaking, we signal and create the relative status of speakers and level of report. If you say, '*Sit down!*' you are signalling that you have higher status than the person you are addressing, that you are so close to each other that you can drop all pleasantries, or that you are angry. If you say '*I would be honoured if you would sit down*', you are signalling great respect or great sarcasm, depending on your tone of voice, the situation, and what you both know about how close you really are. If you say '*You must be so tired — why don't you sit down?*', you are communicating either closeness and concern or condescension. Each of these ways of saying the same thing — telling someone to sit down — can have a vastly different meaning.

As already explained, the study of how sentences are woven into a discourse and interpreted in context is called **pragmatics**. And, consequently, a functional, i.e. pragmatic, analysis of language lies at the heart of analyzing discourse. **Discourse analysis is based on pragmatic theory** [Downes, 1998: 393].

Discourse analysis is concerned with such mechanisms whereby speakers can mean more than, or something quite different from, what they actually say, by inventively exploiting communicative conventions. It accounts for hints, implicit purposes, assumptions, social attitudes that are effectively communicated by the use of

language. Analyzing discourse is often making inferences about inferences [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 13].

Language expressions often have an unstable context-specific pragmatic overlay, namely a set of implicatures.

**Conversational implicature (pragmatic implication)** is a special kind of communicated pragmatic inference, an aspect of the meaning of an utterance in a particular context and situation, inferred by hearer(s) but not explicitly said by the speaker, e.g. '*I'm slightly upset*' has the implicature '*I'm very upset*'.

Conversational implicature is a potential inference that can be drawn from an utterance, as from one that is seemingly illogical or irrelevant, by examining the degree to which it conforms to the canons of normal conversation and the way it functions pragmatically within the situation, as when '*The phone is ringing*', said in a situation where both speaker and listener can clearly hear the phone, can be taken as a suggestion to answer the phone.

Conversational implicature is one of the single most important ideas in pragmatics. It provides some explicit account of how it is possible to communicate more than what is actually 'said' (i.e. more than what is literally expressed). For example, consider the following exchange [Levinson, 1985: 97]:

A: (*to passer by*): *I've just run out of petrol.*

B: *Oh, there's a garage just around the corner.*

Here B's utterance may be taken to implicate that A may obtain petrol there.

The sentence '*That's a nice one*', delivered in a grocer's shop, and accompanied by a gesture at a lettuce, may count as a request to supply the selected vegetable, and an undertaking to purchase it in due course [Levinson, 1985: 280].

An expression with a single meaning can give rise to different implicatures on different occasions. Consider, for example, '*John's a machine*'. This could convey that John is cold, or efficient, or never stops working, or puffs and blows, or has little in the way of grey matter, or indeed any and all of these [Levinson, 1985: 97].

Obviously we can, given an utterance, often derive a number of inferences from it; but not all those inferences may have been intended to be recognized as having been intended. The kind of pragmatic inferences that are called implicatures are always of this special intended kind, and the theory of implicature sketches one way in which such inferences can be conveyed.

Such inferences can not be thought of as semantic (i.e.



pertaining to the meanings of words, phrases and sentences, solely from logical or semantic content). Implicatures are not semantic inferences, but rather inferences based on both the content of what has been said and some specific assumptions about the cooperativeness of participants in conversation.

The theory of conversational implicature was first promulgated by H.P. Grice [1968, 1975, 1981] and since refined and developed by many others.

H.P. Grice's theory of implicature assumes that conversation is a cooperative venture, and that speakers adhere to what he called the Co-operative Principle (CP). According to this principle, speakers try to send understandable communicative messages within the context of any particular conversation, and hearers assume that speakers are doing this. The CP involves both parties knowing, and using, four rules for conversation, which H.P. Grice [1975: 45] called maxims: 1) the maxim of Quality (be truthful, according to the evidence you have); 2) the maxim of Quantity (be informative, but not over-informative); 3) the maxim of Relevance (be relevant to the conversation); 4) the maxim of Manner (say things dearly, unambiguously, and briefly).

These rules or maxims devised by H.P. Grice explain how implicatures arise. In conversations, speakers very often don't follow one or more maxims. When they do this, hearer(s) assume this is for a communicative purpose, and make inferences accordingly. Thus specific effects are created for hearers, called implicatures.

A familiar example is the following kind of letter of recommendation [Pinker, 1994: 229]:

*Dear Professor Pinker:*

*I am very pleased to be able to recommend Irving Smith to you. Mr. Smith is a model student. He dresses well and is extremely punctual. I have known Mr. Smith for three years now, and in every way I have found him to be most cooperative. His wife is charming.*

*Sincerely,*

*John Jones  
Professor*

Though the letter contains nothing but positive factual statements, it guarantees that Mr. Smith will not get the position he is seeking. The letter contains no information relevant to the reader's needs, and thereby violates the maxim that speakers must be informative (the maxim of Quantity). The reader infers that the writer

has no relevant positive information to convey, what he actually says is 'stay away from Smith; he's dumb as a tree'.

Here is one more example of a Quantity violation [Channell, 1994: 34]:

[paper reporting informant work at a linguistics conference]

*We've got about five or six of them but I'm only going to talk about three of them today.*

Clearly, this linguist engaged in linguistic research must know how many informants he has, so hearers could assume that it was possible for him to adhere to the maxim of Quantity and give the exact figure. But he chose not to. Assuming that he was operating the CP, he must have intended something else. Our reading (as hearers in his audience) is 'this is not important, what counts is to focus you on the three people I am going to talk about'.

Maxims are often observed in the breach in convoluted departures from plain speaking found in every society that are called politeness. Taken literally, the statement '*I was wondering if you would be able to drive me to the airport*' ponders the addressee's competence to drive the speaker to the airport. Of course, the real intent — 'Drive me to the airport' — is easily inferred.

One of the most significant developments in discourse analysis was the formulation of **politeness theory** [Brown, Levinson, 1987]. Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson believe that the phenomenon of politenesses is responsible for how people, apparently universally, deviate from the maximally efficient modes of communication, as outlined by H.P. Grice. In other words, politeness is the reason why people do not always say what they mean.

Intentional violations of the Co-operative Principle are also the trigger for irony, humour, metaphor, sarcasm, put-downs, ripostes, rhetoric, persuasion and poetry [Pinker, 1994: 230]. Pragmatic theory of implicature deals with ironic, metaphoric and indirect implications of what we say and contributes to the study of classical tropes or figures of speech (metaphor, irony, rhetorical questions, understatement).

**Presupposition** is another kind of pragmatic inference that seems to be based more closely on the actual linguistic structure of sentences. Presuppositions are speaker's assumptions concerning what the addressee accepts without preliminary explanation. They are part of the cognitive (literal) meaning of expressions, even though they are not semantic inferences. Pragmatic presuppositions are

described as a relation between a speaker and the appropriateness

of a sentence in a context [Levinson, 1985: 107].

Consider the following examples: *I'm sorry I'm late, I'm afraid my car broke down.* < Presuppositional inference here is that the speaker has a car. *John stopped beating his wife.* < John had been beating his wife. *Martha regrets drinking John's home brew.* < Martha drank John's home brew. Many kinds of presupposition-trigger seem to be essentially syntactic or to have syntactic consequences, there seem to be intimate relations between syntactic processes and presuppositions [Levinson, 1985: 168].

The motivation for doing discourse analysis is very often a concern about social inequality and the perpetuation of power relationships, either between individuals or between social groups. Discourse analysis offers a means of **exposing or deconstructing the social practices** which constitute social structure. In this respect, it is a sort of forensic activity, with a libertarian political slant [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 6].

Teun van Dijk [1991, 1992] has studied **racist discourse** as an example of ideological use of language associated with social discrimination. He pointed out the sinister and twisted working of discursive processes which are involved in the legitimizing of racist ideology in face-to-face conversation (interview) and in newspaper articles. The practices are considered sinister and twisted because they depend on the overt denial of the underlying ideology. With the help of discourse analysis, T. van Dijk demonstrates how the socially unacceptable positions are overtly denied but covertly present in the speakers' or writers' accounts of race and ethnic relations.

Teun van Dijk [1992: 92] offers a taxonomy of denials of racism: 1) act-denial ('I did not do/say that at all'); 2) control-denial ('I did not do/say that on purpose', 'It was an accident'); 3) intention-denial ('I did not mean that', 'You got me wrong'); 4) goal-denial ('I did not do/say that, in order to ...').

Why do white people put so much effort into disguising their racism with such regularity? Racism is an ideology, which officially does not find social approval. Therefore, denying racism (despite one's beliefs, or one's 'lived' ideology) is an important aspect of positive self-presentation, whether it is a private individual, journalist, or MP (one part of T. van Dijk's article examines denials of racism in parliamentary debates). On the other hand, maintaining racist ideology is an expression and reinforcement of white, middle-class power over ethnic minorities.

Much of the research on power, ideology and control in discourse falls under the aegis of **critical discourse analysis (CDA)**, which has adopted the social constructionist view of language, rather than one of language as a 'mirror' of social relations. Thus, CDA examines the structure of spoken and written texts in search of politically and ideologically salient features, — which are constitutive of the (re)produced power relations without often being evident to participants [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 32-33].

Some of the linguistic features discussed in the critical linguistic framework include: nominalization, passivization, and sequencing as means of **linguistic and textual manipulation** [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 35]. They are used for ideological control as 'masking devices' as they allow speakers or writers to withhold the identity of the actors and causality of events. For example, nominalization: *Failure to display this notice will result in prosecution*, and passivization: *John was murdered* remove the element of agency and, consequently, responsibility (compare: *John was murdered by the police*). Exploitation of sequencing as in: *Fords I find particularly reliable* is a rhetorical device serving the purpose of manipulating the addressee's attention. The seemingly semantically equivalent sentences: *Employers always quarrel with unions*, and *Unions always quarrel with employers* give varying impressions of importance as to who quarrels the most.

Another area of discourse analysis in which power, dominance and control have been major agenda-setting issues is **language and gender (sexist discourse)**.

Women have been shown to be linguistically dominated by men, whose assertive and aggressive communication strategies are not mere cultural differences between the sexes but manifestations of male superiority, i.e. male dominance over females [Bem, Bem, 1974; Martyna, 1983; Smith, 1985; Fowler, 1991; Roberts et al., 1992; Caldas-Coulthard, 1993; McCracken, 1998].

Word choices and grammatical constructions that ignore or minimize the presence and contributions of one sex in society — at home or school or the workplace, in business or professional spheres, in social or personal relationships — may be considered sexist. Discourse analysts advise us to avoid such usages and reject language that calls attention to the sex of an individual when it is irrelevant to the situation under discussion [Miller, Swift, 1980].

Here are specific suggestions for avoiding sexist language, replacing one term with another to recast sentences



[Random House Webster's College Dictionary, 1990: 1564-1565]

1. Replacing *man* or *men*, or words or expressions containing either, when they are clearly intended to refer to a person of either sex or to include members of both sexes.

<u>Instead of</u>	<u>Consider using</u>
<i>man</i>	<i>human being, human, person, individual</i>
<i>mankind, man</i>	<i>human beings, humans, (collectively) humankind, humanity, people, human race, human species, society, men and women</i>
<i>man-made</i>	<i>synthetic, artificial</i>
<i>working man</i>	<i>worker, wage earner</i>
<i>man in the street</i>	<i>average person, ordinary person</i>

2. Using gender-neutral terms wherever possible to designate occupations, positions, roles, etc., rather than terms that specify sex. A full list of nonsexist job designations can be found in the *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* published by the U.S. Department of Labor.

a. Avoiding terms ending in *-man* or other gender-specific forms. One approach is to use words ending in *-person*. Some of these terms, like *salesperson* and *spokesperson*, have achieved wide acceptance; others, like *councilperson* and *weather person*, still sound awkward to many people. When discussing an individual whose sex is known, gender-specific terms such as *anchorwoman*, *businessman*, *saleswoman*, and *salesman* can be used, although in this situation, too, many people still prefer the neutral terms.

<u>Instead of</u>	<u>Consider using</u>
<i>anchorman</i>	<i>anchor</i>
<i>bellman, bellboy</i>	<i>bellhop</i>
<i>businessman</i>	<i>businessperson, business executive, manager, business owner, retailer, etc.</i>
<i>cameraman</i>	<i>camera operator, cinematographer</i>
<i>chairman</i>	<i>chair, chairperson</i>
<i>cleaning woman</i>	<i>housecleaner, office cleaner, cleaning housekeeper</i>
<i>clergyman</i>	<i>member of the clergy, cleric, minister, rabbi, priest, pastor, etc.</i>
<i>congressman</i>	<i>representative, member of Congress, legislator</i>
<i>fireman</i>	<i>firefighter</i>
<i>forefather</i>	<i>ancestor</i>
<i>housewife</i>	<i>homemaker</i>

<i>insurance man</i>	<i>insurance agent</i>
<i>layman</i>	<i>layperson, nonspecialist, nonprofessional</i>
<i>mailman</i>	<i>mail carrier, letter carrier</i>
<i>policeman</i>	<i>police officer, law enforcement officer</i>
<i>salesman</i>	<i>salesperson, sales representative</i>
<i>spokesman</i>	<i>spokesperson, representative</i>
<i>steward(ess)</i>	<i>flight attendant</i>
<i>weatherman</i>	<i>weather reporter, weathercaster, meteorologist</i>
<i>workman</i>	<i>worker</i>

b. Avoiding 'feminine' suffixes such as *-ess*, *-ette*, *-trix*.

Words with these suffixes are often regarded as implying triviality or inferiority on the part of the person or role involved, as well as making unnecessary reference to the person's sex.

<u>Instead of</u>	<u>Consider using</u>
<i>authoress</i>	<i>author</i>
<i>aviatrix</i>	<i>aviator</i>
<i>poetess</i>	<i>poet</i>
<i>proprietress</i>	<i>proprietor</i>
<i>sculptress</i>	<i>sculptor</i>
<i>suffragette</i>	<i>suffragist</i>
<i>usherette</i>	<i>usher</i>

A few such terms, like *actress*, *heiress*, and *hostess*, remain in active use, though many women prefer the terms *actor*, *heir*, and *host*. Several substitutions for both *waitress* and *waiter* — *waitperson*, *waitron*, and *server* — are gaining ground, but none has yet replaced the traditional designations. Legal terms like *executrix* and *testatrix* are still used, but with diminishing frequency.

c. Eliminating as modifiers the words *lady*, *female*, *girl*, *male*, and the like for terms that otherwise have no gender designation, as in *lady doctor*, *female lawyer*, *girl athlete*, or *male secretary*, unless they serve to clarify meaning.

3. Referring to members of both sexes by parallel terms, names, or titles.

<u>Instead of</u>	<u>Consider using</u>
<i>man and wife</i>	<i>husband and wife</i>
<i>men and girls</i>	<i>men and women, boys and girls</i>
<i>men and ladies</i>	<i>men and women, ladies and gentlemen</i>
<i>President Johnson and</i>	<i>President Johnson and Prime Minister</i>
<i>Mrs. Meir</i>	<i>Meir or Mr Jonson and Mrs Meir</i>

4. Avoiding the third person singular masculine pronoun when referring to an individual who could be of either sex, as in

**When a reporter covers a controversial story, he has a responsibility**

*to present both sides of the issue.* Rephrasing the sentence in any of the following ways will circumvent this situation:

a. Structuring the sentence in the plural and using the third person plural pronouns *they/ their/ theirs/ them*: *When reporters cover controversial stories, they have a responsibility ...*

b. Using either first or second person pronouns — *I/ me/ my/ mine, we/ us/ our/ ours, or you/ your/ yours* — that do not specify sex: *As a reporter covering a controversial story, I have a responsibility ...* or *As reporters covering controversial stories, we have a responsibility ...* or *When you are a reporter covering a controversial story, you have a responsibility ...*

c. Using the third person one: *As a reporter covering a controversial story, one has a responsibility ...*

d. Using both the masculine and feminine singular pronouns: *When a reporter covers a controversial story, he or she (or she or he) has a responsibility ...* The abbreviated forms *he/she, his/her, him/her* (and the reverse forms, with the feminine pronoun first) are also available, though they are not widely used in formal writing. The blend *s/he* is also used by some people.

e. Using the passive voice: *When controversial stories are covered, there is a responsibility to present both sides of the issue (or both sides of the issue should be presented).*

f. Rephrasing the sentence to avoid any pronoun: *When covering a controversial story, a reporter has a responsibility ...*

g. Using nouns, like *person, individual*, or a synonym appropriate to the context, instead of pronouns: *Reporters often cover controversial stories. In such cases the journalist has a responsibility ...*

h. Using a relative clause: *A reporter who covers a controversial story has a responsibility ...*

Different solutions will work better in different contexts.

5. Avoiding language that disparages, stereotypes, or patronizes either sex.

a. Avoiding reference to an adult female as *a girl*; to women collectively as *the distaff side* or *the fair sex*; to a wife as *the little woman*; to a female college student as *a coed*; to an unmarried woman as a *bachelor girl, spinster, or old maid*.

b. Being aware that such generalized phrases as *lawyers/doctors/farmers and their wives* or *a teacher and her students* or *a secretary and her boss* can be taken to exclude an entire sex from

even the possibility of occupying a role. It is possible to choose words or forms that specify neither sex or acknowledge both sexes, as in *lawyers and their spouses* (or *families or companions*); *a teacher and his or her students* (or *a teacher and students* or *teachers and their students*); *a secretary and his or her boss* (or *a secretary and boss*).

c. Avoiding terms like *womanly*, *manly*, *feminine*, or *masculine* in referring to traits stereotypically associated with one sex or the other. English abounds in adjectives that describe such qualities as strength or weakness, nurturing or determination or sensitivity, without intrinsic reference to maleness or femaleness.

Racist and sexist language are highly undesirable. It is worth pointing out, however, that in these cases language is a symptom, not a disease itself. Abolishing racist language will not necessarily abolish racist thinking. And encouraging non-sexist language will not itself lead to sexual equality, although discourse analysts agree that drawing attention to sexist language can be a useful thing to do. Drawing attention to the symptoms can make people more aware of the disease and more inclined to take steps to combat it [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 31].

Discourse analysts have an important auxiliary role to play here (i.e. secondary to the role of people directly affected) in providing analyses and, importantly, in providing educators with resources of what N. Fairclough [1995: 221] has called 'critical language awareness'. Critical discourse analysis in this view is a democratic resource to be made available through the education system. Critical discourse analysts need to see themselves as politically engaged, working alongside disenfranchised social groups [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 35].

- **Task 159.** Analyze one the narratives below (or any other available short story in English) in the light of the above description, paying particular attention to ordering of events, different modalities and voices realized in the narrative, its basic structural features, plotline and functions of story-telling. Then write a short report of your analysis and be ready to discuss it with your fellow-students.

### A Tragedy in the Air

The plane had taken off from the air-field in London, and the journey to South Africa, to Johannesburg to be exact, had started.

It was just after the war, and it was not a jet, as is the case nowadays, but a big plane with four engines, and four propellers, of course.

When a few minutes later we were crossing the Channel, one of the

~~engines went wrong but the stewardess (a smashing blonde) said there~~

were three engines left and the passengers were quite safe.

However, when the plane reached the Mediterranean Sea, the second engine broke down, but the stewardess told us there was nothing to worry about because two engines were quite enough to keep us in the air.

As we got near to the shores of Africa, the rumour spread that only one propeller was working. The stewardess kept her mouth shut, this time, but we came to the conclusion the plane must have developed engine trouble and so it had.

Presently we were flying over the jungle in Central Africa and my fellow travellers were terribly upset. Women were holding their children tighter and tighter and men were drinking more and more heavily... I too was terribly frustrated, and as I looked down at the bush, I could not help thinking of cannibalism, death and things of the kind.

At that moment, the loud-speaker was switched on, and the captain's voice was heard: "Ladies and gentlemen, I have tragic news for you."

The faces of all the passengers turned pale. Some burst into tears. My heart sank into my boots...

The captain continued in a gloomy voice: "It is my sad duty to inform you that England has lost her last football match against Scotland."

(From "Shaggy Dog English")

### All Is Well that Ends Well

To begin at the beginning, the airplane from Minneapolis in which Francis Weed was traveling East ran into heavy weather. The sky had been a hazy blue with the clouds below the plane lying so close together that nothing could be seen of the earth. Then mist began to form outside the windows, and they flew into a white cloud of such density that it reflected the exhaust fires. The color of the cloud darkened to gray, and the plane began to rock. Francis had been in heavy weather before, but he had never been shaken up so much.

The plane had begun to drop and flounder wildly. A child was crying. The air in the cabin was overheated and stale. It was black outside the ports. The exhaust fires blazed and shed sparks in the dark, and, inside, the shaded lights, the stuffiness, and the window curtains gave the cabin an atmosphere of intense and misplaced domesticity. Then the lights flickered and went out. The stewardess announced that they were going to make an emergency landing. All but the child saw in their minds the spreading wings of the Angel of Death. The pilot could be heard singing faintly, "I've got sixpence, jolly, jolly sixpence. I've got sixpence to last me all my life..." There was no other sound.

The loud groaning of the hydraulic valves swallowed up the pilot's song, and there was a shrieking high in the air, like automobile brakes, and the plane hit flat on its belly in a cornfield and shook them so violently that an old man up forward howled, "My kidneys. My kidneys." The stewardess flung open the door, and someone opened an emergency door at the back, letting in the sweet noise of their continuing mortality — the idle splash and smell of a heavy rain. Anxious for their lives, they filed out of the doors and scattered over the cornfield in all directions, praying that the thread would hold. It did. Nothing happened. When it was clear that the plane would not burn or explode, the crew and the stewardess gathered the passengers together and led them to the shelter of a barn. They were not far from Philadelphia, and in a little while a string of taxis took them into the city.

(From *The Country Husband* by J. Cheever)

- **Task 160\***. Try to find instances of conversational implicature in the following conversations. How is it possible to communicate more than what is actually 'said'?

1

A: What on earth has happened to the roast beef?  
B: The dog is looking very happy.

2

A: Can you tell me the time?  
B: Well, the milkman has come.

3

Johnny: Hey, Sally let's play marbles.  
Mother: How is your homework getting along, Johnny?

4

Teacher: What are you laughing at?  
Child: Nothing.

5

A: It's getting late, Mildred.  
B: But, I'm having such a good time.

6

Wife: Would you like to have a bath — the water's hot?  
Husband: Why, where are we going?

7

A: Help yourself to the cake.  
B (tasting the cake): Do you always make your own pastry?

8

A: John thinks Rome is the capital of France.

B: John's a genius!

9

A: I could eat the whole of that cake.  
B: Oh thanks.

10

A: Do you have coffee to go?  
B: Cream and sugar? (starts to pour)

- **Task 161\***. Comment on the presuppositional inferences in the following sentences.

1) John managed to open the door. 2) John forgot to lock the door.  
 3) Joan began to beat her husband. 4) He saw the man with two heads. 5) The flying saucer came again. 6) You can't get gobstoppers anymore. 7) Carter returned to power. 8) Since Churchill died, we've lacked a leader. 9) It wasn't Henry that kissed Rosie. 10) What John lost was his wallet. 11) Linguistics wasn't invented by Chomsky! 12) If Hannibal had only had twelve more elephants, the Romance languages would not this day exist.

- **Task 162\***. There are many examples of linguistic manipulation in George Orwell's masterpiece novel *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and his essay "Politics and the English Language". Inspired by Orwell, linguists accuse governments of manipulating our minds with euphemisms like *pacification* (bombing), *revenue enhancement* (taxes), and *nonretention* (firing). Can you give other examples of government doublespeak found in press? Do ordinary people have trouble detecting and understanding the deception?

- **Task 163.** In an appendix to *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell wrote about the language Newspeak. Read the following extract [Pinker, 1994: 55-56] and comment on linguistic manipulation as a form of mind control.

The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc [English Socialism], but to make all other modes of thought impossible. It was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought — that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc — should be literally unthinkable, at least so far as thought is dependent on words. Its vocabulary was so constructed as to give exact and often very subtle expression to every meaning that a Party member could properly wish to express, while excluding all other meanings and also the possibility of arriving at them by

indirect methods. This was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefly by eliminating undesirable words and by stripping such words as remained of unorthodox meanings, and so far as possible of all secondary meanings whatever. To give a single example. The word *free* still existed in Newspeak, but it could only be used in such statements as "This dog is free from lice" or "This field is free from weeds." It could not be used in its old sense of "politically free" or "intellectually free," since political and intellectual freedom no longer existed even as concepts, and were therefore of necessity nameless.

A person growing up with Newspeak as his sole language would no more know that *equal* had once had the secondary meaning of "politically equal," or that *free* had once meant "intellectually free," than, for instance, a person who had never heard of chess would be aware of the secondary meanings attaching to *queen* and *rook*. There would be many crimes and errors which it would be beyond his power to commit, simply because they were nameless and therefore unimaginable.

Quite apart from the suppression of definitely heretical words, reduction of vocabulary was regarded as an end in itself, and no word that could be dispensed with was allowed to survive. Newspeak was designed not to extend but to diminish the range of thought, and this purpose was indirectly assisted by cutting the choice of words down to a minimum.

- **Task 164\***. In much of our social and political discourse, people assume that words determine thoughts, as illustrated in the passage below [Pinker, 1994: 56-57]. Is there a scientific basis for these assumptions? Is there any scientific evidence that languages dramatically shape their speakers' ways of thinking? Discuss these questions with your partner.

Some feminists blame sexist thinking on sexist language, like the use of *he* to refer to a generic person. Inevitably, reform movements have sprung up. Many replacements for *he* have been suggested over the years, including *E*, *hesh*, *po*, *tey*, *co*, *jhe*, *ve*, *xe*, *he'er*, *thon*, and *na*.

The most extreme of these movements is General Semantics, begun in 1933 by the engineer Count Alfred Korzybski and popularized by his disciples S. Chase and S.I. Hayakawa. General Semantics lays the blame for human folly on insidious "semantic damage" to thought perpetrated by the structure of language. Keeping a forty-year-old in prison for a theft he committed as a teenager assumes that the forty-year-old John and the eighteen-year-old John are "the same person," a cruel logical error that would be avoided if we referred to them not as *John* but as *John1972* and *John1994*, respectively. The verb *to be* is considered a particular source of illogic, because it identifies individuals with abstractions, as in *Mary is a woman*, and licenses evasions of responsibility, like Ronald Reagan's famous nonconfession *Mistakes were made*. One faction seeks to eradicate the verb altogether.

- **Task 165.** Language can be truly bad in different ways. Racist and sexist language are highly undesirable, to say the very least. But one of the most obvious forms of 'bad language' is swearing.

English is not different from other languages in having words and expressions that no one is supposed to say but everyone does say — or nearly everyone. Bad language is closely tied to the culture we live in. This means that the culture, or the ideology of the culture, decides what is right, noble and good. Swearing is tied to social restrictions which mirror the values and beliefs of society. These restrictions are important parts of the structure of the society and can be very deep-seated [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 64]

Comment on social restrictions on swearing in your culture. Are there differences in the frequency of swearing between individuals and different groups depending on age, sex, social class, type of work, etc. (e.g. young people, the unemployed, alcoholics, criminals)? In what situations is swearing more frequent (e.g. formal, informal)? What arguments for and against swearing can you give? To what extent do you personally follow the purity rule in the use of your native language? Teachers are often worried about the bad language of their pupils: how can they get the message of non-swearing through?

- **Task 166\*.** The following is an example from an interview conducted by William Labov [1972; Pinker, 1994: 29] on a stoop in Harlem. The interviewee is Larry, the roughest member of a teenage gang called the Jets. (W. Labov observes that for most readers of his scholarly article, first contact with Larry would produce some fairly negative reactions on both sides.) Analyze the interview extract in terms of racist language, swearing and slang. Why does Larry use these expressions? What functions do these words and expressions have? What do you think about the language of modern teenagers?

You know, like some people say if you're good an' shit, your spirit goin' t'heaven ... 'n' if you bad, your spirit goin' to hell. Well, bullshit! Your spirit goin' to hell anyway, good or bad.

[Why?]

Why? I'll tell you why. 'Cause, you see, doesn't nobody really know that it's a God, y'know, 'cause I mean I have seen black gods, white gods, all color gods, and don't nobody know it's really God. An' when they be sayin' if you good, you goin' t'heaven, tha's bullshit, 'cause you ain't goin' to no heaven, 'cause it ain't no heaven for you to go to.

[... jus' suppose that there is a God, would he be white or black?] He'd be white, man.

[Why?]

Why? I'll tell you why. 'Cause the average whitey out here got everything, you dig? And the nigger ain't got shit, y'know? Y'understan'? So — um — for — in order for *that* to happen, you know it ain't no black God that's doin' that bullshit.

### 12.3. WHAT DISCOURSE ANALYSIS CAN AND CANNOT DO

Adam Jaworski and Nikolas Coupland [1999: 36] actively construct the discipline of discourse studies as a vibrant one, alert to social divisions and, in some cases, seeking to resist them. Discourse promotes itself as aware, liberated and liberating.

The fundamental positive in discourse analysis is the possibility of a greater clarity of vision, specifically of how language permeates human affairs, offering us opportunities but also constraints [Coupland, Jaworski, 1999: 37].

But there are some basic limitations inherent in the discourse analysis which should not get overlooked in the rush to discourse.

Procedures and theoretical tools of DA are imported from mainstream theoretical linguistics. DA is characterized as a series of attempts to extend the techniques so successful in linguistics, beyond the unit of the sentence [Levinson, 1985: 286].

Some DA analysts believe, at least in the simplest formulations, that discourses can be viewed simply as sentences strung together in much the same way that clauses within sentences can be conjoined with connectives of various kinds. It follows that there are no problems for discourse analysis that are not problems for sentential analysis — 'discourse can be treated as a single sentence in isolation by regarding sentence boundaries as sentential connectives' [Levinson, 1985: 287-288]. These researchers try to find rules of a syntactic sort governing conversational sequencing.

Stephen Levinson [1985: 294] observes that conversation is not a structural product in the same way that a sentence is. It is rather the outcome of interaction of two or more independent, goal-directed individuals, with often divergent interests. Moving from the study of sentences to the study of conversations is like moving from physics to biology: quite different analytical procedures and methods are appropriate even though conversations are (in part) composed of units that have some direct correspondence to sentences.



linguistic and social understanding. It inherits both the strengths and the weaknesses associated with qualitative research. As weaknesses, there will always be problems in justifying the selection of materials as research data. It is often difficult to say why a particular stretch of conversation or a particular piece of written text has come under the spotlight of discourse analysis, and why certain of its characteristics are attended to and not others [Coupland, Jaworski, 1999: 36].

Another point is that qualitative interpretive studies of particular fragments of discourse are not self-sufficient. They need support from other methods of research, even quantitative surveying. Multiple perspectives and methods increase the likelihood of reaching good explanations [Coupland, Jaworski, 1999: 36].

Discourse analysts, for instance, often feel the need to make distributional claims (e.g. that men interrupt more than women do, that racist discourse is rife in contemporary Britain or that some forms of signalled intimacy redress threats to a person's face) which their data, analysed qualitatively, may not directly support.

In-depth single-case analyses (of a particular conversation or written report) are appropriate in discourse research, and have full validity, relative to their aims and objectives (usually to demonstrate meaning-making processes and to build rich interpretations of local discourse events). But they cannot stand as alternatives to larger-scale projects based on sampled instances, designed to answer questions about social differences or social change. Such studies have their own limitations and risk essentialising complex local processes [Coupland, Jaworski, 1999: 36].

Discourse analysis is therefore not a panacea, and is suited to some types of research question and not others.

- Task 167.** Study the article below illustrating **discourse analysis of pop songs** [Murphy, 1992: 85]. Then find a recent pop song you like and analyze it in the light of the description, answering the following questions: Do you agree with the analysis of pop songs? To what extent do you think the majority of songs fit the description in the article?

In groups of four, present what you have found to each other and compare your findings. Then write a short report of your analysis, including a statement of the degree to which the song fits the description in the article, how your song compared with those of

others in the group, and the extent to which you think the analysis in the article is an accurate generalization.

### THE WHO, WHERE, AND WHEN OF POP SONG LYRICS

In a recent analysis of 50 pop songs, it was found that all songs but one had an *I* referent, while 88 per cent had a *you*, with only one each of these referents being specified by proper names. Of course, the major theme is *love* in one of its various relationship stages — beginning, ongoing, or breaking up. It seems that the stereotypical message of most songs is '*I love you*', but we are never told who *I* and *you* are.

In addition, only six of the 50 song lyrics explicitly mention the sex of the singer (male or female) and only 17 mention the sex of *you*. This means that usually the pronouns could refer to either sex for either sex. Furthermore, a pop singer's voice is often not distinctively male or female. Thus, we have a type of omniphonic voice, which could be of either sex, speaking to us about undesignated *yous* and *is*.

Another point of interest is that 94 per cent of the songs mention no time reference and 80 per cent have no place reference. These characteristics allow songs to 'happen' whenever and wherever they are heard. Listeners can integrate them into their own world and the people in the songs can become people in their own mind. The 'ghost discourse' which constitutes a song lyric only takes on meaning and form in the minds and environments of the people who use the songs. Thus, we can only say what a song 'means' by focusing on listeners and their interpretations, not by looking at the song itself.

Lastly, the imprecise and highly affective elements of pop songs allow us to use them as 'teddy-bears-in-the-ear': they are verbal 'strokes' which can be ignored or deliberately misunderstood at no risk; like a teddy bear, the song is still 'there' for us. The widespread use of the Walkman makes this analogy even more concrete.

## Unit 13

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### CONVERSATION ANALYSIS


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#### 13.1. DEFINING CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

**Conversation analysis (CA)** explores directly the nature of conversational interaction (talk interaction).

**Conversation** is taken to be that familiar predominant kind of talk in which two or more participants freely alternate in speaking, which generally occurs outside specific institutional settings like religious services, law courts, classrooms and the like [Levinson, 1985: 284]. It implies informal interchange of thoughts, information by spoken words, oral communication between persons, talk, colloquy.

**Conversation** with two or more participants taking their turns when talking to each other, either face-to-face or on the telephone, is the first, and by far the most common use of the spoken language as illustrated below [Leech, Svartvik, 1994: 12].



The second use of spoken English occurs with one person speaking at a time to an audience of people who do not talk back but just listen. It is called **public speaking** in contrast with conversation, which is private speaking. Conversation is typically interactive, and public speaking is less interactive, or even not interactive at all.

The following is an extract from a real-life conversation which took place on March 17, 1973, among President Richard Nixon (P), his counsel John W. Dean (D), and his chief of staff H.R. Haldeman (H) [Pinker, 1994: 222-225]:

P: *The grand jury thing has its, uh, uh, uh — view of this they might, uh. Suppose we have a grand jury proceeding. Would that, would that, what would that do to the Ervin thing? Would it go right ahead anyway?*

D: *Probably.*

P: *But then on that score, though, we have — let me just, uh, run by that, that — you do that on a grand jury, we could then have a much better cause in terms of saying, "Look, this is a grand jury, in which, uh, the prosecutor —" How about a special prosecutor? We could use Petersen, or use another one. You see he is probably suspect. Would you call in another prosecutor?*

D: *I'd like to have Petersen on our side, advising us [laughs] frankly.*

P: *Frankly. Well, Petersen is honest. Is anybody about to be question him, are they?*

D: *No, no, but he'll get a barrage when, uh, these Watergate hearings start.*

P: *Yes, but he can go up and say that he's, he's been told to go further in the Grand Jury and go in to this and that and the other thing. Call everybody in the White House. I want them to come, I want the, uh, uh, to go to the Grand Jury.*

D: *This may result — This may happen even without our calling for it when, uh, when these, uh —*

P: *Vescoe?*

D: *No. Well, that's one possibility. But also when these people go back before the Grand Jury here, they are going to pull all these criminal defendants back in before the Grand Jury and immunize them.*

P: *And immunize them: Why? Who? Are you going to — On what?*

D: *Uh, the U.S. Attorney's Office will.*

P: *To do what?*

D: *To talk about anything further they want to talk about.*

P: *Yeah. What do they gain out of it?*

D: *Nothing.*

P: *To hell with them.*

D: *They, they're going to stonewall it, uh, as it now stands. Except for Hunt. That's why, that's the leverage in his threat.*

H: *This is Hunt's opportunity.*


P: *That's why, that's why,*

H: *God, if he can lay this —*

P: *That's why your, for your immediate thing you've got no choice with Hunt but the hundred and twenty or whatever it is, right?*

D: *That's right.*

P: Would you agree that that's a buy time thing, you better damn



D: I think he ought to be given some signal, anyway, to, to —

P: [expletive deleted], get it, in a, in a way that, uh — Who's going to talk to him? Colson? He's the one who's supposed to know him.

D: Well, Colson doesn't have any money though. That's the thing. That's been our, one of the real problems. They have, uh, been unable to raise any money. A million dollars in cash, or, or the like, has been just a very difficult problem as we've discussed before. Apparently, Mitchell talked to Pappas, and I called him last — John asked me to call him last night after our discussion and after you'd met with John to see where that was. And I, I said, "Have you talked to, to Pappas?" He was at home, and Martha picked up the phone so it was all in code. "Did you talk to the Greek?" And he said, uh, "Yes, I have." And I said, "Is the Greek bearing gifts?" He said, "Well, I want to call you tomorrow on that."

P: Well, look, uh, what is it that you need on that, uh, when, uh, uh? Now look [unintelligible] I am, uh, unfamiliar with the money situation.

Howard Hunt, working for Nixon's re-election campaign in June 1972, had directed a break-in at the Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate building, in which his men bugged the telephones of the party chairman and other workers. Several investigations were under way to determine if the operation had been ordered from the White House, by Haldeman or Attorney General John Mitchell. The men are discussing whether to pay \$120,000 in "hush money" to Hunt before he testified before a grand jury. We have this verbatim dialogue because in 1970 Nixon, claiming to be acting on behalf of future historians, bugged his own office and began secretly taping all his conversations. In February 1974 the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives subpoenaed the tapes to help them determine whether Nixon should be impeached. This excerpt of conversation is from their transcription. Largely on the basis of this passage, the committee recommended impeachment. Nixon resigned in August 1974.

The Watergate tapes are the most famous and extensive transcripts of real-life conversation ever published. When they were released, Americans were shocked, though not all for the same reason. Some people — a very small number — were surprised that Nixon had taken part in a conspiracy to obstruct justice. A few were surprised that the leader of the free world cussed like a stevedore. But one thing that surprised everyone was what ordinary conversation looks like when it is written down verbatim.

Conversation out of context is virtually opaque and hard to interpret. People often speak in fragments, interrupting themselves in

midsentence to reformulate the thought or change the subject. It's often unclear who or what is being talked about, because conversers use pronouns (*him, them, this, that, we, they, it, one*), generic words (*do, happen, the thing, the situation, that score, these people, whatever*), and ellipses (*The U.S. Attorney's Office will* and *That's why*). Intentions are expressed indirectly. In this episode, whether a man would end the year as president of the United States or as a convicted criminal literally hinged on the meaning of *get it* and on whether *What is it that you need?* was meant as a request for information or as an implicit offer to provide something.

Not everyone was shocked by the unintelligibility of transcribed conversation. Journalists know all about it, and it is a routine practice to edit quotations and interviews heavily before they are published. For many years the temperamental Boston Red Sox pitcher Roger Clemens complained bitterly that the press misquoted him. The *Boston Herald*, in what they must have known was a cruel trick, responded by running a daily feature in which his post-game comments were reproduced word for word [Pinker, 1994: 224-225].

**These examples show that real speech in conversations is very far from written language.**

Mainstream linguistic research was mainly based on the written language. The history of the description of the properties of English grammar has been largely a history of the description of English grammar as it has occurred in the written language. Most grammarians tacitly assumed that conversational (or spoken) language was a mere corruption of the literary language and that its influence on grammatical norms was corrosive. The situation has historical parallels in lexicography, as when Dr Samuel Johnson excluded entries from his *Dictionary of the English Language* [1755] which were not attested in written literary sources, on the grounds that they constituted no more than ephemeral vulgarisms. [McCarthy, Carter, 1995: 207].

Conversation became the focus of linguistic research at the beginning of the 1970s with the development of linguistic pragmatics.

**Conversation analysis has been pioneered by a group of sociologists known as ethnomethodologists.** The movement arose in reaction to the quantitative techniques, and the arbitrary imposition on the data of supposedly objective categories, that were typical of mainstream American sociology. In contrast, it was argued, the proper object of sociological study is the set of techniques that the members of a society themselves use to interpret and act within

their own social worlds. Hence the use of the term  
 ethnography, the study of 'ethnics' (i.e. participants' own)

methods of production and interpretation of social interaction [Garfinkel, 1972; Turner, 1974].

Ethnomethodology as a sociological approach to language and communication means studying the links between what social actors 'do' in interaction and what they 'know' about interaction. Social structure is a form of order, and that order is partly achieved through talk, which is itself structured and orderly. Social actors have common sense knowledge about what it is they are doing interactionally in performing specific activities and in jointly achieving communicative coherence. Making this knowledge about ordinary, everyday affairs explicit, and in this way finding an understanding of how society is organized and how it functions, is ethnomethodology's main concern [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 19].

Following this line of inquiry, CA views language as a form of social action and aims to discover and describe how the organization of social interaction makes manifest and reinforces the structures of social organization and social institutions [Boden, Zimmerman, 1991; Drew, Heritage, 1992; Schegloff, 1998; Hutchby, Wooffitt, 1998].

I. Hutchby and R. Wooffitt [1998: 14] define CA as the study of recorded, naturally occurring *talk-in-interaction*. Principally it is to discover how participants understand and respond to one another in their turns at talk, with a central focus being on how sequences of interaction are generated.

Conversation analysis implies a descriptive and analytical approach to language in use which focuses on the goals of participants and the ways in which their goals are displayed by their talk. There is strong emphasis on sequential organization and conversation management [Channell, 1994: 217].

Sequence and structure in conversations are the focal corners of CA. The emphasis in CA is on discovering the structures of talk which produce and reproduce patterns of social action.

CA is a rigorously empirical approach. The methods are essentially inductive; search is made for recurring patterns across many records of naturally occurring conversations, in contrast to the immediate categorization of (usually) restricted data which is the typical first step in DA work. Secondly, in place of a theoretical ontology of rules as used in syntactic description, CA puts emphasis on the interactional and inferential consequences of the choice between alternative utterances. Again in contrast to DA, the

emphasis is on what can actually be found to occur, not on what one would guess would be odd (or acceptable) [Levinson: 1985: 194].

There is also a tendency to avoid analyses based on single texts. Instead, as many instances as possible of some particular phenomena are examined across texts, not primarily to illuminate 'what is really going on' in some interaction, but rather to discover the systematic properties of the sequential organization of talk, and the ways in which utterances are designed to manage such sequences [Levinson, 1985: 194].

- Task 168\***. Comment on characteristic peculiarities of conversation which affect language use and make conversation different from the written language.
  
- Task 169\***. Conversational English differs from the written language lexically, morphologically and syntactically. In the following extract taken from a conversation [Leech, Svartvik, 1994: 11] we can note several distinctive features typical of conversation. Study the example and try to identify these features.

*Well I had some people to lunch on Sunday and – they turned up half an hour early – (laughs) – I mean you know what [g] getting up Sunday's like anyway and – I'd – I was behind in any case – and I'd said to them one o'clock – and I almost phoned them up and said come a bit later – and then I thought oh they've probably left by now – so I didn't – and – twelve thirty – now that can't be them – and it was – and they'd left plenty of time for all their connections and they got all their connections at once – and it was annoying cos they came with this – child – you know who was running all over the place and they kept coming in and chatting to me and I couldn't get on with things and I get really erm – you know when when I'm trying to cook – and people come and chat I get terribly put off – can't get on with things at all erm – and yet you feel terribly anti-social if you do just stay in the kitchen anyway*

### 13.2. CENTRAL CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH AREAS

One central CA concept is *preference*, the idea that, at specific points in conversation, certain types of utterances will be more favoured than others (e.g. the socially preferred response to an invitation is acceptance, not rejection).

Other conversational features CA has focused on are:

- mechanisms of turn-taking;

- conversational structure; openings and closings of

conversations;

- adjacency pairs (paired utterances of the type question-answer, greeting-greeting, offer-acceptance, etc.);
- topic management and topic shift;
- conversational repairs;
- showing agreement and disagreement;
- introducing bad news and processes of troubles-telling;

Conversation is characterized by **turn-taking**: one participant, A, talks, stops; another, B, starts, talks, stops; and so we obtain an A-B-A-B-A-B distribution of talk across two participants. But as soon as close attention is paid to this phenomenon, how such a distribution is actually achieved becomes anything but obvious [Levinson, 1985: 296].

First there are the surprising facts that less (and often considerably less) than 5 per cent of the speech stream is delivered in overlap (two speakers speaking simultaneously), yet gaps between one person speaking and another starting are frequently measurable in just a few micro-seconds and they average amounts measured in a few tenths of a second [Ervin-Tripp, 1979: 392; cited in Levinson, 1985: 296]. How is this orderly transition from one speaker to another achieved with such precise timing and so little overlap?

A second puzzle is that, whatever the mechanism responsible, it must be capable of operating in quite different circumstances: the number of parties may vary from two to twenty or more; persons may enter and exit the pool of participants; turns at speaking can vary from minimal utterances to many minutes of continuous talk; and if there are more than two parties then provision is made for all parties to speak without there being any specified order or 'queue' of speakers. In addition the same system seems to operate equally well both in face-to-face interaction and in the absence of visual monitoring, as on the telephone.

H. Sacks, E. Schegloff and G. Jefferson [1974] suggested a list of guiding principles for the organization of turn-taking in conversation. They observed that the central principle which speakers follow in taking turns is to avoid gaps and overlaps in conversation. Although gaps do of course occur, they are brief.

Another common feature of conversational turns is that, usually, one party speaks at a time. In order to facilitate turn-taking, speakers observe a number of conventionalised principles. For example, speakers follow well-established scripts, as in service

encounters, in which speaker roles are clearly delineated. They fill in appropriate 'slots' in discourse structure, e.g., second part utterances in adjacency pairs, and they anticipate completion of an utterance on the basis of a perceived completion of a grammatical unit (a clause or a sentence). Speakers themselves may signal their willingness to give up the floor in favour of another speaker (who can be 'nominated' by current speaker only). They can do this by directing their gaze towards the next speaker and employing characteristic gesturing patterns synchronizing with the final words. They may alter pitch, speak more softly, lengthen the last syllable or use a question (offer, or request, etc.) plus an address term; a tagged assertion plus an address feature; various hearing and understanding checks (*Who?*, *You did what?*, *Pardon?*, *You mean tomorrow?*), stereotyped tags (*you know, that's it*) [Graddol, Cheshire, Swann, 1994].

Turn-taking is additionally facilitated by the fact that it is most likely to take place in highly predictable, recurring moments in conversation, the transition-relevance places (TRP) [Sacks et al., 1974]. The cues signalling that a turn is about to be terminated tend to coincide with the end of various structural units of talk: clauses, sentences, narratives, but they may also be signalled after smaller formal units, such as phrases or single words.


**Adjacency pairs**, i.e. paired utterances like question-answer, summons-answer, greeting-greeting, offer-acceptance/refusal, apology-minimization, compliment-compliment response, thanks-acknowledgement, etc., are the fundamental unit of conversational organization [Goffman, 1976; Coulthard, 1977: 70].

These are deeply inter-related with the turn-taking system as techniques for selecting a next speaker (especially where an address term is included or the content of the first utterance of the pair clearly isolates a relevant next speaker). The existence of such paired utterances is obvious, but a precise specification of the underlying expectations upon which the regularities are based is not so easy.

E. Schegloff and H. Sacks [1973; cited in Levinson, 1985: 303-304] offer a characterization of adjacency pairs along the following lines: adjacency pairs are sequences of two utterances that are a) adjacent; b) produced by different speakers; c) ordered as a first part and a second part; d) typed, so that a particular first part requires a particular second part, e.g. offers require acceptances or rejections, greetings require greetings, and so on.

There is a rule governing the use of adjacency pairs, namely: having produced a first part of some pair, current speaker must stop

speaking, and next speaker must produce at that point a second part



Conversation analysis has revealed that conversational interaction has an elaborate and detailed **structure** of which speakers have very little conscious awareness.

One kind of conversation with a recognizable overall organization that has been much studied is the telephone call. In this respect, Emmanuel Schegloff's [1972, 1979] work is one of the true cornerstones of CA.

Telephone conversations have recognizable **openings** (clear beginnings). E. Schegloff [1979: 66; cited in Levinson, 1985: 309] recognizes the following typical components of an opening section: the telephone rings and, upon picking up the receiver, the person at the receiving end almost invariably speaks first, either with a station identification (name of a firm, a telephone number, etc.) or a plain *Hello*, whereupon the caller produces a *Hello*, often with a self-identification. If the call is between two friends or acquaintances we may expect an exchange of *How are you*.

One important feature of opening sections in telephone conversations is the immediate relevance, and the potential problems, of identification and recognition [Schegloff, 1979: 67]. Many telephone conversations have as their first three turns (T<sub>1</sub>, T<sub>2</sub>, T<sub>3</sub>) the following, or something closely similar:

- C: [causes telephone to ring at R's location]
- T<sub>1</sub> R: *Hello*
- T<sub>2</sub> C: *Hi*
- T<sub>3</sub> R: *Oh hi*

Such openings illustrate a basic finding of CA, namely that a single minimal utterance can perform, and can be carefully designed to perform, a number of quite different functions at once. Here for example, T<sub>1</sub>, despite being the first turn in the conversation, is not the first move in the interaction: the ring is the summons, and T<sub>1</sub> its answer. But T<sub>1</sub> is also simultaneously a display for recognitional purposes of recipient's identity (in cases where recognition is relevant, as not always, e.g. in business calls), and it is notable that speakers tend to use a 'signatured' prosody or voice-quality in this turn [Schegloff, 1979: 67]. Despite the apparent greeting token in T<sub>1</sub>, greeting is not what the turn appears to do. T<sub>2</sub> on the other hand is indeed a greeting token that does greetings, and greetings being adjacency-paired, T<sub>2</sub> gets a return greeting in T<sub>3</sub>.

The overlapping organizations here are: a) telephone conversations begin with summons-answer pairs; b) reciprocal greetings are relevant at the very beginning of calls; c) at the very beginning of calls, identification is a prime concern.

Note that T2 is the slot for recognitions to be begun, recipient clearly not being able to do this in T1 in the absence of any evidence of who the caller might be. And despite the total absence of any overt recognitional devices (e.g. *Hi, Sam*), the expectation, based on overall organization, of the recognitional relevance of T2 is strong enough invariably to impose on *Hi, Hello*, and other minimal greeting components in T2, a claim that recognition of the recipient by the caller has been achieved. This may be summarized as follows:

C: ((rings)) (summons)

T1 R: *Hello* (answer) + (display for recognition)

T2 C: *Hi* (greetings 1<sup>st</sup> part) + (claim that C has recognized R)  
+ (claim that R can recognize C)

T3 R: *Oh hi* (greetings 2<sup>nd</sup> part) (claim R has recognized C)

We are introduced here to the richness of the communicational content that is mapped onto minimal utterances by virtue of **sequential location** — here a location whose specificity is due to the structure of opening sections of the overall organization of telephone calls [Levinson, 1985: 312].

The opening section of a telephone call is usually followed in what may be called **first topic slot** by an announcement by the caller of the reason for the call:

R: *Hello.*


C: *Hello Rob. This is Laurie. How's everything.*

R: (sniff) *Pretty good. How 'bout you.*

C: *Jus' fine. The reason I called was to ask ...*

The first topic slot immediately after the opening section is a privileged one: it is the only one that is likely to be almost entirely free from topical constraints arising from prior turns. The main body of a call is thus structured by topical constraints: the content of the first slot is likely to be understood as the main reason for the call and after that topics should by preference be 'fitted' to prior ones — topics therefore often being withheld until such a 'natural' location for their mention turns up [Schegloff, Sacks, 1973: 300; cited in Levinson, 1985: 313]. Evidence for this preference for linked transitions from topic to topic can be found in the common experience of having

things to say that one never manages to get in, and more



demonstrably make take transition, unlinked topic 'jumps'. Thus, in the example below, a topic jump is signalled in a typical way by the features of increased amplitude, raised pitch, markers of self-editing and hesitancy and a marker of discontinuity, *hey* [Levinson, 1985: 313].

*R: It's o — it's okay we'll pop down tomorrow Gertrude*

*C: You sure you don't, it is an awful lot of it, you want to quickly nip down now for it*

*R: Okay I will. Er hey you hmm that is have you been lighting a fire down there?*

Finally, some kinds of telephone calls have an expectable overall organization that admits just one topic, such **monotopical** calls being typical of routine business calls or service inquiries. Interestingly, such calls are monotopical not in the sense that no more than one topic is ever addressed within them, but in the sense that the caller orients to the expectation of a single topic in the very introduction of further topics [Levinson, 1985: 313].

So matters of overall organization and of topical organization can be closely interlinked.

We come finally to the **closing** sections of the overall organization of telephone calls. Closings are a delicate matter both technically, in the sense that they must be so placed that no party is forced to exit while still having compelling things to say, and socially in the sense that both over-hasty and over-slow terminations can carry unwelcome inferences about the social relationships between the participants. The devices that organize closings are closely attuned to these problems. E. Schegloff [1979] has found out that conversations close in the following sort of manner:

*R: Why don't we all have lunch*

*C: Okay so that would be in St Jude's would it?*

*R: Yes*

*C: Okay so*

*R: One o'clock in the bar*

*C: Okay*

*R: Okay?*

*C: Okay then thanks very much indeed George*

*R: All right*

*C: See you there*

*R: See you there*

C: Okay

R: Okay bye

R: Bye

The typical features here are the arrangements for a next meeting, a sequence of *Okays* closing down the arrangements (or other topic), a *Thank you* produced by the caller, and a further sequence of *Okays* just prior to a final exchange of *Good-byes*.

One very general schema for closing sections might be represented thus [Levinson, 1985: 317]:

(a) a closing down of some topic, typically a closing implicative topic; where closing implicative topics include the making of arrangements, the first topic in monotopical calls, the giving of regards to the other's family members, etc.

(b) one or more pairs of passing turns with pre-closing items, like *Okay, All right, So, etc.*


(c) if appropriate, a typing of the call as e.g. a favour requested and done (hence *Thank you*), or as a checking up on recipient's state of health (*Well I just wanted to know how you were*), etc., followed by a further exchange of pre-closing items

(d) a final exchange of terminal elements: *Bye, Righteo, Cheers, etc.*

The crucial elements here (after (a) has been achieved) are (b) and (d). Essentially what the two components jointly achieve is a coordinated exit from the conversation: they do this by providing, in the form of the topic-less passing turns in (b), a mutual agreement to talk no more, this being a prelude to the exchange of the terminal adjacency pair in (d) that closes down the conversation. The mutual agreement is secured by one party producing a-topic-less passing turn, indicating that he has no more to say, whereupon the other party — if he too has no more to say — may produce another such turn. The technical and social problems that closings raise are thus initially dealt with by providing that the closing section as a whole is placed in a location that is interactively achieved: a pre-closing offer to close is issued in the form of *Okay, Right, etc.*, and only if taken up do closings proceed [Levinson, 1985: 317-318].

A final point about closing sections that is of interest here is that components of some closings indicate that the placement and content of closing sections is attuned to other aspects of overall organization. Thus, for example, the *Thanks* may be oriented to the specific content of the first topic slot of that call, namely a request for a favour. Similarly one finds in closings reference to aspects of

opening sections, as in *Sorry to have woken you up* referring back to



referring back to responses to *How are you*, and so on. Each aspect of overall organization, then, can be oriented to other aspects, as is exemplified in the attention paid in the opening sections of expectably monotonical calls to the imminence of closing immediately after the first topic is closed down [Levinson, 1985: 318].

Quite a lot has been written about 'fillers' in the field of linguistics, i.e. words that jump out of the mouth while we are figuring out what clever things to say next [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 96].

When we speak we often fill in gaps with 'fillers' like *well, you know, you see, I mean, kind of, sort of* to allow us to think of what next to say, or to just indicate that we intend to go on talking [Leech, Svartvik, 1994: 11].

Linguists have come up with many terms for such small words. Sometimes they are called *evincives* when they function as interjections. Sometimes they are called *politeness* or *planning elements*. They are also often called *particles*, just to be on the safe side. Since particles don't change their form and can be different parts of speech, this term is neutral between the adverbial and the interjection properties of small words.

They have also been called *fillers*, *fumbles* and *hesitation sounds*. According to Lars-Gunnar Andersson and Peter Trudgill [1990: 98-105] these terms do not give them much credit, and lead us to think of them as words or even noises produced while we are figuring out what to say. Their function would be something like 'Hold on, there is more to come. I just have to think of the right words to use.' Admittedly there are words that work like this, the most common being *er-er*; but it is certainly not the most important or most typical function of these small words.

Thus *OK* in *OK, let's look at Turkey during the Middle Ages* is not useless or redundant. It marks the end of whatever preceded this sentence and introduces the next subject matter. *OK* has a *textual function* here. An ordinary conversation, a speech, a lecture or any other act of speech consists of many utterances, of a long stretch of sounds with content. In writing, we separate the content not only into different sentences, but also into paragraphs, sections and chapters. In speech we do the same thing with the help of small words which show how different parts of the text are related to each other. *OK* can be used to introduce a new topic in the discourse.

Many other small words have other important conversational functions to do with change of topic and the point of what is being said. It is often hard for foreigners to learn how to use them correctly.

Compare the following sentences: 1) I forgot the books. 2) Oh, I forgot the books. Sentence (1) is a plain statement. Sentence (2) is not just (1) with some useless sound at the beginning. Rather, *oh* signals that the speaker has just remembered or realized something. Thus small words like *oh* in the above example perform two functions. First, they signal something about what is happening in the mind of the speaker. Second, they say something about how the listener should receive and/or react to the sentence.

Compare the *oh* sentence above with the following *ah* sentence: *Ah*, this is the way to do it. Here, *ah*, with the proper intonation, functions as an indication of something like 'I just realized'. In a cartoon it could be drawn with light bulb over the speaker's head.

People take turns as speakers and hearers. A turn may last from a second up to several minutes. It depends on the situation. When speakers start their turns, they often do this by acknowledging the preceding turn. This is typically done with yes or yeah, which does not mean that the speaker is answering a question or completely agreeing with the previous speaker. In this case, yes means that the speaker has understood what was said and taken it into consideration. After this the speaker is free to argue against what was just said. The yes, but sequence is common in English, as it is in other Germanic languages: *Yes, but I still do not think it is a good idea to have an alligator in the bathtub*.

The opening *well* is a typical spoken discourse 'topic opener': Well I had some people to lunch on Sunday. When an utterance is opened up with *well*, this may also tell the listener that the speaker does not entirely accept what has just been said:

A: *It's wonderful, isn't it?*

B: Well, it's pretty good

*Er-er* is socially rather interesting. It can be used to prevent others from coming into the discussion. Sometimes you can hear how the pitch of the *er-er* rises when the speaker notices that some other person is trying to take a turn.

Some people er more than others: males more than females, the middle class more than the working class. Since men with academic education er the most, they are also the hardest to interrupt. At the turn of the century one Swedish professor of

language noted this difference in the frequency of hesitation sounds between men and women and interpreted it as evidence for men's

more careful thinking: women speak but men think first. This professor was not female. Besides, there is something strange about the principle that the more you er, the more you think.

As speakers we want to know that the topics we introduce are of interest, that our views are not totally irrelevant, that what we say is understood and so on. Tag questions are typically used to ask for such confirmation: *Nice weather, isn't it?*

Of course, speakers are capable of judging the quality of the weather all by themselves, but in this way they invite the listener to agree on this topic and discuss it further. In other situations, the speaker (a salesman or a politician, for example) can use this confirmation-seeking device to manipulate the hearer: *This Jaguar is the nicest car money can buy today, isn't it? You can't really trust the Liberals, can you?*

All the examples above show that fillers have a role to play in language. They are always present in a conversation and they have a number of different functions there.

By using fillers, we react to what others say, indicate our feelings about what we say ourselves, and point to how the listener should understand our utterances. They help to give indications to do with surprise, irritation, insecurity, and so on, without forcing us to spell out the whole story word for word.

Willis Edmondson and Juliane House have called these words *gambits* in their book *Let's Talk and Talk About It* [1981]. This term reflects how these words help to organize a spoken text into parts and sub-parts. Below is the sub-classification of gambits presented by W. Edmondson and J. House.

### UPTAKERS

#### **RECEIPT :**

Meaning 'I've got you'

Phrases: yes, yeah, hm, uh, I see, right, OK

Example: Yes, on the other hand, it's rather expensive.

#### **EXCLAIM**

Meaning 'This is how I feel towards your message'

Phrases: oh, ah really, oh dear, great, super, damn it

Example: Jesus Christ, I'm coming right away.

#### **GO ON**

Meaning 'Go on speaking. I'm following'

Phrases: Yes, yeah, hm, oh, good, fine, good heavens

Example: Really!??

**CLARIFIERS****CAJOLER**

Meaning 'Please be agreeable to my message'

Phrases: *I mean, y'know, you see, honestly, actually, in fact*

Example: *Well, you see John, in fact, I'm rather busy at the moment.*

Notice that *y'know* occurs in this list. This suggests that it is likely to be most heavily used by speakers who are not too sure of themselves or of how what they are saying will be received.

**UNDERSCORER**

Meaning 'Listen carefully now'

Phrases: *look, listen, the point is, fust a minute, wait a sec*

Example: *Well, alright then, listen, we'll go down to the pub and talk to him tonight.*

**APPEALER**

Meaning 'Don't you think so too, hearer?'

Phrases: tag questions, *right, OK, (all) right, remember, eh*

Example: *Cost the earth, wouldn't it?*

**STARTER**

Meaning 'Hold on, I'm going to say something now'

Phrases: *well, now, OK*

Example: *Well, since last week I have been thinking about this communication problem.*

**ASIDE**

Meaning 'I'm talking to myself for a second'

Phrases: *let me see now, where was I?*

Example: *We train — what are they called in English? — mermaids.*

Fillers are not meaningless or useless in language. They are meaningful — without carrying a heavy load of meaning. They are very functional [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 102].

A conversation without any of these small words would sound peculiar and unnatural. The best proof that we need these phrases probably comes from a simple test that everyone can do while speaking on the phone. When you are listening to a person who has a lot to say, listen to yourself also. You will hear yourself saying *hmm, oh dear, yeah*, etc., at intervals of a second or two. Try to keep quiet. After five or ten seconds, you will hear a worried voice saying, 'Hello, are you still there?'

However, linguists do not claim that each and every small word ever uttered was right to the point, well planned and purposeful. Sometimes people come out with things like the following [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 102]: *I mean, I mean she's so little, I*

*mean you, you know sort of one can imagine a sort of middle-aged woman with a coat that seemed you know sort of just slightly*

*exaggerated her form. You know, I mean she could sort of slip things inside pockets. Such sentences are nothing to be proud of.*

- **Task 170.** The phenomenon of turn-taking in conversation requires the speakers to observe basic courtesy, such as not interrupting people when they are in mid sentence, allowing others to have their say. Read the following texts and explain why participants interrupt each other and monopolize conversation. Also reflect upon such issues as conversation management (topic management and topic shift, showing agreement and disagreement, etc.) and features typical of informal talk (silent pauses, voice-filled pauses indicating hesitation (*umm*, etc.), repetitions, false starts, 'fillers', short forms). Discuss your ideas in a small group and support them with appropriate arguments.

### **How to Compete with Friends Who Have Been to Some Glamorous Place on Holidays and Want to Talk about It**

It is quite a problem to know how to compete with your friends who have been to some glamorous place on their holidays and want to talk about it. Particularly if you spent yours at Dried Meat Lake with the kids, outdoor plumbing, and Aunt Sarah who is deaf and doesn't believe in liquor. But don't despair. Get in there and fight. You can hold them at bay or at the very least you can sabotage their pleasure in the telling.

One way is of course to shout them down with local trivia. A variation of this device, but one still requiring a pungent voice is the "Oh that reminds me" gimmick. There doesn't need to be any relationship between the two events. Supposing they are telling about a posh night club just out of San Francisco and are making it sound distressingly fascinating, you interrupt with "oh that reminds me," and then proceed to tell about all the jolly excitement at the lake when the neighbour's cow fell down your well.

If you have ever been to the place they visited, even if it was fifteen years ago, you are in a strong position. Anything they saw or did you can compare unfavorably with your own experience. You can gradually take over and monopolize the conversation with an account of your own trip. If you have never been there, then use someone else's account. You are almost sure to know someone who has been there and insisted on talking about it.

If you don't know anyone who has been there you can fall back on a book. Indeed, if you know in advance where your friends have been it is a good idea to get a book and bone up on the place. In this way you can be the authority and can question them closely. You will be sure to find some things they don't know, like the average rainfall or the percentage of the populace who have sewing machines or the illegitimacy rate, and you can imply quite clearly that they certainly didn't get much out of their trip.

A useful device is to find some place they haven't visited or something they haven't done, and then pour it on.

Supposing your friends the Fleeps have just come back from Hawaii, then the conversation can go something like this:

*You* — There are so many interesting and fascinating spots to go to, aren't there? You'll have to tell us just all about it. I suppose you were at John the Breach Clouter's?

*Horace Fleep* — Oh, of course. We thought ...

*You* — The Open Mu Mu?

*Mildred Fleep* — Yes, yes. It was just ...

*You* — The Pregnant Mermaid?

*Mildred Fleep* — Yes. We went there on a Friday night and ...

*You* — Prince Mahi Mahi's?

*Mildred Fleep* — Prince Mahi Mahi's? Nnno ... I don't think so. However, we did get to ...

*You* — You didn't get to Prince Mahi Mahi's? Oh, what a shame!

This is what you have been looking for. Some place they haven't been. If you get desperate, there doesn't even have to be such a place ... you can just make it up. However, this may backfire. Experienced travellers may not admit a thing. I have heard friends describe in considerable detail and great enthusiasm the wonderful time they had in non-existent places I just made up. This is frightfully dishonest of them and just makes you wonder about some people's ethics — doesn't it?

But to continue:

*You* — Prince Mahi Mahi is a real Polynesian prince and his place is one of the very few spots where you can still see authentic native customs and foods. He ...

*Mildred Fleep* (loudly) — Another place we ...

*You* — These other places are just tourist traps really. Not authentic at all. All the tourists go to them, of course. But you really have to be in the know to find Prince Mahi Mahi's. It's very exclusive and you have to have an entree, etc. etc.

You are on to a good thing with this tourist emphasis. All tourists hate to be called tourists for some obscure reason. The other people on the trip were tourists but they were travellers or visitors or something, but not tourists. Tourists hate to feel that they went only to places where tourists go.

A related device is to emphasize commercialism. "Waikiki is so commercialized now. Not like it was in the old days. I understand it's just like Coney Island. But take Dried Meat Lake ... it isn't commercialized at all." Actually, everything throughout the world that is worth seeing has an admission gate and some character beside it with his palm out.

If by any chance they did get off the beaten path and start yammering about authentic local color you will have to shift ground. The thing to do here is to congratulate them on their great courage and rashness in venturing into the septic hinterland. Talk delicately about sewage disposal, yaws, beri beri, leprosy and chiggers and draw away slightly from them.

When they enthuse about unsullied scenery and quaint local customs,

enquire about creepy things in the salad and did they check the mattresses carefully. By the end of the evening you will have them surreptitiously taking their pulses and furtively scratching ... in fact, everyone will be doing the latter. This indicates you have been a success and they haven't.

Here are some other simple but effective procedures I have heard used. Find fault with the time of year they went, "Venice is so hot and smelly in June, I don't know how you stood it." Enquire why they didn't go some place else instead, "If I was going to spend all that money I certainly wouldn't go to Rio, I'd go to Stockholm." If they did something unusual, be sniffy, "I suppose it's all right if you like that sort of thing" — but if they did the usual make it mundane, "Just everyone is going to Acapulco now, aren't they? It's the obvious thing to do." (This word "obvious" is real murder, use it a lot.) Be critical of the means of transportation, "It's too bad you went by air, you don't really see the country that way do you?" or "Why on earth did you drive, it takes ages to get anywhere. Of course, it's cheaper, isn't it?" Then there's the matter of children. "Oh, you took the kids with you. My aren't you brave and dutiful! But you can't have much fun with children along can you? They always want to go to the bathroom or the zoo or something." Or contrariwise, "You didn't take the children? I always think holidays should be family affairs. I always say families should do things together. That's what I always say." You can also do some switch hitting on entertainers. "I'm surprised you say you enjoyed Bing Johnson at Vegas. I never cared much for him on television. We always turn him off. Anyway, why go all the way to Vegas to see someone you can see on TV at home?" or contrariwise, "No, I never heard of Bing Johnson. I guess if he amounted to much he'd be on television."

There is no simple way to deal with friends who are equipped with movies or slides of their trip. This calls for heroic measures. You can stick a hair pin in the nearest socket and blow the fuses or wait until the lights are out, hit your wife on the head with a beer bottle and call an ambulance, making vague and worried comments about Beatrice not feeling well lately. But get that ambulance there in a hurry.

(From *Holiday Handicapping* by M.L. Huston)

### Talking Down the Cat

"This being National Cat Week," I said to the Captain, "I suppose I should put in a plug for cats."

Captain Fracas is our cat. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that we are his people.

The Captain is ten years old now, pretty senior for a cat. He's had time to learn English, which he speaks with a slight accent that he knows people find charming.

"Cats don't need plugging," yawned the Captain. "Cats can look after themselves."

"A lot of people don't like cats," I said.

"A lot of cats don't like people," he murmured. "But we haven't started a National Humans Week yet ..."

"What cats don't like people?" I demanded.

"The cougar, the panther, the leopard, the lion ..."

The Captain is always dragging in his influential relatives like this.

"You wouldn't know," I said tartly, "but some cats need protection. Alley cats, for instance ..."

"Rank socialism," he interrupted (another bad habit). "Survival of the fittest keeps the species strong ..."

"Survival of the fittest," I hooted. "You lie around on a soft rug all day, get fed the best grade liver, wear a fur coat that didn't cost you a penny, never do a stroke of work, and you talk about survival of the fittest!"

The Captain calmly licked a paw before replying. Then he said:

"If I am so useless, why do you keep me?"

"Well ..." There had to be some reason. "You're a good-looking animal. And you have a lot of personality. You hand us some laughs ..."

"Exactly. The talents of a first-rate insurance salesman. A good salesman makes six or seven hundred a month. I get a couple of dollars' worth of liver, padded with the cheap cat food you buy." The Captain blinked. "Sometimes I envy the alley cat's integrity, but balancing on the rim of a garbage can is not my idea of the way to eat dinner ..."

"It's not just a matter of hardship," I said quickly, noticing that the Captain was beginning to doze. "Some people just can't stand any kind of cat. They hate cats. They prefer dogs, that are open and friendly and wag their tails because they are happy, not because they are sore."

"Escapists," murmured the Captain. "Need their ego bolstered. Dogs make people feel important and necessary. Cats make them feel just like another mammal. Dogs make people feel that it's love that makes the world go around. Cats prove that it's fresh meat. We're bound to be unpopular with the romantics." His eyes closed, his chin nestled in his paws.

"In that case," I said with some asperity, "I shall not plug National Cat Week. I shall write about something else like ..."

"You're not going to use that confounded typewriter!" cried the Captain, fully awake. He has sensitive eardrums. "I certainly am," I crowed, sliding in a sheet of copy paper. "Like this."

I started banging away. Cursing, the Captain got up and went into the bedroom. I had beaten him again.

(From *Talking Down the Cat* by E. Nicol)

- Task 171. Working with a partner or in a small group, try to find adjacency pairs in the following conversations from fiction.

1. Jennie Gerhardt is a poor girl, Lester Kane, a rich man, loves her and does not want her family to suffer any longer.



Lester: Are you...

Jennie: No, my brother Sebastian is. He's twenty-two,

Lester: And what does he do?

Jennie: He's a clerk in a cigar store.

Lester: Do you know how much he makes?

Jennie: I think it's twelve dollars.

Lester: And the other children?

Jennie: Martha and Veronica don't do anything yet. They're too young. My brother George works at Wilson's. He's a cash-boy. He gets three dollars and a half.

Lester: And how much do you make?

Jennie: I make four.

Lester: How much rent do you pay?

Jennie: Twelve dollars.

Lester: How old is your mother?

Jennie: She's nearly fifty now.

Lester: ... Now, I know. There's only one answer to your problem, and it isn't such a bad one. You have to let me help you. I'm not going to see you suffer, nor any one belonging to you.

Jennie: I don't know how to thank you.

(Th. Dreiser. Jennie Gerhardt)

2. Winnie-the-Pooh and the Owl remember about Eeyore's birthday. They are going to give him presents.

Winnie-the-Pooh: Good morning, Owl.

Owl: Good morning, Pooh.

Winnie-the-Pooh: Many happy returns of Eeyore's birthday.

Owl: Oh, is that what it is?

Winnie-the-Pooh: What are you giving him, Owl?

Owl: What are *you* giving him, Pooh?

Winnie-the-Pooh: I'm giving him a Useful Pot to Keep Things In, and I wanted to ask you — ...

Owl: You ought to write 'A Happy Birthday' on it.

Winnie-the-Pooh: That was what I wanted to ask you.

(A. Milne. Winnie-the-Pooh)

3. Mr Pemberton sends his son Trigger on an errand.

Mr Pemberton: You go right on over to Mrs Sheridan's. You'll find her on the front porch, in the rocking chair. Tell her I'll be over just as soon as I've had my supper.

Trigger: Sure, Pa.

(W. Saroyan. Jim Pemberton and His Boy Trigger).

4. The two painters compare the pictures they have just finished.

Vincent Van Gogh: May I see what you've done?

De Bock: With pleasure..(Looking at Vincent's sketch) I say, what's that thing you've got instead of her face? Is that what you mean by putting passion into it?

Vincent: We weren't doing a portrait. We were doing a figure.

De Bock: That's the first time I ever heard a face doesn't belong on a figure.

(J. Stone. Lust for Life)

#### 5. Rosa has come to see Mrs Wingfield.

Rosa: I wanting to speak to Mrs Wingfield. I wonder if that's convenient?

Miss Foy: She doesn't expect you.

Rosa: I'm sorry. If it would be easier, I could go away and come again.

Miss Foy: Oh, it doesn't matter! She'll be amused to see you. You'd better go straight up. Come in, my dear; that's right.

(I. Murdoch. The Flight from the Enchanter)

#### 6 Rosa and Jack are young people, leaving school, who only recently got acquainted.

Rosa: Come in, Jack! Mama is ready to meet you! ... Mama, this is Jack Hunter!

Jack: Hello, Mrs Delle Rose. It sure is a pleasure to meet you. (*Mrs Delle Rose stares indifferently at the boy.*)

Rosa: Mama, Mama, say something!

Jack: Maybe your Mama wants me to ... (*He makes an awkward gesture toward the door.*)

Rosa: No, no, Mama's just tired. Mama makes dresses; she made a whole lot of dresses for the graduation!

(T. Williams. The Rose Tattoo)

#### 7. Mrs Vance and Carrie intend to go to the theatre.

Mrs Vance: Let's go to the matinee this afternoon.

Carrie: All right. What shall we see?

Mrs Vance: Oh, I do want to see Nat Goodwin. I do think he is the jolliest actor. The papers say this is such a good play.

Carrie: What time will we have to start?


Mrs Vance: Let's go at one and walk down Broadway from Thirty-fourth Street. It's such an interesting walk. ...

Carrie: I'll be glad to go. How much will we have to pay for seats?

Mrs Vance: Not more than a dollar.

(Th. Dreiser. Sister Carrie)

#### 8. Gerald Bracher has come to Mr Percy, his schoolmaster, to borrow a book from his home library.



Gerald: I don't really know, sir. I've never read it for pleasure.

Mr Percy: It's just useful for quotations in history essay, eh? ... (*He holds out the book.*) There you are. Borrow this if you like.

Gerald: Thank you, sir.

Mr Percy: Aren't you going to look and see what it is?

Gerald: I think I can trust your taste, sir.

(R. Fuller, *The Ruined Boys*)

9. A writer tells his acquaintance about the way he makes his living.

The girl: You've been poor?

The writer: Poverty-stricken. Constantly without funds. Ill-clothed.

The girl: That's a nice suit you're wearing.

The writer: First suit I ever had made to order. ...

The girl: Who you with?

The writer: Paramount.

The girl: Got a good assignment?

The writer: Swell.

The girl: Really? Or are you kidding again?

The writer: I haven't been kidding.

(W. Saroyan, *What We Want Is Love and Money*)

10. Lord Caversham and Lady Chiltern, society people, talk about Lord Goring, Lord Caversham's son.

Lord Caversham: Good evening, Lady Chiltern! Has my good-for-nothing young son been here? ...

Mabel Chiltern: Why do you call Lord Goring good-for-nothing?

Lord Caversham: Because he leads such an idle life.

Mabel Chiltern: Why, he rides in the Row at ten o'clock in the morning, goes to the Opera three times a week, changes his clothes at least five times a day, and dines out every night of the season. You don't call that leading an idle life, do you?

(O. Wilde, *An Ideal Husband*)

- Task 172.** Analyze the structure of the following telephone conversations from fiction.

#### 1. Seeking an Appointment

Denton: Jordache? That you?

Rudolph: Yes. Who's this?

Denton: Professor Denton.

Rudolph: Oh, how are you, sir?

Denton: I hate to bother you. But can I see you sometime today?

Rudolph: Of course. I'm in the store all day.

Denton: I'd prefer it if we could meet somewhere besides the store. Are you free for lunch?

Rudolph: I just take forty-five minutes...

Denton: That's all right. We'll make it someplace near you. How about Ripley's? That's just around the corner from you, isn't it?

Rudolph: Yes. Is twelve-fifteen all right?

Denton: I'll be there, Jordache. Thank you, thank you. It's most kind of you. Until twelve-fifteen, then. I can't tell you how I appreciate ... (*He seemed to hang up in the middle of his last sentence*)

## 2. The New House Rule

Willie: Yes?

Jack (*from the reception desk*): Captain Abbot?

Willie: Yes.

Jack: We believe there is a young lady in your room.

Willie: I believe there is. What of it?

Jack: You have a single room for the occupancy of one individual.

Willie: All right. Give me a double room. What's the number?

Jack: I'm sorry, every room is occupied. We're booked until November.

Willie: Let's pretend this is a double room, Jack. Put it on my bill.

Jack: I'm afraid I can't do that. Room 777 is definitely a single room for a single occupancy. I'm afraid the young lady will have to leave.

Willie: The young lady isn't living here, Jack. She isn't occupying anything. She's visiting me. Anyway, she's my wife.

Jack: Do you have a marriage certificate, Captain?

Willie: (*After a pause*) She left it home. We'll show it to you tomorrow. I'll have it sent down by special delivery.

Jack: Captain, young ladies are against the rules of the establishment.

Willie: Since when?

Jack: We are under new management now. We are creating a different image of a well-known respectable hotel. If the lady is not out of there in five minutes, Captain, I'm coming up.

Willie: All right, Jack.

## 3. Reporting a Missing Person

Mr Hendricks: Amity Police, Patrolman Hendricks. Can I help you?

Mr Foote: This is Jack Foote, over on Old Mill Road. I want to report a missing person. Or at least I think she's missing.


Mr Hendricks: Say again, sir?

Mr Foote: One of my house guests went for a swim at about one this morning. She hasn't come back yet. Her date found her clothes on the beach.

Mr Hendricks: What was the person's name?

Mr Foote: Christine Watkins.

Mr Hendricks: Age?



date says that's about right.

Mr Hendricks: Height and weight?

Mr Foote: Wait a minute. (*There was a pause.*) We think probably about five-seven, between one-twenty and one-thirty.

Mr Hendricks: Color of hair and eyes?

Mr Foote: Listen Officer, why do you need all this? If the woman is drowned, she's probably going to be the only one you have — at least tonight, right? You don't average more than one drowning around here each night, do you?

Mr Hendricks: Who said she drowned, Mr Foote? May be she went for a walk.

Mr Foote: Stark naked at one in the morning? Have you had any reports about a woman walking around naked?

Mr Hendricks: No, Mr Foote, not yet. But once the summer season starts, you never know what to expect. Color of hair and eyes?

Mr Foote: Her hair is... oh, dirty blond, I guess. Sandy, I don't know what color her eyes are. I'll have to ask her date. No, he says he doesn't know either. Let's say hazel.

Mr Hendricks: Okay, Mr Foote. We'll get on it. As soon we find out anything, we'll contact you.

#### 4. Refusing to meet the press

Duchess: The Duchess of Croydon speaking.

Correspondent: Ma'am, we've a flash from Associated Press and there's just been a follow-up ... Pardon me. (*There was a rustle of paper, then the voice resuming.*) Sorry, ma'am. I'll read this to you. "London — Parliamentary sources here-to-day name the Duke of Croydon, noted British government trouble shooter, as Britain's next ambassador to Washington. Initial reaction is favourable. An official announcement is expected soon." There's more, ma'am. I won't bother you with it. Why we called was to see if your husband has a statement, then with your permission we'd like to send a photographer to the hotel. Ma'am, are you still there?

Duchess: Yes. At the moment my husband has no statement, nor, will he have unless and until the appointment is officially confirmed.

Correspondent (*the voice sounded disappointed*): We'll run what we have, of course, in the next edition.

Duchess: That is your privilege.

Correspondent: Meanwhile, if there's an official announcement we'd like to be in touch.

Duchess: Should that occur, I'm sure my husband will be glad to meet the press.

Correspondent: Then we may telephone again?

Duchess: Please do.

### 5. Leaving a Message

Mr Clark: Mrs Henderson?

Mrs Henderson: Yes.

Mr Clark: Ma'am, my name is Ray Clark. I'm a friend of Mutt's and Jiggs Caseys. Jiggs gave me your phone number and told me to call when I got to town. I just missed Mutt in Washington.

Mrs Henderson: Oh, that's too bad. Mutt got in late Monday, but he had to go right out to the base. I'm afraid he'll be there through the weekend.

Mr Clark: Any way I can reach him?

Mrs Henderson (*laughing*): If you find out, please tell me. I don't even know where it is.

Mr Clark: You mean you've never seen it?

Mrs Henderson: Well, he did show me the general direction once when we were driving over to White Sands, so at least I know my husband's not in Alaska.

Mr Clark: Service wives have it rough.

Mrs Henderson: You're not in the service? (*Mrs Henderson's voice became guarded.*)

Mr Clark: Oh, sure. (*Clark lied.*) That's how I know how it is. Or, rather, my wife does. They keep me travelling all the time.

Mrs Henderson: Oh. (*She sounded relieved.*) Well, tell me where you are stopping, and if he does get home, I'll have him call you.

Mr Clark: Sorry. (*He lied again.*) I've got to fly to L. A. this afternoon. Just tell him Ray called. And thanks anyway, Mrs Henderson.

- Task 173. Continue the following telephone conversations, paying particular attention to their structural organization.

1. Mike phones Lucy at 4.35 in the morning.

Mike: Lucy? (*A man's voice answers*) May I speak to Lucy? ...

Lucy: Is that Mike again?

Mike: Hullo, Lucy. How are you?

Lucy: I'm fine, Mike.

Mike: Good.

Lucy: Mike, you telephoned me at four-fifteen. Do you know what time it is now?

Mike: What time is it now?

Lucy: Four-thirty-five.

Mike: Am I being a nuisance, is that it?

Lucy: No, no. Just, is there anything I can do for you? I mean, do you want something and feel unable to express yourself?

Mike: I'm bored.

(W. Trevor. *The Day We Got Drunk on Cake*)

2. After breakfast Mr Ashenden rings up Alroy Kear.

Mr Ashenden: I hope I didn't wake you.

Alroy Kear: Good God, no. I've been up since seven. I've been riding in the park. I'm just going to have breakfast. Come along and have it with me.

Mr Ashenden: I have a great affection for you, Roy but I don't think you're the sort of person I'd care to have breakfast with. Besides, I've already had mine.

(W.S. Maugham, Cakes and Ale)

- **Task 174\***. Most of the important characteristics of telephone conversation are of course essentially the same as those of conversation which takes place face to face. There are, however, a number of differences which result from the medium of communication and the restrictions which it imposes. Try to find these differences judging from your own experience that you have gained while making phone calls.
  
- **Task 175.** Fillers are indispensable when the feedback must be given vocally [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 102]. In face-to-face conversations, we often nod or glance at someone instead of giving a vocal feedback. In fact, if you send out vocal feedback in ordinary conversations as often as you do in telephone conversations, it sounds very strange. The speaker will probably be irritated with you and think that you are not very relaxed. Try it out in a conversation with your partner.
  
- **Task 176.** Point out hesitations, repairs, repetitions and fillers in the following extract taken from a conversation between two teachers, discussing over coffee the topic of sex education [Milroy, Milroy, 1992: 142].

A: it's very awkward/ it's difficult mind you/ with a class of thirty odd/-occasionally with the second form/ -you get-you know/, well we'll, we'll- have erm- a debate/-

B: m/

A: what do you want to talk about/ and this is something I usually spend one lesson arranging what they want to talk about/ and then- tell them to go away and think about it/ and we- have the discussion a later.a later lesson/ and often enough/. round about the second form/ oh/. sex before marriage sir/ or just sex/ instruction/ or should sex be taught in schools/ you know/

### 13.3. CONTRIBUTIONS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CONVERSATION ANALYSIS

There was a tendency among linguists and people in general to use the written language as a yardstick against which to measure all types of language. This is clearly wrong. The spoken language is primary relative to the written language, in the development both of the individual and of the species [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 188].

Resorting to conversation analysis, pragmalinguists pointed to the value of everyday conversation and raised the status of natural and spontaneous spoken language.

Conversation analysis has made a great contribution to the description of talk in a wide range of private and public settings. Its insights are valuable to understand patterns of individual relations between interactants, individuals' positions within larger institutional structures and overall societal organization. What is also important is that CA has taken the study of discourse firmly into a more dynamic realm of interaction away from the speaker centredness of speech act theory [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 21].

The strength of the CA is that the procedures employed have already proved themselves capable of yielding by far the most substantial insights that have yet been gained into the organization of conversation [Levinson, 1985: 287].

This is not to say that CA is without its critics. The most contested notion in relation to CA is that of 'context'. Indeed, what CA programmatically assumes to be the sole (and sufficient) source of its analysis is, as John Heritage [1984: 1-2] points out, the organization of talk itself. The initial and most fundamental assumptions of conversation analysis is that all aspects of social action and interaction can be examined in terms of the conventionalized or institutionalized structural organizations. These organizations are treated as structures in their own right, independently of the psychological or other characteristics of particular participants.

The data consist of tape-recordings and transcripts of naturally occurring conversation, with little attention paid to the nature of the context as that might be theoretically conceived within sociolinguistics (e.g. whether the participants are friends or distant acquaintances, or belong to a certain social group, or whether the context is formal or informal, etc.) [Levinson, 1985: 149].

The ethnographic critique of CA's disregard for the cultural and historical context of interactions is summarised by Alessandro

Duranti [1997]. Although he does not dismiss CA's methods and observations about interaction cannot be accessed without attending to the context of conversational interaction. There are examples of studies which combine CA with attention to the cultural detail characteristic of the ethnographic approach [Moerman 1988; Ochs 1988; Besnier 1989].

- **Task 177.** Each nation has its own conversation style. It is reported of the African people that turn-taking is pre-allocated by the rank of the participants, so that if A is of higher social status than B, and B than C, then the order in which the participants will talk is A-B-C [Levinson, 1985: 301]. The British consider it impolite to interrupt, while the Latins interrupt all the time. In contrast, Orientals pause before responding, not because they have reservations about what has been said but because they wish to consider it properly. They find it hard to say 'No' and will often say 'Yes' even when it is hard for them to deliver. Participants avoid eye contact in the Far East, and are sensitive to 'seniority' based on age, status or gender [Swallow, Khan-Panni, 2003: 16]. Characterize some aspects of conversational organization in your culture and other cultures of the world you are familiar with.
  
- **Task 178\***. Share your ideas about the art of conversation.

## PART VI

# QUANTITATIVE METHODS OF ANALYSIS



### Unit 14

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#### STATISTICAL METHODS

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##### **14.1. DEFINING STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

An important and promising trend in modern linguistics which has been making progress during the last few decades is quantitative study of language phenomena and application of statistical methods in linguistic analysis [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 185].

**Statistics** is a branch of mathematics dealing with collection, classification, analysis, and interpretation of numerical facts or data.

Originally associated with government data (e.g., census data), the subject now has applications in all the sciences. Statistical tools not only summarize past data through such indicators as the mean and the standard deviation but can predict future events using frequency distribution functions. Statistics provides ways to design efficient experiments that eliminate time-consuming trial and error. By use of mathematical theories of probability, hypothesis testing, least squares method, regression statistics imposes order and regularity on aggregates of more or less disparate elements. Double-blind tests for polls, intelligence and aptitude tests, medical, biological and industrial experiments as well as research into linguistic phenomena all benefit from statistical methods and theories.

**Statistical linguistics** follows certain rules of mathematical statistics. It is generally recognized as one of the major branches of linguistics. There was a considerable growth of interest and activity in statistical linguistics in the 1960s-80s.

One of the first attempts to introduce statistical methods in linguistics was made by an American scientist G.K. Zipf in his book

## Human Behaviour and the Principle of Least Effort [1949] and other

writings. G.K. Zipf is considered a pioneer in linguistic statistics.

Having discovered that there is a direct relationship between the number of different meanings of a word and its relative frequency of occurrence, G.K. Zipf put forward a mathematical formula for this correlation, claiming that the number of meanings in any polysemantic word will tend to be equal to the square root of its relative frequency (with the possible exception of the few dozen most frequent words of a language), so that

$$m = F^{\frac{1}{2}}$$

where  $m$  stands for the number of meanings,  $F$  for relative frequency of occurrence.

This formula for correlation between polysemy and word frequency (termed the "principle of diversity of meanings" by Zipf) is known as **Zipf's law**. Probably it is the best known result achieved in the field of statistical linguistics.

Though numerous corrections to this law have been suggested by subsequent authors, still there is no reason to doubt the principle itself, namely, that the more frequent a word is, the more meanings it is likely to have.

His other formula suggests that if the words in a long text are ranked in order of decreasing frequency of occurrence in the text, so that the most frequent word has the rank  $r=1$ , the next frequent has the rank  $r=2$ , and so forth, then the product of the rank  $r$  and the frequency  $f$  for any word in the text will be approximately the same constant  $c$ , where  $c$  depends on the length of the text.

**Efficient statistical methods extensively employed in linguistics nowadays are:** chi-square ( $\chi^2$ ), contingency coefficient, correlation analysis, coefficient of concordance and the so-called sign test [Левицкий, Стернин, 1989: 7; Перебийніс, 2002: 108].

**Chi-square ( $\chi^2$ )** is generally applied to find out the difference between the observed and expected values, e.g. frequencies of occurrence of some language phenomenon. Besides it is applied to find out whether the frequencies of occurrence are interdependent.

**Contingency coefficient (K)** shows the measure of interdependence between the two language phenomena.

**Correlation analysis** is a very effective method of statistical analysis. Correlation implies the degree to which two or more attributes or measurements on the same group of elements show a tendency to vary (increase or decrease) together. One of a number of

measures of correlation is correlation coefficient, usually assuming values from +1 to -1. In linguistics this coefficient is used to measure mutual relationship between language units (e.g. lexemes), which are in certain paradigmatic or syntagmatic relations.

**Coefficient of concordance (W)** is used to establish to what degree the interviewees show agreement while evaluating some language phenomena.

**Sign test (+ or -)** is used to determine statistical significance of a number of phenomena in relation to certain characteristics.

**Confidence coefficient and significance level (P)** are used to check the reliability of the results obtained. If it is said that some language phenomena is established with significance level  $P = 0,05$ , this means that the possibility of error is 5 %. The level of 5 % is considered minimum in statistics for the obtained results to be proved reliable. If the demands for reliability are higher the level is  $P = 0,01$  and even  $P = 0,001$ .


- **Task 179.** According to Zipf's law, the greater the relative frequency of the word, the greater the number of elements that constitute its semantic structure, i.e. the more polysemantic it is. This regularity is of course statistical, not a rigid one. Word counts show that the total number of meanings separately registered for the first thousand of the most frequent English words is almost 25,000, i.e. the average number of meanings for each of these words is 25. Consult a comprehensive explanatory dictionary to find out how many meanings the following most frequent words have: a) *book, friend, money, woman*; b) *bring, look, love, write*; c) *black, blue, good, new*.

## 14.2. APPLICATIONS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Statistical analysis has a wide field of application. Statistical techniques have been successfully applied in the analysis of different structural types of words, affixes, theoretical problems of meaning (polysemy, homonymy, synonymy, semantic laws), paradigmatic relations of lexical units, word collocability, semantic fields, functional styles, vocabularies of great writers and average speakers, etc.

Statistics describes how things are on the average. For modern linguists it is not enough to know that it is allowable for a given structure to appear, they are interested in its frequency, in how often it appears. In linguistics **frequency** is viewed as one of the most elementary instruments to watch the process of statistical laws.

**Frequency is the main criterion for classification of facts**, it is the criterion of comparison of investigated units or their combinations.



Frequency can help to find common or distinctive features in the course of comparison.

Every linguistic research is based on collecting sample material, in other words, examples. Having, on the basis of preliminary study, determined the object of research, i.e. the problem to be investigated and the set of units or phenomena to be described, the linguist proceeds to collect and classify data. To know how many examples are necessary to make the conclusions valid, one must determine the relative frequency of the phenomenon or unit under study. Mathematical statistics supplies researchers with **formulas showing the necessary size of sample material** depending on the amount of error they are prepared to tolerate. Following certain rules of mathematical statistics, scholars must be able to state their margin of error and to say in what relationship their data stand to the whole body of similar language phenomena.

The first requirement for a successful statistic investigation is the representativeness of the phenomenon in question, its relevance from the linguistic point of view. Statistical regularities can be observed only if the phenomena under analysis are sufficiently numerous and their occurrence is very frequent.

Analizing frequency, we get information as to **structural, semantic and etymological peculiarities of the word**. If the word has high frequency of occurrence, it is, usually, monomorphemic, polysemantic, stylistically neutral. From the etymological point of view it is either native or borrowed in the early period of borrowing.

Linguists consider frequency to be one of **functional characteristics of texts**. The same lexical units can be used in different functional styles. These lexical units in different functional styles are in different proportion, so each style can be described through the number of its statistical frequency characteristics. The peculiarity of functional styles lies not only in selection of words, but also in the number of usage and in combinability. Quantitative methods help to discover the inner peculiarities of the text, which cannot be found without statistics.

Frequency can serve not only as the marker of different functional styles, but also as the marker of the **individual style**, which every author uses. The calculation of different units in the works of one and the same author as well as in the works of different authors gives true information as to the individual author's style.

Counts were made for the **vocabularies of great writers and average speakers.**

Pierre Guiraud, one of the most prominent representatives of statistical linguistics, has estimated that the 'passive' vocabulary of an average educated person comprises about 20,000 words. Only a small part of these is often used. The frequency distribution presents great interest [Arnold, 1986: 289]:

The first **100** most frequent words make up **60%** of any text.

The first **1000** most frequent words make up **85%** of any text.

The first **4000** most frequent words make up **97.5%** of any text.

It follows that the rest of the words (about 15,000) take only 2.5% and thus occur very rarely. The most frequent are form words; on the average they take about 33% of a text and sometimes as much as 50%. In writing, for instance, the most frequent word is *the*; in telephone conversations the first person singular pronoun *I*.

The figures are of course closely dependent on the type of speech and material analyzed. Thus, some linguists find that in colloquial speech it is only 50 most frequent words that account for about 60%. Even with a vocabulary of 20,000 words one can manage to get along for only 10 or 15 words on the average, before one repeats oneself.

The statistical approach proved essential in **selection of vocabulary items of a foreign language for teaching purposes.** It is common knowledge that very few people know more than 10% of the words of their mother tongue. Hence, if teachers do not wish to waste time on committing to memory vocabulary items which are never likely to be useful to the learner, they have to select only lexical units that are commonly used by native speakers. Out of about 500,000 words listed in Oxford English Dictionary (OED) the 'passive' vocabulary of an educated person comprises no more than 30,000 words and of these 4,000 — 5,000 are presumed to be amply sufficient for the daily needs of an average member of the English speech community. Thus, it is evident that the problem of selection of teaching vocabulary is of vital importance. It is also evident that by far the most reliable single criterion is that of frequency as, presumably, the most useful items are those that occur most frequently in our language use [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 186].

This has led to the establishment of 'frequency lists' or 'pedagogical vocabularies', which are now widely taken into account by the authors of textbooks and dictionaries for foreign learners. As far back as 1927, recognizing the need for information on word

frequency for sound teaching materials, E.L. Thorndike brought out a

list of 10,000 words occurring most frequently in a corpus of five million running words from forty-one different sources. In 1944 the extension was brought to 30,000 words.

Other frequency dictionaries and tables of word frequencies were designed for spelling reforming, psycholinguistic studies, and for all-round synchronic analysis of Modern English, etc. In the 1950s-70s there appeared a number of frequency dictionaries for the purposes of automatic analysis of scientific and technical texts and for teaching purposes [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniv, 1998: 146].

It goes without saying that, to be useful in teaching, statistics should deal with meanings as well as sound-forms as not all word-meanings are equally frequent. Besides, the number of meanings exceeds by far the number of words. The total number of different meanings recorded and illustrated in OED for the first 500 words of *The Thorndike Word List* is 14,070, for the first thousand it is nearly 25,000. Naturally, not all the meanings should be included in the list of the first two thousand most commonly used words.

The statistical analysis of **meaning frequencies** resulted in the compilation of *A General Service List of English Words with Semantic Frequencies* (1953). The semantic count is a count of the frequency of occurrence of various senses of 2,000 most frequent words as found in a study of five million running words. The semantic count is based on the differentiation of meanings in OED and frequencies are expressed as percentage, so that the teacher and textbook writer may find it easier to understand and use the list. An example will make the procedure clear:

Word	Meanings	Examples	Frequency
room (n)	'part of a building'	come to my room, bedroom, sitting room, bathroom	83%
	'space available'	takes up too much room, not enough room to turn round	12%
	'suite, lodgings'	my room in college, to have rooms near the university,	2%

It can be easily observed from the semantic count above that the meaning 'part of a house' (*sitting room*, *drawing room*, etc.) makes up 83% of all occurrences of the word *room* and should be included in the list of meanings to be learned by beginners, whereas the meaning 'suite, lodgings' is not essential and makes up only 2% of all occurrences of this word.

One of the most promising trends in statistical inquiries is the analysis of **word collocability**. It is observed that words are joined together according to certain rules. The linguistic structure of any string of words may be described as a network of grammatical and lexical restrictions [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 188].

The set of lexical restrictions is very complex. On the standard probability scale the set of (im)possibilities of a certain combination of lexical units ranges from zero (impossibility) to unit (certainty). Some words, for instance, never occur together and some words always occur together in collocations.

Of considerable significance in this respect is the fact that high frequency value of individual lexical items does not forecast high frequency of the word-group formed by these items. Thus, for example, the adjective *able* and the noun *man* are both included in the list of 2,000 most frequent words, the word-group *an able man*, however, is very rarely used. The importance of frequency analysis of word-groups is indisputable as in speech we actually deal not with isolated words but with word-groups. Attempts have been also made to elucidate this problem in different languages.

Collocability of lexical items may be determined with the help of some statistical devices [Бистрова, 1978; Бистрова, Шевченко, 1987; Левицкий et al., 1987; Романова, 1986, 1990].

The following formula is used to establish syntagmatic correlation between two lexical units:

$$x^2 = \sum \frac{(O - E)^2}{E},$$

where  $O$  stands for observed frequency,  $E$  for expected frequency of occurrence calculated on the basis of observed.

Chi-square ( $x^2$ ) is a quantity equal to the summation over all variables of the quotient of the square of the difference between the observed and expected values divided by the expected value of the variable. Chi-square as the criterion of independence merely indicates the presence or lack of mutual relationship between two or more lexical units under analysis.

Coefficient of mutual collocability  $K$ , on the other hand, is a measure of the degree of association between two or more lexical units (the degree to which they show a tendency to collocate) and usually assumes values from 0 to 1.

$$K = \sqrt{\frac{x^2}{r - C}}$$

where  $x^2$  stands for the criterion of independence,  $r$  for the rank number of the lexical item.

The tables below present some research results on the dependence of lexical collocability of adverbs with verbs upon the so-called 'tense forms' in modern English and American prose, poetry and press [Романова, 1986; 1990].

These results were obtained with the help of criterion of independence  $x^2$  and coefficient of combinability K.

#### Observed and Expected Frequencies of Occurrence of Adverbs with Verbs

Tenses	Adverbs						Total amount
	of time	frequency	place	cause	manner	degree	
The Indefinite Tenses	O: 1362 E: 1363	1326 1463	774 726	191 193	2998 2821	286 287	6937
The Continuous Tenses	O: 94 E: 278	46 72	31 35	11 9	145 139	15 14	342
The Perfect Tenses	O: 271 E: 215	383 219	65 108	31 29	248 423	41 43	1039
The Perfect Continuous	O: 6 E: 5	5 5	4 2	0 0.7	6 10	4 1	25
<b>Total amount</b>	<b>1733</b>	<b>1760</b>	<b>874</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>3397</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>8343</b>

#### Chi-Square Values

Tenses	Adverbs					
	of time	frequency	place	cause	manner	degree
The Indefinite Tenses			18.8		106.4	0.06
The Continuous Tenses	9.76			0.23	0.42	0.05

The Perfect Tenses	20.31	177.2		0.16		
The Perfect Continuous Tenses	0.16		0.81			8.85

NB: 3.84 is the critical value of  $\chi^2$ : if  $\chi^2$  is less than 3.84, there is no dependence of verb-adverb collocability on the tense-forms.

#### Values of Combinability Coefficient K

Tenses	Adverbs					
	of time	frequency	place	cause	manner	degree
The Indefinite Tenses			0.047		0.113	
The Continuous Tenses	0.034					
The Perfect Tenses	0.049	0.146				
The Perfect Continuous Tenses						0.033


Growing interest in **lexicometric study** of word meaning is one of the typical features of present-day linguistics [Бережан, 1973; Левицький, 1975; Бартков, 1981; Шехтман, 1986; Левицький, 1989; Білинський, 1999; Гасько, 2005].

Lexicometric analysis allows researchers to identify the regularities of word usage, establish paradigmatic relations between the elements in the semantic structure of the word, or measure the degree of semantic proximity between two separate words. On the whole, it gives a clearer picture of the semantic structure of words to be presented in various types of dictionaries.

Lexicometric methods of research are especially helpful in the study of synonymy, which is considered one of modern linguistic's most controversial problems.

Synonyms are usually defined as words having the same or nearly the same meaning in the language, as *joyful, elated, glad*.

Synonyms are semantically very close, nevertheless, they differ in terms of their semantic structure. Total (absolute) synonymy is a rare occurrence in the vocabulary system. If two words exactly



coincide in meaning and use the natural tendency is for one of them to change its meaning or drop out of use [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 99]. Thus, synonyms are words only similar but not identical in meaning. This definition is correct but vague. A more precise definition of this difference in meaning may be expressed numerically using a mathematical formula suggested by S.G. Berezhан [Бережан, 1973: 65]:

2c

$$v = \frac{c}{n+m},$$

where c stands for the number of coinciding lexico-semantic variants of a synonymous pair, n, m — the number of meanings each separate word has.

v is a pairwise coefficient of semantic proximity for every separately taken pair of words.

If there are synonymous relations between the two words, the value of v is greater than 0 and less than 1 ( $0 < v < 1$ ).

According to M.E. Bilynsky [1999: xxi], the need for the awareness of lexical proximity when studying or making use of the language is only too apparent:

- which of the two words is a closer synonym to the third one;
- is it possible to single out two words located at the same distance from their synonym;
- what are the cases in which the meaningful relatedness of two words is so loose that they can hardly be referred to as synonyms;
- do the words differ in terms of the sheer number of synonyms and their proximity;
- are there any words which are devoid of close synonyms?

The solution to these as well as other practical problems will be a lot easier should we know the semantic distances between the words in question.

To have something tangible to work on it is convenient to compare some synonyms and their coefficients of synonymous proximity taken from *The Dictionary of Semantic Proximities* compiled by M.E. Bilynsky [Білинський, 1999]. The prime aim of this dictionary lies in visualising the extent of semantic resemblance of the verb to its synonyms. The said task has been accomplished through the lexicometric reversal of Webster's New World Thesaurus (Prentice

Hall Press, 1985). The obtained product is the first in its kind dictionary of the unevenly tight synonymous scales of verbs for the entire lexical-semantic system of English. The dictionary presents the synonymy of over 5,500 monolexemic (non-phrasal) verbs.

The semantic proximity of the headverb of the dictionary entry to its synonym is determined by the numerical factor  $w$  the value of which lies within the range of  $0.00 < w < 1.00$ . This factor amounts to the weight of the synonym in the semantics of the series dominant by the direct thesaurus. It takes into account the ordinal number of the synonym within the series  $r$  as well as the series length  $n$  and is determined by the formula:  $w = (n+1-r) : n$  suggested by V. V. Levitsky and I.A. Sternin [Левицкий, Стернин, 1989: 40].


In the wake of reversing *Webster's New World Thesaurus* the verb which happens to be the series dominant in the latter is ascribed the value of the synonymous affinity factor equalling 1.00. This verb is placed at the head of the reverse synonymous string. It duplicates the name of the entry in the present dictionary of semantic proximity and is included into the overall number of the reverse synonymous string constituents given in brackets. The values of the synonymous affinity factor are scaled in the gradually descending order, in the event of equal values the respective synonyms being adduced alphabetically:

**ABHOR** (7) abhor (1.00); hate (to detest, 0.95); abominate (0.75); detest (0.75); loathe (0.75); execrate (to detest, 0.50);

**DEBASE** (20) debase (1.00); disgrace (0.96); humiliate (0.96); bastardize (0.80); depress (to bring to a lower state, 0.78); alloy (to devalue, 0.75); debauch (0.75); defile (corrupt, 0.75); cheapen (0.73); flatten (to make flat, 0.56); demoralize (to corrupt, 0.50); deprave (0.50); soil (to disgrace 0.50); sully (to defame, 0.50); taint (to corrupt, 0.50); vitiate (to violate, 0.50); adulterate (0.46); bow (to bend, 0.46); dirty (0.18); abuse (to treat badly, 0.12);

**EMERGE** (8) emerge (1.00); appear (to become visible, 0.91); loom (to appear large and imposing, 0.89); result (0.83); flow (to issue forth, 0.78); materialize (to develop, 0.50); escape (0.31); evolve (0.25).

Quantitative scaling of synonymous affinity between words models the compactness of synonyms within the series showing the changeability of the step distancing each subsequent synonym from the headverb. It also points out the proximity of the headverb to its closest as well as most distant synonym. Cases of absolute and relative equalness in synonymous proximity as well as cases of varying proximity including those brought about by polysemy are revealed



as well as for the psycholinguistic verification of the proximity grading of synonymous verbs on the part of those who already have a command of the language and also for solving miscellaneous problems of cognitive linguistics [Bilinsky, 1999: XXV].

Statistical approach has been successfully applied in the experimental investigation of various linguistic issues (experiments, tests and personal interviews).

Eleanor Heider [1971, 1972], for instance, set out to explore the problems of colour categorization and colour naming. She worked with pre-school children and with members of a non-Westernized culture in Papua New Guinea, the Dani. Earlier research had shown that the language spoken by the Dani contained only two basic colour terms, in contrast to the 11 basic colour terms available to speakers of English. Like children, the Dani were therefore particularly well suited as uncorrupted informants for colour categorizing experiments. English-speaking adults, who were supposed to have the full system of basic colour terms at their disposal, were only used as control groups in some of the tests.

E. Heider's first experiment [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 6-9], which was to test the arousal of attention (or stimulus selection), was dressed up as a 'show me a colour' game. She gave 3-year-old children arrays of colour chips consisting of one focal colour, and seven other chips of the same hue, but other levels of brightness. The children were told that they were to show the experimenter any colour they liked. The reasoning behind this game was that young children's attention would be attracted more readily by focal colours than by other colours. In fact, it turned out that the children did pick out focal chips more frequently than non-focal chips. The preponderance of the focal chips was particularly strong for the colours yellow, orange and green, where 22, 21 and 11 respectively out of the total of 24 children selected the focal chip from the array. For the other five hues, the numbers were smaller, but still statistically significant.

The second experiment consisted of a learning task testing retention of previously unknown colour names in long-term memory. This experiment exploited the fact that, because of their limitation to two basic colour terms, the Dani could be taught additional ones under controlled conditions. Before the test began, the Dani informants were told that the experimenter would teach them a new language. At the start, the 16 colour cards (again eight focal colours

and eight non-focal colours) were laid out in random order and the Dani were told the name for each card. (The names used were the names of Dani clans.) After their first display the cards were gathered into a pack, shuffled and presented one by one to the Dani, who were asked to produce the name of each colour. They were praised for every correct response and told the correct name when they were wrong. This procedure was repeated five times a day until the Dani managed to get all 16 answers right.

A detailed record was kept of the whole learning process, which took three and a half days on average. This record supplied the means of measuring the ease of retention of focal and non-focal colours because it allowed a statistically significant computation of all the correct and incorrect answers. Whereas, on average, the Dani gave 9.9 incorrect answers per colour for non-focal colours before they produced their first completely correct run, the mean number of errors per colour for focal colours was only 7.3. Even without previous knowledge of the colour names, the Dani associated focal colours more rapidly with their names than non-focal colours.


The relevant experimental findings are as follows: 1) focal colours are perceptually more salient than non-focal colours; 2) focal colours are more accurately remembered in short-term memory and more easily retained in long-term memory; 3) the names of focal colours are more rapidly produced in colour-naming tasks and are acquired earlier by children. All in all, focal colours appear to possess a particular perceptual-cognitive salience, which is probably independent of language.

What is important is that all types of concrete entities and natural phenomena like colours are conceptually organized in terms of focal (or prototype) categories, whose boundaries do not seem to be clear-cut, but fuzzy.

How can the **fuzzy nature of category boundaries**, which intuitively seems to be a convincing notion, be investigated empirically? This was the task which William Labov set himself in a series of experiments involving cups and cup-like containers [Labov 1973, 1978].


According to W. Labov [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 16-19], the subjective aspect of vagueness may be thought of as the lack of certainty as to whether the term does or does not denote; and this may be transformed into the consistency with which a given sample of speakers does in fact apply the term. If all informants in a test call an object *chair*, the consistency is 100 per cent, if half the informants

have doubts whether a certain object is still a chair and therefore do



not call it *chair*, the consistency value will drop to zero. If hardly any of the informants regard an object as a chair and refuse to call it a *chair*, the consistency value will approach zero.


The actual test procedure of W. Labov's experiments was very simple: informants were shown line drawings of cups and other vessels [Labov, 1973: 354].



The drawings were presented one by one and the informants were asked to name them (additional descriptive details supplied by the informants were neglected in the analysis).

The results of the naming task were statistically analyzed in terms of consistency and presented as 'consistency profiles'.


Figure below [Labov, 1973: 354; cited in Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 17] presents the consistency profile for the vessels shown in the top row of drawings above.



As the graph for the use of *cup* indicates, consistency is 100 per cent for vessel numbered 1 but decreases as we proceed towards vessel numbered 5.

In the first test the informants were only confronted with the drawings, but not given any background information (this was called 'neutral context'). In the subsequent three tests they were asked to imagine one of three different scenes: (a) a coffee-drinking situation, (b) a dinner table situation with the object filled with mashed potatoes ('food context') and (c) a scene where the objects were standing on a shelf with cut flowers in them. In later experiments different materials like china and glass were introduced as well.

The result of including these variables was a massive shift of category boundaries. To give just one example, in a food context, vessel numbered 3 was no longer a *cup* for the majority of the informants. Half the informants called it *bowl* in spite of its unchanged shape, and this switch towards *bowl* was even more pronounced for vessel numbered 4.



In choosing cups and cuplike containers for his experiments W. Labov could rely on 'width', 'height/depth' and 'shape', i.e. on generally accepted 'logical' properties of the dimension type. The dimensions had the advantage that they could be varied under controlled conditions, and these variations could be easily and unequivocally represented in line drawings.

In the drawings the variation of the dimensions is based on the 'prototypical' cup numbered 1. In the top row the height (or depth) of the vessels is kept constant while the width is extended

~~systematically~~ from vessel to vessel. Conversely, in the second row

the width of vessels is identical, but from left to right the vessels become deeper and deeper. Other scalar variations used by Labov concerned the shape of the vessels and involved cylinders, truncated cones, etc. In addition, W. Labov used attributes like 'context' or 'function' ('neutral/ coffee/ food/ flower context'), 'material' (glass, china) and 'presence/ absence of handle(s)', all of them 'non-scalar' attributes at first sight.

To bring these diverse attributes in line with dimensions, W. Labov defined the specific width/height ratios of his test vessels as discrete values on the width and height dimensions. In the same way the attributes involving context, material and handles were interpreted as values on a dimension: the neutral, coffee, food and flower contexts as values on the 'context' dimension, glass and china as values on the 'material' dimension; presence and absence of handles as two values on the 'handle' dimension.

How did these attribute values show up in the actual test results, i.e. the use of *cup* or *bowl* or *mug* for certain vessels? According to W. Labov, the use of these words reflected the 'weighted' acceptability judgements of test subjects. These judgements were weighted in the sense that the different values of the attributes involved led the subjects to choose different names for the test vessels. If the 'prototypical' cup (vessel numbered 1) was called *cup* by all test subjects, this judgement could be related to the fact that vessel numbered 1 represented the favourite width/height ratio in a neutral context. Vessel numbered 2 was still overwhelmingly called *cup* because it represented a very similar width/height ratio. In contrast, vessel numbered 4 was assessed as a borderline case of '*cup*' because its width/height ratio differed markedly from the favoured value. If the use of *cup* was extended by the test subjects in a coffee context and reduced in a food context, this was due to the interaction of the width/height ratio with the respective values on the 'context' dimension.

While such three-variable constellations could still be documented in consistency profiles (as shown in Figures above), the more complex interactions could only be mastered by mathematical formulas and probability calculation.

In this way W. Labov's experiments show that the fuzziness of category boundaries has many facets, of which context-dependence is one of the most important.

- **Task 180.** Investigation of school vocabulary at the elementary level, which was based on textbooks at hand in Ukraine shows that verbs of broad semantics (*be, have, do, take, give, make, come, go, get, keep* and others) make up a group that has high frequency of usage [Kuveneva, Ridkokashna, 1999: 71]. For example, in the text of 5 million words the verb *do* occurs 12,840 times, *go* occurs 8,760 times, *take* occurs 7,008 times, *make* occurs 9,600 times, *come* occurs 7,337 times. Complete the table below representing frequencies of occurrence of these verbs in texts. Working in groups, compare your results.

#### Frequencies of Occurrence of Verbs of Broad Semantics


Verbs of Broad Semantics	Frequency of Occurrence (per 5 million words)	
	absolute	calculated by percent %
come	12,840	
do	8,760	
go		
make		
take		
<b>Total amount</b>		

- **Task 181.** Comment on the duality of synonyms which is, probably, their most confusing feature: they are somewhat the same, and yet they are, most obviously, different. Consult a comprehensive explanatory dictionary to trace some distinctive features within their semantic structure. How do coefficients of semantic proximity to the synonymous dominant [Білинський, 1999] help to differentiate the meanings of synonyms?

- 1) **do** — act (0.97), perform (0.94), make (0.67), commit (0.50), execute (0.50), perpetrate (0.25);
- 2) **get** — receive (0.87), earn (0.85), catch (0.80), accept (0.75), acquire (0.75), win (0.75), gain (0.68), obtain (0.68), find (0.25);
- 3) **give** — administer (0.94), provide (0.73), inflict (0.33);
- 4) **put** — lay (0.75), place (0.75), deposit (0.25).

- **Task 182.** Comment on the similarities of meaning of the following synonyms, as illustrated by coefficients of semantic proximity to the synonymous dominant. Then consult a comprehensive explanatory dictionary to trace some distinctive features within their semantic structure [Гасько, 2005].

1) **strong** — potent (0.333), firm (0.315), staunch (0.266), sturdy



(0.250), solid (0.222), sound (0.181), tough (0.181), male (0.153), (0.125), robust (0.125), stalwart (0.125), virile (0.125), stout (0.117).

2) **weak** — flaccid (0.285), frail (0.285), puny (0.285), feeble (0.250), flimsy (0.250), faint (0.222), delicate (0.222).

- **Task 183.** Draw pictures of prototypical examples and of objects on the borderline between the categories BOTTLE, GLASS, VASE and BOWL, and use them as stimuli for a naming task with your friends or family [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 20].
- **Task 184.** The names of category prototypes tend to come to mind before those of peripheral examples. Check this hypothesis with two informal tests: ask one group of friends to name as quickly as they can five types of dogs, birds, trees, and cars, and a second group to rate these example for their goodness-of-example status within the category. Compare the results and discuss reasons for discrepancies between the two tests [Ungerer, Schmid, 1996: 20].

#### 14.3. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS OF STATISTICAL METHODS IN LINGUISTICS

There are many ways in which statistical methods can be usefully applied to linguistic problems. When combined with automatic computational tools (computerized mathematical analysis), statistical methods enable analyses of a scope of material not otherwise feasible. At a practical level, computers specially programmed to accept linguistic data, perform prescribed mathematical operations at high speed, and display the results of these operations have already been applied with good effect to a wide variety of linguistic data.

Statistical inquiries have considerable importance in **computational linguistics** which deals with the study of the applications of computers in processing and analyzing language, as in automatic machine translation and text analysis.

The statistical approach has become very popular in linguistics, not only because of the precision and objectivity which it is held to guarantee, but also because language is a mass phenomenon *par excellence*, which seems to invite this kind of treatment [Ullmann, 1975: 12].

Statistical approach is most helpful when we have large masses of data to analyze. A single observation may not be reliable, whereas a correctly executed statistical study shows trends, the most typical properties and correlations, provided that the units for analysis are well chosen and sufficiently defined and that the factors we decide to take into consideration (or disregard) correspond to the purposes of the study.

Probably, one of the most important things for modern linguistics was the realization of the fact that non-formalized statements are, as a matter of fact, unverifiable, whereas any scientific method of cognition presupposes verification of the data obtained. The value of statistical methods as a means of verification is beyond dispute [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 185].

It should be pointed out, however, that **the statistical study of the language has some inherent limitations** [Soloshenko, Zavhorodniev, 1998: 188-189].

Firstly, the statistical approach is purely quantitative, whereas most linguistic problems are essentially qualitative. To put it in simpler terms, quantitative research implies that one knows what to count and this knowledge is reached only through a long period of qualitative research conducted upon the basis of certain theoretical assumptions. For example, even simple numerical word counts presuppose a qualitative definition of the lexical items to be counted. In this connection different questions may arise. For instance, is the orthographical unit *work* to be considered as one word or two different words: *work* noun — (*to*) *work* verb? Are all word-groups to be viewed as consisting of so many words or are some of them to be counted as single, self-contained lexical units? In some dictionaries word-groups of the type *by chance*, *at large*, *in the long run*, etc. are counted as one item though they consist of, at least, two words, in others they are not counted at all but viewed as peculiar cases of usage of the notional words *chance*, *large*, *run*, etc. Naturally, the results of word counts largely depend on the basic theoretical assumption, i.e. on the definition of the lexical item.

We also need to use qualitative description of the language in deciding whether we deal with one item or more than one, e.g., in sorting out two homonymous words and different meanings of one word. Consequently, before counting homonyms one must have a clear idea of what difference in meaning is indicative of homonymy. From the discussion of the linguistic problems above we may conclude that an exact and exhaustive definition of the linguistic

~~Qualitative aspects of the items under consideration must precede the~~

statistical analysis.

The usual criticism against the application of mathematical conceptions in linguistics is that the formulas and models arrived at when mathematics is applied to linguistic problems, tell us nothing new and nothing worth knowing about the linguistic side of the phenomena [Arnold, 1986: 286].

It is also true that a lot of quantitative research has been done inappropriately on discourse data, through gross coding of language forms and expressions which hide significant functional/contextual/inferential differences [Malinowski, Coupland, 1999: 37].

Secondly, we must admit that not all linguists have the mathematical equipment necessary for applying statistical methods.

In fact, what is often referred to as the statistical analysis is purely numerical counts of this or that linguistic phenomenon not involving the use of any mathematical formula, which in some cases may be misleading.

Statistical analysis follows very exactly the procedures of mathematical statistics. This requires serious mathematical training. Unfortunately, only a small minority of linguists have the mathematical knowledge necessary for understanding these methods, so that they are very often unable to verify the relevance of the mathematical apparatus introduced into some linguistic publications [Ullmann, 1975: 13].

The situation was neatly summed up a quarter of a century ago by one of the champions of mathematical linguistics: 'both philology and mathematics are essentially esoteric subjects, the latter more so than the former' [Ullmann, 1975: 13-14]. This means that statistical data will not be intelligible to someone who is not a mathematician and the philology will, at the best, be difficult for someone who is not a philologist.

But even a traditionally trained linguist must acquire some rudiments of statistical analysis so as to be able to determine the necessary size of sample material that can provide reliable data.

Statistical analysis is applied in different branches of linguistics as a means of verification and as a reliable criterion for selection of the language data provided qualitative description of lexical items is available.

Quantitative methods play a significant role in linguistic investigations. Nevertheless, research shouldn't be overfilled with figures. Quantitative methods are used for establishing certain

regularities and making qualitative conclusions about functioning of linguistic units.

- Task 185.** Write down your own qualitative interpretation of the numerical data on the dependence of lexical collocability of adverbs with verbs upon the so-called 'tense forms' in modern English and American prose, poetry and press presented above. Exchange and discuss your ideas with a partner.
  
- Task 186\*.** In recent years, quantitative methods of description and analysis have resulted in considerable advances in our detailed understanding of the relationship between linguistic choice and various social characteristics of the speaker. The figures below show the frequency with which speakers from different social backgrounds, in Norwich and Detroit, have been shown to say things like *he go*, *she run* rather than *he goes*, *she runs* [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 45]. Analyze these statistical data about the relationship between language and social class obtained from sociolinguistic studies carried out in Britain and America and write your qualitative conclusions.

#### Use of Verbs without -s in Norwich and Detroit (percentage of speakers by class)

	<b>Norwich</b>	<b>Detroit</b>
Upper middle class	0	1
Lower middle class	2	10
Upper working class	70	57
Middle working class	87	62
Lower working class	97	71

It is quite clear from this that the so-called 'correct' form (*he goes*, *she runs*) is normally used by only a minority of native speakers — certainly no more than 30 per cent. Why is it then that the majority are said to be wrong while the minority are said to be right? Exchange and discuss your ideas with a partner.

## Unit 15

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### CORPUS-BASED APPROACHES TO LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

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#### 15.1. DEFINING TEXT CORPORA AND CORPUS-BASED ANALYSIS

**Corpus** (*pl. corpora*) is a body of utterances (as words, sentences, or texts) assumed to be representative of and used for lexical, grammatical, or other linguistic analysis.

Thus for, instance, when Philip Johnson-Laird and Keith Oatley (1989) collected the emotion words in English from various dictionaries for investigation, their corpus amounted to no less than 590 items. To give an idea of the variety of English emotion terms, here is a list of items related to *fear*: *scared*, *fright*, *frightened*, *terrified*, *petrified*, *horrified*, *dread*, *alarmed*, *panic*, *anguish*, *anxiety*, *worried*, *concerned*, *apprehension*, *shame*, *embarrassment*.

Text corpora for linguistic analysis are nowadays stored on computers. Computerized corpora are used to replace manual investigation of the corpus which is time-consuming.

Commonly available computer-based corpora are:

- the **Longman/Lancaster English Language Corpus**, representing written texts from ten major topical domains (e.g. natural science, social science, fiction, etc.);
- the **London-Lund Corpus** and the **Spoken English Corpus**, representing spoken texts collected in a range of situational settings (e.g. face-to-face conversations, interviews, sports broadcasts, sermons, etc.);
- the **Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus (LOB)**, the **British National Corpus (BNC)** and the **Cobuild Corpus**, representing a variety of written and spoken texts of British English;
- the **Brown University Corpus** and the **Longman Corpus**, containing all types of written texts and real conversations of American English;
- the **International Corpus of Learner English (ICLE)** and the **Longman Learner Corpus**, containing essays written by learners of English from different countries;

- the Louvian Corpus of Native English Essays (LOCNESS), containing argumentative essays covering a variety of topics written by native-speaker American students.

These corpora, stored on computers, provide access to many millions of words of spoken and written material in modern English.

**Corpus Linguistics** recognized as one of the major branches of Linguistics deals with the analysis of large computer-based text corpora to provide linguists with important new insights into language phenomena.

There are three **basic advantages to the use of computerized text corpora for linguistic analysis**:

1. Text corpora provide large empirical databases of natural discourse, so that analyses are based on naturally-occurring structures and patterns of use rather than intuitions and perceptions, which often do not accurately represent actual use.

2. They enable analyses of a scope of material not feasible otherwise, allowing researchers to address issues that were previously intractable. The fact that corpora data is in machine-readable form makes it possible to analyze much more data than before and conduct large-scale linguistic analyses.

3. One of the major advantages of using computer corpora is that the data can be submitted to text handling software tools, thereby making it possible to automate part of the linguistic analysis.

Bengt Altenberg and Sylviane Granger [2001] describe several analytical tools which are useful for phraseological studies. Among those are the **lemmatizer**, the **concordancer**, and the **collocation display**.

The **lemmatizer** enables researchers to group all the inflectional forms of the lemma (search word itself, a word or phrase that is glossed), e.g. *make* — *make*, *makes*, *making*, *made*. The advantage of using this facility is that it is then possible to create a concordance for the lemma rather than having to create concordances for each verbal form.

The **concordancer** is a concordance sorting facility which searches for definite words in a text and sorts them into lines. Concordances are commonly generated from computer-based corpora to provide an exhaustive listing of the use of a word in its immediate textual contexts.

Any word can become the focus of a concordance. The following table presents a small portion of the concordance listing for *certain* in the Longman/Lancaster Corpus [Biber et al., 1994: 177]:

# Sample concordance listings for certain

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**from the Longman/Lancaster Corpus**

---

1.  
to boys. For both are treated in the same way up to  
*a certain age*.  
Discrimination does begin fairly early, however, despite the staunch refusal
  2.  
much about the physical-material aspect of the matter. Let us now turn  
*to certain non-material*  
aspects. There can be no doubt that the idea of
  3.  
this statement. We, or rather our hunting ape ancestors, became infantile  
*in certain ways*  
but not in others. The rates of development of our
  4.  
by gross national product. Perhaps it cannot be measured at all except  
*for certain symptoms*  
of loss. However, this is not the place to go
  5.  
to the ambient temperatures required by farm livestock. There  
*are certain fundamental*  
differences between ruminant animals and pigs and poultry which makes
  6.  
the following positions. Considering the way the human eye is constructed, it  
*is certain that*  
it will never see the galloping horse as it
  7.  
She had been thinking about it ever since she'd heard, and she  
*was certain he*  
hadn't killed his wife, but she wondered if he had
- 

Concordancing software enables researchers to identify patterns that exist in authentic language that are not easily identifiable from a casual inspection of the printed text. Researchers can therefore study the contexts in which particular words occur.

Collocate display is used to automatically sort concordance lines according to their different collocational patterns. This tool

displays the words adjacent to a search word within a collocation 'horizon' (or span) which can go up to 25 words. Entries can be sorted according to their collocates on both the left and the right.

The tool is fast and very user-friendly and is therefore a good starting-point for identifying collocates in computer corpora.

The following table summarizes major collocational patterns for *certain*, giving an overview of the use of *certain* in the Social Science and Fiction text categories from the Longman/Lancaster Corpus (Biber et al., 1994: 178].

**Comparison of average frequencies of collocations  
for *certain* in two text categories  
of the Longman/Lancaster English language Corpus:  
Social Science and Fiction**

	Average freq. of <i>certain</i> in Social Science	Average freq. of <i>certain</i> in Fiction
<b>Collocations with preceding words</b>		
a +	10.0	7.3
in +	3.7 *	0.3
of +	3.2 *	0.3
to +	2.0 *	0.4
. +	1.5 *	0.5
for +	1.5 *	0.4
that +	1.3 *	0.1
, +	1.2 *	0.3
under +	1.0 *	0.04
there BE +	0.7 *	0.3
it BE +	0.4	0.1
you/he/she/they BE +	2.5	6.4 **
I/we BE +	0.0	0.5 **
quite +	0.1	0.5
<b>Collocations with following words</b>		
+ kind(s)	1.4 *	0.05
+ amount(s)	1.2	0.8
+ aspect(s)	1.2 *	0.06
+ extent	1.0	0.1
+ type(s)	0.9 *	0.04
+ that	1.2	1.2

This table presents the average frequency (per 100,000 words) of different collocational pairs in texts from each of the two registers. Averages are based on 42 Social Science texts and 84



Collocations with preceding words are given in the top half of the table, while the bottom half presents the major collocations with following words. Those collocations that are significantly more frequent in Social Science are marked by a single \*, while those that are significantly more frequent in Fiction are marked by a double \*\*.

- **Task 187\***. The corpus-based analysis summarized in the table above highlights important observations about the use of *certain*. Try to identify and indicate them. Be ready to discuss your findings.
- **Task 188.** Examine the following concordance lines from a printed concordance [Lewis, 1997: 113] and draw up lists of major collocates of the words *measures* and *extent*. Compare your lists with the example sentences in one or more English/English dictionaries: are the examples similar or different?

view that, whatever broader measures were taken to deal with the past decade for concrete measures to protect the right to 'legal' discriminatory measures - for the most part and threatened draconian measures to root out corruption in support of the economy measures so that they could as come when even emergency measures may be necessary in co-operate 'to adopt firm measures to prevent such re-ated at the emphasis on legal measures and discouragement a consensus on a series of measures that two years ago take economic and political measures to achieve their scientific environmental protection measures - is the best the wide variety of responsive measures, emanating from belief that only normal security measures had been taken. <ately as a result of 'serious measures' by the authorities government will take severe measures against those responsible parliament approved special measures allowing the military and sport officials that stern measures would be taken if first time Peking has taken measures to express its dis-

selves to it, but the actual extent of the immunity is international practice". To an extent, the anger is to be possessed. The nature and extent of the control and that there was an enormous extent of subterranean wre leaders well before the full extent of the damage was probably to an even greater extent Hitler's image was the case before, to a growing extent of the person of the bing" - escalated rapidly in extent and ferocity. A total urbanite so as to clarify its extent and its limitations es were, however, to a large extent already introduced patient throughout. To some extent this is frustrating assault or battery. To that extent there may be said in acts of violence. So to what extent is juvenile violence

## 15.2. APPLICATIONS OF CORPUS-BASED ANALYSIS

A great number of linguistic issues is amenable to corpus-based investigations. Corpus-based analytical techniques are used to address a range of issues in various areas of research: English grammar, lexicography, stylistics, language acquisition and learning, contrastive linguistics, sociolinguistics, etc.

The storage of vast amounts of text on computer, together with sophisticated concordancing software, has begun to have a significant impact on language description and on language pedagogy. The theoretical impetus for this comes from Firthian linguistics and is in marked contrast to the more psycholinguistic approaches to language description which have been dominant for the last thirty years. In particular, lexical patterning is seen as the key to grammatical description [Owen, 1993: 167].

At a time when few linguists, other than lexicographers themselves devoted much attention to the study of lexis, and outlines of linguistics often contained little reference to dictionaries or to other methods in lexicology, J.R. Firth repeatedly stressed the importance of lexical studies in descriptive linguistics. He did not accept the equation of 'lexical' with 'semantic', and he showed that it was both possible and useful to make formal statements about lexical items and their relations. For this purpose Firth regarded the statement of collocation as the most fruitful approach [Halliday, 1991: 130].

J.R. Firth [1991: 74] argued that 'you shall know a word by the company it keeps'. His familiar example was that of *ass* which occurs (in a now defunct variety of English) in *you silly ass, don't be such an ass* and with a limited set of adjectives such as *silly, obstinate, stupid, awful* and (occasionally) *egregious*. But for Firth this keeping company, which he called 'collocation', was merely part of the meaning of a word.

Firth's 'meaning by collocation' is an abstraction at the syntagmatic level and is not directly concerned with the conceptual idea or approach to the meaning of words. One of the meanings of *night* is its collocability with *dark* and of *dark*, of course, collocation with *night* [Firth, 1991: 74].

Although in general the distribution of words may seem to be determined by their meaning in some cases, this is not entirely true. For example, *rancid* occurs with *bacon* and *butter*, and *addled* with *brains* and *eggs*, in spite of the fact that English has the terms *rotten* and *bad*, and that *milk* is never *rancid* but only *sour*. *Pretty child* and *buxom neighbour* normally refer to females; we should not normally

say *pretty boy* or *buxom man* though *pretty girl* and *buxom woman*

are quite normal. This characteristic of language is found in an extreme form in the collective words — *flock of sheep*, *herd of cows*, *school of whales*, *pride of lions* and the rather more absurd examples such as *chattering of magpies*, *exaltation of larks* [Palmer, 1991: 94].

Firth was concerned with such interesting co-occurrences, the 'mutual expectancy of words', as he put it. He saw collocation as just one of his levels of meaning. His followers have attempted to integrate it more closely to the other levels of linguistic analysis, to argue, for instance, that it may be handled within the level of lexis, which is related in a fairly direct and, in theory, precise way to grammar [Palmer, 1991: 97].

Considering the nature of collocational patterns in language, M.A.K. Halliday [1991: 131], for instance, suggests that it may be helpful to devise methods appropriate to the description of these patterns in the light of a lexical theory that will be complementary to, but not part of, grammatical theory. In other words the suggestion is that lexis may be thought of (a) as within linguistic form, and thus standing in the same relation to (lexical) semantics as does grammar to (grammatical) semantics and (b) as not within grammar, lexical patterns thus being treated as different in kind, and not merely in delicacy, from grammatical patterns. This view is perhaps implicit in Firth's recognition of a collocational level.

Halliday [1991: 135-136] also emphasized the importance of undertaking lexicogrammatical as well as lexical analysis, for it is not known how far collocational patterns are dependent on the structural relations into which the items enter. For example, if a *cosy discussion* is unlikely, by comparison with a *cosy chat* and a *friendly discussion*, is it the simple co-occurrence of the two items that is unlikely or their occurrence in this particular structure?

Fundamental tenets of Firthian linguistics laid the foundation of the new linguistic theory to have made use of the new corpus-based computational techniques — **corpus-based lexico-grammar**. The published evidence of this linguistic theory is a new substantial descriptive grammar of English, the *Collins Cobuild English Grammar* (subtitle: *Helping Learners with Real English*) [1990] developed at the University of Birmingham.

The impetus for the writing of a new reference grammar can be seen to have come from two directions: first, new insights into language structure afforded by concordances of very large amounts of corpus data and second, the need for a pedagogic reference book

which captured those insights and harmonized with new developments in language teaching [Owen, 1993: 167].

Two main strengths of this novel kind of grammar are identified: 1) more integrated view of the lexis/grammar relationship and new insights into lexico-grammatical patterning (grammatical abstractions are seen as dependent on lexical patterning); 2) reliance on actual corpus data — the campaign for real English.

A cornerstone of lexico-grammar is the belief that a description of the language should be organized much more closely around the ways in which words behave than around abstract structures into which we can slot items selected from a wordstock or 'lexicon'. This contrasts with the view of mainstream linguistics, which has generally regarded structure as in some sense primary, and lexis as a secondary, independent and largely unsystematized component of language [Owen, 1993: 168].

Traditional grammars have been interested in lexis only insofar as it is necessary for the illustration of syntactic structures: the assumption has often been that grammar is an activity which is mainly concerned with the description of syntax, and that the role of lexis is to fit into structural slots [Francis, Sinclair, 1994: 199]. In other words, grammar provides the overall patterns, vocabulary the material to put into those patterns.

*Cobuild Grammar* has made a significant move upwards a more lexical approach. Lexico-grammar demonstrates a distinct change in direction — there is the tendency to shift explanation from facts about constructions to facts about words.


The essence of the new approach called 'lexicalism' can be conveyed by the words of D. Wilkins [1972: 111] who reminded the ELT world in 1972 that 'without grammar very little can be conveyed, without vocabulary nothing can be conveyed'.

The central tenet of lexico-grammar is that language consists of grammaticalized lexis, not lexicalized grammar [Lewis, 1997: 33].

Lexical particularities are considered to derive their formal meaning not only from contextual extension of a lexical kind but also from the generalized grammatical patterns within which they appear, and, conversely, the recognition of general patterns is seen as justifiable only in response to selected comparisons of lexical combinations [Owen, 1993: 174].

A large proportion of what is regularly observable in language output cannot be accounted for by a model consisting of abstract formulations of rules of syntax supported by a 'lexicon' in which terms

items are marked with co-occurrence features on broad grammatical



classes such as NP. This traditional approach may give a false sense of security by suggesting that once learners have learnt some structures, using a few basic words, they can easily substitute new words to go into these structures [Owen, 1993: 174].

To illustrate this point, Charles Owen [1993: 174-175] considers a familiar idea that a sentence containing a transitive verb has a passive equivalent in which the direct object is moved to subject position: *She took us upstairs.* → *We were taken upstairs.* According to the rule, the following pairing ought also to be possible, but it is not: *She took a look upstairs.* → *A look was taken upstairs.* It might be said that this is an exception. This would imply that most sentences containing *take + direct object* are acceptable when passivized. In fact there are far too many uses of *take + direct object* which resist the formation of passive structures: *He takes a nap in the afternoon. I take exception to that. Lisa took charge for a few minutes. Such aggression may simply take the form of bad language.*

The following examples presumably occupy different positions on a scale of acceptability [Owen, 1993: 175]: 1) *Care should be taken ...* (seems unexceptional); 2) *Account should be taken ...* (seems possible, but formal); 3) *\*Part should be taken by children under the age of 10.* 4) *\*Stock should be taken of the situation.* Sentences 3 and 4 are not English.

Such examples provide weighty evidence that grammar and lexis cannot be forced apart. We have lived so long with the assumption that grammar is independent of lexical meaning that it will be surprising to many people to see that grammar and lexis are very closely related.

Many English words have several meanings and uses. Each meaning of a word may well have its own grammar.

Verbs referring to physical senses *see, feel, hear, smell*, for instance, when used to refer to the present time are typically preceded by the modal *can* (*can't*) rather than being in the simple present: *I can see George.* However some of the verbs can be used with other non-physical meanings, and in the other meanings the simple present tense is much used: *I see you had a good trip. Many people feel that he should resign immediately.*

Different meanings of a word are likely to occur in different structures. So a verb such as *see* in its physical meaning is likely to go along with noun that means what was seen, or perhaps an adverb such as *well* which gives an evaluation of the power of seeing. When

see is used to mean something like 'understand' it will be followed by a *that*-clause [Collins Cobuild English Grammar, 1990: viii].

*Cobuild Grammar* is considered a halfway house between grammars which ignore the meaning of words, and dictionaries which give some grammatical information [Collins Cobuild English Grammar, 1990: viii].

The information in *Cobuild Grammar* is taken from a long and careful study of a present-day English. Many millions of words from speech and writing have been gathered together in a computer corpus and analyzed, partly by a computer and partly by a team of expert compilers.

*Cobuild Grammar* attempts to make accurate statements about English, as seen in the huge computer corpus (Birmingham Collection of English Texts). The main patterns of English are picked out and described, and the typical words and phrase found in each pattern are printed in the grammar in a series of lists.

The examples given in traditional grammars have often been made up by grammarians rather than taken from real language in actual use. *Cobuild Grammar* uses authentic examples and reports corpus patterns as faithfully as possible.

In order to illustrate the unique value of the computerized corpus and the importance of corpus-driven grammatical description and explanation, Gill Francis and John Sinclair [1994: 196-199] look at one type of verb described in *Cobuild Grammar*, the ergative verb. Without a large corpus of natural language, a full and accurate picture of this interesting class of verbs would not be possible.

Ergative verbs are defined in *Collins Cobuild English Grammar* [1990: 155] as follows:

Some verbs allow you to describe an action from the point of view of the performer of the action or from the point of view of something which is affected by the action. This means that the same verb can be used transitively, followed by the object, or intransitively, without the original performer being mentioned.

In the clause *he narrowed his eyes in concentration*, *his eyes* is the object of the verb *narrow*, and *he* is seen as causing the process to happen. In the clause *his eyes narrowed angrily*, on the other hand, *his eyes* are the subject and are seen as performing the process by themselves: the cause is not mentioned. Ergative verbs, then, have the same thing as their object, when transitive, and as their subject when intransitive.



The intransitive use of agentless verbs then suppresses the agent completely, by presenting the process as agentless. In the real world, of course, there may well be some agent that is causing the process to happen, but this is not grammaticalized. In this the ergative differs from the passive. In passive constructions, the agent is very often suppressed, but there is always the option of mentioning it, typically in a prepositional phrase introduced by *by*.

We can find out which verbs are ergative only by using a large machine-readable corpus, accurately observed and described.

*Cobuild Grammar* [1990: 156] states that there are several hundred ergative verbs in regular use in current English, suggests a semantic categorization, and gives lists of ergative verbs with various types of meaning.

Many ergative verbs describe events which involve a change from one state to another state: *He was slowing his pace.* — *She was aware that the aircraft's taxiing pace had slowed.* *He should have closed the beaches.* — *The street markets have closed.* *The driver stopped the car.* — *A big car stopped.*

Here is a list of ergative verbs which describe events which involve a change of some kind from the *Cobuild Grammar* [156]:

age	continue	empty	rot	stop
begin	crack	end	shatter	stretch
bend	darken	fade	shrink	tear
bleach	decrease	finish	shut	thicken
break	diminish	grow	slow	widen
burn	disperse	improve	split	worsen
change	drown	open	start	
close	cry	quicken	stick	

There are many other ergative verbs which involve food, physical movement, and vehicles: *I'm cooking spaghetti.* — *The rice is cooking.* *The birds turned their heads sharply at the sound.* — *Vorster's head turned.* *She had crashed the car twice.* — *Pollock's car crashed into a clump of trees.*

Here is a list of verbs relating to food, physical movement, and vehicles [Collins Cobuild English Grammar, 1990: 157]:

back	defrost	move	run	steady
bake	drive	park	sail	swing
balance	drop	rest	shake	thicken
boil	fly	reserve	simmer	turn
cook	fry	roast	spin	
crash	melt	rock	stand	

The lists in Cobuild Grammar were made on the basis of a fuller list of 430 verbs that had this label in Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, which was compiled using a corpus of 20 million words. Ergative uses of verbs are increasing in the language. Some new ones which have emerged recently for example, are *organize*, *amalgamate*, *concertina*, *clarify*, *co-ordinate*, and *nose* as in the clauses *The car nosed into the city traffic*, and *I nosed the car onto the tracks* [Francis, Sinclair, 1994: 197].

The availability of a reasonably comprehensive list also allows researchers to make morphological generalizations about ergative verbs. For example, the suffix *-en* when added to an adjective or a noun, yields a verb which means either 'cause to become or become'. Thus *to lengthen* means 'to make longer or to become longer', and so on. Another frequent suffix for ergative verbs is *-fy*, which may also signal the ergative distinction, in such verbs as *ossify*, *putrefy*, and *solidify*. The suffix *-ate* yields another set, with such verbs as *accelerate*, *accumulate*, and *circulate*.

Observation of the corpus yields other interesting facts about the behaviour of ergative verbs. For example, there is a small group which always occur with an adverbial or prepositional phrase adjunct, whether transitive or intransitive, like the verb *nose* referred to above. There are others, like *originate*, which require an adjunct only when intransitive: *His melodies always originate inside his head*. Bentham did not originate this particular point of view. Here is a list of ergative verbs which usually have an adverbial adjunct when they are used intransitively [Collins Cobuild English Grammar, 1990: 157]:

clean	handle	originate	sell	wash
freeze	mark	polish	stain	

Some verbs are used ergatively with one or two nouns only. For example, you can say *He fired a gun* or *The gun fired*. You can also say *He fired a bullet*, but you would not normally say \**The bullet fired*. Here is a list of verbs which can be used ergatively with the noun, or kind of noun, that is given [Collins Cobuild English Grammar, 1990: 157]:

catch (an article of clothing)	ring (a bell, the alarm)
fire (a gun, a rifle, pistol)	show (an emotion, as fear, anger)
play (music)	sound (a horn, the alarm)

While looking at ergative verbs, researchers also find connections between these and another class of verb, the reciprocal verb. Reciprocal verbs are those like *meet* and *negotiate*, which

involve two or more individuals or groups interacting mutually, or participation jointly in the same action or event. Thus we have the

patterns *they met* and *X met Y*; *they negotiated* and *X negotiated with Y*. Some verbs are both reciprocal and ergative. *Combine*, for example, has the following patterns: *X and Y combined*, *X combined with Y*, and *Z combined X and Y*. The first and second of these patterns are intransitive and reciprocal, while the first and third are related as members of an ergative pair. Other verbs with this pattern are *merge*, *amalgamate*, and *integrate*. Then there is another interesting verb, *normalize*, which is ergative and reciprocal in a slightly different way, yielding the patterns *relations normalized*, *X and Y normalized relations*, and *X normalized relations with Y*. The second and third patterns are transitive and reciprocal, while the first and second are related as members of an ergative pair. So far, *normalize* is the only verb discovered with this particular behaviour, and it is difficult to think of further examples. There is every possibility, however, that with accurate observation, they will emerge from the corpus [Francis, Sinclair, 1994: 199].

Other restrictions emerge. *Wed*, for example, is an ergative-reciprocal verb which has an odd distribution of patterns: *X and Y wed*, *X wed Y*, and *X and Y were wed (by Z)*. The 'missing' pattern is *Z wed X and Y*, of which there is as yet no citation in the corpus. Again, this is the only verb actually coded so far as having this behaviour, and again, there is every possibility that there are more of them, and that if there are, they may be semantically linked in some way [Francis, Sinclair, 1994: 199].

In other words, facts like this may mean that there are a lot of one-member classes, where the grammar and the lexicon coincide precisely; there are simply some verbs which have behaviour peculiar to themselves. Or it may be that verbs like *normalize* and *wed* are part of hitherto unexplored sub-classes, with a behaviour pattern common to their members. Only further interrogation of the corpus will tell us. But whichever turns out to be the case, it is interesting for the grammarian, and makes the description of the language far more sensitive [Francis, Sinclair, 1994: 199].

Corpus-based research sheds new light on English grammar, and as a result it offers the possibility of more effective and appropriate pedagogical applications. A lexically based grammar calls for a lexically based teaching approach.

The lexical approach to language teaching has been exemplified by Michael Lewis [1993, 1997, 2000].

**The Lexical Approach** can be summarised in a few words: language consists not of traditional grammar (structure) and vocabulary (words) but of chunks which, when combined, produce continuous coherent text. The chunks are of different kinds and four different basic types are identified. One of these consists of single words while all the others are multi-word items (polywords, collocations, and institutionalized expressions) [Lewis, 1993: 92-94].

M. Lewis [1997: 15] provides the following checklist of some of the changes in both content and methodology which implementing the Lexical Approach involves:

**More attention will be paid to:**

- Lexis — different kinds of multi-word chunks: a central element of language teaching is raising students' awareness of, and developing their ability to 'chunk' language successfully.
- Listening (at lower levels) and reading (at higher levels).
- Activities based on L1/L2 comparisons and translation.
- The use of the dictionary and learner's corpus as resources for active learning.
- Probable rather than possible English.
- Organising learners' notebooks to reveal collocational patterns and aid retrieval.
- The language which learners may meet outside the classroom.
- Preparing learners to get maximum benefit from text.

**Less attention will be paid to:**

- Sentence grammar (single sentence gap-fill exercises, transformation practices, substitution drills).
- Words without the environment in which they occur.
- Indiscriminate recording of 'new words'.
- Talking in L2 for the sake of it (because you claim to use 'a communicative approach').

Like the Communicative Approach, the Lexical Approach places communication of meaning at the heart of language and language learning. This leads to emphasis on the main carrier of meaning, vocabulary. The concept of a large vocabulary is extended from words to lexis, but the essential idea is that fluency is based on the acquisition of a large store of fixed and semi-fixed multi-word prefabricated items [Lewis, 1997: 15].

One of the central specifically linguistic ideas of the Lexical Approach is that of **collocation**. Collocation is the readily observable phenomenon whereby certain words co-occur in natural text with

greater than random frequency: miss the bus, make a mistake, slump

dramatically [Lewis, 1997: 8].

Researchers have demonstrated the overriding importance of collocation in language: it is possible that up to 70% of everything we say, hear, read or write is to be found in some form of fixed expression [Hill, 1989: 53].

J.M. Sinclair [1988] has suggested the need for two models of language: *the open choice principle* and *the idiom principle*.

The open choice model of language divides grammar and lexis, and uses grammar to provide a string of lexical choice points. The principle of idiom is that a language user has available to him a large number of semi-preconstructed phrases that constitute single choices, even though they might appear to be analyzable into segments. The idiom principle is far from being a rather minor feature, compared with grammar, it is at least as important as grammar in the explanation of how meaning arises in text [Sinclair 1988: 322-324].

Recent work in computational linguistics and the analysis of large bodies of text has brought a sharper recognition of the importance of what are variously known as collocations, lexical phrases, preassembled chunks, prefabricated units and there is a growing recognition that these are by no means peripheral to language description [Wray, 2000].

Extensive work is being done in corpus linguistics in lexically conceptualizing language in terms of *The Idiom Principle*, *The Open Choice Principle*, fixedness and variability, and in describing the restrictions that different registers and genres place on collocational patterning and colligational complexity. Projects such as COBUILD have also demonstrated the powerful and all-pervading nature of collocational patterning across long texts.

Far from being of only theoretical interest, collocations can be taken into the classroom immediately [Lewis, 1997: 8].

Collocational patterns are seen as the core of word knowledge. M. Lewis [2000: 53] states that the more collocations learners have at their disposal, the less they need to grammaticalize, whereas J. Hill [1989: 62] further suggests that a student with a vocabulary of 2,000 words will only be able to function in a fairly limited way; a different student with 2,000 words, but collocationally competent with those words, will also be far more communicatively competent.

Most teachers of English will have noticed that their learners often have problems in choosing the correct combination of two (or more) words. Here are a few typical examples of wrong word collocations: \**feeble tea*, \**put up a campaign*, \**laugh broadly*, \**commit treachery*, \**hold a burial*, \**climb a horse*, \**healthy advice* [Bahns, 1993: 56]. Errors in the use of word collocations add to the foreign flavour in the learner's speech and writing and along with faulty pronunciation they are the strongest markers of 'an accent'.

One important need faced by an intermediate learner involves acquiring more medium-strength collocations. The term 'medium-strength' applies to collocations which are neither completely free nor completely fixed: that vast hinterland of collocability for frequent words moving from concrete to more abstract uses. For example, *claim luggage* can be judged as a free collocation, *claim attention* and *claim lives* as medium-strength collocation and *lay claim to* as an idiom [Lewis, 2000: 56].

This acquisition of medium-strength collocations can be achieved on the basis of noticing in new combinations the words which the learner already partially knows. This will expand the learner's repertoire of ready-made language and foster greater fluency. Learners should have their attention directed to, and record, as many collocations of common everyday use as possible. This is the way to enhance language development effectively.

The lexical approach is predicated on learners processing texts and identifying collocational patterning. The key role is assigned to sensitizing learners to useful lexical chunks in the text, and fostering their skill in observing and sorting phrasal patterns from the texts that they meet. That approach provides for increased proficiency, in both accuracy and fluency, as well as in more complex lexical patterning.

The Lexical Approach also makes an appeal towards using small native speaker corpora, concordances, and collocational dictionaries as the central resources for training learners to notice collocational patterns.

The major virtue of books by Lewis [1993, 1997, 2000] from a practical point of view lies in the rich abundance of concrete sample exercises and activities designed on lexical principles (*collocate deletion*, *sorting expressions*, *spaghetti matching*, *collocate search*, *collocation transparencies*, *examining words*, *word dominoes*, *collocation dictation*, *metaphor patterns*, *lexical chants*, *lexical crosswords*, *discussing fixed expressions*, etc.).

Corpus-based investigation leads to findings useful to

lexicography but not otherwise possible.

Current **corpus-based dictionaries** (e.g. the Cobuild series or Longman series of dictionaries including *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary* [1987], *Collins Cobuild English Words in Use — A Dictionary of Collocations* [1991], *Collins Concise Dictionary and Thesaurus* [1995], *Longman Dictionary of American English* [2002]) offer data retrieved from the vast resources provided by corpora and computer concordance programs.

The new edition of the *Longman Dictionary of American English* [2002], for instance, is based on the authentic language data in the Longman Corpus Network. Longman's unique computerized language database contains over 328 million words from all types of written texts, and from real conversations recorded across the US.

The Corpus shows how frequently words and phrases are used, so there is no guesswork in deciding what words and phrases students need to know most. The Corpus shows which grammar patterns are the most important to illustrate. It shows important new words and idioms that people use every day, and words that are frequently used together (called *collocations*). Sample sentences are taken from the Corpus, and this makes the language come alive as never before [Longman Dictionary of American English, 2002: ix].

Real example sentences, now from real conversations and texts, show how words are actually used. For the first time, words and phrases unique to spoken English are featured in an American learner's dictionary. Expanded coverage includes the latest terms from business, technology and the media, such as *downsize*, *website*, *infomercial* obtained from corpus data.

The writers of the dictionary have also analyzed the Longman Learner's Corpus, which is a computerized collection of over 8 million words of writing in English by learners of the language. By studying the errors students make in essays and exams, the writers were able to give clear, helpful usage information throughout the dictionary — in the definitions, example sentences, study notes, and usage notes — to help students avoid common errors [Longman Dictionary of American English, 2002: ix].

Concordances are an important aid to lexicographers in identifying the various senses of a given word, and they represent a major advance over the manual sorting of citation index cards (still practiced in some lexicographic organizations). Since manual techniques depend on the skill and coverage of human readers, there

is no assurance that all major senses of a word will be represented; further, manual techniques provide no reliable basis for assessing the relative frequency of different word uses. In contrast, concordances based on large text corpora can provide too much information, so that lexicographers are overwhelmed by the amount of data. For example, the concordance for *certain* extracted from a 10-million word sample of the Longman/Lancaster Corpus contains approximately 3,000 entries [Biber et al., 1994: 176]. Simply identifying the major patterns in a database of this size is a daunting task; to group different uses accurately and rank them in order of importance is not really feasible without the use of additional computational and statistical tools.

Corpus-based lexicographic research has shown that words and word senses have quite different distributions across registers (different text varieties) — and that our intuitions about a word often do not match the actual patterns of use.

J.M. Sinclair [1991] illustrates this latter point through an analysis of the word *back*. Most dictionaries list the human body part as the first meaning of *back*, and many people identify this as the core meaning. From analysis of the Cobuild Corpus, however, this meaning is seen to be relatively rare. Rather, the adverbial sense meaning 'in, to, or towards the original starting point, place or condition', which is not usually given prominence in dictionary listings, is the most common usage [Sinclair, 1991: 172].

It further turns out, however, that a corpus can give even more information about lexical use by adopting a register perspective. For example, analysis of the use of the word *back* in two registers from the Longman/Lancaster Corpus reveals important differences. In social science texts, the word *back* is by far most commonly used in an adverbial sense (e.g. *went back*, *came back*), supporting Sinclair's general conclusions. In fiction, though, the body part meaning (e.g. *my back*) is much more common than in social science (15.9 times per million words in social science versus 104.5 times per million words in fiction) [Biber et al., 1994: 176].

Findings of corpus-based research make it possible to consider the frequency of different word senses across various registers. Such information is now being incorporated in corpus-based dictionary projects, used for applications in language learning, and for automated computational processing of text.

Corpus-based analysis enables identification and interpretation of linguistic characteristics of different registers in a

language. Registers are defined as varieties of language typically used in a specific type of communicative setting. In an informal register, the register of scientific discourse.

There are several subdisciplines that focus on the linguistic analysis of text varieties and the differences among varieties. Within descriptive and socio-linguistics, there is a long tradition of research on 'registers', 'genres', and 'styles'. Within computational linguistics, research on 'sublanguages' deals with many of the same issues, with the ultimate goal of automatically processing texts from particular varieties with a high degree of accuracy. Finally, there has been considerable research of registers in language teaching focusing on student composition, as well as a number of rhetorical studies of particular genres.

Research in these subdisciplines tends to be empirical, based on analysis of some collection of texts. These studies typically focus on the description of particular linguistic features in particular text varieties. In addition to these research goals, however, a **corpus-based approach enables a variationist perspective** [Biber et al., 1994: 180]. Using computational (semi-)automatic techniques to analyze large text corpora, it is possible to investigate the patterns of variation across a large number of registers, with respect to a wide range of relevant linguistic characteristics. Such analyses characterize particular registers relative to the range of other registers, and they help to demonstrate the extent of the linguistic differences across registers.

Corpus-based approach to register analysis is illustrated using Biber's **multi-dimensional (MD) analysis** [Biber et al., 1994]. Studies in this framework have shown that there are systematic patterns of variation among registers; that these patterns can be analyzed in terms of underlying 'dimensions' of variation; and that it is necessary to recognize the existence of a multidimensional space in order to capture the overall relations among registers. Each dimension comprises a set of linguistic features that co-occur frequently in texts [Biber et al., 1994: 180].

The dimensions are identified from a quantitative analysis of the distribution of linguistic features in a sample of 481 texts (c. 960,000 words) from the LOB and London-Lund corpora.

First, the texts in these corpora were automatically analyzed for 67 linguistic features representing several major grammatical and functional characteristics, such as prepositional phrases, nominal forms, lexical classes (e.g. hedges, emphatics), and dependent

clauses. Second, the frequency of each linguistic feature in each text was counted, and all counts were normalized to their occurrence per 1,000 words of text. Third, a factor analysis was run to identify the co-occurrence patterns among linguistic features, that is, the 'dimensions'. Fourth, dimension scores were computed for each text, so that texts and registers could be compared with respect to each dimension. Finally, the dimensions were interpreted functionally, based on the assumption that linguistic features co-occur in texts because they share underlying communicative functions. Similarly, the patterns of variation among registers were interpreted from both linguistic and functional perspectives [Biber et al., 1994: 180-181].

Six major dimensions are identified. Each comprises a distinct set of co-occurring linguistic features; each defines a different set of similarities and differences among spoken and written registers; and each has distinct functional underpinnings. To illustrate, the table below presents the defining linguistic features for two of the dimensions: 'Involved vs Informational Production' (Dimension 1) and 'Non-Abstract vs Abstract Style' (Dimension 5) [Biber et al., 1994: 181].

**Summary of the linguistic features grouped on  
Dimensions 1 and 5**

DIMENSION 1	DIMENSION 5
<b>'Involved Production'</b>	<b>'Non-Abstract Style'</b> [No positive features]
Private verbs .96	
<i>that</i> -deletion .91	
Contractions .90	
Present tense verbs .86	<b>'Abstract Style'</b>
2nd person pronouns .86	Conjuncts —.48
DO as pro-verb .82	Agentless passives —.43
Analytic negation .78	Past participle
Demonstrative pronouns .76	adv. clauses —.42
General emphatics .74	BY-passives —.41
1st person pronouns .74	Past participle
Pronoun IT .71	postnominal cl. —.40
BE as main verb .71	Other adverbial
Causative subordination .66	suoordinators —.39
Discourse particles .66	
Indefinite pronouns .62	
General hedges .58	
Amplifiers .56	
Sentence relatives .55	
WH-questions .52	


Possibility modals	.50	
Non- phrasal coordination	.48	
WH-clauses	.47	
Final prepositions	.43	
<b>'Informational Production'</b>		
Nouns	—.80	
Word length	—.58	
Prepositions	—.54	
Type/token ratio	—.54	
Attributive adjs.	—.47	

Figure below presents the differences among ten spoken and written registers (including four subregisters from medical prose) within this two-dimensional space [Biber et al., 1994: 182].

The register characterizations reflect different relative frequencies of the linguistic features comprising Dimensions 1 and 5, listed above. For example, medical research articles and scientific prose have the largest negative scores on Dimension 1 (scores between — 18 and — 25 on the vertical axis); these scores represent very frequent occurrences of nouns, long words, prepositions, etc. (the negative features on Dimension 1), together with markedly infrequent occurrences of private verbs, *that*-deletions, contractions, etc. (the positive features on Dimension 1). Medical and scientific prose also have the largest negative scores on Dimension 5 (scores between — 5 and — 9 on the horizontal axis); these scores reflect very frequent occurrences of conjuncts, agentless passives, past participial adverbial clauses, *by*-passives, etc. (the negative features on Dimension 5). At the other extreme, conversations have the largest positive score on Dimension 1, reflecting very frequent occurrence of the positive features on that dimension (private verbs, contractions, etc.) together with markedly few occurrences of the negative features (nouns, long words, etc.). Conversations also have the largest positive score on Dimension 5, reflecting the near complete absence of conjuncts, agentless passives, etc.

As can be seen from the Figure, these ten registers are strikingly different in their linguistic characteristics, even within this two-dimensional space. For example, it shows that scientific prose and medical prose are quite different from the other eight registers in being extremely informational (Dimension 1) and abstract/ passive in style (Dimension 5). It further shows that there are systematic but much smaller differences among the four subregisters within medical

research articles; for example, Methods sections are marked as the most informational and abstract type of prose. At the other extreme, conversation is marked as being extremely involved and non-passive/non-abstract in its linguistic characteristics. Personal letters and interviews have similar characteristics, but the characterizations are not nearly as extreme as in conversations.



When all six dimensions are considered, the differences among registers are even more notable. These patterns show that there is no single register that can be identified as 'general English', for only few linguistic descriptions are adequate for a language as a whole. That is, languages are not homogeneous in their linguistic

characteristics. Rather, corpus-based analyses of large corpora show that there are important systematic differences among

registers at all linguistic levels [Biber et al., 1994: 183].

Researchers emphasize the implications of register varieties for language pedagogy: teachers of advanced students should focus on the English of particular varieties, in naturally-occurring discourse, rather than 'general' patterns that are culled from linguists' intuitions and do not accurately reflect the grammar of any variety.

It is important to teach the linguistic characteristics and functions of particular target registers, so that students will be able to control the language structures they encounter in actual discourse and to adjust their language use appropriately for different registers [Biber et al., 1994: 174].

There are numerous other areas that can be addressed from a corpus-based perspective.

One such area concerns **language acquisition and learning**. Currently researchers are using the corpus-based approach to explore a number of L1 and L2 acquisition issues, including the development of discourse competence and register awareness, and a comparison of spoken and written registers produced by children [Biber et al., 1994: 183].


Bengt Altenberg and Sylviane Granger [2001] investigate EFL learner use of high frequency verbs, and in particular the use of the verb *make*, a major representative of this group. The main questions addressed are: do learners tend to over- or underuse these verbs? Are high-frequency verbs error-prone or safe? What part does native language transfer play in misuse of these verbs? To answer these questions, authentic learner data has been compared with native speaker data using computerized corpora and linguistic software tools. The article focuses on what proves to be the two most distinctive uses of *make*, viz. the delexical and causative uses. Results show that EFL learners, even at an advanced proficiency level, have great difficulty with a high frequency verb such as *make*. In the conclusion, the pedagogical implications of the study are discussed and suggestions made for using concordance-based exercises extracted from native corpora as a way of raising learners' awareness of the complexity of high-frequency verbs.

A corpus-based approach also gives **new perspectives on areas that have been previously investigated**. For example, at Northern Arizona University, several corpus-based dissertation projects of this type have been recently carried out. Reppen has

investigated the development of writing skills in elementary school, across a number of genres and by students from different demographic backgrounds. White has investigated the linguistic characteristics of job interviews, comparing the discourse produced in different job situations, by interviewees from different backgrounds, including successful versus unsuccessful candidates. Burges has investigated the linguistic characteristics of written business communication (especially public memos), describing how social relations in the workplace are established and maintained by surface linguistic features. Conrad has investigated linguistic differences among professional journals, textbooks, and student writing across several academic disciplines. Although there have been previous studies on all these topics, the corpus-based approach facilitates investigations of a wider scope, enabling macroscopic analyses of the inter-relations among several different parameters of variation [Biber et al., 1994: 183-184].

A corpus-based approach is also well suited for **discourse comparisons cross-linguistically**. For example, Lux and Grabe describe two corpus-based analyses of this kind: comparing newspaper editorials in English and Brazilian Portuguese, and comparing university student writing in Ecuadorian Spanish and English. Biber compares the dimensions of variation underlying the range of spoken and written registers in English, Nukulaelae Tuvaluan, Korean, and Somali. In addition, a corpus-based approach can be used in diachronic studies. Biber and Finegan analyze the development of several written registers over four centuries, Atkinson presents a detailed investigation of the development of medical texts [Biber et al., 1994: 184].

Finally, there are a number of **social issues that could be investigated from a corpus perspective**. To date, most descriptions of social variation have focused on individual linguistic characteristics (e.g. different phonetic realizations of a vowel or consonant) across a relatively restricted range of language use. However, corpus-based analyses could be used to identify the patterns of co-occurring linguistic features underlying dialect variation, and to describe and compare complete dialects (defined by social class, education, gender, etc.). Such analyses could further include comparison of the range of spoken and written registers within each dialect, with the eventual goal of an integrated account of dialect and register variation in a language [Biber et al., 1994: 184].



deserve appears in two lists, one for verbs followed by a 'to'-infinitive only, and one for verbs which can be followed by either a 'to'-infinitive or a present participle. There is, of course, an explanation to do with meaning, which is so often forgotten by grammarians. Study the examples from the corpus [Francis, Sinclair, 1994: 195] and try to find a suitable explanation.

#### *-ing or infinitive*

the man	deserves	saving from your fire and brimstone
The occasion	deserved	solemnizing with a dry martini
I know I	deserved	getting shot, he said
theory which	deserves	mentioning on its own merits
people who	deserve	to be treated gently
cruel hunts	deserve	to be hounded out
he does not	deserve	to be dismissed
good buildings	deserve	to be preserved

#### *infinitive*

I did not	deserve	to go to prison
he did not	deserve	to lose his job as foreign editor
he did not	deserve	to win last night's vote
I think you	deserve	to know what it's about

- **Task 190.** Just as with ordinary verbs, some phrasal verbs are ergative verbs; that is, the object of the transitive verb can be used as the subject of the intransitive verb, e.g.: *I won't wake him up just yet.* — *He woke up in the middle of the night.* The guerrillas *blew up* the restaurant. — The gasworks *blew up*. Basing on the list of ergative phrasal verbs retrieved from the Cobuild Corpus [Collins Cobuild English Grammar, 1990: 167], suggest your own semantic categorization of these verbs.

back up	check in	get up	poke through	stick on
block up	check out	heat up	pull through	thaw out
blow off	cheer up	hurry up	rub off	wake up
blow up	chip off	line up	shut up	warm up
book in	close down	move down	sign up	wear down
break off	dry up	move on	slow down	wear out
break up	get down	move up	spread out	
build up	get off	open up	start off	
burn up	get through	peel off	stick in	

- **Task 191.** Using a corpus-based approach, all major uses of *make* were grouped into eight major categories [Altenberg, Granger, 2001: 177]:

1. Produce something (result of creation): *make furniture, make a hole, make a law.*
  2. Delexical uses: *make a distinction/a decision/a reform.*
  3. Causative uses: *make sb believe sth, make sth possible.*
  4. Earn (money): *make a fortune, make a living.*
  5. Link verb uses: *she will make a good teacher.*
  6. *Make it* (idiomatic): *if we run, we should make it.*
  7. Phrasal/prepositional uses: *make out, make up, make out of.*
  8. Other conventional uses: *make good, make one's way.*
- On the whole, category 3 — the causative category — is most common, followed by category 2 — the delexical category.

Study the list of major collocates of delexical *make* obtained from the corpus and suggest your own lexico-semantic classification:

*accusation, achievement, analysis, announcement, answer, apology, appeal, assertion, assessment, assumption, attempt, blunder, bounce, bow, calculation, call, change, choice, claim, clamour, classification, clatter, clutch, comment, comparison, compensation, complaint, compliment, computation, conclusion, confession, conjecture, contribution, copy, count, cry, cut, dart, dash, decision, din, disclosure, discovery, donation, effort, error, exchange, excursion, excuse, experiment, explanation, grab, guess, impression, improvement, investigation, investment, journey, jump, mark, mention, mistake, modification, movement, noise, note, oath, objection, observation, offer, outcry, payment, pledge, presumption, proclamation, profit, progress, promise, proposal, protest, purchase, racket, recommendation, reduction, reference, reform, remark, replacement, reply, report, request, research, resolution, response, report, reward, roar, room, rush, sail, scratch, selection, shout, smudge, snap, snatch, sound, speech, spot, stab, statement, step, study, suggestion, summary, supposition, swing, swish, switch, tear, threat, thrust, tour, transformation, travel, trip, visit, vow, voyage, way, wound, yell.*

- **Task 192.** Look through a modern corpus-based dictionary (e.g. *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary* [1987], *Collins Cobuild English Words in Use — A Dictionary of Collocations* [1991], *Collins Concise Dictionary and Thesaurus* [1995]). How are the contents different from a simple pocket dictionary? What is the role of corpus database in compiling this dictionary?
- **Task 193.** Take three scientific prose articles in your field and study them in the light of the corpus-based register analysis presented above. To what extent does the article fit the above description of scientific prose register? Write a short report of your analysis. Be ready to discuss it in class.

### 15.3. STRENGTHS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CORPUS-BASED RESEARCH

Corpus-based analyses can examine much more language data than otherwise possible, including more texts, longer texts, a wider range of variation (texts from different language varieties), a wider range of linguistic characteristics, and the systematic co-occurrence patterns, among linguistic features.

In addition to quantitative analyses previously not possible, corpus-based approaches thus allow investigation of issues such as register variation and the discourse factors influencing the choice among structurally related variants (e.g. adverb placement, or active versus passive constructions) [Biber et al., 1994: 170].

By utilizing large, diverse text corpora in conjunction with computational and quantitative tools (e.g. statistical analysis), corpus-based analyses have provided new insights into many areas of language structure and use. For example, numerous studies describing the formal variants and functions of particular grammatical constructions have been based on analysis of large text corpora (the bibliography compiled by Altenberg [1991] contains approximately 650 references to studies based on corpora) [Biber et al., 1994: 169].

Corpus data provides us with incontrovertible evidence about how people use language. It allows us to examine in a split second more language than we are likely to use in a lifetime. Because it is very new, and language is very complex, it is showing us many unexpected features – unexpected because unheralded by intuition [Francis, Sinclair, 1994: 191].

A corpus approach, because it is empirically based, also allows us to test assumptions about language use against patterns found in naturally occurring discourse. In fact, corpus-based research shows that the actual patterns of function and use in English often differ radically from prior expectations based on intuition.

However, corpus-based analysis also has some **restrictive weaknesses**.

While fully or semi-automatic corpus-based analysis yields some interesting quantitative results, a qualitative approach is necessary to explain them. Computer techniques and automatic computational tools have become popular but the burden of interpretation passes to the user.

In fact analytical software tools come with a warning against using computer tools to replace the human researcher. The computer is an awful device for recognizing patterns. It is good at addition, sorting, etc. It has a memory but it does not know or understand anything. Nevertheless, the computer is a good device for helping humans to spot patterns and trends. That is why it is important to see computer tools in their true light. A tool helps you to do your job, it doesn't do your job for you [Altenberg, Granger, 2001: 193].

Researchers need to directly study the patterns of language structure and use as they exist in real-world domains to obtain a solid empirical foundation for their research. Corpus-based analyses are particularly well-suited to research purposes of this kind.

The most obvious advantage that computer-assisted linguists have over their predecessors is the ability to store and retrieve for immediate inspection and comparison as many examples of a word or structure as desired. Established categories can be confirmed at a keystroke. Categories which were thought to be important, based on intuition, can be shown to be rather minor, at least in terms of frequency. Previously unsuspected categories can appear with startling clarity when concordances are consulted, delexicalization being a case in point [Owen, 1993: 178-179].

But availability of information does not guarantee accurate description. Much of the work in corpus-based research builds upon the findings of theoretical research. And, conversely, if the underlying theoretical research lacks an adequate empirical basis, applications of the corpus-based research are correspondingly flawed.

There are also age-old controversies about how big a corpus should be or whether a corpus can ever be considered reliable (questions about the comprehensiveness of the corpus and its size).

In spite of its limitations, corpus-based analysis plays a significant role in linguistic investigations.

Because corpus-based research examines a large amount of naturally-occurring language, it is particularly useful for comparing researchers' intuitions against actual patterns of language use and for analyzing complex linguistic issues. Given the explosion in the availability of on-line corpora and computational research tools, analyses and applications of corpus-based work should become increasingly common over the coming years [Biber et al., 1994: 184].

- **Task 194\***. There are many structural options for postnominal modification in English [Biber et al., 1994: 172]:



**A. Head noun + relative clause**

1. *the artist who stands out most prominently*
2. *the substance from which committees are formed*
3. *the little frowning smile she used*

**B. Head noun + participial clause**

4. *the transient current resulting from switching operations*
5. *any vessel owned by the plaintiffs*

**C. Head noun + prepositional phrase**

6. *talks on the protectorate's future*
7. *his seat at the breakfast table*
8. *a meeting of labour MPs*

**D. Head noun + infinitival clause**

9. *the person to see*

**E. Apposition (head noun + noun phrase)**

10. *Sir Roy's chief aide, Mr. Julius Greenfield*
11. *the bargedwellers, creatures neither of firm land nor water*

**F. Head noun + adjective phrase**

12. *an artist popular in the 60's*

Look at the table, which illustrates frequencies of different types of postnominal modifiers (per 1,000 words) in three registers in the LOB Corpus and a private corpus of letters (total number of words c. 115,000) [Biber et al., 1994: 173] and write generalized comments that highlight and compare this numerical data (your qualitative conclusions). Begin your commentary with: "As can be seen from the table, ...". Exchange and discuss your ideas with a partner.

**Frequencies of different types of postnominal  
modifiers (per 1,000 words) in three registers**

	Editorials	Fiction	Letters
Number of texts	27	29	6
<i>that</i> rel. clauses restrictive	1.8	0.7	0.5
WH rel. clauses restrictive	5.4	2.1	1.1
WH rel. clauses non-restrictive	1.9	2.2	0.3
Rel. clauses with no rel. pronoun	0.1	0.1	0.2
Participial post-nominal modifiers (past and present)	4.9	1.8	0.2
Prepositional phrases as noun modifiers	38.2	15.2	16.8
Prepositional phrases as verb modifiers	44.1	56.2	45.8

## ANSWERS TO TASKS

### UNIT 1

#### Task 4

2. English is a "fixed-word-order" language where each phrase has a fixed position. "Free-word-order" languages allow phrase order to vary. In an extreme case like the Australian aboriginal language Warlpiri, words from different phrases can be scrambled together: *This man speared a kangaroo* can be expressed as *Man this kangaroo speared*, *Man kangaroo speared this*, and any of the other four orders, all completely synonymous.

3. English is an "accusative" language, where the subject of an intransitive verb, like *she* in *She ran*, is treated identically to the subject of a transitive verb, like *she* in *She kissed Larry*, and different from the object of the transitive verb, like *her* in *Larry kissed her*. "Ergative" languages like Basque and many Australian languages have a different scheme for collapsing these three roles. The subject of an intransitive verb and the object of a transitive verb are identical, and the subject of the transitive is the one that behaves differently. It is as if we were to say *Ran her* to mean "She ran."

4. English is a "subject-prominent" language in which all sentences must have a subject (even if there is nothing for the subject to refer to, as in *It is raining* or *There is a unicorn in the garden*). In "topic-prominent" languages like Japanese, sentences have a special position that is filled by the current topic of the conversation, as in *This place, planting wheat is good or California, climate is good*.

5. English is an "SVO" language, with the order subject-verb-object (*Dog bites man*). Japanese is subject-object-verb (SOV: *Dog man bites*); Modern Irish (Gaelic) is verb-subject-object (VSO: *Bites dog man*).

6. In English, a noun can name a thing in any construction: *a banana*; *two bananas*; *any banana*; *all the bananas*. In "classifier" languages, nouns fall into gender classes like human, animal, inanimate, one-dimensional, two-dimensional, cluster, tool, food, and so on. In many constructions, the name for the class, not the noun itself, must be used — for example, three hammers would be referred to as *three tools*.

#### Task 5

1. English, like the inflecting languages it supposedly differs from, has an agreement marker, the third person singular -s in *He walks*. It also has case distinctions in the pronouns, such as *he* versus *him*. And like agglutinating languages, it has machinery that can glue many bits together into a long word, like the derivational rules and affixes that create *sensationalization* and *Darwinianisms*. Chinese is supposed to be an even more extreme example of an isolating language than English, but it, too,

contains rules that create multipart words such as compounds and  
 derivational affixes.

2. English, like free-word-order languages, has free ordering in strings of prepositional phrases, where each preposition marks the semantic role of its noun phrase as if it were a case marker: *The package was sent from Chicago to Boston by Mary; The package was sent by Mary to Boston from Chicago; The package was sent to Boston from Chicago by Mary*, and so on. Conversely, in so-called scrambling languages at the other extreme, like Warlpiri, word order is never completely free; auxiliaries, for example, must go in the second position in a sentence, which is rather like their positioning in English.

3. English, like ergative languages, marks a similarity between the objects of transitive verbs and the subjects of intransitive verbs. Just compare *John broke the glass* (*glass* = object) with *The glass broke* (*glass* = subject of intransitive), or *Three men arrived* with *There arrived three men*.

4. English, like topic-prominent languages, has a topic constituent in constructions like *As for fish, I eat salmon* and *John I never really liked*.

5. Like SOV languages, not too long ago English availed itself of an SOV order, which is still interpretable in archaic expressions like *Till death do us part* and *With this ring I thee wed*.

6. Like classifier languages, English insists upon classifiers for many nouns: you cannot refer to a single square as *a paper* but must say *a sheet of paper*. Similarly, English speakers say *a piece of fruit* (which refers to an apple, not a piece of an apple), *a blade of grass*, *a stick of wood*, *fifty head of cattle*, and so on.

### **Task 6**

#### **Phonological universals**

1. Every language has phonological components (phonemes), which are minimum (not further divisible) units of phonological system.

2. In every human language, redundancy measured in phonological terms, is about 50%. If redundancy tends to increase much above the figure, communication becomes insufficient and people speak faster. Decrease much below the figure leads to misunderstanding and people slow down.

3. Every phonological system contrasts phonemes that are typically stops and phonemes that are never stops. (Stops are sounds produced with complete oral closure and complete velic closure).

4. No phonological system has fewer than two contrasting positions of articulation for stops (e.g. labial vs lingual).

5. If a language has a vowel system, it has contrasts of tongue-height in that system.

### **Task 8**

German *wispern*, Norwegian *kviske*, Latin *susurrare*, French *chuchoter*, Spanish *cuchichear*, Russian *шептать*, Ukrainian *шепотити*.

**Task 9**

рука — hand, arm; нога — foot, leg; подорож — journey, travel, trip, tour, cruise, voyage; ще — still, yet, as yet, more, any more, again, else, but.

**UNIT 2****Task 12**

- 1) 1; 2) 3ab; 3) 3b; 4) 1; 5) 2; 6) 2; 7) 2; 8) 3d; 9) 3b; 10) 3bc; 11) 3ab;  
12) 3ab

**Task 22**

become pensive, become silent, become grey, grow/ go white, grow young, grow bald, be cold, be late, get wiser, fall asleep, turn red, be/ get bored, be mistaken

**Task 24**

The standard meaning of the pattern *transitive (ergative) verb + an adjective open + direct object* is defined by N. Amosova [Амосова, 1963: 206] as "to open by means of the action expressed by the verb".

**UNIT 4****Task 36****COME**

**VN:** I shall come myself. Another woman was coming our way. Casey had come a long way, my boy.

**VA:** His shoelace came undone. Our dreams had all come true. The welfare of my school comes first. Tony came alone, right on time.

**VD:** Her thoughts kept coming back. Now I come back to my first questions. If they don't come now, they are never coming.

**VVinf:** I only came to see if you wanted anything. I didn't come here to talk about my sister. He's coming here to work — not play.

**VVing:** Each time I came home I came crying. I'm glad you came looking for me. Everybody came running.

**VprpN:** I'll come in the morning. He's coming on business. The colour came to his cheeks. Jenny came into the room with a sad face.

**GO**

**VN:** We have to go one mile. That's the way it goes.

**VA:** The man went pale. But it's clear something went badly wrong. These apples have gone bad.

**VD:** They took the candle and went upstairs. Who goes there? That's going too far. The tourists went about freely.

**VVinf:** What are you going to do? She knew she was going to die.

**VVing:** The boys went swimming. They went side by side talking pleasantly.

**VprpN:** Let's go for a swim. The meal went in silence. They went in this direction. He went into great detail.

**VprpND:** Go around to the side entrance. I'd better be going back to my work now. Do they often go down to town?

#### TAKE

**VN:** She took his arm and led him to the door, I can't take any chances. Everything that I did that evening took a long time.

**VDVinf:** It did not take long to come to an understanding. It doesn't take much to make a man happy.

**VNN:** Then take the initiative yourself. It says to take one pill every two hours. Don't take it that way!

**VND:** The doctors say, I should take it easy. You could walk me home and then take a cab back. She took her work very seriously.

**VNVinf:** It would take time to see the answer. It would take six men to carry him back to the house.

**VNprpN:** She took him for a walk. Your grandchildren will have to take your word for it. He took a key from his pocket. The mother took her child in her arms. One must take it into consideration.

#### TALK

**VN:** The young man was talking nonsense. They talk a language of their own.

**VD:** The three women were talking quietly. The father talked softly because the children were not far off.

**VprpN:** He didn't want to talk about his work. They talk for several hours. They talked in whispers. They were talking of music. He couldn't talk to a girl like that.

#### TELL

**VN:** Ridges was telling lies. Tom could tell a good story. One cannot tell everything.

**VS:** He could tell that she was smiling. Soames could not tell whether he was glad of that knowledge. Now tell what happened next.

**VNN:** I shall tell you something. He told us a lie. I'll tell you the secret. What did you tell him? To tell you the truth, I wasn't there.

**VND:** She told me so. I said no and I told you why. He told the story over and over.

**VNVinf:** I'll tell your father to teach you a lesson. He told Jane to meet him under the clock. The doctor told Fred to wash.

**VNprpN:** You know I told him about his parents. He told her of a house by a lake. They told us of many difficulties.

**Task 39**

The meaning of *ill* in different distributional structures: ill + N — "bad", V + ill — "sick".

**Task 44**

**VN:** Don't move that hand. I didn't move a muscle. The story moved us deeply. The tale of tragedy moved her.

**VD:** He moved nervously about while Carry looked at him. Life moves too fast. The youth moved sideways.

**VprepN:** She didn't move from the window. His eyes moved slowly from the detectives. He moved in the direction of London.

**VND:** He kept moving his feet about. Her hands aimlessly moved objects around. The cry of the girl moved the father deeply.

**VprepNprepN:** He moved from side to side. They moved from Tennessee to Texas.

Nouns can be classified into animate  $N_{anim}$  and inanimate  $N_{in}$ . The verb *to move* followed by nouns denoting inanimate objects (*move* +  $N_{in}$ ), as a rule, has the meaning "cause something to change position"; when, however, this verb is followed by nouns denoting human beings (*move* +  $N_{anim}$ ) it will usually mean "arouse, work on the feelings".

**Task 45**

**AN:** a blind ad; a blind corner; a blind man; a blind mountain pass; a blind passage; a blind purchase; a blind stupor; blind chance; blind faith; blind flying; blind fury; blind handwriting; blind love; blind passion; blind reasoning; blind tenacity; blind type

**DA:** legally blind

**AprepN:** blind to arguments; blind to danger; blind with rage

**VA:** to be blind

The classification of nouns into animate/inanimate is insufficient for the semantic analysis in the case of the adjective *blind*, and it is necessary to single out different lexico-semantic groups of nouns. Any collocation of this adjective with nouns denoting living beings (animate) will bring out the meaning "without the power to see" (*blind man, cat, etc.*). *Blind* followed by nouns denoting inanimate objects, or abstract concepts may have different meanings depending on the lexico-semantic group the noun belongs to. Thus, *blind* will have the meaning "reckless, thoughtless, etc." when combined with nouns denoting emotions (*blind passion, love, fury*) and the meaning "hard to discern, to see" in collocation with nouns denoting written or typed signs (*blind handwriting, blind type*), etc.

**Task 47**

The distributional formulas which illustrate the distribution of the element *question* are as follows:

d + question +  $V_{fin}$

$V_{obj}$  + question

N + question +  $N_1$

as regards + question

V + prep + question

(d) + question + N

**UNIT 5****Task 56**

*Untruly* might, it seems, be divided both ways, the IC's being either *un-* + *truly* or *untrue* + *-ly*. Yet observing other utterances we notice that the prefix *un-* is but rarely combined with adverb stems and very freely with adjective stems, e.g. *unfair*, *unkind*, *unselfish*, *uncertain*, *uneasy*, *unfortunate*, etc. So we are justified in thinking that the IC's are *untrue-* + *-ly*. Other examples of the same pattern are: *uncommonly*, *unlikely* [Arnold, 1986: 39].

It may be argued that *ceiling* should at present be considered a root word, because the root *ceil-* is no longer current, and the speaker no longer understands it as a covering or lining of the roof, although the existence of the words *covering* and *lining* is sufficient in itself to consider the word divisible. There are, however, other words in which the same suffix performs a similar function. Thus, in *flooring*, *decking*, *piping*, *paving* *-ing* is equivalent to the semi-affix *-work*, so that *framing* is synonymous with *frame-work*. This testifies in favour of taking *ceiling* as consisting of two morphemes [Arnold, 1986: 40].

**UNIT 7****Task 83**

The verbs *glare*, *glower*, *gloat* all have connotations of emotion that accompany an intense gaze. *To glare* is to look piercingly or angrily: *a tiger glares at its prey*. *To glower* is to look fiercely and threateningly, as from wrath; it suggests a scowl along with a glare: *to glower at a mischievous child*. *To gloat* meant originally 'to look with exultation, avaricious or malignant, on something or someone': *a tyrant gloating over the helplessness of his victim*. Today, however, it may imply inner exultation [RHWELD].

**Task 84**

1) *lonely* — 'melancholly, sad' (emotive connotation); 2) *notorious* — 'for criminal act or bad traits of character' (evaluative negative connotation); 3) *celebrated* — 'for special achievement in science, art, etc.' (evaluative positive connotation).

**UNIT 8****Task 98**

1) Agent; 2) Patient; 3) Beneficiary; 4) Experiencer; 5) Object; 6) Instrument; 7) Instrument; 8) Locative; 9) Result; 10) Nominative; 11) Source; 12) Cause; 13) Counter-Agent; 14) Nominative, Locative.

**Task 99**

- 1) Source; 2) Nominative; 3) Patient; 4) Instrument.

**Task 100**

- 1) Agent; 2) Instrument; 3) Cause/Reason; 4) Locative; 5) Patient.

**Task 101**

jump [ \_\_\_\_ A], see [ \_\_\_\_ O+D], know [ \_\_\_\_ O+D], like [ \_\_\_\_ O+D],  
 please [ \_\_\_\_ O+D], show [ \_\_\_\_ O+D+A], hear [ \_\_\_\_ O+D], listen [ \_\_\_\_ O+A],  
 look [ \_\_\_\_ O+A], learn [ \_\_\_\_ O+A]

**Task 102**

- 1) substantive agentive; 2) substantive agentive quantitative; 3)  
 substantive agentive; 4) substantive agentive; 5) agentive indefinite; 6)  
 substantive agentive causative; 7) substantive agentive negative; 8)  
 substantive agentive active modified by substantive possessive; 9)  
 substantive agentive active modified by substantive possessive; 10)  
 substantive agentive active modified by substantive possessive; 11)  
 substantive agentive relative.

**Task 103**

- 1) substantive syntaxeme of the bearer of quality in the object  
 position; 2) substantive objective indefinite collective syntaxeme of the  
 bearer of quality in the object position; 3) substantive syntaxeme of the  
 bearer of quality in the subject position; 4) substantive resultative syntaxeme  
 of the bearer of quality; 5) substantive objective active syntaxeme of the  
 bearer of quality in the object position; 6) substantive syntaxeme of the  
 bearer of quality in the subject position; 7) substantive resultative syntaxeme  
 of the bearer of quality; 8) substantive syntaxeme of the bearer of quality in  
 the subject position; 9) substantive objective active syntaxeme of the  
 bearer of quality in the object position; 10) substantive syntaxeme of the bearer of  
 quality in the subject position.

**Task 104**

- 1) substantive nominative proper; 2) substantive nominative active;  
 3) substantive nominative proper in the subject position; 4) substantive  
 nominative stative; 5) substantive nominative relative; 6) substantive  
 nominative active; 7) substantive nominative active.

**Task 106**

- 1) processual active identifying syntaxeme; 2) substantive  
 nominative syntaxeme; 3) substantive objective syntaxeme of bearer of the  
 quality; 4) substantive syntaxeme of bearer of the quality; 5) substantive  
 syntaxeme of bearer of the quality; 6) substantive objective syntaxeme of  
 bearer of the state; 7) substantive causative syntaxeme; 8) temporal

syntaxeme; 9) processual active consecutive syntaxeme; 10) substantive nominative syntaxeme.

#### **Task 107**

1) processual active identifying syntaxeme; 2) substantive objective negative syntaxeme of bearer of the quality; 3) substantive objective syntaxeme; 4) substantive objective syntaxeme of bearer of the quality; 5) substantive objective syntaxeme of bearer of the state; 6) substantive resultative syntaxeme of bearer of the quality; 7) generalised substantive objective syntaxeme of bearer of the state; 8) substantive causative active syntaxeme; 9) substantive resultative syntaxeme; 10) substantive causative stative syntaxeme.

#### **Task 108**

1) temporal syntaxeme; 2) substantive resultative generalised syntaxeme; 3) substantive comitative active syntaxeme; 4) substantive resultative stative syntaxeme; 5) comitative active syntaxeme of manner; 6) resultative indefinite syntaxeme; 7) locative allative syntaxeme; 8) locative ablative syntaxeme; 9) locative syntaxeme.

#### **Task 109**

1) substantive temporal; 2) substantive temporal; 3) substantive temporal active; 4) substantive temporal locative; 5) substantive temporal causative; 6) substantive temporal causative; 7) substantive temporal causative active; 8) substantive locative; 9) substantive locative; 10) substantive objective; 11) processual active; 12) processual active; 13) qualificative locative; 14) qualificative stative; 15) objective (pronominal); 16) temporal.

#### **Task 110**

A 1) comitative; 2) locative; 3) instrumental; 4) possessive; 5) objective; 6) manner; 7) agentive;

B 1) agentive; 2) manner; 3) iterative syntaxeme of manner; 4) instrumental; 5) instrumental locative; 6) instrumental causative;

C 1) objective active; 2) objective stative; 3) objective reciprocal; 4) locative ablative; 5) temporal ablative; 6) causative; 7) causative qualitative; 8) agentive of source; 9) manner; 10) frequentative of manner.

#### **Task 111**

1) Many mothers bottlefeed their babies.

bottlefeed + their babies + by many mothers  
verb + Dative + Agentive

2) Many mothers feed their babies with a bottle.

feed + their babies + with a bottle + by many mothers  
verb + Dative + Instrumental + Agentive

3) Many mothers give their babies food with a bottle.

give + their babies + food + with a bottle + by many mothers  
verb + Dative + Objective + Instrumental + Agentive

### Task 112

- 1) objective (locatum) verbs; 2) locative verbs; 3) agent verbs; 4) experiencer verbs; 5) goal verbs; 6) source verbs; 7) instrument verbs.

## UNIT 9

### Task 124

- 1) boatels (boaters' hotel); 2) containerport (seaport equipped with special facilities for loading and unloading containerships); 3) bus-napper (bus-kidnapper); 4) beefish (product involving minced fish and beef); 5) escalift (hybrid device with the advantages of a lift and an escalator); 6) skinoe (miniature canoes which fit the feet like skis); 7) spork (an eating utensil combining features of a spoon and a fork); 8) diesohol (the diesel fuel-ethanol combination); 9) oilbergs (oil icebergs); 10) stagflation, slumpflation (words coined to recognize not just that inflation coexisted with stagnation, or slump, but that inflation brought about such conditions); 11) glassphalt (glass asphalt).

## UNIT 10

### Task 131

- 1) non-verbal means: prosodic; 2) non-verbal means: mimic; 3) verbal means: verb, adjective; 4) verbal means: syntactic construction; 5) verbal means: noun, adjective; 6) non-verbal kinesic means; 7) non-verbal kinesic means; 8) non-verbal means: proxemic; 9) verbal means: syntactic construction; 10) verbal means: adjective; 11) verbal means: verb; 12) verbal means: verb; 13) verbal means: noun; 14) verbal means: verb; 15) verbal means: adverb; 16) verbal means: verb; 17) non-verbal means: prosodic; 18) verbal means: syntactic construction; 19) verbal means: idiom; 20) verbal means: noun; 21) non-verbal means: kinesic; 22) non-verbal means: proxemic; 23) verbal means: adjective; 24) verbal means: syntactic construction; 25) verbal means: noun; 26) verbal means: adjective; 27) verbal means: adjective.

### Task 133

- A 1) I bet you five pounds it'll rain tomorrow.  
B 2) I now pronounce you husband and wife.  
C 1) I baptize you.  
D 4) I order you not to leave.  
E 3) I promise I'll buy anything Jeff wants.

Performatives differ from non-performatives (constatives) in a

variety of ways [Napoli, 1996: 451-452].

Almost always the subject of a performative sentence is the first person, although there are times when a passive sentence can be a performative. For example, if at the end of a trial a judge announces '*The defendant is sentenced to ten years*', the utterance is equivalent to the sentencing. As far as the time frame of performative utterances is concerned, only sentences in the simple present are performative. The present progressive as in '*I am baptizing you*' is a description of the act of baptism and the utterance does not constitute an act of baptism; while the past tenses indicate report of the action.

#### **Task 134**

'*Shoot her!*' has the locutionary force 'to execute or put her to death with a bullet'. In appropriate contextual circumstances it may have the illocutionary force of ordering, urging, advising the addressee to shoot her; but the perlocutionary effect of persuading, forcing, or frightening the addressee into shooting her, or frightening her.

#### **Task 135**

1) surprise, dissatisfaction, annoyance (що чого! ач чого захочів!); 2) refusal (а більше нічого не хочеш? наставляй кишеню!); 3) surprise, annoyance, disagreement (ти що, з глазду зіхає?); 4) surprise, annoyance, disagreement (ти що, з глазду зіхає?); 5) agreement, consent (так, охоче: з задоволенням; ще б пак!); 6) offer; 7) disbelief, surprise (невже це правда?); 8) surprise; 9) annoyance (у вас що, очей немає?); 10) suggestion; 11) greeting (як живете? як справи? як живеться? здрастуйте!); 12) uncertainty, doubt, disagreement (зейдки мені знати?); 13) supposition; 14) request; 15) offer; 16) suggestion; 17) threat (ну і що з цього? а тобі яке діло? бажаєш на цьому зіграти? хочеш на цьому заробити?); 18) suggestion; 19) uncertainty, doubt (що я можу сказати?); 20) dissatisfaction, annoyance (ти розумієш, що робиш?); 21) disapproval; 22) surprise; 23) disapproval (що відбувається? в чому річ?); 24) offer (жартома: що ви будете пити?); 25) suggestion; 26) command; 27) request; 28) invitation.

#### **Task 136**

1) disapproval, reproach (не будь дитиною! поводь себе розумно!); 2) warning; 3) warning, threat (поводьтеся пристойно!); 4) suggestion, invitation (роби, що бажаєш; ні в чому собі не відмовляй; покушайтесь!); 5) assurance (повірте мені!); 6) warning, threat; 7) dissatisfaction, annoyance (не роби дурниць; не будь дурним!); 8) disagreement, refusal (ти що, з глазду зіхає?); 9) advice; 10) dissatisfaction, annoyance (не стій як стовп, зроби що-небудь!); 11) disagreement, refusal (не сміши мене!); 12) response to apologies (будь ласка; нема за що дякувати; не варто подяки); 13) warning, threat; 14)

well-wishing (бажаю вам/тобі добре провести час; бажаю повеселитися); 15) request, command; 16) command; 17) dissatisfaction, disapproval, reproach (не будь дитиною); 18) well-wishing (бажаю вам/тобі присмно провести час); 19) surprise (уявіть собі! подумати тільки!); 20) warning, threat (ну стривай! почекай!); 21) advice; 22) warning (обережно! увага!); 23) surprise (подивись, хто тут); 24) assurance (запам'ятай мої слова, ось побачиш); 25) invitation (почувай себе як дома); 26) response to apologies (дарма; нічого; однаково, байдуже; не звертайте уваги, не варто турбуватися, це неістотно, ну так що ж!); 27) request; 28) apology (вибачте за грубість; прощачте на слові!); 29) well-wishing (приємного сну); 30) disagreement, dissatisfaction (робіть, як вам подобається; робіть, як знаєте); 31) assurance (запевняю вас; поірте мені); 32) warning (обережно!); 33) warning (обережно; пильнуй!).

### Task 138

1) qesitive; 2) expressive; 3) directive; 4) expressive; 5) directive; 6) directive; 7) directive; 8) directive; 9) expressive; 10) characterizing; 11) expressive; 12) actional; 13) characterizing; 14) existential-locative; 15) characterizing; 16) actional; 17) expressive; 18) performative; 19) performative; 20) promissive; 21) expressive; 22) expressive; 23) expressive; 24) expressive; 25) menactive; 26) characterizing; 27) characterizing; 28) characterizing; 29) actional; 30) expressive; 31) existential-locative; 32) constative, expressive; 33) constative, expressive; 34) expressive; 35) expressive; 36) performative.

## UNIT 11

### Task 142

+THE PERSON LEADING A LIFE IS A TRAVELLER+

e.g. She went through life with a good heart.

- +HIS PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS+

e.g. He knows where he is going in life.

+THE MEANS FOR ACHIEVING PURPOSES ARE ROUTES+

e.g. I don't know which path to take.

+DIFFICULTIES IN LIFE ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO TRAVEL+

e.g. He worked his way through many obstacles.

+PROGRESS IS THE DISTANCE TRAVELED+

e.g. He made his way in life.

+ THINGS YOU GAUGE YOUR PROGRESS BY ARE LANDMARKS+

e.g. Then he came to a point in his life where he had to make a difficult decision.

+CHOICES IN LIFE ARE CROSSROADS+

e.g. There were two paths open to him.

**Task 147**

1) open path; 2) closed path; 3) closed path; 4) closed path; 5) open path; 6) open path.

**Task 148**

1) initial and final windowing; 2) initial windowing; 3) maximal windowing over the whole PATH; 4) medial and final windowing.

**Task 150**

<b>Stages of a causal event-frame</b>	<i>The hunter shot the rabbit with a gun.</i>
1. Agent intends to act.	1. The agent makes up his mind that he is going to shoot the rabbit.
2. Agent sets parts of his body or his whole body in motion and thereby initiates the causative event.	2. He moves his hand to grasp a gun, raises it, takes aim, pulls the trigger and releases the bullet from his gun thus propelling it forward.
3. Intermediate subevent(s) which are causally related to each other (optional).	3. The bullet sails through the air.
4. Penultimate subevent = immediate cause of final result.	4. The bullet forcefully makes contact with the rabbit.
5. Final resulting subevent = agent's intended goal.	5. The rabbit is killed.

The rabbit was killed by the bullet.

**UNIT 12****Task 157****A. Rules of Introduction**

Though rules for introductions have become much less rigid in recent years, certain forms must be observed. A younger person is presented to an older person. A gentleman is always presented to a lady, even though she is no older than eighteen. No woman is ever presented to a man, with the exception of the recognized head of another country.

The simplest introduction, suitable whenever two individuals are introduced, is the mere pronouncing of the two names: "Mrs Woodman — Mrs Norman".

The name of the older or more notable person is said first. A woman's name is said before a man's, unless the preposition 'to' is used before the lady's name. If, for instance, you find yourself saying Mr Norman's name first, you can turn this slip into a polite gesture by saying, "Mr Norman, may I introduce you to Mrs Maddox?"

Formally, a man introduces another man to his wife: "Mr Brown, I should like to introduce you to my wife". To a good friend, a husband would say: "Jim, I want you to meet my wife" (never 'the wife'). Then, as though in parenthesis, he says to his wife: "Mary, Jim Buyer" or "Mr Buyer". Or if they are all young, he probably says: "Mary, this is Bob Ace"

A lady introduces her husband to friends as 'John' and to acquaintances as 'my husband'. The two names of safety are 'my husband' and 'my wife' because they are correct no matter to whom you are talking. With other than friends, acquaintances and business associates, 'Mr Brown' and 'Mrs Brown' are quite correct.

When introducing a person to a group of people the introducer should lead up the newcomer and say to the group: "This is James Thurston whom I want to introduce to you". Then, indicating each of the group in turn: "Miss A, Mr B, Mrs C, Miss E and Mr F, etc." Strictly, perhaps, he should introduce the newcomer to the ladies first, but this may be complicated, and it would be permissible to go by the order in which the members of the group happen to be standing.

If, as is liable to happen, the introducer momentarily forgets or does not in fact know the name of one of the group, it is up to that person (guests have obligations as well as hosts) to come to the rescue by saying: "I'm Muriel Hay. How are you?" or something of the sort.

In the USA the newcomer would shake hands all round. In Great Britain he need not, if to do so would mean a lot of moving about (as round a table, for instance). If the host then goes on his way, one of the group should have the good manners, to address some remark to the newcomer and draw him into the conversation.

In making an introduction, don't mumble, but pronounce both names distinctly. Many Americans, when introduced, have a sensible habit of repeating the name of the person just made known to them, which gives the other the opportunity to correct it, if he has not heard it properly. (But if your name is a difficult one, resign yourself with a good grace to hearing it mispronounced rather than make the other person feel embarrassed at having got it wrong.) If the introducer has mumbled, it is better for one of the new acquaintances to say frankly to the other: "I'm sorry, I didn't catch your name?" This enables the other, who may be in a similar position, to give his name and, if need be, make the same remark. If you don't make sure in this way, you may have to ask on some later occasion, and it is much better to do this at a first rather than at a third meeting.

If two individuals are introduced each should shake the other's hand. If the introduction takes place out of doors, a man, who is wearing a glove, should take it off. Indeed if he thinks an introduction likely he should take it off in advance, rather than fumble with it while the other's hand is already stretched out. Shaking hands may be dispensed with if the hands of one or both are already full of parcels. There are times when tact and common sense are more important than strict observance of a convention.

## B. Greetings

'Hello' is the universal form of greeting acceptable in any situation except after a formal introduction. Even comparative strangers say 'Hello' in passing, and among 'young' people it is considered friendly after a first-name introduction: "Sally, I'd like you to meet 'Joan'", and Sally says: "Hello, I'm glad to meet you, Joan."

In the business world, 'Good morning' is the usual greeting before the lunch hour. After lunch, the somewhat stilted 'Good afternoon' has been largely replaced by 'Hello'.

In Europe a gentleman bows to a lady first. In the United States a lady is supposed to greet a gentleman first, but today few people observe this formality. When one passes a casual acquaintance, a tipping or slight raising of the hat is necessary.

In theatres, restaurants, shops or almost any public place, people speak to acquaintances as long as the greeting does not create a situation that may disturb others around them, as it would in the middle of a play. If they are too far apart to speak without shouting, they simply smile and wave.

## C. Taking Leave

When a visitor is ready to leave, he or she merely stands and says to the one with whom he has been talking: "Good-bye, I hope I shall see you again soon," or, simply, "I'm glad to have met you." To the first, the other answers; "Thank you, I hope so too", or to both, merely, "Thank you". In taking leave of a group of strangers — whether you have been introduced or merely included in their conversation — you nod and smile a 'Good-bye' to anyone who happens to be looking at you, but you do not attempt to attract the attention of those who are unaware that you are leaving. When leaving a party early, you find your hostess and say "Good-bye" without attracting any more attention than is necessary, in order to avoid being the cause of breaking up the party prematurely.

Among friends or business acquaintances who know each other personally, "Good-bye" or "Good night" is said on parting.

### Task 160

- 1) Perhaps the dog has eaten the roast beef.
- 2) The time is at least after whenever the milkman normally calls.
- 3) Johnny may not yet be free to play.
- 4) Stop laughing (command issued by the teacher).
- 5) It's time to go home.
- 6) I should have a bath, because we are going out.
- 7) This pastry is really leathery.
- 8) John's an idiot.
- 9) The cake is delicious.
- 10) I want to buy a cup of coffee.

### Task 161

- 1) John tried to open the door.
- 2) John ought to have locked, or intended to lock, the door.
- 3) Joan hadn't been beating her husband.
- 4) There exists a man with two heads.
- 5) The flying saucer came before.
- 6) You once could get gobstoppers.
- 7) Carter held power before.
- 8) Churchill died.

- 9) Someone kissed Rosie. 10) John lost something. 11) Someone invented linguistics. 12) Hannibal didn't have twelve more elephants.

### **Task 162**

- 1) *making someone redundant* is supposed to make them less unhappy than firing or sacking them;
- 2) *neutralizing the enemy* must obviously be much less unpleasant and a good deal more ethical than killing them;
- 3) *tension in Kashmir* was used to hide the fact that there was a real uprising in that area;
- 4) *undernourishment of children in India* stood for starvation;
- 5) the word *profit* is replaced by *savings*;
- 6) dismissal of employees is *the reorganization of the enterprise*.

### **Task 164**

There is a scientific basis for these assumptions: the famous Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic determinism, stating that people's thoughts are determined by the categories made available by their language, and its weaker version, linguistic relativity, stating that differences among languages cause differences in the thoughts of their speakers, e.g. the languages that carve the spectrum into color words at different places, the fundamentally different Hopi concept of time, the dozens of Eskimo words for snow. The implication is heavy: the foundational categories of reality are not "in" the world but are imposed by one's culture [Pinker, 1994: 57].

### **Task 166**

The persistence of slang, swearing and racist language calls for some kind of explanation. There must be some positive values connected with all this bad language. Within sociolinguistics this kind of positive value is usually called *covert prestige*.

The language of the BBC has *prestige*; voices with accents like this are associated with power, education and wealth. These things are highly valued and this explains why so many people strive to acquire the official language. On the other hand, so-called bad language is often associated with toughness and strength. These latter properties are also highly valued among quite a number of people. If someone wants to show both that he can afford to drive a Mercedes and that he is a tough guy, then he should learn how to switch between the language varieties connected with prestige and covert prestige [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 8-9].

Bad language can also be used to express strong emotions and attitudes. When your favourite football team is one goal behind and misses a penalty kick in the last minute of the game, there is no limit to the strength, volume and intensity of your *Damn it!* or whatever alternative expression you use [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 53].

For example, expletives like *hell*, *shit*, *damn it* are used to express emotions, not directed towards others. Abusives like *you asshole*, *go to hell*

are directed towards others; they are derogatory and usually include name-

calling and different types of curses. Humorous use of swearing is directed towards others but is not derogatory; it often takes the form of abusive swearing but has the opposite function: is playful rather than offensive as in *Get your ass in gear!* Auxiliary use of swearing is not directed towards a person or situation, swearing is a way of speaking ('lazy swearing'), often or always non-emphatic as in *this bloody train* [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 61].

Slang and swearing may help to identify a person as belonging to a particular social group.

## UNIT 13

### Task 168

#### **Transitory Speech and Permanent Writing**

English, like other languages, makes use of two channels: speech and writing. They have different transmission systems. Speech is transmitted by sound-waves, originated in speaking and received in hearing. Writing is transmitted by letters and other visible marks, produced in writing and received in reading [Leech, Svartvik, 1994: 10-11].

Normal speech is processed in real time and is transitory, leaving no trace other than what we may remember. Our memory being what it is, this is often limited to just the gist of a conversation or some particularly interesting points in a lecture. Writing, on the other hand, takes longer to produce and can be read not just once but many times. Writing leaves a permanent record. Moreover, writing that is made public in some way, such as in printed books and journals, leaves a record which can be read by millions of contemporary readers, and also by later generations.

Such differences between the two channels affect our language use in several ways. One is that spoken communication requires fast, almost instantaneous production and understanding. On the other hand, when we write, we usually have time to revise, check and rewrite what we have written. Likewise, when we receive a piece of writing we can read it, reread it, ponder over it, and discuss it.

An oral text is a fleeting and unrepeatable event that strikes the ear briefly and 'then is heard no more'. Listeners have only a limited time in which to take in the message, and cannot turn back as readers can with the book or a newspaper.

A conversation is not just a matter of giving and receiving information. It is also, perhaps primarily, a form of social interaction, and participant cooperation is indeed a basic feature of conversation. There exists a give-and-take process which is manifested in several ways. One is turn-taking, which means sharing out the role of speaker in the conversation, as one speaker takes a turn, then another.

In a conversation, the speaker can check if the listener has understood by asking 'Do you see what I mean?', and the listener can ask

the speaker for clarification: 'What did you mean by that?', etc. This gives speaking an advantage in providing us with an opportunity for immediate feedback, to find out whether our message has been properly received, or is acceptable. This feedback can be verbal (yes, *uhuh*, *I see*, etc.) or non-verbal (a nod, raised eyebrows, etc.).

Speech may be accompanied by nonverbal signals, such as gestures or facial expressions. A speaker may use gestures to show anger, surprise and other feelings. For example, if the speaker is expressing doubt, he might shrug his shoulders. Nonverbal signals add to a speech and communicate nonverbally what the speaker is trying to say.

Another important feature of speech is spontaneity that in general characterizes oral texts.

As a result, an oral text is always quite different from even the most closely corresponding written version.

### Task 169

In this short extract we can note several **distinctive features typical of conversation**:

- **silent pauses** (indicated by a dash – ): *they've probably left by now – so I didn't – and – twelve thirty – now that can't be them – and it was*
- **voice-filled pauses** (indicated by *erm*) indicating hesitation: *and I I get really erm – you know when when I'm trying to cook*
- **repetitions**: *I I. when when, they'd they'd. you you*
- **false starts**: the speaker may fail to complete a sentence, or lose track of the sentence and mix up one grammatical construction with another: *I mean you know what [g] getting up Sunday's like anyway and – I'd – I was behind in any case; and I I get really erm – you know when when I'm trying to cook – and; people come and chat I I get terribly put off*
- 'fillers', i.e. certain words and phrases such as *well, you know*. The opening *well* in the extract is a typical spoken discourse item in this use of 'topic opener'. When we speak we often fill in gaps with 'fillers' (like *you know, you see, I mean, kind of, sort of*) to allow us to think of what next to say, or just to indicate that we intend to go on talking.
- **informal language** (also called 'colloquial'): *tumed up, a bit later, put off, etc.*
- **intensifying words** (interjections and words with strong emotive meaning as oaths, swear-words, intensifying adjectives and adverbs): *get terribly put off, feel terribly antisocial.*
- **short forms** such as contractions of the negative *not (didn't)* and verb forms (*I'm, I'd, they've*), and *cos* for *because*, etc.
- **preference for coordination**, rather than subordination of clauses which is a characteristic of speech: *Well I had some people to lunch on Sunday and – they tumed up half an hour early – (laughs) – I mean you know what [g] getting up Sunday's like anyway and – i'd – I was behind in any case – and I'd said to them one o'clock – and I almost phoned them up*

and said come a bit later – and then I thought oh they've probably left by

now – so I didn't – and – twelve thirty

• ellipsis when principal part(s) of a sentence can be omitted: can't get on with things at all erm .

#### Task 174

Most of the important characteristics of telephone conversation are of course exactly the same as those of conversation which takes place face to face. There are, however, a number of differences which result from the medium of communication and the restrictions which it imposes.

Conversationalists who can see each other are able to place a great amount of reliance on the facilities offered by such things as gesture and the presence of a common extra-linguistic context, to help in communication and the resolution of ambiguity. Telephone conversation, however, lacks these facilities to large extent and so has a tendency to become rather more explicit than ordinary conversation.

The need for greater explicitness is further increased by the fact that sounds carried by telephone lines become diminished in their qualities of distinctiveness, and many of the small cues which help to maintain ready understanding may get distorted or lost. Thus there is more uncertainty in keeping up the give and take between participants which is so noticeable a part of face to face conversation. Utterances that are unduly long will be avoided and a speaker will tend to leave frequent pauses for his partner to say something and prove that he is still there.

Then, perhaps more often than in ordinary conversation, in telephone conversation, there tends to be a set theme — people do not phone each other accidentally in the way that they may meet in the street and the information which is exchanged probably tends to be related more to a single identifiable purpose.

Finally, the highly formulaic nature of both the opening and closing of all telephone conversation may be noted — the range of accepted linguistic devices for carrying out these operations is relatively small as compared with conversation in general, the predictability of what is likely to be said at those points is probably considerably higher and the stylistic distinctiveness of what takes place is at times extremely marked.

#### Task 178

##### **The Art of Conversation**

The most enjoyable conversations are those that arise spontaneously between intimate friends who happen to hit on a stimulating or congenial topic. On such occasions talk flows freely. It is when people do not know each other well or have only just been introduced that conversation may prove difficult.

Some people have a real gift for conversation. They have a ready command of words, a gay wit and a fund of experience or ideas. We cannot all hope to match them. But if we ourselves take an interest in affairs of

general concern, in books and plays, we can find things to talk about and, under the stimulus of good company, the right words in which to express our ideas. A good conversationalist does not dominate the conversation or lay down the law. He should allow others to have their say. A good story is welcome, but a succession of anecdotes is likely to become tedious. It is rude to interrupt, especially when an older person is talking. When a conversation shows signs of leading to vehement argument or where the topic appears to be distasteful to one of those present, a well-bred person will drop the subject or divert the talk into other channels. Sarcasm at the expense of someone who is shy or stupid is unforgivable. A good talker knows how to listen to others as well as to interest them in what he has to say. It is not his business to exhibit his superior knowledge or, when engaged in friendly conversation, to score debating points.

Here is an example.

A father once took his son with him when he went to call on an elderly man. When they had taken their leave of him the son, with the naive intolerance of his seventeen years, observed: "What a rum old bird." — "Yes", rejoined his father mildly, "I wonder what he thought of you!"

It is by our manners and our conversation that people, when we first meet them, are likely to form their opinion of us.

## UNIT 14

### Task 186

The difference between the working class and the middle class is more pronounced in Britain than in America. This is also reflected in language. When sociolinguistic studies carried out in Britain and America are compared, it can be seen that the gap between the working class and the middle class is wider in the British investigations.

Perhaps the most powerful source of judgements about correctness in English has to do with the relationship between language and social class. The fact is that many forms which are considered to be 'bad English' are simply forms which are typical of lower-class dialects. On the other hand, forms which are considered to be 'correct' are very often associated with the speech of the upper class and upper middle class, who speak a dialect which is known as Standard English. This is also the dialect normally used in writing English and which is usually taught to foreigners.

It is widely agreed by many people who believe themselves to be experts on the English language, but who are really not, that it is incorrect to say *he he go, she run*. This is actually a rather strange thing for anyone to believe because it is quite clear that this form is used by a majority of native English-speakers around the world. Why is it then that the majority are said to be wrong while the minority are said to be right?

This has to do with who uses which form. As will be obvious to anyone who has grown up in the British Isles, North America or Australasia,

the minority of people who say *he goes, she runs* are those who on average

have more wealth, power, status and education than those who say *he go* or *she run* (of course, we can make no claims about every single individual). It is therefore not surprising that the forms like *he go, she run* have less prestige, and that this lower prestige leads these forms to be regarded as undesirable and therefore wrong. It is of course not 'wrong' in any meaningful sense of the word to say *he go, she run*, but it is an indication of relatively low social status. We cannot say that a form that most people use is a 'mistake'. We can say, however, that it is typical of lower-class dialects. Because of the way in which our society is structured, it is a form which can on occasions put its users at a social disadvantage [Andersson, Trudgill, 1990: 119].

## UNIT 15

### Task 187

The corpus-based analysis summarized in the table highlights two important observations about the use of *certain*.

First, we see marked differences between intuition and actual language use when we compare this information to native speaker intuition. An informal survey found that native speakers most commonly associate *certain* with the condition of certainty. In contrast, The table shows that this is a rare use of *certain*. Only five of the collocational pairs listed in the table mark 'certainty' (e.g. *it is certain, he is certain, she is certain, they are certain, I am certain*). In contrast, *certain* is much more commonly used to mark a referent as named but not clearly described or known, us in a *certain kind, in certain types, to a certain extent, there are certain aspects*. The concordance entries 1-5 in Table 6.1 illustrate this use of *certain*.

The second observation is that the two major senses of *certain* are not at all uniformly distributed across registers. Rather, *certain* marking certainty is significantly more common in Fiction than in Social Science, while most occurrences of *certain* in Social Science mark referents as named but not clearly described (and thus in some sense not certain!) [Biber et al, 1994: 177-178].

### Task 189

When the verb that follows *deserve* is understood in a passive meaning, that meaning can be expressed either by a passive infinitive or a present participle.

When the verb following *deserve* expresses an active meaning, only the 'to'-infinitive occurs.

### Task 194

In editorials, relative clauses are slightly more common than participial clauses, although both constructions occur with only moderate

frequencies. In contrast, prepositional phrases as noun modifiers are far more common than either of these other constructions. Fiction and letters show similar patterns, although the overall frequency of postnominal modifiers is much lower than in editorials. There are few relative clauses or participial clauses in fiction, and almost none of these features occur in personal letters. In contrast, there are moderate but notable numbers of prepositional phrases as postnominal modifiers in both fiction and letters.

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
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