SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

for

Eigenpie Protocol

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1 Introduction

Given the opportunity to review the design document and related source code of the Eigenpie protocol, we outline in the report our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts could potentially be improved due to the presence of several issues related to either security or performance. This document outlines our audit results.

1.1 About Eigenpie

The Eigenpie protocol aims to build a Liquid Restaking solution for public blockchain networks. Initially inspired from Kelp DAO, Eigenpie does not mint a single rsETH all for supported LSTs. Instead, it has isolated LRTReceiptToken minted 1:1 for different deposited LST The basic information of audited contracts is as follows:

Table 1.1: Basic Information of Eigenpie

Item	Description
Name	Eigenpie
Type	Smart Contract
Language	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Latest Audit Report	February 19, 2024

In the following, we show the Git repository of reviewed files and the commit hash value used in this audit.

- https://github.com/magpiexyz/eigenpie.git (6dcf4ab)

And this is the commit ID after all fixes for the issues found in the audit have been addressed:

- https://github.com/magpiexyz/eigenpie.git (3ee8b24)

1.2 About PeckShield

PeckShield Inc. [9] is a leading blockchain security company with the goal of elevating the security, privacy, and usability of current blockchain ecosystems by offering top-notch, industry-leading services and products (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/peckshield), Twitter (http://twitter.com/peckshield), or Email (contact@peckshield.com).

Table 1.2: Vulnerability Severity Classification



1.3 Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [8]:

- Likelihood represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: *H*, *M* and *L*, i.e., *high*, *medium* and *low* respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact, and can be accordingly classified into four categories, i.e., *Critical*, *High*, *Medium*, *Low* shown in Table 1.2.

To evaluate the risk, we go through a list of check items and each would be labeled with a severity category. For one check item, if our tool or analysis does not identify any issue, the contract is considered safe regarding the check item. For any discovered issue, we might further

Table 1.3: The Full List of Check Items

Category	Check Item
Basic Coding Bugs	Constructor Mismatch
	Ownership Takeover
	Redundant Fallback Function
	Overflows & Underflows
	Reentrancy
	Money-Giving Bug
	Blackhole
	Unauthorized Self-Destruct
	Revert DoS
	Unchecked External Call
	Gasless Send
	Send Instead Of Transfer
	Costly Loop
	(Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries
	(Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables
	Transaction Ordering Dependence
	Deprecated Uses
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Business Logics Review
	Functionality Checks
	Authentication Management
	Access Control & Authorization
	Oracle Security
	Digital Asset Escrow
	Kill-Switch Mechanism
	Operation Trails & Event Generation
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling
	Frontend-Contract Integration
	Deployment Consistency
	Holistic Risk Management
Additional Recommendations	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array
	Using Fixed Compiler Version
	Making Visibility Level Explicit
	Making Type Inference Explicit
	Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly
	Following Other Best Practices

deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. If necessary, we would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation. The concrete list of check items is shown in Table 1.3.

In particular, we perform the audit according to the following procedure:

- Basic Coding Bugs: We first statically analyze given smart contracts with our proprietary static code analyzer for known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by our tool.
- Semantic Consistency Checks: We then manually check the logic of implemented smart contracts and compare with the description in the white paper.
- Advanced DeFi Scrutiny: We further review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.
- Additional Recommendations: We also provide additional suggestions regarding the coding and development of smart contracts from the perspective of proven programming practices.

To better describe each issue we identified, we categorize the findings with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE-699) [7], which is a community-developed list of software weakness types to better delineate and organize weaknesses around concepts frequently encountered in software development. Though some categories used in CWE-699 may not be relevant in smart contracts, we use the CWE categories in Table 1.4 to classify our findings. Moreover, in case there is an issue that may affect an active protocol that has been deployed, the public version of this report may omit such issue, but will be amended with full details right after the affected protocol is upgraded with respective fixes.

1.4 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release, and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, we always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Last but not least, this security audit should not be used as investment advice.

Table 1.4: Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.
Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use of arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an exploitable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

2 | Findings

2.1 Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the design and implementation of the `Eigenpie` protocol smart contracts. During the first phase of our audit, we study the smart contract source code and run our in-house static code analyzer through the codebase. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by our tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	# of Findings	
Critical	0	
High	0	
Medium	1	■
Low	2	■■
Informational	0	
Total	3	

We have so far identified a list of potential issues: some of them involve subtle corner cases that might not be previously thought of, while others may involve unusual interactions among multiple contracts. For each uncovered issue, we have therefore developed test cases for reasoning, reproduction, and/or verification. After further analysis and internal discussion, we determined a few issues of varying severities need to be brought up and paid more attention to, which are categorized in the above table. More information can be found in the next subsection, and the detailed discussions of each of them are in Section 3.

2.2 Key Findings

Overall, these smart contracts are well-designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved by resolving the identified issues (shown in Table 2.1), including 1 medium-severity vulnerability and 2 low-severity vulnerabilities.

Table 2.1: Key Audit Findings

ID	Severity	Title	Category	Status
PVE-001	Low	Lack of minRec Enforcement in EigenpieStaking	Business Logic	Resolved
PVE-002	Low	Accommodation of Non-ERC20-Compliant Tokens	Coding Practices	Resolved
PVE-003	Medium	Trust Issue of Admin Keys	Security Features	Mitigated

Beside the identified issues, we emphasize that for any user-facing applications and services, it is always important to develop necessary risk-control mechanisms and make contingency plans, which may need to be exercised before the mainnet deployment. The risk-control mechanisms should kick in at the very moment when the contracts are being deployed on mainnet. Please refer to Section 3 for details.

3 Detailed Results

3.1 Lack of minRec Enforcement in EigenpieStaking

- ID: PVE-001
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Low
- Target: `EigenpieStaking`
- Category: Business Logic [6]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-841 [3]

Description

The `Eigenpie` protocol builds a `Liquid Restaking` solution that offers liquidity to illiquid assets deposited into restaking platforms. While examining existing staking logic, we notice its implementation can be improved.

In the following, we show below the related `depositAsset()` implementation. We notice it takes an input argument of `minRec` with the intention of specifying the minimum amount of receipt token. However, this `minRec` amount is not used or enforced in current implementation.

```
107     function depositAsset(
108         address asset,
109         uint256 depositAmount,
110         uint256 minRec,
111         address referral
112     )
113         external
114         whenNotPaused
115         nonReentrant
116         onlySupportedAsset(asset)
117     {
118         // checks
119         if (depositAmount == 0  depositAmount < minAmountToDeposit) {
120             revert InvalidAmountToDeposit();
121         }
122
123         if (depositAmount > getAssetCurrentLimit(asset)) {
124             revert MaximumDepositLimitReached();
```

```
125         }
126
127         if (!IERC20(asset).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), depositAmount)) {
128             revert TokenTransferFailed();
129         }
130
131         uint256 pointBoost = eigenpieConfig.boostByAsset(asset);
132         address onlyReferral = _myReferral(msg.sender, referral);
133
134         emit AssetDeposit(msg.sender, asset, depositAmount, pointBoost, onlyReferral);
135
136         // mint receipt
137         address receipt = eigenpieConfig.mLRTReceiptByAsset(asset);
138         IMintableERC20(receipt).mint(msg.sender, depositAmount);
139     }
```

Listing 3.1: `EigenpieStaking::depositAsset()`

Recommendation Improve the staking logic to ensure the given `minRec` restriction is honored.

Status The issue has been fixed by this commit: `6f0288b`.

3.2 Accommodation of Non-ERC20-Compliant Tokens

- ID: PVE-002
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Low
- Target: `Multiple Contracts`
- Category: Coding Practices [5]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-1126 [1]

Description

Though there is a standardized ERC-20 specification, many token contracts may not strictly follow the specification or have additional functionalities beyond the specification. In this section, we examine the `approve()` routine and analyze possible idiosyncrasies from current widely-used token contracts.

In particular, we use the popular stablecoin, i.e., `USDT`, as our example. We show the related code snippet below. On its entry of `approve()`, there is a requirement, i.e., `require(!((_value != 0) && (allowed[msg.sender][_spender] != 0)))`. This specific requirement essentially indicates the need of reducing the allowance to 0 first (by calling `approve(_spender, 0)`) if it is not, and then calling a second one to set the proper allowance. This requirement is in place to mitigate the known `approve()/transferFrom()` race condition (https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729).

```
194     /**
195     * @dev Approve the passed address to spend the specified amount of tokens on behalf
            of msg.sender.
```

```
196     * @param _spender The address which will spend the funds.
197     * @param _value The amount of tokens to be spent.
198     */
199     function approve(address _spender, uint _value) public onlyPayloadSize(2 * 32) {

201         // To change the approve amount you first have to reduce the addresses`
202         //  allowance to zero by calling `approve(_spender, 0)` if it is not
203         //  already 0 to mitigate the race condition described here:
204         //  https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/issues/20#issuecomment-263524729
205         require(!((_value != 0) && (allowed[msg.sender][_spender] != 0)));

207         allowed[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;
208         Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);
209     }
```

Listing 3.2: USDT Token Contract

Because of that, a normal call to `approve()` is suggested to use the safe version, i.e., `safeApprove()`, In essence, it is a wrapper around ERC20 operations that may either throw on failure or return false without reverts. Moreover, the safe version also supports tokens that return no value (and instead revert or throw on failure). Note that non-reverting calls are assumed to be successful. Similarly, there is a safe version of `transfer()/transferFrom()` as well, i.e., `safeTransfer()/safeTransferFrom()`.

```
38      /**
39       * @dev Deprecated. This function has issues similar to the ones found in
40       * {IERC20-approve}, and its usage is discouraged.
41       *
42       * Whenever possible, use {safeIncreaseAllowance} and
43       * {safeDecreaseAllowance} instead.
44       */
45      function safeApprove(
46          IERC20 token,
47          address spender,
48          uint256 value
49      ) internal {
50          // safeApprove should only be called when setting an initial allowance,
51          // or when resetting it to zero. To increase and decrease it, use
52          // 'safeIncreaseAllowance' and 'safeDecreaseAllowance'
53          require(
54              (value == 0)  (token.allowance(address(this), spender) == 0),
55              "SafeERC20: approve from non-zero to non-zero allowance"
56          );
57          _callOptionalReturn(token, abi.encodeWithSelector(token.approve.selector,
                spender, value));
58      }
```

Listing 3.3: `SafeERC20::safeApprove()`

In current implementation, if we examine the `EigenpieStaking::transferAssetToNodeDelegator()` routine that is designed to transfer funds to an intended `nodeDelegator`. To accommodate the specific idiosyncrasy, there is a need to make use of `safeTransfer()`.

```
173     function transferAssetToNodeDelegator(
174         uint256 ndcIndex,
175         address asset,
176         uint256 amount
177     )
178         external
179         nonReentrant
180         onlyLRTManager
181         onlySupportedAsset(asset)
182     {
183         address nodeDelegator = nodeDelegatorQueue[ndcIndex];
184         if (!IERC20(asset).transfer(nodeDelegator, amount)) {
185             revert TokenTransferFailed();
186         }
187     }
```

Listing 3.4: `EigenpieStaking::transferAssetToNodeDelegator()`

Note other routines, such as `NodeDelegator::maxApproveToEigenStrategyManager()/transferBackToEigenpieStaking()` and `EigenpieStaking::depositAsset()` share the same issue.

Recommendation Accommodate the above-mentioned idiosyncrasy about ERC20-related `approve()/transfer()/transferFrom()`.

Status The issue has been fixed by this commit: `e79f774`.

3.3 Trust Issue of Admin Keys

- ID: PVE-003
- Severity: Medium
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Medium
- Target: `Multiple Contracts`
- Category: Security Features [4]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-287 [2]

Description

The `Eigenpie` protocol has a privileged account (with the role of `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE`) that plays a critical role in governing and regulating the protocol-wide operations (e.g., configure protocol-wide risk parameters and whitelist tokens). It also has the privilege to control or govern the flow of assets among various protocol components. In the following, we examine the privileged account and related privileged accesses in current contracts.

```
54     function addNewSupportedAsset(address asset, address mLRTReceipt, uint256
           depositLimit) external onlyRole(EigenpieConstants.MANAGER) {
55         _addNewSupportedAsset(asset, mLRTReceipt, depositLimit);
56     }
```

```
58      /// @dev Updates the deposit limit for an asset
59      /// @param asset Asset address
60      /// @param depositLimit New deposit limit
61      function updateAssetDepositLimit(
62          address asset,
63          uint256 depositLimit
64      )
65          external
66          onlyRole(EigenpieConstants.MANAGER)
67          onlySupportedAsset(asset)
68      {
69          depositLimitByAsset[asset] = depositLimit;
70          emit AssetDepositLimitUpdate(asset, depositLimit);
71      }

73      /// @dev Updates the strategy for an asset
74      /// @param asset Asset address
75      /// @param strategy New strategy address
76      function updateAssetStrategy(
77          address asset,
78          address strategy
79      )
80          external
81          onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE)
82          onlySupportedAsset(asset)
83      {
84          UtilLib.checkNonZeroAddress(strategy);
85          if (assetStrategy[asset] == strategy) {
86              revert ValueAlreadyInUse();
87          }
88          assetStrategy[asset] = strategy;
89          emit AssetStrategyUpdate(asset, strategy);
90      }

92      /// @dev Updates the point boost for an asset
93      /// @param asset Asset address
94      /// @param boost point boost effect
95      function updateAssetBoost(
96          address asset,
97          uint256 boost
98      )
99          external
100         onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE)
101         onlySupportedAsset(asset)
102     {
103         boostByAsset[asset] = boost;

105         emit AssetBoostUpdate(asset, boost);
106     }

108     function updateReferral (
```

```
109         address me,
110         address referral
111     )
112         external
113         onlyRole(EigenpieConstants.REFER_ADMIN_ROLE)
114     {
115         myReferral[me] = referral;
116
117         emit ReferralUpdate(me, referral);
118     }
```

Listing 3.5: Example Privileged Operations in `EigenpieConfig`

We understand the need of the privileged functions for proper contract operations, but at the same time the extra power to these privileged accounts may also be a counter-party risk to the contract users. Therefore, we list this concern as an issue here from the audit perspective and highly recommend making these privileges explicit or raising necessary awareness among protocol users.

Moreover, it should be noted that current contracts have the support of being deployed behind a proxy. And there is a need to properly manage the proxy-admin privileges as they fall in this trust issue as well.

Recommendation Promptly transfer the `owner` privilege to the intended `DAO`-like governance contract. And activate the normal on-chain community-based governance life-cycle and ensure the intended trustless nature and high-quality distributed governance.

Status This issue has been mitigated with the use of a multisig as the admin.

4 | Conclusion

In this audit, we have analyzed the design and implementation of the Eigenpie protocol, which aims to build a Liquid Restaking solution for public blockchain networks. Initially inspired from Kelp DAO, Eigenpie does not mint a single rsETH all for supported LSTs. Instead, it has isolated LRTReceiptToken minted 1:1 for different deposited LST The current code base is well structured and neatly organized. Those identified issues are promptly confirmed and addressed.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that Solidity-based smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

References

[1] MITRE. CWE-1126: Declaration of Variable with Unnecessarily Wide Scope. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1126.html.

[2] MITRE. CWE-287: Improper Authentication. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html.

[3] MITRE. CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/841.html.

[4] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - Security Features. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/254.html.

[5] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Bad Coding Practices. https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1006.html.

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[8] OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology.

[9] PeckShield. PeckShield Inc. https://www.peckshield.com.