

# Curriculum

## Representation in Practice: The Effects of Selection, Accountability, and Gender on Elite Behaviour

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# 1 Introduction

Dear students of Representation in Practice

We are delighted that you have chosen to take this course and look forward to teaching you! This document contains an overview, weekly schedules, syllabus, and information about the exam. We will give you more information about the exam as the course goes. If you require further information, please contact us at [olev@ifs.ku.dk](mailto:olev@ifs.ku.dk) and [silje.hermansen@ifs.ku.dk](mailto:silje.hermansen@ifs.ku.dk).

Over the next four months, you will gain an intensive knowledge and understanding of how representation, selection, accountability and gender influence elite behaviour; how it is theorised, measured and researched in empirical legal studies, political science, economics, psychology and public policy. We will attempt to answer questions such as 1) How do representatives' ideology and identity affect policies, and do these policies align with the preferences of the people they represent (responsiveness)? 2) What is the impact of term limits and quotas on representation? 3) What behaviours do politicians adopt to provide this information, and are they optimal for effective representation? To lay the grounds, we will analyze the distinction between descriptive representation (the extent to which representatives resemble the people they represent in terms of characteristics such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and class) and substantive representation (advocating for constituents' interests)

Teaching will consist of a mixture of lecturer presentations, student presentations, and group work. All students are expected to read the core syllabus for each week and participate actively in teaching. We hope you are as excited as we are.

All the best, Olivia and Silje

## 2 Resumé

Nr.	Week nr	Date	Teacher	Topic
1	6	2/2	Olivia/Silje	Intro and political representation
2	6	5/2	Olivia	Is representation important?
3	7	9/2	Olivia	Descriptive representation: parliament
4	7	12/2	Silje	Descriptive representation: courts
5	8	16/2	Olivia	Substantive representation
6	8	19/2	Silje	Gender and judicial outcomes
7	9	23/2	Olivia	Scope conditions: who speaks in parliament?
8	9	26/2	Olivia	Scope conditions: reactions
9	10	2/3	Olivia	Parliament as a workplace
10	10	5/3	Silje	Court as a workplace
11	11	9/3	Silje	Political accountability
12	11	12/3	Silje	Selection based on type or behavior
13	12	16/3	Olivia	Are voters biased against women?
14	12	19/3	Olivia	Electoral systems and women's representation
15	13	23/3	Olivia	Gender quotas and policies
16	13	26/3	Silje	Gender quoatas and quality

**27/03 - First assignment is due**

### Week 14: Easter holiday

17	15	9/4	Olivia/Silje	Peer feedback
18	16	13/4	Olivia	Attracting women: rolemodels
19	16	16/4	Olivia	Recruiting women: parties
20	17	20/4	Olivia	Mobilization and backlash
21	17	23/4	Silje	Political change through courts
22	18	27/4	Silje	Parliamentary behavior
23	18	30/4	Silje	Judicial behavior
24	19	4/5	Silje	Politicians and voters
25	19	7/5	Silje	Politicians and voters
26	20	11/5	Silje	TBA
26	20	14/5	Silje/Olivia	Outro
27	21	18/5	Silje/Olivia	Supervision
27	21	21/5	Silje/Olivia	Supervision

**29/05 - Second assignment is due**

### **3 Week planner**

#### **3.1 What is representation?**

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##### **Introduction**

Teacher: Olivia

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##### **3.1.1 What is political representation?**

For this session, we will read the classic literature of representation. What is a political representative? What is the concept of representation?

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Pitkin, H. F. (1967). Introduction. In: *The Concept of Representation*. University of California Press. **13 pages**.

Phillips, A. (1995). Political equality and fair representation. In: *The Politics of Presence*. Oxford University Press. 27-56 **29 pages**

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##### **3.1.2 Is representation important?**

Is representation important for a well-functioning democracy? What are the consequences of a non-representative democracy? Modern democracy relies on representation, but elected representatives do not look like citizens at large. In western democracies, legislatures are disproportionately male, educated, and otherwise unrepresentative, thus creating a deficit of descriptive representation. Mansbridge (1999) discuss whether members of particular groups are expected to represent these groups. Brookman (2013) tests this implication, studying if black politicians are more motivated to advance blacks' interests in general.

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David E Broockman (2013). "Black politicians are more intrinsically motivated to advance blacks' interests: A field experiment manipulating political incentives". In: *American Journal of Political Science* 57.3, pp. 521–536 ~ **15 pages**

Jane Mansbridge (1999). "Should blacks represent blacks and women represent women?"

A contingent” yes””. In: *The Journal of politics* 61.3, pp. 628–657 ~ **29 pages**

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## 3.2 Descriptive representation

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### Descriptive representation

Teacher: Olivia and Silje

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#### 3.2.1 How should a parliament look like?

How should a parliament look like? In this session, we will look at different forms of representation: descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation. Wängnerud (2009) presents an overview of the research of both descriptive and substantive representation of women and the link between the two. Dahlerup (2006) introduces the theory of critical mass that argues that in order to increase women’s representation, women have to make up a certain proportion of the electorate.

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Lena Wängnerud (2009). “Women in parliaments: Descriptive and substantive representation”. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, pp. 51–69 ~ **18 pages**

Drude Dahlerup (1988). “From a small to a large minority: Women in Scandinavian politics”. In: *Scandinavian political studies* 11.4, pp. 275–298 ~ **23 pages**

Drude Dahlerup (2006). “The story of the theory of critical mass”. In: *Politics & Gender* 2.4, pp. 511–522 ~ **11 pages**

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#### 3.2.2 How should a court look like?

How should a court look like? And why should we care? We set up courts to protect our rights, including minority rights, against abuse. But how can courts protect us against the government? Courts have no power to enforce their own rulings. In democracies, this can be offset by an alliance between courts and voters. Specifically, if citizens support court

rulings – and threaten to kick office holders out of office unless they comply with them – then courts may successfully challenge the political branch. This is where legitimacy enters the equation.

We depart from the observation that courts are seen as legitimate when actors – people and politicians – are willing to accept a ruling they disagree with because they conpages the court to be the appropriate decision maker on the matter. If so, then courts need public support to be independent. Without knowing anything about the content or procedure of judicial decision making, we already form an opinion from how the court *looks like*.

Courts deliver judgments on our behalf. This session delves into the question of whether we are more willing to accept them if they also provide descriptive representation. De Vries (2021) provide an overview of the role of constitutional review and rule of law (regimes where office holders are also bound by the law). We then move to look at recent research on public opinion: How does the ideal judge look like?

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Catherine E. De Vries et al. (May 2021a). “13. Rule of Law and Judicial Politics”. In: *Foundations of European Politics*. Oxford University Press, pp. 235–255. ISBN: 978-0-19-883130-3 978-0-19-186925-9. DOI: [10.1093/hepl/9780198831303.003.0013](https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198831303.003.0013). (Visited on 15/03/2023) ~ **18 pages**

Jaclyn Kaslovsky, Jon C. Rogowski and Andrew R. Stone (July 2021). “Descriptive Representation and Public Support for Supreme Court Nominees”. In: *Political Science Research and Methods* 9.3, pp. 583–598. ISSN: 2049-8470, 2049-8489. DOI: [10.1017/psrm.2019.59](https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2019.59). (Visited on 22/01/2026) ~ **16 pages**

Engst, Gschwend, Sternberg (2021) ~ **23 pages**

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### **3.3 Is there a link between descriptive and substantive representation?**

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#### **Substantive representation**

Teacher: Olivia and Silje

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### 3.3.1 Substantive representation among elected politicians

Is there a link between representatives' characteristics and content? In other words, is there empirical evidence for a link between numeric/descriptive representation and substantive representation, and under what conditions? Work on gender representation has often been met with scepticism, where scholars have asked if the election of more women changes anything substantially. Going even further, people have asked if women are qualified to represent and make policy. All the authors in this week shows an empirical effect of electing more women, and oftenwise a positive one based on how we normally evaluate the quality of our democracies. Celis et al (2008) urges us to expand our understanding of substantial representation. Kittilson (2008) asks when and where increases in women MP's has an impact on policy by comparing the length of childcare and maternity leave in 19 democracies. O'Brien and Piscopo (2019) directly speaks to the aforementioned critique and present an overview of the effects of more women in parliament wrt. policy, public opinion and the parliament as a workplace. Kjøller et al (2026) investigate if the election of certain groups in parliament leads to a substantial representation of these groups' interests.

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Karen Celis et al. (2008). "Rethinking women's substantive representation". In: *Representation* 44.2, pp. 99–110 ~ **11 pages**

Miki Caul Kittilson (2008). "Representing women: The adoption of family leave in comparative perspective". In: *The journal of politics* 70.2, pp. 323–334 ~ **11 pages**

Diana Z. O'Brien and Jennifer M. Piscopo (2019). "The Impact of Women in Parliament". en. In: *The Palgrave Handbook of Women's Political Rights*. Ed. by Susan Franceschet, Mona Lena Krook and Netina Tan. Gender and Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 53–72. URL: [https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-37-59074-9\\_4](https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-37-59074-9_4) (visited on 11/10/2023) ~ **14 pages**

Frederik Kjøller, Olivia V. J. Levinsen, Anna Lund Sørensen og Frederik Hjorth (working paper, 2026). "The Effects of Electing Working Class Candidates" ~ **27 pages**

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### **3.3.2 Judges' gender and support for sexual rights and victims of discrimination**

*To what extent do female judges rule differently from male judges?* Women tend to be more liberal than men. This also holds for judges. However, to what extent is this due to their gender rather than their attitudes? This session asks whether judges' own life experiences influence how they assess litigants' situation. This is sometimes labeled "judicial empathy"; the ability for judges to identify with the situation in which litigants find themselves and adjust the application of the law to broader societal values such as the condemnation of discrimination (notoriously hard to prove in court).

The readings in this session all ask the question in relation to sexual and gender-specific topics. Boyd et al (2010) show that female judges do not behave differently from male judges *in general*. The exception is for topics relating to sexual rights where female judges are more likely to find in favor of victims of discrimination. Glynn and Sen (2015) relate this phenomenon to judges' life experiences and ask whether men can also learn from female experience. They find that fathers with daughters are also more likely to find in favor of discrimination than fathers with sons; relating this to the empathy they have learned (or not) from their children.

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Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin (2010). "Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging". In: *American Journal of Political Science* 54.2, pp. 389–411. ISSN: 1540-5907. DOI: [10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00437.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00437.x). (Visited on 10/01/2025)

Adam N. Glynn and Maya Sen (Jan. 2015). "Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women's Issues?: Identifying Judicial Empathy". In: *American Journal of Political Science* 59.1, pp. 37–54. ISSN: 00925853. DOI: [10.1111/ajps.12118](https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12118). (Visited on 03/12/2019)

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## **3.4 Behaviour in office**

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Teacher: Olivia

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### 3.4.1 Scope conditions: who speaks in parliament?

Parties decide who speaks in parliament. Time is limited, and being able to speak represents a source of power. In recent times, researchers have gained access to an unforeseen amount of data on politicians behavior in parliament. One of these resources are transcripts of the parliamentary floor, allowing us to see if there are gender differences in who speaks and when they speak. Silva et al (2024) goes even further, seeing if women adopt a more masculine way of speaking the longer they stay in office, thus discerning if there is a socialization or a selection effect of women politicians.

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Hanna Bäck, Marc Debus and Jochen Müller (2014). “Who takes the parliamentary floor? The role of gender in speech-making in the Swedish Riksdag”. In: *Political Research Quarterly* 67.3, pp. 504–518 ~ **11 pages**

Hanna Bäck and Marc Debus (2019). “When do women speak? A comparative analysis of the role of gender in legislative debates”. In: *Political Studies* 67.3, pp. 576–596 ~ **17 pages**

Bruno Castanho Silva, Danielle Pullan and Jens Wäckerle (2024). “Blending in or standing out? Gendered political communication in 24 democracies”. In: *American Journal of Political Science* ~ **13 pages**

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### 3.4.2 Reactions

Building on the former session, we will see if there are gender differences in the reactions to parliamentary speeches. Do politicians react indifferently to women and men speaking on the floor and under what conditions? Are men seen as more legitimate to speak about typical masculine topics such as foreign policy and economy? And with what consequences?

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Elliott Ash, Johann Krümmel and Jonathan B Slapin (2024). “Gender and reactions to speeches in German parliamentary debates”. In: *American Journal of Political Science*

~ 14 pages

Lotte Hargrave and Tone Langengen (2021). “The gendered debate: Do men and women communicate differently in the house of commons?” In: *Politics & Gender* 17.4, pp. 580–606 ~ 26 pages

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### 3.5 Are female representatives treated differently in office?

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#### Representative institutions as a workplace

Teacher: Olivia and Silje

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This topic delves into the question of how the working conditions differ between representatives.

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##### 3.5.1 Parliament as a workplace

Parliament is a workplace. Like other workplaces, it can be important to see if some groups are more or less advantaged. In this session we will look at the gendered cost of politics.

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Frederik Kjøller and Lene Holm-Pedersen (2025). ”The Gendered Cost of Politics”. In: British Journal of Political Science. ~ 35 pages

Karina Kosiara-Pedersen (2024). “Single ladies and freedom of speech: gendered explanations for, and effects of, violence in politics”. In: *European journal of politics and gender* 7.2, pp. 221–238 ~ 17 pages

Sandra Håkansson (2021). “Do women pay a higher price for power? Gender bias in political violence in Sweden”. In: *The journal of politics* 83.2, pp. 515–531 ~ 17 pages

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### 3.5.2 Courts as a workplace

*What is the effect of discrimination on female performance in office?* Statistical discrimination implies that the bar for women to enter office or other positions of influence is higher. Women may also be held to higher standards in office, meaning they have to exert higher effort there too. If so, then the quality of female representatives should, on average, be higher because they had a higher bar to clear (Anzia and Berry, 2011). This increase in quality may be overshadowed by gender biases in office, however.

In this session, we look at the working conditions for female judges and lawyers. Cai et al (2025) find that female lawyers tend to be more interrupted during oral hearings. Jacobi et al (2017) find that even US Supreme Court judges – at the pinnacle of any legal career – tend to be interrupted more often during oral hearings. You can also listen to the topic on the More Perfect podcast episode. Boulaziz (2025) looks at the task allocation between judges, and find that female judges tend to work more – they deliver more rulings faster – but also tend to get fewer important tasks.

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Sarah F. Anzia and Christopher R. Berry (2011). “The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?” In: *American Journal of Political Science* 55.3, pp. 478–493. ISSN: 1540-5907. DOI: [10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00512.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00512.x). (Visited on 12/01/2022) ~ **35 pages** (we will read this paper again for the next topic)

Erica Cai et al. (Oct. 2025). ““Let Me Just Interrupt You”: Estimating Gender Effects in Supreme Court Oral Arguments”. In: *Journal of Law and Courts* 13.2, pp. 375–396. ISSN: 2164-6570, 2164-6589. DOI: [10.1017/jlc.2024.7](https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2024.7). (Visited on 22/01/2026) ~ **17 pages**

”Justice interrupted”. *More Perfect*. Podcast episode <https://www.npr.org/podcasts/481105292/more-perfect> Alternatively, you can read the full paper: Tonja Jacobi and Dylan Schweers (Jan. 2017). “Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideology, and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments”. In: *Virginia Law Review* 103, p. 1379 ~ **17 pages**

Louisa Boulaziz (Apr. 2025). “Beyond the Glass Ceiling, More ‘Housework’? Womens’ Work Assignment, Performance and Influence in Political Institutions”. In: *The Journal*

## 3.6 How do we obtain representation?

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### Principal-agent theories of political accountability

Teacher: Silje

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Representative democracy is based on the idea that our preferences can be aggregated through the delegation of decision making authority. The way we select our representatives and how we hold them accountable influence who represents us and how they behave. This week introduces the principal-agent framework of political representation (de Vries, 2021, provide an overview). We touch on two causal mechanisms that may – or may not – increase representation: Selection and sanction. In practice, these two mechanisms blur.

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#### 3.6.1 Political accountability

Classical democratic theory relies on accountability as a means to ensure representation. If we can hold representatives accountable we may be able to make them change behavior from fear of a sanction (Ferejohn, 1999). This mechanism is most often discussed as "retrospective voting".

Accountability requires two conditions to be present: We need to be able to observe the behavior of our representatives (monitoring) and to be willing and able to impose a sanction (most often to kick officeholders out). Importantly, if the threat of a sanction is sufficiently credible, we will never see the sanction being imposed. Instead, we can observe how behavior changes as a function of the selectors' desires.

In this session, we take the opportunity to look at the latter mechanism with respect to judges political accountability (Stiansen, 2022).

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*European Politics*. Oxford University Press, pp. 112–131. ISBN: 978-0-19-883130-3 978-0-19-186925-9. DOI: [10.1093/hepl/9780198831303.003.0007](https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198831303.003.0007). (Visited on 15/03/2023) **24 pages.**

John A. Ferejohn (1999). “Accountability and Authority: Toward Theory of Political”. In: *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Ed. by Przeworski, Adam, Stokes, Susan Carol and Manin, Bernard. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 131 **23 pages**

Øyvind Stiansen (2022). “(Non)Renewable Terms and Judicial Independence in the European Court of Human Rights”. In: *Journal of Politics* 1

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### 3.6.2 Selection based on type or sanction based on behavior?

An alternative mechanism to obtain representation is to select representatives based on their ”type” (Fearon, 1999). ”Type” describes all qualities that representatives cannot change themselves: their talents, gender and preferences, for example. Successful selection based on type means that even independent representatives provide policies that are close to our preferences. The condition is that we have information about their aptitudes and preferences up front. We go back to the Anzia and Berry article (2011) and discuss how this might look like in their study. \_\_\_\_\_

James D. Fearon (1999). “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance”. In: *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Ed. by Adam Przeworski, Bernard Manin and Susan C. Stokes. Cambridge Studies in the Theory of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 55–97. ISBN: 978-0-521-64616-1. DOI: [10.1017/CBO9781139175104.003](https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139175104.003). (Visited on 23/04/2025) **43 pages**

Sarah F. Anzia and Christopher R. Berry (2011). “The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?” In: *American Journal of Political Science* 55.3, pp. 478–493. ISSN: 1540-5907. DOI: [10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00512.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00512.x). (Visited on 12/01/2022)

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## 3.7 Drivers of women's representation I

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### Outside and inside electoral systems

Teacher: Olivia

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#### 3.7.1 Are voters biased against women?

Can voter-preferences explain the long underrepresentation of women in parliament?

While voters seems to have been biased against women candidates in the 1960s and 1970s, newer research suggests that voters actually prefer women candidates. However, Teele et al (2018) shows us that women are not evaluated on the same criteria as men politicians creating a double bind for women in politics.

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Susanne Schwarz and Alexander Coppock (Mar. 2022). "What Have We Learned about Gender from Candidate Choice Experiments? A Meta-Analysis of Sixty-Seven Factorial Survey Experiments". In: *The Journal of Politics* ~ **10** pages

Dawn Langan Teele, Joshua Kalla and Frances Rosenbluth (Aug. 2018). "The Ties That Double Bind: Social Roles and Women's Underrepresentation in Politics". en. In: *American Political Science Review* 112.3, pp. 525–541 ~ **16** pages

Amanda Clayton et al. (2020). "(How) do voters discriminate against women candidates? Experimental and qualitative evidence from Malawi". In: *Comparative Political Studies* 53.3-4, pp. 601–630 ~ **29** pages

Ellen Lust and Lindsay J Benstead (2024). "Is the Future Female? Lessons from a Conjoint Experiment on Voter Preferences in Six Arab Countries". In: *Comparative Political Studies* ~ **37** pages

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### 3.7.2 Do some electoral systems favor women's representation?

What are the best conditions for women's representation? In this session we look at different electoral systems (proportional vs first-past-the-post and their effect on women's representation). We also look at party elites indirect behavior: do party elites nominate women and men on different ranks? And how does this ranking affect their chances of getting elected? \_\_\_\_\_

Maarja Luhiste (2015). "Party gatekeepers' support for viable female candidacy in PR-list systems". In: *Politics & Gender* 11.1, pp. 89–116 ~ **27 pages**

Ulrik Kjaer and Mona Lena Krook (2019). "The blame game: analyzing gender bias in Danish local elections". In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* ~ **13 pages**

Mona Morgan-Collins (2024). "How Gap Measures Determine Results: The Case of Proportional Systems and the Gender Mobilization Gap". In: *British Journal of Political Science*, pp. 1–9 ~ **9 pages**

Olivia V. J. Levinsen, Anna Lund Sørensen, Frederik Kjøller og Frederik Hjorth (working paper, 2026). "Cherries on Top - Women and Ballot Order" ~ **23 pages**

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## 3.8 Drivers of women's representation II: gender quotas

### 3.8.1 Do gender quotas lead to different policies?

What is the effect of introducing instruments such as quotas to the representation of women? And do quotas affect policy output? Clayton (2021) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) shows that the election of women changes policy outcomes, lending credit to the link between descriptive and substantive representation. Armstrong (2024) et al asks under what conditions women are elected for typical masculine positions such as finance minister.

Brenna Armstrong et al. (2024). "Financial crises and the selection and survival of women finance ministers". In: *American Political Science Review* 118.3, pp. 1305–1323 ~ **14 pages**

Amanda Clayton (2021). "How do electoral gender quotas affect policy?" In: *Annual*

*Review of Political Science* 24.1, pp. 235–252 ~ **17 pages**

Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo (2004). “Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India”. In: *Econometrica* 72.5, pp. 1409–1443 ~ **34 pages**

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### 3.8.2 Do quotas reduce the quality of our representatives?

Teacher: Silje

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A classical argument against gender quotas is that they artificially recruit low-quality (women) representatives. Murray (2014) argues that instead of seeing quotas in politics as an instrument to correct individual-level harm (against women running for office), we should compages them as a correction for a failure of meritocratic recruitment for the benefit of all. If so, then gender quotas are less about individual justice, and more about capping the over-representation of men that acquire office not for their merits, but because they benefit from a male bonus (leading to the fall of the "mediocre man", as Besley et al (2017) put it).

Hermansen (2025) uses the natural experiment offered by the European Parliament to test this intuition. She finds that prior to quota reforms, the higher entry cost for women into office leads to fewer by higher quality women, as compared to men (and other women). Once quotas lower the threshold for women (and elevate the threshold for men), this relationship disappears. Legislator quality evens out across genders. However, bias liners: Quota women have more to prove vis-a-vis their party. They stand to gain more from high performance and therefore exert more effort in office. Overall, this means the quality of representation increases: Male legislators are of higher quality while female legislators compensate by working harder. Barnes and Holmen (2020) then broadens the perspective to look at the longer-term effect of quotas on parties and the group of representatives that access office.

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Rainbow Murray (Aug. 2014). “Quotas for Men: Reframing Gender Quotas as a Means of Improving Representation for All”. In: *American Political Science Review* 108.3, pp. 520–532. ISSN: 0003-0554, 1537-5943. DOI: [10.1017/S0003055414000239](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000239). (Visited

on 12/01/2022) ~ 14 pages

Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen (Mar. 2025). “Lingering Bias: The Effects of Legislated Gender Quotas on Representation Quality in the European Parliament”. In: *European Union Politics* 26.1, pp. 66–95. ISSN: 1465-1165. DOI: [10.1177/14651165241302656](https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165241302656). (Visited on 23/03/2025) ~ 17 pages

Tiffany D. Barnes and Mirya R. Holman (Oct. 2020). “Gender Quotas, Women’s Representation, and Legislative Diversity”. In: *The Journal of Politics* 82.4, pp. 1271–1286. ISSN: 0022-3816. DOI: [10.1086/708336](https://doi.org/10.1086/708336). (Visited on 22/01/2026) ~ 34 pages

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## 3.9 Peer-feedback

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### Workshop

Teacher: Olivia/Silje

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#### 3.9.1 Workshop with peer-feedback

In this section, you will give feedback on each others first assignment. To prepare for the section, you will read each others assignments and comment on them. In class, you will give feedback orally. We will provide you with guiding questions for the feedback before the class.

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## 3.10 Drivers of women’s representation III

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### Drivers of representation

Teacher: Olivia

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#### 3.10.1 Attracting women: Role models

Can women role models increase representation and shape parliamentary behavior? Krook and O’Brien (2012) investigates what explains variation in women’s access to cabinet

power, while Campbell and Wolbrecht (2006) looks at the effect of women rolemodels on political activism and political participation. Wahmann (2021) looks at behavioral differences amongst MP's when there is a woman leader vs a man leader, and finally Krober (2021) sees if parties led by women have other party positions and topics than if led by a man.

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Michael Wahman, Nikolaos Frantzeskakis and Tevfik Murat Yildirim (2021). "From thin to thick representation: How a female president shapes female parliamentary behavior". In: *American Political Science Review* 115.2, pp. 360–378~ **18 pages**

Josephine Arnfred, Asmus Leth Olsen, Merlin Schaeffer (2026). "Diversifying the Bureaucracy of Tomorrow: Role Models and the Educational Pipeline" (Working Paper, 2026). Download here: <https://osf.io/uqgx5/files/wm7eb> ~ **12 pages**

Corinna Kroeber (2022). "How parties led by a woman redefine their positions: Empirical evidence for women's green, alternative and libertarian agenda". In: *European Journal of Political Research* 61.1, pp. 175–193~ **12 pages**

Mona Lena Krook and Diana Z O'Brien (2012). "All the president's men? The appointment of female cabinet ministers worldwide". In: *The Journal of Politics* 74.3, pp. 840–855~ **15 pages**

David E. Campbell and Christina Wolbrecht (May 2006). "See Jane Run: Women Politicians as Role Models for Adolescents". en. In: *The Journal of Politics* 68.2, pp. 233–247. ISSN: 0022-3816, 1468-2508. DOI: [10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00402.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00402.x). (Visited on 28/10/2021)~ **15 pages**

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### 3.10.2 Recruiting women: Parties

Political parties are gatekeepers to office. They decide who gets nominated to run for office, where they are nominated and when. In this session, we will look at what role parties play in political representation. Have they historically helped or hindered women's representation?

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Ulrik Kjaer and Karina Kosiara-Pedersen (2019). "The hourglass pattern of women's

representation”. In: *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 29.3, pp. 299–317

~ 18 pages

Timothy Besley et al. (Aug. 2017). “Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden”. en. In: *American Economic Review* 107.8, pp. 2204–2242 ~ 38 pages

Frederik Klaaborg Kjøller et al. (2024). “What Happens When Women Win Elections? The Electoral Returns to Increased Representation of Women”. In ~ 10 pages

Moa Frödin Gruneau and Johanna Rickne (2024). “Working Mothers and Political Daughters: Intergenerational Dynamics of Women’s Political Officeholding”. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 54.4, pp. 1385–1394 ~ 10 pages

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### 3.11 Can social movements increase political representation?

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#### Mobilizing for representation

Teacher: Olivia ; Silje

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##### 3.11.1 Mobilization and backlash

As political scientists, we tend to focus on the political system and its components in explaining causes. However, a lot of things exists outside the political system. In this session, we examine whether social movements in a broad sense can generate political representation or change public opinion and behavior.

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Mona Morgan-Collins and Valeria Rueda (2025). “Activism and the Electoral Participation of Women”. In: *British Journal of Political Science* ~ 18 pages

Ro'ee Levy and Martin Mattsson (2023). “The effects of social movements: Evidence from # MeToo”. In: *Available at SSRN 3496903* ~ 37 pages

Magdalena Breyer (2024). “Backlash or progressive mobilization? Voter reactions to perceived trajectories of women’s representation”. In: *Comparative Political Studies* 57.13,

pp. 2193–2224 ~ **32 pages**

Kira Sanbonmatsu (Dec. 2008). “Gender Backlash in American Politics?” en. In: *Politics & Gender* 4.4, pp. 634–642. ISSN: 1743-9248, 1743-923X. doi: [10.1017/S1743923X08000512](https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X08000512). (Visited on 11/10/2023) ~ **8 pages**

Olivia Levinsen (2025). “Riding the Second Wave: Can Radical Movements Increase Descriptive Representation?” Working paper, University of Copenhagen ~ **20 pages**

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### 3.11.2 Political change through courts: the case of gay rights

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*To what extent are courts fora for societal change?* ”Legal mobilization” denotes the effort of social movements to use courts to obtain social change. We approach the topic through the angle of the gay rights movement.

We can borrow from the interest group literature and theorize that courts are fora for two types of lobbying strategies: they may be fora for ”inside” strategies, where litigants seek legal change directly from a decision maker. Helper and Voeten (2014) theorize the conditions under which such a strategy may be successful. Litigation may also be part of an ”outside” strategy, where litigants seek to put an issue on the public political agenda to pressure change from political decision makers. This is a feedback loop: Favorable court rulings may have an effect on gay people’s own right consciousness (Bailey, 2024).

Either way, the gay movement meets with several coordination challenges: are they willing to go ”mainstream” and ask for equal rights to heterosexual couples? (Vanhala, 2009). Also, to win the judges and the public’s support, it may also be advantageous to find the ”perfect plaintiff”; someone whose personal history appeals to our empathy. This is a strategic choice of litigant that in itself can be challenging (”The Imperfect Plaintiff”).

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”Sex Appeal”, episode on the *More Perfect* podcast, NPR. <https://www.npr.org/podcasts/481105292/more-perfect>

Laurence R. Helper and Erik Voeten (Jan. 2014). “International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from LGBT Rights in Europe”. In: *International Organization* 68.1,

pp. 77–110. ISSN: 0020-8183, 1531-5088. DOI: [10.1017/S0020818313000398](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818313000398). (Visited on 12/01/2023)

Christine M. Bailey et al. (Feb. 2024). “The Effect of Judicial Decisions on Issue Salience and Legal Consciousness in Media Serving the LGBTQ+ Community”. In: *American Political Science Review*, pp. 1–16. ISSN: 0003-0554, 1537-5943. DOI: [10.1017/S0003055424000030](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055424000030). (Visited on 10/01/2025)

“The Imperfect Plaintiffs”, episode on the *More Perfect* podcast, NPR. <https://www.npr.org/podcasts/481105292/more-perfect>

Lisa Vanhala (Aug. 2009). “Anti-Discrimination Policy Actors and Their Use of Litigation Strategies: The Influence of Identity Politics”. In: *Journal of European Public Policy* 16.5, pp. 738–754. ISSN: 1350-1763, 1466-4429. DOI: [10.1080/13501760902983473](https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760902983473). (Visited on 21/07/2021)

### **3.12 What do politicians do when voters are *not* watching? I**

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#### **Selection on type: the effect of party ideology on policy making**

Teacher: Silje

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*What policies do our representatives pursue when we do not watch them?* The normative ideal of “trustee” representation stipulates that representatives should behave independently and sincerely according to their own convictions. In positivist theories, this is often equated to the effect of ideological selection. It is a special case of what Fearon (1999) calls selection on “type”. If we choose representatives whose ideological preferences align with our own, they will, to the best of their abilities, provide policies that congrue with ours; even when we do not monitor or sanction them.

We approach the question through the link between the promises parties make in their electoral programs and the policies they advocate for in fora where voters are unlikely to watch: policy making at the international level (foreign policy) and in courts.

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### **3.12.1 Parliamentary behavior: Voter choice, preference congruence and representation abroad**

### **3.12.2 Parliamentary behavior: Voter choice, preference congruence and representation abroad (cont.)**

To warm up, De Vries et al. (2021b) give us a reminder of the proximity theory of vote choice. All else equal, voters prefer representatives that share their preferences. Dingler, Kroeber, and Fortin-Rittberger (2019) infer from this that women's higher electoral participation would also mean a closer congruence between women in Europe and the preferences of our parliamentarians. In contrast to many of the readings thus far, they do not theorize what preferences women hold. Instead, they measure this empirically from survey responses.

Once in office, do these representatives follow up on their promises? We compages the link between voter choice and foreign policy choices among politicians. Finke (2023) argues that governmental parties emphasize foreign policy goals that congrue with their ideological preferences – as measured through their party programs – even when they are unlikely to be elected on or held accountable for these during elections. To make his argument, he studies speech behavior in the UN General Assembly. Finally, Lipps and Voeten (2025) take one step back and one to the side to look at how the gender identity and preferences of parliamentarians split parties in their reactions to Russia's anti LGBTQ+ stance. To do so, they study voting in the fairly unknown and unmonitored Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe; a forum in which behavior is unlikely to lead to electoral accountability.

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Catherine E. De Vries et al. (May 2021b). "5. Voting Decisions". In: *Foundations of European Politics*. Oxford University Press, pp. 72–86. ISBN: 978-0-19-883130-3 978-0-19-186925-9. DOI: [10.1093/hepl/9780198831303.003.0005](https://doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198831303.003.0005). (Visited on 15/03/2023)

Sarah C. Dingler, Corinna Kroeber and Jessica Fortin-Rittberger (Feb. 2019). "Do Parliaments Underrepresent Women's Policy Preferences? Exploring Gender Equality in Policy Congruence in 21 European Democracies". In: *Journal of European Public Policy* 26.2, pp. 302–321. ISSN: 1350-1763, 1466-4429. DOI: [10.1080/13501763.2017.1423104](https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1423104). (Visited on 26/09/2022)

Jana Lipps and Erik Voeten (May 2025). “Voting with Putin: Gender, LGBT Rights, and Tacit Support for Russia among Europe’s Parliamentarians”. In: *Comparative Political Studies*, p. 00104140251342925. ISSN: 0010-4140. DOI: [10.1177/00104140251342925](https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140251342925). (Visited on 22/01/2026)

Daniel Finke (Mar. 2023). “Party Ideologies and UN Debates”. In: *Party Politics* 29.2, pp. 281–293. ISSN: 1354-0688. DOI: [10.1177/13540688221074494](https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688221074494). (Visited on 30/11/2025)

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### **3.13 What do politicians do when voters are *not* watching? II**

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#### **Selection on type: the effect of party ideology on policy making**

Teacher: Silje

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##### **3.13.1 Judicial behavior: Effect of selection on policies**

##### **3.13.2 Judicial behavior: Effect of selection on policies (cont.)**

Our second example of the effect of selection pertains to the policies pursued by judges. This time, we trace the effect of voters’ choice of parties during parliamentary elections all the way to the decisions made by politically appointed judges. High courts often end up adjudicating key societal issues because laws are incomplete and have to be interpreted (“operationalized”). The legal gap left by the legislator (or the constitution) has to be filled. This is where judges’ preferences come in through their sense of “equity”, the gut feeling of what is right. It is therefore common that judges are politically appointed to constitutional courts – because they can strike down government policies – and international courts – because states would not cede sovereignty without representation.

The readings for this use party programs to infer how voter preferences link to judicial decisions. Honnige (2009) demonstrates how we can link constitutional courts’ decisions to strike down or uphold parliamentary policy proposals back to judges preferences. Against this backdrop, he discusses how different electoral systems have led to

more or less success for opposition parties in leveraging constitutional review to challenge the government.

The two next readings unpack this link further. Hermansen and Naurin (2026) study judicial reselection to the Court of Justice of the European Union. Voting is secret, but productivity is visible. They therefore argue that judges are selected for their preferences, but retained for their visible influence. Judges' limited political accountability may therefore partially be explained by the cost of replacement (Fearon, 1999). Hermansen and Voeten (2025) infer that judges' appointing parties' preferences can explain court rulings, and show that this is the effect of selection, not accountability; judges do not change behavior when there is a change in government.

You may want to brush up on your reading of Fearon (1999) and the chapter from de Vries et al (2021) before this session.

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Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen and Daniel Naurin (2026). "Shaping the Bench: The Effect of Ideology and Influence on Judicial Reappointments". In: *The Journal of Politics*. DOI: [10.33774/apsa-2024-kvbc9](https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2024-kvbc9)

Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen and Erik Voeten (Nov. 2025). *Ideology and Agenda Setting on the Court of Justice of European Union: Evidence from Anti-Trust and State Aid Cases*. DOI: [10.33774/apsa-2025-rkpjg](https://doi.org/10.33774/apsa-2025-rkpjg). (Visited on 12/11/2025)

Christoph Hönnige (Sept. 2009). "The Electoral Connection: How the Pivotal Judge Affects Oppositional Success at European Constitutional Courts". In: *West European Politics* 32.5, pp. 963–984. ISSN: 0140-2382. DOI: [10.1080/01402380903064937](https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380903064937). (Visited on 21/10/2025)

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### 3.14 What do politicians do when voters *are* watching?

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**Accountability: the behavioral paradoxes that appear from voters' need for information**

Teacher: Silje

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Voters and representatives face an informational problem: They may agree to the priorities of representative office – to make policy – but nevertheless fail to find an optimal solution. We approach the question through the lens of personal-vote seeking and parliamentary behavior.

To hold representatives accountable, voters need to observe the efforts that their parliamentarians exert in office. This is hard; most voters do not follow parliamentarians day-to-day activities. This leads MPs to invest in highly visible activities – such as constituency service – rather than legislative activities – such as committee work – to signal that they perform as expected. This is true even when voters would prefer them to spend more time in parliament.

The dynamic is exasperated by certain electoral systems. We have previously classified electoral rules according to the proportionality principle, and whether they provide quotas. This time, we compages the incentives to personal-vote seeking. When MPs compete in systems where they compete for votes not only from other parties, but from their own party colleagues, they cannot ride the party label as a short-cut to policy packages. Instead, they have to distinguish themselves from their colleagues on other grounds; often boiling down to visibility.

Andre et al (2014) provide a theoretical overview of the argument, while Pedersen (2025) tests what voters actually want in systems that incentivize personal-vote seeking. Høyland et al (2019) and Hermansen and Pegan (2023) then compages the how MPs invest their resources, conditional on the electoral rules.

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Audrey André, Sam Depauw and Matthew Søberg Shugart (June 2014). “The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Legislative Behaviour”. In: *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*. ISBN: 978-0-19-965301-0. (Visited on 10/03/2021)

Helene Helboe Pedersen (Jan. 2025). “Legislator or Representative? Politicians’ Tasks According to Voters”. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 56, e4. ISSN: 0007-1234, 1469-2112. DOI: [10.1017/S0007123425101245](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123425101245). (Visited on 22/01/2026)

Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen and Andreja Pegan (2023). “Blurred Lines between Electoral and Parliamentary Representation: The Use of Constituency Staff among Members of the European Parliament”. In: *European Union Politics* 24.2, pp. 239–263. ISSN:

1465-1165. DOI: [10.1177/14651165221149900](https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221149900). (Visited on 02/02/2023)

Bjørn Høyland, Sara B. Hobolt and Simon Hix (Apr. 2019). “Career Ambitions and Legislative Participation: The Moderating Effect of Electoral Institutions”. In: *British Journal of Political Science* 49.2, pp. 491–512. ISSN: 0007-1234, 1469-2112. DOI: [10.1017/S0007123416000697](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000697). (Visited on 01/10/2019)

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## 4 Outro: what have we learned?

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Teacher: Olivia and Silje

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In this session, we will take a broader look at selection, accountability and gender on elite behavior. What have we learned from the sessions and what do you need to prepare before the last assignment.

### 4.1 Supervision

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Teacher: Olivia and Silje

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#### Tuesday the 19th of May: Supervision

Send 1-2 pages covering your idea

Include:

- Introduction/motivation for the topic
- Research Questions
- Datasources
- Potentially preliminary analyses
- Questions for us to discuss

Every group gets ~ 15 minutes of supervision

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**Thursday the 21st of May: Supervision**

Send 1-2 pages covering your idea

Include:

- Introduction/motivation for the topic
- Research Questions
- Datasources
- Potentially preliminary analyses
- Questions for us to discuss

Every group gets ~ 15 minutes of supervision

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## **5 Exam information**

### **5.1 27/03 - First assignment**

TBA

### **5.2 29/05 - Second assignment**

TBA