

I) F_2 is how much the individual saves for period 2

$$C_1 + F_2 = wL$$

$$C_2 = (1+r)F_2$$

$$C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+r} = wL$$

II) $\max_{C_1, C_2, L} U = \log(C_1) + \log(C_2) + \log(1-L)$
S.t. $C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+r} = wL$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}(C_1, C_2, L, \lambda) &= \log(C_1) + \log(C_2) + \log(1-L) \\ &\quad - \lambda \left(C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+r} - wL \right) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_1} &= \frac{1}{C_1} - \lambda = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{1}{C_1} \\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_2} &= \frac{1}{C_2} - \frac{\lambda}{1+r} = 0 \Rightarrow C_2 = \frac{1+r}{\lambda} \\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial L} &= -\frac{1}{1-L} + w\lambda = 0 \Rightarrow 1-L = \frac{1}{w\lambda} \\ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda} &= -C_1 - \frac{C_2}{1+r} + wL = 0 \Rightarrow C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+r} = wL \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{\partial G}{\partial C_1} = \frac{1}{C_1} - \lambda = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{1}{C_1} \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{\partial G}{\partial C_2} = \frac{1}{C_2} - \frac{\lambda}{1+R} = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{1+R}{C_2} \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{\partial G}{\partial L} = \frac{-r}{1-L} + \lambda w = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{1}{w(1-L)} \quad (3)$$

From (1) and (2):

$$\frac{1}{C_1} = \frac{1+R}{C_2} \Rightarrow C_2 = (1+R) C_1 \quad (4)$$

From (1) and (3):

$$\frac{1}{C_1} = \frac{1}{w(1-L)} \Rightarrow C_1 = w(1-L) \quad (5)$$

Using the budget constraint:

using (4) and (5):

$$C_1 + C_2 = wL \Rightarrow 2C_1 = wL$$

using (5):

$$2w(1-L) = wL$$

$$2(1-L) = L$$

$$2 - 2L = L$$

$$3L = 2$$

$$L^* = \frac{2}{3}$$

this makes sense,
Utility is a third
leisure and two
thirds consumption.

income effect cancels out substitution effect (so if wages rise)

(consumption today and in future will be the same
in their current value:

$$C_1^* = w(1-L) = w\left(1 - \frac{2}{3}\right) = \frac{1}{3}w$$

$$C_2^* = C_1(1+R) = \frac{1}{3}w(1+R)$$

$$\text{III) } C_1 + F_2 = wL - T$$

(where T is the tax
on F_2 and P is
the pension)

$$C_2 = (1+R)(F_2 + P)$$

But the intertemporal budget constraint
says the same:

$$C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+R} = wL$$

The outcomes are exactly the same. But in this
case the saving is done for the individual
by the government. So unless the government
taxes more than the individual would have saved
himself, there is no effect.

should be $P/(1+R)$? But if you say P = value of pension in current value, it is still true
But it makes sense conceptually if you assume that the pension fund will grow over time (if you
understand pensions like that)

$$C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+R} = wL + \frac{P}{1+R}$$

~~$$E_2 = (1-t)wL$$

$$C_2 = (1+r)(F_2 + F_1 wL)$$~~

∴ I do the Lagrangian again:

$$\max_{C_1, C_2, L} U = \log(C_1) + \log(C_2) + \log(1-L)$$

$$\text{s.t. } C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+r} = wL - t + p$$

$$\mathcal{L} = \log(C_1) + \log(C_2) + \log(1-L) - \lambda \left(C_1 + \frac{C_2}{1+r} - wL + t - p \right)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_1} = \frac{1}{C_1} - \lambda = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{1}{C_1} \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_2} = \frac{1}{C_2} - \frac{\lambda}{1+r} = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{1+r}{C_2} \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial L} = \frac{-1}{1-L} + \lambda w = 0 \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{1}{w(1-L)}$$

From (1) and (2):

$$\frac{1}{C_1} = \frac{1+r}{C_2} \Rightarrow C_2 = (1+r)C_1 \quad (4)$$

From (1) & (3):

$$\frac{1}{C_1} = \frac{1}{w(1-L)} \Rightarrow C_1 = w(1-L) \quad (5)$$

With the Budget constraint and (4):

~~$C_1 + C_2 = 2C_1$~~

$$C_1 + C_2 = 2C_1 = wL - t + p$$

and using (5)

$$2w(1-L) = wL - t + p$$

$$2w - 2wL = wL - t + p$$

$$2w = 3wL - t + p$$

$$3wL = 2w + t - p$$

$$L^* = \frac{2w + t - p}{3w}$$

$$C_1^* = w\left(1 - \frac{2w + t - p}{3w}\right)$$

~~$C_2^* = w\left(1 - \frac{2w + t - p}{3w}\right)$~~

$$\frac{w - t + p}{3}$$

$$C_2^* = \frac{(1+R)(w - t + p)}{3}$$

So, ~~if~~ with a large lump-sum tax,
People will start working more because it is just
an income effect. So ~~the~~ leisure will reduce
together with consumption at C_1 and C_2 . The
opposite is true for the Reason.

IV) This will also cause a substitution effect
 Because consuming will become proportionally
 more expensive than before.

$$C_1 + F_2 = \cancel{wL} (1-t)wL$$

$$C_2 = F_2 + P$$

$$(R=0 \Rightarrow 1+R=1)$$

$$C_1 + C_2 = (1-t)wL + P$$

$$\max_{C_1, C_2, L}$$

$$U = \log(C_1) + \log(C_2) + \log(1-L)$$

$$\text{s.t. } C_1 + C_2 = (1-t)wL + P$$

$$\mathcal{L} = \log(C_1) + \log(C_2) + \log(1-L) - \lambda(C_1 + C_2 - (1-t)wL - P)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_1} = \frac{1}{C_1} - \lambda \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{1}{C_1} \quad (1)$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial C_2} = \frac{1}{C_2} - \lambda \Rightarrow \lambda = \frac{1}{C_2} \quad (2)$$

From (1) and (2):

(4) $C_1 = C_2$ this is because the interest
 rate $R=0$ so consumption today is exactly
 equal to consumption in the future

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial L} = \frac{-1}{1-L} + \lambda (1-t)w = 0$$

$$\lambda = \frac{1}{w(1-t)(1-L)}$$

From (1) & (3):

$$C_1 = w(1-t)(1-L) \quad (4)$$

with the constraint and (4)

$$2C_1 = (1-t)wL + p$$

and with (5):

$$2w(1-t)(1-L) = (1-t)wL + p$$

$$2w(1-t) - 2wL(1-t) = (1-t)wL + p$$

$$3wL(1-t) = 2w(1-t) - p$$

$$L^* = \frac{2w(1-t) - p}{3w(1-t)}$$

So and $C_1^* = C_2^* = \frac{(1-t)w + p}{3}$

So as taxes increase, L will decrease
 as leisure increases. This is because there
 is also a substitution effect now

as consumption becomes more expensive in
terms of labour.