(37)

A: Jones arrives at the airport after the scheduled departure time

W: the plane will wait for Jones

N: nobody notices that ...

The argument being made is:

$$A \to W \therefore (A \wedge N) \to W$$

? T F_5	T_3 T_1 T_4 F F_2

There is no counterexample so the argument seems valid. However, you could argue that the plane will of course only wait for Jones (i.e. an implicit assumption) if they ~~k~~ know that he is late, so you could argue that the argument should actually be formalised the following way:

$$(A \wedge \neg N) \to W \therefore (A \wedge N) \to W$$

T_5 F_8 F_7 T_6 T F_9	T_3 T_2 T_4 F F_1

So in this case there is a counterexample and so the argument is not valid.

This, however, does not have to be the case, there could be some other ~~Re~~ mechanism ~~Mecha Bitta~~ that will cause the plain to wait ~~th~~ which does not require anyone to know that Jones is late. So, in my opinion we should apply the principle of charity and assume the latter.

I)

A	Robin believes that A
t	?
F	?

II)

A	Robin knows that A
t	?
F	F → however, this depends on your definition of what it means to know something

III)

A	Robin knows that A, but it's not true that A
t	F → this is false because we just said that if something is not true, one cannot know it
F	F

Could be done as

A	(Robin knows that	A	$\wedge$	$\neg$	A)
t	?	t	F	F	t
F	F	F	F	t	F

~~How can we get different results?~~

~~that is because in this case, Robin would never~~

~~You could argue here that there should not be a question mark because in the event of A being true there is~~ a contradiction because

It is a contradiction, Robin would never believe A if A is false so both statements can't be true at the same time.

IV)

A	the infallible clairvoyant believes that A
T	~~T~~ ?
F	F

this depends on the definition of "Believing" though. If you say that it is impossible to believe something without having thought about it, the first row becomes a "?".

V)

A	B	A, but B
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	F
F	F	F

(same as ∧)

VI

A	B	Suppose A; then B
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	F	?

it could be a counterfactual, so this one could be both

~~VI)~~

A	B	Suppose A; then B
T	T	?
T	F	?
F	T	?
F	F	?

(~~Same~~ Same as →)

Because the hypothetical world is based on reality: Suppose the ~~earth~~ sky is fully black then you could still see the sun.

(3.6)

S : many students will be in Schopenhauer's lectures

H : " Hegel's "

t : they are scheduled at the same time

E_1 : Hegel's lectures are entertaining

E_2 : Schopenhauer's "

Initially you'd think it is formalised like this:

$$t \to (H \vee S),\ t,\ E_1 \to H,\ E_2 \to E_1,$$
$$S \to E_2 \ \therefore\ H \wedge \neg S$$

	$S\ H\ t\ E_1\ E_2$	$t \to (H \vee S)$	t	$E_1 \to H$	$E_2 \to E_1$	$S \to E_2$	$H \wedge \neg S$
1	F t t t t	t_1 t $\underline{t_3}$ t_2 $\underline{t_4}$	t	t_{13} t t_5	t_{11} t t_{12}	t_6 t t_7	t_8 F F_{10} t_9

So there is a counterexample,

so

However, "many students come to Schopenhauer's lectures or Hegel's lectures" ~~[illegible]~~ ~~should~~ Could Be interpreted as an exclusive or, ~~[illegible]~~ ~~Should~~ ~~[illegible] that the students~~ that there could not Be many students ~~[illegible]~~ in Both lectures:

	t	→	$((H \vee S) \wedge \neg(H \wedge S))$	t	$E_1 \to H$	$E_2 \to E_1$	$S \to E_2$	$H \wedge \neg S$
1	t_1	t	t_6 t_3 F_7 t_2 t_4 t_8 F_5 F_9	t	t t_{10}	t	F_{11} t	t_{12} F F_{13} ?
2	t_1	t	F_6 t_3 t_7 t_2 t_4 F_8 F_5 t_9	t	F_{11} t F_{10}	F_{13} t F_{12}	? t F_{13}	F

You only have to check these two Because there are only two ways for an XOR to be true. So there are no Counterexamples, so the assumption makes the argument valid