

Schema Mechanisms as an Attempt to Implement Genetic Epistemology

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Abstract. We review schema mechanisms.

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1 Introduction

2 Genetic epistemology

The notion of *sensori-motor scheme* proposed by Piaget.

Piaget’s genetic epistemology: “Knowledge does not originally arise either from a subject conscious of itself or from objects already constituted (from the subject’s point of view) that would impose themselves on the subject. Knowledge results from interactions occurring halfway between the subject and the objects, and thus involving both, but due to a complete un-differentiation and not from exchanges between distinct forms.

If, at the beginning, there is neither a subject, in the epistemic sense of the term, nor objects, conceived as such, nor, above all, invariant instruments of exchange, then the initial problem of knowledge will be to construct such mediators. Starting from the contact zone between one’s own body and the objects, these mediators will progressively engage more deeply in both complementary directions toward the exterior and the interior. It is from this dual progressive construction that the joint elaboration of both the subject and the objects depends.

The initial instrument of exchange is not perception, as rationalists too easily conceded to empiricism, but rather action itself, with its much greater plasticity. Certainly, perceptions play an essential role, but they partly depend on action as a whole, and some perceptual mechanisms that one might have thought to be innate or very primitive only emerge at a certain level of object construction.”

([6])

[8].

3 Schema mechanisms

[2] [1] [3] [5] [4] [7]

4 Conclusion

The problem of abstraction.

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