

# OLIVIER KOOI

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## Office Contact Information

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Saieh Hall for Economics  
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## Education

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<b>University of Chicago</b> , Ph.D. Economics	<i>2019–present</i>
<b>University of Chicago</b> , M.A. Economics	<i>2018–2019</i>
<b>Erasmus University</b> , B.A. Economics and Business Economics	<i>2015–2018</i>

## References

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Professor Mikhail Golosov (Chair) University of Chicago Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics golosov@uchicago.edu (773) 702-6405	Professor Esteban Rossi-Hansberg University of Chicago Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics rossihansberg@uchicago.edu (650) 714-2093
Professor Erik Hurst University of Chicago Booth School of Business erik.hurst@chicagobooth.edu (773) 834-4073	Professor James Robinson University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy jamesrobinson@uchicago.edu (773) 702-6364

## Research and Teaching Fields

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Primary:	International Trade, Political Economy
Secondary:	Macroeconomics, Public Finance

## Job Market Paper

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### **Power & Resilience: An Economic Approach to National Security Policy**

*Abstract: This paper considers the prospects for constructing an economic theory of national security policy based on the view that international politics is a bargaining problem in the shadow of conflict. Bargaining induces countries to value bargaining power. This in turn depends on their resilience to conflict. Resilience and therefore bargaining power depends on economic decisions such as investment and trade patterns. If bargaining power is not a priced commodity, decision makers will undervalue resilience in their decision-making, leading to a national security externality. This framework can be applied to a wide range of policy issues. Investment subsidies to the defense industrial base, the reshoring and friendshoring of productive capacity, and various ways to weaponize trade, including sanctions, are all studied as optimal policy solutions to the problem of missing markets for bargaining power.*

## Work in Progress

**The theory of the economic security union**

## Awards, Scholarships, and Grants

Bradley award	<i>2023</i>
Neubauer Family Foundation Distinguished Scholar Doctoral Fellowship	<i>2019–2024</i>
University of Chicago Social Sciences Division Fellowship	<i>2019–2024</i>

## Teaching Experience

New Developments in Public Finance (graduate)	TA for Profs. Ganong, Noel and Zwick	<i>Winter 2023</i>
Public Finance (graduate)	TA for Prof. Golosov	<i>Winter 2023</i>
Price Theory I (graduate)	TA for Prof. Murphy	<i>Fall 2022</i>
New Developments in Public Finance (graduate)	TA for Profs. Ganong, Noel and Zwick	<i>Spring 2022</i>
Price Theory I (graduate)	TA for Prof. Murphy	<i>Fall 2021</i>

## Research Experience and Other Employment

Research Assistant for Prof. Josse Delfgaauw, Erasmus University	<i>2017–2018</i>
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## Professional Experience

<b>Conferences</b>	<i>First double workshop in geoeconomics, geopolitics and preventing conflict studies</i>
<b>Presentations</b>	<i>Capital Theory, Trade working Group, Political Economy Lunch Seminar</i>
<b>Refereeing Activity</b>	<i>Journal of Political Economy</i>

## Additional Information

<b>Citizenship</b>	Netherlands
<b>Programming Skills</b>	Python, Matlab, Stata
<b>Languages</b>	Dutch (Native), English (Fluent)