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UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS, LAGOS, NIGERIA.

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AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

By

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It is possible to discuss rigorously only "The State of African Philosophy Today". But to do so and stop at that will look like a truncated presentation which only perceives innocuously or deliberately the trunk of a tree without bothering about the roots and the sprouts. Happily, to think or to talk of the state of African Philosophy today presupposes both a situational antecedent and consequent. Consequently, I decided to dispose with presuppositions and assumptions and be forthright by spelling out the title in full unelliptically. By this decision I can now perceive deliberately and intensely the whole tree – three roots – which form the foundation and the past, the trunk – connecting and holding together the roots and the branches and representing the present through which one must pass to reach the future, and the sprouts or branches whose physical and spiritual well-being and reality are guaranteed by the fact that these conditions hold for the root and the trunk.

The state of African Philosophy is what it is today because of what the state of African Philosophy, African education and indeed African personality had been in the past as a result of our physical, mental and spiritual colonization which has been successfully and phenomenally sustained by Western propaganda. Fortunately, African Philosophy has arrived. Because African Philosophy has arrived, the African has arrived. African Philosophy has been the missing link in the long awaited arrival of the African. We are the ones who will chart, and we have infact started charting, the direction and future of African Philosophy.

A proper and pertinent discussion of the State of African Philosophy today calls for the utilization of the principle of a new past and an old future [1]. We have to examine the past in the present in a new light, with a new understanding. The existing predominant literature, mainly those dating from the onset of African colonization,[2] cannot be taken baldly and nakedly to inform and guide our present state of African Philosophy much more being allowed to set the inte-

llectual tone for its future development and direction. The past has to be examined in a new light not really for ideological purposes, even though this reason in itself is weighty enough, but for the purposes of academic and scholarly honesty – to set the records and the facts straight and right. When the past is examined in a new light we will then be enabled to build the future on old foundations which will be reliable and durable

For a long time to come the ghost of the well known protracted debate about the existence or non-existence of African Philosophy will continue to haunt any outing on African Philosophy. It is tempting to see the debate as notorious and unnecessary. Thus Dr. M. Akin Makinde says of African Philosophy that "for a long time, it would seem that the only thing about it was its existence or non-existence."[3] However, we should concede that the debate turned out informative, challenging and enlightening[4]. The debate cannot then but form part of the substance of African Philosophy.

This is not to say or convey the impression that those who started out by denying the existence of African Philosophy have given up or have accepted that African Philosophy exists. Their new trick is to give a clear conception of their own understanding of Philosophy and challenge African Philosophy "to pass muster" by that conception"[5].

No one should feel upset, angry or surprised about the affirmation of the non-existence of African Philosophy. The African, since the onset of colonization has had to prove everything; beginning with his very being and humanity – that he is a human being and not a monkey or a donkey; that he has a language, not a dialect; that his buttocks is natural, not tailed; that he lives in houses, not on top of trees; that he speaks, not gibbers; that he is deistic, not atheistic; that he is moral and decent, not immoral and promiscuous; that indeed he had geography, history, culture, science, political and economic organisations, technology, arts and literature and civilization in epochs antedating the attainment of similar achievements by the caucasians.[6]

In the few areas where an attribute or a quality is not denied of the African, it is stimagtized and subordinated. Thus a man with a black skin is believed by the Causasians to be inferior to a man with a white skins and since they hold this to be the gospel truth the black man cannot be, if he is at all, as rational as the white man and it is

perfectly in place to trade him in slave trade and slavery.[7] In fact, as argued by Professor G. O. Olusanya, some caucasian scholars even find solace in the Biblical story of creation and hold that the Black man was created inferior.[8]

Assuming that this interpretation of the Genesis is correct, that is their own understanding of the Story of Creation. The Uchi (Auchi) people of Bendel State of Nigeria, according to Oshiothenua, tell a different (and it's probably the correct) story of Creation: "In the beginning everything was dark. God created everything black from molten charcoal. But man was given the eyes of a cat to enable him see in the dark. There were two human races and one of them now known as the white race spoke through the nose while the other race, the African race, spoke normally. God did not originally create their nose that way. What happened was that shortly after creation, the whiteman went and stole two kernels belonging to the rabbit. The tortoise saw the whiteman bending down as if picking up something. But before the tortoise could apprehend him, he stuffed the two kernels he had succeeded in picking up into each nostril. In replying to the tortoise's queries, it was obvious that he wasn't speaking normally but he claimed it was because he had a cold. Trust the tortoise, he was not convinced and so he stayed long enough with the whiteman In the process, the kernels in the whiteman's nostrils pushed up and elongated the nose as the molten charcoal was gradually drying up. The whiteman went later to the riverside to sneeze out the kernels but not his way of speaking. This was the proof the tortoise needed to take to God. God was naturally very upset at the behaviour of the whiteman. As a mark of punishment and identification, God changed the colour of the whiteman from black to white and also decreed, "Let there be light"[9] in order that the whiteman can be easily identifiable at least during the day time."

For the Uchi people, therefore, the whiteman acquired his complexion from creation as a punishment for thievery and deceit; thievery because the whiteman stole the rabbit's kernels and deceit because he tried to hide the fact from the tortoise Even now can we say that the tiger has changed his spots.

The Uchi people, like many other people the world over, also have their own story of a man who ascended into heaven not to sit at the right hand of God but just to show his powers. According to

this story there was this powerful medicine man who loved music and dancing so much and who was always telling people that he would, one day, dance and ascend into Heaven. One day the whole town gathered at the village square to watch the miracle. The medicine man ordered for his favourite music. He danced and danced and danced. Then he brought a thread from his pocket and ordered the thread to continue to stretch and elongate skywards. The thread did. The thread stretched and stretched for miles upwards. The man started to climb. He climbed and climbed until he was out of sight.

These two Uchi stories – one of creation and the other of Ascension – were effectively blanked out of the education of the Uchi child and they still do not form part of his education. It is all part of the generic denial of anything African.

Personally, I am now convinced that any African who denied or still denies the existence of African Philosophy does so more to raise intellectual dust than for any other reason. After all a large part of the career of the professional philosopher is supposed to be devoted to writing to generate controversy. To the extent that some professional philosophers have discharged this function creditably, to that extent they've played their roles as good philosophers.

But if such philosophers actually meant to be taken seriously and factually, then there is cause for alarm and pity. One will then feel justifiably that some philosophers are being ignorant or mischievous. They are being ignorant because they should know that the denial of the existence of African Philosophy is the latest in a continuation of the denial of any positive thing African. They are being mischievous because they are playing to the gallery of alien intellectual tradition.

4 African metaphysics, in its ancient settings, like the ancient metaphysics of any people, has a structure or a pattern.[10] The biggest river in the territory of a people always has a spirit worshipped by the people and to whom the people supplicate through institutionalized rituals. The biggest tree in the densest forest of a people is always inhabited by a spirit who commands and attracts worship, supplications and rituals from the people. A people surrounded by mountains or who live in mountainous regions always has a God or Gods at the highest point(s) of the mountain. A people

inhabiting a savannah or desert territory always posit a genie, or jinn somewhere in the region, preferably a cave or an anthill, who is their spirit of God

What all this comes down to is that whether it is in riverine areas, mountainous regions, forest or desert zones, ancient people always has a spirit or a God whom they believe to possess all the divine attributes except perhaps those of creation and forgiveness. The attributes of protection, security, progress, safety, success, guaradianship, victory, harmony, luck, blessing, prosperity and vengeance are believed to be possessed by such a spirit or a God. I do not know of any literature which reveal a people who hold their spirit or God to possess the attributes of Creation or of Forgiveness of sins. In other words, unlike in Islam or Christianity where adherents pray to the Supreme God for forgiveness while they go on living sinful lives,[11] adherents of what Dr. Onuoha christened "natural religions" are acutely aware of the in-built penal mechanisms in their religions.[12]

Anyone, on a little reflection on his roots, will immediately identify or recollect which metaphysical structure or pattern his or her people fits into. Such a recognition does not, of course, settle the question whether his people are thereby philosophical. Suppose someone retorts that such a people are mythological or superstitious or that such metaphysics are a mere world-view and not a philosophy. Before I deal with these two questions, I'll like to confront an issue raised by Dr T. Uzodima Nwala.

In his paper, Dr. Nwala compared two approaches in the study of Ancient Igbo Philosophy. These two approaches are the idealist and the materialist approach[13]. Idealism and materialism are metaphysical doctrines and their epistemological cognates are rationalism and empiricism. On the epistemological plane, therefore, Dr. Nwala is comparing the rationalist and the empiricist methodologies in the study of Ancient African Philosophy.

According to Dr. Nwala, most studies in Ancient African Philosophy take the idealist approach whereby "foe example, the concept of force is treated as the most generic concept. Then every other idea is shown to revolve around it. The economy, political life, and all forms of social intercourse now revolve, around the concept of force". Dr. Nwala argues that this way of looking at the philosophy is wrong because "it makes everything revolve around ideas, philo-

sophy and ideology". This is nothing but a reversion of the true relation between ideas and reality.

Dr. Nwala prefers the materialist approach because it allows for change and the process of becoming, and that the basis of change is material. "To understand the Igbo mind, Igbo philosophy, or even culture", says Dr. Nwala, "we should understand the natural and social environment in which they live. It is this that determine their consciousness and their philosophy. "It is the natural environment, social system and the level of development of the productive forces which create or make· relevant and irrelevant "gods, ancestors, spirits or forces".

Dr. Nwala acknowledged that one Major Arthur Lionard has used the materialist approach in the study of Igbo Philosophy and agrees with Lionard that it is no longer possible "to dissociate religion from geography". Both Lionard's and Nwala's materialistic approach takes its cue from Montesquieu who had held long before the duo that climate (geography) determines politics, economics and rationality. Of course, we know that Nwala's approach is also pointedly marxist. The marxist and materialistic conception of things and issues, as an intellectual theory, is ossifiedly procrustean – the bed is never modelled or re-fashioned to suit things and concepts. Rather things or concepts are slimmed or fattened, trimmed or bloated, shortened or elongated to fit the size of the bed. No procedure or methodology can be more dogmatic and static.

The simple question is whether reason, mind, ratioacination imposes order on nature or matter or it is nature or matter which dictates to reason or mind what to do or the sort of order that should be imposed on it. The consensus of opinion in philosophy after Karl Popper and Immanuel Kant before him, is that reason asks nature its own questions and demands answers. After this there could be observable regularities but these do not come before the philosophy which begins from wonder, awe, reverence or mystification. Following the structure or pattern of metaphysics which I outlined above, no river has it stamped on its bank that it is the abode of a spirit nor does an Iroko tree write the same thing on its bark. If the issue were that materialistic and empirical, a diver who surfaces to report that he found no spirit in the depths of a river should shake the confidence of a people's belief and a sawer who fells an iroko tree and found no spirit there should invoke the

same feeling in a people. The Americans and the soviets have probed the moon and returned. But the monotheistic religions hold more tenaciously and dogged by to their belief in God. If a people's mind is materialistically made and conditioned then the same procedure should unmake and debrief a people's mind.

Belief in a spirit or a God who has almost all the divine attributes can be said to be mythological or superstitious. As I have shown in my book – *The Substance of African Philosophy* – there are four broad positions on the mythological question in African Philosophy viz.,

1. Positive Position: This position holds that African Philosophy is mythology, appreciatively and positively. Dr. K. C. Anyanwu is the major proponent of this position and he holds that every philosophy or science is fundamentally mythology. Professor J. O. Sodipo and Professor Odera Oruka also subscribe to this position.

2. Negative Position: African Philosophy and only African Philosophy is here held to be mythology, pejoratively and epithetically, Proponents of this position include Professor P. O. Bodunrin, Professor Kwasi Wiredu and Paulin Hountundji.

3. Historical Position: Dr. Makinde is a proponent of this position. Dr. Nwala will also fall into this group. This group sees African Philosophy as mythological first because it is idealistic and also because of the "philosophical' activities of the colonial scholars who were mainlyanthropologiests and missionaries, not philosophers.

4. Contextual Position: This is the position which the present writer urges that myth or mythology should not be denied to be philosophical without taking the context into consideration.[14]

Within the ancient period of any philosophy, philosophy is mythology. Myth or mythology, understood as a system of interwoven myths or metaphysics of myths, in the beginning came first after the world or the universe and the objects in it. In the beginning mythology comprised and embraced incipiently all aspects of knowledge as we know them today. Mythology was the initial, the first and rudimentary efforts of man to understand and explain the uni-

verse or the world, conquer, pacify or appease nature or the environment and stabilize or maintain the status quo in society.

Many philosophers have often asserted with airs of primacy and preminence that philosophy once embraced or comprised all subjects. In actual fact, that status, whether glorious or infamous, belongs to mythology. We notice, for example, that even though the words mythology and philosophy are of Greek origin, the first, *mythos,* is one word while the second *philo-sophis* is two words in one. The linguistic lead we have here is that originally even the Greeks had no one word for philosophy. They had to coin and later baqueath it to the English Language. A linguistic neologism in a language is evidence that the new word is a later or borrowed concept.

In the light of the present state of learning and skills available in philosophy and other areas of knowledge, the professional philosopher has no excuse to be as baldly mythological as his ancestor but it must be remembered because it is a fact, that the ancient man was a child of his mythology and his times. The logical positivist, in so far as his reasoning cannot transcend science, logic, analysis, and mathematics is also a child of his mythology and his times.

If we, as we should, understand myth as empbodying the convinctions of a people in relation to an item or issue of primacy and paramountcy, we'll discover that philosophy has always being a hand-maiden to the mythology of any age. Whether it is the rationalism or morality of the ancient Greeks, the legalism of the Romans, the theology of the medievals, the humanism of the Renaissance, the irrationalism of romanticism, the materialism of the marxists, or the scientism dating from the 18th century and the computerism of the modern era, philosophy has always being a handmaiden to any of these myths. Beliefs in a Spirit or a God is no less mythological than belief in mathematics or in computers.

Similarly both beliefs, to a large extent, manifest world-views. Godwin Azenabor in a research work on African metaphysics, discusses this point at some length.[15] He quoted Robert Redfield as holding that "world view is the outlook upon the universe that is characteristic of a people" and philosophy is an individual's rational and conscious reflection on things generally. We are also told that a world-view is neither explicit nor systematic as "it is not critical compared to other philosophies and it does not include attempts to prove".

First, we note that even though a world view may be characteristic of a people's communal outlook upon the universe, it does not follow that the origin or formulation of that world view was communal. A worldview definitely was initially propounded by one individual in the distant past. It is now a worldview among mathematicians that 2+2 = 4. But the formulation of that mathematical fact was not the communal doing of mathematicians. Secondly, we note that there are sub-world-views within a world-view. This is what explains the Earthist, the Airist and the Waterist doctrines in African philosophy.[16] Thirdly, we find that there are individuals in every culture who critically examine their cultural world-views. This fact has been confirmed by Professor Kwasi Wiredu and Professor Odera Oruka, And a doctrine does not have to be comparative, critical and deductive before it can pass muster as philosophy. At any rate, any doctrine by nature is a choice among options. To settle for an option calls for critical and comparative judgement which may never be explicitly spelt out. Against the background of such considerations, we find it difficult to draw a sharp line between world-view and philosophy.

There are at least six problems on African Philosophy, viz.,

1. The problem of the intellectual dilemma of the African philosopher or scholar.
2. The problem of the definition of African Philosophy.
3. The problem of the placement or a status of African philosophy.
4. The problem of the content of African philosophy.
5. The logic question in African philosophy, and
6. The problem of the direction in African philosophy.[17]

Philosophers who discuss these problems and others do so against the background of three schools of thought in African philosophy. The first school of thought is that of African logical neo-positivism. The African logical neo-positivists are pretty well known. Some of them are Professor Kwasi Wiredu, Professor Odera Oruka, Professor P. O. Bodunrin, Professor Paulin Hountunji and Professor Robin Horton Scholars in this school of thought started out by denying the existence of African philosophy. They shifted grounds later and gave their own conceptions of philosophy by which they expected African Philosophy to pass muster or forever hold its peace.[18] Dr. Akin Makinde is a quasi-logical neo-positivist in the sense that, in letter, he is not one with them but he seems to be in spirit. This is

because Dr. Makinde holds that critical analysis (a pet view of the logical positivists) should be the method of doing African philosophy since that is the method western philosophers will appreciate.[19]

The second school of thought is the Theological school. This is the school of thought which sees African Philosophy as beginning properly from the period when we were exposed to missionary and colonial education, Professor W. E. Abraham *(mind of Africa).* Tempels and Professor Chukwudum B. Okolo are the leading proponentso of this view. Listen to Professor Okolo: "There was no African philosophy before the dawn of literacy in Africa. The dawn of formal education in Africa which coincided with colonialism may well be the start of formal African philosophy".[20] Assuming that the advent of formal education is the onset of formal philosophical activities one wonders why Professor Okolo does not see the point made by Professor I.C. Onyewuenyi that from the 15th century Africa was civilizing Europe through the University of Sankhore in Timbuktu".[21] Professor Abraham, on his part profounded the complex theory of Cultural Essentialism by which Africans are to harmonize and synthesize their indigenous culture and colonial and alien experiences."[22] At the end of the day Professor Abraham too emphasises formal education as the greatest asset. Our concern now is with Abraham's contention that we should not bother with the past but with the present and the future. Yet we know that our colonization did much to make our people disdain, ridicule and poohpooh anything traditional. Our culture was brutally assaulted, in almost all fronts especially in the religious, moral, philosophical and scientific fronts. The present bears the marks of this assault and conquest and to say that we should only be concerned with the present and the future is to argue that traditional culture is nothing but what it presently is. We are being urged, in fact, to forget our past. That, of course, is unacceptable and misleading.

The third school of thought in African philosophy is the purist school. Some members of this school are my humble self, Dr. Sophie B. Oluwole, Professor Onyewuenyi, Professor Sodipo, Dr. Barry Barry Hallen, Dr. K. C. Anyanwu, Dr. Uzodima Uwala, Dr. Jim Unah Dr. Enyeribe Onuoha, and to some extent also Dr. Akin Makinde. The purish school holds that African Philosophy is a sovereign though not unique enterprise. The method of discussing or discours-

ing African Philosophy can differ from philosopher to philosopher and must, of necessity, be influenced by the intellectual orientation of the tradition within a particular philosopher trained.[23]

The Purist school holds that any work that claims to be on African philosophy be it by an indigenous or non-African philosopher, is not African philosophy if it is actually not in harmony and congruence with the spirit of African philosophy. Any work can be appropriately classified as African philosophy if such a work, first, is in African philosophy and, secondly, if such a work is in harmony with the spirit of African philosophy.

Professor Odera Oruka also presents a three-fold classification of schools of thought in African Philosophy: 1. Ethonological school 2. The Rationalist school (3) The Historical school. Members of the 1st school are "those who positively rely on the ethonological findings in their conception or definition of African philosophy" and who "need not themselves be ethnographers or anthropologists". Members of 2nd school are those "who refuse to accept that there is lack of critical philosophical and systematics scientific thinking in African philosophy". Members of the 3rd school "gather data and texts that are of historical and philosophical interest to the on-going question of African philosophy".[24]

Professor Oruka's classification is somewhat unclear and untidy with the possible exception of the 2nd school. To say, for members of the 1st school, that they "rely on ethnological findings in their conception or definition of African philosophy" and for the 3rd school that members gather data on the "ongoing question of African philosophy" is to juggle language while conflating the two schools in reality. For what is the "on-going question in African philosophy" if not its "conception and definition"? Nor will anyone even remotely familiar with Professor J. O. Sodipo's works on African philosophy tingely agree with Professor Oruka that they are just a collection of data and texts. Professor Bodunrin settles this question conclusively when he writes: "Since, we have now, through Sodipo's analysis, come to see that there is a difference between the traditional Yoruba account of cause and effect, and the scientific account, the important question is...." Here Professor Bodunrin gives the highest rating to Sodipo's analysis and this score indicates clearly that Professor Sodipo is not merely engaged in the procurement of data and texts.

What is really astonishing is the way and manner Professor Oruka slotted the names of Professor Bodunrin and Professor Hountundji into his most prestigious school – The Rationalist school of thought. If there is anything which the two professors acquiesce to in African philosophy, it is the proposition that there is a lack of critical, philosophical and systematic scientific thinking in African philosophy". In his landmark article, "The Question of African Philosophy" *Philosophy* 56, (1981), Bodunrin characterises philosophy "as a negative appraisal of received ideas" (p. 137) and concludes that since African philosophy is not critically inclined, it is not philosophy. Professor Paulin Hountundji position is equally crystally unambiguous: "The development of philosophy is, in some way, a function of the development of the sciences. . . we shall never have in African a philosophy in the strict sense until we have produced in Africa, a history of science, a history of the sciences". *African Philosophy: Myth and Reality*, p. 98. Professor Oruka's decision to classify Bodunrin and Hountundji as rationalists in the sence of "those who refuse to accept that there is a lack of critical, philosophical and systematic scientific thinking in African philosophy" is obviously based on personal fellowship, not on philosophical textual evidence. If the thesis Oruka is foisting on Bodunrin is accepted, then Professor Bodunrin's fame in African philosophy becomes travestied in one fell swoop. The three African Philosophical musketeers are the leading African logical neo-positivists.

Professor Onyewuenyi, in his enlightening book, *The African Origin of Greek Philosophy*, shows conclusively how some Greek, Western and Christian doctrines are firmly rooted in African (Egyptian) philosophy. The work shows that major Greek doctrines and concepts were not original with the Greeks. Professor Onyewuenyi is wrong, however, if he thinks that the fact of Egyptian origin of Greek philosophy proves the existence of philosophy in Sudanese African. Since Egypt hosted a literate civilization long ago, it is doubtful if anybody ever contested the existence of Egyptian philosophy which is not synonymous with African philosophy.

Five principles of Discourse in African philosophy are now generally accepted. These are: Radin's Principle of the Existence of an Authochthonous Intellectual Class, Hunning's Principle of Synthesis, Horton's Principle of Departmentalization, Abraham's Principle of th Destinction between private and public Aspects of African philosophy, and my own principle of Periodization.[25]

The first principle calls for a brief discussion. Professor Paul Radin ... advanced a canon to guide any scholarly undertaking and understanding in African philosophy. Professor Radin affirms that contrary to popular and traditional belief, there are in every human groups individuals who in the words of William James, "were constrained by their individual temperaments and interests to occupy themselves with the basic problem of what we customarily term philosophy". In traditional and ancient African societies these were generally medicine men, priests, rulers, military leaders and sagacious elders whose position in the group corresponds roughly to the position occupied by the scholars and thinkers in modern societies. Any scholar doing research in any area of Ancient African Philosophy should look our for members of the indigenous intellectual elite and he should not be surprised if they do not come up with uniform views on the same subject.

What should be the direction and tradition in African Philosophy? This question is necessary in view of the existing situation whereby British philosophy is seen as predominantly empirical, American as pragmatic, French as rational and dualistic, German as idealist, Russian as materialist, Indian as spiritualist and Chinese as humanist. Any philosophical work in the direction of the moral, the metaphysical, the spiritual, the intuitive or even the mystical is within the tradition of Ancient African Philosophy both in its communal and private aspects. This is because for the African what is, in the words of Abraham, Idoniboye and Tempels is, in the first place, Spirit or Vital Force. Spirit or Vital Force is primitive in Ancient African Philosophy.

The logical positivist can wonder how anyone would want to encourage the African Tradition in philosophy in this age of science. My answer is that I have always thought that science should take its cue from philosophy not methodically but teleologically. In other words, for any scientific invention to be worth its salt, its consequences and purpose for mankind and humanity must be seen to be moral. I am advocating a *moral scientism* for science. Any discovery or invention in science has to be embraced only if it advances the moral worth, the simplicity and the dignity of man. The simple test is: Will the application of a scientific invention or discovery advance the simplicity and moral worth of mankind? If the answer is "Yes"

such a discovery should be developed and embraced. If the answer is "No" such an invention should be left to cool away in the laboratory or drawing board."[26]

The logic question in African philosophy is indirectly related to the tradition and direction in African philosophy. The confusion over the logic question in African philosophy can be easily resolved by a distinction between logic in natural language and logic in artificial language. In the first sense, African philosophy is logical because as a system of thought, it has an underlying logic. Africans as rational human beings are also eminently logical in this first sense.

The second sense of logic is really an attribute of formal training in symbolic or deductive logic. African philosophy is logical in this second sense because its basic propositions are formalizable. Patterns of reasoning, inferences and discourses in African philosophy can also be formalized and tested for formal validity or invalidity using the techniques of modern formal logic. Africans as professional philosophers can be logical in this sense since they are well placed to master and learn the techniques of modern logic. There are, however, at least two parts to a logical system – origination from and harmony with its cultural, ideological or metaphysical background or root. Any philosophy has a purpose, nature or structure and the logic of such a philosophy must serve such a purpose. It is alright and correct to hold that there is logic in African philosophy in our second sense of the demarcation of logic except that the purpose and structure of African philosophy is not that artificial. The aim of African philosophy and ancient elders was not to win arguments and contrive linguistic and conceptual analysis to throw up individual prodigies and intellectual giants. Rather the aim was to understand, cooperate, empathize with nature, environment and Creation and mould a moralistic, humane and communal universe.

The logic of such a philosophy, then should not be the validity of arguments and the correctness or fallacies of assertions which sometimes border on sophistry but the harmony and considerateness of discouse and patterns of thought. The development of formal logic has shown that it is possible to develop a formal logic appropriate or relevant to any philosophy or system. The logic issue in African philosophy, therefore, is more of a challenge than a question, It is the challenge to African philosophers to develop a formal logic that will capture the spirit and metaphysics of African philosophy.

Contemporary African scholars with any shed of philosophical learning can now claim to be philosophers and teachers of philosophy. And why not? After all they have been so certified by the Western untellectual tradition. It is not a controverted fact, therefore, whether there are professional African philosophers. The issue all along has been the image which outsiders had gleefully painted about the intellectual status of the traditional African, the native African. "African, without any exception", said Sir Samuel Baker, "have a dark mind which is" not enlightened even by a ray of superstition". The implication underlying such opinions is that the contemporary African professional philosopher or intellectual had neither the intellectual nor philosophical background. If he is now logical and philosophical, it is only and solely by Western grace".[27] Our examination in the present of the past in a new hight shows clearly that we have no choice but to build the future of African philosophy on old foundations. This way we have the best of all possible worlds – a new past and an old future.

FOOT NOTES

1. C.S. Momoh, *Philosophy of a New Past and An Old Future* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1986), Chapter One
2. Innocent C. Onyewuenyi, *African Oirgin of Greek Philosophy,* (Nsukka: Department of Philosophy,1987), p. 15
3. M. Akin Makinde, "Philosophy in Africa" in *The Substance of African Philosophy,* C. S. Momoh, ed. (Auchi: African Philosophy Projects Publications, 1989).
4. C.S. Momoh, "African Philosophy: Does it Exist", *Diogene,* No. 136, 1985
5. P. O. Bodunrin, "The Question of African Philosophy" in *The Substance .....*, p. 24
6. Onyewuenyi, p. 15
7. C. S. Momoh, "A Critique of Borderland Theories in *Borderlands in Africa,* A.I. Asiwaju and P.O. Adeniyi, eds., p. 58
8. G.O. Olusanya, *The 2nd World War and Politics in Nigeria* (Lagos: Univ. of Lagos Evans Brothers Limited 1973), p. 25
9. It is clear that the story of creation in the Genesis took off from this point. I learnt of this story of creation in 1977 from Aliu Oshiothenua when I was conducting my field work for a Ph.D. thesis in African metaphysics. At that time I was already over 30

years old and most of those years I spent at Auchi schooling and working. That I learnet of the story for the first time in 1977 is a clear testimony of the effectiveness of our colonial education.

10. C.S. Momoh, "Modern Theories in African Philosophy", *Nigerian Journal of Philosophy,* Vol. 1, No. 2, 1981, pp. 8–10
11. C. S. Momoh, "The God of Morality Vs. The God of Religion" in C.S. Momoh, et al, ed. *Nigeria Studies in Religious Tolerance Vol. II: Religion and Morality* (Lagos: CBAAC/NARETO, 1989), p. 83.
12. Enyeribe Onuoha, "The Philosophy of Igbo Religion" in C.S. Momoh et al ed., *Nigerian Studies in Religious Tolerance,* (Lagos: CBAAC/NARETO 1989), p. 374.
13. T. Uzodima, Nwala, "The Study of Igbo Philosophy: A Historical and theoretical setting" *Kiabara· Journal of the Humanities,* Vol. 5, No. 2, 1982.
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15. Godwin E. Azenabor, *African Metaphysics: Esan Concepts and Arguments* (University of Lagos Department of Philosophy, M.Phil Dissertation, 1988), p.9
16. C.S. Momoh, "Issues in African Philosophy" in *The Substance of African Philosophy*
17. C.S. Momoh "Problems in African Philosophy", *The Substance of African Philosophy",*
18. Bodunrin, p. 25
19. Makinde, p. 90
20. Chukwudum B. Okolo, *What is African Philosophy?* (Enugu Freemans Press Limited, 1987), p. 27
21. Onyewuenyi, p. 16
22. W.E. Abraham, *The Mind of Africa,* Chapter One
23. C.S. Momoh, "A Study of African Thought", *Daily Times,* 17/1/90
24. H. Odera, Oruka *Trends In Contemporary African Philosophy* (Nairobi, Shirikon Publishers, 1990), pp. 135–137.
25. C. S. Momoh, "Issues in African Philosophy", p. 58
26. Ibid, p. 60.
27. C. S. Momoh, "On Cultural Philosophy" *Journal of African Philosophy and Studies,* Vol. 1 Nos. 1 & 2, 1988, p. 36.

THE ULTIMATE ORIGIN OF MORAL NORMS

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1

Human conduct does not take place in a vacuum: man deliberates and acts within a given context. Consider two adults, X and Y, who are walking along the road. All of a sudden, X hits Y on the head and runs into Z's glass house. Y picks up a piece of stone and runs after X at whom he throws the stone through the glass window of Z's house. To pass judgement on the above incident, one already comes to grips with human and nonhuman elements, with the society or group and the individual. Among the questions which ordinarily come to mind with regard to this incident are the following: Why did X hit Y on the head of all places? Is Y justified in throwing a stone at X through the glass window of Z? what steps will Z take to get his window repaired? The aim of this paper is not to resolve this case of stone throwing, but to investigate the ultimate origin on which depend moral judgement and human conduct. More precisely, we want to examine the very origin and validity of moral norms in so far as these norms are connected both with the maintenance of authority by means of reward and punishment and man's striving for self-realisation.

II

If one fixes his attention on moral norms not only as dealing with individual human actions, but also as connected with the maintenance of authority by means of reward and punishment, he directly faces the tension which can exist between the interests of the group and the interests of the individual, between the demands of group or customary rules of conduct and conscience as the arbiter of individual freedom. First, let us consider the nature of custom and customary morality.

Custom can be examined from its collective and individual aspects. In its collective aspect, custom is a usage so public, reasonable, peaceable, uniform, long-continued that it has acquired the force of law. (However, it is good to note that custom becomes law for practical purposes when the "courts" recognise it as such by applying it as a rule of decision in a particular case.) Custom is created for each people by themselves and their ancestors as an immediate adaptation of life to its environment, and comes to

constitute their unwirtten law. In-as-much as custom is an adaptation to the environment, it can differ from one region to another.

In its individual aspect, custom begets morals. For customs are enforced upon the individual, and he becomes accustomed to being moral - both the enforcement of custom and the habituation to the custom taking place before the individual is competent to judge for himself. Hence custom cannot be inherited. On the contrary, it rests on acquired habit in individual; if custom were physically inherited, it would be instinct. When socially transmitted from generation to generation, custom becomes tradition[1].

The essence of customary morality is rigid and meticulous conformity with the rules of conduct laid down by the group. To maintain the observance of its customs, the group employs various devices. First, the main negative commandments of the group are raised to the level of taboo. Thus, by constantly refraining from doing those things forbidden by the group, one develops a certain sense of reverence for the norms of the group - a sense of reverence which is often strengthened by the force of public opinion in so far as it makes one wish to do what the neighbours approve. Another device employed by the group to ensure the maintenance of its customs is religious ritual. Religious ritual is a most powerful ally of customary morality. In the main, it serves to work up the members of group to a state of great emotion in favour of the custom. The power of religious ritual in this regard is evident in rites of passage (for example to manhood), where impressive ritual is used to bring home to the youth both the authority of the group and the importance of obeying its customs[2]. Finally, the group is generally prepared to use physical force to compel the recalcitrant individual to observe its customs.

From the foregoing, it seems clear that the chief characteristic of customary morality is that it compels the individuals in the group to be good. Nevertheless, customary morality has some obvious advantages. The society or group already realises the imporance of norms for the smooth running of its affairs. Secondly, the importance of maintaining these norms are highlighted by the means through which the norms are enforced. On account of this enforcement, customary morality instils in the individual regular habits under the influence of the norms of the group. However, in so far as the individual observe these norms for reward either here or hereafter or for fear of punishment be it here or hereafter, it is evident that the moral authority is outside the individual. He lacks freedom in the sense that he cannot choose what is right for himself. The understanding that people should be free to choose the right thing for themselves belongs to the level of consicence[3].

III

Conscience operates when one makes intellectual judgement on definite acts (whether accomplished or proposed) of his own, and decides whether these acts are right or worng. Such judgements centring on the individual and his circumstances are always accompanied by self-satisfaction or self-dissatisfaction depending on whether the individual feels he has fulfilled or fallen short of the moral law . Conscience inflicts remorse or approves, deters or suggests. Conscience has an intellectual side and an emotional side. It may be enlightened or the reverse, sensitive or the reverse. The enlightenment of conscience may be estimated by the moral ideal of the individual; as has already been noted, one may obey the moral law through fear of punishment here or hereafter or through hope of reward here or hereafter. On a more reflective level, one can obey the moral law simply in order to realise the ideal self.

At the level of conscience, the moral authority is inside the individual. The individual is directed by a power within himself. This power which directs the individual in his conduct and which is sometimes called the "inner voice" is the basis of the right to the freedom of conscience and the other rights linked with it[5]. Hence morality at the level of conscience has certain clear characteristics. First, the standards or norms of morality are now actively chosen by the individual after mature deliberation. These norms are no longer passively accepted as an inevitable part of life in a group. Though the individual may not deliberately choose to accept or reject the norms of the group, still he feels that, if the need arises, he can decide for himself in moral matters. Secondly, one experiences a new personal interest in morality, because the good is actually considered (though not necessarily exclusively) from the well-being of the individual himself. In brief, on the level of conscience, the individual is imbued with freedom with its possibilities of new and creative forms of goodness. From this it follows that the most enlightened or educated conscience is not that of the man limited to a set of fixed rules, but that of the man who has the highest ideal, i.e., the conscience of the man who wishes to realise the best life of which humanity is capable[6].

To attain the best life of which humanity is capable, the individual must have some stability of moral background, and some assurance that his fellow citizens will not interfere unduly with his freedom. It is doubtless that only a well-established moral traditon can provide such a background: anarchy or a garrison state

cannot provide the best environment for the exercise of individual conscience and freedom. Thus, when one comes to consider the authority best suited for a given society - be it monarchical, government by a council of elders, government by a council of title

holders or rule by an age grade, it must be such that it provides the environment suitable for the exercise of individual conscience[7]. However, we cannot further pursue this problem of the best government without straying from our discussion, its detailed examination must be assigned to political philosophy.

Nevertheless, our examination of the relationship which exists between society and the individual has shown that both the society and the individual can be considered "law-givers"[8]. The society, through its legitimate channels makes and enforces laws. The individual is, on his own right, a law-giver, but he is primarily a law-giver to himself. That is, in certain cases, the sustained activities of the individual can fundamentally transform the face of the society, thereby raising basic questions concerning the law-making and law-enforcements power of a given authority in a given society[9].

If both the society and the individual are accepted as law-givers, then we seem to have arrived at a view of the society and the individual as two autonomous but interacting agents. Considered in his autonomy, the individual seems able to differ with the society in so far as he can decide not to follow the customary observance of the society. Admittedly, an enlightened conscience does, in most cases, counsel one to follow customary observance. However, when the individual openly differs with the society, it is mainly from one of the following two separate reasons. The individual can ostensibly refuse to follow the norms of the society or customary norms because the law restricts his undiscriminated self-interest. The owners of a beer parlour can resist a dust to dawn curfew imposed during a state of "emergency". For it is after dusk that he gets the greatest number of customers. if his motive for resisting the curfew is mere desire for personal gain, his stand will not survive the punishment of the law-enforcement agents, who will see in the open beer parlour not only the refusal of one man to obey, but also an invitation to those who cannot resist the taste of the drinks to disregard the curfew. Customary law can be resisted for another reason, i.e., as going contrary to the existence or meaning of the entire society. Thus an enlightened conscience, S, refuses to observe the same curfew as the owner of the beer parlour, but the enlightened conscience argues that the problem which gave rise to the declaration of the state of emergency could have been handled in a more satisfactory manner. For the emergency was declared because of some physical confrontation between two agricultural towns in a remote area of the country. S, who has now assumed the conscience of the nation, would extend his argument to other inefficiencies, and so invite those who have their eyes open to witness the deplorable state of sanitation in the cities and towns,

the general insecurity to life and property and other glaring social malpractices. The stand of S is a questioning of the relevance of the particular ruling power to the general well-being of the entire society. His position, compared to that of the owner of the beer parlour, is based on a clearer and deeper perception of the significance of the laws or whatever customs and traditions on which the society prides itself.

It is understandable if one in the position of S is prepared to undergo any punishment, including the loss of his life. If this is the case, it seems to be on account of his conviction that point and strive to bring about the important changes. However, an important problem now arises: clear as it seems that the individual cannot get his power to differ with common observance from a given authority (which is the mouthpiece of the society), does he obtain it from himself or from another source?

IV

It is clear that the individual cannot be self-sufficient. Since he is not an island, he must be dependent on the society of which he is a member for certain necessities of his life. Nor can the individual express himself through speech or by the written word without using language. But, in another sense, the individual can become aware of his distance from the commonor customary observance of the society. In this respect, we can say that he stands outside or is other than the society. Standing in this position, he is able to question the customs or norms of his group and its applications. Similarly, the individual can be said to stand outside or surpass himself - i.e., in so far as he is considered the centre of unreflected experiece. Hence the individual can also question himself or the motives for his actions. In those circumstances in which the action of the individual can be said to surpass the immediate (i.e., look towards the long-term) demands of the group or self, we can say that the individual is motivated by a reality other than the group or the mere self. To qualify as a proper motivating power, this reality must have all the qualities and possibilities to which both the group and the individual can aspire. Furthermore, given that the individual or each member of the group is in principle equally related to this reality, each individual can grasp the fundamental significance of the norms of the group as contained in this reality. Finally, this reality which is at once the source of the norms of the society and the individual must be accorded an ultimate significance with regard to the existence and aspirations both of the community and the individual. Hence, when the authority of a given society enacts its laws on the basis of a proper grasp of the reality and significance of this source of the norms of human

conduct, then those laws can be said to be right or just. On the contrary, if the laws are articulated from an improper grasp of the significance of the source of the norms of human conduct, they can be said to be wrong or unjust. Similarly, the individual, considered as a moral agent (i.e., as one striving, on the level of conscience, to realise himself as member of a given society) ought to act from a proper grasp of the significance of this ultimate source of the norms of human conduct. Where he grasps the meaning of this ultimate source of the norms of human conduct and refuses to act in accordance with it or acts from an improper understanding of the same ultimate source, he cannot be said to be striving to realise himself.

Following from what has just been said, the reason why the individual can challenge some laws of a given society seems clear. The enlightened conscience is striving to attain the best life of which humanity is capable by his life and action within a given society. In so far as he is striving to attain the best life of which humanity is capable, it is doubtless that he would want each and every individual in the society to attain the same life. Hence he challenges the ordinances of a given authority only to the extent that it disorganises society. and so makes it difficult for the members of the society to realise themselves through living and acting in that society. Now, a more urgent problem remains to be solved. Earlier, we considered both the society and the individual as law-givers. In what precise sense can both be said to be law-givers?

To resolve this problem, it is important to recall what has alreday been said in connection with the function of the society and the individual as law-givers. The laws of the societ are enacted by its legitimate authority with a view to maintaining order and peace. The validity of these laws, as already pointed out, derives from their being articulated from a proper grasp of the significance of the ultimate source of the norms of human conduct), which ought to contain all the qualities and possibility. Failure to base these laws on a sound understanding of this source of the norms of human conduct renders them susceptible to the disorganisation of the society. As a result, each member of the society, in so far as his conscience is enlightened and he seeks to attain the best life of which humanity is capable (realising of course that it is for the well-being of the entire society that each and every member of the society should seek the same life), can challenge the ordinances of a given authority which tend to disorganise the society. We shall now add that the possibility to grasp the significance of this ultimate source of the norms of human conduct rests on some elements common both to each member of the society and to the very ultimate source itself. We shall call these common elements

inherent laws, in the sense that they are intimate to the nature of all beings. These laws pervade all beings and exist or operate in all beings at various levels of complexity. Hence the function of the legitimate authority of a given society (and this authority is constituted of individuals in the society) and that of each member of the society, in so far as he acts from an enlightened conscience, is a proper perception and articulation of these laws (which are inherent in all beings) in relation to the object in question. Since these inherent laws exist in all beings in various grades, the laws of the society which deal with human life, will be more fundamental than those which deal with property. When the main insights into these inherent laws (whether they are connected with human life or with property) are properly articulated, they ought to command universal validity, that is, they ought to bind man wherever he is found.[10] In addition, these fundamental ordinances, to the extent that they are valid, ought to form the basis of further legislation (whether these concern political or purely moral matters). How then do we designate a legislator (considered either as the authority of a given society or an enlightened conscience giving the law to itself) to reflect his proper function?

The inherent laws, which are intimate to the nature of all beings may now be considered common to (in the sense of being qualitatively the same in) the ultimate reality and every other being. These inherent laws exist in all beings in various levels of complexity. Therefore, they exist in the ultimate reality in an ultimate complexity. The function of the legislator is a perception of these inherent laws as they truly exist both in the ultimate reality and in every other being, and articulating them as the basis of man's conduct as a member of given society and as an individual striving to realise himself. Hence the legislator, whether it is the authority of a given society or the individual striving to realise the best life of which humanity is capable, cannot be strictly called a legislator or law-giver, because the laws already exist as inherent laws in an ultimate complexity in the ultimate reality. In so far as the legislator perceives the inherent laws and articulates them as moral norms, we can say that he is interpreting or more precisely expressing the laws which are inherent in all beings and which operate in beings at various levels of complexity. The ultimate source of moral norms thus transcends both the individual and the society.

NOTES

1. On the collective and individual aspects of custom, compare *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, ed. by James Mark Baldwin, Glouchester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1960, Vol. I,P. 250.

2. A modern example of such ritual is a national pledge which is made by the youth to instil in them the importance of loyalty to their country. Similarly, oaths of office are often made in a foreign language, and this adds to the sense of mystery and awe.

3. In considering morality from its customary or social level, attention has mainly been paid to the objective aspect, i.e., to moral norms as articulated and enforced by the group, without examining in any great detail the subjective respose. In the observance of customary morality, deliberation and choice on the part of the individual is not absent. However, these will mainly concern the alternatives provided by customary rules of conduct. The individual seems to build up his personality by "conforming" to the rules of his group in so far as his moral consciousness is operating within the framework of customary rules of conduct.

4. In the classical Greek philosophers, "conscience" is not used as a technical term in ethics. In the Ethics of Aristotle, , often translated as "prudence" comes closest to the English equivalent of conscience. However, in the Ethics of Aristotle the term is more nearly the equivalent of "moral insight". The Stoics laid more stress on the rational nature of the moral law. The self-dependent wiseman of the Stoics is distinguished by his moral worth. Two characteristics distinguished the doctrine of conscience of the schoolmen. First, conscience was an intellectual power, capable of grasping the universally binding rules of conduct. To this function of conscience, the name of "synderesis" was given. Secondly, conscience performed the function of applying the general rule to particular cases. This later function was specifically called "conscientia". Peculiar problems were later to arise from this application of general norms to particular cases (cases of conscience), difficulties which were formulated and systematised to give rise to casuistry as an aspect of moral inquiry. The basis of this distinction would seem to lie in the Thomistic rational psychology and the distinction between the speculative and practical intellect which goes back to Aristotle. For St. Thomas, the mind knows directly only the universal. It knows the individual through the

application to the individual of the universal concepts which it realises. Leading contemporary moralists of the intuitionist school adopt the distinction between "synderesis" and "conscientia". But the term "synderesis" is dropped and the term conscience is almost restricted to the consciousness of the universal laws or laws of morality, while "moral judgement" is sometimes used for the application of the general rule to the particular case. For more details on this historical development, see *Encyclopedia of Ethics and Religion*, ed. by James Hastings, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark; New York, Charles Scribner, 1911, Vol. IV, pp. 30 - 47.; Jacques Leclercq, *La Philosophia Morale de Saint Thomas devant la Pense Contemporaine, Louvain,* Publication Universitaire de Louvain; Paris, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955, ch. v, pp. 138 - 153.

5. For an interesting discussion of these rights seesJohannes Messner, *Social Ethics, Natural Law andsthe Western World*, St. Louis and London, Herder, 1964, pp. 326 - 330.

6. The enlightened conscience has not yet realised this best life of which humanity is capable. But implied in his striving to reach this life the conviction that if all aspire to this best life, the consequence will be the well-being of humanity as a whole. For an analysis of customary morality and morality on the level of conscience, see William Lillie, *An Introduction to Ethics*, London, Methuen (1948), 1966, Ch. III, p. 56 - 64. See also my "The Fundamental Sources of Discipline". a paper presented on the Fifth Academic Day and Convocation Ceremony of the Spiritian School of Philosophy, Isienu - Nsukka, Isienu, 1984.

7. We must note two things concerning which the relevant authority should take note in order to establish the suitable environment for the exercise of individual conscience. First, even the most "advanced" of human societies is still largely at the level of custom: few people in them reflect much on moral matters, and if they do reflect, it is in one or two special directions. The authority will see it as an important duty to find a way to accomodate the presence of this reflecting minority. It will be a facile approach to see in this reflecting minority a threat to authority instead of an invitation to reflect. Secondly, even for the majority who conform to customary observanve, when their basic needs, food, clothing and shelter are not provided, the maintenance of right conduct runs into problems. It is indeed after people have been fed and clothed that the problem of morality arises. In other words, right conduct presup-

poses some peace on earth, which the society and the individual will strive not only to maintain, but also to improve.

8. For the moment, we shall take "law-giving" as a power in the society of the individual to recognise its ideal (for the society, one can consider some order and peace without which growth or development cannot obtain, for the individual, a suitable environment to realise the ideal self) and to grasp the rules which it must follow to attain it.

9. At this point there seems to be an indistinction in the concept of moral norms in so far as they claim universal application and civil laws which are binding on the inhabitants of a given political entity. There is no way one can confuse moral norms and the laws of a state. What is at stake is that both moral norms and the laws of a state often deal with the same things. However, "political" authority is only concerned with external conformity. Though it may legislate on purely moral matters, like the taking of human life and stealing, it can do very little to control the inner springs of moral action. It is true that Aristotle considered ethics a subordinate, though an important, part of politics. However, we shall maintain the African traditional view according to which the goo d man was also the good citizen. We shall not say that the good man is primarily a good citizen, but that both the conduct of the individual in the specifically political sphere and his conduct in so far as he is striving to realise the ideal self are fundamentally moral.

10. Hence reward, considered as an encouragement to conformity with the laws of a group, is basically founded on the nature of these laws of the group as articulations of the inherent laws which reach the very root of every being; while punishment, considered as a deterrent against non-conformity with given laws of a group, is founded on the recognition of non-conformity as a violation of the norms the validity of which stem from laws inherent in all beings.

UNAMUNO'S REVOLT AGAINST RATIONALISM

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Existentialism, as we know, arose largely as a reaction to rationalism. Kierkegaard, the father of existentialism, started the existentialist movement in reaction against Hegel's abstraction and exaggerated confidence in the power of human reason[1]. He frowned on Hegel's bold claim to have succeeded in encompassing the whole of reality within his speculative system. Hegel believed that reason could penetrate into the depths of reality, into the 'Absolute". and unfold its inner structure. He was not prepared to concede any limit to the powers of human reason. This absolute confidence in the powers of human reason was characteristic of the Age of Reason which was, itself, a reaction against the supremacy of Faith over Reason in the Middle Ages. Reacting against this Medieval subordination of Reason to Faith, the Age of Reason reversed the order and put Reason above Faith. The tendency of every reaction is to go to the opposite extreme, and the Age of Reason did precisely that by exaggerating the powers of human reason to the neglect of the other dimensions of the human being, namely, the affective dimension. This was, in turn, bound to provoke a reactionary movement and it did, for it led to irrationalism which opposed the exaggeration of the powers of human reason and gave primacy to the affective dimension in man which was ignored by the Age of Reason. Before Kierkegaard, Pascal, one of the predecessors of existentialism, had raised a voice of protest against this exaggeration of the powers of human reason. Reason, Pascal points out, has its own limitations which reason itself recognizes. "The last proceeding of reason is to recognize that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it. It is but feeble if it does not see so far as to know this"[2] Pascal opposed reason with the heart. Reason, according to him, cannot discover God, it is the heart that discovers God.Reason does not always understand what the heart does because the heart has its own reason which reason itself does not know.

The irrationalist movement was not confined to philosophy, it could be seen also in science and in psychology. Darwin's *Origin of Species (1859)* struck a heavy blow on rationalism by its claim that reason is the product of matter, that man is the product of blind

evolutionary process. The concept of man's reason as something transcendental, coming from above, suffered a serious set back, as did also th distinction between man and the apes. Darwin's mechanistic explanation of the universe left no room for conceding any privileged status to the human reason. Under the influence of Darwin's theory of natural selection, according to which all beings in the universe have to struggle for their survival, with only the fittest surviving, Nietzsche embarked on his programme of the transvaluation of values, which in effect, amounts to opposing reason with instinct. The traditional morality based on reason was rejected by Nietzsche as a "slave morality" fit only for the weaklings Instead he advocated a morality based on instinct, a morality of struggle, of ruthlessness, of the display of strength, etc. This he called the "Master morality" as opposed to the "slave morality" based on reason. The irrationalist movement can also be seen in the philosophy of Arthur Scopenhauer (1788–1860) who in his major work, *The World as Will and Idea*, identifies the ultimate reality, the Absolute, as *Will* rather than as *Reason* as Hegel had done. The Absolute, according to Schophenhauer, is not rational; it is not a rational being developing consciously towards a goal as it is portrayed by Hegel. On the contrary, the Absolute, according to Schopenhauer is irrational, for it is a blind, irrational impulse for life, which he calls the *Will* to live In psychology, the founder of psycho-analysis, Sigmund Freud (d. 1939) lent weight to the irrationalist movement by his theory that man is actuated by the "libido", and not by reason as it is generally believed. Human actions, according to him, are not the products of reason, but of instinctive drives (the "libido") operating from the "unconscious" level of our being. If we try to repress these instincts in one form they come back (unknown to us) in another form and have their way. These, and not reason, are the determinants of human actions and behaviour, according to Freud. A similar claim had earlier been made by David Hume who contended that it is not reason, but rather the passions that control and determine human behaviour. The role of reason in human behaviour, according to Hume, is no more than that of a slave serving its masters – the passions. "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."[3]

In contemporary philosophy irrationalism has had its most forceful expression in existentialism. Indeed irrationalism is one of the distinguishing features of existentialism. Among contemporary existentialists, irrationalism finds its most dramatic expression in the

philosophy of the Spanish existentialist, Miguel De Unamuno (1864–1936). The philosophy of Unamuno, like that of Kierkegaard, derives mainly from the personal experience of the philosopher. For the philosopher, says Unamuno, does not philosophize with his reason alone, but with his passions, his emotions, his life experience and, indeed his whole being. In his youth, Unamuno was inclined towards rationalism. He had an exaggerated confidence in the cognitive power of human reason, and thought reason could comprehend everything in reality. But he eventually became disillusioned and came to the conviction that reality lies beyond the scope of reason. It is not by reason alone that man acquires knowledge, otherwise reality would elude us. "How can we know this reality if reason alone holds the key to knowledge?", Unamuno asks.[4] He objects to the Aristotelian definition of man as a rational animal, for rationality, he contends is not man's distinguishing feature. What distinguishes man from the animals is, according to Unamuno, not reason but the emotions. "I do not know why he has not been defined as an affective or feeling animal. Perhaps that which differentiates him from other animals is feeling rather than reason. More often I have seen a cat reason than laugh or weep"[5] Animals, Unamuno contends, display a certain degree of reasoning. But what they never do and cannot do is to laugh or weep, and this is an emotional expression which is peculiar to man. Hence man should rather be defined as an affective animal, rather than as a rational animal. We can agree with Unamuno that animals do not laugh, smile or weep but that is because smiling or weeping requires reasoning, reflection or, in short, consciousness, which animals lack. These things are not just emotions alone but emotion plus reason. Only a being which possesses both emotions and reason can laugh or weep, for smiling, laughing or weeping results from the joint function of rationality and emotions. Animals do have emotions and often display them. A dog for example displays emotions conspicuously, and if it is incapable of smiling or weeping it is not that it lacks emotions (for it certainly has and displays emotions). Rather, a dog is incapable of smiling or weeping because it lacks rationality. Unamuno's contention therefore that it is emotion or affection that differentiates man from the animals is untenable.

It is a mistake, Unamuno contends, to think that philosophizing is the function of reason alone. On the contrary the heart is even more active in the philosophical activity than reason. For the philosopher is not a disembodied spirit, but a man of flesh and bone whose desires and emotions are more active in his philosophical

activity than his reason. Unamuno illustrates what he means with the example of Kant. After destroying the traditional arguments for the existence of the "rational God", Kant brought in "the God of the heart", that is, the God who is close to man and who rewards man's virtue with happiness. Here Kant's heart was doing more philosophy than his reason, for "he reconstructed with his heart that which with his head he had overthrowned."[6]

The central problem of philosophy, according to Unamuno, is the problem of immortality. The desire for immortality, that is, the desire for self-perpetuation, is man's most fundamental desire. Everything man does is ultimately with a view to satisfying this most basic desire. "Knowledge is employed in the service of the necessity of life and primarily in the service of the instinct of self-preservation. This necessity and this instinct have created in man the organs of knowledge and given them such capacity as they possess. Man sees, hears, tastes, and smells that which it is necessary for him to see, hear, touch, taste, and smell in order to preserve his life."[7] Even society itself is formed with a view to employing it to satisfy the instinct of self-preservation, and it therefore "owes it being and maintainance to the individual's instinct of perpetuation."[8] Reason itself is also the product of the instinct of self-preservation since it is the product of language which is itself a social product. For to think is to talk to oneself in and through a language. Thought is an inward language and it derives from language while language itself derives from the society. And since society is the product of man's instinct of self-preservation, it follows that reason itself is the product of the instinct of self-perpetuation.[9] In this way Unamuno subordinates reason to instinct. Reason is the product of instinct and is at the service of instinct. Philosophizing too is at the service of the instinct of self-preservation, for as the old Latin adage says, one must first of all live before he can philosophize ("Primum vivere, deinde philosophari").

While Albert Camus says that the central problem of philosophy is the problem of the meaning of human life,[10] Unamuno points out that underlying this search for the meaning of human life is man's instinctive thirst for immortality. It also underlies the search for God in various religions andthe problem of the existence of God in Western philosophy. Unamuno again takes Kant as an example, to illustrates what he means: He points out that Kant's moral argument for the existence of God derives from his argument for the immortality of the soul. This means that Kant's main preoccupation is not God as such, but the immortality of the soul "and in order to sustain

this immortality God is introduced."[11] The thirst for immortality is, according to Unamuno, a universal thirst, not confined to human beings alone. For all beings seek to perpetuate themselves in existence and resist any attack on their existence. The rocks, the trees, the animals, all strive to preserve themselves in existence, to perpetuate their existence, thereby manifesting this universal desire for immortality. One does not become explicitly aware of this thirst for immortality until one reflects on the phenomenon of death; for "to discover death is to discover the hunger for immortality."[12] This discovery is made when one is struck with "the terror of extinction" which could follow death.

Is there any guarantee that this most basic of human desires will ever be satisfied? Is there any guarantee, in other words, that this immortality which man desires with all his being is a possibility, that man is not going to end up in extinction at death? No, says Unamuno. There is no such guarantee, no certainty that we shall survive death even though it is our most basic desire. It may well be that it is extinction that awaits us at death and that the desire for self-perpetuation is doomed to frustration right from the start. Reason is incapable of showing us either that there is immortality or that there is none. This very uncertainty about our ultimate destiny shows the tragedy of life, for life is a tragedy, and philosophy "is the science of the tragedy of life, a reflection upon the tragic sense of it."[13] Man's whole being is permeated by this basic desire for immortality and all his actions are directed towards it, yet he is not sure whether or not it will be within his reach. This, according to Unamuno, is the tragic sense of life. We should, nevertheless, revolt against the idea of extinction at death. We should resist it and fight against it by living in such a way as to deserve immortality. If we do this and we are still made to face extinction at death, then it would become unjust. "If it is nothing that awaits us, let us make an injustice of it; let us fight against destiny even though without hope of victory."[14] Unamuno quotes with approval the French writer, Senancour, who in his book, *Oberman* (1804) had expressed a similar idea: "Man is perishable. That may be; but let us perish resisting, and if it is nothing that awaits us, do not let us so act that it shall be a just fate."[15] Unamuno says that this very uncertainty about our future and our ultimate destiny is a good foundation for ethics. It is better to base ethics on uncertainty than on dogmatism.

"What I wish to establish is that uncertainty, doubt, perpetual wrestling with the mystery of our final destiny, mental despair, and

the lack of any solid and stable dogmatic foundation, may be the basis of an ethic."[16] To base one's ethics on a rationalist dogma which is believed to be an infallible and incontrovertible principle is to run the risk of being a fanatic. The moment the dogma is weakened or shattered "the morality based upon it gives way."[17]

Morality, Unamuno contends, is not the function of reason but that of feelings He therefore disagrees sharply with Socrates and Plato who saw morality as a function of reason and identified virtue with knowledge. "For my part", says Unamuno, "I feel that virtue, like religion, like the longing never to die – is the fruit of passion."[18] Not surprinsingly, Unamuno denies the a priori nature of moral principles and claims that ethical principles and doctrines are usually the justification a posteriori of our conduct. What is prior, according to him, is our conduct. Ethical principles are then employed as means of justifying both to ourselves and to others what we have done or what we are doing. "Once more I must repeat that our ethical and philosophical doctrines in general are usually merely the justification a posteriori of our actions. Our doctrines are usually the means we seek in order to explain and justify to others and to ourselves our own mode of action "[19]

Faith, or religion, just like morality, is not, according to Unamuno, a function of reason but of the will. Faith, he says, is not a matter of giving intellectual assent to certain doctrinal propositions about God. This is not the essence of faith. To believe is essentially to express a wish; to believe in God is to wish that God may exist and to behave as if he really exists. "What is certain is that for thinking believers today, faith is, before all and above all, wishing that God may exist. Wishing that God may exist, and acting and feeling as if He did exist."[20] What is important, Unamuno says, is not the actual act of believing but the *will* to believe, that is, the wish that there may be a God Reason is incapable of conceiving God, for "every rational conception of God is in itself contradictory."[21] Nor is reason capable of proving the existence of God. The God whose existence metaphysicians have tried to prove is what Unamuno calls the rational God, the metaphysical or theoretical God. This is the God of Reason, an abstract, lifeless and immobile God. Unamuno dismisses this God as unreal. A God who is impassible and insensitive to human suffering cannot be real. Unamuno would rather replace this rational God, *the God of reason, with the God the heart,* the God who is close to man; the God who suffers with man and is therefore able to love and pity man This God of the heart conceived by Unamuno is a panentheistic God which he identifies with the

universe. "The God of the heart, the God who is felt, the God of living men, is the universe itself conceived as personality, is the consciousness of the universe."[22] It is because God suffers in us and with us that he loves us, for "there is no true love save in suffering".[23] Unamuno is aware that what he is saying about God would shock many people. How can God suffer? Does that not imply that God is limited? He however offers no apology, for God, he insists, is actually limited He is limited by matter from which he tries to free himself. "God, the consciousness of the universe is limited by the brute matter in which he lives, by the unconscious, from which he seeks to liberate himself".[24] To love God therefore means to pity him in his suffering and to endeavour to free him from matter. "God suffers in each and all of us. . . . and we all suffer in him. . . To love him is to feel him suffering, to pity him. . . The work of charity, of th love of God, is to endeavour to liberate God from brute matter."[25]

There are a number of points one could object to in Unamuno's arguments. I have already pointed out above the weakness of his argument that it is affection rather than reason that differentiates man from the animals. Far from distinguishing man from the animals emotions are in fact common to both men and animals. What men have but which the animals lack is rationality, and it is this that differentiates man from the animals. Aristotle was therefore quite right in defining man as a rational animal. While animal emotions are devoid of rationality, human emotions are *rational emotions* and this explains why men alone are capable of smiling or weeping while the animals are incapable of any of these acts even though they are expressions of emotions. Similarly untenable is Unamuno's contention that moral principles are a posteriori justifications of our conduct. This, in other words, means that we first of all act, and then invent moral principles to justify or explain our action. But this is untenable. A person does not, for example, first of all refrain from stealing and then invent the moral principle which prohibits stealing in order to explain why he does not steal. To argue this way is to put the cart before the horse This does not mean that moral principles are necessarily a priori and transt endental. We don't have to be kantians. It can be argued that moral principles are in fact a posteriori in the sense that they are derived from the collective experience of mankind. Mankind having known from past experiences that certain kinds of actions are detrimental to human welfare, due to their adverse effects, eventually formulated the moral principles, warning men to desist from such actions. In this way, though the

moral principles are a posteriori (in the sense that they derive from human experience), they are nevertheless not justifications or explanations of past conduct but rather *warhings* and *guides* for future actions and conduct.

Unamuno's contention that reason is the product of instinct is questionable. His argument for this thesis is, as we have seen, that society is the product of man's instinct of self-preservation while language itself is in turn the product of society. Thinking, he goes on, is the product of language, for to think is to talk to oneself in and through a language. It follows therefore, according to the argument, that reason is the product of instinct (via society and language). Now the relationship between language and thinking is not as simple as Unamuno would have us believe. It is true that thinking is always done in, and through, a language But it is also true that language itself presupposes thinking and that there can be no language of any sort without thinking. The relationship between language and thinking is therefore dialectical; each presupposes the other. It can therefore not be said that thinking is the product of language as if language were prior to thinking. In fact the fact that it is only rational beings that can develop language suggests that rationality is prior to language. While conceding that language is much more than a mere vehicle for the expression or transmission of thought, that language does shape one's thinking, we must realize that the rational faculty has to be first of all present before language can arise. This shows that rationality is prior to language.

In spite of these and other points on which one couuld raise objection to Unamuno's irrationalism its main point is clear and is hardly controvertible: Man is not reason alone, nor is he completely rational, for he is made up of "flesh and bone". It is not by reason alone that man acquires knowledge nor is reason the only guide of human conduct. For man is also an effective, emotional being, and the passions (emotions) are integral parts of his being. The affective dimension of man has been too often ignored in traditional philosophy which portrays man as if he were a purely rational being. But man is not surely rational, for he is a blend of rationality and emotions. This is the central message of Miguel De Unamuno's irrationalism and his main contribution to contemporary philosophy.

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ETHICS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

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ETHICS OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

Plato believed that if only we knew what justice is, then, the problem of being just would be relatively easy. Similarly, if we knew what community development means, then the task of developing our community would not be much of a problem.

A review of Nigeria's historical development shows that on many occasions, various governmernts have embarked on programmes that would ensure better social and economic life for Nigerians. Such programmes include the Green Revolution of the Shagari administration and the Operation Feed the Nation of the Obasanjo administration. In recent times the Babangida administration has instituted the Directorate for Food, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DFRRI) and the Better life for Rural Women programmes as agents of community and rural development in the country. All these programmes, the paper contends are genuine efforts, but dares to suggest that it might be useful to match our practical involvements with some theoretical reflections.

The purpose of this paper therefore is to attempt some conceptual clarifications of the notion of community development and to analyse the morality of the present thrust of community development in Nigeria. The three approaches in the study of ethics will be reflected in the structure of the essay. The first is the metaethical approach which concerns itself with definitions and conceptual clarification, the second is the descriptive approach which deals with the description of the actual state of affairs, while the third is the normative approach which deals with the prescription of the principles of human action that seek to promote mutual welfare, growth, creativity and meaning in striving for good over bad and right over

wrong. Since community development has to do with human activities that seek to ensure social welfare, growth and creativity within human environment, it seems reasonable that the study of the ethics of community development in todays society should be a subject of major concern. It must be pointed out right from the beginning that the paper is not an empirical or a sociological study, rather, it is a purely theoretical reflection on the subject.

SOME THEORETICAL ISSUES

It would be most appropriate to begin by raising some pertinent questions such as, what is community?, What is development?, and what is the existing relationship such that we are able to describe a particular state of affairs as community development?

WHAT IS COMMUNITY

The question "what is community?" seems at first glance hardly to deserve any intellectual attention. However, despite our familiarity with the word, any attempt to give a clear cut anwer to the question often results in an enigmatic perplexity such as is recorded of St. Augustine on the question of time. "What then is time? If no one asks me I know, if I want to explain it to someone who does ask me, I do not know."(1) St. Augustine is not alone in this dilemma, we often find ourselves in the same nook if we try to raise the question "what is community? ' Perhaps the perplexity stems from the fact that we have not ascertained the question of the existence of community in which case we might be attempting to define a non-existent entity. Or alternatively, if it does exist we have not yet understood what it is. We shall therefore proceed in our discussion by raising the existential or the "is it" question. Does community exist?

As to whether community really exists or whether there is a real possibility for its existence, Robert Nisbet, in his book, *The Social Philosophers*, has noted that the whole of human development is punctuated with the search for community.(2) According to him, we see youth's search for community take the form of activities ranging from musical festivals to pentecostal and charismatic revivalism. We also experience the formation of various religious, political, ethnic, peer and economic groupings. All these point to and give credence to the evidence and necessity of community. The search for

community is also seen in social and philosophical writings. For example, from Plato's lasting portrait of the political community in his *Republic* through St. Augustine's formation of religious community in his *City of God* to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jacques Rousseau and many others down to Karl Mark's brilliant vision of social community. All these represent the generation's intellectual search for an ideal community. If community does exist, what then is its nature?

We often use the word community in expressions like "community leader", "community school", "community development", etc., we even embark on community development programmes, yet when asked what we mean by community, we lack words to express it. Our experience of the usage and the application of the word indicates a sense of ambiquity. In traditional English usage, the word community operates between two poles of meaning. The first is the geographical sense as when we refer to a group of people living in a particular geographical area. For example, we often talk of Ibibio community, referring to a people living in the South Eastern part of Nigeria. At other times the word is used to refer to a group of people living at a certain location within a larger group as when we talk of Hausa community in Owerri (heart of Ibo) town. However, as to whether occupying a certain geographical location really constitutes a people into a community is questionable.

The second sense is the etymological sense Here the word implies "a coming together for thepurpose of uniting" or "a common unity". This understanding denotes a lasting sense of relationships among individuals that are characterized by high degree of personal intimacy, of social cohesion or moral commitment and of continuity in time.(3) What then is the type of being that has the capacity for "common unity?" What is the basis of the common unity? Is it blood ties or kinship or associations with land and ties of place or sheer contractual agreement?

Ferdinand Tonnies (1887) in his book *Gemeinchaft und Gesellshaft,* while attempting to make the distinction between *community* and *society* argued that community is supposed to rest upon ties of blood and kinship, upon associations with land and ties of place, belief.(4) The prototype of this community is the family and out of it grows the extended communal forms of association such as the village. Bernard Lonergan had a similar opinion when he defined

community as "a people with a common field of experience, with a common or at least complementary way of understanding people and things, with common goals"5)

The problem with Tonnies yardstick for what constitutes a community is that he did not seem to take cognisance of the fact that it is not every relationship resting on ties of blood and kinship, upon associations with land and place that results in the formation of a community. A typical example is that of the biblical Cain and Abel who though brothers by blood relationship, having association with land and place, and invariably enjoying a social life, could not form a community. Also, it would follows from Tonnies and Lonergan's understanding that any group of individuals organized for a common goal or purpose, or even shared feeling and common belief would pass for a community. In which case, it would be possible to speak of such a thing as evil community or community of evil doers. This surely would be a faulty notion of community as it is only morally good persons that can be truly unified to form a community. The thing to note is that it is not every group which symbolically shares beliefs and ideas even if it is in and through stable institutions and law can count as a genuine community.

Another contribution of Tonnies, which is relevant to the theme of this paper is his distinction between community and society. He defined society as "the artificial construction of an aggregate of beings. . . where everybody is by himself and isolated, and there exists a condition of tension against all other".(6) Thus the prototype of society (Gesellschaft) is the atomic collection of individuals and its basic form is contractual. This type of contractual society has its roots from the British contract theorists like Thomas Hobbes and John Locke

Historically, it might be observed, that since the Enlightenment in Europe, with its attendant emphasis on the primacy of individual freedom and upon the so-called "contractual" relations, the original person centred concept of community was lost. For the last two centuries, European social scientists like Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Robert Nisbet etc., have been seeking to recover the concept of community based on Tonnies' *society*. Such a "community" has been marked by explicit or implicit contract, impersonal functional relations and declared special purpose Thus for the West, a community is developed when there exists large business co-opera-

tions, massive state bureaucracies, professional organizations and special interest groups This is why one often hears of expressions like European Economic Community (EEC) or Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Business Community, Political Community, Academic Community, etc. Community is here interpreted in terms of the collectivity of individuals or a collective individual. It was this very conception of community and its sense of development that Nigeria inherited from her colonial masters. The result of this inheritance was that she lost the indigenous person-centred communal concept of community.

Today, despite its concreteness, when we try to find a referent for the word "Community" in our urbanized Nigerian society, we find the meaning slipping away from us for want of a referent. It is important to note that perhaps this obscurity signals not just the imminent loss of a once meaningful word; it may forecast the loss of the thing itself in our modern day Nigerian society. Since the inception of the Mamserization Programme, (7) there has been clarion calls for community development But at the heart of these calls is the question of what is meant by community and the nature of its development

The analysis done so far has revealed the complexity of the notion of community. However, despite the polydimensional character, two main models could be deciphered, namely, community as a contractual society and community as a person. The two models will be analysed and contrasted with the hope of identifying which notion of community describes what a community ought to be But before this analysis is undertaken, it might be proper at this juncture to address the question what is development?

WHAT IS DEVELOPMENT?

The term development cannot be easily defined. As noted by Walter Rodney, it is "a many-sided process."(8) Because of this many sided nature, I would prefer not to bother the reader with excessive tedious terminological and definitional discussions rather, I would like to offer a new interpretation that would be universally applicable to the many-sidedness or various dimensions of development. The interpretation will be person centered.

according to Rodney, at the level of the individual person, development implies increased skill and capacity, greater freedom,

creativity, self-discipline, responsibility, and material well-being.[9] But for Rodney the achievement of any of these aspects of personal development is very much tied in with the state of the society as a whole. It must be pointed out here that it is in this last remark that Rodney's mistake about development is constituted. He seems to have subsummed the person within the social structures as a necessary condition for development. The position of this paper is that the reverse seems to be the case For both socio-economic and political conditions are contingent on the individual person's development

Sir Francis Ellah, in his book, *Nigerian Society and Governance,* subscribes to this idea of development originating from person and being person centred. He noted this when he wrote:

> *"No development can occur in the absence of Freedom, because without freedom we are in bondage, and bondage is slavery, which is the lowest degradation to which human nature can fall, which is the very opposite of development. There can be no development if men are ignorant intimidated, poor and sick in body and mind . . There is no development if man himself, is not developed in his body and in his mind* (10)

The crucial point in Ellah's submission is the issue of freedom as a *conditio sine qua non* and since freedom resides primarily in the person, it could be concluded that development must begin with the person Ellah's next claim is that there can be no development if men are ignorant and sick in body and mind Here again, the emphasis is on the person as the focus of development.

A synthesis of both Walter Rodney and Francis Ellah's submissions reveals that development can be defined as a process leading to the realization of full human and environmental potentials. If therefore, in our thrust toward community development, the full human and environmental potentials are not realized, then community is still yet to be developed.

COMMUNITY AS A CONTRACTUAL SOCIETY

The notion of contractual relation stems from the basic belief that human beings are isolated individuals who live primarily to protect their self-interest. Thus, for the contractarians, the community is an artificial construction of an aggregate of human beings who stay together precisely because they have an interest that they seek to protect.

According to Kenneth Schmitz, this notion of the human person as an isolated individual reduces community to what could be described as a collectivity of individuals or a collective individual, set of radically discrete units related to one another externally in space and/or time, an aggregate of individuals radically closed off from one another.(11) What must be noted here is that, the fact that the word community is used by contractarians to describe a netword of relationships among individuals does not mean that such relationships really constitute a community. Eventhough this experiential network is an important and even essential requirement in human association, the position of this paper is that a community is not merely the reciprocity of its individuals, neither their external nor their internal reciprocal relations. The nature and reality of community should neither be identified simply with interpersonal relationships nor merely conceived as an artificial construct, rather it should be understood as a social *a priori*, something that transcends mere interpersonal reciprocal relationships.

Sometimes too, apart from the collectivity of individuals approach to community, the notion of community is inflated into a great *Individual* set above or beneath or alongside the network of individuals The most extreme form of this inflation it found in the "absolutism" of the totalitarian state where the will of the sovereign is regarded as the will of the people. An example would be Rousseau's General Will. Hegel too identified community of *Volk* or state with a sort of great individual, a sort of sovereign public person *(de absolute Geist).*

Given this new artificially constructed notion of community, rationality and morality came to be seen as having the capacity to calculate utility and pleasure in all engagements. The value of any relationship came to be determined by the amount of profit or gain that one gets. Since ones personal interest is what is paramount in this contractual community, the natural community , far from being actuated is instead denied. This is why, in a country like Nigeria most community development efforts do not achieve their set objectives. For example, there are community development projects like health centres .Yet most of these health clinics are without drugs precisely because few individuals would rather siphon the drugs meant for these clinics to their private chemists for selfish gains than make them available at the clinics where people can have access to them at a minimum cost. What's more, the indigenous doctors who should

man the community clinics have abandoned these clinics Thus the original aim of developing a community by providing health care for the people becomes defeated.

The position of this paper is that both the reduction of the notion of community to external collectivity as well as the inflation to the collective Individual are illusions of community. It is precisely because of this illusion that the true sense of community has evaded us and every attempt to embark on community development often results in what could be termed as community "de-development ". On reflecting on the nature of the human community, Michael Novak in a recent book wrote:

> *Human community has no parallel in nature; it is not collectivist, in the fashion of a herd, hive, flock of birds, or school of fish. But neither are humans merely individuals, as if atomic particles entirely closed off from one another. . Each is a member of human community imagined as a whole, including all ancestors, all descendants, and all contemporaries among the living; in short, the entire "family of humankind ". . . In modern terms, no community can be adjudged to be good if it treats individuals as mere instruments. The purpose of human community is to enable each person to reach the full term of his or her personal development, in the full range of basic human skills and virtues Each human community is to be judged in the light of how it promotes the full development of all its individual members* (12)

If therefore, as noted in the above passage, community is not to be found in individual collectivity, where then can community be found. Before proceeding to examine where community can be located it might be proper to examine the Nigerian situation.

COMMUNITY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT OR COMMUNITY AND RURAL DE-DEVELOPMENT: THE NIGERIAN SITUATION

The notion of community as a contractual society seems to be the most overriding influence in the nature and direction of community and rural development in Nigeria. In recent times, there has been a national call for citizens who are well-to-do financially to return to their rural roots to engage in community development. This is one way, it has been argued that the millionaires in our society can plough back their wealth for the purpose of the common good.(13) Definitely, some infrastructural modifications might be achieved from such financial patronage but it might not necessarily lead to the development of a community. The major disadvantage is that it will encourage public servants to embezzle public funds for

the purpose of using such il-gotten money to attract recognition among the rural dwellers. What's more, those who do not have well-to-do sons and daughters will be placed at a disadvantage, their rural community will not be developed. From this it could be seen that the present "return home" strategy for community and rural development is morally bankcrupt.

People are in the habit of collecting themselves together and raising money for building prestige structures like the civic centre, or health centre and rural electrification etc. The Government sometimes embarks on the opening of new tarred roads in rural areas. These ventures are often referred to as community development.

The problem with this type of understanding of community development is that community development is used interchangeably with rural development thus equating community with rurality. This is the case of a mistaken equation or a category mistake. First of all, that a place has rural features does not necessarily mean that it is a community. Secondly, when a rural environment is being developed in terms of essential facilities, it does not mean that a community is being developed. What should be understood is that rural development or urbanization is not synonymous with community development. When therefore basic infrastructures are developed in a rural area, it does not mean that a community is developed. We must here make the distinction between rural development and community development.

In the first instance, it should be remarked that rural development can only take place in a rural environment whereas community development is possible both in a rural environment and an urbanized environment. For a place to be said to be rurally developed the essential features of ruralness must be maintained and allowed to mature precisely as a rural environment. This means for example that there must be a continuous absence of industrial pollution and the people in their endeavours must seek to promote the common good as opposed to the private good of the collective individuals.

What we experience today as rural development is either rural de-development or rural destruction. In one sense, rural de-development occurs when a rural environment lacks basic facilities and infrastructures for meaningful life In another sense rural de-development occurs when the facilities and infrastructures provided become agents of underdevelopment. Reflect on the following scenario: A new rural road has been opened, the rural dwellers abandon their old rural roads in preference to the new roads. But due to lack of maintenance, these new roads soon turn into death traps with pot holes

and water logs. The rural dwellers whose roads have been rendered impassable, and not having the technological know how for the maintenance of these roads are left in a worse condition than they were before they were "developed." I see this condition as a form of rural de-development In a similar reasoning, when a rural health centre is established, the rural dwellers abandon their herbs and roots only to find that they have a community health centre that has neither doctors nor drugs

As a form of community development, schools have been opened in various areas Most, if not all of these community schools are ill-equiped and understaffed. Ill-equiped because the government has shown little or no interest in the provision of facilities in the schools Poorly staffed either because qualified teachers have refused to take up appointment in rural community schools or because the quality of teachers sent there is not good enough. The result is that the products of the so-called community schools are academically untutored and technically handicapped. Intellectually, they are not developed to be able to pass the public examinations like the school certificate examination or Joint Admission Matriculation Board (JAMB), and this means no hope for higher education for the children of the so-called communitires. Technically these schools do not equip them for the work force. Given the present state of the so-called community schools one can understand the reason for the falling standard of education. Perhaps, it might be more appropriate to describe these community schools as agents of human de-development.

It would seem therefore, that in the present dispensation, there has been too much emphasis on economic development, political development and infrastructural development to the detriment of the development of a humane community which by its nature is the soul and form of all forms of development be they economic, political, religious or infrastructural. A community is developed when the full human potentials are harnessed for the purpose of promoting mutual welfare, growth, creativity and meaning in striving for good over bad right over wrong. It is only in a humane community that the culture of maintenance and concernfulness will be cultivated so that the rural roads will be maintained, drugs and doctors will be found in hospitals. For the community to be developed the schools must be properly equiped and staffed so that the best can be brought out of the community children. We have a community only when the conscience of our public persons are tailored toward caring for the common good as against their private interest.

COMMUNITY AS PERSON

The notion of community as Person has two dimensions The first conotes the human community as a single whole, possessing a unity, and serving as a moral person The second aspect relates to the individual persons as being communal. However, in this paper, emphasis will be laid on the notion of individual as communal. The reason for the choice stems from the conviction that, such an analysis will help clarify the ontological foundation of community and shed more light on why any form of community development should be person centred :

The community in which an individual lives possesses a tissue of unity that lies prior to the relationships which make up a collectivity, a unity prior to the distinctions presupposed by any contractual agreements. Not only is community prior to the individual as such, bur it normally out-lasts him. According to Aristotle, the principle of human form resident in the individual is the very ground of community. It is the underlying principle for common brotherhood This is the real principle that is responsible for the non-restriction of the individual to his individuality. As noted by Kenneth Schmitz, this principle of human form is "the real ground for the very actuality of that ontological sharing that is the root and traffic of community".(14) It is this principle of communality that the classical philosophers described as the *rational principle* The anthropologists describe it in terms of the capacity for language, technology, art and religion 'All these capacities are in themselves products of community. The priority of the community therefore is an anthropological *factum* that provides the individual with an agenda for the realization of a more complete humanity.

The human communality therefore, it could be said belongs not to geographical location, not to any abstract idea like politics or religion but to the human person as part of his ontological constitution. The point that must be noted here is that human communality does not absorb our individuality rather individuality is enhanced and ensured by communality. Individuality is ensured precisely in the humanity that is common to all. Without such an ontological communality, we would lack the specific form, the capacity for altruistic love, by which we can come together in friendship. The power by which we differentiate ourselves is the very same power by which we share ourselves. It was this type of understanding that led Michael Novak in his book *Free Persons and the Common Good,* to conclude that the highest development of individual persons is not reached if those individuals remain self-enclosed, impervious to

their brothers and sisters, and shut off from habits of co-operation, civic spirit, and personal contributions to the development of the human community as a whole.(15) Human community is thus brought about by self sharing through love, love of the human person which gives correct motivation, unifying motivation to our symbolic sharing of selves through language, society, science, art law and religion. If therefore a community is to be developed, the focus of the development must be the human person :

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the paper was to attempt a conceptual clarification of the notion of community development and to attempt an "ethical" appraisal of the notion of community development in Nigeria. The paper examined the notions of community as a contractual society and community as person. It argued that since community has to do with human beings and not merely with physical structures, that it is only when the individual person is developed can a community be developed.

Electricity, roads, health clinics and other conveniences are shown to be effects and by-products of community development and not community development in themselves Community development, the paper contends consists in the people's capacity to harness the resources within their reach, manipulate them to their own advantage. To do this the individual must recognise the limitations of his individuality and learn to live together in peace and in a co-operative spirit with other human beings :

Community development therefore begins with the orientation of the peoples minds to eschew selfishness, self-centeredness, utilitarian and hedonistic relationships 'Altruistic love, the wishing of good to another for that other s sake, the covivalist spirit (live and let live) are the links that bind and nurture community. If community is to be developed in Nigeria, Nigerians must recognise each other as equals in citizenship. It is only in a situation where there is progressive moral relations and moral restraint characterized by bonds of sympathetic identification and mutual aid resting upon a perception of common humanity (and not social aggregates), can it be said that a community has been developed 'As citizens, Nigerians must identify with each other, recognize one another as fellow human beings, equal in importance, in value and in dignity. Without such identification and recognition, the tendency is to overlook, exploit and use other human beings for selfish ends The more this exploitative tendency perdures, the more community elludes us Community

is not a collectivity but a togetherness of the family of humankind Man is the only being that is capable of such a unity. To develop the human being therefore is to develop a community.

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TOWARDS A RELEVANT SCIENCE CULTURE FOR NIGERIA

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In this paper I shall examine the development of science in Nigeria with a view to evaluating attempts, successes and failures that have beset the advancement of science in Nigeria. I shall, at the end of this examination, recommend a more appropriate attitude to the pursuit and acquisition of science and technology for the country, which I believe will give the nation the kind of identity she requires as an independent nation that is anxious to acquire scientific and technological culture.

1 PREAMBLE

Nigeria, as a developing nation, requires all the skills, all the technical know-how, all the machineries and raw materials for her accelerated development. Thus in the national policy on education, emphasis is placed on the study of science and technology that could enhance the acquisition of skills needed for the operation of our industrial concerns. Both at the secondary schools' level and tertiary institutions, the study of science and technology is given a lot of encouragement. At the university level, admission is pegged at 40:60 percent in favour of science and technology. Scholarship, loans and bursary awards are more liberal to the science students, even at the expense of their counterparts in the Humanities and social sciences

In the late '70', Nigerian students were sent to various countries abroad such as Bulgaria, Italy, Canada and Japan, all in the effort to raise middle level manpowers to manage the country's industrial establishments. In essence, the national educational philosophy places a lot of emphasis on the promotion of science and technology, which the nation's policy makers believe is still at infant stage. But to what extent the nation has advanced in her quest for science and technology through this policy is still an open question.

2 THE STUDY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN NIGERIA

As earlier on stated, there is emphasis on science and technology in the national philosophy of education. The policy is aimed at producing scientists that could man thenation's industrial concerns as

well as men that are skilled enough to be self-employed, in one technical concern or the other. This explains the generous incentives that science teachers and students enjoy, both in secondary and tertiary institutions.

In spite of this, the nation has not been able to acquire the requisite science culture that will match the challenges of the new world. The country still depends on experts from the more advanced countries of the West for her technological needs. We still lack the capabilities for both maintenance and productive processes.

That the country is yet to meet up to expectations in developing scientifically, seems not to centre primarily on policy formulation, but also in execution. That there is a national philosophy towards the promotion of science and technology is definitely a good idea, but where the real issue lies is on the actions taken in the spirit of this ambition. The 6-3-3-4 system is a very good example. The philosophy that informed this policy is the need to lay a solid foundation for science and technology in particular and education in general, right from the beginning of a child s career in learning. As the programme affects science, it was believed that the six years a child spends in the primary school will serve the purpose of exposing him to the primary principles of science. At the post primary level, elementary technical problems as well as the fundamental principles of science are expected to be taught. It was in essence believed that at the end of the first three years at the post-primary school, a pupil will be able to discover himself and be aware of the appropriate discipline he can fit in very well. There is, nonetheless, emphasis on science. And as Bajah, etal puts it, at the junior secondary school level, studies in the sciences are done in such a way that the pupil "gains the concept of the fundamental unity of science, gains the commonality of approach to problem of a scientific nature."[1] At this level, too ' "the fundamental unity of science"[2] is stressed. The whole idea is to equip the pupils for greater challenges in the pursuit of their career in science and technology.

At the senior secondary school level, pupils are then exposed to the basic sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology. The approach at this level is expected to be critical and mature with a lot of emphasis on practicals. And the essence of this, as Ikeobi and Bello, etal stated is,

> *to ensure that learners are provided with continuous experiences in skills of defining problems, recognising assumption, critical thinking . hypothesising, observing, collecting and recording data, testing and evaluating evidence, manipulating variables,*

generalising and applying generalisation [3].

The emphasis, at this level on field and laboratory studies, is to ensure that pupils are exposed to practical application of the concepts they have previously known theoretically.

There is provision for pupils that cannot proceed beyond the junior secondary school. This set is expected to concentrate attention on the study of technical and vocational related works such as woodwork and carpentry, designing, cookery and secretarial students The policy is in consonance with the national philosophy of self-reliance to ensure that everyone is reasonably equipped to source for livelihood for himself. This idea, immaculate as it is, has been met with varied problems especially at the execution stage. About ten years after the programme has taken off which (according to Bajah, Odunsi, etal) is meant to "equip students to live effectively in our modern age of science and technology,"[4] most schools are yet to have basic equipments needed for their laboratories and workshops. Many students have passed through the first stage of the six years programme in the post-primary institutions without knowing what a plier, typewriter, divider, burette and pipettes are all about. Thus everything they have known as far as science is concerned is theoretical. There have not been enough opportunity for pupils to subject to critical examination all the concepts they have known. The kind of environment necessary for the development of inquisitive and independent mind which are the hall-mark of a scientist are non-existent. They have been trained more or less to be robots that swallow doctrines without questioning their rationale and authenticity.

At the senior secondary level, these students who are expected to be trained as scientists are most ill-prepared to appreciate the intricacies, techniques, skills, patience and the critical mind needed for experimental and research activities. They are, amidst this state of affairs, introduced to the basic sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology. This kind of sudden exposure frightens the pupils: and more often than not, studies even at this level lack necessary teaching aids for practical purposes. By the time necessary equipments are made available for field and laboratory works, pupils are almost at the last lap of their programmes.

Thus what is done at the six years post-primary career is at best a crash programme. The first three years spent there is definitely not enough for a pupil to make up his mind on the career to choose, especially as the facilities that will enhance this study are absent.

The remaining three years are spent with lots of anxiety as pupils at this level fight the war of survival.

At the higher institutions, the problems that the students had contended with at the post-primary level rear up their heads again. Facilities necessary for the standardization of the laboratories and libraries are either in short supply or are completely absent. Research grants that should assist the lecturers to update their knowledge which should positively affect the students are unavailable and where available, are grossly inadequate. It is under this kind of environment that students graduate as scientists, engineers, pharmacists and medical Doctors. This explains why a Nigerian trained engineer cannot detect common fault in a machinery; experts must have to be flown in from abroad to attend to this Similarly, locally trained medical Doctors practice essentially by trial and error, with diagnosis and prescriptions being largely a guess work to the extent of abuse and enormous risk to their patients. In the course of treating one ailment a more serious one crops up. The situation is the same in the field of Agriculture. The Nigerian trained agriculturalists have proved quite incapable of meeting the challenges of technological revolution that has taken place in the field of agriculture. Farmers in the country are yet to know what hybrid crops are all about, as our agriculturists are yet to wake up to such challenges. The most primitive method of farming, harvesting and storage has remained very much with us. Yet we have many graduates in agriculture, botany and zoology.

In the circumstance, the nation has no better option than to rely on the developed countries of the world for technical assistance in basically all fields that have something to do with science and technology. Our scarce foreign exchange that could have been invested in more productive ventures is wasted annually to pay these 'experts' while our own talents are lying undeveloped and unexploited. This situation calls for a change of attitude and a better approach to the training of our scientists.

3. TRAINING OUR SCIENTISTS: WHAT TO DO

As a developing nation, Nigeria needs to train her scientists that will make them suitable for our needs in industries, agriculture and medical services. This training is to spread at all levels of education. And as Novikova stated "a scientific world outlook as a whole is shaped through general school, specialised and university education..."[5]

The 6-3-3-4 system as earlier on pointed out has been beset with tremendous problems to the extent that one is bound to ask whether rigorous thinking was done on it even at the conception stage. There is presently not much to justify the huge amount of resources already expended and is still being spent on the project. The products of the programme are still as raw as ever.

There is thus the need to train our scientists in the best tradition. And as KARL Popper (a well known philosopher of science) recommended, our scientists need to imbibe the culture of critical and dynamic approach to scientific issues. They should be receptive to new ideas and be prepared always to question any knowledge in science from whatever source, as no theory in science is precluded from critical questioning. And as Asike puts it, Popper believes that "... our beliefs are replaced by competing theories and competing conjectures. And through the critical discussion of these theories we can progress."[6] At the same time, this critical attitude should not necessarily be geared towards destroying theories, but rather to build it on a more solid foundation.

Similarly, our scientists should be in love with adventure, with sourcing new problems and finding their solutions, if possible. And as Popper advises too "one of the things a philosopher may do and one of those that may rank among his highest achievements is to see a a problem, not previously seen by anyone else."[7] Nigerian scientists should be daring and develop the culture of seeking for innovative ideas, and at the same time be able to ask fundamental questions about the existing source of knowledge. Presently, our scientists, unfortunately, seem to regard truth in science as sacred which should not be questioned. This is a timid approach to science which must be jettisoned. And as Popper advises again, no theory or statement of knowledge is "immune from criticism, whatever its source may be."[8] Nigerian scientists need to cultivate this kind of attitude so as to free themselves from their present dogmatic mentality and unprogressive mind.

It is really sad that the 6-3-3-4 system introduced about ten years ago, is being shabily implemented. Its execution does not say how serious we are to advance in both science and technology, that several years after its inception, the objectives are far from being realised.

Its failure is primarily rooted on the non-existence of suitable environment for the execuion of the programme. The dearth of facilities seems the greatest singular factor the project faces. It is a known fact that in research that some experiments are highly techni-

cal and require a lot of skill. How can such skills be acquired without adequate and necessary equipments. It is not enough that few unity schools are equipped beyond what they need. It is to be realised that this class of educational institutions do not constitute up to 2% of the post-primary institutions all over the federation, where we are supposed to train our future manpower, scientists inclusive. It is wrong to suppose (as it seems to be the case presently) that the future leaders in science and technology of the nation must come from this elitist schools. The practice (of over-equipping the unity schools at the expense of others) is in the main both discriminatory and myopic. There is, in contrast to the present posture, the need to equip all the institutions of learning in the whole federation adequately, from primary to the tertiary levels, if we must achieve the purpose for which they were established. It has to be realised that in the formulation of theories that testing is necessary. And this is a cardinal feature of scientific research. And this cannot be carried out in the absence of necessary equipments.

Experimentation thus is unavoidable in authentic scientific research programme. For a genuine work to be done in this direction the necessary equipments have to be available.[9]

It is to be stated, at this juncture, that the 6-3-3-4 system which is believed to hold the key to the science and technological needs of the country is misconceived in the first place, which probably underlies the obstacles in its execution. It is wrong to believe that three years is good enough to evaluate if a pupil is good enough to pursue a career or not in the sciences. This is more real in the face of dearth of equipment, and conducive environment for mental development. In our kind of environment, it is definitely wrong to expect ,one's mental facility to take definite shape within a short space of three years.

There was nothing fundamentally wrong in the structure of our erstwhile system of education, where after a six-year primary school a pupil will have a straight five years' programme in the post-primary school. Argument in favour of the five-year programme is to the effect that it is in the final year that a pupil is made to take a definite stance on whether to be a scientist or not. There is no doubt that such a length of time gives enough room for thinking and rethinking, evaluation and re-evaluation of one's ability with a view to taking a rational position in the face of one's mental capability and interest, of course. Those who cannot cope with post-primary education should be given the opportunity to go to technical schools, suitable for their level where skilled men such as carpenters, barbers, tailors,

mechanics, etc. are trained.

At the post-primary school level, emphasis should be laid on both ideas and practice in the study of science. The minds of the students should be trained to be critical, inquisitive and adventurous. They should be brought up to always seek the rational basis for any piece of knowledge. More especially a lot of emphasis should be laid on practicals and as Novikova pointed out "practical requirements (are) a powerful stimulus to the development of science itself for the systematic utilisation of scientific technologies in industry demand the accelerated elaboration of scientific theories."[10] If students are made to undertake practical works, they will cultivate the habit of objectivity in approaching scientific matters. And to achieve a reasonable practical exposure, trips to industries, farms and research institutes should be encouraged. These kind of trips, if properly coordinated, will no doubt dymystify all the theories students have been cramming all along without proper digestion. When it is stated, for instance, that current flows, that molecules combine to form complex elements, that acid and base dissolve to form soap, students are definitely at a loss. But when they are made to witness some of these assertions empirically, its assimilation becomes quicker. In fact, all the myths surrounding science, vanishes once they are subjected to critical evaluation. And this critical evaluation can only be achieved by experimentation and testing in the normal scientific procedure of making a proposition, gathering equipments, carrying out tests, carrying out observation and reaching a conclusion. Pupils should be allowed to enjoy the benefit of subjecting scientific theories to a critical evaluation through empirical tests.

Another point that is worth mentioning is the obvious fact that many pupils are not keen in making careers in science. This should not be allowed to continue. There should be a conscious effort to cultivate interest in science in as many pupils as possible. Thus, besides the immediate material incentives that should be given to prospective scientists, there might be the need for indoctrination of a kind. It is a well known fact that most pupils are attracted to study law when they see how gorgeous lawyers and judges dress; just as many want to be journalists when they see all the glamour and the excitement that go with journalism. In the same vein, there is the need to indoctrinate pupils right from the primary school level that science, as an academic enterprise, is prestigious and carry privileges both in public perception and personal remuneration. The respect that scientists command among the members of the society should be emphasized: how they have changed the life of man by

understanding and harnessing the laws of nature. If this indoctrination is properly done, and early enough, it will certainly bring out the best in those that already have the potential to be scientists

There is besides, the need for a change of system as to the ways that professional scientists such as engineers, medical personnel and technologists are trained presently in the country. The present system is defective and has obviously not served our purpose well enough.

The viable system to adopt in the training of this set of scientists is that, at the completion of post-primary education, students who have the potentials to undertake careers in science should be made to undergo preliminary training in the basic sciences such as chemistry, biology, physics and mathematics. At the end of four-year programme, those who are good in physics and mathematics should be encouraged to undertake training in engineering, those who are exceptionally brilliant in biology, physics, chemistry and to some extent, in mathematics, should be encouraged to train as medical doctors or pharmacists. The others who cannot cope very well in any of these professions should be encouraged to undertake post-graduate studies in the single disciplines, so also are the set who have natural inclinations for specializing in the single disciplines. This set of students are going to constitute the future researchers as well as educators of would-be scientists in the country. It is to be remarked that great scientists that have made discoveries such as Albert Einstein, Lavorsier specialized in physics and chemistry in that order.

The essence of this system is easily discernible. Foremost, it makes for a smooth entry into any of these core-professions that are generally seen to be difficult. A student that is keen on studying engineering, who started first with physics and mathematics, is definitely on the right course, just as a prospective student of medicine who starts with physics, chemistry and biology. Besides the obvious advantage of easy entry into the stated core-professions this system makes for maturity and thorough mastering of the theoretical frameworks of the professions one intends to enter. Physics and mathematics and to some extent, Chemistry are the bedrock of engineering. If a prospective engineering student has a proper grounding in them, his problem of making a career in it is half-solved. The same situation is applicable in physics, chemistry and biology as they affect medicine and pharmacy.

There should also be a well organised programme for the set of pupils who either dropped out of the secondary schools or could not

go beyond it. This set of pupils should be encouraged to acquire technical skills. In this wise, the huge amount of money being currently wasted in the importation of equipments that are hardly installed for use for the 6-3-3-4 system at the post-primary level should be usefully employed in building technical schools all over the federation. The standard of such schools should definitely be below those of colleges of technology. Its orientation should be towards the acquisition of practical skills. Since the beneficiaries of this programme should be the set of pupils that have acquired at least basic education, it is expected that they should be able to absorb instructions easily. Their areas of studies should cover technical, secretarial and vocational education. Thus, such trades as mechanics, elementary electricity, typing, sewing and weaving, cabinet making should be taught. The graduates of these institutions will definitely constitute the vanguard for the nation's technological development of the lower cadre. And if meticulous planning is done and enough resources invested in the programme, it will be discovered that the days of having drop-outs dotted all over our streets will be gone for good. In addition, the long queue of applicants with little or no skill besieging government institutions and private concerns for employment will drastically reduce, for everyone would have been given the opportunity to actualise himself, to be useful to himself and the society at large, which agrees with the national philosophy of self-reliance

And since the nation needs high level manpower for complex and sophisticated scientific adventure, there is no reason why enough resources should not be pumped into our universities to enable them meet up with such challenges. To train scientists with obsolete or sub-standard equipments is like sending a soldier poorly trained into war-fronts to face enemies that were better trained and sophisticated. The scientific world is competitive with every nation guiding whatever skills she acquires jealously. Thus the talk of technological transfer is simply self-deception. And as Susu, Agu, etal pointed out

> *some people talk about technology transfer with the expectation that all the benefits of technology will accrue once the technology in advanced countries is transplanted to us. Such talk in the existing circumstances is like wishing a fruit tree to be transplanted to a poor soil which has not been prepared to suit the germination and survival of the tree* [11]

The above analogy applies to a large extent to the state of affairs in our quest for advancement in science and technology. We need to lay a solid foundation before this quest could be realised. Besides, it is ridiculous that the nation should be crying for the dearth of well-trained scientists and yet the few ones that are great assets to the country are not encouraged to stay to contribute in building the nation. Equally, there have not been sufficient efforts made to attract Nigerian scientists home. As Joe Garba, the former United Nations (UN) General Assembly President pointed out, "It was a question of making proper proposition for Nigeria's technologists now exhibiting such skills overseas to come back and do it here. [12] He believes that to attract this set of people home there is the need to propose adequate incentives and conducive practising atmosphere for them. It is convinced that African nations, Nigeria inclusive, have not done enough in a bid to acquire the requisite science and technology for which the Western world is known. Joe Garba is definitely correct in stating our attitude to the development of science and technology. It is ironical that Nigeria spends so much hard currency paying foreign experts and yet nothing substantial is done to attract our own indegenous scientists home from abroad. Worst still, those who are at home practising are frustrated out as a result of hostile environment. There is the need for serious and urgent actions in this line to stem the tide: our human resources (home and abroad) should be provided with enough favourable conditions to practice here. If half of the resources spent annually on the expatriates is spent on our indigenous scientists, there is definitely not reason why they should prefer to practice abroad.

In conclusion, all that the Nation needs to advance her science and technology are dynamic policies and actions. It is a misplaced hope that the Western World will allow the secret of its scientific and technological feat to leak to us. Besides since our environment and problems are quite different from theirs we need to develop our science and technology bearing such factors in mind.

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THE PROCEDURES OF INVESTIGATING REALITY IN PHILOSOPHY

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I
INTRODUCTION

Every discipline has a method or procedure of investigation. Philosophy, like other disciplines, is expected to have a procedure of investigating reality. This paper attempts to uncover and explain the rational method(s) available to philosophy. It shall proceed by examining the following concepts, among others: "reality," "procedure," "method," "rational." It will attempt to distinguish between between scientific method and philosophical method. It will also discuss five modes of philosophical inquiry identified by T. Oizerman and determine their rationality or irrationality.

II

The concept of reality is one of the concepts featuring in the topic of this paper. What type of reality are we talking about? An unchanging reality or historic reality? Or, are we talking about something actually seen or experienced? What do we mean by unchanging reality? Are we talking mainly about God or something which underlies appearance? What is meant by historic reality? It means in the words of S.J. Frederick Copleston, historic man in the changing cosmos.[1] According to Frederick Copleston, Ortega regards

> *reality (as) the infinity of possible perspectives. . . . A man's perspective of reality is . . . a component of reality for that man. (This does not mean) that the man projects a subjective point of view or perspective on reality. The perspective is reality revealing itself to a man in a definite situation*[2]

Ortega conceives "life" as the fundamental reality. This "life", an activity, is an active intercourse between myself and my world.[3] It also "means change and movement".[4] According to Oxford

Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English (O.A.L.D.O.C.E. P. 700) reality can also mean something actually seen or experienced.

What type of reality does philosophy investigate? This question is pertinent because the type of reality is investigates can determine the procedure of investigation. Does philosophy examine the nature of God? Or does it inquire into those things which underlie appearance? Furthermore, does philosophy investigate historic reality, life, or man in the changing cosmos? If Philosophy is taken as the study of fundamental principles or presuppositions underlying human beliefs and actions – ethical, religious, social, economic, political etc, it has the task of examining changing and unchanging reality.

Why are some people moral while others are immoral? What is the nature of morality? Why are people theists whereas others are atheists or agnostics? What is the nature of religion? What is the nature of God or supernatural being(s)? Does God exist? Do supernatural beings exist? What is the relationship between man, other men and the external world? Why do two or more people perceive a thing or phenomenon differently? Does this suggest that reality is many or changing? Or, is there something which underlies the different appearances or perceptions of that phenomenon? In other worlds, is reality one and unchanging? Philosophy deals with these and other similar questions. The questions about perceptions show that philosophy is concerned with perceptions but not with things actually seen or experienced as such in the sense in which science is so concerned. According to Oizerman:

> *Philosophy (unlike physics) is not satisfied with knowing merely how certain processes take place. It wants to know why they take place in one way and not another. The philosopher for instance, asks not only "Do we know the world?" He also asks "Why is the world knowable? Why do we know it?"*[5]

III

What rational procedure does philosophy use in finding answers, if it finds any at all, to these and other relevant questions? In other words, what is the rational method(s) adopted by philosophy in investigating "reality". But what do we mean by "rational procedure" or "rational method"? Procedure or method can be defined as the regular order or way of doing things (O.A.L.D.O.C.E., PP 533 and 665).

When we talk about rational way of doing things, what do we mean by "rational"? To be rational is to be sensible. But sensible may, among other things, mean "practical" or "reasonable." Thus "rational procedure" may mean "practical procedure" or "reasonable procedure" Practical procedure is a way of doing things in accordance with evidence of facts whereas reasonable procedure is a way of doing things in accordance with reason (O.A.L.D.O.C E., PP 777, 701, 697) When we talk about rational procedure or rational method we may, therefore, be talking about either of these two ways or both. The question is, which of these two ways should philosophy adopt in investigating reality? Should it adopt inductive method, empirical demonstration or deductive method, logical analysis? Or should it use both methods?

A.R. Larcey defines induction, in its widest sense, as "any rational process where from premises about some things of a certain kind a conclusion is drawn about some or all of the remaining things of that kind."[6] Deduction is also a rational process but one in which a conclusion is drawn "from certain premises on the grounds that to deny the conclusion would be to contradict the premises."[7] Induction is regarded as the scientific method whereas deduction is considered as the method of logic and mathematics. It is often claimed that to say that the rational procedure available to philosophy for investigating reality is induction is to say that it is scientific. There is also an argument that philosophy is logical analysis if its rational procedure is regarded as deduction. Furthermore, it is often asserted that either induction or deduction cannot be the philosophical method. Whether these claims are tenable or untenable will become clear as we proceed further.

IV

Kemeny states that the scientific method can be defined by "the cycle of induction, deduction and verification, and its eternal search for improvement of theories which are only tentatively held."[8] Steps of scientific method have been enumerated as follows:" (1) Observation, (2) Definition of a problem i.e. questioning (3) Procedure of guessing otherwise called postulation of hypothesis, (4) Experimentation (5) Evidence (6) Formulation of theory. . ."[9] A. A. Zinovyer recognises two distinct levels of scientific research.

> *(He) classifies the first level as 'Observation of separate phenomena, connections, processes and so on, their selection, comparison, mental analysis; all kinds of experiment; abstraction of*

> *separate properties and relations of objects, the formation of concepts, generalisation, establishing of empirical laws, making of hypotheses, modelling, use of deductions, etc... The first level in such understanding is valid scientific research in the full sense of the term, the basis and fundamental content of science in general. The majority, of discoveries are made at this level'. Zinovyer classifies the second level of research as the building of theories, which he characterises as totalities of concepts and judgements referring to a fairly wide range of subjects and united in a single whole with the aid of definite logical principles.*[10]

The above observations reveal that scientific method is not limited to induction and that it also embraces deduction among other things. This fact is underlined by division of science into two: namely, formal science and empirical science.

> *Formal science consists of analytic statements established by logic and mathematics; empirical science consists of synthetic statements established in the different fields of factual knowledge.*[11]

Analytic statements or propositions are true either by virtue of definitions or by virtue of the analysis of the meanings of some terms contained in them. Synthetic statements are true or false by virtue of what occurs in the material or visible world. Synthetic statements express contingent truths whereas analytic statements express necessary truths. "All men are human beings," Water is equal to H_2O" are examples of analytic statements whereas "All metals conduct electricity" typifies a synthetic statement or proposition.

We have observed that analytic statements are established by logic and mathematics. "Logic is the autonomous science of the objective though formal conditions of valid inference . . . (It) is the science of the weight of evidence in all fields. . ."[12] Ayo Fadahunsi is of the view that:

> *Logic is the study of the principles of reasoning especially, the structure of propositions as distinguished from their content and of method and validity in deductive reasoning. As it is a system of reasoning, it is equally a mode of reasoning. Logic is the formal guiding principles of a discipline – for example, science*[13]

Logical propositions as a group of analytic propositions are true by virtue of, among other things, the analysis of the meanings of some terms contained in them.

Apart from logical propositions, mathematical propositions are another group of analytic statements constituting formal science. Mathematics attempts to

> *deduce a proposition by means of a system of vigorous reasoning which is ultimately founded on indubitable evidence 'And for mathematicians, to know is to be able to deduce evidence'*[14]

Mathematical propositions are true by virtue of, among other things, definitions and analyses of the meaning of words 'Mathematics "deals with logical constructs – 'entia rationis' – instead of with real being."[15] According to kemeny, mathematics is no more than an analysis of the meaning of words, and a study of forms of arguments He claims further that:

> *Mathematics is founded on properties of integers (whole numbers). If you are well acquainted with these, the rest of Mathematics is deducible by purely logical arguments*[16]

Bertrand Russell explains the relation of mathematics to logic as follows: Mathematics and logic, historically speaking, have been entirely distinct studies. Mathematics has been connected with sicnece, logic with Greek. But both have developed in modern times: Logic has become more mathematical and mathematics has become more logical. The consequence is that it has now become wholly impossible to draw a line between the two; infact, the two are one. They differ as boy and man: logic is the youth of mathematics and mathematics is the manhood of logic.[17]

D. Greenwood gives an insight into the relation of mathematics to science. He states that the

> *"logical constructs – rational entities – of mathematics enter into the sciences in the core of their deductive function . . It is hy the mathematical formulation of its observations and measurements that a science is able to form mathematically expressed hypotheses. (Furthermore), it is through its hypotheses that a natural science is able to make predictions.'*[18]

Since the scientific method also embraces deduction, among other things, it is inadequate to just name induction as its method.

Perhaps Philosophical method can be distinguished from scientific method as follows·

> *The method of philosophy is to proceed from theobservable phenomena to the real causes which underlie the phenomena, while the method of science is to proceed from the observable phenomena to a formula expressing a regular order in the occurrences of the phenomena, and eventually, through the application of this formula, to prediction of future phenomena.*[19]

Since logic is part of philosophy, logical analysis – deduction – is part of philosophical method. It is relevant to observe that logical atomists regard analysis as the proper function of philosophy.

> *Analysis consists in rewriting sentences of natural languages in such a way that these sentences will exhibit their proper logical form. When they are put into their logical form, their meaning will become clear, and philosophical perlexity will be eliminated*[20]

The Philosophy of logical Atomism "contends that philosophy is an activity which gives us knowledge of the world; not the same kind of knowledge which science gives us. . ., but knowledge nonetheless."[21]

It may be true that it is now impossible to draw a line between logic and mathematics, it is still possible to differentiate philosophy from mathematics. As Kant reveals, definitions can serve as basis of distinction.

> *Philosophical definitions' are made only in the form of exposition of the concepts given to us, while those of mathematics take the form of construction of originally created concepts; the former are made analytically by means of dissection (the completeness of which is not apodictically reliable), and the second synthetically; hence mathematical definitions create the concept itself, while those of philosophy only explain it*[22]

As earlier noted, logic is a formal science. Its method, logical analysis, is scientific in the sense in which it is concerned with weight of evidence in all fields. Since logic is part of philosophy, it follows that philosophical method is partly scientific. However, philosophy can be said to be unscientific in the sense in which it does not use inductive method or empirical demonstration. But it will not only be inadequate but also wrong to claim that philosophy is not scientific at all. Thus the statement, "Philosophy is not scientific" needs qualification. The same thing goes for the statement, "Philosophy is scientific.'; In the light of the foregoing considerations, it is true that philosophical method cannot be said to be inductive. It is, however, false to claim that it is not partly deductive.

VI

It has been argued that philosophical method is partly deductive. It cannot be overstressed that deduction is a rational procedure in the sense of being a reasonable way of investigating reality. Five

modes of philosophical inquiry have been identified by Theodor Oizerman. These are speculation, intuition, imagination, interpretation and theoretical synthesis.

In the ancient times, philosophical form of knowledge was supposed to be distinguished by speculative mode of thought whereby knowledge is obtained through logical deduction, through "conclusions drawn from the analysis of everyday notions and concepts, (through) elucidation of the meaning of words and so on."[23] Plato gives an idealist-rationalist interpretation of the ancient conception of the nature of philosophical knowledge. He says that "only in thought . . . is true being, or at least a part of it, revealed to the mind."[24] He then illustrates his interpretation with ontological arguments or theses. These are (a) that the human soul is immortal; (b) that the soul existed before birth, and that it is independent of the body. The "proof" of the first thesis

> *is obtained by concretising. . . the proposition on opposites: although all opposites arise from opposites an opposite itself cannot be opposite to itself.*[25]

The "proof" of the second thesis involves interpretation of cognition as recollection. Though modern idealism would rather regard Plato's theses as beliefs, Oizerman pleads that speculation need not be identified with its idealist interpretation. He asserts that:

> *The essence of speculation is the logical process and the naivete' of Plato's reasoning is exposed by logic, which shows the vagueness, the indefiniteness of the propositions which he takes as initial, self-evident truths.*[26]

According to Oizerman, Kant firmly rejected the possibility of mathematising the philosophical mode of inquiry. This rejection is based on the distinction which, in his opinion, exists between philosophy and mathematics expecially within the context of definitions. He holds that philosophical speculation, "proceeds from the fact, asks how this fact is possible, and reveals the conditions that make the fact possible."[27] He illustrates this in his "Critique of Pure Reason."

> *. . (He) proceeds from the fact of the existence of morality. How is morality possible? he asks. His well-known answer is that the condition for the existence of morality is the 'a pior' moral law, the categorical imperative. Further analysis of the fact culminates in the conclusion that the moral consciousness presupposes such postulates as recognition of the immortality of the soul, God – and the republican ofder of society.*[28]

Kant "understood cognition only as the categorial synthesis of sensory data."[29] For Oizerman, Kant's illustration of philosophical speculation is faulty and inadequate in the sense in which the appearance of the fact, which is also a fact, was wrongly regarded as its essence.

Hegel does not agree with Kant's denial of the necessity of the logical deduction of whatever is accepted as fact. The former's conception of philosophical speculation is quite different from the latter's. Whereas Kant believes that philosophy proceeds from facts, Hegel claims that it arrives at them. Hegel asserts that philosophy, being (pure) thought – that is, though purified of all empirical content

> *proceeds from thought and strives to know the content of thought (the content of science) as the product of its own development.*[30]

Therefore, Hegelian panlogism – as Oizerman puts it – supports

> *the traditional belief regarding the ability of philosophy by means of reason alone, 'by pure thought, to arrive at discoveries which are in principle beyond the scope of empirical knowledge*[31]

He reaffirmed this traditional belief, which had earlier been rejected by Kant, on "the basis of dialectical idealism, which understands the relationship between sense and reason as contradition, negation and the negation of negation."[32] Hegel holds that the essence of philosophy as a specific and at the same time the highest form of consciousness consists in the following: Philosophical thought is present in itself, relates to itself and has itself for its subject.[33] This pure thought attains absolute reality.[34] Like Kant's, Hegel's conception of the nature of philosophical knowledge or of the logical process of knowledge is unacceptable.

> *Oizerman states the reason thus: The dialectics of the transition from the sensual to the rational, from the empirical to the theoretical and back virtually escapes Hegel. Idealism prevented him from seeing that thought is based on empirical data, even when it enters into contradiction with them.*[35]

Having rejected the ancient and the idealist-rationalist conceptions of the nature of philosophical knowledge, Oizerman enumerates some features of philosophical speculative thought. First, philosopher's speculative licence is limited by logic. second,

philosophical propositions, even when they are not true possess (to a greater or less extent) an implicit or explicit idea which becomes obvious in so far as these propositions are applied.[36]

Furthermore, the specific nature of philosophical knowledge is characterised by speculation which to a certain extent breaks away from fact.[37] But philosophy shares the aforementioned features with any thought in general which achieves high levels of abstraction What is peculiar to philosophy, therefore, is not so much the speculative mode of developing concepts as

the degree of speculativeness of thought, organically connected... with its apparatus of categories, initial theoretical propositions etc.[38]

Intuition is another method of philosophical inquiry recognised by Oizerman. Intuitionists claimed that the specific nature of philosophy is, in fact, the intuitive discovery of its initial propositions [39] According to Oizerman:

Forms of intuition manifest themselves in sensory perception, imagination, 'accelerated deduction,' appreciation and so on. (In fact Dialectical materialism has revealed that intuition) is actually a part of the sensory and rationalist reflection of objective reality.[40]

The following illustration shows the link between intuition and reflection of objective reality:

Thousands of people looked at the swinging lamp in Pisa Cathedral, but none of them with the exception of Galileo ever thought of deducing from this fact a general law of the swing of a pendulum. For Galileo, however, this was enough to produce the law (approximate, of course) of so-called isochronism that would apply to any pendulum.[41]

Intuition can also be conceived as an "alogical process" or irrational process in the sense in which it is regarded as immediate perception of truth. We agree with Oizerman that intuition thus conceived is an alogical act of cognition of irrational reality.

We emphasise that intuition, like speculation, is characteristic of philosophy and any other theoretical inquiry. What differentiates philosophy from other theoretical inquiries is the "degree to which speculation and intuition are employed by philosophy."[42]

Apart from intuition, the productive ability of the imagination also performs key functions in philosophy. This is particularly so if this aility is, according to Oizerman, interpreted materialistically and not as the 'a priori' mental construction of an empirical reality.

Interpretation can also be considered as a method of philosophi-

cal inquiry. It performs important role in philosophy as in other theoretical inquiries. Philosophy "seeks to interpret not separate phenomena but their multiform totalities, the basic forms of existence and the knowledge of it."[43] In the opinion of Oizerman, the possibilities of interpretation are always limited by the availability of knowledge. And any further increase in its volume changes the substance and form of interpretation according to a recognisable pattern. He caims that the above considerations explain the prevalence of differnt and even mutually exclusive interpretations of nature, matter, consciousness and so on.

In philosophy, different interpretations are the expression of different trends and are always in a polemical relation to one another. Nevertheless it would be wrong to assume that contrasting philosophical interpretations are always in the relationship of truth and error to each other; the truth often emerges when both contradictory interpretations are rejected

Oizerman contends further that:

Any interpretation proceeds from facts or from what is considered to be a fact. Its key function is to explain these facts (or what are considered to be facts), to reveal their relation to other facts, to assess the notions connected with these facts, to revise them if necessary and to draw new conclusions. Philosophies are distinguished by what facts (or assumptions) they take as their point of departure, and also by the significance of interpretation which they place upon these facts.[45]

He illustrates his contention with the philosophies of Thomas Aquinas and Hegel. Both philosophers proceed from the notion of the existence of an absolute, divine reason. It should be noted that the initial propositions of both thinkers are not facts but assumptions. Aquinas believes divine reason to be outside the world, infinitely superior to the world, and to have created it out of nothing. Hegel maintains that divine reason does not exist outside the world, because it comprises its essence, just as it is also the essence of human reason. Hence the divine and the human are not so far distant from one another.

Like any other form of knowledge, ultimate confirmation or denial of philosophical interpretation depends on the "whole mass of evidence provided by science and practice."[46] Philosophical interpretations of reality change as facts increase, scientific discoveries multiply as outstanding historical events occur. It is important to observe that:

The epistemological analysis of interpretation as a specific way of relecting reality shows that its key feature is not expression of the subjective attitude of the thinker to certain definite facts, but 'a scientific quest for the connection of these phenomena with others whose existence is recognised or presumed on the basis of the available data.' In this sense interpretation may be regarded as linking.[47] *And since the essence of phenomena is above all their internal interconnection, interpretation is also a mode of cognising the essence of phenomena.*[48]

Oizerman discusses two conflicting conceptions of interpretation. These are (1) the idealist and metaphysical conception and (2) the dialectical-materialist conception. Two examples, at least, indicate the difference between these conceptions; namely the interpretation of (a) the concept of necessity and (b) the statement that people themselves make their history.[49] In the medieval period, the concept of necessity was interpreted theologically (idealist/metaphysical interpretation). However, marx and Engels gave it a dialectical-materialist interpretation.

(They evolved the concept of 'historical' necessity as the specific form of essential connection not only of simultaneously existing phenomena but also of social phenomena that replace one another in time.[50]

Pre-marxian materialists interprete the statement "people themselves make their history" to mean that external nature and the nature of man are the determining force of social development and that the results of the activity of previous generations are independent of the present generations. Marxist interpretation is, however, different. For Marx, neither external nature nor the nature of man determines social development. Prevailing level of the productive forces influence the way people make their own history.

Though interpretation has contributed to the development of philosophical knowledge, some attempts have been made to belittle its cognitive significance. For instance, Wilhelm Dilthey holds that interpretation is a specifically natural scientific mode of inquiry which yields only probable knowledge.

In contrast to interpretation and explanation (he) proposed description of the content of consciousness in a way that could be directly understood: 'The methodical advantage of psychology lies in the fact that it has a direct and living spiritual connection in the form of the emotional experiences of reality.[51]

Apart from speculation, intuition, imagination, and interpretation, philosophy also employs theoretical synthesis as a mode of inquiry. According to Oizerman, the specific nature of philosophical synthesis consists in the fact that it cannot be reduced to synthesis of philosophical ideas. Mention must also be made of philosophical synthesis of scientific advances. Philosophy is thus unlike the specialised sciences that are concerned with research and synthesis of ideas within the framework of their own deliberately limited fields. Philosophy deals with critical comprehension, analysis and synthesis of man's everyday experience. The question of man is one of the key problems of philosophy. "The fate of the individual, his emotions and aspirations, his life and death have always been one of the most important themes in philosophy."[52] It is important to stress that:

Historical events. . . shape (the philosopher's) attitude to the world, his frame of mind, and determine his attitude to philosophical tradition . .[53]

In modern times,, the achievements of mathematics and celestial mechanics rather than immediate everyday experience have become the point of departure for philosophical reflection"[54] Oizerman observes further that nevertheless, the questions of the essence of man, his position in the world, his purpose and so on determine, to a considerable extent, the concept and specific form of philosophical knoweldge.

Though intuition is sometimes conceived as an irrational process of cognition, the foregoing considerations reveal that intuition, speculation, imagination, interpretation, theoretical synthesis as identified by Oizerman are rational or reasonable methods that can be used by philosophy to reflect reality.

We have earlier observed that philosophy is partly scientific. However, Oizerman thinks that dialectical materialism, marxist philosophy, is wholly scientific. He claims that dialectical materialism denies the following distinctions, among others: (1) The distinction between philosophy on the one hand and the positive science and practice on the other. (2) The distinction between theoretical and scientific theoretical knowledge. In spite of these denials, B. Russell still thinks that philosophy is essentially distinct from science. According to him:

The essential characteristic of philosophy, which makes it a study distinct from science, is criticism. It examines critically the principles employed in science and in daily life; it searches out any inconsistencies there may be in these principles, and it only accepts them when, as the result of a critical inquiry, no reason for rejecting them has appeared . . .The criticism aimed at. . . is

not that which, without reason, determines to reject, but that which considers each piece of apparent knowledge on its merits, and retains whatever still appears to be knowledge when this consideration is completed.[55]

It is deducible from the above quotation that critieism entails analysis and evaluation. Criticism may begin with clarification of the various principles employed in science and in daily life. This helps to reveal in-consistencies inherent in them and the implications for holding or rejecting them. This gradually leads to evaluation. The values ofthe principles are being decided when they, as well as their implications, are shown to be good or bad. If the implications, or consequences of a principle are "proved" to be good, there is a tendency for people to believe that it is good. Similarly, people will tend to regard as bad any principle which has bad consequences. These tendencies are questionable because good things do not necessarily yield good consequences just as bad things do not necessarily produce bad consequences. A good thing may produce a bad consequence and a bad thing may lead to a good result. Lying, for instance, is bad. However, one may lie to save life. Though saving of life is good, it does not make lying good. It may nevertheless, serve as a ground for relieving the liar of punishment. If a principle and its implications are shown to be good, its acceptance is being tacitly recommended. If a principle and its implications are, however, revealed to be bad, people are being implicity called upon to reject it. Judgements have been made. The last judgement involves fault - finding, criticism. The judgements are moral positions reached through logical deduction or logical analysis and interpretation.

VII

We have argued that it is the task of philosophy to investigate changing and unchanging reality. Philosophy concerns itself with perceptions but not with things actually seen or experienced as such in the sense in which science is so concerned. If philosophy does not and ought not to use induction, this does not imply that philosophy is totally unscientific. It is partly scientific in the sense in which, one of its aspects-Logic-is concerned with the weight of evidence in all fields. Method of Logic is accordingly scientific. Therefore, philosophical method is partly scientific. It is consequently inadequate and fallacious for anyone to say that philosophy is not scientific at all.

Whereas Russell thinks criticism is what essentially differentiates philosophy from science, Oizerman submits that the basis of distinction is the degree to which deduction or speculation, intuition, imagination, interpretation and theoretical synthesis are employed by philossophy. Philosophy can use the rational or reasonable methods of logical deduction, intuition, imagination, interpretation and theoretical synthesis to reflect reality. But more often than not, logical deduction and interpretation are employed in moving from descriptions (facts) to evaluations (moral positions).

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BOOK REVIEW

PHILOSOPHY IN AFRICA: TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES
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This book is a collection of selected papers from an International Conference on African Philosophy held at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, from 15 to 19 February, 1981. The objectives of the editor in compiling this selection are twofold. The first objective is "to improve communication between African philosophers all over" (P. XV). The second objective is to promote the emergence of "a distinctive African philosophical tradition and focus" *(Ibid.)* which the rest of the world cannot ignore.

The two objectives just mentioned force us to ask: Why regard this book a contribution to *Phisolophy in Africa,* rather than a contribution to *African Philosophy?* This is an important question, given the fact that there are some African philosophers – "the traditionalists" – who are strongly committed to "the discovery of authentic African ideas and thought systems uninfluenced by alien accretions" (P XI). But, according to the editor, the title is meant to reflect "an awareness of our African background and of our belonging to an international community" (P. IV). This, it would appear, is a convincing answer to the question raised above. As African philosophers strive to tackle issues that are of relevance (direct or indirect) to "the African experience", they still have to recognise the affinity of their works with philosophical works elsewhere.

Philosophy in Africa is divided into four parts, each part dealing with issues that are sufficiently related to fall under the same broad title. (For reasons of convenience, the papers in this selection are not treated in a chronological order. Also, not all of these papers are reviewed). Part one, given the broad title "African philosophy", opens, quite appropriately, with a paper which is a further contribution to the debate on the question of African philosophy, i.e., the

question of what we may mean when we talk of "African philosophy". In this paper entitled "African philosophy: Yesterday and Today" (pp. 1–14), Dr. Joseph Omoregbe argues, very eloquently, for the view that African philosophy is much more than the work of contemporary (academic) philosophers. In his view, it also refers to the world-views of traditional Africans, as handed down in their "mythologies, wise-sayings, traditional proverbs, stories and especially religion" (pp. 6–7). Dr. Omoregbe thinks that this should be the case for two reasons. The first reason is that philosophy is "essentially a reflective activity" (P. 1). The second reason, on the other hand, consists in the observation that "there is no part of the world where men never reflect on such basic questions about the nature of the human person or about the universe" (pp. 3–4). Thus, African traditional thought should be placed on the same pedestal with, for example, the works of Budha, Socrates, Plato, Descartes etc, simply because Africans, like other men elsewhere, have reflected on fundamental questions "about the human person or about the physical universe."

Dr. Omoregbe can be seen in this part of his paper, as taking philosophy to mean the world-views of a people. This is inspite of the distinction he makes, on page 4, between philosophy in a "loose sense" and philosophy in a "strict sense". But those who deny that there is anything like African traditional philosophy do not deny that Africans had a world-view of their own. All they deny, with justification, is that Africans ever had a tradition of philosophy as an academic discipline – i.e. a tradition of philosophy as a reflective, critical and systematic attempt at analysing and examining the fundamental ideas Africans lived by. Philosophy, they insist, is not only a reflective activity, it is also, and perhaps more importantly, a critique of reason. But this conception of philosophy is in accord with the "strict sense" of philosophy which Dr. Omoregbe identifies in his paper. It is even a conception of philosophy which his own paper – which is both a brilliant attempt to argue for a position on the question of African philosophy and also an attempt to argue for a view on the nature of truth and knowledge – examplifies. It is, therefore, a conception of philosophy he cannot dismiss.

If Dr. Omoregbe's paper is important because it allows us to have a clear view of the assumption(s) underlying the position of the "traditionalists" on the question of African philosophy, the other papers (two of them) in part one together with Dr. Anthony Appiah's paper – "Soyinka and the Philosophy of Culture" (pp. 250–263) – and Late Dr. Tunde Erumevba's paper on "The Concept

of African Brotherhood" (pp. 190–206) are no less important. For they expose students of African philosophy, and the general reader, to different aspects of the African condition.

Prof. Mourad Wahba's "Contemporary Moslem Philosophers in North Africa" (pp. 15–26) is a vivid celebration of the African problematic – that of fashioning modes of development (intellectual and socio-political) which will enable Africans to confront the challenges of today, while at the same time preserving what is best in the traditions of yesterday. Dr. Anthony Appiah's paper, on the other hand, gives us an insight into the nature of this problematic as it relates to some of the works of a foremost African literary scholar, Prof. Wole Soyinka. In this paper, we see a masterly philosophical exploration into the tension in Wole Soyinka that is generated by the search for an authentic "I" – a search that is necessitated by the dynamics of "modern economic relations" – and the search for an enduring, collective, "we" which, no doubt, has its root in the socio-cultural disorientations engendered in the African by the colonial experience.

But, while these papers (by Prof. Wahba and Dr. Appiah) provide us with significant insights into different, though closely related, aspects of the African condition, they do not, it would appear, give us any clue as to what should be the response of African intellectuals to this situation.

It is precisely because Dr. Christipher Nwodo and Late Dr. Tunde Erumevba attempt, in varying degrees, to do this that their papers can be regarded as significant contributions in *Philosophy in Africa*. Dr. Nwodo, in concluding his paper entitled "The Explicit and Implicit in Amo's philosophy" (pp; 27–39), gives us an indication of what he thinks should be the role of the African philosopher in the search by Africans for an appropriate model of development in all its interlocking facets. He writes :"As Contemporary Africans, we could try like Amo to do a little more than teach philosophy for a living. We could be a little more committed, more courageous, more relevant" (p. 38). This sounds good, but it does not seem to touch the heart of the matter. For the question can still be asked as to what kind of things, ideas or ideals are relevant to our situation and what is to be the nature of our commitment to, and courage in defending, them.

It should not be thought, however, that *Philosophy in Africa* is not without papers that are devoted to the examination of specific responses to the question of how "true development and progress" can be ensured in Africa. For in Dr. Erumevba's paper we have a care-

ful and critical examination of Nyerere's proposal for "true development and progress on the African continent". Nyerere had argued, and Dr. Erumevba agrees with him, that the only way by which the development and progress of Africans can be guaranteed is "through the formation of a strong and virile political union by emergent African states" (p. 190). And the basis of this political union, for Nyerere, is to be found in the concept of African brotherhood.

Here Dr. Erumevba disagrees with Nyerere because, as he puts it; "the kind of kinship to which the feeling of African brotherhood is usually attached is not a significant kinship and cannot sustain the praxis of African unity" (p. 191). For him, the feeling of "true brotherhood" – i.e. the brotherhood of man to man – which can actually forster African unity can only emerge after all the exploitative class structures in African societies must have been thoroughly dismantled (p. 192). Thus, the immediate task for Africans is the destruction, in their various societies, of the exploitative socio-economic structures foistered on them by their colonial or neo-colonial masters.

Dr. Erumevba's proposal appears very firm, afterall we cannot deny that one of the strong obstacles to the development of African unity is the fact that most African states are still tied to their neo-colonial exploiters. However, we also need to recognise the fact that the successful destruction of the exploitative socio-economic structures in specific African countries requires the creation of certain minimum structures that can serve as a bulwark against eternal manipulation, or even aggression. This is where such regional socio-economic formations like the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) become very relevant to the drive for African unity. We do not need to wait for all African states to be liberated before we begin to achieve the goal of unity.

It should by now be clear that a significant portion of the selection under review deals with issues that are of direct relevance to the socio-economic condition of Africans. This, perhaps, is in response to the call that African intellectuals should be relevant to their socio-cultural milieu. But, it will be wrong to conclude, on the basis of this observation, that the editor considers abstract, theoretical, questions as being totally out of place in the scheme of things. For the papers in part Two of his selection (pp. 42–102) are devoted to this kind of questions.

In this part of the book, however, we witness the limitations of linguisitc analysis as a method of philosophizing. Here, we can see

two distinguished African philosophers not only disagreeing on the correct rendition of "truth" in Akan language – a language of which they both have first-hand knowledge – but also drawing on the resources of the same language to arrive at different views on the nature of truth and the interpretation of fact. Prof. Kwasi Wiredu thinks that the correspondence theory of truth rendered in Akan can only amount to an unelightening tautology. This, in his view, is the case because *nea ete sa* – "fact" – can only be interpreted as "what is so". However, Dr. Bedu-Addo thinks otherwise. For, as he maintains, *"ete saa (otse dem)* is used not only with reference to statements, but also to things" (p. 83).

Now, how do we decide which of the two positions constitutes an adequate interpretation of the Akan conception of truth? By calling on another Akan – speaking philosopher who may provide another interpretation that is different from the two we already have? or by appealing to a linguist who, as is sometimes the case, may not be able to follow the intricacies of the arguments marshalled in support of the two positions? In any case, how does an African philosopher who is not Akan-speaking participate effectively in this debate? It would therefore appear that linguistic analysis, more-so when it is done through the medium of a foreign language (English language, for example) can only lead to a dead end, except, of course, it serves as a clearing house for the discussion of substantive issues, particularly in metaphysics.

But if the attempt to pursue a purely linguistic analysis of truth (in Akan Language) in this selection is not, even philosophically, particularly rewarding, the same thing cannot be said of Prof. Wiredu's insightful defence of his views on truth and existence in his "Replies to Critics" (pp. 91–102). Truth and existence, for Prof. Wiredu, are not attributes of reality; "they both consist", he maintains, "of a relation between reality and cognitive beings" (p. 98). (To say of a thing – say x – that it exists is to assert that certain things about it can be known to be the case; and to assert that a statement – p – is true is to claim that what the statement asserts to be the case – its "ideational content" – is the case, i.e. to agree with the point of view of the assertor of p). And since language is an essential element in this relation, the best we could have in our cognitive concerns is experience as interpreted, not experience as such; reality as interpreted, not reality as such; But since every interpretation is stand-point bound, the best we could do in determining the truth-value of a judgement is to compare it with another judgement, emanating from the same or a different point of view.

The difference between Prof. Wiredu and his critics – Dr. Omoregbe and Prof. Gene Blocker – then, as he himself puts it in his replies, is not that he denies that our opinions or judgements are about independently existing objects or state of affairs. What he denies, with justification, is the possibility of our experiencing the world "ungrammatically". His position, therefore, rather than being an attempt to reform human experience, as Prof. Blocker would have us believe (p. 60), is a brilliant attempt to explain a significant aspect of this experience – i.e. the centrality of language to human cognitive concerns.

We can see from this brief review that *Philosophy in African: Trends and Perspectives* is an interesting combination of papers. It consists both of papers which attempt to grapple with knotty epistemological issues and also those like Dr. Thomas F. Mason's "Towards a Philosophy of Pluralism" (pp. 105–127) and Dr. Agrawal's "Morals and the Value of Human Life" (pp. 207–226) – which deal with universal human problems. It is not even without papers that deal with specific problems that arise out of a people's existential situation. This set of papers include Dr. Adeigbo's "Neutrality Arguments and Educational Relevance :The Chess Game Analogy" (pp. 264–279) and Prof. Kurt Buttner's "Historico-Philosophical aspects of Different Concepts of Colonialism" (pp; 169 – 184). Thus, *Philosophy in Africa* is much a significant addition to the growing body of literature in African philosophy, as it is a worthwhile contribution to the intellectual heritage of mankind.