





# INTRODUCTION:

In this project, we designed, modeled, and secured a continuous-time dynamic car-control system. The objective was to integrate principles of control engineering with cybersecurity by modeling the vehicle's motion, designing a PID controller to regulate velocity, and finally, simulating cyber-attacks to analyze system resilience. We used MATLAB/Simulink and Python to simulate the physical plant and the controller logic.



# Dynamic Car Modeling





In this phase, we modeled the car to see how it moves with different forces and road slopes. We used Python to simulate four cases:



Case I (Flat Road): With the engine off ( $F=0$ ), the car slowed down until it stopped. This happens because friction is always pushing back against the car.





Case II (Flat Road): We turned on the engine to 500 N. The car speed went up and stayed at 10 m/s because the engine push was equal to the friction push.





## Case III & IV (Hilly Road):

Case III: the car became very slow, even though the engine was still pushing with 500 N.



Case III & IV (Hilly Road):

Case IV: On the steep 10-degree hill, the car could barely move.



# Task 2.0: Controller Block Diagrams (P and PI)




Figure 2: Block Diagram of PII Controller

The diagram shows how the P and PI controllers work.

The error is found by comparing the reference speed with the actual speed.

The P part uses  $K_p * e(t)$ , and the PI controller also adds an integral term to reduce long-term error.

The control signal drives the plant, and the output speed is fed back to keep correcting the error.

# Task 2.1: Derivation of P and PI Controller Equations

The error is defined as →  $e(t) = R - v(t)$

```
for i = 1:N  
    e = R_local - v;
```

The difference between the **desired speed** and the **actual speed**.

The P controller uses →  $u(t) = K_p * e(t)$

The P controller is applied when  $K_i = 0$

```
for i = 1:N  
    e = R_local - v;  
    if Ki == 0  
        u_cmd = Kp * e;
```

The controller **output** is directly proportional to the **error**

The PI controller uses →  $u(t) = K_p * e(t) + K_i * \int e(t) dt$

The PI controller adds **the integral** accumulation when  $K_i > 0$

```
if (u_cmd == u_sat) && (Ki == 0)  
    integral = integral - e * dt_local;  
    u_cmd = Kp * e + Ki * integral;
```

The **integral** term helps remove steady-state error.

## 2.3: Controller Implementation (MATLAB)

### Run\_controller in matlab


```
%% -----
function [v_hist, u_hist] = run_controller(Kp, Ki, theta_profile, R_local, dt_local, m_local, g_local, b_local, u_min_local, u_max_local)
    N = length(theta_profile);
    v = 0;
    integral = 0;
    v_hist = zeros(1,N);
    u_hist = zeros(1,N);
    for i = 1:N
        e = R_local - v;
        if Ki == 0
            u_cmd = Kp * e;
        else
            integral = integral + e * dt_local;
            u_cmd = Kp * e + Ki * integral;
        end
    end
    % -----
% -----
[vP5, uP5]      = run_controller(Kp_P, 0,      theta_5,  R, dt, m, g, b, u_min, u_max);
[vP10, uP10]     = run_controller(Kp_P, 0,      theta_10, R, dt, m, g, b, u_min, u_max);
[vPvar, uPvar]   = run_controller(Kp_P, 0,      theta_var, R, dt, m, g, b, u_min, u_max);

[vPI5, uPI5]     = run_controller(Kp_PI, Ki_PI, theta_5,  R, dt, m, g, b, u_min, u_max);
[vPI10, uPI10]   = run_controller(Kp_PI, Ki_PI, theta_10, R, dt, m, g, b, u_min, u_max);
[vPIvar, uPIvar] = run_controller(Kp_PI, Ki_PI, theta_var, R, dt, m, g, b, u_min, u_max);
```


## 2.4. Simulation Results (Plots)

Simulation for  $\rightarrow 5^\circ$  For each P, PI

For the P controller , 5 degree Slope Kp=600




For the PI controller , 5 degree Slope Kp=600 , Ki=40




## 2.4. Simulation Results (Plots)

Simulation for  $\rightarrow 10^\circ$  For each P, PI

For the P controller , 10 degree Slope Kp=600




For the PI controller , 10 degree Slope Kp=600 ,Ki=40




## 2.4. Simulation Results (Plots)

### Variable slope

P Controller Response ,Variable slope , Kp= 600




PI Controller Response ,Variable slope , Kp= 600, Ki=40




Reacts quickly but cannot correct long-term

Reduces steady-state error significantly.


# TASK 3







# SIMULATE USING DIFFERENT SLOPES ( CONSTANT VS TIME VARIANT SLOPES ) WITH DIFFERENT KP , KI VALUES

**CASE 1 → KP = 2, KI = 0.5**




**CASE 2 → KP = 10, KI = 4.5**







**CASE 3 → KP = 0.8, KI = 0.2**




**CASE 4 → KP = 2, KI = 0.5 + SLOPE 10**






# COMPONENTS WITH (SINE WAVE) VARIABLE SLOP





## CASE 5 → $K_P = 2$ , $K_I = 0.5$ + VARIABLE SLOPE




# TASK 4

## Overshoot

Overshoot --> how much the speed goes above the target speed before settling down

If overshoot is high → the controller reacts too fast or is too aggressive

$$\text{Overshoot (\%)} = ((\text{PeakValue} - \text{ReferenceValue}) / \text{ReferenceValue}) * 100$$



## Settling Time

Settling time is how long it takes until the speed becomes stable and stays within a small band around the target


## Steady-State Error


SSE tells you how close the final speed is to the target speed.

If SSE = 0 → perfect tracking.


If SSE is negative → final speed is lower than desired.

$$\text{SSE} = \text{FinalValue} - \text{ReferenceValue}$$





Case 1 →  $K_p = 2, K_i = 0.5$




$$\text{Overshoot: OS} = (20.3 - 20) / 20 \times 100 = 1.5\%$$

Settling Time ≈ 7 s

$$\text{SSE: } 20.0657 - 20 = +0.0657 \text{ m/s}$$


CASE 2 – Aggressive Gains,  $K_p = 10, K_i = 4.5$




$$\text{OS} = (21.1805 - 20) / 20 \times 100 = 5.9\%$$

Settling Time ≈ 4s

$$\text{SSE: } 20.001 - 20 = +0.001 \text{ m/s}$$



## CASE 3 – Low Gains, K<sub>p</sub> = 0.8, K<sub>i</sub> = 0.2




$$OS = (19.9704 - 20) / 20 \times 100 = 0\%$$

Settling Time:  $\approx 17$  s

$$SSE: 19.9704 - 20 = -0.03 \text{ m/s}$$

## CASE 4 – Constant Slope, K<sub>p</sub> = 2, K<sub>i</sub> = 0.5, Slope = 10°




$$OS = (20.0206 - 20) / 20 \times 100 = 0.1\%$$

Settling Time:  $\approx 10$  s

$$SSE: 20.0206 - 20 = +0.02 \text{ m/s}$$




## CASE 5 — variable Slope, K<sub>p</sub> = 2, K<sub>i</sub> = 0.5,



$$OS = (20.7 - 20) / 20 \times 100 = 3.5\%$$

No fixed settling — periodic steady-state after  $\approx 15$  s

$$sse = 19.8375 - 20 = -0.1625 \text{ m/s}$$



# Comparasion table for the cases and overshoot , sittling time , SSE:


Case	Kp	Ki	Slope Condition	Peak Speed (m/s)	Overshoot (%)	Settling Time (s)	SSE (m/s)
1	2	0.5	Flat ( $\theta = 0$ )	20.3	$\approx 1.5\%$	$\approx 7$ s	0.0657
2	10	4.5	Flat ( $\theta = 0$ ), aggressive gains	21.1805	$\approx 6\%$	$\approx 7$ s	0.001
3	0.8	0.2	Flat ( $\theta = 0$ ), low gains	19.9704	0%	$\approx 17$ s	-0.03
4	2	0.5	Constant slope ( $\theta = 10^\circ$ )	20.0206	$\approx 0.1\%$	$\approx 10$ s	0.02
5	2	0.5	variable slope, , gain -10	20.7	$\approx 3.5\%$	Periodic oscillation (steady after $\sim 15$ s)	-0.1625





# Task 5 : Security Attacks

## Attack 1 – Sensor Spoofing

### Spoofing Attack (+3 m/s Bias)




# Attack 2 – DoS (Delay) Attack (1.5 s Feedback Delay)




# Normal vs attacked PID responses

Normal




spoofing attack +3




# Normal vs attacked PID responses

Normal



Dos attack



# DoS Delay (1.5 s):


outdated feedback → ~20% overshoot

longer settling time (~13 s)

System becomes unstable

Overshoot: 1.5% → 20%

Settling time: 7 s → 13 s



# Sensor Spoofing (+3 m/s):

controller thinks the car is faster → speed drops to ~17 m/s

data was incorrect

SSE: - 3 m/s large steady-state error

Settling time: ~12 s

Controller thinks car is faster → reduces throttle



# Mitigation

## Spoofing

- Communication authentication:

**Make sure the messages inside the car network are real and not changed by an attacker.**

- Redundant sensors :

**Use more than one sensor. If one sensor lies or fails, the other sensors confirm the truth**



## DoS Delay Attack

- Timestamp validation :

**checks if incoming data is too old.  
If the feedback or sensor data is delayed (DoS attack),  
the system discards it and uses only fresh data.**

- Redundant communication :

**channels provide backup data paths.  
If one network is attacked or delayed, the second  
network continues delivering fresh data.**