

Cryptography

RSA

Cryptography and Network Security William Stallings

Content



| Content |
|--|
| Introduction |
| Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems |
| The RSA Algorithm |
| The Chinese Remainder Theorem |
| Computational Aspects |
| The Security of RSA |

Introduction

- Public key algorithms = asymmetric algorithms
- Public key cryptography relies on number theory
- **Misconception:** asymmetric crypto is more secure than symmetric crypto
 - The security relies on the the length of the key and the computational work to break
- **Misconception:** asymmetric crypto made symmetric crypto obsolete
 - Symmetric crypto is still in use, sometimes preferable over the asymmetric crypto
- **Misconception:** it's easy to distribute the keys of public key crypto
 - Some protocols are still needed involving a central agent

Content



| Content |
|--|
| Introduction |
| Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems |
| The RSA Algorithm |
| The Chinese Remainder Theorem |
| Computational Aspects |
| The Security of RSA |

Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

- Public key cryptography evolved to solve two issues:
 1. Key distribution under symmetric encryption
 - The communicants already share a key
 - Or the use of a key distribution center
 2. Digital signatures:
 - Signing electronic documents


Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

- Asymmetric crypto uses two keys:
 - One for encryption
 - Another different **but related** key for decryption
- Characteristics:
 - Cannot compute the decryption key given only the algorithm and the encryption key
 - Either of the two keys can be used for encryption, with the other used for decryption
 - RSA exhibits this characteristic

Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems


- A public-key encryption scheme has six ingredients:

- Plaintext
- Encryption algorithm
- Public and private keys
- Ciphertext
- Decryption algorithm




Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

- Basic steps



Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

- A public-key encryption: confidentiality
- Encryption \rightarrow Public key
- Decryption \rightarrow Private key
- The cryptanalyst tries to:
 - Guess the plaintext, \hat{X}
 - Guess the private key, \hat{PR}_b




Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

- A public-key encryption: authentication – **Digital Signature**


- Encryption \rightarrow Private key
- Decryption \rightarrow Public key

- The cryptanalyst tries to:
 - Guess the private key, \hat{PR}_a



Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

- A public-key encryption: authentication and confidentiality



Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

What are the requirements for public key cryptography?

Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

1. Computationally easy for party B to generate key pair (PU_B, PR_B)

Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

1. Computationally easy for party B to generate key pair (PU_B, PR_B)
2. Computationally easy for a sender to encrypt a message: $C = E(PU_B, M)$

Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

1. Computationally easy for party B to generate key pair (PU_B, PR_B)
2. Computationally easy for a sender to encrypt a message: $C = E(PU_B, M)$
3. Computationally easy for a receiver to decrypt a message: $M = D(PR_B, C)$

Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

1. Computationally easy for party B to generate key pair (PU_B, PR_B)
2. Computationally easy for a sender to encrypt a message: $C = E(PU_B, M)$
3. Computationally easy for a receiver to decrypt a message: $M = D(PR_B, C)$
4. Computationally hard to get PR_B given only the PU_B

Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

1. Computationally easy for party B to generate key pair (PU_B, PR_B)
2. Computationally easy for a sender to encrypt a message: $C = E(PU_B, M)$
3. Computationally easy for a receiver to decrypt a message: $M = D(PR_B, C)$
4. Computationally hard to get PR_B given only the PU_B
5. Computationally hard to decrypt a C using PU_B

Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems


1. Computationally easy for party B to generate key pair (PU_B, PR_B)
2. Computationally easy for a sender to encrypt a message: $C = E(PU_B, M)$
3. Computationally easy for a receiver to decrypt a message: $M = D(PR_B, C)$
4. Computationally hard to get PR_B given only the PU_B
5. Computationally hard to decrypt a C using PU_B

Trap-door
one-way
function



Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems


- Trapdoor function: maps the domain to the range



Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

- Trapdoor function: maps the domain to the range but impossible to calculate from the other direction

$$y = f_k(x)$$
$$x \neq f^{-1}_?(y)$$




Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

- Trapdoor function: maps the domain to the range but impossible to calculate from the other direction unless some information is known.

$$y = f_k(x)$$


$$x \neq f_k^{-1}(y)$$

$$x = f_k^{-1}(y)$$



Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems

- Trapdoor function: maps the domain to the range but impossible to calculate from the other direction unless some information is known.



Content



| Content |
|--|
| Introduction |
| Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems |
| The RSA Algorithm |
| The Chinese Remainder Theorem |
| Computational Aspects |
| The Security of RSA |

The RSA Algorithm

- RSA sees the plaintext and ciphertext as integers between $[0: n - 1]$
- n is a large integer value; of size 1024 bits
 - A number that is 309 digits
 - $n < 2^{1024}$

```
24725387912226386773406422770506824337943430362146117585611811
53322971499614407180042227635152596218510405414532496746537437
34734188672138481874162250814304104733926303051948325997875058
56430815348087510866371728812805464582241735489450115288528172
8600701643105745461025953612473530075689406770397864088629194
```


The RSA Algorithm

- RSA math depends on **modular exponentiation**.
- The plaintext block must be less than n .

0 $\log_2(n)+1$
...1001010111010110100...

- For example, if $n = 13$, the plaintext block size = $\log_2(13) + 1 \cong 4$ bits
- Thus, the possible values can be $[0: 12] \rightarrow [0000 : 1100]$

The RSA Algorithm

- Encryption:

$$C = M^e \bmod n$$

- Decryption:

$$M = C^d \bmod n = (M^e)^d \bmod n = M^{ed} \bmod n$$

- Public key: $PU = \{e, n\}$
- Private key: $PR = \{d, n\}$
- Both sender and receiver know e, n
- Only receiver knows d

The RSA Algorithm

- RSA requirements:

1. Possible to find value $e, d, n \mid M^{ed} \bmod n = M \quad \forall M < n$
2. Easy to compute $M^e \bmod n$ and $C^d \bmod n \quad \forall M < n$
3. Infeasible to determine d given e and n

The RSA Algorithm

- RSA requirements:

1. Possible to find value $e, d, n \mid M^{ed} \bmod n = M \quad \forall M < n$

How to find values e, d to satisfy $M^{ed} \bmod n$?

2. Easy to compute $M^e \bmod n$ and $C^d \bmod n \quad \forall M < n$

3. Infeasible to determine d given e and n

The RSA Algorithm

- $M^{ed} \bmod n \rightarrow$ if e and d are multiplicative inverses modulo $\phi(n)$

$$ed \bmod \phi(n) = 1$$

$$ed \equiv 1 \bmod \phi(n)$$

$$d = e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$$

- $\gcd(e, \phi(n)) = 1$ and $\gcd(d, \phi(n)) = 1$

- $\phi(n)$ is Euler totient function

- If $n = p \times q$, where p and q are primes $\rightarrow \phi(pq) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$

The RSA Algorithm

- RSA parameters set

| | | |
|--|---------|------------|
| Prime numbers p, q | Private | Chosen |
| $n = pq$ | Public | Calculated |
| $e \mid \gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1; 1 < \phi(n)$ | Public | Chosen |
| $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$ | Private | Calculated |

The RSA Algorithm

- Alice generates her keypair

Key Generation by Alice

Select p, q

p and q both prime, $p \neq q$

Calculate $n = p \times q$

Calculate $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$

Select integer e

$\gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1; 1 < e < \phi(n)$

Calculate d

$d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$

Public key

$PU = \{e, n\}$

Private key

$PR = \{d, n\}$

The RSA Algorithm

- Bob sends a message to Alice

Encryption by Bob with Alice's Public Key

Plaintext: $M < n$

Ciphertext: $C = M^e \bmod n$

- Alice decrypts the message

Decryption by Alice with Alice's Private Key

Ciphertext: C

Plaintext: $M = C^d \bmod n$

The RSA Algorithm

- Key generation example

| |
|------------------------------------|
| Find primes p, q |
| $n = p \times q$ |
| $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ |
| Find $e \mid \gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1$ |
| $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod n$ |
| Publish $PU\{e, n\}$ |
| Keep $PR = \{d, n\}$ |

$$p = 17$$
$$q = 11$$

The RSA Algorithm

- Key generation example

| |
|------------------------------------|
| Find primes p, q |
| $n = p \times q$ |
| $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ |
| Find $e \mid \gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1$ |
| $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod n$ |
| Publish $PU\{e, n\}$ |
| Keep $PR = \{d, n\}$ |

$$p = 17, q = 11$$

$$n = p \times q = 17 \times 11 = 187$$

The RSA Algorithm

- Key generation example

| |
|------------------------------------|
| Find primes p, q |
| $n = p \times q$ |
| $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ |
| Find $e \mid \gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1$ |
| $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod n$ |
| Publish $PU\{e, n\}$ |
| Keep $PR = \{d, n\}$ |

$$p = 17, q = 11$$

$$n = p \times q = 17 \times 11 = 187$$

$$\phi(187) = (17 - 1)(11 - 1) = 160$$

The RSA Algorithm

- Key generation example

| |
|------------------------------------|
| Find primes p, q |
| $n = p \times q$ |
| $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ |
| Find $e \mid \gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1$ |
| $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod n$ |
| Publish $PU\{e, n\}$ |
| Keep $PR = \{d, n\}$ |

$$p = 17, q = 11$$

$$n = p \times q = 17 \times 11 = 187$$

$$\phi(187) = (17 - 1)(11 - 1) = 160$$

$$e = 7 \mid \gcd(160, 7) = 1$$

The RSA Algorithm

- Key generation example

| |
|------------------------------------|
| Find primes p, q |
| $n = p \times q$ |
| $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ |
| Find $e \mid \gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1$ |
| $d \equiv e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$ |
| Publish $PU\{e, n\}$ |
| Keep $PR = \{d, n\}$ |

$$p = 17, q = 11$$

$$n = p \times q = 17 \times 11 = 187$$

$$\phi(187) = (17 - 1)(11 - 1) = 160$$

$$e = 7 \mid \gcd(160, 7) = 1$$

$$d = e \gcd(e, \phi(n)) = e \gcd(7, 160) = 23$$

The RSA Algorithm

- Key generation example

| |
|------------------------------------|
| Find primes p, q |
| $n = p \times q$ |
| $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ |
| Find $e \mid \gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1$ |
| $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{n}$ |
| Publish $PU\{e, n\}$ |
| Keep $PR = \{d, n\}$ |

$$p = 17, q = 11$$

$$n = p \times q = 17 \times 11 = 187$$

$$\phi(187) = (17 - 1)(11 - 1) = 160$$

$$e = 7 \mid \gcd(160, 7) = 1$$

$$d = e \gcd(e, \phi(n)) = e \gcd(7, 160) = 23$$

$$PU = \{7, 187\}$$

The RSA Algorithm

- Key generation example

| |
|------------------------------------|
| Find primes p, q |
| $n = p \times q$ |
| $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ |
| Find $e \mid \gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1$ |
| $d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{n}$ |
| Publish $PU\{e, n\}$ |
| Keep $PR = \{d, n\}$ |

$$p = 17, q = 11$$

$$n = p \times q = 17 \times 11 = 187$$

$$\phi(187) = (17 - 1)(11 - 1) = 160$$

$$e = 7 \mid \gcd(160, 7) = 1$$

$$d = e \gcd(e, \phi(n)) = e \gcd(7, 160) = 23$$

$$PU = \{7, 187\}$$

$$PR = \{23, 187\}$$

The RSA Algorithm

- Encrypt the message: “ABC” given $PU = \{7, 187\}$

1. Convert the string to numerical values:

| A | B | C |
|----|----|----|
| 65 | 66 | 67 |

2. Encrypt each character by computing: $M^7 \bmod 187$

| 65 | 66 | 67 |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| $65^7 \% 187 = 142$ | $66^7 \% 187 = 110$ | $67^7 \% 187 = 67$ |

3. Send ciphertext $\{142, 110, 67\}$ to Alice

The RSA Algorithm

- Decrypt the message: $\{142, 110, 67\}$ given $PR = \{23, 187\}$

1. Read each ciphertext block and compute: $C^{23} \bmod 187$

| 142 | 110 | 67 |
|---|-----|----|
| $142^{23} \% 187 = 65$ $110^{23} \% 187 = 66$ $67^{23} \% 187 = 67$ | | |

2. Decode the encrypted values

| 65 | 66 | 67 |
|----|----|----|
| A | B | C |

3. The plaintext is "ABC"

Content

| Content |
|--|
| Introduction |
| Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems |
| The RSA Algorithm |
| The Chinese Remainder Theorem |
| Computational Aspects |
| The Security of RSA |

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- CRT: Solves a set of congruences with one variable but different moduli, which are relatively prime.

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv a_1 \pmod{m_1} \\ x \equiv a_2 \pmod{m_2} \\ x \equiv a_3 \pmod{m_3} \end{cases}$$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- CRT: Solves a set of congruences with one variable but different moduli, which are relatively prime.

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv a_1 \pmod{m_1} \\ x \equiv a_2 \pmod{m_2} \\ x \equiv a_3 \pmod{m_3} \end{cases} \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{Each of these is} \\ \text{called a modulus,} \\ m_1 \neq m_2 \neq m_3 \end{array}$$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- CRT: Solves a set of congruences with one variable but different moduli, which are relatively prime.

Relatively prime =

coprime =

no common factors =

$\gcd(m_1, m_2) = 1$

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv a_1 \pmod{m_1} \\ x \equiv a_2 \pmod{m_2} \\ x \equiv a_3 \pmod{m_3} \end{cases}$$

e.g., $\gcd(5, 7) = 1$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- Example:

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv 2 \pmod{3} \\ x \equiv 3 \pmod{5} \\ x \equiv 2 \pmod{7} \end{cases}$$

Has a unique solution which is $x = 23$. Because:

$$\begin{aligned} 23 \% 3 &= 2 \rightarrow 23 \equiv 2 \pmod{3} \\ 23 \% 5 &= 3 \rightarrow 23 \equiv 3 \pmod{5} \\ 23 \% 7 &= 2 \rightarrow 23 \equiv 2 \pmod{7} \end{aligned}$$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- How CRT works to find the solution:

Find the common modulus: $M = m_1 \times m_2 \times \cdots \times m_k$



Find $M_1 = M/m_1, M_2 = M/m_2, \dots, M/m_k$



Find the multiplicative inverses: $M_1^{-1}, M_2^{-1}, \dots, M_k^{-1}$ using their corresponding moduli



Compute the solution: $x = (a_1 \times M_1 \times M_1^{-1} + a_2 \times M_2 \times M_2^{-1} + \cdots + a_k \times M_k \times M_k^{-1}) \bmod M$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

• Example:

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv 2 \pmod{3} \\ x \equiv 3 \pmod{5} \\ x \equiv 2 \pmod{7} \end{cases}$$

1. $M = 3 \times 5 \times 7 = 105$

2. $M_1 = 105/3 = 35, 105/5 = 21, 105/7 = 15$

3. $M_1^{-1} = \text{Inv}(35, 3) = 2, M_2^{-1} = \text{Inv}(21, 5) = 1, M_3^{-1} = \text{mInv}(15, 7) = 1$

4. $x = (2 \times 35 \times 2 + 3 \times 21 \times 1 + 2 \times 15 \times 1) \bmod 105 = 23$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- CRT can be used to represent large integers as a list of smaller integers.
- Example: Assume we need to calculate $z = x + y$ where $x = 123$ and $y = 334$, but our system accepts only numbers less than 100.

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- $x = 123$ and $y = 334$, the limit is 100

1. Represent the numbers as congruences

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv \alpha_1 \pmod{99} \\ x \equiv \alpha_2 \pmod{98} \\ x \equiv \alpha_3 \pmod{97} \end{cases} \quad \begin{cases} y \equiv \beta_1 \pmod{99} \\ y \equiv \beta_2 \pmod{98} \\ y \equiv \beta_3 \pmod{97} \end{cases}$$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- $x = 123$ and $y = 334$, the limit is 100

1. Represent the numbers as congruences

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv \alpha_1 \pmod{99} \\ x \equiv \alpha_2 \pmod{98} \\ x \equiv \alpha_3 \pmod{97} \end{cases}$$

$$\begin{cases} y \equiv \beta_1 \pmod{99} \\ y \equiv \beta_2 \pmod{98} \\ y \equiv \beta_3 \pmod{97} \end{cases}$$

$$\alpha_1 = 123 \pmod{99} = 24$$

$$\alpha_2 = 123 \pmod{98} = 25$$

$$\alpha_3 = 123 \pmod{97} = 26$$

$$\beta_1 = 334 \pmod{99} = 37$$

$$\beta_2 = 334 \pmod{98} = 40$$

$$\beta_3 = 334 \pmod{97} = 43$$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- $x = 123$ and $y = 334$, the limit is 100

1. Represent the numbers as congruences

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv 24 \pmod{99} \\ x \equiv 25 \pmod{98} \\ x \equiv 26 \pmod{97} \end{cases} + \begin{cases} y \equiv 37 \pmod{99} \\ y \equiv 40 \pmod{98} \\ y \equiv 43 \pmod{97} \end{cases} = \begin{cases} z \equiv 61 \pmod{99} \\ z \equiv 65 \pmod{98} \\ z \equiv 69 \pmod{97} \end{cases}$$

The Chinese Remainder Theorem

- $x = 123$ and $y = 334$, the limit is 100

1. Represent the numbers as congruences

$$\begin{cases} x \equiv 24 \pmod{99} \\ x \equiv 25 \pmod{98} \\ x \equiv 26 \pmod{97} \end{cases} + \begin{cases} y \equiv 37 \pmod{99} \\ y \equiv 40 \pmod{98} \\ y \equiv 43 \pmod{97} \end{cases} = \begin{cases} z \equiv 61 \pmod{99} \\ z \equiv 65 \pmod{98} \\ z \equiv 69 \pmod{97} \end{cases}$$


2. Solve the z congruences using CRT to get $z = 457$

Content

| Content |
|--|
| Introduction |
| Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems |
| The RSA Algorithm |
| The Chinese Remainder Theorem |
| Computational Aspects |
| The Security of RSA |

Computational Aspects

- Computational Aspects



Computational Aspects

Exponentiation in modular arithmetic

- $(large\ integer)^{large\ integer} \bmod (large\ integer) \rightarrow$ The intermediate values are too large to handle!
- **Solution:** reduce the intermediate results modulo n :
 - For multiplication: $(a \times b) \bmod n = [(a \bmod n) \times (b \bmod n)] \bmod n$
 - For exponentiation: $x^{16} = x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \times x \rightarrow x^{(10000)}_b$; use the square-multiply algorithm, performs 4 squares and 1 multiplication.

Computational Aspects

Efficient operation using the public key

- To allow faster computations during encryption, specific e values can be chosen: 65537, 3, 17
- Each of these choices has only two 1 bits, so the number of multiplications required to perform exponentiation is minimized
- Using small e values makes the RSA vulnerable to attacks

Computational Aspects

Efficient operation using the public key

- Three different RSA users use $e = 3$ but have unique values of n : n_1, n_2, n_3 .
- If user A sends the same encrypted message M to all three users, then the ciphertexts are $C_1 = M^3 \bmod n_1$, $C_2 = M^3 \bmod n_2$, $C_3 = M^3 \bmod n_3$.
- It is likely that n_1, n_2, n_3 are pairwise relatively prime. Therefore, one can use the CRT to compute $M^3 \bmod (n_1 n_2 n_3)$.
- $M = \sqrt[3]{M^3}$
- **Solution:** pad each M with a unique random bit string to be encrypted

Computational Aspects

Efficient operation using the private key

- Small values of $d \rightarrow$ Brute force attacks
- To speed up the computation of $M = C^d \bmod n$:
 1. Define: (1) $V_p = C^d \bmod p$, $V_q = C^d \bmod q$
(2) $X_p = q \times (q^{-1} \bmod p)$, $X_q = p \times (p^{-1} \bmod q)$
 2. Compute $M = (V_p X_p + V_q X_q) \bmod n$

Computational Aspects

Efficient operation using the private key

- Small values of $d \rightarrow$ Brute force attacks
- To speed up the computation of $M = C^d \bmod n$:
 1. Define: (1) $V_p = C^d \bmod p$, $V_q = C^d \bmod q$
(2) $X_p = q \times (q^{-1} \bmod p)$, $X_q = p \times (p^{-1} \bmod q)$
 2. Compute $M = (V_p X_p + V_q X_q) \bmod n$
- Calculating V_p and V_q is 4X faster with **Fermat's little theorem**:
 - $V_p = C^d \bmod p = C^{d \bmod (p-1)} \bmod p$, $V_q = C^d \bmod q = C^{d \bmod (q-1)} \bmod q$

Computational Aspects

Key generation

Determining two prime numbers, p and q

- Selecting large primes to prevent factorizing n into p and q
- Use **probabilistic primality test** algorithms to test p, q
 - e.g., Miller-Rabin algorithm

Selecting either e or d and calculating the other

- We need to select e such that $\gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1$ and calculate $d \equiv e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$
- The Extended Euclidean Algorithm can determine the \gcd and the inverse at the same time

Content

| Content |
|--|
| Introduction |
| Principles of Public-Key Cryptosystems |
| The RSA Algorithm |
| The Chinese Remainder Theorem |
| Computational Aspects |
| The Security of RSA |



The Security of RSA

- Five possible approaches to attacking the RSA algorithm

Brute force

- Trying all possible keys

Mathematical attacks

- Efforts to factorize n into p, q

Timing attacks

- Determine the run-time of the decryption algorithm to determine the decryption key

Hardware fault-based attack

- Inducing hardware faults in the processor that is generating digital signatures

Chosen Ciphertext attack

- Exploiting properties of the RSA algorithm

The Security of RSA

The factoring problem

- Determining the factors of $n = pq \rightarrow$ calculating $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$
- Thus, it's easy to compute $d \equiv e^{-1} \bmod \phi(n)$
- Fast algorithms to compute the factorization:
 - Generalized number field sieve (GNFS)
 - Specialized number field sieve (SNFS)
- Researchers broke the modulus n up to 768-bits
- Governmental standards recommend using n of size 2048 or larger

The Security of RSA

Timing attacks

- Attackers observe the time to decrypt a message to recover the private key
- Exploit the square-multiply algorithm and similar algorithms that don't run in a fixed time
- Countermeasures:
 1. **Constant exponentiation time:** Ensure that all exponentiations take the same amount of time before returning a result
 2. **Random delay:** add a random delay to the exponentiation algorithm to confuse the timing attack
 3. **Blinding:** Multiply the ciphertext by a random number before performing exponentiation

The Security of RSA

- Blinding prevents knowing what ciphertext bits are being processed and therefore prevents the bit-by-bit analysis.

Generate a secret random number
 r between 0 and $n - 1$



```
graph TD; A[Generate a secret random number r between 0 and n - 1] --> B[Compute C' = C x r^e mod n]; B --> C[Compute M' = C'^d mod n]; C --> D[Compute M = M' r^-1 mod n | r^-1 is the multiplicative inverse of r];
```

Compute $C' = C \times r^e \bmod n$

Compute $M' = C'^d \bmod n$

Compute $M = M' r^{-1} \bmod n$ | r^{-1}
is the multiplicative inverse of r

The Security of RSA

Fault-based attacks

- Reduces the power to the processor → computing invalid signatures → attackers can recover the private key
- Can take 100 hours to extract 1024-bit private key
- It requires the attacker to have physical access to the computer → not very practical

The Security of RSA

Chosen Ciphertext attacks

- We can decrypt $C = M^e \bmod n$ using CCA as follows (we don't know M):
 1. Compute $X = (C \times 2^e) \bmod n$
 2. Submit X as a chosen ciphertext and receive back $Y = X^d \bmod n$
 3. Now, $Y = X^d \bmod n \rightarrow (C \bmod n) \times (2^e \bmod n)$
 $= (M^e \bmod n) \times (2^e \bmod n) \rightarrow (2M)^e \bmod n$
 4. The attacker deduces M
- Check this demo: https://asecuritysite.com/encryption/c_c

The Security of RSA

Chosen Ciphertext attacks

- The goal of CCA is to model the attackers' capabilities
- Decrypting something is not always enough to break a system!
 - Example: Video-protection devices perform encryption/decryption queries using the device's chip.
 - But attackers are interested in the key to redistribute it;
 - In this case, decrypting "for free" isn't sufficient to break the system
 - Check this: <https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/26689/easy-explanation-of-ind-security-notions/26738#26738>
- To prevent CCA, use the **optimal asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP)**

The Security of RSA

- Write a python function to return a prime number of specific bit size.
 - Use *sympy.isprime()* function to check if a random value is prime or not.
- Implement the EGCD algorithm to return the modular inverse of a number.
- Implement a function that generate two RSA key pairs.
 - Assume a default value for $e = 65537$
- Implement a function to encrypt an integer value using RSA.
- Implement a function to decrypt an integer value using RSA.