# **Block Ciphers**

### Content

#### **Content**



Introduction


**Constructing Block Ciphers** 

**Modes of Operation** 

**Advanced Encryption Standard** 

What is a block cipher?

A cipher combined with a mode of operation to process data in blocks.




- Secure block cipher = pseudorandom permutation (PRP).
  - PRP is a function to shuffle the input.
- Security objectives:
  - Cannot produce any ciphertext without a key
  - Cannot discover any pattern in plaintext/ciphertext
  - Indistinguishable from random permutation
  - Impossible to recover the secret key
  - Cannot recover plaintext from ciphertext without the key.

- A block cipher depends on two value:
  - o **Block size:** the length of single unit processed by the PRP of the cipher.
  - Key size: the length of the key used in encryption and decryption.
- Most block ciphers have either 64-bit or 128-bit blocks
  - ODES's blocks have 64 (26) bits
  - $\circ$  AES's blocks have 128 (2<sup>7</sup>) bits.

What is the ideal block size?

- A block size should not be too large to minimize memory footprint.
- Blocks of 64, 128, 256 bits are short enough.
  - Such size can fit into the registers of most CPUs.
  - Allow efficient implementations.



- While blocks shouldn't be too large, they also shouldn't be too small.
- Short block sizes make the cipher susceptible to codebook attacks.
  - An attack on a block cipher, where you generate every possible plaintext and consequently every possible ciphertext for a fixed key.
  - KPA model.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	В	C	D	Е	F
)	E0	F7	6	1A	23	3E	47	5C	6E	79	83	9B	A2	B2	CE	D8
1	F6	5	19	22	3D	46	5B	6D	78	82	9A	A1	B1	CD	D7	EF
2	4	18	21	3C	45	5A	6C	77	81	99	A0	B0	CC	D6	EE	F5
3	17	20	3B	44	59	6B	76	80	98	AF	BF	CB	D5	ED	F4	3
4	2F	3A	43	58	6A	75	8F	97	AE	BE	CA	D4	EC	F3	2	16
5	39	42	57	69	74	8E	96	AD	BD	C9	D3	EB	F2	1	15	2E
5	41	56	68	73	8D	95	AC	BC	C8	D2	EA	F1	0	14	2D	38
7	55	67	72	8C	94	AB	BB	C7	D1	E9	F0	F	13	2C	37	40
8	66	71	8B	93	AA	BA	C6	D0	E8	FF	E	12	2B	36	4F	54
9	70	8A	92	A9	B9	C5	DF	E7	FE	D	11	2A	35	4E	53	65
A	89	91	A8	B8	C4	DE	E6	FD	C	10	29	34	4D	52	64	7F
В	90	A7	B7	C3	DD	E5	FC	В	1F	28	33	4C	51	63	7E	88
C	A6	B6	C2	DC	E4	FB	A	1E	27	32	4B	50	62	7D	87	9F
D	B5	C1	DB	E3	FA	9	1D	26	31	4A	5F	61	7C	86	9E	A5
Ε	C0	DA	E2	F9	8	1C	25	30	49	5E	60	7B	85	9D	A4	B4
F	D9	E1	F8	7	1B	24	3F	48	5D	6F	7A	84	9C	A3	B3	CF

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Introduction



**Constructing Block Ciphers** 

**Modes of Operation** 


**Advanced Encryption Standard** 

Simon and Speck Ciphers


- Encryption: performing a sequence of rounds.
  - Each round performs weak operations on its own.
  - $\circ$  More rounds  $\rightarrow$  strong cipher.
- ullet A block cipher with three rounds:  $oldsymbol{R_3} \left( oldsymbol{R_2} ig( oldsymbol{R_1}(P) ig) 
  ight)$

• To decrypt, each round should have an inverse:  $iR_1\left(iR_2\left(iR_3(C)\right)\right)$ 


- The round functions are identical, but they are parameterized by a value called the *round key*.
  - Different keys → different rounds.



- The round functions are identical, but they are parameterized by a value called the *round key*.
  - Different keys → different rounds.
- Round keys are derived from the main key, K, using a key schedule algorithm.




- Identical rounds  $\rightarrow$  slide attack.
- Slide attacks look for two plaintext/ciphertext pairs (P1, C1) and (P2, C2),
   where P2 = R(P1) if R is the cipher's round.
  - Knowing the input/output of a single round helps recovering the key.



https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=62e452197f49c2 9e499342d978e562999c09cbbf

- Properties of block ciphers:
  - o Confusion: the input (plaintext and key) undergoes complex transformations.
  - o **Diffusion**: the transformations depend equally on all bits of the input.
    - Changing 1 bit plaintext changes half of the ciphertext



• Two techniques to construct rounds


Constructing a round

Substitution—permutation networks (e.g., AES)


Feistel

schemes (e.g., DES)

- A Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN):
  - o takes in blocks of plaintext and keys,
  - o applies substitution layers (S-boxes) and permutation layers.




- Substitution boxes are lookup tables that transform chunks of 4 or 8 bits.
  - Example, DES S-Box:



- S-boxes must be designed carefully:
  - Cryptographically secure
  - No statistical bias


- Feistel Schemes works as follows:
  - 1. Split the ciphertext block into two halves, L and R.
  - 2. Set L to L  $\bigoplus$  F(R), where F is a round function.
  - 3. Swap the values of L and R.
  - 4. Go to step 2 and repeat a certain number of times.
  - 5. Merge L and R into the one output block.




- In a Feistel scheme, the F function can be:
  - Pseudorandom permutation (PRP)
  - Pseudorandom function (PRF)

Property	Pseudorandom Permutation (PRP)	Pseudorandom Function (PRF)					
Output	Pseudorandom output						
Mapping	Shuffles the data and creates a unique mapping. Must be unique.  E.g., PRP(0xAB) ≠ PRP(0xCD)	Transforms the input based on random function. Doesn't have to be unique.  E.g., PRF(0xAB) = PRF(0xCD)					
Invertibility	Always invertible with respect to the key.	Not necessarily invertible.					
Key	Both use a secret key to transform the plaintext						

- In a Feistel scheme, the F function can be:
  - Pseudorandom permutation (PRP) bijective.



- In a Feistel scheme, the F function can be:
  - Pseudorandom function (PRF)



### Content

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Introduction

**Constructing Block Ciphers** 



**Modes of Operation** 

**Advanced Encryption Standard** 

### Modes of Operation


• Encryption schemes combine a permutation with a mode of operation to handle messages of any length.

Cipher Permutation

Mode of operation


### Modes of Operation

Basic modes of operation



- ECB is the simplest, the dumpiest.
- 1. Takes plaintext blocks  $P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_N$
- 2. Processes each independently by computing  $C_1 = E(K, P_1)$ ,  $C_2 = E(K, P_2)$

Insecure mode.



- ECB is not semantically secure
  - o Identical plaintext blocks results in identical ciphertext blocks.






Figure 4-7: The original image (left) and the ECB-encrypted image (right)

- CBC makes each ciphertext block dependent on all the previous blocks.
  - o Ensures that identical plaintext blocks won't be identical ciphertext blocks.



- $C_i = E(K, P_i \oplus C_{i-1})$
- When encrypting the first block,  $P_1$ , CBC takes a random initial value (IV)

- Decryption needs to know the IV used to encrypt, so it's sent along with the ciphertext, in the clear.
- Decryption can be parallelized.



Two ways to align the plaintext to the block size in CBC mode.


#### Padding

- Add extra bytes to fill the last block
- 01,02 02,03 03 03,..., fifteen 0*f*
- If ptxt aligns to blocks, pad with sixteen 10
- Vulnerable to padding oracle attack
- Increase the ciphertext size


#### Ciphertext stealing

- Extend the last block with bits from the previous ciphertext block, and then encrypts the resulting block.
- No increase in ctxt size
- Not vulnerable to padding oracle attack
- NIST has three implementation variants of the CBC-CS mode


Padding



• Encryption in CBC-CS



Decryption in CBC-CS




• Example: assume we are encrypting ptxt="ABCD", the block size is 3 bytes, IV=123, and the key is K.


ABC


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
ABC


D00





















QWE


**(** 















- In CTR mode, a cipher encrypts blocks composed of a counter and a nonce.
  - <u>Counter</u>: an integer incremented for each block.
    - Blocks in a message use different counters.
    - Different messages can use the same counter sequence (1, 2, 3, ...).
  - Nonce: a number used only once.
    - The same for all blocks in a single message.
    - No two messages should use the same nonce.
    - not secret.
- The encryption of Nonce | |CTR| is XORed with the plaintext.



• Nonces must be <u>unique</u>, but not necessarily random.

- To ensure uniqueness:
  - Some techniques include a timestamp within a random nonce.
  - Update the counter for every plaintext you encrypt.
- Advantage: faster than any mode.
  - More than parallelizable.
  - Start encrypting before knowing the message by picking a nonce and computing the stream that you'll later XOR with the plaintext.

#### Content

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Introduction

**Constructing Block Ciphers** 

**Modes of Operation** 



- AES is a symmetric block cipher.
  - Fixed block size, 128 bits.
  - Key size: 128 (most common), 192, 256 bits.
- It processes a 16-byte block as a 2D array.
- Transforms the bytes, rows, and columns to produce the final ciphertext






Figure 4-3: The internal state of AES viewed as a  $4 \times 4$  array of 16 bytes

- AES uses an SPN structure.
  - $\circ$  128-bit key  $\rightarrow$  10 rounds.
  - $\circ$  192-bit key  $\rightarrow$  12 rounds.
  - $\circ$  256-bit key  $\rightarrow$  14 rounds.
- Each round consists of:
  - SubBytes: Replaces each byte (s0, s1, . . . , s15)
     with another byte according to an S-box.
  - ShiftRows: shift the last three row cyclically a certain number of steps.
  - MixCols: a linear mixing operations on the columns of the state.
  - AddRoundKey: XORs a round key to the internal state.




- In a full-AES implementation:
  - We start by AddRoundKey with the ptxt
  - The last round does not include MixColumns.
- Substitution layers → SubBytes operations.
- Permutation layers → ShiftRows + MixColumns operations.



**KeyExpansion**: the key schedule algorithm.

- Takes the master 16-bytes key
- Creates the round keys.
  - Each subkey is 16 bytes.
- **Drawback**: given one of the round keys, an attacker can recover other round keys and the master key.
  - A single round key can be recovered through a side-channel attack.





#### **AddRoundKey**

Combine the key with the internal state.

XORs each byte from the key with a byte from the

internal state.







of AES

#### **SubBytes**

 Each byte in the state array is replaced with another byte using an 8-bit substitution box.






of AES

#### **ShiftRows**

 Cyclically shift the bytes in each row by a certain offset.








Figure 4-4: The internal operations of AES

#### **MixColumns**

• The four bytes of each column of the state are combined using an invertible linear transformation.



 $0 \leq j \leq 3$ 







Figure 4-4: The internal operations of AES

- Real-world implementation of AES is different from the algorithm.
- Fast AES software uses special techniques:



#### **Table- based implementations:**

- Instead of SubBytes-ShiftRows-MixColumns, use a hardcoded table.
  - The table is hardcoded into the program.
  - Loaded in memory during runtime.
  - Perform lookups to the table to transform a given byte.
- Vulnerable to cache-timing attacks.
  - Exploits timing variations when a program access elements in cache memory.
  - Timings leak information about which element was accessed, which in turn leaks information on the secrets involved.
  - Difficult to avoid.

#### **Table- based implementations:**

```
/* round 1: */

to = TeO[so >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & oxff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & oxff] ^ Te3[s3 & oxff] ^ rk[ 4];

t1 = TeO[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & oxff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & oxff] ^ Te3[s0 & oxff] ^ rk[ 5];

t2 = TeO[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & oxff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & oxff] ^ Te3[s1 & oxff] ^ rk[ 6];

t3 = TeO[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & oxff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & oxff] ^ Te3[s2 & oxff] ^ rk[ 7];

/* round 2: */

s0 = TeO[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & oxff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & oxff] ^ Te3[t3 & oxff] ^ rk[ 8];

s1 = TeO[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & oxff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & oxff] ^ Te3[t0 & oxff] ^ rk[ 9];

s2 = TeO[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & oxff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & oxff] ^ Te3[t1 & oxff] ^ rk[10];

s3 = TeO[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & oxff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & oxff] ^ Te3[t2 & oxff] ^ rk[11];

--snip--

Listing 4-2: The table-based C implementation of AES in OpenSSL
```

#### **Native implementation (AES-NI):**

Solve the problem of cache-timing attacks on AES software implementations.

• Example: AESENC instruction will execute a round on a given block.

○ 10X faster than software.

• Assuming xmm5 to xmm15 registers hold the subkeys, and xmm0 has ptxt block.

```
PXOR
                    %xmm0
           %xmm5,
AFSFNC
                    %xmm0
           %xmm6.
AESENC
           %xmm7,
                    %xmmO
AESENC
                    %xmmO
           %xmm8.
AESENC
                    %xmm0
           %xmm9,
AESENC
           %xmm10, %xmm0
AESENC
           %xmm11, %xmm0
           %xmm12, %xmm0
AESENC
AESENC
           %xmm13, %xmm0
AESENC
           %xmm14, %xmm0
AESENCLAST %xmm15, %xmm0
Listing 4-3: AES native instructions
```

• Implement AES using *pycryptodome* 

#### **TASK**

**Challenge:** You've been tasked with decrypting a flag encrypted with AES-128 in CBC mode. But, there's more to it than just AES. This isn't your typical AES encryption challenge. The secret flag has been encrypted using a weak AES key. The key is 16 bytes long, but the catch is that each byte of the key is identical, and it's derived from a random value.

- The ciphertext is shown below
- Hint: check the class's code for how a key was generated.

b'\xb5W\xae"k(u\x18\*"e\xf1\x98\x17\xa0\xe6\xc2\xd1\xf6\x98i\xa5[>\x02\xf1\xb6\xd5\x db;\xc4ZJ\xc0\xf1\xa0\x0b\*\xa5\xfej%\xb8\x1e\x07\xb3\x02\x16'