



IAEA

STUDY GUIDE

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**FIRE & FURY : THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR
DISARMAMENT IN IRAN & NORTH KOREA**

ROTMUN
MMXVIII



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ROTMUNKHI



Humza Nadeem Jami

Secretary General

Humza Nadeem Jami will be serving as the Secretary General for the Rotaract Model United Nations Conference 2018. Jami, as he likes to be known, is a graduate of the Lahore University of Management Sciences, where he was a senior member of the LUMUN Society's Secretariat and Travelling Model UN Team. Prior to this, he was a former Head Delegate at the Lyceum School's Debate Team, one of the powerhouses of the country.

As a member of the LUMUN Secretariat, Jami is famous for the most technologically innovative and immersive crisis experiences Pakistan has ever seen - having designed and chaired Harry Truman's National Security Council as part of the country's first ever Joint Crisis Cabinet (JCC) in 2016, and a Twitter integrated real time UN Security Council in 2017. As a part of the LUMUN Travelling Model UN Team, he reached the pinnacle of his career when he won a Diplomacy Award at the Harvard World Model UN Conference hosted in Panama City, Panama in March 2018 (as seen in the picture above).


Jami has been doing Model UN since January 2011, and cannot be more excited to welcome you to ROTMUN! He is an original graduate and a two time Best Delegate winner at the original Rotaract Model UN Conference that occurred between the years of 2010 and 2012, hosted by the Rotaract Public Speaking Forum.

His vision for the conference is simple: to bring the best and the absolute best of the country inside the halls of IBA City Campus for the most uniquely immersive delegate experience offered at any Model UN Conference in the country. He is inspired by the ROTMUNs of yore, where high levels of academic integrity and learning were the core of Model UN as an activity, which he finds an opportunity to revive this year. He will be flying in chairs from the best corners of the country to achieve this.

Jami feels Model UN has become an activity that has become very elitist, very exclusionary, and has lost its roots in intellectual political dialogue. All of that will return in due time at the 2018 edition of the Rotaract Model United Nations Conference under his leadership to foster Socratic dialogue using this activity.

He cannot wait to see you this October!





Uwais Parekh

Under Secretary General

Uwais graduated from Cedar College in 2018 and is currently in the midst of figuring stuff out in his gap year. Usually found in bed with a bag of Doritos while he goes hours into the night being engrossed with Video Games

Uwais served as the Head of the Model UN wing of Cedar Union, Cedar's Public Speaking & Debating Society in his last year where he captained the Model UN Team to multiple landmarks at conferences such as LUMUN, MUNIK & HUMUN.

He has also been a long serving member of the Destiny Model United Nations Society, having served as the Vice President & the Academic Curator for their annual Conference, apart from that Uwais somehow managed to garner an Experience of more than an acceptable amount of Public Speaking & Debating Events; be they Model UNs, Parliamentary Debates or Moot Courts, at the obvious expense of his GPA

Being an Immense Believer in the change that is only plausible through discourse and engagement with Ideas. Uwais absolutely cannot wait to give it his all to ensure that aspiring policy makers have the suitable environment to participate in dialogue that helps them explore the diplomat present within themselves in the Country's best emulation of the Chambers of the United Nations.





Maheen Naveed

Under Secretary General

Maheen is currently in her first year pursuing an MBBS degree at Ziauddin University but likes to spend her free time imagining all the possible, completely unrelated careers she can go into after she completes her MBBS. She is a graduate of the Lyceum School, where she was Head Delegate of the Debate Team and regards that time as one of her most cherished.

During her tenure as a member of the Lyceum's Debate Team, she has won awards at local and international conferences including LUMUN, ROTMUN, MUNIK and Harvard MUN; the former at which she was awarded a Best Delegate at UNSC and the latter at which she was awarded Honourable Mention twice.

She is looking forward to helping create a conference that is centred around the classic MUN values of energetic debate, impeccable policy making and above all, a return to the high standard of academic intellect and argumentation theory that is expected of delegates attending the hallowed halls of a ROTMUN conference.

She hopes that ROTMUN is the experience of a lifetime for its delegates, and wishes you the best of luck in October!





Yasir Thara

Committee Director

Presenting for the first time in Pakistan after a four year hiatus, is Yasir Thara. Yasir is a Petroleum Engineer by profession and a debater by passion since the age of 15. Having done his Bachelors from Middle East Technical University (METU) in Turkey, Yasir was part of the PAF Chapter Delegation that could back in 2013 and 2014 where he was a core part of the Team that managed to rank as the third Best Delegation at ZABMUN & MUNIK.

Yasir has scored multiple awards in the Pakistan circuit such as ZABMUN, ROTMUN, LUMUN & MUNIK. He capped off his Model UN Career in Pakistan by serving as the President for PAFMUN 2014. Once in Turkey he quickly founded the English Public Speaking Society at METU (NCC) and bagged an Outstanding Diplomacy Award at MUNTR in 2015. Continuing his dominance, he served as the Committee Director at notable conferences such as MUNTR 2016, KOCMUN 2015 and EUROSIMA 2015.

Yasir has a strong attachment to Mountain Dew and would not mind his delegates lending him a hand there, but at the same time they should expect no mercy when he challenges them to a dance off in the entertainment sessions.





Asra Shaikh Committee Director

Asra Shaikh is pursuing her law degree from the University of London, where she hopes to one day become a human rights lawyer working for women rights. She has been part of various conferences since 2014, and represented the Lyceum Debate Team at both national and international conferences, where she won awards at ROTMUN, MUNIK and LUMUN.

Most recently, she was a delegate at Harvard Model United Nations in Boston, where she won an Outstanding Diplomacy Award in the United Nations High Commission for Refugees.

Asra's advice to the delegates of the International Atomic Energy Agency is to be well versed with the topic and to go the extra mile to engage in diplomacy. She hopes that this committee is an enriching experience for all it's delegates



Introduction

The beginning of international nuclear regulation can be traced back to American President Dwight Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" speech at the United Nations on 8 December 1953. Emphasizing the need for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in his speech, President Eisenhower also called for the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. In addition, he strongly urged the United Nations to develop a way to monitor nuclear technology and keep all member countries in line with an international nuclear standard established by the UN. This speech was the catalyst for the formation of the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), a specialized agency within the United Nations with a very specific purpose, to control and regulate nuclear technology.

Because of the recognition in the early 1950s that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to stop the spread of nuclear technology, the IAEA was called to regulate the results of the spread of nuclear knowledge and to push for collaboration among nuclear nations. The IAEA was not intended to be an agency that restricted knowledge flow, but rather one that encouraged it.

The United Kingdom took the lead in drafting a statute for what would become the IAEA. This statue was presented to the United States in December 1954, and it called for the IAEA to be very similar to a trade organization, with the ability to exchange nuclear materials with member countries and to regulate the nuclear activities of its member countries. In July 1955, after seeing the initial drafts of the statute, the Soviet Union ended its opposition to the agency and joined the IAEA negotiations. With the consensus of both superpowers, the UN hosted the First Geneva Conference in August 1955. During this conference, global scientific and diplomatic leaders showed great international enthusiasm for the creation of the IAEA.

The final statute empowered the IAEA to "provide materials, services, equipment and facilities for research and development, and for practical applications of atomic energy," "establish and apply safeguards to ensure that any nuclear assistance or supplies with which the IAEA was associated should not be used to further any military purposes," and "establish or adopt nuclear safety standards."

Statement of the Problem

The accumulated threat posed by the estimated 27,000 nuclear weapons in the United States, Russia, and the other Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear weapons states, merits worldwide concern. It is common to divide the process of proliferation of nuclear weapons into three waves of increasing level of threat. The first one, consisting of the United Kingdom, France, and China is often considered tolerable as the original group of five nuclear weapon including the United and Russia, is characterized by stable political systems. According to this view, the second wave was already undesirable, because nuclear weapons were acquired by India, Pakistan and, probably, Israel – countries that claim that they are seriously endangered by terrorist acts and which might find it difficult to effectively protect their arsenals. These states could not be held responsible for violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty because they had never been parties to it. The third wave of proliferation, which included Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea is commonly seen as a



mortal danger and has met with a much more forceful reaction by the international community. In addition to these, any country that currently possesses nuclear enrichment facilities is technically able to produce materials that could be used in the production of weapons if intercepted by terrorists – this issue concerns for example Japan and Brazil. Ultimately, while existing nuclear arsenals and stockpiles of fissile material represent the most immediate concern, the spread of nuclear weapons and material has increased the probability of terrorists acquiring or constructing a nuclear device.

Nuclear Disarmament remains elusive for the international community. The establishment of a legal framework set out to ensure disarmament, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, has not resulted in disarmament. There are still Member States who are not signatories to the former Treaty and, furthermore, there are Member States who appear unwilling to make concrete steps towards actual nuclear disarmament. This particular topic has become more and more prevalent with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's recent actions in 2016-17. It has been obvious during the last year that North Korea has consistently disregarded any effort by the United Nations and the Member States more involved in the Six Party Talks, to reach a peaceful resolution of the issue. Instead, tensions have continued to rise between the DPRK and the United States of America – a fact that has increased the regional tensions within the Korean Peninsula.

Nevertheless, mainly due to humanitarian initiatives which evolve the discourse on nuclear disarmament, a growing number of non-nuclear armed states, international organizations and civil society groups argue against the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament, given that the progressively increasing steps that have been taken over the past twenty years, have not been implemented. In this respect, in 2016, the Open-Ended Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament (as the result of the A/RES/70/33) was involved in forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, serving the purpose of addressing concrete, effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that need to be concluded, in order to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.

The world today faces more challenges in the area of nuclear disarmament, specific to the regulation of testing, and the turbulent political attitudes towards the Iran Nuclear Deal and North Korea's persistent testing. Therefore, a new review of international nuclear policy and requirements must begin with a realistic assessment of the security environment and the challenges it poses.

North Korea openly defies UN resolutions and international sanctions with provocative military behavior and threatening rhetoric, including nuclear threats. North Korea's continued development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles—linked to its overarching goals of regime preservation and unifying the Korean peninsula under its control—place the regime in fundamental opposition to most of the international community. Under the solidified leadership of Kim Jong Un, North Korea's nuclear forces appear to be increasing both in quantity and quality. The DPRK has tested a nuclear device five times in recent years and, while open estimates vary, the country may have enough fissile material to produce 50–100 weapons by 2020. It also remains committed to developing long-range missiles capable of reaching US territory.



Despite the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran retains the potential to become a nuclear power in relatively short order. The JCPOA does not limit potential nuclear delivery vehicles such as missiles, and Iran reportedly continues to invest heavily in their development. Its recent satellite launches suggest that long-range missile development remains part of these efforts as well. Technology sharing between North Korea and Iran is also of great concern.

A great deal of analysis is still needed to assess whether and how reductions could be managed to the point that no nuclear-armed state has more than a minimum deterrent. For even further reductions to occur, the process would necessarily have to be multilateral, including China, India, and Pakistan. While China and other states have indicated that they would potentially be willing to enter into negotiations once the United States and Russia reduce their arsenals, they have not specified at what level of forces this might conceivably take place.

The Iran Nuclear Deal

Although Iran does possess nuclear capabilities, Iran's leadership has repeatedly denied the country is building a bomb and says weapons of mass destruction are forbidden under Islam. In the 1980's and 1990's Iran actively pursued a policy of procuring foreign suppliers of nuclear technology. In 1985, with French assistance, Iran completed laboratory-scale uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities at Isfahan. Most significantly, the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) initiated fuel-cycle research at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre in the mid-1980s, and began to purchase designs and components for uranium enrichment from the A.Q. Khan network, based in Pakistan. The Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and the international community's failure to respond to it, may have triggered a renewed interest among the Iranian leadership in the country's nuclear program and the country began to actively lobby for foreign suppliers and technical advice. In early 1995, a Russian firm signed a contract with the AEOI to complete the Bushehr plant, which was intended as only the initial step for Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation. China also became a principal supplier for Tehran. In the early 1990s, China agreed to provide Iran with research reactors, laser enrichment equipment, and an industrial-scale uranium conversion facility (UCF), as well as uranium fluorides and oxide. It was during this time that the United States of America stepped up its diplomatic initiative to put pressure on potential suppliers.

Under pressure from the IAEA and the West, Tehran struck a deal with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the "E-3") in October 2003 to sign the Additional Protocol (AP) to the NPT, which provided for expanded safeguards and inspections by the IAEA. Iran also agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment activities and to be forthcoming about its past nuclear efforts. In return, the E-3 agreed to enter into negotiations with Iran. The E-3 negotiating position was to offer a package of positive inducements that included security guarantees, assistance with civilian nuclear technology, and the lifting of economic sanctions. In return, Iran would need to give up its enrichment program, stick to an enhanced IAEA inspections and safeguards regime, and answer outstanding questions about past behaviour. The deal broke down however when The E-3 (and the United States) insisted that any deal include the full cessation of uranium enrichment. The Iranians insisted that their nuclear program was peaceful, and vowed never to



give up the fuel cycle, arguing they had a "right" to an enrichment program. On July 14 2015, after over a decade of failed negotiations and sanctions, a deal was reached on Iran's nuclear program called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The deal significantly reduces the number of Iranian centrifuges by two-thirds, places bans on enrichment at key facilities, and limits uranium research and development to the Natanz facility. In return, Iran could challenge inspections of suspect sites and delay access for a matter of weeks; would receive an estimated 100 billion dollars in frozen oil-sale assets; and would have all nuclear-related, multilateral sanctions on the country lifted (likely within a matter of months), along with the embargo on conventional arms within five years and restrictions on Iranian missile-technology acquisition within eight years.

Under the Trump administration however, any progress made in nuclear disarmament in Iran threatens to fall apart. On May 8, 2018 - Trump announced that the United States will withdraw from the JCPOA, and will be imposing "the highest level of economic sanction" against Iran. In Tehran, Rouhani countered by saying that Iran will take a few weeks to decide how to respond to the US withdrawal, but that he has ordered the country's "atomic industry organization" to be prepared to "start our industrial enrichment without limitations."

At present, there is no pressing evidence to suggest that Iran is stockpiling nuclear weapons. As one of it's main nuclear facilities, Nantanz, is under IAEA inspections, it is unlikely that Iran would invest in constructing a secret facility for the enrichment of HEU; first, it would be difficult for Iran to do this without detection, and it would also be difficult for it to mount such a large-scale expansion of its centrifuge program.

Nuclear Disarmament in North Korea

North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, as with others like Pakistan, is based on the classical concept of nuclear deterrence whereby an inferior power could deter a more powerful adversary by virtue of the threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the country needs money to prop-up its sagging economy and one of the lucrative options could be selling nuclear weapons or related materials and technology to both state and non-state actors. There has been substantive evidence in the past of Pyongyang's gradually escalating nuclear threats during a crisis by testing nuclear weapons in 2006, 2009, 2013 and most recently, an alleged hydrogen bomb in 2016, showing that nuclear disarmament efforts in the country have been significantly hampered by the unpredictable nature of it's leadership.

In order to analyse the future of nuclear disarmament in North Korea, and in Iran for that matter, one must cultivate an understanding of what motivated the country to start a nuclear program, and their reasons for non-compliance with disarmament treaties. In the case of North Korea, the reasons can be broadly categorised as security, economic and political concerns.

First and foremost, it was security concerns that prompted the North Korean leadership to develop nuclear weapons technology. The Korean War had ended but there is still a tense standoff along the 150-mile demilitarised zone. Additionally, the US has heightened this security concern by posing a nuclear




threat and engaging in Team Spirit military manoeuvres. A concession to offer in this case would be that the US offer a commitment that it would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea, a suspension of the Team Spirit exercises as a show of confidence, and unilateral commitment by South Korea that it would not seek to acquire an offensive military superiority over the North. However, in light of the unpredictable nature of the politics that govern North Korea, such concessions are unlikely unless North Korea offers the olive branch.

Second, North Korea wanted to establish a secure energy source and a nuclear energy program offered such a possibility. Large scale economic assistance was offered in the Agreed Framework, which froze and suggested replacement of North Korea's nuclear power plant program with light water reactor power plants, which were more resistant to proliferation. The Framework broke down in 2003 due to disagreement on the scope and implementation of the agreement.

Third, it can be hypothesised that North Korea wanted political normalization. Its nuclear program allowed it to stand shoulder to shoulder with more powerful nations and gave the Kim regime legitimacy as a significant regional power. However, negotiations as well as diplomatic recognition by the US lent the country credibility on an international stage.

Figure 1 The Treaty Compliance Ladder, Illustrating the Progression of Steps Typically Taken by the International Community to Ensure Compliance with a Treaty



Under the Trump administration, relations between North Korea and the US, and North Korea and South Korea have seen tumultuous developments. Where late October saw an exchange of threats between both countries and renewed North Korean testing of ICBM's and its most powerful nuclear bomb to date, June of 2018 saw Trump and Kim Jong-un meet at a Singapore summit; the first ever meeting between a sitting US president and a North Korean leader and they The pair signed a document pledging to establish new relations, work towards "complete denuclearisation" and to build a lasting peace on the peninsula. Although the details of the agreement are vague, with no timeline or framework, North Korea has suspended its controversial missile testing, and Kim Jong-un promised to dismantle North Korea's main missile testing and launching site, and said he could decommission the main nuclear test site, if the US took some reciprocal action. North Korea has also extended a hand of friendship to South Korea, and the President of South Korea, Moon Jae-in, became the first South Korean leader to visit the North in a decade. While these renewed relations bode well for the current climate of disarmament, unless a proper framework and timeline is established we cannot move forward.

Past UN Actions

Neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council has never passed a resolution specifically on a nuclear-free Middle East. However, the Council has passed several resolutions on subsets of the topic. On the issue of Iran's nuclear programme, two resolutions circulated by the Western bloc in 2010 have yet to be formally adopted on the SC. However, Resolution 1835 (2008), reaffirmed earlier resolutions and called for a negotiated solution to the issue. Those earlier resolutions were 1803 (2008) and 1747 (2007). 1803 called for a suspension of the Iranian enrichment programme, outlining steps such as closer vigilance of financial transactions such as capital flows into Iran, cargo inspections of air traffic into and out of Iran, and restraints on trade with Iran. 1747 banned the export of military equipment to Iran, reaffirmed earlier calls for negotiations with Iran and added to an ongoing list of organizations, such as Iran's Revolutionary Guard, involved in ballistic activity.

While the SC has not yet committed to a nuclear-free Middle East, the UN General Assembly did exactly this in 1996, with Resolution 51/41: this called for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region. This resolution is essential reading for our committee, as it provides a framework for a potential agreement, even as it was written before the advent of Iran's nuclear programme. However, the resolution of 1996 was ultimately ineffective and did not go far enough. It made no reference to any specific nation. The GA has reaffirmed this decision several times subsequently, most recently in Resolution 66/25, adopted in 2011. But this committee must go further: to commit to the principle of a Nuclear-Free Middle East is not sufficient without the recommendation of actual practical steps to achieve that goal, something all organs of the UN have failed to do up to this point.

Delegates must know the provisions of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The original deal involved a resolution by non-nuclear weapon states not to pursue military nuclear program, and a commitment by the five nuclear states – USA, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China – to conduct nuclear disarmament. All parties also agreed to share nuclear technologies between themselves to facilitate



non-military uses of nuclear power. Further provisions ensured that parties to the agreement entered into safeguard commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency and promised to exercise control over their nuclear-related exports: the Safeguards Agreement. At present, only four countries in the world are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty: India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan.

Despite its wide international appeal, the Non-Proliferation Treaty suffers from four general groups of problems that hinder its proper role. In fact, the NPT is the weakest of all international agreements concerning weapons of mass destruction in regards to its provisions about implementation. The first group relates to the failure to make progress towards nuclear disarmament by the nuclear- weapons states. Nuclear tests were still conducted by the five powers for at least another 20 years after the NPT was adopted, and presently all five states still maintain their nuclear arsenals and continue to develop new nuclear weapons. The second set of problems concerns the many breaches of the treaty by the originally non-nuclear states, such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Iran that were not faced with any strong consequences, which created the risk of inducing a domino effect. Thirdly, the example of North Korea illustrates the lack of response measures to a country's withdrawal as a party to the treaty. The only provision to address such cases was included in Chapter 2, which states that any notice of withdrawal must be brought to the attention of all other parties and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which will determine whether the planned withdrawal constitutes a threat to the world peace and the appropriate international response that should be adopted. If the UNSC fails to respond in a strong enough manner, it may encourage others to follow suit and also withdraw from the NPT. Finally, the last problem is of entirely technical nature – the lack of any provision for a standing secretariat of the Treaty to assist the parties in implementing the treaty has proven ineffective. At least one reform to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be easy to conduct – its states parties should establish a standing secretariat to handle administrative matters, organize the treaty's review conferences and their preparatory committee sessions, as well as other meetings to consider cases of possible non- compliance or withdrawal.

Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

- On the question of Iran's nuclear program, what can be done by the UN, beyond inspections of verified and known nuclear power plants, in order to keep a check on such facilities in Iran? What measures can be taken to prevent Israel unilaterally striking against Iran's nuclear facilities?
- How can the role and impact of IAEA be strengthened? What measures in legislature can the UN take to enforce nuclear disarmament, including inspections of both civil and military nuclear facilities?
- Would the incentive of a nuclear-free Middle-East be a more effective approach to nuclear disarmament in Iran?
- What is the importance of civilian nuclear energy and how is it related to potential nuclear weapons?
- What lasting frameworks can be implemented to disarm Iran and North Korea's nuclear weapons?
- To what extent does North Korea pose a nuclear threat to the global community?
- Should the committee consider alternatives to complete nuclear disarmament? For example, is a framework for managing reductions to the point that no nuclear-armed state has more than a minimum deterrent feasible? Should the process be multilateral, or enforced by the UN?



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Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=future&searchText=of&searchText=nuclear&searchText=disarmament&searchText=in&searchText=iran&searchText=and&searchText=north&searchText=korea&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3Fwc%3Don%26amp%3Bgroup%3Dnone%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff%26amp%3BQuery%3Dfuture%2Bof%2Bnuclear%2Bdisarmament%2Bin%2Biran%2Band%2Bnorth%2Bkorea%26amp%3Bac%3Don&refreqid=search%3A44fa5c58621a71d93babdf65e151428f&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

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