

University of Cologne Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences

Chair for International Politics and Foreign Policy

Between Muddling Through and Grand Design: German Foreign and Security Policy in the
Strategic Competition of the 21st Century



Term Paper

(Approx. 3000 words excl. titles, appendices and bibliography)

***From Ancient to Digital Silk Road: Turkey's Strategic Hedging Between China's Digital
Influence and NATO Commitments***

Winter Semester 2024/2025

Course Instructor: Patrick Benedict Kessler

Presented by Ömer Faruk Durmuş, 5th Semester, Master Subject

Matriculation Number: 7406414

odurmus1@smail.uni-koeln.de

Cologne, 14.02.2025

1. Introduction

The growing influence of the People's Republic of China in a multipolar world order, ruled by its unique polity under Xi Jinping, is no longer a surprising phenomenon. A milestone in China's *national rejuvenation* is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) announced in 2013. Despite its massive real-world investments, the BRI's geopolitical connectivity extends beyond land and maritime networks (BRI Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan, 2017; Cheng & Zeng, 2024a; Goldstein, 2020a; Omprasad, 2024; Yeung, 2024).

A strategically important yet understudied component of BRI is the Digital Silk Road (*shuzi sichou zhilu*) (S. Erie & Thomas Streinz, 2021). Initially announced as *Information Silk Road*, it was introduced in the National Development and Reform Commission's 2015 report (Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, 2017; Patil & Gupta, 2024). DSR is often regarded as a virtual pathway for exporting China's technology through leading telecommunication and e-commerce providers such as Huawei, Alibaba, ZTE, and others (Duprey & Kassenova, 2021). For some analysts, it is a geo-strategic initiative that aims to establish a global digital ecosystem ruled by China (E. Hillman, 2021). Therefore, China's rise in global digital influence raises concerns for both state and private actors, particularly on both sides of the Atlantic, and regional powers following a Multi-Vector Foreign Policy between the East and the West such as India and Turkey (CISA, n.d.; Reuters, 2024).

Turkey, one of the key partners in the BRI's "Middle Corridor", joined the DSR in 2017, and increasingly engaged with the initiative through several digital infrastructure projects (Yilmaz, 2022b). While maintaining economic and security ties with the West, the current Turkish government has also increased economic and diplomatic relations with China. (Belt and Road Portal, 2021; Kutlay & Öniş, 2021) However, Turkey's increasing dependency on China in Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is likely to raise concerns about its national security as well as NATO alliance's cybersecurity principals (NATO Press Release, 2021; Park, 2024; Strategic Comments, 2021).

The research on China's digital expansionism often focuses on its implications for specific regions, such as the Indo-Pacific or Europe, or the strategic interests of much bigger shareholders in the international system (Lewis, 2023; S. Eder et al., 2019). Furthermore, Turkey's engagement with Chinese digital infrastructure projects in the context of foreign policy and its compliance with NATO security standards has received little or no academic

attention. Therefore, this study addresses these gaps by investigating: **1) To what extent do Turkey's strategic digital infrastructure investments, particularly in 5G networks and e-commerce, received from China since 2017 under the Digital Silk Road initiative, align with Turkey's national cybersecurity policies? 2) How does Turkey implement strategic hedging between participating in the Digital Silk Road initiative and its NATO security commitments?**

This empirical study employs a qualitative case study approach in conjunction with process tracing. The research design follows a Y-centered framework, taking strategic hedging of the Turkey at its center. To further enhance the analysis, a variety of qualitative and quantitative data sources have been incorporated, including journal articles, official and private company documents and reports, media reviews, investment volumes, trade flows, and statistical analyses.

The study begins with a literature review identifying research gaps and establishes connections between the DSR investments as part of its Grand Strategy and Turkey's role in the initiative as an emerging regional actor with strong ties to NATO. The next section dives into conceptual discussion and explores the concepts of Grand Strategy and Strategic Hedging. The final section provides a detailed presentation of the research design, methodology, operationalization and data sources used in the analysis.

2. Literature review

2.1 Digital Silk Road: China's Strategic Expansion and Security Concerns

Scholars argue that China's endeavor to construct a digital ecosystem aligns with its broader ambitious foreign policy agenda (Article 19, 2024; Eldem, 2020; Lewis, 2023; Nouwens, 2021a; Omprasad, 2024). Moreover, the Digital Silk Road (DSR) is considered an important element of this agenda, aiming to extend China's global influence, particularly in developing nations (Patil & Gupta, 2024; Reddy, 2023; S. Eder et al., 2019; S. Erie & Thomas Streinz, 2021). In this regard, China has signed memorandums of understanding (MOUs) to extend the scope of the initiative and strengthen cooperation in the construction of the Digital Silk Road with 16 countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Hungary, and the Republic of Korea (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.; Nouwens, 2021a; Yilmaz, 2022b).

Despite the ongoing dispute about the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leading private tech companies, the DSR participators have received substantial support from the Chinese government allowing them to extend their reach across continents. This also evidenced in China's national cybersecurity law which lays the foundation of the unquestionable and mutual national interests in global digital competition (Article 19, 2024; Gürel & Kozluca, 2022; Mutlu, 2023; Nouwens, 2021a). On this account, companies such as Huawei, Alibaba, ZTE, and Tencent have been instrumental in developing digital infrastructure, advancing artificial intelligence, and establishing new norms in cyber governance across more than 137 countries (Greene, 2020; Nouwens, 2021b; Reddy, 2023).

2.2 Turkey's Engagement in the Digital Silk Road

Turkey's participation in the DSR stems from the country's quest for growth and technological modernization, as well as to alleviate the economic crisis which the country grappling with since 2018 (Eldem, 2020; İltir, 2024; Kutlay & Öniş, 2021; Silk Road Fund, 2023; Ülgen & Umarov, 2024; Uluyol, 2024). In 2017, Turkey formalized its commitment by signing the Belt and Road Digital Economy International Cooperation Initiative and begun to integrate its digital infrastructure with Chinese-led projects (Yilmaz, 2022b). By 2025, more than 1,300 Chinese companies including digital infrastructure and technology sectors operate in Turkey, with total investment volume reaching nearly \$6 billion (Guliyev, 2024). One of the most prominent examples is e-commerce giant Alibaba's acquisition of an 86.5% stake spending nearly \$2 billion in Turkey's largest e-commerce company, Trendyol (Reuters, 2021; Yilmaz, 2022a). Turkish companies, notably Turkcell and Turk Telekom, have also formed partnerships with Chinese tech giants such as Huawei — as evidenced by their collaboration on 5G infrastructure and smart city initiatives in 2018 — and these partnerships are seen by the government as catalysts for economic dynamism and digital innovation (Huawei, 2024; Presidency of Republic of Türkiye Investment Office, 2011).

2.3 NATO Cybersecurity Pledge and National Cybersecurity in Turkey

In today's changing international conjuncture, Turkey appears as a regional military power and maintains its important role in the NATO alliance (Dal & Kursun, 2016; Parlar Dal & Dipama, 2024). At the national level, Turkey has been experiencing a rapid digital transformation in recent years (Digital Transformation Office, 2024; Ministry of Transport

and Infrastructure of Turkey, 2024). Many coordinated projects are being carried out in the public, private, and military sectors, significant investments are being made by important defense industry organizations, cyber security institutes are being established in the academic field, and new products and technologies are being developed with national capabilities (Halisdemir, 2021). As a result of these efforts, Turkey has recently become one of the most successful countries in the field of cybersecurity (Eldem, 2020; Halisdemir, 2021; UN ITU, n.d.) .

As a NATO member, Turkey is responsible for strengthening its national defense capabilities under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. NATO emphasizes information sharing, real-time threat reporting, rapid response teams, and regular cyber defense exercises to create a secure and predictable cyberspace while helping member states enhance their cybersecurity (NATO, 1949). The Cyber Defence Commitment and Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence reinforce the idea that each member must protect its national infrastructure, following the principle of turning weak links into strong ones (NATO Press, 2016; NATO Press Release, 2021; Strategic Comments, 2021). This puts Turkey in a delicate position—on one hand, it must strengthen its cyber defenses in line with NATO’s collective security framework, while on the other, it must navigate the economic benefits and risks posed by China's expanding digital influence to maintain its autonomy.

2.4 Research Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research

This study contributes to the literature by examining how Turkey uses strategic hedging to capture economic and technological opportunities while ensuring its national security. By integrating the economic, technological and security dimensions of China's digital investments, the research provides a unified framework that clarifies the role of strategic hedging in digital transformation and cyber risk management, deepening our understanding of how middle powers drive competing priorities in a multipolar world. The findings also provide guidance to policymakers on reconciling economic benefits and cybersecurity challenges, particularly in the context of NATO alliances, and offer actionable recommendations for mitigating the risks associated with China's digital expansion.

As with most research on China, this research faces limitations due to the scarcity of objective, accurate and accessible data, information pollution and difficulties in obtaining

hard data on BRI and DSR initiatives. In addition, some data is restricted for national security reasons and requires special permission. To mitigate these challenges, the researcher contacted the relevant Turkish institutions directly to obtain the necessary information.

Lastly, how Turkey's cybersecurity policy will evolve under Chinese digital expansion and the long-term geopolitical consequences of Turkey's digital hedging remains to be seen. Therefore, further research is needed to explore these areas and provide a more comprehensive understanding of Turkey's position within the evolving global digital landscape.

3. Theoretical/Conceptual Framework

3.1 Grand Strategy

In the Chinese context, grand strategy involves comprehensive blueprint policies that integrate economic growth, technological innovation and military modernization (Goldstein, 2020b). Scholars argue that China's grand strategy is unique in its nature as it is built on nationalism and regime's political security (Goldstein, 2020c; Omprasad, 2024). Another important aspect of China's Grand strategy is that it has evolved chronologically. For instance, Deng Xiaoping's admonition of **"hide its capabilities and bide its time"** has replaced by **"Chinese dream"** or **"rejuvenation"** by Xi Jinping (Dunst, 2021; Goldstein, 2020b).

Despite the assertions of certain scholars who contend that the Digital Silk Road does not constitute a unilateral imposition of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agenda to advance Beijing's geopolitical objectives, it is mostly considered as the digital manifestation of China's Grand strategy (Cheng & Zeng, 2024b; Omprasad, 2024). Through the DSR, China aims not only to expand its economic and technological capacity, but also to shape international digital governance standards (Article 19, 2024; Cheney, 2019; Cheng & Zeng, 2024b; Duprey & Kassenova, 2021; Greene, 2020; Mutlu, 2023; Omprasad, 2024; S. Erie & Thomas Streinz, 2021).

3.2 Strategic Hedging

The concept of strategic hedging has emerged in the post-Cold War era, as theories of international relations were not sufficient to explain the picture that emerged from the international climate of the time (Ciorciari, 2019; Kuik, 2021a; Shlykov, 2023). This concept

is often contrasted with the concepts of **balancing** and **bandwagoning** (Schweller, 1994, 2016; Waltz, 1993). Both strategies seem to require states to choose one great power over another. Therefore, strategic hedging emerges as a mixture of both balancing and bandwagoning approaches (Dersan Orhan, 2023; Kara, 2023; Kuik, 2021b).

The bandwagoning elements of a hedging strategy include a number of measures designed to “**maximize returns**”. These measures include economic pragmatism meaning that trading with the threatening power, *biding engagement* which implies interacting with the threatening power through institutional platforms, and *limited bandwagoning*, aligning with the threatening power on specific issues (Kara, 2023; Kuik, 2021a).

However, states also simultaneously take balancing measures to avoid becoming overly dependent on a rising or threatening power. In this framework, three main balancing methods stand out within the “**risk control**” strategy (Cheng-Chwee, 2008; Kara, 2023). *Economic diversification* aims to reduce dependence on a single power by cooperating with different trading partners. *Denial of dominance* seeks to balance their influence in the region through political cooperation with more friendly great powers. Indirect balancing involves internal and external security measures, with states balancing internally by strengthening their own defense capacity and externally by strengthening security relations with friendly countries and regional actors. *The return-maximizing* policies of hedging strategies allow middle powers to maximize a range of economic and political returns vis-à-vis China and Russia (Chaziza, 2018; Cheng-Chwee, 2008; Kuik, 2021a; Shlykov, 2023). However, these policies can also increase the risks of becoming dependent and losing autonomy.

In this context, Turkey is turning its face to the East without provoking the West, which is an important element of the security alliance. As a result, it is developing its economic, military and diplomatic relations with China, although not as much as Russia (Daskin & Yar, 2022). An important part of this is the Digital Silk Road and the investments it has received within this scope. Therefore, this study adopts the definition of strategic hedging as Kuik put an “insurance-seeking behavior” to uncertainties in power concentration trends (Kuik, 2021b).

Drawing upon these, this study suggests the following hypotheses:

- 1- China is expanding its technological footprint in Turkey through Digital Silk Road investments reflecting its broader desire for geopolitical influence.**

- 2- Turkey is adopting a strategic hedging to reduce dependency in the West by deepening its economic cooperation with China through Digital Silk Road investments.
- 3- China's digital investments offers technological and economic progress, as well as cybersecurity threats. Turkey mitigates these risks by investing cybersecurity, establishing effective institutions, investing in research and development and abiding NATO's cybersecurity standards.

4. Methodological framework

4.1 Research Design


This empirical thesis adopts a qualitative approach to provide a comprehensive analysis of Turkey's strategic hedging between East and West (Tzagkarakis & Kritas, 2023). The research design of the study is framed to be Y-centered (see *Figure 1* for further details). The study examines Turkey's unique geopolitical and economic position through a case study as well as following a process to map how Chinese investments intersect with Turkey's national security priorities (Klotz & Prakash, 2009). As a supporting methodology, the study analyzes quantitative data on Chinese investments, trade flows and digital infrastructure projects to measure Turkey's economic dependence on China and its diversification efforts. Variables of interests in this study follows as:

Dependent Variable: Turkey's Strategic Hedging between the West and China.

Independent Variables:

- 1- Turkey's Economic Conditions.
- 2- China's Digital Silk Road investments in TurkeyX
- 3- Western Threat Assessment towards China.

Figure 1: Casual Diagram



Sources: Canva. (2025). Causal Diagram [Figure]. URL: <https://www.canva.com>

Figure 1 summarizes the factors shaping Turkey's strategic balance between the US and China in the digital age. Global US-China rivalry is fueling China's Digital Silk Road investments in many countries in the Asia, including Turkey, which are further encouraged by Turkey's economic challenges and growing disconnect with the West. However, Turkey's longstanding alliance with the West and its rules-based digital governance, constrain full cooperation with China. As a result, Turkey pursues a policy of strategic hedging, balancing its relations with both global leaders.

Focusing solely on China's Digital Silk Road investments in Turkey, and relating it to China's Grand Strategy, may result in a weak analysis as the research try to explain China's Grand Strategy over a single country. For this reason, a second research question regarding Turkey's NATO commitments have incorporated. In this way, the direction of the research was determined as Y-centered and methodological and conceptual confusions were tried to be eliminated.

4.2 Case selection

Turkey's location in Anatolia, often called a *natural bridge* has positioned it as a crucial link between the East and West (Çelik, 2020). This strategic role, once exemplified by Turkey's position along the historic Silk Road continues to shape its geopolitical importance today (Çelik, 2020; Hussain, 2021). As a NATO member and a nation deepening its cooperation with Russia and China, Turkey finds itself at the crossroads of competing geopolitical agendas (Kutlay & Öniş, 2021; Uluyol, 2024; Yilmaz, 2022a).

Turkey is seeking a position of autonomy in an increasingly polarized world and plays an active and important role in regional balance. Therefore, with its growing economic relations

with China and Russia, Turkey is highly relevant to be considered in the economy, foreign policy, and cyber security equation.

4.3 Method

The study examines Turkey's unique geopolitical and economic position through a case study as well as following a process to map how Chinese investments intersect with Turkey's national security priorities (Klotz & Prakash, 2009). As a supporting methodology, the study analyzes quantitative data on Chinese investments, trade flows and digital infrastructure projects to measure Turkey's economic dependence on China and its diversification efforts.

A case study is a research method that allows for a detailed examination of a specific case (in this case, Turkey's geopolitical and economic situation). This research method is ideally suited to identify, describe and analyze the interaction between China's digital investments and Turkey's national security priorities. Process tracing complements this by systematically mapping the causal mechanisms and sequences of events that link these investments to policy outcomes, thus providing a clear view of how Turkey's strategic hedging took place and evolved.

4.4 Operationalization

In the Turkish context, strategic hedging is operationalized by assessing two key dimensions. First, the economic dimension is measured by quantifying Turkey's digital investments and trade flows with China, such as the volume of Chinese-funded projects, the number of joint ventures in the digital sector, and the proportion of total digital infrastructure investments attributed to Chinese capital. Second, the security dimension is addressed through qualitative indicators, including content analysis of policy documents, official statements and diplomatic communications that reflect Turkey's efforts to maintain compliance with NATO's cybersecurity standards while engaging with China.

Process tracing is used to chronologically map key policy decisions, reforms and diplomatic actions that demonstrate Turkey's balance between Western security commitments and economic opportunities from China. Together, these metrics provide a comprehensive and multidimensional assessment of how Turkey operationalizes strategic hedging in its foreign policy and economic strategies.

4.5 Data

This study uses a wide range of primary and secondary data to develop the analysis. Primary data include Turkish government publications, laws, and institutional reports from ministries such as Transportation, Technology, Foreign Affairs and Trade, as well as data from the Turkish Statistical Institute and the Digital Transformation Office. Additional data obtained from Parliamentary Minutes, the Official Gazette, NATO policy statements and China's official correspondence. Secondary data is obtained from academic literature on Turkey-China relations through databases such as Google Scholar, JSTOR and University Digital Libraries, as well as international think tanks such as Pew Research Center, Carnegie Endowment, Mercator Institute, Chatham House and CSIS. Quantitative information was obtained from trade and investment databases such as the UN Cyber Security Index, World Bank, OECD and OEC World (The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure, n.d.; Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), n.d.; UN ITU, 2020).

Bibliography

- Article 19. (2024). The Digital Silk Road: China and the Rise of Digital Repression in the Indo-Pacific. *Article 19*, 16–17.
- Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. (2017). *Vision and actions on jointly building Belt and Road*. 2. <http://2017.beltandroadforum.org/english/n100/2017/0410/c22-45.html>
- Belt and Road Portal. (2021, September 17). Turkey, China create win-win partnership within BRI framework, experts say. *Belt and Road Portal*, 1.
- BRI Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan. (2017). *The Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan* (p. 2). Belt and Road Portal. <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/13392.html>
- Çelik, S. (2020). Turkey's Geopolitical Position Today/Günümüzde Türkiye'nin Geopolitik Konumu. *The Journal of International Social Research*, 13(74), 202–203.
- Chaziza, M. (2018). Israel–China Relations Enter a New Stage: Limited Strategic Hedging. *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, 5(1), 31–32. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2347798917744293>

- Cheney, C. (2019). China's Digital Silk Road: Strategic Technological Competition and Exporting Political Illiberalism. *Pacific Forum*, 19, 2.
- Cheng, J., & Zeng, J. (2024a). "Digital Silk Road" as a Slogan Instead of a Grand Strategy. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 33(149), 823–838.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2023.2222269>
- Cheng, J., & Zeng, J. (2024b). "Digital Silk Road" as a Slogan Instead of a Grand Strategy. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 33(149), 832–834.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2023.2222269>
- Cheng-Chwee, K. (2008). The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 30(2), 160–165. JSTOR.
- Ciorciari, J. D. (2019). The variable effectiveness of hedging strategies. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 19(3), 368. <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz007>
- CISA. (n.d.). *People's Republic of China Cyber Threat*. <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/nation-state-cyber-actors/china>
- Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). *Assessing China's Digital Silk Road Initiative*. 2.
- Dal, E. P., & Kursun, A. M. (2016). Assessing Turkey's middle power foreign policy in MIKTA. *International Journal*, 71(4), 624–626. JSTOR.
- Daskin, E., & Yar, H. (2022). The War In Ukraine and Turkey's Hedging Strategy Between the West and Russia. *Ghent Institute for International and European Studies*, 1–2.
<https://biblio.ugent.be/publication/8748234>
- Dersan Orhan, D. (2023). Strategic Hedging or Alignment? Qatar's Foreign Policy Toward Iran in the Wake of the Blockade Crisis. *Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations*, 20(80), 95–97. JSTOR.
- Digital Transformation Office. (2024). *Information and Communication Security Guide* (p. 6). Presidency of Republic of Turkey. <https://cbddo.gov.tr/en/icsguide/>
- Dunst, C. (2021, August 25). The long game: China's grand strategy to displace American order. *Council on Foreign Relations*, 5.

- Duprey, B., & Kassenova, N. (2021, June). Digital Silk Road in Central Asia: Present and Future. *Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies*, 1–2.
- E. Hillman, J. (2021). Competing with China's Digital Silk Road. *CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, CSIS, Global Forecast 2021*, 2.
- Eldem, T. (2020). The Governance of Turkey's Cyberspace: Between Cyber Security and Information Security. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 43(5), 1–3.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2019.1680689>
- Goldstein, A. (2020a). China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance. *International Security*, 45(1), 165. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00383
- Goldstein, A. (2020b). China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance. *International Security*, 45(1), 186–187. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00383
- Goldstein, A. (2020c). China's Grand Strategy under Xi Jinping: Reassurance, Reform, and Resistance. *International Security*, 45(1), 168. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00383
- Greene, R. (2020, May 8). Will China Control the Global Internet Via its Digital Silk Road? *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*, 6.
- Guliyev, V. (2024, December 3). Turkish-Chinese Rapprochement: Growing Chinese Investment in Türkiye. *Caspian-Alpine Society*, 4–5.
- Gürel, B., & Kozluca, M. (2022). Chinese Investment in Turkey: The Belt and Road Initiative, Rising Expectations and Ground Realities. *European Review*, 30(6), 4.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798721000296>
- Halisdemir, E. (2021). *National Cybersecurity Organisation: Turkey* (p. 7). The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.
<https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/national-cyber-security-organisation-turkey/>
- Huawei. (2024, February 29). Turkcell and Huawei signed three MOUs ON 5.5G, green energies, and AI based networks at MWC 2024. *Huawei News & Events*, 1.
- Hussain, E. (2021). The Belt and Road Initiative and the Middle Corridor: Complementarity or Competition? *Insight Turkey*, 23(Summer 2021), 235–236.
<https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021233.12>

- İltir, M. (2024, July). Cumhuriyetin Ekonomik Kriz Tarihi/Economic Crisis History of the Republic. *Doğruluk Payı*. <https://www.dogrulukpayi.com/zaman-tuneli/cumhuriyetin-ekonomik-kriz-tarihi>
- International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. (n.d.). *Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)—Türkiye* [Financial Statistics and data]. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG?end=2023&locations=TR&start=2001&view=chart>
- Kara, M. (2023). Strategic Hedging of Middle Powers in an Era of Great Power Competition. *Diverse Asia*, 3–4.
- Klotz, A., & Prakash, D. (Eds.). (2009). *Qualitative methods in international relations: A pluralist guide*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kuik, C.-C. (2021a). Getting hedging right: A small-state perspective. *China International Strategy Review*, 3(2), 302. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-021-00089-5>
- Kuik, C.-C. (2021b). Getting hedging right: A small-state perspective. *China International Strategy Review*, 3(2), 301. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s42533-021-00089-5>
- Kutlay, M., & Öniş, Z. (2021). Turkish foreign policy in a post-western order: Strategic autonomy or new forms of dependence? *International Affairs*, 97(4), 1093. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iab094>
- Lewis, J. A. (2023, November). Rethinking Technology Transfer Policy toward China. *E Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 1–4.
- Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of Turkey. (2024). *National Cybersecurity Report 2024-2028* (pp. 9–13). Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of Turkey. <https://www.uab.gov.tr/uploads/pages/siber-guvenligin-yol-haritasi-yerli-ve-milli-teknoloji-ulusal-siber-guvenlik-stratejisi-2024-2028.pdf>
- Mutlu, N. (2023). Digital Silk Road; Is it an Anti-Globalization Backlash? Is it Chinese-Style Globalization? *International Journal of Politics and Security*, 5(2), 43. <https://doi.org/10.53451/ijps.1225710>

- NATO. (1949). North Atlantic Treaty. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 4(2), 156–158. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002070204900400206>
- NATO Press. (2016, July 8). *NATO Cyber Defence Pledge*. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/11/NATO-160708-CyberDefencePledge.pdf>
- NATO Press Release. (2021). *Brussels Summit Communiqué*. 1–2. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm
- Nouwens, M. (2021a). *China's Digital Silk Road: Integration into National IT Infrastructure and Wider Implications for Western Defence Industries* (p. 9). IISS. <https://www.iiss.org/sv/research-paper/2021/02/china-digital-silk-road-implications-for-defence-industry/>
- Nouwens, M. (2021b). *China's Digital Silk Road: Integration into National IT Infrastructure and Wider Implications for Western Defence Industries* (p. 8). IISS. <https://www.iiss.org/sv/research-paper/2021/02/china-digital-silk-road-implications-for-defence-industry/>
- Omprasad, G. (2024). Understanding China's Grand Strategy through the Belt and Road Initiative. *International Studies*, 61(2), 183. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00208817241247665>
- OpenAI. (n.d.). *ChatGPT* (Version Feb 14 version) [Computer software]. OpenAI. <https://chatgpt.com/>
- Park, A. (2024, August 16). NATO Looks to Digital Transformation for the Future Fight. *National Defence Magazine*, 3.
- Parlar Dal, E., & Dipama, S. (2024). Assessing the Diffusion of Military Power Capacity of Middle Powers: The Case of Turkey. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 1–29. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2024.2414166>
- Patil, S., & Gupta, P. (2024). The Digital Silk Road in the IndoPacific: Mapping China's Vision for Global Tech Expansion. *Observer Research Foundation*, 683, 4.
- Presidency of Republic of Türkiye Investment Office. (2011). Success Stories: Huawei. *Presidency of Republic of Türkiye Investment Office*, 1.

- Reddy, R. (2023, February 8). *Beijing's Digital Footprint and its Political Implications*. 7.
- Reuters. (2021, April 20). China's Alibaba invests \$350 mln in capital increase to Turkey's Trendyol -trade registry. *Reuters*, 1.
- Reuters. (2024, September 18). Erdogan says Turkey will deepen ties with East while still facing West. *Reuters*, 1.
- S. Eder, T., Arcesati, R., & Mardell, J. (2019, August 28). *Networking the Belt and Road: The future is digital*. Mercator Institute for China Studies.
<https://merics.org/en/tracker/networking-belt-and-road-future-digital>
- S. Erie, M. & Thomas Streinz. (2021). The Beijing Effect: China's "Digital Silk Road" as Transnational Data Governance. *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 54, 3.
- Schweller, R. L. (1994). Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In. *International Security*, 19(1), 72. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539149>
- Schweller, R. L. (2016, May). *The Balance of Power in World Politics*. Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.119>
- Shlykov, P. V. (2023). The State of Strategic Hedging: Turkey's Foreign Policy and Relations with Russia. *Russia in Global Affairs*, 21(3), 137–139. <https://doi.org/10.31278/1810-6374-2023-21-3-134-158>
- Silk Road Fund. (2023, July 27). Silk Road Fund and the Investment Office of the Presidency of Turkey Co the Roundtable on China-Turkey Investment Cooperation. *Silk Road Fund Media Center*, 1–2.
- Strategic Comments. (2021). China's place on the NATO agenda. *Strategic Comments*, 27(5).
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2021.1957324>
- Teker, S., Teker, D., & Orman, I. (2023). International trade between Turkey and China. *Pressacademia*, 16, 184–188. <https://doi.org/10.17261/Pressacademia.2023.1685>
- The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure. (n.d.). *The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure: Cyber Security Data Base* [Website]. Retrieved January 23, 2025, from
<https://hgm.uab.gov.tr/siber-guvenlik>

- Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK). (n.d.). *Data Portal for Statistics* (Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK)) [Virtual]. <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/>
- Tzagkarakis, S. I., & Kritas, D. (2023). Mixed research methods in political science and governance: Approaches and applications. *Quality & Quantity*, 57(S1), 39–42.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-022-01384-y>
- Ülgen, S., & Umarov, T. (2024). Transatlantic Policies on China: Is There a Role for Türkiye? *Carnegie Endowment For International Peace*.
<https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/transatlantic-policies-on-china-is-there-a-role-for-turkiye?lang=en>
- Uluyol, Y. (2024, March 20). Partnership with limits: China Turkey relations in the late AKP era. *Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung*, 1–2.
- UN ITU. (n.d.). *Global Cybersecurity Index 2024 5th Edition* (p. 126) [Index]. International Telecommunication Union. Retrieved January 23, 2025, from https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/GCIv5/2401416_1b_Global-Cybersecurity-Index-E.pdf
- UN ITU. (2020). *Global Cybersecurity Index 2020: Measuring commitment to cybersecurity* (p. 128) [Index]. United Nations International Telecommunication Union.
https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2021-PDF-E.pdf
- Waltz, K. N. (1993). The Emerging Structure of International Politics. *International Security*, 18(2), 44. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2539097>
- Yeung, C. (2024, March 19). *The Belt and Road Initiative 10 Years Later: China's Transition to 'Small and Beautiful.'* 6.
- Yilmaz, B. (2022b). The Belt and Road Initiative and the Impacts on Turkey as a part of the Middle Corridor. *Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik (SWP)*, 2, 15.
- Yilmaz, B. (2022a). The Belt and Road Initiative and the Impacts on Turkey as a part of the Middle Corridor. *Stiftung Wissenschaft Und Politik (SWP)*, 2, 12.

Appendices:

Authors Note: Artificial intelligence (AI) tools were used in this study to perform certain tasks. The tools, their purposes and prompts are described below in detail.

1- ChatGPT for creating a well-structured paper:

Prompt: “Please create a structure (only subtitles) for a research article in social sciences consisting introduction, literature review, theoretical framework and methodology parts.”(OpenAI, n.d.)

2- ChatGPT for Brainstorming:


Prompt: “Please indicate your opinion regarding”

Prompt: “Please evaluate my reasoning on and give me feedback about it”(OpenAI, n.d.)

3- ChatGPT for Proofreading:

Prompt: Please read below paragraph in detail and highlight spelling, punctuation and grammar errors in bold format, so that I can apply corrections.(OpenAI, n.d.)

Figure 1. Research Methodology Tree



Sources: Faruk, Ömer. (2025). Methodology tree for master thesis [Diagram]. Created using DiagrammeR in RStudio.
Unpublished work.

Data Representations:

Table 1. China and Turkey Five Years Macroeconomic Indicators between 2000-2021

China	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2021
Population (000)	1.262.645	1.303.720	1.337.705	1.379.860	1.411.100	1.412.360
Inflation	2,06	3,90	6,88	0,00	0,49	4,37
Unemployment %	3,26	4,52	4,53	4,63	5,00	4,82
GDP (mio US\$)	1.211.347	2.285.966	6.087.164	11.061.553	14.687.674	17.734.063
GDP per Capita	959	1.753	4.550	8.016	10.409	12.556
Income per Capita	801	1.435	3.511	6.040	7.572	
Exports (mio US\$)	253.095	773.339	1.654.816	2.362.093	2.723.250	3.548.553
Imports (mio US\$)	224.309	648.712	1.432.416	2.003.257	2.357.106	3.089.623
Reserves (mio US\$)	171.763	831.410	2.913.712	3.405.253	3.357.241	3.427.931
Internet Usage (%)	1,8	8,5	34,3	50,3	70,4	

Turkey	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2021
Population (000)	63.240	67.903	72.327	78.529	84.339	85.043
Inflation	49,36	7,09	7,01	7,84	14,83	28,70
Unemployment %	6,50	10,64	10,66	10,24	13,11	13,39
GDP (mio US\$)	274.303	506.308	776.993	864.317	719.955	815.272
GDP per Capita	4.337	7.456	10.743	11.006	8.536	9.587
Income per Capita	3.586	6.201	8.998	9.263	7.147	
Exports (mio US\$)	54.535	110.761	164.677	212.028	206.374	288.571
Imports (mio US\$)	61.645	122.861	198.136	229.539	233.811	292.007
Reserves (mio US\$)	23.515	52.494	85.959	110.490	93.512	109.535
Internet Usage (%)	3,8	15,5	39,8	53,7	77,7	

Resources: Table showing China's and Turkey's macroeconomic indicators 2000-2021, World Bank Data (Teker et al., 2023)

Table 2. The annual breakdown of Chinese capital investment in Sino-Turkish joint ventures (2011–2020)

Year	Number of firms	Total amount of capital in joint ventures (USD)	Amount of Chinese capital in joint ventures (USD)	Percentage of Chinese ownership (%)
2011	49	\$8.428.186,27	\$5.844.395,22	69
2012	47	\$6.358.491,09	\$4.032.850,78	63
2013	73	\$58.009.453,78	\$56.059.453,78	97
2014	89	\$70.455.002,28	\$67.960.027,41	96
2015	84	\$19.207.720,59	\$14.617.211,40	76
2016	72	\$5.710.264,90	\$4.462.225,17	78
2017	54	\$3.562.369,79	\$3.073.252,47	86
2018	87	\$11.135.874,07	\$8.509.918,19	76
2019	115	\$14.010.398,31	\$11.272.188,93	80
2020	75	\$7.852.924,63	\$6.119.417,89	77
Total	745	\$204.730.685,72	\$181.950.941,23	80

Source: Authors' own calculations based on Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği (TOBB) (Gürel & Kozluca, 2022)

Table 3. Chinese Companies Involved in the DSR

Service/Activity	Chinese Companies Involved
Undersea cables	Hengtong, HMN Technologies
CCTV cameras	Hikvision, Dahua
4G/5G mobile network	Unicom, China Mobile, Huawei
Digital payments	Alipay








Resources: Table Showing Some Chinese Companies Involved in the DSR (Patil & Gupta, 2024)

Table 4. Largest Acquisitions in Turkey by Chinese Capital 2015-2020

Asset	Year	Acquirer Company	Target	Industry	Share %	Transaction Value (mio USD)
1 Fina & Kumport Ports	2015	Cosco Pasific, China Merchants, CIC	Fina Holding	Ports	65	940,1
2 Trendyol.com	2018	Alibaba Group Holdings	Various Investors, EBRD, Tiger Global	E-commerce	75	728,0
3 Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge	2019	Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Anhui, China Merchants Expressways	ICA	Transportation, Infrastructure	51	688,5
4 Netaş Telecom	2016	ZTE Corp	One Equity Partners LLC, Rhea Equity	Technology	48	101,3
5 TekstilBank	2015	Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC)	Public Shares	Banking	24,5	76,9
6 Demirer Cable	2018	Jiangsu Zhongtian Technology	Saudi Cable Company	Industrial Production	100	66,7
7 Boyracı Construction	2017	Evershine Group Holdings	Osman Boyracı	Construction	30	6,6


Resources: Table showing largest acquisitions by Chinese Companies in Turkey between the years of 2015-2020 (Tekere et al., 2023)

Figure 1: Digital Silk Road Project Categories and Types

Over-the-top Platforms		E-Commerce
		E-Governance
		Financial Technology (FinTech)
Services		Smart City
		Security Information System
		Data Centre
Infrastructure		Fibre Optic Cables
		Telecom
		5G Network
		Satellite Tracking Ground Stations


Resources: IISS China Connects: From coal to code (Nouwens, 2021a)

Figure 2. Global Cybersecurity Index 2020: TURKEY




Resources: Global Cybersecurity Index 2020 by United Nations International Telecommunication Union, Measurement of Turkey's Cybersecurity across multiple domains (UN ITU, 2020)

Figure 3. Trade Volume Between Turkey and China:



Resources: China- Turkey Trade Volume between 2000- 2020, World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) by World Bank (Mio USD) (Tekler et al., 2023)

Figure 4: Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) - Turkiye



Sources: Figure displaying inflation rate in Turkey under Erdogan's AKP within 2001-2022. (International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, n.d.)