

RePoPoW: A Gas-Efficient Superlight Bitcoin Client in Solidity

ABSTRACT

Superlight clients enable the verification of proof-of-work-based blockchains by checking only a small representative number of block headers instead of all the block headers as done in SPV. Such clients can be embedded within other blockchains by implementing them as smart contracts, allowing for cross-chain verification. One such interesting instance is the consumption of Bitcoin data within Ethereum by implementing a Bitcoin superlight client in Solidity. While such theoretical constructions have demonstrated security and efficiency, no practical implementation exists. In this work, we put forth the first practical Solidity implementation of a superlight client which implements the NIPoPoW superblocks protocol. Contrary to previous work, our Solidity smart contract achieves sufficient gas-efficiency to allow a proof and counter-proof to fit within the gas limit of a block, making it practical. We provide extensive experimental measurements for gas. The optimizations that enable gas-efficiency heavily leverage a novel technique which we term hash-and-resubmit, which almost completely eliminates persistent storage requirements, the most expensive operation of smart contracts in terms of gas. Instead, the contract asks contesters to resubmit data and checks their veracity by hashing it. We show that such techniques can be used to bring down gas costs significantly and may have applications to other contracts. We also identify and rectify multiple implementation security issues of previous work such as premining vulnerabilities. Lastly, our implementation allows us to calculate concrete cryptoeconomic parameters for the superblocks NIPoPoWs protocol and in particular to make recommendations about the monetary value of the collateral parameters. We provide such parameter recommendations over a variety of liveness and adversarial bound settings.

KEYWORDS

Blockchain; Superlight clients; NIPoPoWs, Solidity

1 INTRODUCTION

Blockchain interoperability [18] is the ability of distinct blockchains to communicate. This *cross-chain* [7, 9, 10, 13, 17] communication can enable useful features across blockchains such as the transfer of asset from one chain to another (one-way peg) and back (one-way peg) [13]. To date, there is no commonly accepted decentralized protocol that enables cross-chain transactions. Currently, crosschain operations are only available to the users via third-party applications, such as multi-currency wallets. However, this treatment is opposing to the nature of decentralized currencies.

In general, crosschain-enabled blockchains A, B would support the following operations:

- Crosschain trading: A user with deposits in blockchain A, can make a payment to a user in blockchain B.
- Crosschain fund transfer: A user can transfer her funds from blockchain A to blockchain B. After this operation, the funds no longer exist in blockchain A. The user can later decide to transfer any portion of the original amount to the blockchain of origin.

In order to perform crosschain operations, there must be a mechanism to allow for users of blockchain A to discover events that occur in chain B, such that a transaction occurred. A trivial manner to perform such an audit is to participate as a full node in both chains. This approach, however, is impractical because a sizeable amount of storage is needed to host entire chains as they grow with time. As of May 2020, Bitcoin [15] chain spans roughly 245 GB, and Ethereum [2, 16] has exceeded 350 GB¹. Naturally, not all users are able to accommodate this size of data, especially if portable media are used, such as mobile phones.

An early solution to compress the extensive space of blockchain was given by Nakamoto with the Simplified Payment Verification (SPV) protocol [15]. In SPV, only the headers of blocks are stored, saving a considerable amount of storage. However, even with this protocol, the process of downloading and validating all block headers can lead to unpleasant user experience. In Ethereum, for instance, headers sum up to approximately 5.1 GB² of data. A mobile client needs several minutes, even hours, to fetch all information needed in order to function as an SPV client.

In order to deliver more practical solutions for blockchain transaction verification, a new generation of *superlight* clients [1, 8, 11, 12] emerged. In these protocols, cryptographic proofs are generated, which prove the occurrence of events inside a blockchain. Better performance is achieved due to considerably smaller size of proofs compared to the data needed in SPV. By utilizing superlight client protocols, a compressed proof for an event in chain A is constructed, and, if chain B supports smart contracts, the proof can then be verified automatically and transparently *on-chain*. Note that, this communication is realized without the intervention of third-party applications. An interesting application of such a protocol is the communication between Bitcoin and Ethereum.

Related Work. We use the Non-Interactive Proofs of Proof of Work (NIPoPoWs) [12, 13] as the fundamental building block of our solution. This cryptographic primitive is *provably secure* and provides *succinct proofs* regarding the

¹The size of the Bitcoin chain was derived from <https://www.statista.com/statistics/647523/worldwide-bitcoin-blockchain-size/>, and the size of the Ethereum chain by <https://etherscan.io/chartsync/chaindefaults>

²Calculated as the number of blocks (10,050,219) times the size of header (508 bytes). Statistics by <https://etherscan.io/>

existence of an arbitrary event in a chain. Contrary to the linear growth rate of the underlying blockchain, NIPoPoWs span polylogarithmic size of blocks.

Christoglou [5], has provided a Solidity smart contract which is the first ever implementation of crosschain events verification based on NIPoPoWs, where proofs are submitted and checked for their validity. This solution, however, is impossible to apply to the real blockchain due to extensive usage of resources.

Our contributions. We put forth the following contributions:

- (1) We developed the first ever decentralized client that securely verifies crosschain events and is applicable to the real blockchain. Our client establishes a safe, cheap and trust-less solution to the interoperability problem. We implemented our client in Solidity, and we verify Bitcoin events to the Ethereum blockchain.
- (2) We present a novel pattern which we term *hash-and-resubmit*. This pattern improves the performance of Ethereum smart contracts [2, 16] in terms of gas consumption by utilizing *calldata* space to eliminate high-cost storage operations.
- (3) We design an *optimistic* schema for our client which can be used in the design of smart contracts replacing *non-optimistic* architectures. This design achieves the improvement of smart contracts' performance enabling multiple phases of interactions.
- (4) We prove via application that NIPoPoWs can be utilized in the real blockchain, making the cryptographic primitive the first ever provably secure construction of succinct proofs which is applied in a real setting.

Our implementation meets the following requirements:

- (1) Secure: The client is invulnerable against all adversarial attacks.
- (2) Trustless: The client is not dependent on third-party applications and operates in a transparent, decentralized manner.
- (3) Practical: The client can be utilized in the real blockchain and comply with all environmental constraints, i.e. block gas limit and *calldata* size of Ethereum blockchain.
- (4) Cheap: The application is cheaper to use than the current state of the art technologies.

We selected Bitcoin as source blockchain as it the most used cryptocurrency and enabling crosschain transactions in Bitcoin is beneficial to the vast majority of blockchain community. We selected Ethereum as the target blockchain because it is also very popular and it supports smart contracts, which is a requirement in order to perform on-chain verification.

Structure. In Section 2 describe all blockchain technologies which are relevant to our work. In Section 3 we put forth In Section 4 we show ... and, finally, in Section 5, we discuss ...

2 THE HASH-AND-RESUBMIT PATTERN

We now introduce a novel design pattern for Solidity smart contracts which results into massive gas optimization due to the elimination of expensive storage operations.

Motivation. It is essential for smart contracts to store data in the blockchain. However, interacting with the storage of a contract is among the most expensive operations of the EVM [2, 16]. Therefore, only necessary data should be stored and redundancy should be avoided when possible. This is contrary to conventional software architecture, where storage is considered cheap. Usually, the performance of data access in traditional systems is related with time. However, in Ethereum performance is related to gas consumption. Access to persistent data costs a substantial amount of gas, which has a direct monetary value. One way to mitigate gas cost of reading variables from the blockchain is to declare them public. This leads to the creation of a *getter* function in the background, allowing free access to the value of the variable. But this treatment does not prevent the initial population of storage data, which is significantly expensive for large size of data. Towards the goal of implementing gas-efficient smart contracts, several patterns have been proposed [3, 4, 6].

By using the *hash-and-resubmit* pattern, large storage variables are omitted entirely, and structures are contained in memory which results to vastly improved performance. When a function call is performed, the arguments and signature of the function is included in the transactions field of the body of a block. The contents of blocks are public to the network, therefore this information is available to nodes. By simply observing blocks, a node retrieves data sent by other users, which is processed off-chain. To interact with data originated by other users, the node resends the observed information to the public network, possibly accompanied by complementary data depending on the context of the application. The concept of resending data would be redundant in conventional systems. However, in Solidity this can be utilized very efficiently because function arguments are contained in memory rather than storage, which supports vastly cheaper operations.

Applicability. We now list the cases in which the *hash-and-resubmit* pattern is efficient to use:

- (1) To reduce gas cost due to extensive read/write storage operations and to make smart contracts that exceed block gas limit practical.
- (2) To interact with smart contract depending on prior actions of other users
- (3) When a full node observes the traffic of a contract

Participants and collaborators. The first participant is the smart contract S which accepts function calls. Another participant is the invoker E_1 , who dispatches arbitrary data d_0 to S via a function $\text{send}_1(d_0)$. Note that d_0 are potentially processed on-chain, resulting to d . The last participant is the observer E_2 , who is a node that observes transactions towards S in the blockchain. After observation, E_2 retrieves data d . Finally, E_2 acts as an invoker, by making an interaction with S , $\text{send}_2(d)$. However, a malicious E_2 may alter d before

interacting with S . We will denote the potentially modified d as d^* . The verification that $d = d^*$, which is a prerequisite for the secure functionality of the underlying contract consists a part of the pattern and is performed in $\text{send}_2(d^*)$.

Implementation. The implementation of this pattern is divided into two parts. The first part covers how d^* is retrieved by E_2 , whereas the second part explains how the verification if $d = d^*$ is realized. The challenge here is twofold:

- (1) Availability: E_2 must be able to retrieve d without the need of accessing on-chain data.
- (2) Consistency: E_2 must be prevented from dispatching d^* that differs from the originally submitted d .

Hash-and-resubmit technique is performed in two stages to face these challenges: (a) the *hash* phase, which addresses *reliability*, and (b) the *resubmit* phase which addresses *availability*.

Addressing availability: During *hash* phase, E_1 makes the function call $\text{send}(d_0)$. This transaction, which includes a function signature (send_1) and the corresponding data (d_0), is added in a block by a miner. Due to blockchain's transparency, the observer of send , E_2 , retrieves a copy of d_0 , without the need of accessing contract data. In turn, E_2 performs *locally* the same set of on-chain instructions operated on d_0 generating d .

Addressing reliability: We prevent an adversary E_2 from altering d^* by storing the *hash* of d in contract's state during the execution of $\text{send}_1(d)$ by E_1 . The pre-compiled `sha256` is convenient to use in Solidity, however we can make use of any cryptographic hash function $H()$:

$$\text{hash} \leftarrow H(d)$$

Then, during contest phase, verification is performed by comparing the stored hash of d with the hash of d^* .

$$\text{require}(\text{hash} = H(d^*))$$

In solidity, the size of the hash is 32 bytes. To persist such a small value in contract's memory only adds a constant, negligible cost overhead.

Sample. We now demonstrate the usage of the hash-and-resubmit pattern with a practical example. We create a smart contract that orchestrates a game between two players, P_1 and P_2 . The winner is the player with the most valuable array. The interaction between players and the smart contract is realized in two phases: (a) Submit phase and (b) Contest phase.

Submit phase: P_1 submits an N -sized array, a_1 and becomes the holder of the contract.

Contest phase: P_2 submits a_2 . If $a_2 > a_1$, then the holder of the contract is changed to P_2 . We provide a simple implementation for the $>$ operator between arrays, but the comparison can be implemented arbitrarily.

We make use of the *hash-and-resubmit* pattern by prompting P_2 to provide *two* arrays to the contract during contest phase: (a) a_1^* , which is the originally submitted array by P_1 , possibly modified by P_2 , and (b) a_2 , which is the contesting array.

We provide two implementations of the above described game. Algorithm ?? is the implementation using storage, and Algorithm ?? is the implementation embedding the *hash-and-resubmit* pattern.

Algorithm 1 best array using storage

```

1: contract best-array
2:   function initialize
3:     best  $\leftarrow \emptyset$ ; holder  $\leftarrow \emptyset$ 
4:   end function
5:   function submit( $a$ )
6:     best  $\leftarrow a$  ▷ array saved in storage
7:     holder  $\leftarrow \text{msg.sender}$ 
8:   end function
9:   function contest( $a$ )
10:    require(compare( $a$ ))
11:    holder  $\leftarrow \text{msg.sender}$ 
12:   end function
13:   function compare( $a$ )
14:    require(| $a$ |  $\geq$  |best|)
15:    for  $i : |best|$  do
16:      if  $a[i] \leq \text{best}[i]$  then return false
17:    end if
18:  end for
19:  return true
20: end function
21: end contract

```

Algorithm 2 best array using hash-and-resubmit pattern

```

1: contract best-array
2:   function initialize
3:     hash  $\leftarrow \emptyset$ ; holder  $\leftarrow \emptyset$ 
4:   end function
5:   function submit( $a_1$ )
6:     hash  $\leftarrow H(a_1)$  ▷ hash saved in storage
7:     holder  $\leftarrow \text{msg.sender}$ 
8:   end function
9:   function contest( $a_1^*, a_2$ )
10:    require(hash256( $a_1^*$ ) = hash) ▷ validate  $a_1^*$ 
11:    require(compare( $a_1^*, a_2$ ))
12:    holder  $\leftarrow \text{msg.sender}$ 
13:   end function
14:   function compare( $a_1^*, a_2$ )
15:    require(| $a_1^*$ |  $\geq$  | $a_2$ |)
16:    for  $i : |a_1^*|$  do
17:      if  $a_1^*[i] \leq a_2[i]$  then return false
18:    end if
19:  end for
20: end function
21: return true
22: end contract

```

Gas analysis. The gas consumption of the two implementations is displayed in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Gas-cost reduction using the *hash-and-resubmit* pattern. By avoiding gas-heavy storage operations, the cost of function invocations is decreased significantly by 93-95%.

By using the *hash-and-resubmit* pattern, the gas consumption is decreased by 93-95%. This significantly affects the efficiency and applicability of the contract. Note that, the storage implementation exceeds the Ethereum block gas limit³ for arrays of size 500 and above, contrary to the optimized version, which consumes approximately $1/10^{th}$ of the block gas limit for arrays of 1000 elements.

Merkle-hash-and-resubmit. Now consider a variation of the above game, in which P_1 calls `send(a_1)`, and then calls `pickSpan(n)` that determines the span n of a_1 which can be contested, where $n \leq |a_1|$. In reality, P_2 only needs to send $a_1^*[n]$ and $a_2[n]$ in order to perform the comparison $a_1[n] < a_2[n]$. However, the digest of a_1 is calculated by hashing the entire structure. Therefore, the *resubmit* phase cannot be successfully performed with $a_1^*[n]$, because $H(a_1) \neq H(a_1[n])$.

A different approach to address such scenarios is to adopt different hashing schemas that utilize constructions such as Merkle Trees (ref) or Merkle Mountain Ranges (ref) in order to facilitate selective specific reshapes of structure segments. In this variation of the pattern which we term *merkle-hash-and-resubmit*, the signature of a_1 is generated by constructing the Merkle Root of a_1 in contract's state. In *resubmit* phase, $a_1[n]$ is dispatched, accompanied by the

³ As of July 2020, the Ethereum block gas limit approximates 10,000,000 gas units




Figure 2: Trade-offs between *hash-and-resubmit* variations. Depending on d_0 and d size, there is an optimal implementation. In vertical axis the gas consumption is displayed, and in vertical axis the size of d as a function of d_0 . The size of d_0 is 1000 bytes, and the hash function we used is pre-compiled sha256.

siblings that reconstruct the Merkle Root of a_1 which is used for verification.

The size of the underlying data determines the performance of each variation of the pattern. In Table 1 we display the aggregated gas cost for hashing and verifying the underlying data for both variations as a function of data size. In Figure 2 we demonstrate how gas consumption changes with respect to different sizes of d and $d_0 = 1Kb$.

actions	hash and resubmit	merkle hash and resubmit
<i>hash</i>	$load(d_0) + hash(d)$	$load(d_0) + prove(d)$
<i>resubmit</i>	$load(d) + hash(d)$	$load(d[m:n]) + load(siblings_d) + verify(siblings_d)$

Table 1: Summary of operations for *hash-and-resubmit* and *merkle-hash-and-resubmit* patterns. For each variation, different gas cost function is formulated. The aggregated gas consumption is determined by the size of the underlying data d_0 and d . d_0 is the data as sent from the caller. d is the product of on-chain operations on d_0 , and consist the subject of data comparison between the invoker and the observer of the function.

Consequences The most obvious consequence of applying the *hash-and-resubmit* pattern variations is the circumvention of storage structures, a benefit that saves a substantial amount of gas, especially in the cases where these structures are large. To that extend, contracts that exceed the Ethereum block gas limit become practical. Furthermore, the pattern

enables off-chain transactions, significantly improving the performance of smart contracts.

Known uses. To our knowledge, we are the first to combine the notion of the transparency of the blockchain with data structures signatures to eliminate storage variables from Solidity smart contracts by resubmitting data.




Figure 3: Entity 1 makes a function call with arguments arg_1 and arg_2 . Entity 2 reads the content of transactions in the block and retrieves the input data. Entity 2 can use this data to make a different invocation.

Enabling NIPoPoWs. We now present how the *hash-and-resubmit* pattern can be used in the context of the NIPoPoW superlight client. Similar to the aforementioned example, the NIPoPoW verifier adheres to a submit-and-contest-phase schema, and the inputs of the functions are arrays that are processed on-chain.

In *submit-phase*, a *proof* is submitted, which can be contested by another user in *contest-phase*. The user that initiates the contest, needs to monitor the traffic of the smart contract. This is a logical assumption as mentioned in the NIPoPoW paper. The input of **submit** function includes the *submit proof* (π_{subm}) that indicates the occurrence of an *event* (e) in the source chain, and the input of **contest** function includes the contesting proof (π_{cont}). A successful contest of π_{subm} is realized when π_{cont} has a better score. The process of score evaluation which is described in [12], is irrelevant to the pattern and remains unchanged.

In previous work [5], NIPoPoW arrays are saved on-chain, resulting to extensive storage operations that limit the applicability of the contract considerably. In Algorithm ?? we show how hash-and-resubmit pattern is embedded into the NIPoPoW client. In Figure 4 we display how the gas consumption differentiates from previous work for the aggregated cost of submit and contest phase. We observe that by using the *hash-and-resubmit* pattern, we achieve to increase the performance of the contract by reducing the gas consumption by 40%. This is a decisive step towards creating a practical superlight client.

3 REMOVING MUTABLE STORAGE

Now that we can freely retrieve immutable structures, we can focus on other storage variables. A challenge we faced is

Algorithm 3 The NIPoPoW client using hash-and-resubmit pattern

```

1: contract crosschain
2:   function initialize( $G_{remote}$ )
3:      $G \leftarrow G_{remote}$ 
4:   end function
5:   function Submit( $\pi_{subm}, e$ )
6:     require( $\pi_{subm}[0] = G$ )
7:     require( $events[e] = \perp$ )
8:     require(validInterlink( $\pi$ ))
9:      $DAG \leftarrow DAG \cup \pi_{subm}$ 
10:     $events[e].hash \leftarrow H(\pi_{subm})$   $\triangleright$  enable pattern
11:     $ancestors \leftarrow findAncestors()$ 
12:     $events[e].pred \leftarrow evaluatePredicate(ancestors, e)$ 
13:     $ancestors = \perp$ 
14:  end function
15:  function Contest( $\pi_{subm}^*, \pi_{cont}, e$ )  $\triangleright$  provide proofs
16:    require( $events[e].hash = H(\pi_{subm}^*)$ )  $\triangleright$  verify  $\pi_{subm}^*$ 
17:    require( $\pi_{cont}[0] = G$ )
18:    require( $events[e] \neq \perp$ )
19:    require(validInterlink( $\pi_{cont}$ ))
20:     $lca = findLca(\pi_{subm}^*, \pi_{cont})$ 
21:    require( $score(\pi_{cont}[:lca]) > score(\pi_{subm}^*[:lca])$ )
22:     $DAG \leftarrow DAG \cup \pi_{cont}$ 
23:     $ancestors \leftarrow findAncestors(DAG)$ 
24:     $events[e].pred \leftarrow evaluatePredicate(ancestors, e)$ 
25:     $ancestors = \perp$ 
26:  end function
27: end contract

```




Figure 4: Performance improvement using hash-and-resubmit pattern in NIPoPoWs related to previous work. The gas consumption decreased by approximately 40%

that the protocol of NIPoPoWs depends on *DAG* structure which is a mutable hashmap. This logic is intuitive

and efficient to implement in most traditional programming languages such as C++, JAVA, Python, JavaScript, etc. However, as our analysis demonstrates, such an algorithm cannot be efficiently implemented in Solidity. This is not due to the lack of support of look-up structures, but because Solidity hashmaps can only be contained in storage. Other mutable structures, such as *ancestors* that are stored in the persistent memory also affect performance, especially for large proofs.

We make a keen observation regarding the possible position of the *block of interest* in the proof which lead us the constriction of an architecture that does not require *DAG*, *ancestors* or any other complementary structures. We will use the notation from [12] to present our claim.

Position of block of interest. NIPoPoWs are sets of sampled interlinked blocks, which means that they can be perceived as chains. If π_1 differs from π_2 , then a fork is created at the index of the last common ancestor (*lca*). The block of interest, b , lies at a certain index within π_{subm} and indicates a stable predicate [12, 14] that is true for π_{subm} . The case in which b is absent from π_{subm} is aimless, because the submission automatically fails since the predicated is evaluated against π_{subm} . We will refer to such aimless actions as *irrational* and components that are included in such actions irrational components, i.e. irrational proof, blocks etc. We will use the term *rational* to describe non-irrational actions and components.

The entity that initiates the contest of π_{subm} , tries to prove the falseness of the underlying predicate against π_{cont} . This means that, if the block of interest is included in π_{cont} , then the contest is irrational.

In the NIPoPoW protocol, proofs' segments $\pi_{subm}\{lca\}$ and $\pi_{cont}\{lca\}$ are merged to prevent adversaries from skipping or adding blocks, and the predicate is evaluated against $\pi_{subm}\{lca\} \cup \pi_{cont}\{lca\}$. We observe that $\pi_{submit}\{lca\}$ can be omitted because there is no block $\{B : B \notin \pi_{subm}\{lca\} \wedge B \in \pi_{cont}\{lca\}\}$ that results to positive evaluation of the predicate. This is due to the fact that b is not included in $\pi_{cont}\{lca\}$, and, presumably there is no B such that $b = B$.




Figure 5: Fork of two chains. Solid lines connection blocks of π_{subm} and dashed lines connect blocks of π_{cont} . Given the configuration, blocks in dashed circles are irrational blocks of interest, and the block i in the solid circle is a rational block of interest.

In Figure 5 we display a fork of two proofs. Solid lines connect blocks of π_{subm} and dashed lines connect blocks

of π_{cont} . Examining which scenarios are rational depending on different positions of the block of interest, we observe that blocks B, C and E do not qualify, because they are included only in π_{cont} . Block A is included in $\pi_{subm}\{lca\}$, which means that π_{cont} is an irrational contest. Given this configuration, the only rational block of interest is D.

Minimal forks. By combining the above observations, we derive that, π_{cont} can be truncated into $\pi_{cont}\{lca\}$ without affecting the correctness of the protocol. We will term this truncated proof π_{cont}^{tr} ⁴. Security is preserved if we require π_{cont}^{tr} to be a *minimal fork* of π_{subm} . A minimal fork is a fork chain that shares exactly one common block with the main chain. Proof $\tilde{\pi}$, which is a minimal fork of proof π , has the following attributes:

- (1) $\pi\{lca\} = \tilde{\pi}[0]$
- (2) $\pi\{lca : \} \cap \tilde{\pi}[1 :] = \emptyset$

By requiring that π_{cont}^{tr} is a minimal fork of π_{subm} , we prevent an adversary from dispatching an augmented π_{cont}^{tr} to claim better score against π_{subm} . Such an attempt is displayed in Figure 6.




Figure 6: An adversary tries to send a malformed proof consisting of blocks $\{A, X, B, C, D'\}$ that achieves better score against $\{A, B, C, D\}$. This attempt is rejected due to the minimal-fork requirement.

In Algorithm ??, we show how minimal fork technique is incorporated in our client, replacing *DAG* and *ancestors*. In Figure 7 we show how the performance of the client has improved.

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⁴We cannot proceed to further truncation of π_{cont}^{tr} , because in the NIPoPoW protocol blocks within segment $\pi\{lca\}$ of each proof are required for the score calculation.

Algorithm 4 The NIPoPoW client using the minimal fork technique

```

1: function Submit( $\pi, e$ )
2:   require( $\pi[0] = \text{Gen}$ )
3:   require( $\text{events}[e] = \text{false}$ )
4:   require( $\text{validInterlink}(\pi)$ )
5:    $\text{events}[e].\text{pred} \leftarrow \text{evaluatePredicate}(\pi, e)$ 
6:    $\text{events}[e].\text{hash} \leftarrow \text{sha256}(\pi)$ 
7: end function

1: function Contest( $\pi, \tilde{\pi}, e, f$ )  $\triangleright f$ : fork index in  $\pi$ 
2:   require( $\tilde{\pi}[0] = \pi[f]$ )  $\triangleright$  check min. fork head
3:   require( $\text{events}[e].\text{hash} = \text{sha256}(\pi)$ )
4:   require( $\text{events}[e].\text{pred} = \text{true}$ )
5:   require( $\text{validInterlink}(\tilde{\pi})$ )
6:   require( $\text{disjoint}(\pi[f+1:], \tilde{\pi}[1:])$ )  $\triangleright$  check min. fork
7:   require( $\text{score}(\tilde{\pi}) > \text{score}(\pi[f:])$ )
8:    $\text{events}[e].\text{pred} \leftarrow \text{evaluatePredicate}(\tilde{\pi}, e)$ 
9: end function

```




Figure 7

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