

# What is UKRAINE'S perception in the EU?



**CASES OF  
GERMANY, FRANCE  
ITALY, POLAND**





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


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## INTRODUCTION

In the western model of shaping policy, public opinion plays a particularly important role. Since the beginning of Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, support of Ukraine by its partners, particularly from the West, has been an essential component of countering Moscow's attack and helping Ukraine implement needed reforms.

In order to understand attitudes toward Ukraine, the New Europe Center carried out an opinion poll in several major European countries. The overall aim of the survey was to learn more about the public opinion toward Ukraine as well as to determine the most common associations with Ukraine. The data obtained will be used to develop a fact-based – and country-specific – policy agenda. The 2020 survey is a follow-up to a similar exercise carried out in 2015 – further amplifying the value of the collected data.



## METHODOLOGY

The opinion poll was conducted in France, Germany, Italy and Poland by the sociological agency Kantar Profiles Division at the request of New Europe Center. Overall, over 4,000 respondents aged between 18 and 65+ answered six questions, including one open question. Respondents represent their countries proportionally based on gender, age and regions. All the answers were collected on an internet-based survey taking place from 22 to 29 September 2020.





## QUESTIONS

# QUESTIONS:

**1** Given the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, how should your government approach relations with eastern neighbor states outside of the EU (especially Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia)?

- a) draw them closer to ensure more stability around the EU
- b) focus on domestic problems
- c) continue present cooperation
- d) limit contacts to those benefiting our country

**2** Name your three main associations with Ukraine (open question)

**3** What should Ukraine do above all in order to become a member of the EU? (in order of prioritization)

- a) significantly improve the economy
- b) eradicate corruption
- c) regain its territorial integrity
- d) I don't know

**4** How could your government support Ukraine against Russian aggression? (in order of prioritization)

- a) extend sanctions against Russia
- b) provide financial support
- c) offer EU membership
- d) arm Ukraine
- e) it should not support Ukraine at all
- f) I don't know

**5** How do you see EU-Ukraine relations in the long-term?

- a) Ukraine as a full EU member
- b) close and integrated economic and political partner (e.g. Norway)
- c) relations like today
- d) market-based relations without political support
- e) like an ordinary neighbor

**6** Do you think Ukraine should become a member of the following organizations:

- a) EU
- b) NATO
- c) Both EU and NATO
- d) None of the above

## TEN KEY FINDINGS:

- 1 In 2020, as in 2015 the main association with Ukraine is war. However, in 2020 Ukraine is less associated with war and conflict. Compared to 2015, when 49% of respondents associated Ukraine with war, in 2020 this number dropped to 12%, a fourfold decrease.
- 2 Ukraine is increasingly associated with immigrants. In 2015, Ukraine's association with immigrants was marginal. In 2020 this was the third most popular association with Ukraine, mentioned by 10.3% of respondents. This reflects an increasing trend of labor migration from Ukraine to the EU.
- 3 Unfortunately, a majority of respondents across countries have negative associations with Ukraine. Most of the top ten associations are negative and perceptions at the levels of surveyed countries are pretty much the same. An exception to this trend was Italy whose respondents had more positive and neutral associations in the top ten associations than any other surveyed country.
- 4 One surprising finding is that 23.6% of people surveyed do not have any association with Ukraine at all, suggesting an opportunity for Ukraine to brand and promote itself.
- 5 The perspectives among surveyed countries on how to help Ukraine during the COVID-19 pandemic were fragmented. Roughly half of the surveyed countries believed they should maintain the status quo or deepen relations while the other half favor limiting cooperation or focusing on their country's internal problems.
- 6 The Russian narrative on Ukraine abroad has failed. Only 0.8% of respondents believe Ukraine is undergoing a civil war and under 0.2% associated Ukraine with extremism or fascism.
- 7 As in 2015, the current survey shows that the biggest obstacle for Ukraine's EU membership is its ongoing fight against corruption, which was prioritized by 43.1% of respondents compared to 33% in 2015.
- 8 A majority (55%) of respondents support Ukraine's membership in the EU. Support for Ukraine's NATO membership is also significant (38%) but does not represent a majority opinion.
- 9 In 2020, Ukraine's associations with Russia amount to 9.1%; five years ago, twice as many (18%) associated Ukraine with Russia. This reflects an increased dissociation of Ukraine from Russia and thus a perception of Ukraine which is independent from Russia.
- 10 The most popular option (21.5%) regarding supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression was to extend EU sanctions against Russia. The least popular was arming Ukraine.



# ANALYSIS OF ANSWERS

## COVID-19 PANDEMIC

There is no prevailing opinion regarding relations between surveyed countries and their eastern neighbors, including Ukraine, during the COVID-19 pandemic. Roughly half of respondents (49.2%) preferred to maintain the same, or higher, level of cooperation, while the other half (50.8%) would prefer to focus on domestic issues and limit contacts to that which benefits their own country.


Interestingly, the cohorts most skeptical to a greater cooperation are the 18-25 age group and 56-65 years. On the opposite side, the age groups of 26-35 years, 36-45 years, 46-55 years 65+ years are more optimistic about cooperation between their countries and Ukraine. As for gender disparities, female respondents exhibited a higher propensity for isolationist attitudes.

Considering respondents by country, Italy appears to be the most isolationist with 23% of those surveyed in favor of limiting external contacts to only those which benefit Italy directly. In contrast, only 12.4% of Poles surveyed supported such isolationist policies. Older respondents from France and Italy tended to hold more isolationist and country-focused attitudes.

In between these two countries is Germany with 19.1% of respondents favoring isolationism and France with 17.2%. Of the countries surveyed, Germany was the most open to deepened relations with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, with 25.5%, followed by Poland with 21.7% and then France with 17.2% and Italy with 15.5%.

### 1 Given the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, how should your government approach relations with eastern neighbor states outside of the EU (especially Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia)?

- draw them closer to ensure more stability around the EU
- focus on your country own problems
- continue present cooperation
- limit contacts to only what benefits your country



## ASSOCIATIONS WITH UKRAINE

The question on associations is one of the most interesting because of the open response format. The opportunity for respondents to make free associations with Ukraine resulted in a very diverse list of connotations for Ukraine amounting to over 280 unique responses. However, the leading associations refer to “war/conflict with Russia” with 12%; “poverty/unemployment” with 10.8% and “immigration / seasonal workers” which 10.3% of respondents associate with Ukraine. In this context, it is interesting to compare the data with the 2015 associations; while similar in subject matter, their frequency is much different. For instance, the 2015 data showed that the three main associations were “war” with 49%, “Russia” with 18% and “poverty” with 9%. This shows a significant decline of association with war from 49% to 12%. This indicates a


**In 2020, as in 2015 the main association with Ukraine is war. However, in 2020 Ukraine is less associated with war and conflict. Compared to 2015, when 49% of respondents associated Ukraine with war, in 2020 this number dropped to 12%, an almost fourfold decrease.**

marked improvement of Ukraine’s image in the surveyed countries, despite the fact that the war with Russia has remained constant over the last six years. At the same time, the dissociation of Ukraine with war could result in lower support of Ukraine by its Western partners over time. Also, in 2020 Ukraine’s associations with Russia amounted to 9.1%, while only five years ago twice as many respondents (18%) were associating Ukraine with Russia. This shows a notable dissociation of Ukraine from Russia and thus an increased perception of Ukraine as independent from Russia. The last association in the top five is “Crimea/Russian invasion” which was mentioned by 6.6% of respondents. One should note the significant increase of associations of Ukraine with immigration. In 2015 the proportion of respondents associating Ukraine with immigrants peaked at 2%. In 2020 this percentage increased to 10.3%, demonstrating that over the last five years Ukraine has become increasingly perceived as a country of origin for migrants. Although at first sight this might be perceived as an exclusively negative association, this is not actually the case. Ukrainian immigrants are often “ambassadors” of Ukraine abroad, and this may explain why some respondents believe Ukrainians represent a skilled labor force.

As for negative associations, aside from war and poverty, some respondents associate Ukraine with “unrest/instability” (5.5%) and “corruption/bribery/fight against corruption” (4.6%). Some other frequently named negative association included “dictatorship/totalitarian/authoritarian state” (2.5%), “Soviet/former USSR” (2.5%), “Chernobyl” (2.1%) and “alcohol” (1.7%).



## ANALYSIS OF ANSWERS



2 Name your three main associations with Ukraine



In terms of famous individuals and political figures, Ukraine is mostly associated with “Klitschko/Klitschko brothers” – 1.6%, Putin – 1.4%, Bandera – 1.1% and Lukashenko 0.5%. Below 0.5% were also, Tymoshenko, Yuschenko, Shevchenko, Bubka. Interestingly, only nine respondents total associated Ukraine with its current President Zelenskyy.

It is also worth underlining that the Russian narrative on Ukraine has largely failed. Only 0.8% of respondents think Ukraine is undergoing a civil war and those who think Ukraine is extremist/fascist represent a meager 0.2% of all individuals surveyed.

23.6% of all respondents had no association with Ukraine at all. That also represents a rather positive news since a positive impression and association could be made with Ukraine given information and exposure.



Unfortunately, a majority of respondents across countries have negative associations with Ukraine. Most of the top ten associations are negative and perceptions at the levels of surveyed countries are pretty much the same. An exception to this trend was Italy whose respondents had more positive and neutral associations in the top ten associations than any other surveyed country.

The associations vary markedly from country to country. For instance, Poland mostly associates Ukraine with immigrants (25.8%) and with poverty (25%) and only then with war. However, in

Germany and France the leading associations have to do with Russia and war. Most French respondents (15.5%) associate Ukraine with Russia, with war and conflict (13.1%) and with Eastern Europe (10.6%). Germany's top 3 association have all to do with Russia (war, Crimea invasion and Russia), which makes almost half of the respondents (47.5%). For Germany and France, the high degree of association with war could be due to increased visibility of the Russo-Ukrainian war owing to the important

Germany and Poland, most of the associations in the top ten are negative.


This is not the case of Italy, in which the Russian-Ukrainian war is almost absent in the public opinion – only 0.6% of the respondents mentioned the war. Italy is remarkably one of the most positive towards Ukraine. In the top ten associations there is only one partially negative association “immigrants/unemployment” while other are either neutral such as “gas/energy resources”, “politics”, or positive such as “culture/history” or “Ukrainian friends”.

## BARRIERS ON THE PATH TO EU

One of the most common questions around Ukraine's reform process and its European integration aspirations is which issues need to be addressed to clear the way for Ukraine's EU membership. The eradication of corruption was rated as the number one priority by survey respondents. Broken out by country, the fight against corruption is still the leading response, although it varies from country to country; the highest numbers being in Germany (over 58%) and the least priority, although still on the first place, in Italy with 29.1%. It is important to note that in 2015 the eradication of corruption was also rated as a top priority by 33% of respondents.

The second most important priority by respondents was for Ukraine to significantly improve the economy. A stronger economy has been mentioned by all countries as the second highest priority except France, where regaining its territorial integrity ranked higher than improvement of economy. Generally speaking, Ukraine's territorial integrity is not a significant obstacle for Ukraine's EU integration, or at the very least it is a lowest-priority problem.

### 3 What should Ukraine do above all in order to become a member of the EU? (in order of prioritization)\*



—◎ \* 19.30 % respondents answered «I don't know»

## SUPPORT OF UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

In supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression most respondents prefer extending sanctions against Russia with 21.5% of respondents listing this as a first order priority. The option of offering EU membership to Ukraine as a first order priority came closely behind. Three countries' respondents feel that extension of sanctions against Russia



## ANALYSIS OF ANSWERS


should be the top priority for supporting Ukraine; Poland with 23.3%, France with 23.4% and Germany also with 23.4% – a nearly identical alignment of preferences. The only country which differs is Italy, which opted for EU membership for Ukraine as the top priority (24.1%), prioritizing the extension of sanctions second.

The option to provide financial support to Ukraine is not particularly popular as a first-order priority, however many have mentioned this option as a second and third priority like in the table below. However, the least popular choice as a top priority was the option of arming Ukraine, with only a 2.6% response. By country, Poland had the greatest portion of support for arming Ukraine with 5.1%, followed by France with 2.9%, Germany with 1.4% and Italy with 0.9%. This provides further support to the hypothesis that EU countries are loath to support arming Ukraine.

In the case of Germany, it is quite interesting that the option to not support Ukraine at all earned the support of 13.1% of the respondents as a first priority, which exceeded the options of providing financial support and arming Ukraine taken together. A similar situation is observed in France but this was not similarly observed for Italy and Poland.

One of the most striking findings was actually related to respondents not knowing how to support Ukraine – at least 42.1% of Italians opted for this answer. French respondents followed closely with around 40%, then Germans with around 35% and Polish with slightly over 29%.

### 4 How could your government support Ukraine against Russian aggression? (in order of prioritization)\*




\* 37% respondents answered «I don't know»

## EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM

When offered a wide variety of choices on the future of EU-Ukraine relations, the most popular option was that the EU has to develop its relations with Ukraine such as with an ordinary neighbor; 26% chose this answer. This demonstrates that there is a significant group of isolationist respondents, who would prefer their governments to focus on domestic problems. A relatively similar level support is showed for the option of Ukraine following the “Norway model” (20.1%) and maintaining status quo relations, 20.8%. Two options which are almost opposite are having less support compared to others: Ukraine as a full member – 16.2% and market-based relations without political support – 17%. However, separately these numbers give less understanding about the trends in the surveyed societies. If the combine the choices of relations like today or higher then one could see that these represent 57.1%, compared to 42.9% who rather opted to downgrade the relations of Ukraine with the EU.

Broken out to the country level, responses are more or less the same with some insignificant differences. Quite surprisingly, is that Poles (30.5%) more than counterparts in Germany, Italy and France, are most in favor or relations with Ukraine like with an ordinary neighbor.

### 5 How do you see EU-Ukraine relations in the long term?






## MEMBERSHIP IN EU AND NATO

Support for Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO is not similar in the surveyed countries. A majority, 55%, of respondents support Ukraine's membership in the EU. Support for Ukraine's NATO integration has reached 38% which demonstrates it has not a similar level of support like the EU. The number of respondents who think Ukraine should not join the EU or NATO was 28.5%.

From an individual country perspective, there is strong support for Ukraine's EU membership in Poland (69.5%) and Italy (61.6%). In Germany (47%) and in France (42.6%), support for Kyiv's EU aspirations fall short of a majority.

Regarding NATO, there lacks majority support in all the surveyed countries. The most open to Ukraine's NATO membership is France with 39.9% of respondents, followed by Poland with 33.3% and by Germany and Italy with 31.3% for both countries.

### 6 Do you think Ukraine should become a member of the following organizations?




# GERMANY

## COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Support among Germans for building upon relations with its eastern neighbors – including Ukraine – during the COVID-19 pandemic, is evenly divided. On one hand – 49.1% of respondents preferred to either maintain relations at status quo levels or deepen them by bringing them closer to the EU (25.5%). However, 50.9% believe that Germany should focus on domestic problems and limit relations to those providing a direct interest to Berlin. The most isolationist option – “limit contacts to only what benefits your country” – was the least popular response, with 19.1% of responses.

### 1 GIVEN THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC, HOW SHOULD YOUR GOVERNMENT APPROACH RELATIONS WITH EASTERN NEIGHBOR STATES OUTSIDE OF THE EU (ESPECIALLY UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA)?




- Draw them closer to ensure more stability around the EU
- Focus on your country own problems
- Continue present cooperation
- Limit contacts to only what benefits your country



## ASSOCIATION WITH UKRAINE

Germany's top 3 associations with Ukraine all have to do with Russia ("war", "Crimea invasion" and Russia), which makes almost half of the respondents (47.5%). War with Russia is the most common association with Ukraine among German respondents. Germany plays an important role in the mediation efforts between Kyiv and Moscow and thus Ukraine is a familiar subject in Berlin – this could potentially explain in the frequent association with war and Ukraine. The remainder of the associations in the top ten are mostly negative and reference "corruption", "poverty", "unrest", "instability" and "danger". The neutral associations are Kyiv and Eastern Europe. Notably, 5.7% of respondents associate Ukraine with Klitschko brothers, which is significant compared to all other personalities mentioned. Additionally, some respondents recalled other positive associations such as "culture and history" and "beautiful country".


### 2 NAME YOUR THREE MAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH UKRAINE



## BARRIERS ON THE PATH TO EU

The German public has clearly indicated that the eradication of corruption Ukraine's biggest obstacle to joining the EU. Overall, 58.7% of respondents named eradication of corruption as the top priority. The improvement of its economy and regaining territorial integrity scored low as top priorities with 12.8% for the economy and 11.7% for the territorial integrity. As a second priority, more than one third of the respondents (35.9%) opted for improvement of economy. The regaining of Ukraine's territorial integrity is the lowest priority for the German public.

### 3 WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE DO ABOVE ALL IN ORDER TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EU? (in order of prioritization)\*







## SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

When asked about support for Ukraine against Russian aggression, almost a quarter (23.4%) of Germans believed the extension of sanctions was the top priority. The option to arm Ukraine was ranked as the lowest as the first priority with only 1.4% of support. The second-most chosen priority was EU membership, gathering the support of 17.6% respondents. The option to offer Ukraine a membership path maintains constant support at over 17% as the second and third priority. Other popular choices were to provide financial support, which scored highest as a second-order priority (22.1%). Interestingly, more respondents favored not supporting Ukraine at all (13.1%) than providing financial support (8.7%) or arming Ukraine (1.4%).

### 4 HOW COULD YOUR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION? (in order of prioritization)\*




\* 35,8 % respondents answered «I don't know»



## EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM

In the long run, most Germans (28%) see EU-Ukraine relations remaining at the same level as today. Almost a third of Germans interviewed (32.9%) would like to improve EU-Ukraine relations among this portion, 11% see a future with Ukraine as a full EU member while 21.9% see it as a close and integrated economic and political partner. However, support for downgrading relations is also high with 20% of respondents favoring market-based relations only and 19.1% supporting maintaining relations at the level of an ordinary neighbor.

### 5 HOW DO YOU SEE EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM?






## MEMBERSHIP IN EU AND NATO

There is a high support for Ukraine's EU integration in Germany, although not quite a majority, with 47% in favor. Unlike support for the EU, the support for Ukraine's NATO accession is lower with nearly one third of people (31.3%) in favor Ukraine's membership in NATO. Conversely 37.9% of respondents do not see Ukraine in either the EU or NATO. One interesting observation is that the support for Ukraine's membership in EU and NATO is much higher among the young population than older age groups. For example, support for Ukraine's EU membership among those aged 18-25 years was 60.7% while among the 56-65 year cohort the support was only 37%, significantly lower than support among younger Germans.

### 6 DO YOU THINK UKRAINE SHOULD BECOME A MEMBER OF THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS?




# FRANCE

## COVID-19 PANDEMIC

When asked about relations with Eastern neighbors amid the COVID-19 pandemic, respondents maintained a very France-centered perspective. 38.9% of respondents believe the French government should focus on its own priorities. Furthermore, 17.2% think that France should limit its relations to own benefits only. This shows a significant portion of population the holds isolationist views, focused primarily on domestic problems. In this context, it is also worth noting that the older the respondents, the more isolationist these views are. Only one in five people feel that the EU should draw Eastern countries closer to ensure regional stability.

### 1 GIVEN THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC, HOW SHOULD YOUR GOVERNMENT APPROACH RELATIONS WITH EASTERN NEIGHBOR STATES OUTSIDE OF THE EU (ESPECIALLY UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA)?




- █ Draw them closer to ensure more stability around the EU
- █ Focus on your country own problems
- █ Continue present cooperation
- █ Limit contacts to only what benefits your country



## ASSOCIATION WITH UKRAINE

French society holds rather negative associations with Ukraine. Seven of the top ten associations are negative, while the other three are neutral. Most respondents (15.5%) associate Ukraine with Russia, war and conflict (13.1%) and with Eastern Europe (10.6%). 10.5% associate Ukraine with poverty and unemployment as well. Overall, aside from the high degree of association with Russia, other narratives, such as “control-dominated by Russia”, “Putin”, etc. showing that the French public continues to view Ukraine through Russian lenses. Respondents who clearly expressed positive associations with Ukraine most often mentioned “culture/history” (4.6%), “breadbasket/soils” (3.3%) and “beautiful/beautiful country” (3.1%).


### 2 NAME YOUR THREE MAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH UKRAINE



## BARRIERS ON THE PATH TO EU

For the French public, Ukraine's ongoing fight against corruption is the foremost obstacle to allowing Ukraine to join the EU. The eradication of corruption was chosen as the foremost priority for Ukraine to join the EU by 44.8% of respondents, as a second priority by 20.3% and as a third priority by 14.8%. As a second priority, almost one-third of respondents (30%) mentioned that regaining territorial integrity is important and the improvement of economy came close with 29.6%. At the same time very few people (13.9%) see the improvement of Ukraine's economy as a top priority and most of these see it as a third-level priority, with 36.4%.

### 3 WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE DO ABOVE ALL IN ORDER TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EU? (in order of prioritization)\*






## SUPPORT OF UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

Respondents in France prioritized the extension of sanctions against Russia as the best way for their government to counter Russian aggression against Ukraine. As the top priority, the extension of sanctions was named by almost a quarter (23.4%) of respondents, and as a second priority by 17.9%. It is interesting that among the top priorities, 15% of French respondents indicated that France should not support Ukraine at all. The least popular option as a first priority was the question of arming Ukraine, only gaining 2.9% support. Quite close is the provision of the financial support which was mentioned by 4.8% of the respondents. A high proportion of respondents (40.3%) were indifferent to France's position toward Ukraine.

### 4 HOW COULD YOUR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION? (in order of prioritization)\*




\* 40,3% respondents answered «I don't know»



## EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM

In the long-term, French respondents prefer to treat EU-Ukraine relations as that of an ordinary neighbor – almost a third of respondents (29.6%) preferred this option. Nearly 20% of the population prefer to maintain relations like today. In addition, 16.9% prefer EU's relations with Ukraine to be built on market-based links without political support. This clearly shows that the majority of French respondents prefer maintaining the same, or a slightly lower level of relations between EU and Ukraine. Only 13.8% clearly indicated that they see Ukraine as a full member of EU in the future, while 19.8% preferred economic and political integration along the Norway model.

### 5 SHOW DO YOU SEE EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM?






## MEMBERSHIP IN EU AND NATO

Support for Ukraine's membership in EU and NATO is not popular in France. Overall, more than a third (34.6%) of respondents believe that Ukraine should not become member of NATO and EU, while support for EU membership is at 42.6% and for NATO at 39.9%. Those who are in favor of Ukraine's membership in both the EU and NATO represent only 17.1%. The greatest proportion of support for Ukraine's EU and NATO membership came from young respondents – aged 18 to 35

### 6 DO YOU THINK UKRAINE SHOULD BECOME A MEMBER OF THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS?




# ITALY

## COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Italians seem to be less sensitive to Eastern neighborhood states during the COVID-19 pandemic. Most of the respondents (31.4%) are in favor of focusing on domestic problems while the option to deepen relations with Eastern neighborhood states and the EU was the least popular (15.5%) response. Older respondents tended to disfavor closer relations with eastern neighbor states. The second most popular response, with 30.1%, was to maintain relations at the present level of cooperation. Less than a quarter – 23% – were in favor of limiting contacts as part of an isolationist, Italy-focused policy.

### **1 GIVEN THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC, HOW SHOULD YOUR GOVERNMENT APPROACH RELATIONS WITH EASTERN NEIGHBOR STATES OUTSIDE OF THE EU (ESPECIALLY UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA)?**




- █ Draw them closer to ensure more stability around the EU
- █ Focus on your country own problems
- █ Continue present cooperation
- █ Limit contacts to only what benefits your country



## ASSOCIATION WITH UKRAINE

Italian respondents were remarkable in their more positive attitudes towards Ukraine. Only one of the top ten associations was negative (“immigrants/unemployment” while other associations were neutral, including “gas/energy resources” and “politics” or positive, such as “culture/history” or “Ukrainian friends”. Surprisingly, associations with “war/conflict with Russia” were almost entirely absent, only registering a 0.6% response. But more predictably, Italians associated Ukraine with “football” and related terms such as “Shevchenko”, “Dynamo Kyiv”, and “Shakhtar Donetsk”.



### 2 NAME YOUR THREE MAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH UKRAINE



## BARRIERS ON THE WAY TO EU

Asked what Ukraine should do above all in order to become a member of the EU, respondents prioritized the eradication of corruption with support of 29.1% of those surveyed. The second most popular priority was for Ukraine to significantly improve its economy and finally, the third-ranked priority was for Ukraine to regain territorial integrity. More than a quarter of respondents (27.8%) do not know what Ukraine should prioritize in order to become an EU member. Overall, there was a fairly even distribution of answers to this particular question.

### 3 WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE DO ABOVE ALL IN ORDER TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EU? (in order of prioritization)\*




\* 27.8% respondents answered «I don't know»




## SUPPORT OF UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

Italians polled were asked how best to support Ukraine against Russian aggression; the most popular response (24.1%) was to offer Ukraine EU membership. Conversely, arming Ukraine was ranked as a highest priority by only 0.9% of respondents. The second and third most popular responses were to extend sanctions against Russia (16%) and offering greater financial support to Ukraine (8.6%). Most strikingly, 42.1% of Italians responded they did not know how best to support Ukraine, the most common response to this survey question.

### 4 HOW COULD YOUR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION? (in order of prioritization)\*




\* 42,1% respondents answered «I don't know»



## EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM

Almost a quarter of Italians (24.8%) see the development of relations with Ukraine similarly to that of an ordinary neighbor and another 21.5% believe that relations should be maintained as status quo. In addition, 17.4% would prefer market-based relations without political support for Ukraine. Slightly over a third of Italians wish to see Ukraine as either a full EU member (18.6%) or as a close and integrated economic and political partner (17.7%). Italians who aged over 65 are least supportive of EU membership for Ukraine.

### 5 SHOW DO YOU SEE EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM?






## MEMBERSHIP IN EU AND NATO

Views on Ukraine's potential membership in EU and NATO divided Italian respondents. A clear majority (61.6%) support EU membership for Ukraine while 31.3% view NATO accession for Ukraine positively. A smaller percentage of respondents, 16.6%, viewed NATO and EU membership as a possibility for Ukraine. Interestingly, males (20.8% in favor of EU and NATO) supported Ukraine's full European integration at a higher proportion than females surveyed (12.7%).

### 6 DO YOU THINK UKRAINE SHOULD BECOME A MEMBER OF THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS?




# POLAND

## COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Survey participants from Poland were more open to maintaining or deepening relations with eastern neighbors, including Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova; 36.3% of participants preferred to maintain the current level of relations, and 21.7% believed deepening relations would help ensure regional stability. Only 12.4% of respondents were in favor of a more Poland-centric, isolationist policy.

### 1 GIVEN THE ONGOING COVID-19 PANDEMIC, HOW SHOULD YOUR GOVERNMENT APPROACH RELATIONS WITH EASTERN NEIGHBOR STATES OUTSIDE OF THE EU (ESPECIALLY UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND GEORGIA)?




- Draw them closer to ensure more stability around the EU
- Focus on your country own problems
- Continue present cooperation
- Limit contacts to only what benefits your country



## ASSOCIATION WITH UKRAINE

Compared to other surveyed EU states, Poland has different associations with Ukraine and Ukrainians. Above all, there is less fragmentation in the answers. The most popular association was that of “immigration/seasonal workers” which is not unexpected given that more than 1 million Ukrainians work in Poland either permanently or seasonally. In a close second, and perhaps supporting the association with immigration, 25% of respondents associate Ukraine with “poverty/unemployment”. Associations with “war” which was the leading response in the aggregated data, came in third among Polish respondents with 16.4%. One element differentiating Poland from the rest of the surveyed countries is the shared and contentious historical memory; 7.7% of respondents associated Ukraine with “bad history with Poland/massacres of Poles in Volynia and Eastern Galicia” and by 4.1% with “[Stepan] Bandera”.


### 2 NAME YOUR THREE MAIN ASSOCIATIONS WITH UKRAINE



## BARRIERS ON THE WAY TO EU

Polish respondents especially underlined the need to eradicate corruption as the most important reform for Ukraine's potential EU membership. Overall, 39.4% of respondents chose this as the biggest priority. The second biggest priority was to improve the economy, followed by regaining territorial integrity.

### 3 WHAT SHOULD UKRAINE DO ABOVE ALL IN ORDER TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE EU? (in order of prioritization)\*





\* 12,4% respondents answered «I don't know»



## SUPPORT OF UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

Polish respondents showed a high degree of openness toward supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression. Asked how their government could support Ukraine, respondents most preferred to extend sanctions against Russia (23.3%) or offer Ukraine EU membership (22.3%). The third most common response was financial support for Ukraine, and finally, the proposal to arm Ukraine, an option which is widely unpopular in Poland. Very few respondents believed Poland should not support Ukraine at all, while nearly 30% did not know how Poland should best support Ukraine against Russian aggression.


### 4 HOW COULD YOUR GOVERNMENT SUPPORT UKRAINE AGAINST RUSSIAN AGGRESSION? (in order of prioritization)\*



## EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM

Asked about the future of EU-Ukraine relations, most Poles surveyed (30.5%) believe these relations should develop like those with an ordinary neighbor. The second most popular response was of those who wished to see Ukraine as a full member of the EU (21.2%) and then 21% who wish to see Ukraine as a close and integrated economic and political partner -- much like Norway is today. Respondents in favor of status quo relations (13.7%) and in favor of market-based relations without political support (13.6%) were in the minority. The greatest proportion of support for Ukraine as a full EU member was from the age category 56-65 years and 65+, whose support is almost 30%.

### 5 SHOW DO YOU SEE EU-UKRAINE RELATIONS IN THE LONG TERM?






## MEMBERSHIP IN EU AND NATO

A significant majority - 69.5% - of Poles surveyed believe Ukraine could become a member of EU (EU + EU and NATO) and almost half (49,5%) of Poles surveyed think Ukraine could become member of NATO. As for the separate entities, 33.3% think Ukraine could become a member of the EU only, 36.2% of the EU and NATO and 13.4% of NATO only. A minority, 17.1%, believed Ukraine could not become a member of any of the above organizations. The highest support for Ukraine's membership in EU and NATO was among respondents aged 65+.

### 6 DO YOU THINK UKRAINE SHOULD BECOME A MEMBER OF THE FOLLOWING ORGANIZATIONS?







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## ABOUT NEW EUROPE CENTER

*The New Europe Center was founded in 2017 as an independent think-tank. Despite its new brand, it is based on a research team that has been working together since 2009, at the Institute for World Policy. The New Europe Center became recognized by offering high-quality analysis on foreign policy issues in Ukraine and regional security by combining active, effective work with advocacy.*

*The New Europe Center's vision is very much in line with the views of the majority of Ukrainians about the future of their country: Ukraine should be integrated into the European Union and NATO. By integration, we understand not so much formal membership as the adoption of the best standards and practices for Ukraine to properly belong to the Euroatlantic value system.*

*More about New Europe Center: [www.neweurope.org.ua](http://www.neweurope.org.ua)*



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