

Unveiling the Ontological Implications of Motivation and Directedness Towards Inostensible Referents: an Evaluation of Meinong's and Russell's Perspectives

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How abstraction in computational models can be part of what there is ?

Problems

Presuppositions about existence in Realist Ontologies...

- Reference to Abstract entities is a complicated task [1] [2]
- The Universe is Independent from Human beings [1] [2]
- Skepticism towards Abstract entities [1]
- Confusion between "What is there" and "What to value" [3]
- Non-Ostension is assimilated to Non-Reference [1]
- Reduction of Non-Ostensive objects [1]

...but Curiosity is useful in Animal behavior models and RL

- Curious learners can generate complex, adaptable plans of action to satisfy their curiosity. [4]
- Curiosity is partly defined with "Inostensive Reference" [4]

Problem: no room in Realist Ontologies for Curiosity

- Impossible to integrate Curiosity in "what there is"
- Non-Ostensive Reference is a non-existent
- Need to model Curiosity with Inostensive reference

The ontological debate between Meinong and Russell: Analysis of their weaknesses.

Meinong's Theory of Objects [2]


	Pure Object (Außersein)					
Logic	Non Contradictory					Contradictory
Type	Complete		Incomplete			
Status	Being			Non-existence		
Sub-Status	Exists	Subsists				
Kinds of Objects	Concrete	Abstract	Ideal	Possible	Fictional	Impossible
Examples	This red apple with a diameter of 5 centimeters, weighs 200 grams from a specific region.	The concept of an apple.	The biggest apple in the world.	A possible apple of unknown color	The golden mountain of apples	An existent and non-existent apple

Russell's Theory of Facts [1]

Examples	1. Existence	2. Uniqueness	3. Predication	Proposition :
The Capital of Sweden is pretty	T	T	T	T
The Capital of England is pretty	T	T	F	F
The Capital of Holland is pretty	T	F	T	F
The Capital of Lilliput is pretty	F	T	T	F

Three metaphysical models about Mental entities

Meinong's Worldview




Abstract entities allowed even when they do not refer to the Real World

They *are* but *do not exist* : contradiction ?

Example: Pegasus is, but it does not exist.

Russell's Worldview




Abstract entities are allowed iff they refer to the Real World.

If they do not refer, they are significations without reference.

Example: Pegasus can be reduced to "winged horse". "winged" and "horse" exist, but not when combined together.

Naturalist's Worldview



Abstract entities are allowed as part of Cumulative Culture.

"Non-existent" entities are cognitive and cultural entities: no contradiction.

Example: Pegasus exists as a cognitive and cultural entity.

[5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

Implications

A Naturalist Metaphysics to bypass Realists Presuppositions

- Reference to abstractions is allowed [8]
- The Universe, through evolution, constructs Human beings [8]
- Human-dependent entities socially and cognitively exist, even when they are false/wrong [9]
- If something exists, it does not mean it has to be valued [9]
- Non-Ostensive Reference is thus part of existence [9]
- Curiosity implies contradictory beliefs or ideas that are tested by agents

An Ontological argument about Models

Models are part of what there is:

- Curiosity and Intrinsic Motivation exist in the Universe
- Studying animals (including humans) + RL is part of Universe

Limits

- Meinong's theory is better to describe ordinary language but "there are things that do not exist"
- How to construct a new concept of Reality inside Naturalism ?
- Processual, Pluralist and Participatory Realism ?

References

- [1] B. Russell, Principles of Mathematics (1903)
- [2] A. Meinong, "On the theory of objects" (1904)
- [3] W. Quine, "On what there is", Review of Metaphysics (1948)
- [4] N. M. Ady, R. Shariff, J. Günther, and P. M. Pilarski, "Five Properties of Specific Curiosity You Didn't Know Curious Machines Should Have" (2022)
- [5] J. Schaffer, "On what grounds what.", *Metametaphysics* (2009)
- [6] C. Matheson, "Is the Naturalist Really Naturally a Realist?" *Mind* (1989)
- [7] R. Peels., "Should We Accept Scientism?: The Argument from Self-Referential Incoherence », *What is Scientific Knowledge?*" (2019)
- [8] J. Dupré, D. J. Nicholson, "A Manifesto for a Processual Philosophy of Biology", in *Everything flows* (2018)
- [9] A. Rozanski, "De la légitimité d'exister", Master's thesis (2020)