



Security Assessment

OolongSwap

Oct 15th, 2021



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About

Summary

This report has been prepared for OolongSwap to discover issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the OolongSwap project as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. A comprehensive examination has been performed, utilizing Static Analysis and Manual Review techniques.

The auditing process pays special attention to the following considerations:

- Testing the smart contracts against both common and uncommon attack vectors.
- Assessing the codebase to ensure compliance with current best practices and industry standards.
- Ensuring contract logic meets the specifications and intentions of the client.
- Cross referencing contract structure and implementation against similar smart contracts produced by industry leaders.
- Thorough line-by-line manual review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that ranged from critical to informational. We recommend addressing these findings to ensure a high level of security standards and industry practices. We suggest recommendations that could better serve the project from the security perspective:

- Enhance general coding practices for better structures of source codes;
- Add enough unit tests to cover the possible use cases;
- Provide more comments per each function for readability, especially contracts that are verified in public;
- Provide more transparency on privileged activities once the protocol is live.

Overview

Project Summary

Project Name	OolongSwap
Platform	Ethereum
Language	Solidity
Codebase	https://github.com/OolongSwap/oolongswap-core/tree/903dd1166b6336b709c8873bb2c0ac43db5ca8a1/contracts
Commit	

Audit Summary

Delivery Date	Oct 15, 2021
Audit Methodology	Static Analysis, Manual Review
Key Components	

Vulnerability Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total	⚠ Pending	⊗ Declined	ℹ Acknowledged	🕒 Partially Resolved	✅ Resolved
🔴 Critical	0	0	0	0	0	0
🟠 Major	2	0	0	2	0	0
🟡 Medium	0	0	0	0	0	0
🟠 Minor	0	0	0	0	0	0
🟡 Informational	4	0	0	4	0	0
🟢 Discussion	0	0	0	0	0	0

Audit Scope

ID	File	SHA256 Checksum
IER	interfaces/IERC20.sol	f665e903b98b0d76a0becad5fc84c03bd380b00edfa2bdc36ea424d46018e123
IOS	interfaces/IOolongSwapCallee.sol	58a2ad166f54b4dda1379a01a6d9540e713723b1cb2c87fa2a3d65b5a9b4e568
IOE	interfaces/IOolongSwapERC20.sol	50244578f26937d73a30313a323c97ef813fc32522b9dfc99f4c067ed3cabd3f
IOF	interfaces/IOolongSwapFactory.sol	c4823ca843c48a50fbde65cc9080b4786ee0773dff6e9fc0c5f286bb8d1c82ce
IOP	interfaces/IOolongSwapPair.sol	1bd1fcc2e0c5537d884427012f7532cd997a4578d037092c5d63da64d690acab
IOR	interfaces/IOolongSwapRouter01.sol	10acfe464c79561f500e9d42b53be18360ed34b2b658c376d8fb5cb0c9f2aa39
IOC	interfaces/IOolongSwapRouter02.sol	a56f1dd1dd0c9669b1a1292c4ebb031fe72fb7c7e42e59d1c7585899c479c047
IWE	interfaces/IWETH.sol	973ac9cc6853587679062600c304b5cb425fffd8ea1cfec1b528f9782e9b265
MCK	libraries/Math.sol	e5e4a6f522b7ef72418e81874bb0e37646c7e6c9cd104c5e1d8cbaa13eb2fcc0
OSL	libraries/OolongSwapLibrary.sol	5e232f5eaa540299da7f1e80e0f34187f6a86cefca305277dd47b584c8ae8d06
SMC	libraries/SafeMath.sol	6d35be465dd8c9a5798d3eee87fd68e94fda06c378015d029d5d575248aa211b
THC	libraries/TransferHelper.sol	87ea8e943bc7a366b85869ae4e6973ef76238b943cced84219c47dd8fa1f5cb8
UQC	libraries/UQ112x112.sol	6c58c41fe1a59dd88cfc538d2366a26a312fea2dd21cc19f90ede6061dacbc5b
OSE	OolongSwapERC20.sol	19d196e906acf0562727ea307f619ec0fc5529f0375192a3af53015b13723d58

ID	File	SHA256 Checksum
OSF	OolongSwapFactory.sol	3fa955cb7a8312aefb18529d8a88d0c893f6d3d71a2482e6d71d6a8e8e2f85dd
OSP	OolongSwapPair.sol	d07e8cb5fcd606bc198853b7bfd3d6aa1e0a55f185a44a606fe764f2a7a16342
OSR	OolongSwapRouter02.sol	05b4729b213b7cc1239fee435a432b44e9493e393d44d97d1cb5f2f8bc754939

Findings



■ Critical	0 (0.00%)
■ Major	2 (33.33%)
■ Medium	0 (0.00%)
■ Minor	0 (0.00%)
■ Informational	4 (66.67%)
■ Discussion	0 (0.00%)

ID	Title	Category	Severity	Status
OSF-01	Lack of input validation	Volatile Code	● Informational	ⓘ Acknowledged
OSF-02	Centralization Risk	Centralization / Privilege	● Major	ⓘ Acknowledged
OSP-01	Mismatch of Codes and Comments	Coding Style	● Informational	ⓘ Acknowledged
OSP-02	Centralization Risk	Centralization / Privilege	● Major	ⓘ Acknowledged
OSR-01	Proper Usage of <code>require</code> And <code>assert</code> Functions	Language Specific	● Informational	ⓘ Acknowledged
OSR-02	Lack of input validation	Volatile Code	● Informational	ⓘ Acknowledged

OSF-01 | Lack of input validation

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	● Informational	OolongSwapFactory.sol: 25	📄 Acknowledged

Description

The assigned value to address type variable `_feeToSetter` should be verified as a non-zero value to prevent error.

Recommendation

Check that the address is not zero in the function as shown below:

```
require(_feeToSetter != address(0), "_feeToSetter is zero address!");
```

Alleviation

No Alleviation.


OSF-02 | Centralization Risk

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	● Major	OolongSwapFactory.sol: 57~60, 62~65, 67~71, 74~78, 81~85	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

In the contract, `OolongSwapFactory`, the role, `feeToSetter`, has the authority over the functions shown in the diagram below.

Any compromise to the privileged account which has access to `feeToSetter` may allow the hacker to take advantage of this.



Recommendation

We advise the client to carefully manage the privileged account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked.

In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol to be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., Multisignature wallets.

Indicatively, here is some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at the different level in term of short-term and long-term:

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;
- Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the private key;
- Introduction of a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement.

Alleviation

The development team replied that they will solve it with multi sig wallet.

OSP-01 | Mismatch of Codes and Comments

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Coding Style	● Informational	OolongSwapPair.sol: 89, 100	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

The comment says that the mint liquidity is equivalent to 1/6th of the growth in \sqrt{k} , but the statement implies not.

Alleviation

No Alleviation.

OSP-02 | Centralization Risk

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Centralization / Privilege	● Major	OolongSwapPair.sol: 102	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

In the contract `OolongSwapPair`, the `feeTo` account would gain more and more fees when the `feeOn` is `true`. Any compromise to the `feeTo` account may allow the hacker to take advantage of this.

Recommendation

We advise the client to carefully manage the `feeTo` account's private key to avoid any potential risks of being hacked. In general, we strongly recommend centralized privileges or roles in the protocol to be improved via a decentralized mechanism or smart-contract-based accounts with enhanced security practices, e.g., Multisignature wallets.

Indicatively, here is some feasible suggestions that would also mitigate the potential risk at the different level in term of short-term and long-term:

- Time-lock with reasonable latency, e.g., 48 hours, for awareness on privileged operations;
- Assignment of privileged roles to multi-signature wallets to prevent a single point of failure due to the private key;
- Introduction of a DAO/governance/voting module to increase transparency and user involvement.

Alleviation

The development team replied that they will solve it with multi sig wallet.

OSR-01 | Proper Usage of `require` And `assert` Functions

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Language Specific	● Informational	OolongSwapRouter02.sol: 30	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

The `assert` function should only be used to test for internal errors, and to check invariants. The `require` function should be used to ensure valid conditions, such as inputs, or contract state variables are met, or to validate return values from calls to external contracts.

Recommendation

We advise the client using the `require` function, along with a custom error message when the condition fails, instead of the `assert` function

Alleviation

No Alleviation.

OSR-02 | Lack of input validation

Category	Severity	Location	Status
Volatile Code	● Informational	OolongSwapRouter02.sol: 25~26	ⓘ Acknowledged

Description

The assigned values to address type variables `factory`, `WETH` should be verified as non-zero values to prevent error.

Recommendation

Check that the addresses are not zero in the constructor, like below:

```
require(_factory != address(0), "_factory is zero address!");  
require(_WETH != address(0), "_WETH is zero address!");
```

Alleviation

No Alleviation.

Appendix

Finding Categories

Centralization / Privilege

Centralization / Privilege findings refer to either feature logic or implementation of components that act against the nature of decentralization, such as explicit ownership or specialized access roles in combination with a mechanism to relocate funds.

Volatile Code

Volatile Code findings refer to segments of code that behave unexpectedly on certain edge cases that may result in a vulnerability.

Language Specific

Language Specific findings are issues that would only arise within Solidity, i.e. incorrect usage of private or delete.

Coding Style

Coding Style findings usually do not affect the generated byte-code but rather comment on how to make the codebase more legible and, as a result, easily maintainable.

Checksum Calculation Method

The "Checksum" field in the "Audit Scope" section is calculated as the SHA-256 (Secure Hash Algorithm 2 with digest size of 256 bits) digest of the content of each file hosted in the listed source repository under the specified commit.

The result is hexadecimal encoded and is the same as the output of the Linux "sha256sum" command against the target file.

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