


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NOTE: AKM utilizes an Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM) methodology when it comes to encrypting and authenticating. Thus, for purposes of simplification of the state machine, when it is testing whether or not a frame can be decrypted or not, that test includes both a successful authentication of the message, followed by a successful decryption of the message. If a message has been authenticated, and then fails to decrypt the frame, then implies there is something seriously wrong with the implementation and should go to Fatal Error state and should reflect that in a status message both to its own host log file as well as sending that to the AKM Provisioning and Monitoring module as an analytic message.

AKM FSM Acronyms and Definitions



- ADF: AKM Data Frame** – The AKM Data Frame refers to the normal user data frame encrypted within the AKM framework.
- ATR: AKM Trust Relationship** – The AKM Trust Relationship (ATR) is what defines the two nodes in the AKM PTP relationship.
- CS-BEK: Current Session-Bulk Encryption Key** – This is the Bulk Encryption Key associated with the current AKM session.
- FSM: Finite State Machine** – The AKM Protocol Processing FSM is represented by an event/state diagram illustrating the logical progression through the processing of an AKM frame and the interrelationship with other AKM Edge Nodes.
- NS-BEK: Next Session-Bulk Encryption Key** – This is the Bulk Encryption Key associated with the next AKM session.
- PTP: Point-to-Point** – Refers to the configuration of the AKM Trust Relationship. The initial implementation of AKM will ONLY support PTP.
- SAF: Session Announcement Frame** – This is a regular AKM data frame with the Session Announcement Bit Flag set. This is used to announce that the session is now fully active.

States

- AS1: AKM Session State-1
- AS2: AKM Session State-2
- AS3: AKM Session State-3
- BFE: Bad Frame Error Threshold Policy State
- CFB: Check if Fallback Session Key can Decrypt Frame State
- CFS: Check Failsafe Key State
- CNS: Check if Next Session Key can Decrypt Frame State
- EFB: Enter Fallback Session FSM State
- FBI: Fallback Initialization State
- FBR: Fallback Retransmission Timer Check State
- FBW: Fallback Wait State
- FS2: Failsafe Check for 2nd Frame in Failsafe 3-Way Handshake State
- FS3: Failsafe Check for 3rd Frame in Failsafe 3-Way Handshake State
- FSE: Test Failsafe Error Threshold State
- FSI: Failsafe Initialization State
- FSW: Failsafe Wait State
- RPR: Request PMM Reset State
- SS: Start State
- TFB: Test Fallback Completion State

AKM Session-1 (SA1) State – The FSM enters this state upon transmission of a regular AKM frame (either a Session Announcement AKM frame or regular AKM frame).

AKM Session-2 (SA2) State – The FSM enters this state when there is a periodic AKM frame timeout .

AKM Session-3 (SA2) State – The FSM enters this state upon receipt of a regular AKM frame.

Bad Frame Error (BFE) State – The FSM traverses to this state in order to test if the “Bad Frame Error Threshold Policy” has been exceeded or not.

Check if Fallback Session Key can Decrypt Frame (CFB) State – The FSM traverses to this state in order to see if the Fallback Session Key can be used (or not) to decrypt the current frame.

Check Failsafe (CFS) State – The FSM traverses to this state to check if the current frame can be decrypted by the Failsafe Session Key. If not, it then checks to see if the Fallback Error Threshold Policy has been exceeded and if not, discards the frame and continues Fallback processing. If the Fallback Error Threshold Policy has been exceeded, then the FSM will initiate Failsafe Session processing by transmitting the 1st frame in a 3-way Failsafe protocol exchange.

Check Next Session Key (CNS) State – The FSM traverses to this state to check if the current frame can be decrypted by the Next Session Key. If not, it then it tries the Fallback Session Key. However, if it can be decrypted with the Next Session Key, then it assigns the Next Session Key (NS-BEK) to the Current Session Key (CS-BEK) and returns back to the Session Activated State, transmitting a Session Announcement Frame, which confirms a new session has successfully started.

Enter Fallback Session (EFB) State – The FSM traverses to this state to after receiving the 1st frame in the 3-way Fallback protocol exchange from the other end of the PTP connection.

Fallback Initialization (FBI) State – The FSM traverses to this state after the Edge Node has initiated a Failsafe Session by transmitting the 1st frame in the 3-Way Fallback Session Handshake protocol.

Fallback Retransmission (FBR) Timer Check State – The FSM traverses to this state when it cannot decrypt the current frame with either the Fallback Key or the Failsafe Key and checks to see if the “Fallback Retransmit Time-out” has been exceeded. Either way it discards the junk frame and if it the retransmit time-out has not been exceeded, it goes directly back to the EFB state and if it has been exceeded, it retransmits the 2nd FB Frame of the Fallback 3-way Handshake.

Fallback Wait (FBW) State – The FSM traverses to this state after the Edge Node responds with the 2nd frame in the Fallback Session 3-Way handshake protocol. It then wait there for one of four events:

- 1) The Edge Node receives a new AKM frame.
- 2) The Fallback Retransmit Time-out has been exceeded.
- 3) The Fallback Retransmit Time-out has not been exceeded.
- 4) The Fallback Error Threshold Policy has been exceeded.

Failsafe Check for 2nd Frame in Failsafe 3-Way Handshake (FS2) State – The FSM traverses to this state after the Edge Node has initiated a Failsafe Session by transmitting the 1st frame and then subsequently received an incoming AKM frame, with the expectation that the incoming frame is the 2nd frame in the Failsafe 3-Way Handshake.

Failsafe Check for 3rd Frame in Failsafe 3-Way Handshake (FS3) State – The FSM traverses to this state after the Edge Node has transmitted the 2nd frame in the Failsafe 3-Way Handshake, and has subsequently received an incoming AKM frame, with the expectation that the incoming frame is the 3rd frame in the Failsafe 3-Way Handshake. Thus, completing the Failsafe Session 3-Way Handshake.

Test Failsafe Error Threshold (FSE) State – The FSM traverses to this state after the Edge Node could not decrypt the frame with the Failsafe Session Key and checks if the Failsafe Error Threshold Policy has been exceeded, If it has, it goes to the RIR state where it will request the Provisioning & Monitor Module (PMM) to reset the AKM relationship. This can be done by either the PMM or the AKM Backend Configuration server, insofar as “autonomous” reconfigurations can occur. It can always be reconfigured manually, but doing so should never be required.

Failsafe Initialization (FSI) State – The FSM traverses to this state after the Edge Node has initiated a Failsafe Session by transmitting the 1st frame in the 3-Way Fallback Session Handshake protocol.

Failsafe Wait (FSW) State – The FSM traverses to this state after the Edge Node responds with the 2nd frame in the Failsafe Session 3-Way handshake protocol. It then wait there for one of three events:

- 1) The Edge Node receives a new AKM frame.
- 2) The Failsafe Retransmit Time-out has been exceeded.
- 3) The Failsafe Error Threshold Policy has been exceeded.

NOTE: that if the Failsafe Error Threshold Policy has been exceeded, the AKM relationship must be reset externally by either the PMM or the AKM Backend Configuration server, insofar as “autonomous” reconfigurations can occur. It can always be reconfigured manually, but doing so should never be required.

Request PMM Reset (RPR) State – This state is entered if both Fallback Resynchronization and Failsafe Resynchronization efforts have failed and the AKM Trust Relationship must request its state be reset by either the PMM or the backend configuration server. If there is no PMM within the network and there is no network connectivity to the backend, then, the AKM security group’s designated Arbiter Node will attempt to reconfigure the AKM Trust Relationship. If one of the nodes has lost all ability to connect via AKM, then, the AKM Trust Relationship will remain disabled until a network administrator can manually refresh the AKM Trust Relationship.

Session Start (SS) State – Each ATR has an ascending order of priority that determines which node within the ATR will transmit the SEF first. If within a preconfigured time, that does not begin transmitting after power-on reset, the next node by order of priority will transmit the SEF, and so on, until finally one of the nodes within the ATR is successful at starting the session.

NOTE: The Session Establishment Frame SEF) is a normal AKM Data Frame (ADF), with whatever payload the sender wishes to send. The only difference is that the SIF bit flag is set and remains set until the other node in the PTP relationship responds, at which time, it will then set the SAF bit (which is the Session Active bit).

Test Fallback (TFB) Completion State – This state test whether or not the Fallback Resynchronization process has completed by receiving the final frame in the Fallback 3-Way protocol.

Non-Fatal Exception (NFE) State – This state is entered whenever there is a State/Event transition that is not expected within the FSM. Meaning, an event occurred within a particular state that should not have occurred while in that state. Thus, the FSM needs to go to this state as a means of capturing whatever data it can in order to determine how that happened (that the FSM had a State/Event transition that was not expected).

AKM FSM (Event Descriptions)

AKM Versions Do Not Agree (AVDNA) Event – This event indicates that the two endpoints constituting the AKM Trust Relationship do not agree. The only known method for correcting this is to re-provision one or both endpoints making up the ATR.

Bad Frame Error Policy Threshold Exceeded (BFETPE) Event – This event indicates that the policy for the “bad frame error threshold” has been exceeded.

Bad Frame Error Threshold NOT Exceeded (BFETPNE) Event – This event indicates that the policy for the “bad frame error threshold” has NOT been exceeded.

Could NOT Decrypt Frame with Fallback nor Failsafe Keys (CNDDFFBSK) Event – This event indicates that the current AKM Data Frame (ADF) was not able to be decrypted using either the Fallback or Failsafe session keys.

Could NOT Decrypt Frame with CS, NS, or FB Keys (CNDFCSNSFB) Event – This event indicates that the current frame being processed was not able to be decrypted with the CS-BEK, the NS-BEK, nor the FB-BEK.

Could NOT Decrypt Frame with Fallback Key (CNDDFFBK) Event – This event indicates that the current frame being processed was not able to be decrypted with the FB-BEK.

Could NOT Decrypt Frame and Failsafe Error Threshold NOT Exceeded (CNDDFFSETNE) Event – This event indicates that the current AKM frame cannot be decrypted by the Failsafe Session Key, but the Failsafe Error Threshold policy has not been exceeded. Thus, implying the FSM should remain within the Failsafe Resynchronization session.

Could NOT Decrypt Frame with Failsafe Key (CNDDFFSK) Event – This event indicates that the current AKM frame cannot be decrypted by the Failsafe Session Key.

Could NOT Decrypt Frame with NS-BEK (NDNS) Event – This event indicates that the current AKM Data Frame (ADF) cannot be decrypted using the next session BEK.

Decrypted Inbound AKM Frame with CS-BEK (DIAFCSK) Event – This event indicates that the current frame was successfully decrypted using the current session’s BEK (i.e., CS-BEK).

Decrypted Inbound AKM Frame with FB-BEK (DIAFFBK) Event – This event indicates that the current frame was successfully decrypted using the Fallback session’s BEK (i.e., FB-BEK).


Decrypted Inbound AKM Frame with FS-BEK (DIAFFSK) Event – This event indicates that the current frame was successfully decrypted using the Failsafe session’s BEK (i.e., FB-BEK).

- Decrypted Inbound AKM Frame with NS-BEK (DIAFNSK) Event** – This event indicates that the current frame was successfully decrypted using the current session’s BEK (i.e., NS-BEK).
- Fallback Retransmit Timer Exceeded (FBRTTE) Event** – This event indicates that the Fallback Retransmit Time-out has been exceeded and it is now time to retransmit another Fallback Frame in an effort to get the other PTP to respond in kind with its own Fallback Frame, so that the AKM Trust Relationship can return back to normal AKM frame processing.
- Fallback Retransmit Timer NOT Exceeded (FBRTTE) Event** – This event indicates that the Fallback Retransmit Time-out has not yet been exceeded (i.e., has not yet expired).
- Fallback Error Threshold Exceeded (FBETE) Event** – This event indicates that the Fallback Error Threshold Policy has been exceeded and the FSM should transition into the Failsafe Session FSM.
- Fallback Error Threshold NOT Exceeded (FRETNE) Event** – This event indicates that the Fallback Error Threshold Policy has NOT been exceeded and the FSM should remain within the Fallback Session FSM.
- Failsafe Error Threshold Exceeded (FSETE) Event** – This event indicates that the Failsafe Error Threshold Policy has been exceeded and the FSM should transition into the Request PMM Reset (RIR) state.
- Failsafe Error Threshold NOT Exceeded (FSETNE) Event** – This event indicates that the Failsafe Error Threshold Policy has not been exceeded and the FSM should remain within the Failsafe Session FSM.
- Failsafe Retransmit Timer Exceeded (FSRTTE) Event** – This event indicates that the Failsafe Retransmit Time-out has been exceeded and the Edge Node should re-transmit another Failsafe Session Notification Frame in an effort to resynch with the other end of the AKM PTP connection.
- New Frame Queued for Transmit (NAFQT) Event** – This event indicates that the current frame was successfully decrypted using the Fallback session’s BEK (i.e., FB-BEK).
- Periodic AKM Frame Timeout (PAFTO) Event** – This event indicates that the AKM Frame Timeout has expired and another AKM Keepalive frame must be transmitted.
- Receive AKM Frame (RAF) Event** – This event indicates that an AKM Frame has been received and is ready for processing.
- Received 3rd part of Failsafe 3-Way Handshake Session Establishment Protocol (R3FS3WHS) Event** – The Edge Node’s FSM has received the 3rd and final frame in the Failsafe Resynchronization 3-Way Handshake session establishment protocol and can now safely transition back to normal communication.
- Received 2nd part of Failsafe 3-Way Handshake Session Establishment Protocol (R2FS3WHS) Event** – The Edge Node’s FSM has received the 2nd part of in the Failsafe Resynchronization 3-Way Handshake session establishment protocol and can now transmit out the 3rd and final part of the Failsafe 3-Way handshake and safely transition back to normal communication.
- Start AKM (SAKM) Event** – This event is used to start the AKM Finite State Machine (FSM).
- Transmit AKM Frame with CS-BEK (TAFCS) Event** – This event indicates that an AKM Frame has been encrypted with the current session key (CS-BEK) and subsequently transmitted.

AKM FSM (Action Descriptions)

- Attempt to Decrypt Frame with Fallback Resynchronization Session Key (ADFFBK) Action** – This action implicitly indicates that the current and next session keys have failed and thus, the FSM should attempt to decrypt the current frame with the Fallback Resynchronization Session key.
- Attempt to Decrypt Frame with Failsafe Resynchronization Session Key (ADFFSK) Action** – This action implicitly indicates that attempts to decrypt the current frame with the Fallback Resynchronization Session key.
- Set CS-BEK to FB Key & Transmit AKM Session Announcement Frame (CSTFBTASAF) Action** – This action updates the current session key with the current Fallback Session Key and subsequently sends out a Session Announcement Frame (by setting the Session Announcement bit in a regular frame) to let the other endpoint know that a new session has started.
- Set CS-BEK to FS Key & Transmit AKM Session Announcement Frame (CSTFSTASAF) Action** – This action updates the current session key with the current Failsafe Session Key and subsequently sends out a Session Announcement Frame (by setting the Session Announcement bit in a regular frame) to let the other endpoint know that a new session has started.
- Discard Frame (DF) Action** – This action discards the current frame.
- Discard Frame, Respond with 1st Failsafe Frame in 3-Way Failsafe Handshake (DFRP13WFSHS) Action** – This action discards the current Fallback frame (which could not be decrypted) and then initiates Failsafe Resynchronization by transmitting out the 1st Failsafe frame in the 3-Way Failsafe Handshake protocol.
- Discard Frame and Transmit 1st FB Frame in 3-Way Fallback Handshake (DFT1FBF3WFBHS) Action** – This action discards the current frame (which could not be decrypted) and then initiates Fallback Resynchronization by transmitting out the 1st Fallback frame in the 3-Way Fallback Handshake protocol.
- Discard Frame and Transmit 1st FS Frame in 3-Way Failsafe Handshake (DFT1FSF3WFSHS) Action** – This action discards the current frame (which could not be decrypted) and then initiates Failsafe Resynchronization by transmitting out the 1st Failsafe frame in the 3-Way Failsafe Handshake protocol.
- Discard Frame and Test Fallback Resynchronization Session Fail Timer (DFTFBSFT) Action** – This action discards the current frame and checks to see if the time allotted for the Fallback Resynchronization Session Fail Timer has been exceeded.

- Discard Frame and Transmit AKM Session Announcement Frame (DFTASAF) Action** – This action discards the current frame and then transmits an AKM session announcement frame, which is generally transmit at the beginning of a new session.
- Discard Frame and Test Fallback Retransmit Timeout Policy (DFTFBRTTOP) Action** – This action discards the current frame and then tests to see if the Fallback Retransmit Timeout Policy has been exceeded or not.
- Do Nothing (DN) Action** – This action represents that the FSM should not take any direct action as a consequence of this state/event transition.
- Enter Fallback Mode and Transmit 2nd FB Frame of 3-way Handshake (EFMT23HS) Action** – This action occurs after the FSM enters the Fallback 3-Way Handshake as a consequence of receiving the 1st Fallback Frame of the 3-way Fallback handshake protocol and subsequently responds with the 2nd Fallback Frame in the 3-way Fallback handshake protocol.
- Inbound AKM Frame Processing (IAFP) Action** – This action represents the processing of an inbound AKM frame, including the decryption.
- Retry Decryption with Fallback Session Key (RDFBSK) Action** – This action implicitly indicates that attempts to decrypt the current frame with the current and next session keys have failed and the Fallback Session key should now be tried for decrypting the current frame.
- Retry Decryption with Next Session Key (RDNSK) Action** – This action implicitly indicates that attempts to decrypt the current frame with the current session key has failed and the next session key should now be tried for decrypting the current frame.
- Request PMM Reset (RPMMR) Action** – As a representative of the AKM Trust Relationship, the Edge Node requests that the AKM Trust Relationship be reset by either the Provisioning Management Module (PMM) or the backend configuration server. If there is no PMM within the network and there is no network connectivity to the backend, then, the AKM security group’s designated Arbiter Node will attempt to reconfigure the AKM Trust Relationship. If both nodes are no longer present within the AKM PTP Trust Relationship, then, the AKM Trust Relationship will remain disabled until a network administrator can manually refresh the AKM PTP Trust Relationship
- Respond with 2nd Failsafe Frame in 3-Way Failsafe Handshake (RP23WFSHS) Action** – This action occurs as a consequence of receiving the 1st Failsafe Frame of the 3-way Failsafe handshake protocol and subsequently responds with the 2nd Failsafe Frame in the 3-way Failsafe handshake protocol.
- Set CS-BEK to NS-BEK & Transmit AKM Session Announcement Frame (SCNSTPAF) Action** – This action occurs as a consequence of receiving an incoming frame that can only be decrypted using the next session Bulk Encryption Key (NS-BEK).
- Transmit 1st Fallback Frame in 3-Way Fallback Handshake (T1FBF3WFBHS) Action** – This action initiates the Fallback 3-Way Handshake by sending the first frame in the aforementioned Fallback Session 3-Way Handshake protocol.
- Transmit 1st Failsafe Frame in 3-Way Fallback Handshake (T1FSF3WFSHS) Action** – This action initiates the Failsafe 3-Way Handshake by sending the first frame in the aforementioned Failsafe Session 3-Way Handshake protocol.
- Transmit 2nd Fallback Frame in 3-Way Fallback Handshake (T2FBF3WFBHS) Action** – This action responds to the 1st FB Frame in the Fallback 3-Way Handshake by sending the 2nd FB frame in the aforementioned Fallback Session 3-Way Handshake protocol.
- Transmit AKM Frame with CS-BEK (TAFCSBEK) Action** – This action transmit a regular AKM Frame with CS-BEK.
- Transmit AKM SA Frame with CS-BEK (TASAFCSBEK) Action** – This action transmit an AKM Session Announcement Frame with CS-BEK.
- Test Frame Error Threshold Policy (TFETP) Action** – This action tests to see if the Fallback Frame Error Threshold Policy has been exceeded or not.
- Test Frame Failsafe Error Threshold Policy (TFFSETP) Action** – This action tests to see if the Failsafe Error Threshold policy has been exceeded.




AKM Layer Security (ALS) Protocol Processing Performs:

- 1) Frame Header Processing.
- 2) Digital Signature Processing.
- 3) Encryption Processing.

The below is an overview of what is required in processing an incoming ALS frame:

- 1) First, there is there is the recognition of the frame being delineated into two unencrypted parts and an encrypted part.
- 2) If the relationship identifier does not match an AKM Trust Relationship within the AKM Node, then the frame should be discarded.
- 3) The “Total Frame Size” field provides the size of the entire frame, including the Frame HMAC.
- 4) The first encrypted fields are the Frame-Type bit (Data-Frame or Management Frame), Application field, and Flag Bits. Process application and flags bits accordingly (i.e., this is implementation dependent).
- 5) The next encrypted field is the AKM Revision Field is used to ensure that all processing of frames between the endpoints utilizes the same exact frame structure. The value of this should match the AKM revision that the receiving endpoint is using.
- 6) The next encrypted field is the ATR Integrity Code, which is used to provide implicit zero trust functionality, given that every AKM Endpoint has previously authenticated both its endpoint and its membership within an AKM Trust Relationship. This field utilizes a 4-byte snippet of the ATR Integrity Code and the specific snippet used will directly be tied to a modulo 8 value (for a SHA256 based HMAC) of the ATR IC.
- 7) Check the “Replay Counter”.
- 8) Process the Source Node Identifier information, which should correspond with the ATR Identifier.
- 9) Authenticate the frame, using the Frame HMAC, that is added to the frame after it has been encrypted. NOTE: AKM uses an EtM (i.e., Encrypt, then, MAC) methodology, so only authenticate the frame after it has been decrypted. Also, the number of bytes to include for the Frame HMAC, defaults to 4-bytes, but is always the same throughout the deployment. Thus, every frame within a deployment will ALWAYS use the same Frame HMAC snippet (ranging from 4-32 bytes).

AKM Frame Processing (Outgoing)




AKM Layer Security (ALS) Protocol Processing Performs:

- 1) Frame Header Processing.
- 2) Digital Signature Processing.
- 3) Encryption Processing.

The below is an overview of what is required in processing an outgoing ALS frame:

- 1) Fill out the Relationship ID and Source ID. Because this is Point-to-Point, there is no need to fill in the Destination Node ID.
- 2) Calculate and insert the Frame Encrypted Part Size.
- 3) The first encrypted fields are the Frame Type, Application Specific, and Flag bits.
- 4) The next encrypted field is the AKM Revision Field is used to ensure that all processing of frames between the endpoints utilizes the same exact frame structure. The value of this should match the AKM revision that the receiving endpoint is using.
- 5) The next encrypted field is the Replay Counter, that is updated with each outgoing frame.
- 6) The next encrypted field is the specific ATR Integrity Code Segment, and must be inserted in accordance to the value of the Replay Counter (the ATR is divided into segments and then a Modulo Value of the Replay counter is utilized to determine which 4-bytes of the ATR IC is used.
- 7) The next encrypted field is the Source Node Identifier.
- 8) And, the final encrypted field is the actual payload.
- 9) Thus, all of the encrypted fields must be encrypted with AES.
- 10) Finally, calculate the Frame HMAC to validate the entire frame in accordance with the description provided previous section (outlining “Incoming” processing in (9), describing frame authentication).
- 11) Pass it down to TCP, UDP, or other transport layer protocol ... context and/or implementation dependent.



ATR Identifier: This 128-bit field represents the AKM Trust Relationship Identifier. In theory, because this version of AKM is point-to-point, there would be no need for either the Source Node Identifier or Destination Node Identifier given that the Relationship Identifier binds the two side together and with the exception of a “loopback” test of some sort, the AKM frame could only come from one place. However, as of this writing, only the destination node identifier is eliminated.

Total Frame Size: This 2-byte field has a maximum allowed value of 64K – the size of the Encrypted Part of the Frame.

AKM Frame Type: Currently, this is a 1-bit field, with ‘0’ representing a user data frame and ‘1’ representing a management frame. AKM management frames have yet to be defined, so at present, this field should always be ‘0’. At a minimum, AKM Management Frames will probably be used for resynching during Fallback and Failsafe.

AKM Application Parameter bits are seven bits and will enable specific applications on opposing ends of a connection to directly communicate with each other.

The AKM frame header Flag bits have eight bits available for use. Bit definitions that are available, include, but are not limited to the following bits:


- ❑ Bits 0-2: Session Indicator Values indicate the “state” of the session:
 - ❖ Value: 000 – Undefined and does not use the SIV.
 - ❖ Value: 001 – Session Announcement (Current Session BEK) – This value assumes that both nodes within the ATR are actively participating within the session and as far as it knows are using the Current Session BEK.
 - ❖ Value: 010 – Session Activated (Next Session BEK) – This value is set to indicate that the ATR is currently transitioning to the Next Session security credentials.
 - ❖ Value: 011 – Fallback Resynchronization Session – This value is set to indicate that the ATR is currently within the Fallback Resynchronization Session in an effort to resynchronize its security credentials.
 - ❖ Value: 100 – Failsafe Resynchronization Session – This value is set to indicate that the ATR is currently within the Failsafe Resynchronization Session in an effort to resynchronize its security credentials.
 - ❖ Values: 101, 110, & 111 – undefined/reserved.
- ❑ Bits 3-5: HMAC Snippet Size:
 - ❖ Value: 000 – 4-bytes (Default).
 - ❖ Value: 001 – 8-Bytes.
 - ❖ Value: 010 – 16-Bytes.
 - ❖ Value: 011 – 32-Bytes.
 - ❖ Value: 100 – 64-Bytes.
 - ❖ Values: 101, 110, & 111 – undefined/reserved.
- ❑ Bits 6 & 7: Currently, Undefined/Reserved.

AKM Revision Field: This two-byte field is split into parts: Major Revision and Minor Revision. As of this writing, each part is one-byte in length. This field ONLY occurs in a Session Announcement frame. Thereafter (after a session has been established), this field is omitted, as it serves no useful purpose given that once the revisions on both sides have been verified, it can be assumed that the AKM revision will not change mid-session.

ATR Integrity Code (AIC): This is used to provide implicit zero trust functionality, given that every AKM Endpoint has previously authenticated both its endpoint and its membership within an AKM Trust Relationship, this is a very simplistic and implicit mechanism for proving the sender is authenticated. The actual mechanics are beyond the scope of this document, but can be explained with a deeper dive and should be the source of a separate document on this subject.

AKM Replay Counter: This is a 32-bit field, that is always incremented from the perspective of the sender. Thus, both sides of an AKM connection will have different values for when they are sending the Replay Counter.

Source Node Identifier – This identifies the node that transmitted the frame.



Given that every single AKM implementation is a closed implementation. Meaning, all possible AKM Identifiers are known ahead of runtime (post-provisioning), it is advantageous for many reasons to use a level of indirection when referring to AKM Identifiers. This enables the nominal AKM Frame Header to be reduced from 44-bytes down to 16-bytes, which, greatly facilitates communication, storage, and even security with the smaller overall header size. There shall be a single data structure mapping the two-byte abbreviated addresses to the larger 16-byte addresses, that is provided by the provisioning module to each of the AKM Endpoint Nodes within a deployment. Further, the abbreviated Frame Header is the default methodology within an AKM or AIM deployment.

ATR Identifier: This 16-bit field is an index into an implementation deployment specific table mapping the index to the actual AKIM Identifier. The primary purpose of this level of indirection is to dramatically reduce the overall size of the frame header. Although not the primary basis for doing so, having this level of indirection provides a side benefit of obfuscating the actual AKM Identifiers.

Frame Encrypted Part Size: This 2-byte field has a maximum allowed value of 64K – the size of the Encrypted Part of the Frame.

AKM Frame Type: Currently, this is a 1-bit field, with ‘0’ representing a user data frame and ‘1’ representing a management frame. AKM management frames have yet to be defined, so at present, this field should always be ‘0’. At a minimum, AKM Management Frames will probably be used for resynching during Fallback and Failsafe.

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❖ Values: 101, 110, & 111 – undefined/reserved.
- ☐ Bits 3-5: HMAC Snippet Size:

❖ Value: 000 – 4-bytes (Default).

❖ Value: 001 – 8-Bytes.

❖ Value: 010 – 16-Bytes.

❖ Value: 011 – 32-Bytes.

❖ Value: 100 – 64-Bytes.

❖ Values: 101, 110, & 111 – undefined/reserved.

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AKM Replay Counter: This is a 32-bit field, that is always incremented from the perspective of the sender. Thus, both sides of an AKM connection will have different values for when they are sending the Replay Counter.

Source Node Identifier – This identifies the node that transmitted the frame and like the ATR Identifier is actually an index representing the Source Node Identifier and not the actual Source Node’s AKM ID.

FSM (Left half of FSM)

FSM (Right half of FSM)