Version 2.0
This Specification is designed to provide an iteration to the OpenChain Security Assurance Specification (1st Generation). It is currently a draft and is not ready for deployment.
The OpenChain Project is working towards a supply chain where open source is delivered with trusted and consistent compliance information. As part of this mission, we maintain OpenChain ISO/IEC 5230:2020, the International Standard for open source license compliance. A natural next step in support of the broader mission was to develop a guide to identify and present the minimum core set of requirements every Security Assurance program should satisfy with respect to the use of Open Source software.
For context, OpenChain ISO/IEC 5230:2020 is a process management specification that identifies inbound, internal and outbound inflection points where a process, policy or training should exist. The identification and tracking of software used and deployed is an inherent part of getting this right, and this allows our approach to also be useful for security or export control.
The OpenChain Project community noticed OpenChain ISO/IEC 5230:2020 being used in the security domain and decided to develop this security specification to satisfy market demand. This specification is intended to identify and describe the key requirements of a quality Security Assurance Program in the context of using Open Source Software. It focuses on a narrow subset of primary concern: checking Open Source Software against publicly known security vulnerabilities like CVEs, GitHub/GitLab vulnerability reports, and so on.
The OpenChain security assurance specification focuses on the “what” and “why” aspects of a quality Security Assurance Program rather than delving into to “how” and “when.” This is a conscious decision to ensure flexibility for organizations of any size and in any market to use this reference specification. This approach, along with the types of processes identified, is built on more than half a decade of practical global feedback around the creation and management of such programs. The result is that a company can frame a program that precisely fits their supply chain requirements, scoped to a single product or a complete legal entity, and take this solution to market quickly and effectively.
This specification is built from the Security Assurance Reference Guide 2.0 (Release Candidate 1) published on 2022-03-28. That reference document went through a final approval process via our normal voting practice to transform into this published security specification. The scope of this reference specification may expand over time based on community feedback.
This introduction to this specification describes its purpose. Section 2 defines key terms used throughout this document. Section 3 defines the requirements that a Program must satisfy to achieve a core level of Security Assurance. Each requirement consists of one or more verification materials (i.e., records) that must be produced to satisfy the requirement. Verification materials are not required to be made public, though an organization may choose to provide them to others, potentially under a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA).
This specification is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0 (CC-BY-4.0). Because it takes the form of a Specification, it is not designed to be modified outside of the formal editing track. You can take part in editing this document via the OpenChain Project. You can learn about joining our work here:
https://www.openchainproject.org/community
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. These terms and definitions only apply to this specific version of the specification.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as:
"MUST" This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the definition is an absolute requirement of the specification.
"MUST NOT" This phrase, or the phrase "SHALL NOT", mean that the definition is an absolute prohibition of the specification.
"SHOULD" This word, or the adjective "RECOMMENDED", mean that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but the full implications must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing a different course.
"SHOULD NOT" This phrase, or the phrase "NOT RECOMMENDED" mean that there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the particular behavior is acceptable or even useful, but the full implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed before implementing any behavior described with this label.
"MAY" This word, or the adjective "OPTIONAL", mean that an item is truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because the vendor feels that it enhances the product while another vendor may omit the same item. An implementation which does not include a particular option MUST be prepared to interoperate with another implementation which does include the option, though perhaps with reduced functionality. In the same vein an implementation which does include a particular option MUST be prepared to interoperate with another implementation which does not include the option (except, of course, for the feature the option provides.)
These definitions are originally from IETF RFC 2119: https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt We reviewed the ISO definitions to confirm no conflict: https://www.iso.org/foreword-supplementary-information.html
For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply.
A Component Record should consist of a Supplier Name, Component Name, Version of the Component, Other Unique Identifiers, Dependency Relationship, Author of SBOM Data and Timestamp (as per NTIA minimum elements for SBoM)
There is agreement that the processes used to find, track or fix security issues are regarded as sufficient and correct by relevant customers or user organizations if applicable.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is a public database of disclosed computer software security issues and flaws. When someone refers to a CVE, they mean a security flaw that's been assigned a CVE ID number within the database. The CVE database is sponsored by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).
This is explicit stored information that outlines, explains or records information related to activities and actions referred to in this specification.
Security vulnerabilities previously discovered in Open Source Software components that are publicly available. That would include any publicly published vulnerabilities including but not limited to CVEs, GitHub/GitLab vulnerability alerts, package manager alerts and so forth.
Security vulnerabilities just discovered in Open Source Software components that are publicly available. That would include any publicly published vulnerabilities including but not limited to CVEs, GitHub/GitLab vulnerability alerts, package manager alerts and so forth.
Remediation is when a vulnerability is eliminated or removed. It involves identifying where in the code the vulnerability stems from and it has been patched or the code has been rewritten to avoid the identified issue. In this situation, the vulnerability is removed.
Mitigation is when the impact of the vulnerability is decreased without eliminating a vulnerability. For example, it can involve working around or avoiding the functionality that contains the vulnerability. Another example is that it can also involve isolating or preventing access to the vulnerability to prevent exploitation. In this situation, the vulnerability continues to exist, but is contained.
Software subject to one or more licenses that meet the Open Source Definition published by the Open Source Initiative (see opensource.org/osd) or the Free Software Definition published by the Free Software Foundation (see gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html) or similar license.
The set of policies, processes and personnel that comprise an organization’s security assurance activities.
Any organization employee or contractor that defines, contributes to or has responsibility for preparing Supplied Software. Note: Depending on the organization, that may include (but is not limited to) software developers, release engineers, quality engineers, product marketing, product management and procurement.
2.12 - Secure Software Development A process for the development of software using secure programming techniques and using best practices for code quality.
The confidence that a system meets the requirements for security best practices and is resilient against Known Vulnerabilities.
A process for the analysis and monitoring of software (or other components) that allows for understanding their current and potential future management in the context of Known and Unknown Vulnerabilities. This should include using techniques such as static application security testing (SAST) / dynamic application security testing (DAST), pentesting, malware testing and/or SCA scanning. For instance, this may include using NIST SP 800-218 Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) for best practices.
a “Software Bill of Materials” (SBOM) is a inventory for software, a list of ingredients that make up software components. Regardless of the SBOM specification used, it should follow a complete profile for the intended use case.
Software that an organization distributes or makes available to third parties (e.g., other organizations or individuals).
Materials that demonstrate that a given requirement of the specification is satisfied.
A written policy will be created that governs Open Source Software Security Assurance of Supplied Software. The policy will be internally communicated. The policy and its method of communication will have a review process to ensure they are current and relevant.
- 3.1.1.1: A documented Open Source Software Security Assurance policy;
- 3.1.1.2: A documented procedure to make Program Participants aware of the Security Assurance policy.
This is to make sure a process exists to create, record, and make Program Participants aware of the existence of an Open Source Software Security Assurance policy. Although no requirements are provided here on what should be included in the policy, other sections may impose additional requirements.
The organization shall:
- Identify the roles and responsibilities that impact the performance and effectiveness of the Program;
- Determine the necessary competence of Program Participants fulfilling each role;
- Ensure that Program Participants have appropriate education, training, and/or experience;
- Where applicable, ensure Program Participants take actions to acquire the necessary competence;
- Retain appropriate documented information as evidence of competence as well as who is currently a participant in the program.
- 3.1.2.1: A documented list of roles with corresponding responsibilities for the different Program Participants;
- 3.1.2.2: A document that identifies the competencies for each role;
- 3.1.2.3: List of participants and their roles;
- 3.1.2.4: Documented evidence of assessed competence for each Program Participant;
- 3.1.2.5: Documented Evidence of periodic reviews and changes made to the process;
- 3.1.2.6: Documented verification that these processes are current with company internal best practices and who is assigned to accomplish them.
To ensure that Program Participants have a sufficient level of competence for their respective roles and responsibilities.
The organization will ensure that the Program Participants are aware of:
- The Open Source Software Security Assurance policy;
- Relevant Program objectives;
- Their contribution to the effectiveness of the Program;
- The implications of not following the Program’s requirements.
- 3.1.3.1: Documented Evidence of assessed awareness for the Program Participants - which should include the Program’s objectives, one’s contribution within the Program, and implications of Program non-conformance.
To ensure the Program Participants have obtained a sufficient level of awareness for their respective roles and responsibilities within the Program.
A Program should have defined guiding principles and scope that match the risk management policy of the entire organization. It should be clear whether the Program applies to a: product line, a department, or the entire organization. It should also be understood that this scope may change over time and metrics should be established to assess the Programs ongoing effectiveness. To create an effective Program you should understand how you will accomplish the following objectives:
- understand structural and technical threats to the Supplied Software;
- track Known Vulnerabilities when discovered;
- verify that identified risks have been addressed before release of Supplied Software;
- report Known Vulnerabilities to the customer upon release of the software when warranted;
- conduct continuous Security Testing for all Supplied Software both prior to and following release;
- report newly discovered Vulnerabilities following release of the Supplied Software;
- report identified risks to third parties as appropriate.
- 3.1.4.1: A written statement that clearly defines the scope and limits of the Program;
- 3.1.4.2: A set of metrics the program shall achieve to improve;
- 3.1.4.3: Documented Evidence from each review, update, or audit to demonstrate continuous improvement.
To provide the flexibility to construct a Program that best fits the scope of an organization’s needs. Some organizations could choose to maintain a Program for a specific product line while others could implement a Program to govern the Supplied Software of the entire organization.
The Organization demonstrates sound procedures for handling Known Vulnerabilities and for ensuring Secure Software Development by defining and implementing robust methods for:
- Identifying structural and technical threats to the Supplied Software;
- Detecting the existence of Known Vulnerabilities in the Supplied Software; Monitoring the identified Known Vulnerabilities;
- Communicating the identified Known Vulnerabilities to customer base when warranted;
- Analyzing the Supplied Software for newly published Known Vulnerabilities post-release;
- Conducting continuous and repeated Security Testing for all Supplied Software before release;
- Verifying that the identified risks have been addressed before release of Supplied Software;
- Certifying that exported information about the identified risks to the third parties is appropriate.
A process shall exist for the Security Assurance methods listed above.
- 3.1.5.1: A documented procedure exists for each of the methods identified above.
To ensure appropriate processes exists for detecting and following up on Known Vulnerabilities in the Supplied Software.
Maintain a process to effectively receive and if appropriate respond to Known Vulnerability external inquiries. Publicly identify a means by which a third party can inquire about a Known Vulnerability with respect to a given software offering.
- 3.2.1.1: Publicly visible method to allow third parties to make Known Vulnerability or Newly Discovered Vulnerability enquires (e.g., via an email address or web portal that is monitored by Program Participants);
- 3.2.1.2: An internal documented procedure exists for responding to third party Known Vulnerability or Newly Discovered Vulnerability inquiries.
To ensure there is a reasonable way for third parties to contact securely the organization regarding security vulnerability inquiries and that the organization is prepared to respond.
Identify and Resource Program Task(s):
- Assign accountability to ensure the successful execution of Program tasks;
- Program tasks are sufficiently resourced;
- Sufficient time to perform the tasks have been allocated;
- Adequate funding has been allocated;
- A process exists for reviewing and updating the policy and supporting tasks;
- Technical expertise pertaining to Known Vulnerabilities is accessible to those who may need such guidance.
- 3.2.2.1: Document with name of persons, group or function in Program role(s) identified;
- 3.2.2.2: The identified Program roles have been properly staffed and adequate funding provided;
- 3.2.2.3: Identification of expertise available to address identified Known Vulnerabilities;
- 3.2.2.4: A documented procedure that assigns internal responsibilities for Security Assurance.
To ensure: i) Program responsibilities are effectively supported and resourced and ii) policies and supporting processes are regularly updated to accommodate changes in Security Assurance best practices.
A process shall exist for creating and maintaining a bill of materials that includes each Open Source Software component from which the Supplied Software is comprised.
- 3.3.1.1: A documented procedure ensuring all Open Source Software used in the Supplied Software is continuously recorded across the lifecycle of the Supplied Software. This includes an archive of all Open Source Software used in the Supplied Software;
- 3.3.1.2: Open Source Software Component Records for the Supplied Software that demonstrates the documented procedure was properly followed.
To ensure a process exists for creating and managing a Software Bill of Materials used to construct the Supplied Software. A bill of materials is needed to support the systematic review of each component to understand if any Known Vulnerabilities exist
A process shall exist to detect, identify, and document the existence of Known Vulnerabilities in each Open Source Software component in the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for the Supplied Software.
For each identified Known Vulnerability assign a risk/impact score using a valid process such as NIST SP 800-30; For each detection and assigned score determine and document necessary remediation or mitigation steps suitable for the use-case of the software; Depending on risk/impact score take the appropriate action (i.e. contact customer, upgrade software, no further action) ; If required, obtain Customer Agreement that the proposed resolution is acceptable if necessary; at or above a previously determined level (e.g. severity scores above 4.5....); If a Newly Discovered Vulnerability is present in previously distributed Software, depending on the risk/impact score take the appropriate action (e.g., contact customer if applicable).
- 3.3.2.1: A documented procedure for handling detection and resolution of Known Vulnerabilities for the Open Source Software components of the Supplied Software;
- 3.3.2.2: For each Open Source Software component a record is maintained of the identified Known Vulnerabilities and action(s) taken (including even if no action was required).
To ensure the Program is sufficiently robust to handle the identified Known Vulnerabilities for the Open Source Software from which the Supplied Software is comprised. That a procedure exists to support this activity and that the procedure is followed.
For a Program to be deemed conformant with this specification, the organization shall affirm that the Program satisfies the requirements presented in this document.
- 3.4.1.1: Documented Evidence affirming the Program specified in §3.1.4 satisfies all the requirements of this document.
To ensure that if an organization declares that it has a Program that is conforming, that the Program has met all the requirements of this document. The mere meeting of a subset of these requirements is not considered sufficient.
A Program that is conformant with this version of the specification will have a review period every 12 months.
- 3.4.2.1: A document affirming the Program meets all the requirements of this specification, within the past 12 months of obtaining conformance validation.
It is vital for a Program to remain current with the specification requirements if an organization wants to assert conformance over time. This requirement ensures that the Program’s supporting processes and controls do not erode if an organization continues to assert Program conformance over time.