

NORDUnet BoD Service

OGF40 Oxford, January 15th 2014 Henrik Thostrup Jensen <htj@nordu.net>





Overview

ETA: TNC2014 (early May) Working, not perfect and shiny NSI2 CS r116 Stack: OpenNSA + NCS + NI + Juniper Close cooperation with SURFnet Some augmentations for the CS protocol







NCS = Network Control System (commercial product) NI = Network Inventory





Demarcation points will be Ethernet + VLAN MPLS tunnels internally Initially no flow control / limiting / shaping Likely to be added later Most of this will be over 100G pipes





Purpose: Create NSI production infrastructure

Involves a lot more than just the CS protocol

Group intentionally kept small, but open about what is happening

Close communication with AutoBAHN

Protocol augmentations

- AAI
- Connection Traces
- Topology based on announcing reachability

AAI + Connection Traces will be covered by Hans Thursday





Topology

Announce reachability, instead of global port knowledge The model is always chain, control plane = data plane An NSA ONLY talk to its peers Exported topology complies with NML schema (for revised schema) Pathfinding = 20 lines of straightforward Python code

```
<nsi:NSA id="urn:ogf:network:surfnet.nl:nsa">
```

```
<gns:TopologyReachability>
```

<nml:Topology id="urn:ogf:network:nordu.net.nl:topology" gns:cost=5>
<nml:Topology id="urn:ogf:network:sunet.se:topology" gns:cost=10>
<nml:Topology id="urn:ogf:network:deic.dk:topology" gns:cost=15>
</gns:TopologyReachability>

```
</nsi:NSA>
```

. . .

. . .





OpenNSA

Used on several sites (6ish)

Open source (BSD), multiple backends, easily hackable

Updated to r116 in early january (queryNotification not done)

Interoperability test pending

Likely to support both NML and topology reachability

NORDUnet augmentation/integration will be kept optional / easily separable

git clone git://git.nordu.net/opennsa.git





Questions?





Bonus slide 1: AAI

Two request types

- Transit : Has at least one endpoint towards a customer
- Termination : Request user/group/token is checked against STP

SAML Example

```
<nsi:sessionSecurityAttr>
<s:Attribute Name="user">
<s:AttributeValue> <u>htj@nordu.net</u></s:AttributeValue>
</s:Attribute>
<s:Attribute Name="group">
<s:AttributeValue>nordu.net</s:AttributeValue>
<s:AttributeValue>dev.nordu.net</s:AttributeValue>
</s:AttributeValue>dev.nordu.net</s:AttributeValue>
</s:Attribute>
```





We need to see origin of request

CS protocol does not provide this functionality

Looks like this (goes in the NSI header)

<gns:ConnectionTrace>

<gns:Connection>urn:ogf:network:aruba:2013:nsa:AR-Tfe07c58e3f</gns:Connection>
 <gns:Connection>urn:ogf:network:bonaire:2013:nsa:B0-s7780</gns:Connection>
 <gns:Connection>urn:ogf:network:curacao:2013:nsa:CU-1234</gns:Connection>
</gns:ConnectionTrace>

Can also be used for loop detection

