

Introduction to the Large-scale Overlapping Generations Model of India Day 1

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Tax Policy Research Unit and World Bank

Our goals

By the end of this week, TPRU staff should:

- calibrate some important parts of OG-India
- be familiar with theory, code, and solution methods for OG-India
- be able to customize and run experiments using OG-India

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Medium-term to long-term goals:

- Fully calibrate OG-India to Indian economy
- Integrate microsimulation models with OG-India
- Have TPRU staff have mastery of software, collaboration, and modeling best practices

Before we begin

- Remove any old (last year) OG-India repositories from your GitHub accounts accounts
- We will continue to place supplementary materials in <https://github.com/OpenRG/WB-India-2019>
- Fork and clone OG-India repo <https://github.com/TPRU-India/OG-India>

Today's outline

- 1 OG-India **brief tour**
- 2 OG-India **documentation**
- 3 OG-India **theory and computation**

Lunch break: 1-2pm

- 4 Map and tour of files and modules
- 5 Running OG-India, setting a policy
- 6 Experiments and results (TCJA)

Why overlapping generations?

	Microsim	OG	Microsim + OG
revenue estimates	X		
marginal tax rates	X		
distributional analysis	X		
macroeconomic effects			
macroeconomic feedback			

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- How does a change in the GST affect wages?

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- How does tax change affect wealthy and old if $w \uparrow$ and $r \downarrow$?

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- How does a change in the GST affect wages?
- How does tax change affect wealthy and old if $w \uparrow$ and $r \downarrow$?
- Are feedback effect bigger in India with significant hand-to-mouth population?

Brief tour

- Give brief tour of OG-India repo
<https://github.com/TPRU-India/OG-India>
- Jason will give more detailed tour of file structure and modules

OG-India Documentation

- Show the PDF documentation at <https://github.com/TPRU-India/OG-India/blob/master/docs/OGINDIAdoc.pdf>
- Discuss source \LaTeX files and where to put them

OG-India model summary overview

- 100-period-lived agents
- heterogeneous age, lifetime income
- realistic demographics (fertility rates, mortality rates, immigration rates, population growth)
- intentional and unintentional bequests
- representative perfectly competitive firms
- productivity growth
- closed, large open, small open economy specifications

OG-India model summary overview

- Fiscal policy
 - Household ETR, MTR from microsimulation model
 - Corporate taxation (Corp inc tax rate, depreciation expensing rate)
 - Household transfers
 - Non-transfer government spending
 - Non-balanced government budget constraint
 - Exogenous interest rate wedge

Some shining components

- Incorporation of microsimulation tax data
- Realistic demographics
- Calibration of lifetime income process
- Flexible closure rule (technical)
- Flexible openness assumptions

- Fertility rates f_s , mortality rates ρ_s , immigration rates i_s


$$\omega_{1,t+1} = (1 - \rho_0) \sum_{s=1}^{E+S} f_s \omega_{s,t} + i_1 \omega_{1,t} \quad \forall t$$

$$\omega_{s+1,t+1} = (1 - \rho_s)\omega_{s,t} + i_{s+1}\omega_{s+1,t} \quad \forall t \quad \text{and} \quad 1 \leq s \leq E + S - 1$$


$$N_t \equiv \sum_{s=1}^{E+S} \omega_{s,t} \quad \forall t$$

$$g_{n,t+1} \equiv \frac{N_{t+1}}{N_t} - 1 \quad \forall t$$


Demographics: fertility rates




Demographics: mortality rates




Demographics: immigration rates



Demographics: population distribution



Demographics: population growth



Household maximization problem

- Maximize lifetime utility

$$\max_{\{(c_{j,s,t}), (n_{j,s,t}), (b_{j,s+1,t+1})\}_{s=E+1}^{E+S}} \sum_{s=1}^S \beta^{s-1} \left[\Pi_{u=E+1}^{E+s} (1 - \rho_u) \right] u(c_{j,s,t+s-1}, n_{j,s,t+s-1}, b_{j,s+1,t+s})$$

- Subject to a budget constraint

$$c_{j,s,t} + b_{j,s+1,t+1} = (1 + r_t)b_{j,s,t} + w_t e_{j,s} n_{j,s,t} + \zeta_{j,s} \frac{BQ_t}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}} + \eta_{j,s,t} \frac{TR_t}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}} - T_{s,t}$$

- and occasionally binding constraints

$$c_{j,s,t} \geq 0, \quad n_{j,s,t} \in [0, \tilde{n}], \quad \text{and } b_{j,1,t} = 0 \quad \forall j, t, \text{ and } E+1 \leq s \leq E+S$$

Household optimality conditions

- S static labor supply Euler equations

$$w_t e_{j,s} (1 - \tau_{s,t}^{mtrx}) (c_{j,s,t})^{-\sigma} = e^{g_y(1-\sigma)} \chi_s^n \left(\frac{b}{\tilde{l}} \right) \left(\frac{n_{j,s,t}}{\tilde{l}} \right)^{v-1} \left[1 - \left(\frac{n_{j,s,t}}{\tilde{l}} \right)^v \right]^{\frac{1-v}{v}}$$

$$\forall j, t, \quad \text{and} \quad E+1 \leq s \leq E+S$$

- $S-1$ dynamic savings Euler equations

$$(c_{j,s,t})^{-\sigma} = \chi_j^b \rho_s (b_{j,s+1,t+1})^{-\sigma} + \beta (1 - \rho_s) \left(1 + r_{t+1} [1 - \tau_{s+1,t+1}^{mtry}] \right) (c_{j,s+1,t+1})^{-\sigma}$$


$$\forall j, t, \quad \text{and} \quad E+1 \leq s \leq E+S-1$$

- One end-of-life savings (bequests) equation

$$(c_{j,E+S,t})^{-\sigma} = \chi_j^b (b_{j,E+S+1,t+1})^{-\sigma} \quad \forall j, t \quad \text{and} \quad s = E+S$$

Lifetime earnings profiles in USA

$$c_{j,s,t} + b_{j,s+1,t+1} = (1 + r_t)b_{j,s,t} + w_t e_{j,s} n_{j,s,t} + \zeta_{j,s} \frac{BQ_t}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}} + \eta_{j,s,t} \frac{TR_t}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}} - T_{s,t}$$



OG-India Tax integration

DeBacker, Jason, Richard W. Evans, and Kerk L. Phillips, “Integrating Microsimulation Models of Tax Policy into a DGE Macroeconomic Model,” *Public Finance Review*, 47:2, pp. 207-275 (Mar. 2019).

$$c_{j,s,t} + b_{j,s+1,t+1} = (1 + r_t)b_{j,s,t} + w_t e_{j,s} n_{j,s,t} + \zeta_{j,s} \frac{BQ_t}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}} + \eta_{j,s,t} \frac{TR_t}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}} - T_{s,t}$$

$$\forall j, t \quad \text{and} \quad s \geq E + 1 \quad \text{where} \quad b_{j,E+1,t} = 0 \quad \forall j, t$$

$$w_t e_{j,s} (1 - \tau_{s,t}^{mtrx}) (c_{j,s,t})^{-\sigma} = e^{g_y(1-\sigma)} \chi_s^n \left(\frac{b}{\tilde{l}} \right) \left(\frac{n_{j,s,t}}{\tilde{l}} \right)^{v-1} \left[1 - \left(\frac{n_{j,s,t}}{\tilde{l}} \right)^v \right]^{\frac{1-v}{v}}$$


$$\forall j, t, \quad \text{and} \quad E + 1 \leq s \leq E + S$$

$$(c_{j,s,t})^{-\sigma} = \chi_j^b \rho_s (b_{j,s+1,t+1})^{-\sigma} + \beta (1 - \rho_s) \left(1 + r_{t+1} [1 - \tau_{s+1,t+1}^{mtry}] \right) (c_{j,s+1,t+1})^{-\sigma}$$


$$\forall j, t, \quad \text{and} \quad E + 1 \leq s \leq E + S - 1$$

OG-India Tax integration, USA 42-yr-old, 2017


ETR, Lab. Inc., and Cap. Inc., Age=42, Year=2017




MTR Labor Income, Lab. Inc., and Cap. Inc., Age=42, Year=2017



MTR Capital Income, Cap. Inc., and Cap. Inc., Age=42, Year=2017




Histogram by lab. inc., and cap. inc., Age=42, Year=2017




OG-India Tax integration, USA 42-yr-old, 2017


Truncated ETR, Lab. Inc., and Cap. Inc., Age=42, Year=2017




Truncated MTRx, Lab. Inc., and Cap. Inc., Age=42, Year=2017



Truncated MTRy, Lab. Inc., and Cap. Inc., Age=42, Year=2017





Histogram by lab. inc., and cap. inc., Age=42, Year=2017



Bequests and Transfers

$$c_{j,s,t} + b_{j,s+1,t+1} = (1 + r_t)b_{j,s,t} + w_t e_{j,s} n_{j,s,t} + \zeta_{j,s} \frac{BQ_t}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}} + \eta_{j,s,t} \frac{TR_t}{\lambda_j \omega_{s,t}} - T_{s,t}$$

- It matters how bequests are distributed $\zeta_{j,s}$
- We take data and incorporate it into the model



Firms optimality conditions

- Representative perfectly competitive CES production

$$Y_t = F(K_t, L_t) \equiv Z_t \left[(\gamma)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} (K_t)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} + (1 - \gamma)^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} (e^{g_y t} L_t)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}} \quad \forall t$$

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- Firms choose K_t and L_t to maximize profit

$$PR_t = (1 - \tau^{corp}) \left[F(K_t, L_t) - w_t L_t \right] - (r_t + \delta) K_t + \tau^{corp} \delta^\tau K_t \quad \forall t$$

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- FOC for labor demand L_t and capital demand K_t

$$w_t = e^{g_y t} (Z_t)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \left[(1-\gamma) \frac{Y_t}{e^{g_y t} L_t} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} \quad \forall t$$

$$r_t = (1 - \tau^{corp}) (Z_t)^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \left[\gamma \frac{Y_t}{K_t} \right]^{\frac{1}{\varepsilon}} - \delta + \tau^{corp} \delta^\tau \quad \forall t$$

Government budget conditions

- Government revenue

$$Rev_t = \underbrace{\tau^{corp} [Y_t - w_t L_t] - \tau^{corp} \delta^\tau K_t}_{\text{corporate tax revenue}} + \underbrace{\sum_{s=E+1}^{E+S} \sum_{j=1}^J \lambda_j \omega_{s,t} \tau_{s,t}^{etr} (x_{j,s,t}, y_{j,s,t}) (x_{j,s,t} + y_{j,s,t})}_{\text{household tax revenue}}$$

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- Government spending

$$Spend_t = \underbrace{G_t}_{\text{public goods}} + \underbrace{Tr_t}_{\text{Transfers to HH}}$$

$$\text{where } G_t = g_{g,t} \alpha_g Y_t \quad \text{and} \quad Tr_t = g_{tr,t} \alpha_{tr} Y_t$$

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- Law of motion for government debt

$$D_{t+1} + Rev_t = (1 + r_t) D_t + G_t + TR_t \quad \forall t$$

Government interest rate wedge

- Government might borrow at different rate than households

$$r_{gov,t} = (1 - \tau_{d,t})r_t - \mu_d$$

Government interest rate wedge

- Government might borrow at different rate than households

$$r_{gov,t} = (1 - \tau_{d,t})r_t - \mu_d$$

- Households hold government and firm assets in proportion from data (average interest rate, assume perfect substitutes)

$$r_{hh,t} = \frac{r_{gov,t}D_t + r_tK_t}{D_t + K_t}$$

Government budget and closure

- Model must be stationary and stable (growth and balance)
- (Closure rule): Most models change policy in future to stabilize debt-to-GDP.
- OG-USA allows for multiple stabilization options
 - Gov't discretionary spending
 - Gov't transfers to households
 - Taxes
 - Combinations of the three
- These options can be implemented over time

Market clearing: 3 markets, one LOM

$$L_t = \sum_{s=E+1}^{E+S} \sum_{j=1}^J \omega_{s,t} \lambda_j \mathbf{e}_{j,s} n_{j,s,t} \quad \forall t$$

$$K_t + D_t = \sum_{s=E+2}^{E+S+1} \sum_{j=1}^J \left(\omega_{s-1,t-1} \lambda_j \mathbf{b}_{j,s,t} + i_s \omega_{s,t-1} \lambda_j \mathbf{b}_{j,s,t} \right) \quad \forall t$$

$$Y_t = C_t + K_{t+1} - \left(\sum_{s=E+2}^{E+S+1} \sum_{j=1}^J i_s \omega_{s,t} \lambda_j \mathbf{b}_{j,s,t+1} \right) - (1 - \delta) K_t + G_t \quad \forall t$$

and

$$BQ_t = (1 + r_t) \left(\sum_{s=E+2}^{E+S+1} \sum_{j=1}^J \rho_{s-1} \lambda_j \omega_{s-1,t-1} \mathbf{b}_{j,s,t} \right) \quad \forall t$$

Open Economy Options: Small and Large

Small Open Economy

- Capital flows freely to keep interest rate at an exogenous world interest rate
- Capital market clearing condition satisfied by foreign capital flows:

$$K_t^f = K_t^{\text{demand}} - B_t - D_t \quad (1)$$

Large Open Economy

- Lies between closed and small open economy cases
- *This should be the default option for OG-India*
- Foreign investors purchase some fraction of new debt issues:

$$D_{t+1}^f = D_t^f + \zeta_D(D_{t+1} - D_t) \quad (2)$$

- and own some fraction of capital:

$$K_t^f = \zeta_K K_t^{\text{open}} \quad (3)$$

Steady-state (long-run) equilibrium

Definition (Stationary steady-state equilibrium)

A non-autarkic stationary steady-state equilibrium in the OG-India model is defined as constant allocations of stationary household labor supply $n_{j,s,t} = \bar{n}_{j,s}$ and savings $\hat{b}_{j,s+1,t+1} = \bar{b}_{j,s+1}$ for all j, t , and $E + 1 \leq s \leq E + S$, and constant prices $\hat{w}_t = \bar{w}$ and $r_t = \bar{r}$ for all t such that the following conditions hold:

- 1 the population has reached its stationary steady-state distribution $\hat{w}_{s,t} = \bar{w}_s$ for all s and t ,
- 2 households optimize according to *JS* labor supply Euler equations and *JS* savings Euler equations,
- 3 firms optimize according to capital and labor first order conditions,
- 4 Government activity behaves according to government budget constraint and closure rule, and
- 5 markets clear according to labor and capital market clearing (and bequests law of motion).

Non-steady-state (transition path) equilibrium

Definition (Non-stationary (transition path) equilibrium)

A non autarkic nonsteady-state functional equilibrium in the OG-India model is defined as stationary allocation functions of the state

$\{n_{j,s,t} = \phi_s(\hat{\Gamma}_t)\}_{s=E+1}^{E+S}$ and $\{\hat{b}_{j,s+1,t+1} = \psi_s(\hat{\Gamma}_t)\}_{s=E+1}^{E+S}$ for all j and t and

stationary price functions $\hat{w}(\hat{\Gamma}_t)$ and $r(\hat{\Gamma}_t)$ for all t such that:

- 1 households have symmetric beliefs $\Omega(\cdot)$ about the evolution of the distribution of savings, and those beliefs about the future distribution of savings equal the realized outcome (rational expectations),
- 2 households optimize according to S labor supply Euler equations and S savings Euler equations in all periods,
- 3 firms optimize according to capital and labor first order conditions in all periods,
- 4 Government activity behaves according to government budget constraint and closure rule in all periods, and
- 5 markets clear according to labor and capital market clearing (and bequests law of motion in all periods.

Solution method

- See documentation
- ① Guess outer loop aggregates
 - Choose the aggregates needed to solve the household problem
 - r_t, w_t, BQ_t, TR_t

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 - r_t, w_t, BQ_t, TR_t
 - 2 Given outer loop aggregates, solve household decisions
 - 3 Update outer loop aggregates based on household decisions

Things to add

- ① Link with TPRU household microsim
- ② Dynamic firms (own capital, adj. costs) WIP PR
- ③ Multiple industries, multiple goods
- ④ Link with TPRU corporate microsim
- ⑤ Calibration, revenue estimation
- ⑥ Stochastic income