



Detection and Diagnosis of Flight Anomalies in Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

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Talk Outline

- Introduction
 - Problem Domain and Research Statement
- Anomaly Detection
 - Requirements for Deep Learning based Anomaly Detectors
 - Heuristic-based Detectors and Real-time Anomaly Detection with Real-world Drones
 - Adaptive Monitoring for Resource Optimization
- Anomaly Diagnosis
 - Diagnosis of Root-Cause of Anomalies
- Data Collection and Community Support

Introduction

Drones in Various Sectors

FORBES > LEADERSHIP > LEADERSHIP STRATEGY

How Drones Are Shaping The Future Of Ultrafast Delivery Across American Suburbs

Gary Drenik, Contributor @ Follow

May 31, 2023, 10:00am EDT

SHARE f X in e



Delivery Drone ADOBE STOCK_446167872

AUGUST 20, 2019

Using drones in agriculture to spray fields with Rantizo

by João Antunes in Forestry & Agriculture

SHARE f X in e



At California Blazes, NASA Team Observes How Drones Fight Wildfire



A drone being used in wildfire response operations is seen flying at the Dixie fire in Northern California in August 2021. Software developed by the STEERd project for coordinating multiple parts of a fire response could be used on a tablet in the field, much like this pilot is using today's commercially available software.

Credits: National Park Service/Joe Suarez

FRENCH SKI RESORT TURNS TO THERMAL DRONES TO AID RESCUE WORKERS

Haye Kesteloo / October 13, 2020 / Drones For Good, France



Drone Helps Firefighters Rescue Two from River in Maine

See the dramatic rescue footage.

By ABC News
July 1, 2015, 4:08 PM



AUBURN FIRE DEPT/CHIEF FRANK ROMA

abc NEWS

Drone helps rescue trapped rafters

Jon Fingas
Reporter
Updated Thu, Jul 2, 2015 • 2 min read



Drones in Various Sectors

As of 2023, the FAA has registered a total of **863,728** drones in the United States.
352,222 for commercial purposes,
and **506,635** for recreational purposes.

The global drone market size is projected to **grow from \$22.5 billion in 2020 to over \$42.8 billion by 2025**, at a compound annual growth rate (**CAGR**) of **13.8%**.

Commercial drone shipments expected to **rise by 66% from 2022 to 2024**, indicating robust industry demand and an expanding range of applications.


The Future



Research Statement

My research focuses on ***Real-time Detection and Diagnosis of Flight Anomalies*** in small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS), commonly known as UAVs or Drones.

A Motivating Incident




A post-accident photo of the UAV.

A test flight for checking computer vision capabilities of the UAV. It was supposed to take off, detect a person and then circle the person.

Another Incident

1




2



Post-mission, hovered for 20+ minutes for endurance test. Crashed in final minutes of flight!

The cause of the crash was not obvious at all. Engineers from our team, Griffiss airbase, and NASA deeply analyzed flight logs.

3





Physical flight X2
(hover time reduced for test)

Flight log:
<https://tinyurl.com/TEAL-Crash>

- Cruise Altitude: 100 ft (30.4 m)
- Distance: 500 meters
- Max Alt: 129.41 meters

Anomaly Detection

Anomaly Detection




The flight controller collects huge amounts of data using its sensors during the flight


Each flight generates more than 2000 time-series in real time!

This data is also stored in the flight log

Anomaly Detection - Challenges



Huge amounts of generated time-series data



Discussion Forums


External compass interference?
Hi, I have a custom built hexacopter (1000mm, big dry weight) with Potensic (20R original) 1000kv, big dry GPS/Compass module (also 3DR). The flight controller is mounted on the PDB. External GPS/Compass is 45cm away from FC. A small PDB is mounted on the top of the frame. The FC is angled off and has a custom built compass.

Hi, I have a custom built hexacopter (1000mm, big dry weight) with Potensic (20R original) 1000kv, big dry GPS/Compass module (also 3DR). The flight controller is mounted on the PDB. External GPS/Compass is 45cm away from FC. A small PDB is mounted on the top of the frame. The FC is angled off and has a custom built compass.

Most of the information shared over the discussion forums




Limited knowledge in documentations



Lack of annotated data



Fuzzy decision boundaries between anomalies and non-anomalies



RESAM: Requirements Elicitation and Specification for Anomaly Models

Formal Documentation

Mission Planner and ArduPilot documentation list several different failure types.

Online Discussion Forums

External compass interference?

Hi, I have a custom built hexacopter (1000mm, 5kg dry weight) with Pixhawk (3DR original) and compasses from Hitec. The flight controller is mounted on the PDB. External GPS/Compass is 40cm away from FC and PDB (from mother board). Internal compass is turned off and off by default.

Cd had plenty of compass issues including the ERROR_COMPASS_UNCALIBRATION one a few years back. If remember correctly I just disabled the compass check in the ARMING_CHECK parameter (log set ARMING_CHECK = 4, see details here: <http://ardupilot.org/copters/parameters.html#arming-check-arm-checks-to-perform>)

(4) If that works that'll allow you to get the copter in the air but this is kind of a dirty trick as this doesn't solve the underlying compass measurement issue.

To solve underlying compass issues I've had good success taking a series of 360 degree measurements and graphing them. You can do this in a gpx file or a gpx file. You should get a nice circle of points centered on the origin. If the circle is not centered then your offsets need to be tweaked (you can change them directly in the configuration).

The measurement protocol I use is this: put the copter on the floor while connected to Mission Planner and read the raw and my values off the "Flight data" tab. Rotate by 10 degrees and take a measurement. Repeat until you've covered 360 degrees. Then you can graph the data.


1

Identified Sources of Information

Fault Type	Source	Forum Issues			Fault Description
		ArduP	Px4	Tot.	
Mechanical Failure	●	26	17	43	Divergence of actual vs. planned attitude, PWM imbalance, elevated throttle
Excessive Vibration	●	18	23	41	High fluctuations in sensor readings
Compass Interference	●	17	7	24	Erroneous compass heading
Power Issues	● ●	13	3	16	Unusual fluctuations in battery voltage, complete power failure, brown outs
GPS Failures	● ●	6	7	13	GPS Glitch, Need 3D Fix, Bad velocity, High GPS HDOP
Failsafe Errors	●	8	5	13	Unexpected behavior often triggered by failsafe, Incorrect failsafes
Barometer Failures	●	3	3	6	Barometer not healthy, Alt Disparity
Compass Failures	● ●	7	5	12	Compass not healthy or not calibrated, Offsets too high, Compasses inconsistent
Inertial Navigation Sys (INS)	● ●	3	4	7	Accels and/or Gyros not healthy, incorrectly calibrated, or inconsistent
Tuning errors	●	10	6	16	Uncontrolled oscillations in control signal
EKF switching	● ●	4	0	4	Switching of primary EKF during flight
Voltage sensor calibration	● ●	3	2	5	Erroneous voltage readings during flight
Logging issue	● ●	3	1	4	logging inconsistent or stopped
Disarming Errors	● ●	0	4	4	Problems in disarming
Radio Controller	● ●	2	1	3	RC not calibrated, RC Low voltage

2

Identified the Common Flight Failures




RESAM: Requirements Elicitation and Specification for Anomaly Models

	Description	ArduPilot	PX4 messages
Mechanical	Actual Attitude: represented by roll, pitch, and yaw in degrees Desired Attitude: represented by roll, pitch, and yaw in degrees Actual Attitude Rates to compensate for difference in actual and desired attitude (degrees/sec) Desired Attitude Rates needed to compensate for difference in actual and desired attitude (degrees/sec) PWM outputs to power ESCs/motors (Typically set between 1100 to 1900)	ATT.Roll, ATT.Pitch, ATT.Yaw ATT.DesRoll, ATT.DesPitch, ATT.DesYaw PIDR.Act PIDP.Act PIDY.Act RATE (for some old versions) PIDR.Tar PIDP.Tar PIDY.Tar RCOUT	vehicle_attitude_estimate vehicle_attitude_setpoint vehicle_angular_velocity vehicle_rates_setpoint actuator_outputs
Vibration	Vibration measures: Standard deviations of accelerometer measurements (typically values under 30 are acceptable) Raw accelerometer values: PID outputs from rate controller sent to the mixer to generate PWM outputs	VIBE.VibeX, VIBE.VibeY, VIBE.VibeZ, VIBRATION.vibration{ x, y, z } ^T IMU.AccX, IMU.AccY, IMU.AccZ	N/A vehicle_acceleration
Actuator controls	Throttle: Shows generated throttle signal	RCIN CTUN.{ThO,Thl}, CURRENT.thr, RCIN.C3, VFR_HUD.throttle, actuator_controls.control ^T	actuator_controls actuator_controls.control
Compass Error	Raw magnetic field measurements: across x,y, and z axes Norm of magnetic field: considering raw values across x,y, & z axes	MAG.MagX, MAG.MagY, MAG.MagZ, CUSTOM.mag_field ^T	vehicle_magnetometer sensor_mag N/A
Battery	Voltage: Board Voltage: received at the board Battery Current: drawn from the battery	BATVolt CURR.Volt POWRVcc, CURRVcc, HWSTATUS.Vcc ^T BAT.Curr CURR.Curr	battery_status.voltage_v N/A battery_status.current_c
Power	Satellites: Number of satellites visible to receiver Dilution of Precision (DOP): Accuracy measure of GPS signal dependent upon the geometry of connected satellites Position accuracy: Standard deviation of horizontal and vertical position error	GPS.NSats GPS.HDop GPS.VDop N/A	sensor_gps.satellites_used satellite_info.count, GPS_RAW_IT.satellites_visible ^T sensor_gps.hdop sensor_gps.vdop, GPS_RAW_IT.eph ^T sensor_gps.eph sensor_gps.epv
GPS			

Attribute^T: Attributes sent to ground control station and available in Telemetry log (TLOG). All other attributes stored onboard.

3

Identified the time-series data attributes that reflect the failures



RESAM: Requirements Elicitation and Specification for Anomaly Models

4

Specified software requirements for building Deep Learning-based anomaly detectors for detecting FIVE flight failures.

Mechanical Failures			
R1	When the actual roll, pitch, or yaw deviates suddenly and sufficiently from desired roll, pitch, or yaw, then an <i>attitude divergence</i> anomaly shall be detected.		
	Sudden divergence of actual attitude (roll, pitch, yaw) from desired attitude.	ATT.Roll, ATT.Pitch, ATT.Yaw, ATT.DesRoll, ATT.DesPitch, ATT.DesYaw	
R2	When an imbalance is detected in RPM sent to the motors then an <i>RPM imbalance</i> anomaly shall be detected.		
	Imbalanced RPM sent to motors	RCOUT	
Alternate Causes of Symptoms			
1	Severe wind		
2	Twitch maneuvers of the UAV (e.g., for collision avoidance).		




(a) Vibration Problems			
R1	When the deviation between GPS readings and estimated position exceeds 30ms on any axis (X,Y,Z), then a <i>geolocation</i> anomaly shall be detected.		
	Standard deviation of accelerometer measurements across three axes.	VIBE.VibeX, VIBE.VibeY and VIBE.VibeZ	
R2	When the accelerometer reaches its maximum limit more than 100 times during a mission with increasing frequency , then an 'overworked accelerometer' error shall be detected.		
	Accelerometer frequently reaching maximum limit	VIBE.Clip0, VIBE.Clip1 and VIBE.Clip2	
Alternate Causes of Symptoms			
1	Aging and/or underpowered battery		
2	Excessive wind.		
3	Tuning error (e.g., MOT_THST_HOVER not set correctly)		

(c) Compass Interference			
R1	When the correlation above 30% between the throttle and magnetometers occurs, a <i>compass interference</i> anomaly shall be detected.		
	Increased throttle interferes with compass (detected by correlation between magnetometer readings and throttle)	I2-norm (i.e., $\sqrt{\text{SumOfMags}}$, where $\text{SumOfMags} = \text{MagX}^2 + \text{MagY}^2 + \text{MagZ}^2$)	Throttle (CTUN.ThO)
No known alternate causes of symptoms			



(b) GPS Glitch			
R1	When GPS.HDop values exceed 2 , a 'GPS Glitch with Loss of horizontal precision' error shall be raised.		
	Number of satellites	NSats	GPS.HDop
R2	When GPS.HDop values exceed 2 and sudden and sharp course corrections are detected, then a 'GPS Geolocation Failure' shall be raised.		
	Sharp flight route divergence	GPS Coordinates	
	Number of satellites	NSats	GPS.HDop
Alternate Causes of Symptoms			
1	Loss of satellite lock		
2	Incorrect positioning of components on UAV causing interference		

(d) Power Issues			
R1	When increases in throttle are correlated with battery drain then a 'throttle causing excessive battery drain' error is detected.		
	Increases in throttle correlated with battery drain	CTUN.ThO, BAT.Volt	
R2	When erratic swings in altitude are detected then an 'altitude fluctuation' error is detected.		
	Erratic swings in altitude	BARO.Alt, CTUN.Alt, GPS.Alt	
Alternate Causes of Symptoms			
1	Excessive wind.		
2	Onboard software or sensor drain		

LSTM Autoencoders (Deep Learning Approach)



Rule-based Methods



5
Credit: Yihong Ma

Count of annotated training logs collected from our own UAVs




Type	Attitude			Forum logs		
	Our own logs			Forum logs		
	Total	Norm.	Anom.	Total	Norm.	Anom.
Quadcopters	69	48	21	29	15	14
Hexcopters	43	28	15	17	7	10
Total	112	76	36	46	22	24

Type	Vibration			Forum logs		
	Our own logs			Forum logs		
	Total	Norm.	Anom.	Total	Norm.	Anom.
Quadcopters	103	52	51	29	15	14
Hexcopters	32	16	16	17	7	10
Total	135	68	67	46	22	24



Type	Compass Interference			Forum logs		
	Our own logs			Forum logs		
	Total	Norm.	Anom.	Total	Norm.	Anom.
Quadcopters	38	30	8	16	10	7
Hexcopters	0	0	0	4	0	3
Total	38	30	8	20	10	10

Used the requirements to design LSTM Autoencoders for detecting THREE of these failures.

LSTM Autoencoders (Deep Learning Approach)



Rule-based Methods



Interference Anomaly

Tested on 46 publicly available flight logs collected from forums

Metrics	Vibration			Attitude			Int Mag
	VibeX	VibeY	VibeZ	Roll	Pitch	Yaw	
LSTM	Precision	0.68	0.61	0.86	0.81	0.90	0.83
	Recall	1.00	1.00	0.95	0.87	0.75	0.63
	Accuracy	0.87	0.80	0.91	0.89	0.91	0.91
	F1	0.81	0.76	0.90	0.84	0.82	0.71
Rule	Precision	0.67	1.00	0.88	0.78	0.83	0.47
	Recall	0.15	0.35	0.79	0.47	0.42	0.86
	Accuracy	0.74	0.80	0.87	0.78	0.82	0.80
	F1	0.25	0.53	0.83	0.58	0.56	0.61

Metrics	Vibration			Attitude			Mag Int.
	VibeX	VibeY	VibeZ	Roll	Pitch	Yaw	
LSTM	0.919	0.906	0.958	0.928	0.866	0.817	0.750

Area under the curve (AUC)

5

Used the requirements to design LSTM Autoencoders for detecting THREE of these failures.

Problems with Deep Learning Detectors



Vehicle Type: Hexacopters

Flight Control Computer: mRo Control Zero F7

Flight Control Software: PX4 Autopilot

Companion Computer: NVIDIA Jetson (NX)


Heuristic Based Anomaly Detectors

Heuristic Based Detectors

7 Heuristic Based Anomaly Detectors

Symptom	Ardupilot		Px4	
	Attributes	Anomaly conditions	Attributes	Anomaly conditions
Vibration	VIBE.{VibeX,VibeY,VibeZ}	values over 30ms^2	sensor_accel	Standard deviation over 30ms^2
Attitude	ATT.{Roll,Pitch,Yaw} ATT.Des{Roll,Pitch,Yaw}	ATT.{Roll,Pitch,Yaw} diverges from ATT.Des{Roll,Pitch,Yaw} by 5°	vehicle_attitude vehicle_attitude_setpoint	vehicle_attitude diverges from vehicle_attitude_setpoint by 5°
Interference	CTUN.ThO MAG.{MagX,MagY,MagZ}	Correlation between norm of MAG and ThO goes over 50%	sensor_mag.{x,y,z} actuator_control[3]	Correlation between norm of sensor_mag and actuator_control[3] goes over 50%
GPS	GPS.NSats GPS.HDop	NSats under 12 and HDop over 1.2	vehicle_gps_position.{satellites_used,hdop,vdop,noise,jamming_indicator}	satellites_used<12, hdop>1.2m vdop>2m, noise>120 jamming_indicator>40
Power	BAT.Curr BAT.Volt	Slope of Curr or Volt below -0.05 in any 200 observation window	battery_status.voltage_v battery_status.current_a	Slope of current_a or voltage_v below -0.05 in any 200 observation window
Rc-in-out	RCOU.{C1:C6 }	Avg. gap above 200 PWM between two sets of RCOU.C values, RCOU.C clips the minimum or maximum PWM values	actuator_outputs[0:5]	Avg. gap above 200 PWM between two sets of actuator_outputs values, actuator_outputs clips the minimum or maximum PWM values
EKF	EKF3.{IP,IV,IM } EKF4.{SP,SV,SM,SH,SVT}	EKF3.{IP,IV} outside range [-1,1] EKF3.{IM} outside range [-50,50] EKF4 outside range[-0.5,0.5]	estimator_innovations[:]	Any innovation outside range [-1,1]


Real-Time, Onboard Architecture



Using MAVROS to communicate with PX4 and then subscribe to ROS Topic

Real World Flight Tests

Test in Gazebo Simulator



Simulating anomaly detection in Gazebo, a high-fidelity simulator.

Attitude anomaly was forced using high wind gusts in Gazebo.

Field Test with Real Drones – Passing Criteria

Detectors	ROS Topics	Passing Criteria
Vibration	/mavros/imu/data	(1) Vibration data recorded by the real-time detectors match the data found in the logs. (2) Detection of intentionally (and carefully) generated vibrations using heavy payload.
Attitude	/mavros/imu/data /mavros/setpoint_raw/target_attitude	(1) Attitude divergence values recorded by the real-time detectors match the data found in the logs. (2) Inducing attitude divergence by temporarily restricting roll/pitch/yaw movements and ensuring that attitude anomalies are detected when divergence goes over threshold.
Interference	/mavros/imu/mag /mavros/setpoint_raw/target_attitude	(1) Interference data (mag and throttle) recorded by the real-time detectors match the data found in the logs. (2) Lowering the detection threshold for interference and ensuring that the interference detection warnings are generated when the correlation between magnetic field and throttle goes higher than the threshold
GPS	/mavros/gpsstatus/gps1/raw	(1) GPS data recorded by the real-time detectors match the data found in the logs. (2) Detection of low number of satellites and high HDOP and VDOP inside GPS constrained area (e.g., confined laboratory)
Power	/mavros/battery	(1) Power data recorded by the real-time detectors match the data found in the logs. (2) Performing battery endurance tests and ensuring that low battery warnings are raised when battery voltage falls below predefined thresholds
RC Output	/mavros/rc/out	(1) When RC output values recorded by the real-time detectors match the data found in the logs. (2) Detection of intentionally generated RC clippings using heavy payload.
EKF	/mavros/estimator_status	found in the logs.

Field Test with Real Drones



Tests were conducted against a simple takeoff, fly to waypoint A, return to waypoint B, Land.

This drone was equipped with a **step-down transformer causing imbalance**. It was deliberately selected for the tests.

Field Test with Real Drones

```
Activities Terminal • May 15 11:37 • root@3a6d9128ae57: /catkin_ws/src/dr_onboard_autonomy/nodes
root@3a6d9128ae57: /catkin_ws/src/dr_onboard_autonomy/nodes
=====
Accelerometer data: [-0.102, 0.693, 9.963]
Vibration data: [0.533, 1.186, 0.863]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
=====
Accelerometer data: [0.327, -0.363, 10.039]
Vibration data: [0.42, 1.15, 0.394]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
=====
Accelerometer data: [-0.582, -0.282, 11.08]
Vibration data: [0.486, 1.049, 0.795]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
=====
Accelerometer data: [0.525, 1.745, 9.065]
Vibration data: [0.44, 1.35, 0.827]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
=====
Accelerometer data: [1.498, 0.814, 10.595]
Vibration data: [0.83, 1.027, 0.956]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
=====
Accelerometer data: [0.438, -0.245, 10.91]
Vibration data: [0.845, 0.983, 1.136]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
=====
Accelerometer data: [-0.745, -0.765, 11.764]
Vibration data: [0.931, 1.043, 1.541]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
=====
Accelerometer data: [-0.771, 0.404, 10.506]
Vibration data: [0.969, 1.048, 1.427]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
=====
Accelerometer data: [0.601, 0.966, 9.582]
Vibration data: [0.978, 0.762, 1.398]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
=====
Accelerometer data: [0.023, -0.722, 10.642]
Vibration data: [0.67, 0.757, 1.404]
Vibration Anomalies: [0, 0, 0]
```

Real-time accelerometer data and vibration detection



Analysis is run onboard and results streamed to the Ground Station.

Real-time onboard detection of Vibration, Attitude and Motor PWM output anomalies


Field Test with Real Drones - Results

```
Motor PWM values: [1799. 766. 1928. 456. 199. 1999.]  
Minimum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0]  
Maximum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]  
[1315, 1528, 1451, 1398, 1317, 1525]  
Found it  
Motor PWM values: [1315. 1528. 1451. 1398. 1317. 1525.]  
Minimum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]  
Maximum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]  
[761, 1921, 977, 1805, 1764, 1042]  
Found it  
Motor PWM values: [ 761. 1921. 977. 1805. 1764. 1042.]  
Minimum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]  
Maximum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]  
[1337, 1537, 1490, 1388, 1251, 1609]  
Found it  
Motor PWM values: [1337. 1537. 1490. 1388. 1251. 1609.]  
Minimum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]  
Maximum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]  
[1789, 909, 1900, 691, 432, 1998]  
Found it  
Motor PWM values: [1789. 909. 1900. 691. 432. 1998.]  
Minimum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]  
Maximum clipping anomalies: [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]
```

Anomalies detected in motor PWM outputs!
Prototype sends alerts to Ground Station Console.




Motor PWM outputs from the flight log



Motor PWM outputs recorded in real-time

Field Test - Detection and Adaptation

CICADA: Controller Instability-preventing Configuration Aware Drone Adaptation




PX4 has 1800 different flight parameters!

This work explores which parameters are likely to cause instability.

Supported Adaptation:

- Revert-to-baseline
- Loiter
- Land-in-place

Field Test - Detection and Adaptation



Normal Takeoff

Takeoff with $MC_ROLL_P = 0$


Testing **Revert-to-Baseline** with the CICADA Framework

MC_ROLL_P had a baseline value of 0.4 which we changed to 0.

Upon anomaly detection, **MC_ROLL_P** was **reverted** back to the baseline

Resource Optimization for Real-time Analytics

More anomalies ..




18 anomaly types were identified. Most required analysis of multiple data stream in real-time.

Needed:

Light weight approach that can run in the background all the time, and trigger an alert that activates more refined detectors.



ADAM: Adaptive Drone Anomaly Monitor



ADAM avoids the requirement to run all the detectors simultaneously.

ADAM turns on anomaly detectors using the **Activation Sequence Tree**.

Anomalies detected in a **parent node** turns on all detectors of its **child node**.

ADAM: Adaptive Drone Anomaly Monitor

Detector Turned On



Anomaly Detected



ARDUPILOT Versatile, Trusted, Open

Sign Up | Log In

Quadplane almost crashed in auto mode fw 4.3.1 & cube orange, please help!


ton999 Tony Atma 1 Oct 2022

Hello gentlemen,
I just upgrade my quadplane to Arduplane FW 4.3.1 from 4.2.3.
The drone flew perfectly using FW 4.2.3, and I have conducted several way point missions without any issue.
Just yesterday I did upgrade to FW 4.3.1, I have got some issues. First is all servos are showing erratic behavior, in FBWA mode elevator servos move very little, when I did test on the ground after arming.
While aileron servos are normal. So servos shows very strange (erratic) behavior, compare with previous FW. (4.2.3). Secondly, I get error : "Compass Inconsistency" many times when I turn on the drone. I use dual GPS and Cube Orange.

After I rotate the drone, then I don't see any Compass Inconsistency message. I can fly very well in FBWA mode without any issue. Then next day I did full AUTO MISSION from take off to landing. This is what happen during AUTO MODE:

1 / 18 Oct 2022


Back



Evaluating ADAM

Anomaly Count	Case Count	% Detected (Adapt.)	% Traversed	% Detected (Non-Adapt.)	% Crash
1	5	60.00	60.00	100.00	0.00
2	7	78.57	78.57	92.86	28.57
3	6	72.22	83.33	77.78	33.33
4	7	75.00	92.86	75.00	42.86
5	14	88.57	95.71	88.57	50.00
6	12	87.50	98.61	87.50	66.67
7	10	87.14	98.57	87.14	70.00
7+	8	74.24	96.97	74.24	37.50
Total	69	82.51	95.04	83.97	47.83

Evaluation on forum logs: The adaptive monitoring approach using ADAM achieved **82.52%** accuracy on forum logs, almost matching the non-adaptive approach's **83.97%**



Resource consumption test: ADAM could reduce resource usage by up to **65%**.

In steady state, when only the Canary remains activated, it could achieve much higher resource consumption savings.

Evaluating ADAM





Functionality Test: The functionality of the framework was tested in a high fidelity simulator Gazebo. Pseudo-anomaly messages were sent throughout the mission to trigger various anomaly detectors in the activation sequence tree.



Initial lab testing with real drones: The drone was manually tilted 10 degrees to generate an attitude anomaly, which triggered the Canaries!


Anomaly Diagnosis

Anomaly Diagnosis



Anomaly Detection (Symptoms)



Vibe
GPS
EKF




Symptoms

Type of anomalies reflected in different data attributes

Anomaly Diagnosis



Anomaly Diagnosis



Root Cause

The high-level problem that is causing the anomalies in the data attribute(s).



Anomaly Diagnosis

Symptom Identification

21 different types of symptoms:

Example:

- Vibration
- Interference
- Attitude

Root cause Identification

17 different types of root-causes:

Example:

- Hardware issue
- Tuning Issue
- Calibration Issue

Symptom and root cause identification



Vibration-Accel	Interference	Attitude	GPS
Vibration	Interference	Desired Roll	latitude
Raw acceleration	interfare	attitude divergence	satellite
Raw accelerometer	interfaring	toilet bowling	longitude
VIBE	coupling	Excessive yaw	Lat
IMU	interfered	YAW drift	HDop
AccZ	throttle	angle of the scroll	NSats
AccX	magnetic field	wobbling	GPS.HDop
AccY	thrust	DesPitch	GPS.Alt
IMU.AccZ	MagX	violent turn	RelAlt
VibeX	MagY	DesYaw	SPD
VibeY	MagZ	ATT.DesPitch	GPS.Lat
VibeZ	MAG	ATT.Roll	Lng
vehicle_acceleration	MAG2	ErrYaw	GCr
vehicle_imu	CTUN.ThR	ATT.ErrYaw	GPS.NSats
sensor_accel	CTUN.ThO	vehicle-angular_velocity	vehicle_gps_position
sensor_accel.x	actuator_controls[3]	vehicle_attitude	vehicle_global_position
sensor_accel.y	vehicle_magnetomete	vehicle-angular_acceleration	vehicle_gps_position.lat
sensor_combined	sensor_mag	vehicle_attitude_setpoint	vehicle_gps_position.lon

List of query terms

Anomaly Diagnosis

Symptoms

Vibe

GPS

EKF

Root Cause

Hardware Issue

Tuning Issue

Root Cause

The high-level problem that is causing the anomalies in the data attribute(s).



Anomaly Diagnosis

Symptoms							Root causes				
Post	Vibration	Interference	Attitude	Power	EKF	Hardware	Isolation	Wiring	Weather	Sensor
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
2763	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



ARM

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{Support} = \frac{\text{frq}(X, Y)}{N} \\
 \\
 \text{Rule: } X \Rightarrow Y \quad \begin{array}{l} \xrightarrow{\quad} \\ \downarrow \\ \xleftarrow{\quad} \end{array} \quad \text{Confidence} = \frac{\text{frq}(X, Y)}{\text{frq}(X)} \\
 \\
 \text{Lift} = \frac{\text{Support}}{\text{Supp}(X) \times \text{Supp}(Y)}
 \end{array}$$



Association Rules

```
Rule: {'Power', 'GPS', 'Attitude'} -> {'Power issue'}
Confidence: 0.75
Lift: 3.376415094339623
=====
Rule: {'Power', 'Attitude'} -> {'Motor', 'Hardware'}
Confidence: 0.225
Lift: 3.3977848101265824
=====
Rule: {'Compass', 'Vibration', 'Tuning'} -> {'Calibration'}
Confidence: 0.5882352941176471
Lift: 3.1328781512605044
=====
Rule: {'Vibration', 'Interference', 'Calibration'} -> {'Compass'}
Confidence: 0.875
Lift: 3.9391509433962266
=====
```

Mined data from forum texts
related to co-occurring
symptoms and root causes

Applied Association Rule Mining

Association rules that can recommend root causes given the detected symptoms

Anomaly Diagnosis

Symptoms

Vibe

GPS

EKF

Root Cause

Hardware Issue


Tuning Issue

Root Cause


The high-level problem that is causing the anomalies in the data attribute(s).



Anomaly Diagnosis




Case 1
Symptoms generated using both **problem description** and **anomaly detection** on the flight log



Case 2
Symptoms generated using **anomaly detection** on the flight log

What went wrong?

1




2



Post-mission, hovered for 20+ minutes for endurance test. Crashed in final minutes of flight!

The cause of the crash was not obvious at all. Engineers from our team, Griffiss airbase, and NASA deeply analyzed flight logs.

3



Physical flight X2
(hover time reduced for test)

Flight log:
<https://tinyurl.com/TEAL-Crash>

- Cruise Altitude: 100 ft (30.4 m)
- Distance: **500 meters**
- Max Alt: 129.41 meters

What went wrong?

Anomalies Detected:



- RC-in-out
- Current
- Attitude

Top 3 recommendations from the ARM Model:

- Power (73.68%)
- Motor/ESC (45%)
- GPS Issue (37.06%)



(a) Anomalies were detected because the average outputs to a group of motors diverged excessively from another group by over 200 PWM.




Data Collection and Community Support

Longitudinal Data Collection



Time series
sensor data



Weather Data



Battery Info



Flight Plan



GCS Error
Messages



Post flight
analysis





Additional Info




Annotating Anomalies


Anomaly ID	A00001	A00002	A00003
Flight-ID	F0012	F00001	F00002
Anomaly Tag	LOSS-OF-SIGNAL	ACCEL-CLIPPING	HIGH-VIBRATION
Description	Drone transitioned to HOVER state on failure to detect heart-beat from the GCS > 20 seconds. Heartbeat was restored & mission was completed.	An error message was raised stating “Accel 0 clipping, not safe to fly!” Upon landing we detected that the cap had opened creating significant drag.	High vibration was observed in the flight logs. Upon landing we detected that the cap had opened creating significant drag
Start Time	518	578	530
End Time	518	578	680
Observability	Observed during flight via BEEP to redundant Radio Controller, Flight logs.	During flight via error message, Flight Logs.	Flight logs only
Outcome	Exception case handled correctly during flight	Significant impairment with successful RTL	Significant impairment with successful RTL
Time-series	Timeline, vehicle_status.nav_state	Timeline, accel_clipping[0], accel_clipping[1], accel_clipping[2]	Timeline, var_accel[0], var_accel[1], var_accel[2]



Collected Data - example of two flights



Planned flight
(simulation)





Flight 1



Flight 2


Collected Data - example of two flights

Information Type	Flight 1	Flight 2
Time-series Sensor Data 	All the sensor data extracted from the log file saved into separate CSV files	All the sensor data extracted from the log file saved into separate CSV files
Weather Information 	Weather model: GFS27 Wind: 8.26 knots NE Air temperature: 78F Dew point: N/A Relative Humidity: N/A Atm pressure (inHg): N/A	Weather model: GFS27 Wind: 6 knots N Air temperature: 66F Dew point: 48 Relative Humidity: 51% Atm pressure (inHg): 30.21
Battery Profile 	Battery ID: #10013 Specs: 16000 mah 6S 25C 22.2V Before Flight: Total Voltage: 25.1V C1: 4.17V C2: 4.21V C3: 4.18V C4: 4.17V C5: 4.15V C6: 4.21V After Flight: Total Voltage: 24.1V C1: 4.03V C2: 4.06V C3: 4.05V C4: 4.01V C5: 4.05V C6: 4.06V	Battery ID: #10017 Specs: 16000 mah 6S 25C 22.2V Before Flight: Total Voltage: 25.2V C1: 4.19V C2: 4.14V C3: 4.16V C4: 4.16V C5: 4.13V C6: 4.14V After Flight: Total Voltage: 23.8V C1: 3.94V C2: 3.92V C3: 3.94V C4: 3.94V C5: 3.90V C6: 3.92V


Collected Data - example of two flights

Information Type	Flight 1	Flight 2
Flight Path Information 	Waypoints traversed (lat, lon, alt(m)): 41.6066955094, -86.3555046667, 10 41.6045566645, -86.3554461571, 30 41.6040586892, -86.3595820504, 40 41.6066955094, -86.3555046667, 10	Waypoints traversed (lat, lon, alt(m)): 41.6066955094, -86.3555046667, 10 41.6045566645, -86.3554461571, 30 41.6040586892, -86.3595820504, 40 41.6087610934, -86.3602510006, 236 41.6066955094, -86.3555046667, 236
GCS Error Messages 	Avionics Power low: 4.60 Volt Accel 0 clipping, not safe to fly! Accel 2 clipping, not safe to fly! Land now, and check the vehicle setup. Clipping can lead to fly-aways.	Manual control lost Manual control regained after 0.8s Manual control lost Manual control regained after 0.2s
Post-flight Analysis Report 	Actuator outputs are fluctuating greatly with frequent minimum and maximum clippings indicating heavy and imbalanced payload. Current data shows that the sUAS was under-powered compared to its weight. This also caused high z-axis vibrations.	Because no GF_ACTION was set, the sUAS transitioned from OnBoard to stabilized mode. However, the throttle was slightly above neutral. Our current finding is that the throttle position caused the increase in altitude, and the sUAS' momentum plus the southerly wind caused it to head North.


Longitudinal Data Collection - Flight Routes



Polygon



Zigzag



Circle



North-South route





East-West route

Used sequentially to analyze the effects of wind direction

Acknowledgments



Thanks to all my collaborators



Publications

ADAM: Adaptive Monitoring of Runtime Anomalies in Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems

Md Nafee Al Islam and others

(SEAMS'24)

RESAM: Requirements Elicitation and Specification for Deep-Learning Anomaly Models with Applications to UAV Flight Controllers

Md Nafee Al Islam and others

(RE'22)

Configuring mission-specific behavior in a product line of collaborating Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

Md Nafee Al Islam and others

(JSS'23)

Towards an Annotated All-Weather Dataset of Flight Logs for Small Uncrewed Aerial System

Md Nafee Al Islam and others

(AIAA'23)

Diagnosing and Explaining Flight Anomalies in small Unmanned Aerial Systems

Md Nafee Al Islam and others

(Work Completed)

Requirements-driven configuration of emergency response missions with small aerial vehicles

J. Huang, A. Agrawal, Md Nafee Al Islam and others

(SPLC'20)

Towards Real-Time Safety Analysis of Small Unmanned Aerial Systems in the National Airspace

J. Huang, N. Chawla, M. Cohen, Md Nafee Al Islam and others (AIAA'22)

RESAM: Requirements Elicitation and Specification for Deep-Learning Anomaly Models with Applications to UAV Flight Controllers

Md Nafee Al Islam and others (RE'22)

Detecting Anomalies in Small Unmanned Aerial Systems via Graphical Normalizing Flows

Yihong Ma, Md Nafee Al Islam and others (IEEE Intel. Sys. '23)

Hazard Analysis for Human-on-the-Loop Interactions in sUAS systems

M. Vierhauser, Md Nafee Al Islam and others (FSE'21)

Salil Purandare, Urjoshi Sinha, Md Nafee Al Islam, "Self-Adaptive Mechanisms for Misconfigurations in Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems

S. Purandare, U. Sinha, Md Nafee Al Islam and others (SEAMS'23)



Detection and Diagnosis of Flight Anomalies in Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

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Assistant Professor
Department of Computer Science
University of San Diego
email: mislam@sandiego.edu

12th November 2024

