Radiation Hardening by Software – Advanced FDIR and Redundancy Concepts with COTS in Space

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Radiation Hardening by Software – Part II

Advanced FDIR and Redundancy Concepts with COTS in Space

Stephan Busch, Fraunhofer EMI and Klaus Schilling, ZfT

Fraunhofer
EMI

Preface

About Me

research and development in the context of
robust, **flexible**, and **efficient** designs
for innovative **small satellite** systems

- University of Würzburg, JMUW
- Center for Telematics, ZfT
- Fraunhofer Ernst-Mach-Institute, EMI



2007

ZENTRUM FÜR TELEMATIK

2015

Fraunhofer EMI



2018

Fraunhofer Ernst-Mach-Institute

Fraunhofer EMI

28 000 Staff

74 Institutes

Fraunhofer Ernst-Mach-Institute

Fraunhofer EMI

Compact Camera Payloads | Small Satellite Demonstrators | Geoanalytics







Agenda

- ❑ Preface
- ❑ Introduction
- ❑ Mitigation Concepts
- ❑ Example System Design
- ❑ On the Horizon
- ❑ References



Pico-Satellite Bus *UWE*

Introduction

New Approaches for NewSpace



Innovation

- state-of-the-art technology for new applications
- high performance, high efficiency

Iteration

- agile system development with rapid design, integration and test cycles

Automation

- for design, test, and operation of many satellites

image credits: SpaceX

The chance of COTS in NewSpace

Onboard Autonomy

- onboard AI, deep learning based image classification and segmentation
- real-time information extraction

Advanced FDIR

- onboard AI for advanced sensor data analysis and anomaly detection

Payload-in-the-loop

- Optimization of image acquisition (e.g. pointing)



The challenge for COTS in LEO



- total ionizing dose (TID)
  - electronics, solar cells, optics
- single event effects (SEE)
  - transients, upsets, latchups, burnouts

Advanced FDIR and Redundancy Concepts with COTS

» How to provide a
reasonable level of robustness
for modern system architectures based on
commercial-of-the-shelf hardware
to allow dependable operation in the
hazardous space environment «



Mitigation Concepts

Robustness

robustness = reliability + fault-tolerance

the ability of a system to…

1. accomplish its designated operations during intended lifetime under normal conditions (reliable)
2. continue at least reduced operations in the event of the failure of some of its components (fault-tolerant)

Reasonable level of robustness for a small satellite

- most failures are not inherently destructive and can be recovered
  e.g. by power cycles, complex recovery procedures by ground control
- at least the key components have to be implemented robustly to enable recovery
  i.e. OBC + EPS + COM

General Concepts of Radiation Effects Mitigation

radiation effects mitigation for COTS based designs

robustness of COTS based systems by design hard- and software design can be achieved by avoidance, conservative design, or redundancy and recovery

Hardware

- shielding
- non-sensitive operation modes
- component selection
- device redundancy
- protection circuits

Software

- information-redundancy
- time-redundancy
- code-redundancy
- reduced operation duty cycle
- fault detection, isolation, and recovery mechanisms (FDIR)

[Maurer et. al., 2008]

Hardware: Effect Reduction

- Shielding of critical components
  - protons: light materials, e.g. PE (Polyethylene)
  - electrons: high-Z materials, e.g. Ta (Tantal)

- Non-sensitive operation modes
  - partial power down of unused hardware exploiting reduced duty cycle
  - low clock frequency reduces probability for SET

Shielding of Protons



Shielding of Electrons



[Höffgen, 2021]

Hardware: Component Selection

- Radiation tolerant COTS
  - bipolar integrated circuits
  - MRAM (Magnetoresistive RAM), FRAM (Ferroelectric RAM), Flash
- De-Rating
  - conservative component selection, large margin for relevant specification parameters
- Target minimization: reduced surface of vulnerability
  - prefer reduced complexity (i.e. sensitive nodes)

Hardware: Tolerant System Design

- Device redundancy
  - parallel loosely coupled operation
    e.g. parallel switches, diodes, LDOs
  - voting circuits
    e.g. TMR (triple modular redundancy)

Triple redundancy with single voter



- Protection circuits
  - damage protection,
    e.g. current limiter, latchup protection
  - watchdog timer recovery

Latchup Protection



Hardware: Tolerant System Design

- Device redundancy
  - parallel loosely coupled operation
    e.g. parallel switches, diodes, LDOs
  - voting circuits
    e.g. TMR (triple modular redundancy)

Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)



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Latchup Protection



Software: Redundancy

- Information redundancy
  - state verification
    e.g. periodical check of register settings
  - error detection and correction (EDAC) codes
    and memory scrubbing
    e.g. parity, CRC, Hamming or Reed-Solomon codes
    periodic memory scan mitigates cumulative errors
- Code redundancy
  - redundant software images
  - redundant instructions for critical calculations (ILR)
    source-2-source compilers generate “hardened” code
- Time redundancy
  - execute redundant operations subsequently on the same hardware

Example: Instruction-Level Redundancy (ILR)



	(a) Native	(b) ILR
1	loop:	loop:
2	r1 = **add** r1, r2	r1 = **add** r1, r2
3		r1’ = **add** r1’, r2’
4		r1’’ = **add** r1’’, r2’’
5		**majority**(r1, r1’, r1’’)
6		**majority**(r3, r3’, r3’’)
7	**cmp** r1, r3	**cmp** r1, r3
8		
9		
10	**jne** loop	**jne** loop

[Kuvaiskii et.al, 2016]

Software: Monitor and Recover

- Software Watchdog
  - monitor task execution, communication link, or external device
  - execute recovery procedures
    e.g. checkpoint recovery, reset of a task or entire system,
    initiate power cycle of external hardware, etc.



[Abaffy et.al. 2010]

Example System Design

The UWE Satellite Bus

A **robust**, flexible, and efficient satellite bus

- UWE-3: Attitude Control (launch 2013)
- UWE-4: Electrical Propulsion (launch 2018)

Julius-Maximilians-
UNIVERSITÄT
WÜRZBURG

The UWE Satellite Bus

- Modular architecture
- Standardized subsystem interface
- Redundancy of core components

UNISEC Subsystem-Interface





EPS

OBC
Core Module

COM



[Busch, 2016]

Robust and Efficient OBDH Core Module

- optimized as dedicated housekeeping und autonomous FDIR module
- two redundant microcontrollers units (MCU) in warm-backup
- less than 10mW total power consumption





Robust and Efficient OBDH Core Module



- Toggle Watchdog Unit (TWU)
  - autonomous reconfiguration
  - reset and switch-over
  - allow slave enable





Robust and Efficient OBDH Core Module



- Power Cycling Unit (PCU)
  - loosely coupled redundancy
  - intrinsic majority voting





Robust and Efficient OBDH Core Module



- Power Cycling Unit (PCU)
  - loosely coupled redundancy
  - intrinsic majority voting
  - full isolation of CMOS devices







Robust and Efficient OBDH Core Module

- Mutual MCU supervision and reconfiguration
  - redundant software images in local and remote unit
  - remote program memory supervision using rapid (<2s) pseudo signature analysis checksums PSA via JTAG/EEM hardware and bitwise-logic operators





Robust and Efficient OBDH Core Module

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

not decidable		$\overline{RP}$		RP	
		$\overline{RR}$	RR	$\overline{RR}$	RR
$\overline{LP}$	$\overline{LR}$	0	0	0	x
	LR	0	x	x	1
LP	$\overline{LR}$	0	x	x	1
	LR	x	1	1	1

C1		$\overline{RP}$		RP	
		$\overline{RR}$	RR	$\overline{RR}$	RR
$\overline{LP}$	$\overline{LR}$	0	0	0	1
	LR	0	0	0	1
LP	$\overline{LR}$	0	0	0	1
	LR	1	1	1	1

$C1 = (LP \wedge LR) \vee (RP \wedge RR)$

C2		$\overline{RP}$		RP	
		$\overline{RR}$	RR	$\overline{RR}$	RR
$\overline{LP}$	$\overline{LR}$	0	0	0	0
	LR	0	1	1	1
LP	$\overline{LR}$	0	1	1	1
	LR	0	1	1	1

$C2 = (LP \vee LR) \wedge (RP \vee RR)$

Robust and Efficient OBDH Core Module

- Mutual MCU supervision and reconfiguration
  - redundant software images in local and remote unit
  - remote program memory supervision using rapid (<2s) pseudo signature analysis checksums PSA via JTAG/EEM hardware and bitwise-logic operators
  - early recovery by floating gate cell marginal read









Software Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI)



Software Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI)

- PER (periphery registers)
  - illegal access violation
  - hardware misconfiguration (e.g. clock, interfaces,…)
- BSS (statically allocated RAM)
  - state corruption
  - function pointer corruption
- STACK
  - return pointer corruption
- HEAP (not used)
- Flash
  - illegal instruction execution

→ fault → recovery



Software Implemented Fault Injection (SWIFI)

- runtime: 443 hours
- injections: 1.038.069
- recovered: 6490
- not-recovered: 5

Target:	PER	BSS	STACK	LP
Size (bytes)	4096	4332	4096	131072
Runtime (hrs)	93	138	141	71
Injections	299741	290580	436947	10801
Unrecoverable	0	0	0	5
Reset Recoveries	3443	1583	650	859
PCU	11	34	4	39
TWU	576	1334	509	343
Direct	2856	215	137	477









Survival Analysis (here BSS)





Survival Analysis

- runtime: 443 hours
- injections: 1,038,069
- reco
- not-

Target:	PER	BSS	STACK	LP
Size (bytes)	4096	4332	4096	131072
Runtime (hrs)	93	138	141	71



Sensitivity Analysis



selective code hardening



In-Orbit Operation

Evolution of the industry – GEO vs MEO vs LEO

SES



from Alessandra Costantinos Slides

Image credits: Kosmotras

In-Orbit Operation

Various SEEs in first months after launch

- 10^{-6} bit^{-1} day^{-1} SEU in RAM
- 1 latchup (+ 50mW on 20.04.2014)
- several TWU recoveries and direct resets



Image credits: Kosmotras

In-Orbit Operation

- Clear correlation of observed SEE with position in orbit

SEU in monitored section



TWU recovery



SEE locations for SEU detection and TWU recoveries with two minute scan interval. Overlay on Electron (> 0.04MeV) and Proton (> 0.1MeV) MAX Integral Flux (cm−2s−1) according to AE-8/AP-8 models as simulated with SPENVIS for the UWE-3 orbit

On the Horizon

The chance of COTS in NewSpace

Onboard Autonomy

- onboard AI, deep learning based image classification and segmentation
- real-time information extraction

Advanced FDIR

- onboard AI for advanced sensor data analysis and anomaly detection

Payload-in-the-loop

- Optimization of image acquisition (e.g. pointing)



Fraunhofer Advanced Nanosatellite

Fraunhofer EMI



High Performance Data Processing Unit

- COTS SoC ZynqMP Ultrascale+
- various camera interfaces
- image processing pipeline
- hardware AI accelerator
- mass storage

Cryo Cooled Detector

- 1280 × 1024px HgCdTe detector
- Cryogenic Stirling Cooler (95K)
- 8 channel filter wheel
- 2.5-5µm MWIR

Radiation Sensor (Fraunhofer INT)

- SEE (calibrated SRAM)
- TID (preconditioned EEPROM)

[Schimmerohn et. al., 2022]

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