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**From:** Steve Greer <[REDACTED]>  
**Sent:** Thursday, February 2, 2023 10:11 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** Fwd: Lieutenant General Interview  
**Attachments:** SENIOR GENERAL OFFICER INTERVIEW.docx; Untitled attachment 00016.html

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Sent from my iPhone

Begin forwarded message:

**From:** [REDACTED] >  
**Date:** February 2, 2023 at 2:53:07 PM MST  
**To:** Steve Greer <[REDACTED]>  
**Subject:** Lieutenant General Interview

See attached interview of a Lieutenant General, related to SAPs and USAPs.

Parts are hilarious in my opinion. Perhaps you will get a few chuckles. Everyone that has read it does. All 100% true as it happened in my presence and I witnessed it first hand.

I hope this gives additional insight.

My Best,

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## **SENIOR GENERAL OFFICER INTERVIEW**

I'm still not sure how I had this case assigned to me, but I was told the Commanding General and Director wanted me leading the investigation, working with the FBI. So, from Los Angeles, CA, I traveled back and forth to the Pentagon, Washington DC, and worldwide on this case with FBI SA [REDACTED]. It was probably one of the more political and stressful investigations of my career. I later came to know I was chosen to investigate this case by our director. There was one incident offense which allegedly occurred in the judicial district I worked out of, the Central District of California, Los Angeles, CA. So, we had a venue for prosecution. HQ-Army CID did not like this investigation and wanted it closed as soon as possible—and I did too. Constant travel and the inability to communicate any details of the matter was challenging.

There was a Lieutenant General (General) suspected of committing a number of felony crimes. It was reported the General was pretty brazen and headstrong. He wore his rank so everyone could see who he was. We knew that an interview or an interrogation would be somewhat difficult. The FBI SA and I had been surreptitiously investigating this General for many months—perhaps a half a year—before we were prepared and ready to interview him. We took great time in planning for the interview. We knew deep down that we would probably only get one chance to interview him. And we knew that interviewing the General at his office in Washington DC was not an option.

We wanted him out of his comfort zone. But also, having him come to the Army CID or FBI Office for an interview was not an option in our opinion, since we wanted the element of surprise. We did not want the General to develop an alibi or explanation, and convince himself he did nothing criminal, or predetermine he would not talk with us. The General

traveled TDY quite extensively all over the world, so we had some options. We decided to approach and interview him while he was on Temporary Duty (TDY), away from Washington DC and his office.

We had a high-placed Confidential Informant who let us know the General's travel schedule and the itinerary for trips. The General always traveled with a good-sized entourage on Military fixed-wing aircraft. Never on commercial air. Always Military. The Army has a fleet of fixed-wing aircraft for use by general officers, special mission unit personnel, and other required priority users. So, after reviewing his travel schedule and itineraries, we decided to contact the General in Honolulu, Hawaii. The General had a fairly light schedule on the day he arrived in Hawaii, so we decided to conduct the interview then, giving us that element of surprise. The FBI Agent and I flew to Hawaii and prepared for the interview. We had a large suite booked where we intended to conduct the interview. However, that plan failed, so we ended up interviewing the General in his private hotel room. We spent time together in the lobby and awaited for the General's arrival to the hotel.

After his arrival, we gave him about an hour to check into his room and get settled. We then approached his room and knocked on the door. The General immediately answered it, wearing nothing but his sports-style tightly whitey underwear and a white tank top-type undershirt. The General boldly inquired as to who we were and what we wanted. I advised the General I was with Army CID and my partner was with the FBI. The General demanded to be shown our credentials, which we produced. As we stood in the hallway for several awkward seconds, fumbling with my credentials, I requested that we move inside his room to continue talking in private. After allowing us in, he was requested—but declined—to come to the booked suite we had pre-arranged. So, we conducted the interview in his room.

The room was small and there were not many places to sit. The General sat in a chair opposite me while the FBI Agent sat in a chair he moved from the wall. As such, we inadvertently set up a situation where the General was blocked into the area along the side of his bed. After getting through the rights advisement, which he waived and agreed to talk with us, we began.

Without going into all details, some if not all, of the allegations surrounded a female government contractor, who worked as a personal aide for the General. Her job description stated that she was responsible for assisting in the preparation of briefings and the accompanying him to keep his PowerPoint presentations orderly. That is what she was *supposed* to be doing. But she was acting as an personal aide, taking care of all of his needs at any and all hours. She had managed to always travel with him all over the world. There was not a spot worldwide she did not travel with him to. She was just that close.

There were persistent allegations and rumors that they were having an inappropriate relationship, which I was not interested in. Our investigation did not concern any adultery, but the inappropriate relationship was a component, motive, of the willing and knowingly criminal conduct by the General. When we asked the General about their relationship, it set him off. Boy did it set him off. The General was adamant that his relationship with her was private and not of our concern in any way, shape or manner.

The General continued with his insistent that we were out of line for inquiring into the appropriateness of his relationship with her. Well, we weren't (not even close) as the alleged criminal conduct was so egregious and serious that it had to be addressed as it was a part of the motive for some allegations. The General had a full staff and military aides to assist him in almost every aspect of his assignment. The Assistant US Attorney (AUSA) responsible for the federal prosecution specifically wanted

answers regarding the nature of their relationship for establishing motive a clearer understanding of why the General did what he did.

About twenty minutes into the interview, we hear the delicate sound of a magnetic hotel room key card opening the General's hotel room door. It put the room into complete silence. As the female contractor in question opens the door and begins to walk into the room. The General, in one giant spiderman-type move, physically leaps over the FBI Agent, heads straight for the door, and pushes her into the hallway, causing the door to shut behind the General. This effectively shut the General out of his hotel room. The FBI Agent and I looked at each other, wondering what just happened and began to laugh because it was one of the funniest things we had ever seen.

We look around the room, and right in front of us was an unopened suitcase with the female contractor's name attached directly to it. Within just a few minutes, there was a knock at the door. I walked over to the door, and without opening it, asked, "*Who is it?*" The General, in a very stern loud pissed off voice states his name and tells me to open the door. I comply, open the door, and the General re-enters the hotel room. (Remember, he is still in his sports-style underwear) and proceeds to leap back over the FBI Agent again like the amazing spiderman, sitting down in his seat as if nothing had just happened. It was hilarious.

Without missing a beat, the General sternly said, "*Okay, where were we at?*" I questioned the General about who was at the door and he became irate and told me that it has nothing to do with anything. I reinforced to him that it had everything to do with everything. But the General refused to answer the question. I then specifically asked if it was the female contractor, and he confirmed positively that it was. I queried the General why she had a key to his room, but the General refused again to answer. I proceeded to ask him if his military aid or anyone else with his entourage had an extra key to his room, and he refused to answer that

question too. I was very persistent in my questioning, and finally got the General to answer the questions. However, the general then began to ask me a slew of questions. I stopped him by putting my hand up and explained to him that I am the one who asks the questions, not him.

By this time, the General was like a bull seeing red. The General was the maddest I have ever seen a General get. He demanded to know who authorized our tactics of interviewing him. I explained all tactics employed were legal. The General did not like that answer. The FBI Agent jumped in and tried to calm him down so he could continue to answer our questions. We explained that the FBI had notified FBI HQ of a distinguished person interview, as per their protocol. And, I notified HQ Army CID of the pending interview of a GO, per my protocols.

Both of our direct supervisors, along with the Judge Advocate of the US Army (TJAG), the Inspector General of the Army (TIG), and the Assistant US Attorney, were all briefed and concurred with our plan and tactics to conduct the interview. The General was surprised that so many people knew of the interview and the investigation made him even more upset. At that point, the General told us he was having dinner with the PACOM Commander (a four-star General) and needed to get ready. I pulled out his schedule—which he was disturbed that I had a copy—and reminded him that his dinner was not for another two hours. The FBI Agent continued his attempt to persuade the General to answer more questions for another hour, which would allow him one hour to prepare for his dinner engagement. As it turned, the dinner was booked for the General, the female contractor, the PACOM Commander and his wife. No one else.

The General informed us that he was done with the interview and asked us to leave his room. We continued to engage with the General as we are gathering our materials and leaving. As we were preparing to leave, I asked him if we could meet at his office at the Pentagon and continue

the interview there. Surprisingly, the General agreed and then we departed from the room. As we were heading downstairs, we noticed the female contractor sitting in the hotel lobby bar by herself having a drink. (We ended up interviewing her weeks later in Washington DC which also turned out to be a somewhat hostile interview).

A week later, the FBI Agent and I returned to Washington DC and headed to the Pentagon to interview the General. When we arrived, The General was completely composed and answered our questions for several hours. I employed the Behavioral Analysis Interview Technique. The General was clearly not being truthful with us in his answers, but we already knew that. At the conclusion of the interview, I explained that we would like to come back for another two-hour session of interviewing to follow up his explanations. I also informed him that we were going to need to go to a classified location to talk about the SAP/USAP matters. He agreed to it, and we made arrangements to interview him the following week. Roughly an hour later that afternoon, I received a call from a lawyer who said he represented the General and informed me that the General would not be consenting to any additional interviews. The lawyer told me we were not to contact the General in the future.

At this stage of the investigation, we had overwhelming evidence of his criminal conduct and specifically the crimes he committed, so additional interviews were technically not necessary. It would have been better to have had him elaborate on certain matters; state in his own words what occurred knowingly and willfully; and that he knew it to be in violation of federal criminal law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but it was not imperative. During the course of the investigation, certain details were related to the community of Special Access Programs (SAPs), which the General clearly violated with impunity.

As a side note, and one of significant mention, the AUSA, through USDOJ in Washington DC, attempted to get "read on" to the specific

SAPs/USAPs the investigation pertained to. After a long, two-year period, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued the final denial for the "read on" request. DOD cited the reason was the SAPs/USAPs were so vital to the Nations National Security Posture, details could not be further released. The spooky technology at hand in the matter was apparently so sensitive our government had decided to deep six it.

USDOJ was furious. And to my surprise there was nothing USDOJ could do. The request, and the ensuing conversations regarding the "read on," were at the highest levels of our government. TJAG and the Attorney General of the United States (The AG) discussed the matter several times. And it was way above my pay grade. In the end, the AUSA never "read- on" and was more than upset. The AUSA issued a formal Declination for prosecution, declining to prosecute the General for any criminal offense. The AUSA cited access was required to all materials for proper evaluation and assessment. Without access to all information there would be no prosecution, just a declination.

The funny thing was that my supervisors did not even know the details of the USAPs. At the time, there were only three people in Army CID who were "read on" to the various SAPs/USAPs. Our Army CID Commanding General at the time, my Director and myself.

From meetings I had with the Army CID Commanding General, I personally learned he positively did not like the investigation of the Lieutenant General. Had he had it his way, the Army CID Commanding General would have been deep sixed it, never to be mentioned again.

The world of SAPs and USAPS are very secret, controlled, and protected. After it was made clear to me on several occasions to close the investigation, only two or three years later did it finally close. The Department of Justice is still incensed. (Oh well, out of my control). I did

my best at my job as directed and could not get wrapped up in matters that were way above my pay grade.