How secure boot outlocks Free Software

Rüdiger Weis

OpenTechSummit 2015

Rivest on TPM: You may not trust

Ron Rivest, 2002:

"The right way to look at this is you are putting a virtual set-top box inside your PC. You are essentially renting out part of your PC to people you may not trust."

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Microsoft has allready deactivated UEFI-Secure-Boot-Modules

December 2013

Microsoft Security Advisory 2871690:

• 9 UEFI-Secure-Boot-Modules stopped booting

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Windows 10: Lock In

MUST have TPM and Secure boot

"OPTIONAL": Switch off Secure Boot

MUST NOT switch off on smart phones and tablets

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shim Hack

Fragile Trust Chain

booting? SingedByMicrosoft(.) AND SignedByUbuntu(.)

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Cryptographic Problems

- Standard mistakes for standard documents
- Insufficient security parameters
- Cryptographic mistakes
- Security problems because of integration
- Key generation problem

...

Insufficient Security Parameters

 Standard mistaks for standard documents SHOULD versus MUST, use of MAY, ...

Trusted Platform Module Library, Part 1: Architecture, March 15, 2013, p. 37:

"A TPM should implement an approved hash algorithm that has approximately the same security strength as its strongest asymmetric algorithm.

NOTE The TCG may create sets of algorithms that do not have the same security strength for the hash and asymmetric algorithms."

- RSA 2048 bit not enough
- SHA1 still allowed

...

Still allowed: SHA1

- Look back:
 - CCC Datenschleuder, März 2005:
 - http://www.cryptolabs.org/hash/WeisCccDsHash05.html

Practical Attacks

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Integration of TPM

Integration of TPM functions in not secured hardware chips makes hacking easier.

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Key Question Key Control

 "(The Microsoft approach) lends itself to market domination, lock out, and not really owning your own computer."

Whitfield Diffie, 2003:

"To risk sloganeering,

I say you need to hold the keys to your own computer"

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Requirements

- Eckpunktepapier der Bundesregierung
 - Opt-In
 - Opt-Out
 - ...
- State-of-the-art Cryptography
- Privacy friendly Cryptography (DAA, PFS,...)
- International control and certification of the TPM manufacturing process
- Publication and certification of the secure boot code
- Anti trust evaluation of Microsoft
- ..

HowManyMillionBIOSWouldYouLikeToInfect_{Full}.pdf

Lighteater

- Corey Kallenberg and Xeno Kovah:
- "How many million BIOSes would you like to infect?"
- CanSecWest Vancouver 2015

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"2 guys + 4 weeks + 2k\$ =

Multiple vendors' BIOSes infected, with multiple infection capabilities"

- Acer
- Asus
- Dell
- Gigabyte
- HP
- Lenovo
- . . .

Skynet (is) for WIMPs

- System Management Modus (SMM)
- Intels Active Management Technology (Intel AMT)
- Intels Serial-Over-LAN

Code has agency

Bruce Schneier, 5. September 2013

Remember this:

- The math is good, but math has no agency.
- Code has agency, and the code has been subverted.

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