CS4261/5461: Assignment for Week 9 Solutions

Due: Sunday, 26th Oct 2025, 11:59 pm SGT.

1. (a) Agent 4's value for the interval [1/3, 2/3] is

$$\int_{1/3}^{2/3} f_4(x) dx = \left(\int_{1/3}^{1/2} f_4(x) + \int_{1/2}^{2/3} f_4(x) \right) dx$$

$$= \int_{1/3}^{1/2} f_4(x) dx + \int_{1/2}^{2/3} f_4(x) dx$$

$$= \int_{1/3}^{1/2} 0 dx + \int_{1/2}^{2/3} (8x - 4) dx$$

$$= 0 + (4x^2 - 4x) \Big|_{1/2}^{2/3}$$

$$= \frac{1}{9}.$$

(b) First, each agent i marks the point x_i such that $v_i(0, x_i) = 1/4$. We have $x_1 = 1/4$, $x_2 = 1/8$, $x_3 = 1/20$, and $x_4 > 1/2$, so the smallest x_i is x_3 , and agent 3 receives the piece [0, 1/20].

Second, each remaining agent i marks the point y_i such that $v_i(1/20, y_i) = 1/4$. We have $y_1 = 3/10$, $y_2 = 7/40$, and $y_4 > 1/2$, so the smallest y_i is y_2 , and agent 2 receives the piece [1/20, 7/40].

Third, each remaining agent i marks the point z_i such that $v_i(7/40, z_i) = 1/4$. We have $z_1 = 17/40$ and $z_4 > 1/2 > 17/40$, so the smallest z_i is z_1 , and agent 1 receives the piece $\lceil 7/40, 17/40 \rceil$.

Finally, agent 4 receives the remaining piece [17/40, 1].

- (c) First, each agent i marks the point a_i such that $v_i(0, a_i) = 1/2$. We have $a_1 = 1/2$, $a_2 = 1/4$, $a_3 = 1/10$, and $a_4 > 1/2$. The second smallest a_i is a_2 , so we recurse on [0, 1/4] with agents 2 and 3, and recurse on [1/4, 1] with agents 1 and 4.
 - On [0, 1/4], each agent $i \in \{2, 3\}$ marks the point b_i such that $v_i(0, b_i) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot v_i(0, 1/4)$. We have $b_2 = 1/8$ and $b_3 = 1/10$, so the smallest b_i is $b_3 = 1/10$. Hence, agent 3 receives the piece [0, 1/10] and agent 2 receives the piece [1/10, 1/4].
 - On [1/4, 1], each agent $i \in \{1, 4\}$ marks the point c_i such that $v_i(1/4, c_i) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot v_i(1/4, 1)$. We have $c_1 = 5/8$, and since agent 4 has positive value only for [1/2, 1] and this value is

skewed to the right, $c_4 > 3/4 > 5/8$. So the smallest c_i is $c_1 = 5/8$. Hence, agent 1 receives the piece [1/4, 5/8] and agent 4 receives the piece [5/8, 1].

2. No. For example, let

$$f_1(x) = \begin{cases} 2 & \text{if } x \in [0, 1/2]; \\ 0 & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$
$$f_2(x) = \begin{cases} 2 & \text{if } x \in [1/2, 1]; \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The cut-and-choose protocol gives [0, 1/4] to agent 1 and [1/4, 1] to agent 2, but this is Pareto dominated by the allocation that gives [0, 1/2] to agent 1 and [1/2, 1] to agent 2.

3. We claim that c = 2/3.

First, we show that in the output of this protocol, no agent envies another agent by more than 2/3. Consider any agent i.

- If i receives a piece from Step 2, then i gets value at least 1/6, and values any other agent's piece at most 1 1/6 = 5/6. Hence, i's envy toward any other agent is at most 5/6 1/6 = 2/3.
- If i does not receive a piece from Step 2, i still remains when the knife reaches the end of the cake. We will show that i has value at most 1/6 for any other agent's piece, and therefore envy at most 1/6.

Note that i has value at most 1/6 for a piece of cake allocated to any agent in Step 2 (otherwise i should have shouted "Stop!"). Since i remains after Step 2, any agent who receives cake in Step 2 does not receive more cake in Step 3. Now, consider an agent who receives cake (only) in Step 3. Since the knife reached the end of the cake without i having shouted "Stop!", i also has value at most 1/6 for the piece allocated in Step 3.

Next, we give an example with two agents such that, in the output of this protocol, one agent envies the other by exactly 2/3. Suppose that $f_1(x) = f_2(x) = x$ for all $x \in [0, 1]$. The protocol first allocates [0, 1/6] to either agent, say, agent 1. It then allocates [1/6, 1/3] to agent 2. Finally, the remaining cake [1/3, 1] is added to agent 2's piece. As a result, agent 1 envies agent 2 by 5/6 - 1/6 = 2/3.