

Optional Material: Mixed Indivisible + Divisible Goods

Model: Mixed Indivisible and Divisible Goods

- Agents $N = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$
- m indivisible goods and a cake
- Each agent has
 - utility function for the indivisible goods;
 - density function for the cake.
- Allocation $A = (A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n)$, where $A_i = M_i \cup C_i$
 - Indivisible goods: (M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n)
 - Cake: (C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n)
- Utility $u_i(A_i) = u_i(M_i) + u_i(C_i)$

Candidate Fairness Notions

- **Envy-freeness (EF)**: No agent envies another.

$$\forall i, j \in N, u_i(A_i) \geq u_i(A_j)$$

- **Envy-freeness up to one (indivisible) good (EF1)**: Any envy that an agent has towards another agent can be eliminated by removing *some* good from the latter agent's bundle.

$$\forall i, j \in N, \exists g \in A_j \text{ such that } u_i(A_i) \geq u_i(A_j \setminus \{g\})$$

- **EF** for divisible goods + **EF1** for indivisible goods.

Alice and Bob divide three indivisible goods and two dollars

				 
Alice 😊	5	4	3	
Bob 😊	5	4	3	

				
Alice 😊	5	4	3	
Bob 😊	5	4	3	 

Envy-freeness for Mixed Goods (EFM)

Definition (EFM)

For all agents i, j ,

- if agent j 's bundle consists of *only* indivisible goods, there exists $g \in A_j$ such that $u_i(A_i) \geq u_i(A_j \setminus \{g\})$;
- otherwise, $u_i(A_i) \geq u_i(A_j)$.

With only divisible goods: EFM reduces to EF.

With only indivisible goods: EFM reduces to EF1.

Theorem

*EFM allocations **always exist** for any number of agents and can be found in polynomial time.*

Proof Sketch.

- Start with an EF1 allocation of indivisible goods.
- Iteratively (and carefully) add some cake.
- Maintain EFM throughout the process.



Envy Graph


Definition

A directed graph of agents with

Envy edge: $i \longrightarrow j$ if $u_i(A_i) < u_i(A_j)$;

Equality edge: $i \dashrightarrow j$ if $u_i(A_i) = u_i(A_j)$.

				
	5	4	1	5
	3	4	4	5
	4	3	3	5




Addable Set

Definition

A subset of agents $S \subseteq N$ such that

- no envy edge in S ;
- no edge from $N \setminus S$ to S .



Maximal addable set

There does not exist any other addable set $S' \subseteq N$ such that $S \subsetneq S'$.



- If exists, is **unique**.
- Can be found in polynomial time.


Intuition

Add some cake to the **maximal addable set** (in a “perfect” manner).

Cake-Adding Phase

Add some cake to the maximal addable set S

				
	5	4	1	5
	3	4	4	5
	4	3	3	5



Perfect allocation [Alon, 1987]


Every agent in N values all $|S|$ pieces equally.

Given an EFM allocation, after a cake-adding phase, the resulting allocation is still EFM.

Envy Cycle

Definition


A **cycle** in the envy graph with at least one *envy* edge.



Intuition

Eliminate an envy cycle by rotating bundles.

Envy-Cycle-Elimination Phase



Given an EFM allocation, after an envy-cycle-elimination phase, the allocation is still EFM.

What can we do now?

Connection Between Addable Set and Envy Cycle

Key Lemma

At any time, there exists either an **addable set** or an **envy cycle**.

- Always make progress.
- The partial allocation is always EFM.
- The process always terminates.

Caveat

- A polynomial-time algorithm if we have a **perfect allocation oracle** for cake cutting.
- The perfect allocation oracle **cannot be implemented** in a bounded time in the Robertson–Webb model.

Open Question

A bounded (or even finite) EFM protocol in the Robertson–Webb model?

EFM Relaxation

ϵ -Envy-freeness for mixed goods (ϵ -EFM)

For all agents i, j ,

- if agent j 's bundle consists of only indivisible goods, there exists $g \in A_j$ such that $u_i(A_i) \geq u_i(A_j \setminus \{g\})$;
- otherwise, $u_i(A_i) \geq u_i(A_j) - \epsilon$.

Theorem

An ϵ -EFM allocation can be found in time $\text{poly}(n, m, \frac{1}{\epsilon})$ in the Robertson–Webb model.