

ORACLE SWAP

Smart Contract Review

Deliverable: Smart Contract Audit Report

Security Report

December 2022

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Report Summary

Title	ORACLE SWAP Smart Contract Audit		
Project Owner	ORACLE SWAP		
Туре	Public		
Reviewed by	Vatsal Raychura	Revision date	10/12/2022
Approved by	eNebula Solutions Private Limited Approval date		10/12/2022
		Nº Pages	35

Overview

Background

ORACLE SWAP's team requested that eNebula Solutions perform an Extensive Smart Contract audit of their 'PRONFTMultiStaking', 'PRONFTMultiStakingDistributor', 'OracleNFTWeight' Smart Contracts.

Project Dates

The following is the project schedule for this review and report:

- **December 10**: Smart Contract Review Completed (Completed)
- **December 10**: Delivery of Smart Contract Audit Report (Completed)

Review Team

The following eNebula Solutions team member participated in this review:

- Sejal Barad, Security Researcher and Engineer
- Vatsal Raychura, Security Researcher and Engineer

Coverage

Target Specification and Revision

For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the smart contract of ORACLE SWAP.

The following documentation repositories were considered in-scope for the review:

- ORACLE SWAP Project:
 - 1. https://songbird-explorer.flare.network/address/0x5A0C046439E6C033F7710d19270c64FEbdd6f924/contracts#address-tabs
 - 2. https://songbird-explorer.flare.network/address/0xaf1C26d3A52b688d5E006AD4406cCcBeb42Dfa87/c ontracts#address-tabs
 - 3. https://songbird-explorer.flare.network/address/0x136993B9Bea254CC103d08A8965867e123622bD0/contracts#address-tabs

Introduction

Given the opportunity to review ORACLE SWAP Project's smart contract source code, we in the report outline our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts is ready to launch after resolving the mentioned issues, there are no critical or high issues found related to business logic, security or performance.

About ORACLE SWAP: -

Item	Description		
Issuer	ORACLE SWAP		
Type	ERC721		
Platform	Solidity		
Audit Method	Whitebox		
Latest Audit Report	December 10, 2022		

The Test Method Information: -

Test method	Description	
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.	
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.	
White box testing	Based on the open-source code, non-open-source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.	

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description		
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant effect on the		
	security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the		
	critical vulnerabilities.		
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi		
	project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.		
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi		
	project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.		
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project		
	in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project party should		
	evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.		
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to		
	reproduce in engineering.		

The Full List of Check Items:

Category	Check Item		
	Constructor Mismatch		
	Ownership Takeover		
	Redundant Fallback Function		
	Overflows & Underflows		
	Reentrancy		
	MONEY-Giving Bug		
Pagia Coding Puga	Blackhole		
Basic Coding Bugs	Unauthorized Self-Destruct		
	Revert DoS		
	Unchecked External Call		
	Gasless Send		
	Send Instead of Transfer		
	Costly Loop		
	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries		
	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables		
	Transaction Ordering Dependence		
	Deprecated Uses		
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks		
	Business Logics Review		

1		
	Functionality Checks	
	Authentication Management	
	Access Control & Authorization	
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Oracle Security	
Advanced Bell Scruding	Digital Asset Escrow	
	Kill-Switch Mechanism	
	Operation Trails & Event Generation	
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling	
	Frontend-Contract Integration	
	Deployment Consistency	
	Holistic Risk Management	
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array	
	Using Fixed Compiler Version	
Additional Recommendations	Making Visibility Level Explicit	
	Making Type Inference Explicit	
	Adhering To Function Declaration	
	Strictly	
	Following Other Best Practices	

Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit:

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.

Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.		
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.		
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.		
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use arguments or parameters within function calls.		
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.		
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an ex pilotable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.		

Findings

Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the ORACLE SWAP's Smart Contract. During the first phase of our audit, we studied the smart contract source code and ran our in-house static code analyzer through the Specific tool. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	No. of Issues
Critical	0
High	0
Medium	0
Low	3
Total	3

We have so far identified that there are potential issues with severity of **0 Critical**, **0 High**, **0 Medium**, **and 3 Low**. Overall, these smart contracts are well- designed and engineered.


Functional Overview (For PRONFTMultiStaking.sol)

(\$) = payable function	[Pub] public	
# = non-constant function	[Ext] external	
	[Prv] private	
	[Int] internal	

- + [Int] IERC165
 - [Ext] supportsInterface
- + [Int] IERC721 (IERC165)
 - [Ext] balanceOf
 - [Ext] ownerOf
 - [Ext] safeTransferFrom #
 - [Ext] safeTransferFrom #
 - [Ext] transferFrom #
 - [Ext] approve #
 - [Ext] setApprovalForAll #
 - [Ext] getApproved
 - [Ext] isApprovedForAll
- + [Int] IERC20
 - [Ext] totalSupply
 - [Ext] balanceOf
 - [Ext] transfer #
 - [Ext] allowance
 - [Ext] approve #
 - [Ext] transferFrom #

+ [Int] IERC20Permit - [Ext] permit # - [Ext] nonces - [Ext] DOMAIN_SEPARATOR + [Lib] Address - [Int] isContract - [Int] sendValue # - [Int] functionCall # - [Int] functionCall # - [Int] functionCallWithValue # - [Int] functionCallWithValue # - [Int] functionStaticCall - [Int] functionStaticCall - [Int] functionDelegateCall # - [Int] functionDelegateCall # - [Int] verifyCallResult + [Lib] SafeERC20 - [Int] safeTransfer # - [Int] safeTransferFrom # - [Int] safeApprove # - [Int] safeIncreaseAllowance # - [Int] safeDecreaseAllowance # - [Int] safePermit # - [Prv] _callOptionalReturn # + [Lib] EnumerableSet - [Prv] _add # - [Prv] _remove #

- [Prv] _contains




+ Ownable (Context) - [Pub] <Constructor> # - [Pub] owner - [Int] _checkOwner - [Pub] renounceOwnership # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Pub] transferOwnership # - modifiers: onlyOwner - [Int] _transferOwnership # + ReentrancyGuard - [Pub] <Constructor> # + [Int] IERC721Enumerable (IERC721) - [Ext] totalSupply - [Ext] tokenOfOwnerByIndex - [Ext] tokenByIndex + [Lib] EnumerableMap - [Int] set # - [Int] remove # - [Int] contains - [Int] length - [Int] at - [Int] tryGet - [Int] get - [Int] get - [Int] set # - [Int] remove # - [Int] contains - [Int] length

- [Int] at - [Int] tryGet - [Int] get - [Int] get - [Int] set # - [Int] remove # - [Int] contains - [Int] length - [Int] at - [Int] tryGet - [Int] get - [Int] get - [Int] set # - [Int] remove # - [Int] contains - [Int] length - [Int] at - [Int] tryGet - [Int] get - [Int] get - [Int] set # - [Int] remove # - [Int] contains - [Int] length - [Int] at - [Int] tryGet - [Int] get - [Int] get + [Int] IOracleNFTWeight - [Ext] oracleNFTWeight

- + PRONFTMultiStaking (Ownable, ReentrancyGuard, ERC721Holder)
 - [Ext] < Fallback > (\$)
 - [Ext] <Fallback> (\$)
 - [Pub] <Constructor> #
 - [Pub] totalStakedNFTCount
 - [Ext] totalStakedNFT
 - [Ext] userWalletNFT
 - [Pub] userStakedNFT
 - [Pub] userStakedNFTCount
 - [Pub] isStaked
 - [Pub] distributeReward (\$)
 - modifiers: onlyDistributorOrOwner
 - [Prv] backToPool #
 - [Ext] distributedUserTotalReward
 - [Ext] distributedTotalReward
 - [Prv] updateDebt #
 - [Ext] pendingRewards
 - [Pub] harvest #
 - [Prv] rewardBackToPool #
 - [Prv] depositOracleBar #
 - [Prv] withdrawOracleBar #
 - [Pub] batchNFTStake #
 - modifiers: nonReentrant
 - [Pub] NFTStake #
 - modifiers: nonReentrant
 - [Pub] NFTWithdraw #
 - modifiers: nonReentrant
 - [Pub] batchNFTWithdraw #
 - modifiers: nonReentrant
 - [Pub] calculateUserNFTWeight
 - [Ext] deposit (\$)

- modifiers: nonReentrant
- [Ext] extendLockTime #
 - modifiers: nonReentrant
- [Ext] increaseLockAmount (\$)
 - modifiers: nonReentrant
- [Pub] withdraw #
 - modifiers: nonReentrant
- [Prv] transferETH #
- [Pub] totalProLocked
- [Ext] setOracleWeight #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setMinxOracle #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setMinPro #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setDistributor #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] getGlobalStatus
- [Ext] getRewardHistory
- [Pub] onERC721Received #
- [Ext] recallA #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] recallB #
 - modifiers: onlyOwner

Inheritance (of PRONFTMultiStaking.sol)



Detailed Results

Issues Checking Status (for OracleNFTWeight.sol, PRONFTMultiStaking.sol, PRONFTMultiStakingDistributor.sol)

1. Floating Pragma

- SWC ID: 103Severity: Low
- Location: OracleNFTWeight.sol, PRONFTMultiStakingDistributor.sol, PRONFTMultiStaking.sol
- Relationship: CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
- Description: A floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directives are "">0.8.9"", "">0.8.16"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

```
116

117 pragma solidity ^0.8.9;

118

1158

1159 pragma solidity ^0.8.16;

1861

1862 pragma solidity ^0.8.16;
```

 Remediations: Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases) for the compiler version that is chosen.

2. State Variable Default Visibility

SWC ID: 108Severity: Low

• Location: PRONFTMultiStakingDistributor.sol, PRONFTMultiStaking.sol

• Relationship: CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards

• Description: State variable visibility is not set. It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "rewardHistoryTimes" is internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.

• Remediations: Variables can be specified as being public, internal or private. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables.

3. Missing zero address validation

• Severity: Low

• Confidence: Medium

- Location: PRONFTMultiStakingDistributor.sol, PRONFTMultiStaking.sol
- Description: Detect missing zero address validation, here in the constructor function lacks a zero check on 'oracleWeight = _oracletWeight'.

• Remediations: Check that the address is not zero.

Automated Tools Results (of PRONFTMultiStaking.sol)

Slither: -

```
PRONFTMultiStaking.withdrawOracleBar(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#230) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-tokenFee = (amount * 50 * mode) / 100 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2313)
-burnAmount = (tokenFee * 50) / 100 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2320)
PRONFTMultiStaking.withdraw(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2320)
-tokenFee = (amount * 50 * mode) / 100 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#26370)
-tokenFee = (amount * 50 * mode) / 100 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2679)
-burnAmount = (tokenFee * 5) / 10 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2688)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply
PRONFTMultiStaking.totalStakedNFT() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1976-1992) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- tokenCount == 0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1980)
PRONFTMultiStaking.userWalletNFT(address) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1994-2012) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- tokenCount == 0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2000)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
Reentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.deposit(uint256,uint8) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2542-2581):
PRONFTMultiStaking.deposit(uint256,uint8) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2542-2581) contains a tautology or contradiction:
- require(bool,string)(lockMode >= 0 && lockMode < 5,Invalid lock mode) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2549)
PRONFTMultiStaking.extendLockTime(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2583-2617) contains a tautology or contradiction:
- require(bool,string)(lockMode >= 0 && lockMode < 5,Invalid lock mode) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2584)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#tautology-or-contradiction
```

```
PRONFTMultiStaking.pendingRewards(address).i (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2169) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.calculateUserNrTWeight(address).i (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2525) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2525) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2108) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2718) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2719) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2233) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2233) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2143) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2768) is a local variable never initialized PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2768) is a local variable never initialized RRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2193) is a local variable never initialized Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables
    RONFTMultiStaking.distributeReward(address,uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2034-2076) ignores return value by accRewardPerWeight.set(token,newValue)
 PRONFTMULTISTAKING. distributeReward(address,uint256) (PRONFTMULTISTAKING.S01#2034-2076) ignores return value by accRewardPerweight.set(token,newValue) (PRONFTMULTISTAKING.s01#2063)
PRONFTMULTISTAKING.sol#2068)
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PRONFTMULTISTAKING.sol#2084)
PRONFTMULTISTAKING.sol#2084)
PRONFTMULTISTAKING.sol#2084)
PRONFTMULTISTAKING.sol#20804)
  ultistaking.sol#2089)
RONFTMultistaking.backToPool(address,uint256) (PRONFTMultistaking.sol#2078-2097) ignores return value by rewardHistoryTimes.add(block.timestamp) (PRO
    FTMultiStaking.sol#2091)
RONFTMultiStaking.updateDebt() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2137-2155) ignores return value by userDebtRewards[msg.sender].set(token,newDebt) (PRONFTMulti
  taking.sol#2148)
RONFTMultiStaking.harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2187-2225) ignores return value by userTotalReward[msg.sender].set(token,newTotalValue) (PRONFTMu
     ONFTMultistaking.harvest() (PRONFTMultistaking.sol#2187-2225) ignores return value by userDebtRewards[msg.sender].set(token,newDebt) (PRONFTMultista
    RONFTMultiStaking.rewardBackToPool() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2227-2276) ignores return value by accRewardPerWeight.set(token.newValue) (PRONFTMultiSt
    RONFTMultiStaking.rewardBackToPool() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2227-2276) ignores return value by totalReward.set(token.newTotalValue) (PRONFTMultiStak
    ng.sol#2257)
RONFTMultiStaking.rewardBackToPool() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2227-2276) ignores return value by rewardHistoryTimes.add(block.timestamp + i) (PRONFTMu
  tiStaking.sol#2259)
RONFTMultiStaking.rewardBackToPool() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2227-2276) ignores return value by userDebtRewards[msg.sender].set(token,newDebt) (PRONF
  RONFTMULTIStaking.batchNFTStake(uint256[]) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2332-2389) ignores return value by userNFTBalances[_msgSender()].add(tokenId) (PRO
FTMultiStaking.sol#2366)
RONFTMultiStaking.NFTStake(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2391-2430) ignores return value by userNFTBalances[_msgSender()].add(tokenId) (PRONFTMult
PRONFTMULTIStaking.NFTMithdraw(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2432-2463) ignores return value by userNFTBalances[_msgSender()].remove(tokenId) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2443)
PRONFTMultiStaking.batchNFTWithdraw(uint256[]) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2465-2513) ignores return value by userNFTBalances[_msgSender()].remove(tokenId) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2487)
Reference: https://glithub.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
PRONFTMultiStaking.userWalletNFT(address)._owner (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1994) shadows:
- Ownable._owner (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1151) (state vartable)
PRONFTMULTIStaking.userStakedNFT(address)._owner (PRONFTMULTIStaking.sol#2014) shadows:
- Ownable._owner (PRONFTMULTIStaking.sol#1151) (state vartable)
PRONFTMULTIStaking.userStakedNFTCountfaddress)._owner (PRONFTMULTIStaking.sol#2022) shadows:
- Ownable._owner (PRONFTMULTISTAKINg.sol#1151) (state vartable)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
   RONFTMultistaking.NFTWithdraw(uint256) (PRONFTMultistaking.sol#2432-2463) ignores return value by userNFTBalances[ msgSender()].remove(tokenId) (PRON
  PRONFTMultiStaking.setDistributor(address) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2739-2741) should emit an event for:
- distributor = _distributor (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2740)
  Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-access-control
 PRONFTMultiStaking.batchNFTStake(uint256[]) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2332-2389) should emit an event for:

- totalPoolWeight += addedWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2387)

PRONFTMultiStaking.NFTStake(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2480) should emit an event for:

- totalPoolWeight += addedWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2482)

PRONFTMultiStaking.NFTWithdraw(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2432-2463) should emit an event for:

- totalPoolWeight -= reduceddWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2460)

PRONFTMultiStaking.batchNFTWithdraw(uint256[]) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2465-2513) should emit an event for:

- totalPoolWeight -= reduceddWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2465-2513) should emit an event for:

- totalPoolWeight -= reduceddWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2510)

- totalPoolWeight -= reduceddWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2510)
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-arithmetic
  RONFTMultiStaking.constructor(address)._oracleWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1968) lacks a zero-check on :
 room indeetstaking.comstoactor(audiess);__oracteweight (PROMEINDEETSTAKING.3021#306)

- oracleWeight = _oracleWeight (PROMEINDEETSTAKING.302#306)

PRONFTMultiStaking.setDistributor(address). distributor (PROMEINDEETSTAKING.sol#2739) lacks a zero-check on :

- distributor = _distributor (PROMEINDEETMILTISTAKING.302#3744)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
  PRONFTMultiStaking.totalStakedNFT() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1976-1992) has external calls inside a loop: result[index] = IERC721Enumerable(oracleNFT).
:okenOfOwnerByIndex(address(this),index) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1987-1988)
 tokenOfOwnerByIndex(address(this),index) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1987-1988)

PRONFTMultiStaking.userWalletNFT(address) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1987-1988)

PRONFTMultiStaking.userWalletNFT(address) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2087-2088)

PRONFTMULTISTAKING.Where,index) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2332-2389) has external calls inside a loop: regulre(bool,string)(IERC721(oracleNFT).ownerOf(tokenId) == _msgSender(),wrong owner) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2355-2358)

PRONFTMULTISTAKING.Where

PRON
```

```
ultiStaking.NFTStake(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2391-2430):
                                          - IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2207)

External calls sending eth:
- depositOracleBar(minxOracleAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2403)
- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)
- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2415)
- (res) = address(recipient).call(value: amount)() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)

State variables written after the call(s):
- totalPoolWeight += addedWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2428)

Reentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.NFTWithdraw(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2432-2463):
External calls:
External calls:
- IERC721(oracleNFT).safeTransferFrom(address(this),_msgSender(),tokenId) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2435-2439)
- withfdrawOracleBar(minxOracleAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2441)
- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#662)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)
- IERC20(xOracle).safeTransfer(msg.sender,amountWithdraw) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2317)
- IERC20(xOracle).safeTransfer(deadAddress,burnAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2312)

External calls sending eth:
- withdrawOracleBar(minxOracleAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2441)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)

State variables written after the call(s):
- withdrawOracleBar(minxOracleAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2441)
- rewardHistory[block.timestamp] = Reward(token,_amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2093-2096)

Reentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.batchNFTStake(uint256[]) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2332-2389):
External calls:
                                     External calls:
External calls:

- depositoracleBar(minxOracleAmount * count) (PRONFTMultistaking.soi#2342)

- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2283-2287)

- IERC20(xOracle).safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender),address(this),amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2283-2287)

- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#465)

- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2381)

- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#662)

- (res) = address(recipient).call(value: amount)() (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2713)

- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#465)

- IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2207)

External calls sending eth:

- depositoracleBar(minxOracleAmount * count) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2342)

- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#465)

- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2381)

- (res) = address(recipient).call(value: amount)() (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2713)

- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#465)

State variables written after the call(s):

- totalPoolWeight += addedWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2387)

Reentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2503)

- Reversel() (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2503)

- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2503)
                                     External calls:
                                   External calls:
- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2503)
- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#662)
- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
- IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2207)
- withdrawOracleBar(minxOracleAmount * count) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2505)
- returndata = address(token).functioncall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#662)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#65)
- IERC20(xOracle).safeTransfer(msg.sender,amountWithdraw) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2317)
- IERC20(xOracle).safeTransfer(deadAddress,burnAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2322)
External calls sending eth:
                                   External calls sending eth:
- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2503)
- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)
- withdrawOracleBar(minxOracleAmount * count) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2505)

    - Withur awd acteban (Hunton acteanment) - Count) (PROMET INDUCTSTAKING SOCH#2399)
    - (success, returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (PRONETMultiStaking.sol#465)
    State variables written after the call(s):
    - withdrawOracleBar(minxOracleAmount * count) (PRONETMultiStaking.sol#2505)
    - rewardHistory[block.timestamp] = Reward(token,_amount) (PRONETMultiStaking.sol#2093-2096)

    1ERC20(protoken), saferiantserrom(addressingg.sender), address(ints), amount) (PRONFIM
State variables written after the call(s):

            proAmountForLock[lockMode] += amount (PRONFTMultistaking.sol#2573)
            totalPoolWeight += addedWeight (PRONFTMultistaking.sol#2571)

    entrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.depositoracleBar(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2278-2298):

                                      External calls:
   - IERCZQ(XX) actors after interference call(s):

State variables written after the call(s):

- totalX0racleLocked += amount (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2297)

- lock.X0racleLock += amount (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2295)

Reentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.distributeReward(address, uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2034-2076):

External calls:

**TOTACETARCAL CARRON CARRON (address(mso.sonder) address(this) amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking)
                                            IERC20(token).safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender),address(this), amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2044-2048)
    - IERCZO(LOREN).Saferfanisferfom(address(msg.sender),address(lnts),_amount) (PROMFINULTISEAR
State variables written after the call(s):
- rewardHistory[block.timestamp] = Reward(token,_amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2072-2075)
eentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.extendLockTime(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2583-2617):
External calls:
                                          Arvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2600)

- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#662)

- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)

- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)

- IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2207)
                                 - IERC20(token).safelransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFFINDITIOSTARCHY.351#2207)

External calls sending eth:
- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2600)
- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)

State variables written after the call(s):
- proAmountForLock[lock.lockMode] -= lock.lockedAmount (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2604)
- proAmountForLock[lockMode] += lock.lockedAmount (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2606)
- totalPoolWeight += addeddWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2602)
```

```
in PRONFTMultiStaking.increase.ockAmount(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2623-2657)
                          IERC20(proToken).safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender).address(this).amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2632-2636)
                          IERCZO(proloken).SafeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender),address(tnts),amount) (PRONFIMULTISTAKIng.soi#2032-2030)
harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#262)
- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#662)
- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2713)
- (success, returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#465)
- IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.soi#2207)
                     External calls sending eth:
- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2642)
  External calls:

- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2676)

- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#662)

- (res) = address(rectplent).call(value: amount)() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)

- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#265)

- IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2207)

- IERC20(proToken).safeTransfer(msg.sender,amountWithdraw) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2684)

- IERC20(proToken).safeTransfer(deadAddress,burnAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2689)

External calls sending eth:

- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2676)

- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)

- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#265)

State variables written after the call(s):

- proAmountForLock[lock.lockMode] -= amount (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2698)

- backToPool(proToken,tokenFee - burnAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2690)

- rewardHistory[block.timestamp] = Reward(token_amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2093-2096)

Reentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.withdrawOracleBar(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2300-2330):

External calls:
                    - IERC20(xOracle).safeTransfer(msg.sender,amountWithdraw) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2317)
- IERC20(xOracle).safeTransfer(deadAddress,burnAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2322)
State variables written after the call(s):
State variables written after the call(s):
- backToPool(xOracle,tokenFee - burnAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2324)
- rewardHistory[block.timestamp] = Reward(token_amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2093-2096)
- totalXOracleLocked -= amount (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2329)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
Reentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.deposit(uint256,uint8) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2542-2581):
External calls:
                     - IERC20(proToken).safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender),address(this),amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2557-2561) Event emitted after the call(s):
  - OnTokenLock(msg.sender,amount,unlockTime,lockMode) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2579)
eentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.extendLockTime(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2583-2617):
External calls:
                         Atternal Calls:
harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2600)
    returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#662)
    (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
    (success,returndata) = target.call{value: alue}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)
    IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2207)
 - IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2207)

External calls sending eth:
- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2600)
- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)

Event enitted after the call(s):
- OnLockDurationIncreased(msg.sender,unlockTime) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2616)

eentrancy in PRONFTMultiStaking.increaseLockAmount(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2623-2657):
                      External calls:
                        harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2642)

- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#662)

- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)

- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)

- IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2207)
                    External calls sending eth:
- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2642)
                    - (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)
Event enitted after the call(s):
                          OnLockAmountIncreased(msg.sender,amount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2656)
```

```
ultiStaking.withdraw(uint256) (PRONETMultiStaking.sol#2663-2710):
                                                  narvest() (PRONFIMULISTAKING,SORIZEO/B)
- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC20: low-level call failed) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#662)
- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)
- IERC20(token).safeTransfer(msg.sender,reward) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2207)
IERC20(proToken).safeTransfer(msg.sender,amountWithdraw) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2684)
    - IERC20(proToken).safeTransfer(msg.sender,amountWithdraw) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2684)
- IERC20(proToken).safeTransfer(deadAddress,burnAmount) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2689)
External calls sending eth:
- harvest() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2676)
- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#465)
Event emitted after the call{s}:
- OnLockWithdrawal(msg.sender,amount,mode) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2708)
- OnTokenUnlock(msg.sender) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2706)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
       RONFTMultiStaking.pendingRewards(address) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2157-2185) uses timestamp for comparisons
                                        obngcious compartanna.
- lock.totalWeight > 0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2164)
ultiStaking.withdrawOracleBar(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2300-2330) uses timestamp for comparisons
                               Dangerous comparisons:
- block.timestamp < lock.unlockTime (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2309)
[MultiStaking.deposit(uint256,uint8) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2542-2581) uses timestamp for comparisons
    PRONFINULTISEARCH, deposit(Unit2s) (PRONFINULTISEARCH), SOU#2542-2581) uses timestamp for compound to the compound of the comp
      Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#529-549) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#541-544)
EnumerableSet.values(EnumerableSet.AddressSet) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#954-964) uses assembly
    Enumer auteset; values(canner auteset; Audressset; (FROME) intertistaktig; sot#994-999) uses assembly 
- INLINE ASM (PRONFTMULTISTAKIng.sot#959-961) 
EnumerableSet; values(EnumerableSet; Ultintset) (PRONFTMULTISTAKIng.sot#1028-1038) uses assembly 
- INLINE ASM (PRONFTMULTISTAKIng.sot#1033-1035) 
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage
  ^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1221)
^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1288)
    - 0.8.0 (FROMETMULTISTAKING.SOL#1286)
- ^0.8.0 (PROMETMULTISTAKING.SOL#1319)
- ^0.8.1 (PROMETMULTISTAKING.SOL#1848)
- ^0.8.1 (PROMETMULTISTAKING.SOL#1862)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/sitcher/akki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used
Address.functioncallition_com/crytic/sitcher/akki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used
Address.functioncallition_com/crytic/sitcher/akki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used
Address.functioncallition_com/crytic/sitcher/akki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used and should be removed
Address.functioncallition_com/crytic/sitcher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation_com/cryticher/akki/Detector-Documentation
       ddress.functionCall(address,bytes) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#413-415) is never used and should be removed
```

```
EnumerableSet.values(EnumerableSet.AddressSet) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#954-964) is never used and should be removed
EnumerableSet.values(EnumerableSet.Bytes32Set) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#888-890) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeApprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#598-611) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeDecreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#622-633) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#613-620) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20.safePermit(IERC20Permit,address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#635-649) is never used and should be
     Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
     Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
    Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultistaking.so.##8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultistaking.sol##182) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultistaking.sol##182) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultistaking.sol##268) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultistaking.sol##32) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#358) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1047) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1047) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1045) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1106) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1206) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1280) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1280) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1319) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.0 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1862) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version^0.8.1 (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1862) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 solc-0.8.9 is not recommended for deployment Reference: https://glthub.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
  Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#388-393):

- (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#391)

Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#456-467):

- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#485-494):

- (success,returndata) = target.staticcall(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#492)

Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#512-521):

- (success,returndata) = target.delegatecall(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#519)

Low level call in PRONFTMultiStaking.target.delegatecall(data) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#519)

Low level call in PRONFTMultiStaking.target.fuldedress,uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2712-2715):

- (res) = address(recipient).call{value: amount}() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2713)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
Redundant expression "i (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2526)" inPRONFTMultiStaking (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1863-2796)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
   PRONFTMultiStaking.PERCENT_FACTOR (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1912) is never used in PRONFTMultiStaking (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1863-2796)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-state-variable
    PRONFTMultiStaking.oracleNFT (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1966) should be constant
PRONFTMultiStaking.oracleNFT (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1948) should be constant
PRONFTMultiStaking.totalNFTWeight (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1948) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
  onERC721Received(address, address, uint256, bytes) should be declared external:

- ERC721Holder.onERC721Received(address, address, uint256, bytes) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1120-1127)

- PRONFTMultiStaking.onERC721Received(address, address, uint256, bytes) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2779-2786)

renounceOwnership() should be declared external:

- Ownable.renounceOwnership() (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1191-1193)

transferOwnership(address) should be declared external:

- Ownable.transferOwnership(address) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#1199-1202)

userStakedNFTCount(address) should be declared external:

- PRONFTMultiStaking.userStakedNFTCount(address) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2022-2024)

batchNFTStake(uint256[]) should be declared external:

- PRONFTMultiStaking.batchNFTStake(uint256[]) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2332-2389)

NFTStake(uint256) should be declared external:

    PRONFTMultistaking.batchNFTStake(uint256[]) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2332-2389)
    NFTStake(uint256) should be declared external:

            PRONFTMultistaking.NFTStake(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2391-2430)

    NFTWithdraw(uint256) should be declared external:

            PRONFTMultiStaking.NFTWithdraw(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2432-2463)

    batchNFTWithdraw(uint256[]) should be declared external:

            PRONFTMultiStaking.batchNFTWithdraw(uint256[]) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2465-2513)

    calculateUserNFTWeight(address) should be declared external:

            PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#315-38

- PRONFTMultiStaking.calculateUserNFTWeight(address) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2515-2535)
withdraw(uint256) should be declared external:
- PRONFTMultiStaking.withdraw(uint256) (PRONFTMultiStaking.sol#2663-2710)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
```

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(SWC-103) Floating Pragma

(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility

Report for PRONFTMultiStaking.sol https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/5f9db38b-0b26-43f3-a85f-2cfaed989e80			
Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
8	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
37	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
182	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
268	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
332	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
558	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
676	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1047	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1075	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1106	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1136	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1221	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1288	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1319	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
1848	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Low

Low

A floating pragma is set.

State variable visibility is not set.

Solhint: -

```
PRONFTMultiStaking.sol:627:18: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultiStaking.sol:2112:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultiStaking.sol:2131:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultiStaking.sol:2131:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultiStaking.sol:2150:26: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultiStaking.sol:2180:26: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultiStaking.sol:2220:26: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
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PRONFTMultistaking.sol:2271:26: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultistaking.sol:2376:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultistaking.sol:2498:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultistaking.sol:2530:26: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultistaking.sol:2720:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'

PRONFTMultistaking.sol:2773:22: Error: Parse error: missing ';' at '{'
```

Basic Coding Bugs

1. Constructor Mismatch

 Description: Whether the contract name and its constructor are not identical to each other.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

2. Ownership Takeover

o Description: Whether the set owner function is not protected.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

3. Redundant Fallback Function

o Description: Whether the contract has a redundant fallback function.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

4. Overflows & Underflows

 Description: Whether the contract has general overflow or underflow vulnerabilities

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

5. Reentrancy

 Description: Reentrancy is an issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETHs.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

6. MONEY-Giving Bug

 Description: Whether the contract returns funds to an arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

7. Blackhole

 Description: Whether the contract locks ETH indefinitely: merely in without out.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

8. Unauthorized Self-Destruct

 Description: Whether the contract can be killed by any arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

9. Revert DoS

 Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to DoS attack because of unexpected revert.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

10. Unchecked External Call

o Description: Whether the contract has any external call without checking the return value.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

11. Gasless Send

 $\circ\quad \text{Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to gasless send.}$

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

12. Send Instead of Transfer

o Description: Whether the contract uses send instead of transfer.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

13. Costly Loop

 Description: Whether the contract has any costly loop which may lead to Out-Of-Gas exception.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

14. (Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries

o Description: Whether the contract use any suspicious libraries.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

15. (Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables

 Description: Whether the contract contains any randomness variable, but its value can be predicated.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

16. Transaction Ordering Dependence

 Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

17. Deprecated Uses

• Description: Whether the contract use the deprecated tx.origin to perform the authorization.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

Semantic Consistency Checks

 Description: Whether the semantic of the white paper is different from the implementation of the contract.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

Conclusion

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed ORACLE SWAP's 'PRONFTMultiStaking', 'PRONFTMultiStakingDistributor', 'OracleNFTWeight' Smart Contracts. The current code base is well organized but there are promptly some Low-level issues found in the first phase of Smart Contract Audit.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

About eNebula Solutions

We believe that people have a fundamental need to security and that the use of secure solutions enables every person to more freely use the Internet and every other connected technology. We aim to provide security consulting service to help others make their solutions more resistant to unauthorized access to data & inadvertent manipulation of the system. We support teams from the design phase through the production to launch and surely after.

The eNebula Solutions team has skills for reviewing code in C, C++, Python, Haskell, Rust, Node.js, Solidity, Go, and JavaScript for common security vulnerabilities & specific attack vectors. The team has reviewed implementations of cryptographic protocols and distributed system architecture, including in cryptocurrency, blockchains, payments, and smart contracts. Additionally, the team can utilize various tools to scan code & networks and build custom tools as necessary.

Although we are a small team, we surely believe that we can have a momentous impact on the world by being translucent and open about the work we do.

For more information about our security consulting, please mail us at – contact@enebula.in