

# Trust Is Risk: Introducing a decentralized platform for financial trust

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## 1 Abstract

Reputation in centralized systems typically uses stars and review-based trust. These systems require extensive manual intervention and secrecy to avoid manipulation. In decentralized systems this luxury is not available as the reputation system should be autonomous and open source. Previous peer-to-peer reputation systems define trust abstractly and do not allow for financial arguments pertaining to reputation. We propose a concrete sybil-resilient decentralized reputation system in which direct trust is defined as lines-of-credit using bitcoin's 1-of-2 multisig. We introduce a new model for bitcoin wallets in which user coins are split among trusted friends. Indirect trust is subsequently defined using a transitive property. This enables formal game theoretic arguments pertaining to risk analysis. Using our reputation model, we define financial risk and prove that risk and max flows are equivalent. We then propose several algorithms for the redistribution of trust so that a decision can be made on whether an anonymous third party can be indirectly trusted. In such a setting, the risk incurred by making a purchase from an anonymous vendor remains invariant. Finally, we prove the correctness of our algorithms and provide optimality arguments for various norms.

## 2 Introduction

## 3 Keywords

decentralized, trust, web-of-trust, bitcoin, multisig, line-of-credit, trust-as-risk, flow

## 4 Key points

## 5 Definitions

**Definition 5.1** (Graph).

TrustIsRisk is represented by a sequence of wheighted directed graphs  $(\mathcal{G}_j)$  where  $\mathcal{G}_j = (\mathcal{V}_j, \mathcal{E}_j), j \in \mathbb{N}$ . Members of  $\mathcal{E}_j$  are tuples of two nodes from  $\mathcal{V}_j$  and a positive real number. More formally,  $e \in \mathcal{E}_j \Rightarrow \exists A, B \in \mathcal{V}_j, w > 0 : e = (A, B, w)$ .

**Definition 5.2** (Players).

The set  $\mathcal{V}_j = V(\mathcal{G}_j)$  is the set of all players in the network, otherwise understood as the set of all pseudonymous identities.

**Definition 5.3** (Capital of  $A$ ,  $Cap_A$ ).

Total amount of value that exists in P2PKH in the UTXO and can be spent by  $A$ . We also define  $Cap_{A,j}$  as the total amount of value that exists in P2PKH in the UTXO and can be spent by  $A$  during turn  $j$ .

**Definition 5.4** (Direct Trust from  $A$  to  $B$  after turn  $j$ ,  $DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j}$ ).

Total amount of value that exists in  $1/\{A, B\}$  multisigs in the UTXO in the end of turn  $j$ , where the money is deposited by  $A$ . When  $DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j} > 0, (A, B, DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j}) \in \mathcal{E}_j$ . When  $DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j} = 0, (A, B, 0) \in \mathcal{E}_j$  or equivalently  $\nexists w \in \mathbb{R} : (A, B, w) \in \mathcal{E}_j$ .

**Definition 5.5** ((In/Out) Neighbourhood of  $A$  on turn  $j$ ,  $N^+(A)_j, N^-(A)_j, N(A)_j$ ).

1. Let  $N^+(A)_j$  be the set of players  $B$  that  $A$  directly trusts with any positive value at the end of turn  $j$ . More formally,  $N^+(A)_j = \{B \in \mathcal{V}_j : DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j} > 0\}$ .  $N^+(A)_j$  is called out neighbourhood of  $A$  on turn  $j$ . Let also  $S \subset \mathcal{V}_j$ .  $N^+(S)_j = \bigcup_{A \in S} N^+(A)_j$ .

2. Let  $N^-(A)_j$  be the set of players  $B$  that directly trust  $A$  with any positive value at the end of turn  $j$ . More formally,  $N^-(A)_j = \{B \in \mathcal{V}_j : DTr_{B \rightarrow A,j} > 0\}$ .  $N^-(A)_j$  is called in neighbourhood of  $A$  on turn  $j$ . Let also  $S \subset \mathcal{V}_j$ .  $N^-(S)_j = \bigcup_{A \in S} N^-(A)_j$ .
3. Let  $N(A)_j$  be the set of players  $B$  that either directly trust or are directly trusted by  $A$  with any positive value at the end of turn  $j$ . More formally,  $N(A)_j = N^+(A)_j \cup N^-(A)_j$ .  $N(A)_j$  is called neighbourhood of  $A$  on turn  $j$ . Let also  $S \subset \mathcal{V}_j$ .  $N(S)_j = N^+(S)_j \cup N^-(S)_j$ .
4. Let  $N(A)_{j,i}$  (respectively  $N^+(A)_{j,i}, N^-(A)_{j,i}, N(S)_{j,i}, N^+(S)_{j,i}, N^-(S)_{j,i}, S \subset \mathcal{V}_j$ ) be the  $i$ -th element of set  $N(A)_j$  (respectively of  $N^+(A)_j, N^-(A)_j, N(S)_j, N^+(S)_j, N^-(S)_j$ ), according to an arbitrary but fixed enumeration of the set players.

**Definition 5.6** (Total incoming/outgoing trust of  $A$  in turn  $j$ ,  $in_{A,j}, out_{A,j}$ ).

$$in_{A,j} = \sum_{v \in N^-(A)_j} DTr_{v \rightarrow A,j}$$

$$out_{A,j} = \sum_{v \in N^+(A)_j} DTr_{A \rightarrow v,j}$$

**Definition 5.7** (Turns).

The game we are describing is turn-based. Let  $DTr_{B \rightarrow A,j}$  be  $B$ 's direct trust to  $A$  in turn  $j$ . In each turn  $j$  exactly one player  $A \in \mathcal{V}$ ,  $A = Player(j)$ , chooses an action (according to a certain strategy) that can be one of the following, or a finite combination thereof:

1. Steal value  $y_B, 0 \leq y_B \leq DTr_{B \rightarrow A,j-1}$  from  $B \in N^-(A)$ .  $DTr_{B \rightarrow A,j} = DTr_{B \rightarrow A,j-1} - y_B$ . ( $Steal(y_B, B)$ )
2. Add value  $y_B, -DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j-1} \leq y_B$  to  $B \in \mathcal{V}$ .  $DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j} = DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j-1} + y_B$ . When  $y_B < 0$ , we say that  $A$  reduces her trust to  $B$  by  $-y_B$ , when  $y_B > 0$ , we say that  $A$  increases her trust to  $B$  by  $y_B$ . If  $DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j-1} = 0$ , then we say that  $A$  starts directly trusting  $B$ . ( $Add(y_B, B)$ )

If player  $A$  chooses no action in her turn, we say that she passes her turn. Also, let  $Y_{st}, Y_{add}$  be the total value to be stolen and added respectively by  $A$  in her turn,  $j$ . For a turn to be feasible, it must hold that  $Y_{add} - Y_{st} \leq Cap_{A,j-1}$ . We set  $Cap_{A,j} = Cap_{A,j-1} + Y_{st} - Y_{add}$ . Moreover, player  $A$  is not allowed to choose two actions of the same kind against the same player in the same turn.

The set of actions a player makes in turn  $j$  is  $Turn_j$ . Examples:

- $Turn_{j_1} = \emptyset$
- $Turn_{j_2} = \{Steal(y, B), Add(w, B)\}$  (given that  $DTr_{B \rightarrow A,j_2-1} \leq y \wedge -DTr_{A \rightarrow B,j_2-1} \leq w \wedge y - w \leq Cap_{A,j_2-1}$ , where  $A = Player(j_2)$ )
- $Turn_{j_3} = \{Steal(x, B), Add(y, C), Add(w, D)\}$  (given that  $DTr_{B \rightarrow A,j_3-1} \leq x \wedge -DTr_{A \rightarrow C,j_3-1} \leq y \wedge -DTr_{A \rightarrow D,j_3-1} \leq w \wedge x - y - w \leq Cap_{A,j_3-1}$ , where  $A = Player(j_3)$ )
- $Turn_{j_4} = \{Steal(x, B), Steal(y, B)\}$  is not a valid turn because it contains two  $Steal()$  actions against the same player. If  $x + y \leq DTr_{B \rightarrow A}$ , the correct alternative would be  $Turn_{j_4} = \{Steal(x + y, B)\}$ , where  $A = Player(j_4)$ .

**Definition 5.8** ( $A$  is stolen  $x$ ).

Let  $j, j'$  be two consecutive turns of  $A$  ( $j, j' : Player(j) = Player(j') = A \wedge j < j' \wedge \nexists j'' \in \mathbb{N} \cap (j, j') : Player(j'') = A$ ). We say that  $A$  has been stolen a value  $x$  between  $j$  and  $j'$  if  $out_{A,j} - out_{A,j'} = x > 0$ . If turns are not specified, we implicitly refer to the current and the previous turns.

**Definition 5.9** (History).

We define History,  $\mathcal{H} = (\mathcal{H}_j)$ , as the sequence of all the tuples containing the sets of actions and the corresponding player.  $\mathcal{H}_j = (Player(j), Turn_j)$ .

**Definition 5.10** (Conservative strategy).

A player  $A$  is said to follow the conservative strategy in turn  $j$  if for any value  $x$  that has been stolen from her since the previous turn she played, she substitutes it in her turn by stealing from others that trust her value equal to  $\min(x, in_{A,j})$  and she takes no other action. More formally, let  $j' = \max\{k \in \mathbb{N} : k < j \wedge Player(k) = Player(j)\}$ ,  $Damage_j = out_{A,j'} - out_{A,j-1}$ . If  $Strategy(A) = Conservative$ , then  $\forall j \in \mathbb{N} : Player(j) = A$  it is

$$Turn_j = \begin{cases} \emptyset, & Damage_j \leq 0 \\ \{Steal(y_1, N^-(A)_1), \dots, Steal(y_{|N^-(A)|}, N^-(A)_{|N^-(A)|})\}, & Damage_j > 0 \end{cases}$$

In the second case, it is  $\sum_{i=1}^{|N^-(A)_j|} y_i = \min(in_{A,j-1}, Damage_j)$ .

If  $j$  is the first turn in which  $A$  plays,  $j'$  is not well defined. In this case, we choose  $Turn_j = \emptyset$ , except if it is otherwise denoted in some special cases.

As we can see, the definition covers a multitude of options for the conservative player, since in case  $0 < Damage_j < in_{A,j-1}$  she can choose to distribute the  $Steal(s)()$  in any way she chooses, as long as  $\forall i, y_i \leq DTr_{N^-(A)_{j,i} \rightarrow A, j-1} \wedge \sum_{i=1}^{|N^-(A)_j|} y_i = Damage_j$ . The oracle remembers  $PrevOutTrust = out_{A,j'}$  for  $j' = \max\{k \in \mathbb{N} : k < j \wedge Player(k) = Player(j)\}$  and can observe all incoming and outgoing direct trusts of player  $A$ ,  $\forall v \in N^-(A)_{j-1}, DTr_{v \rightarrow A, j-1}, \forall v \in N^+(A)_{j-1}, DTr_{A \rightarrow v, j-1}$ . We note that  $N(A)_{j-1} = N(A)_j$ .

**Algorithm 1:** Conservative Oracle

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**Output:**  $Turn_j$

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1  $\mathcal{O}_{cons}()$  :
2  $NewOutTrust \leftarrow \sum_{v \in N^+(A)_{j-1}} DTr_{A \rightarrow v, j-1}$ 
3  $NewInTrust \leftarrow \sum_{v \in N^-(A)_{j-1}} DTr_{v \rightarrow A, j-1}$ 
4  $Damage \leftarrow PrevOutTrust - NewOutTrust$ 
5 if  $Damage > 0$  then
6   if  $Damage \geq NewInTrust$  then
7      $Turn_j \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
8     for  $v \in N^-(A)_{j-1}$  do
9        $Turn_j \leftarrow Turn_j \cup \{Steal(DTr_{v \rightarrow A, j-1}, v)\}$ 
10  else
11     $(y_1, \dots, y_{|N^-(A)_{j-1}|}) \leftarrow SelectSteal(DTr_{N^-(A)_{j-1,1} \rightarrow A, j-1}, \dots,$ 
12       $DTr_{N^-(A)_{j-1, |N^-(A)_{j-1}|} \rightarrow A, j-1}, Damage)$ 
13     $Turn_j \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
14    for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $|N^-(A)_{j-1}|$  do
15       $Turn_j \leftarrow Turn_j \cup \{Steal(y_i, N^-(A)_{j-1,i})\}$ 
16  else
17     $Turn_j \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
18 return  $Turn_j$ 

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$SelectSteal()$  returns  $y_i, i \in [|N^-(A)_j|] : \forall i, y_i \leq DTr_{N^-(A)_{j,i} \rightarrow A}, \sum_{i=1}^{|N^-(A)_j|} y_i = Damage$ .

**Definition 5.11** (Idle strategy).

A player  $A$  is said to follow the idle strategy if she passes in her turn. More formally, if  $Strategy(A) = Idle$ , then  $\forall j \in \mathbb{N} : Player(j) = A$  it is  $Turn_j = \emptyset$ .

**Algorithm 2:** Idle Oracle**Output:**  $Turn_j$ 

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1  $\mathcal{O}_{idle}()$  :
2 return  $\emptyset$ 

```

**Definition 5.12** (Evil strategy).

A player  $A$  is said to follow the evil strategy if she steals value  $y_B = DTr_{B \rightarrow A, j-1} \forall B \in N^-(A)_j$  (steals all incoming direct trust) and reduces her trust to  $C$  by  $DTr_{A \rightarrow C, j-1} \forall C \in N^+(A)_j$  (nullifies her outgoing direct trust) in her turn. More formally, if  $Strategy(A) = Evil$ , then  $\forall j \in \mathbb{N} : Player(j) = A$  it is  $Turn_j = \{Steal(y_1, N^-(A)_{j,1}), \dots, Steal(y_m, N^-(A)_{j,m}), Add(w_1, N^+(A)_{j,1}), \dots, Add(w_l, N^+(A)_{j,l})\}$  where  $m = |N^-(A)_j|, l = |N^+(A)_j|, \forall i \in [m], y_i = DTr_{N^-(A)_{j,i} \rightarrow A, j-1}, \forall i \in [l], w_i = -DTr_{A \rightarrow N^+(A)_{j,i}, j-1}$ . We note again that  $N(A)_{j-1} = N(A)_j$ .

**Algorithm 3:** Evil Oracle**Output:**  $Turn_j$ 

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1  $\mathcal{O}_{evil}()$  :
2  $Turn_j \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
3 for  $v \in N^-(A)_{j-1}$  do
4    $Turn_j \leftarrow Turn_j \cup \{Steal(DTr_{v \rightarrow A, j-1}, v)\}$ 
5 for  $w \in N^+(A)_{j-1}$  do
6    $Turn_j \leftarrow Turn_j \cup \{Add(-DTr_{A \rightarrow v, j-1}, w)\}$ 
7 return  $Turn_j$ 

```

**Definition 5.13** (Indirect trust from  $A \in \mathcal{V}_j$  to  $B \in \mathcal{V}_j, Tr_{A \rightarrow B, j}$ ).

Maximum possible value that can be stolen from  $A$  if  $B$  follows the evil strategy,  $A$  follows the idle strategy and everyone else ( $\mathcal{V} \setminus \{A, B\}$ ) follows the conservative strategy. More formally,

$$Tr_{A \rightarrow B, j} = \max_{j': j' > j, configurations} [out_{A, j} - out_{A, j'}]$$

where  $Strategy(A) = Idle, Strategy(B) = Evil, \forall C \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{A, B\}, Strategy(C) = Conservative$ .

**Definition 5.14** (Indirect trust from  $A \in \mathcal{V}_j$  to  $S \subset \mathcal{V}_j, Tr_{A \rightarrow S, j}$ ).

Maximum possible value that can be stolen from  $A$  if all players in  $S$  follow the evil strategy,  $A$  follows the idle strategy and everyone else ( $\mathcal{V} \setminus (S \cup \{A\})$ ) follows the conservative strategy. More formally,

$$Tr_{A \rightarrow S, j} = \max_{j': j' > j, configurations} [out_{A, j} - out_{A, j'}]$$

where  $Strategy(A) = Idle, \forall E \in S, Strategy(E) = Evil, \forall C \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{A, E\}, Strategy(C) = Conservative$ .

**Definition 5.15** (Trust Reduction).

Let  $A, B \in \mathcal{V}, x_i$  flow to  $N^+(A)_i$  resulting from  $maxFlow(A, B), u_i = DTr_{A \rightarrow N^+(A)_i, j-1}, u'_i = DTr_{A \rightarrow N^+(A)_i, j}, i \in [|N^+(A)|], j \in \mathbb{N}$ .

1. The Trust Reduction on neighbour  $i, \delta_i$  is defined as  $\delta_i = u_i - u'_i$ .
2. The Flow Reduction on neighbour  $i, \Delta_i$  is defined as  $\Delta_i = x_i - u'_i$ .

We will also use the standard notation for 1-norm and  $\infty$ -norm, that is:

1.  $\|\delta_i\|_1 = \sum_{i \in N^+(A)} \delta_i$
2.  $\|\delta_i\|_\infty = \max_{i \in N^+(A)} \delta_i$ .

**Definition 5.16** (Restricted Flow).

Let  $A, B \in \mathcal{V}, i \in [|N^+(A)|]$ .

1. Let  $F_{A_i \rightarrow B}$  be the flow from  $A$  to  $N^+(A)_i$  as calculated by the  $\text{maxFlow}(A, B)$  ( $x'_i$ ) when  $u'_i = u_i$ ,  $u'_k = 0 \forall k \in [N^+(A)] \wedge k \neq i$ .
2. Let  $S \subset N^+(A)$ . Let  $F_{A_S \rightarrow B}$  be the sum of flows from  $A$  to  $S$  as calculated by the  $\text{maxFlow}(A, B)$  ( $\sum_{i=1}^{|S|} x'_i$ ) when  $u'_C = u_C \forall C \in S, u'_D = 0 \forall D \in N^+(A) \setminus S$ .

## 6 Theorems-Algorithms

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**Algorithm 4:** Execute Turn
 

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**Input:** old graph  $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$ , old capital  $Cap_{A,j-1}$ ,  $ProvisionalTurn_j$

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1 executeTurn( $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$ ,  $Cap_{A,j-1}$ ,  $ProvisionalTurn_j$ ) :
2 ( $Turn_j$ ,  $NewCap$ )  $\leftarrow$  validateTurn( $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$ ,  $Cap_{A,j-1}$ ,  $ProvisionalTurn_j$ )
3 commitTurn( $mathcal{G}_{j-1}$ ,  $NewCap$ ,  $Turn_j$ )
4
5 validateTurn( $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$ ,  $Cap_{A,j-1}$ ,  $ProvisionalTurn_j$ ) :
6  $Y_{st} \leftarrow 0$ 
7  $Y_{add} \leftarrow 0$ 
8 for  $action \in ProvisionalTurn_j$  do
9    $action$  match do
10  case Steal( $y, w$ ) do
11    if  $y > DTr_{w \rightarrow A, j-1} \vee y < 0$  then
12      return  $\emptyset$ ,  $Cap_{A,j-1}$ 
13    else
14       $Y_{st} \leftarrow Y_{st} + y$ 
15  case Add( $y, w$ ) do
16    if  $y < -DTr_{A \rightarrow w, j-1}$  then
17      return  $\emptyset$ ,  $Cap_{A,j-1}$ 
18    else
19       $Y_{add} \leftarrow Y_{add} + y$ 
20 if  $Y_{add} - Y_{st} > Cap_{A,j-1}$  then
21   return  $\emptyset$ ,  $Cap_{A,j-1}$ 
22 else
23   return  $ProvisionalTurn_j$ ,  $Cap_{A,j-1} + Y_{st} - Y_{add}$ 
24
25 commitTurn( $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$ ,  $Cap_{A,j-1}$ ,  $Turn_j$ ) :
26 for  $(v, w) \in \mathcal{E}$  do
27    $DTr_{v \rightarrow w, j} \leftarrow DTr_{v \rightarrow w, j-1}$ 
28 for  $action \in Turn_j$  do
29    $action$  match do
30  case Steal( $y, w$ ) do
31     $DTr_{w \rightarrow A, j} \leftarrow DTr_{w \rightarrow A, j-1} - y$ 
32  case Add( $y, w$ ) do
33     $DTr_{A \rightarrow w, j} \leftarrow DTr_{A \rightarrow w, j-1} + y$ 
34  $Cap_{A,j} \leftarrow NewCap$ 
35  $\mathcal{H}_j \leftarrow (Player(j), Turn_j)$ 

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**Algorithm 5:** TrustIsRisk Game
 

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1  $j \leftarrow 0$ 
2 while True do
3    $j \leftarrow j + 1$ 
4    $v \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{V}_j$ 
5    $ProvisionalTurn_j \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_v()$ 
6   executeTurn( $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$ ,  $Cap_{A,j-1}$ ,  $ProvisionalTurn_j$ )

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**Algorithm 6:** Transitive Steal**Input** :  $A$  idle player,  $E$  evil player,  $j_0$   $E$ 's first turn**Output:**  $\mathcal{H}$  history

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1  $Turn_{j_0} \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_E()$ 
2  $\text{executeTurn}(\mathcal{G}_{j_0-1}, Cap_{E,j_0-1}, Turn_{j_0})$ 
3  $Angry \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
4  $Happy \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
5  $Sad \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
6  $j \leftarrow j_0$ 
7 for  $v \in \mathcal{V}$  do
8   if  $v \in N^-(E)_{j_0-1}$  then
9      $Loss_v \leftarrow DTr_{v \rightarrow E, j_0-1}$ 
10    if  $v \neq A$  then
11      if  $in_{v,j_0} > 0$  then
12         $Angry \leftarrow Angry \cup \{v\}$ 
13      else
14         $Sad \leftarrow Sad \cup \{v\}$ 
15    else
16      if  $v \neq A$  then
17         $Happy \leftarrow Happy \cup \{v\}$ 
18 while  $True$  do
19    $j \leftarrow j + 1$ 
20    $v \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{V}_j \setminus \{A, E\}$ 
21    $Turn_j \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_v()$ 
22    $\text{executeTurn}(\mathcal{G}_{j-1}, Cap_{v,j-1}, Turn_j)$ 
23   for  $w \in N^-(v)$  do
24     if  $\exists Steal(y, w) \in Turn_j$  then
25        $exchange \leftarrow y : Steal(y, w) \in Turn_j$ 
26        $Loss_w \leftarrow Loss_w + exchange$ 
27        $Loss_v \leftarrow Loss_v - exchange$ 
28       if  $v \neq A$  then
29         if  $w \in Happy$  then
30            $Happy \leftarrow Happy \setminus \{w\}$ 
31         if  $in_{w,j} = 0$  then
32            $Sad \leftarrow Sad \cup \{w\}$ 
33         else
34            $Angry \leftarrow Angry \cup \{w\}$ 
35    $Angry \leftarrow Angry \setminus \{v\}$ 
36   if  $in_{v,j} = 0 \wedge Loss_v > 0$  then
37      $Sad \leftarrow Sad \cup \{v\}$ 
38   if  $Loss_v = 0$  then
39      $Happy \leftarrow Happy \cup v$ 

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Given that  $Damage_{v,j} = out_{v,j'} - out_{v,j}, j' = \max\{k \in \mathbb{N} : k < j \wedge Player(k) = Player(j)\}$ , or  $j' = j_0 - 1$  if  $j$  is the first turn in which  $Player(j) = v$ , the algorithm generates turns:

$$Turn_j = \begin{cases} \emptyset, & Damage_{v,j-1} = 0 \\ \{Steal(y_1, N^-(v)_1), \dots, Steal(y_{|N^-(v)|}, N^-(v)_{|N^-(v)|})\}, & Damage_{v,j-1} > 0 \end{cases}$$

In the second case, it is  $\sum_{i=1}^{|N^-(v)|} y_i = \min(in_{v,j-1}, Damage_{v,j-1})$ . From the definition of  $Damage_{v,j}$  and knowing that no strategy in this case can increase any direct trust, it is obvious that  $Damage_{v,j} \geq 0$ . Also,

we can see that  $Loss_{v,j} \geq 0$  because if  $Loss_{v,j} < 0$ , then  $v$  has stolen more value than she has been stolen, thus she would not be following the conservative strategy.

**Lemma 6.1** (*Loss equivalent to Damage*).

It holds that  $Player(j) = v \in \mathcal{V}_j \setminus \{A, E\} \Rightarrow \min(in_{v,j}, Loss_{v,j}) = \min(in_{v,j}, Damage_{v,j})$ .

*Proof.*

- If  $j = j_0$ , then  $Player(j) = Player(j_0) = E$  and thus the proposition holds en kenw.
- $j \in \mathbb{N} : j > j_0$ .  $v = Player(j)$ .
  - $v \in Happy_{j-1}$ . Then
    1.  $v \in Happy_j$  because  $Turn_j = \emptyset$ ,
    2.  $Loss_{v,j} = 0$  because otherwise  $v \notin Happy_j$ ,
    3.  $Damage_{v,j} = 0$ , or else any reduction in direct trust to  $v$  would increase equally  $Loss_{v,j}$  (line 26), which cannot be decreased but during an Angry player's turn (line 27).
    4.  $in_{v,j} \geq 0$
 Thus  $\min(in_{v,j}, Damage_{v,j}) = \min(in_{v,j}, Loss_{v,j}) = 0$ .
  - $v \in Sad_{j-1}$ . Then
    1.  $v \in Sad_j$  because  $Turn_j = \emptyset$ ,
    2.  $in_{v,j} = 0$  (lines 13-14, 31-32),
    3.  $Damage_{v,j} \geq 0 \wedge Loss_{v,j} \geq 0$ .
 Thus  $\min(in_{v,j}, Damage_{v,j}) = \min(in_{v,j}, Loss_{v,j}) = 0$ .
  - $v \in Angry_{j-1} \wedge v \in Happy_j$ . Then the same argument as in the first case holds, if we ignore the 1st argument.
  - $v \in Angry_j \wedge v \in Sad_j$ . Then the same argument as in the second case holds, if we ignore the 1st argument.

□

**Theorem 6.1** (Trust convergence theorem).

Let  $A, E \in \mathcal{V} : Strategy(A) = Idle, Strategy(E) = Evil, \forall C \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{A, E\}, Strategy(C) = Conservative$  and  $j_0 \in \mathbb{N} : Player(j_0) = E$ . Given that all players eventually play, there exists a turn  $j' > j_0 : \forall j \geq j', Turn_j = \emptyset$ .

*Proof.* First of all,  $\forall j > j_0 : Player(j) = E \Rightarrow Turn_j = \emptyset$  because  $E$  has already nullified his incoming and outgoing direct trusts in  $Turn_{j_0}$ , the evil strategy does not contain any case where direct trust is increased or where the evil player starts directly trusting another player and the other players do not follow a strategy in which they can choose to *Add()* trust to  $E$ , thus player  $E$  can do nothing. Also  $\forall j > j_0 : Player(j) = A \Rightarrow Turn_j = \emptyset$  because of the idle strategy that  $A$  follows. As far as the rest of the players are concerned, consider the algorithm 6, which is a variation of the TrustIsRisk Game.

As we can see from lines 9 and 26-27,  $\forall j, \sum_{v \in V(G) \setminus \{A, B\}} Loss_v = \sum_{v \in N^-(B)} DTr_{v \rightarrow B, j_0}$ , that is the total loss is constant and equal to the total value stolen by  $B$ . Also, we can see in lines 9 and 27, which are the only lines where the *Sad* set is modified, that once a player enters the *Sad* set, it is impossible to exit from this set. Also, we can see that players in  $Sad \cup Happy$  always pass their turn. We will now show that eventually the *Angry* set will be empty, or equivalently that eventually every player will pass their turn. Suppose that it is possible to have an infinite amount of turns that players do not choose to pass. We know that the number of nodes is finite, thus this is possible only if  $\exists j_1 : \forall j \geq j_1, |Angry_j \cup Happy_j| = c > 0 \wedge |Angry_j| > 0$  (the total number of angry and happy players cannot increase because no player leaves the *Sad* set and if it were to be decreased, it would eventually reach 0). Since  $Angry_j \neq \emptyset$ , a player  $v$  that will not pass her turn will eventually be chosen to play. According to algorithm 6,  $v$  will either deplete her incoming trust and enter the *Sad* set (line 32), which is contradicting  $|Angry_j \cup Happy_j| = c$ , or will steal enough



value to enter the *Happy* set, that is  $v$  will make  $Loss_{v,j} = 0$ . Suppose that she has stolen  $m$  players. They, in their turn, will steal total value at least equal to the value stolen by  $v$  (since they cannot go sad, as explained above). However, this means that, since the total value being stolen will never be reduced and the turns this will happen are infinite, the players must steal an infinite amount of value, which is impossible because the direct trusts are finite in number and in value. More precisely, suppose that in  $Turn_{j_1-1}$ ,  $\sum_{w,w' \in \mathcal{V}} DTr_{w \rightarrow w'} = S_{j_1-1}$ . In  $Turn_{j_1}$ ,  $v$  steals  $St_{j_1} = \sum_{i=1}^m y_i$ . Thus  $S_{j_1} = S_{j_1-1} - St_{j_1}$ . Eventually there is a turn  $j_2$  when every player in  $N^-(v)$  will have played. Then  $S_{j_2} \leq S_{j_1} - St_{j_1} = S_{j_1-1} - 2St_{j_1}$ . Eventually there is a turn  $j_3$  when every player in  $N^-(N^-(v))$  will have played. By repeating this reasoning  $n$  times, we see that  $S_{j_n} \leq S_{j_1-1} - nSt_{j_1}$ . However  $S_{j_1-1}, St_{j_1} \in \mathbb{N}$ , thus  $\exists n \in \mathbb{N} : nSt_{j_1} > S_{j_1-1} \Rightarrow S_{j_n} < 0$ . We have a contradiction because  $\forall w, w' \in \mathcal{V}, DTr_{w \rightarrow w'} \geq 0$ , thus eventually  $Angry = \emptyset$  and everybody passes.  $\square$

**Theorem 6.2** (Saturation theorem).

Let  $s$  source,  $n = |N^+(s)|$ ,  $x_i, i \in [n]$ , flows to  $s$ 's neighbours as calculated by the *maxFlow* algorithm,  $u'_i$  new direct trusts to the  $n$  neighbours and  $x'_i$  new flows to the neighbours as calculated by the *maxFlow* algorithm with the new direct trusts,  $u'_i$ . It holds that  $\forall i \in [n], u'_i \leq x_i \Rightarrow x'_i = u'_i$ .

*Proof.*  $\forall i \in [n], x'_i > u'_i$  is impossible because a flow cannot be higher than its corresponding capacity. Thus  $\forall i \in [n], x'_i \leq u'_i$ . (1)

In the initial configuration of  $u_i$  and according to the flow problem setting, a combination of flows  $y_i$  such that  $\forall i \in [n], y_i = u'_i$  is a valid, albeit not necessarily maximum, configuration with a flow  $\sum_{i=1}^n y_i$ . Suppose that  $\exists k \in [n] : x'_k < u'_k$  as calculated by the *maxFlow* algorithm with the new direct trusts,  $u'_i$ . Then for the new *maxFlow*  $F'$  it holds that  $F' = \sum_{i=1}^n x'_i < \sum_{i=1}^n y_i$  since  $x'_k < y_k$  and (1) which is impossible because the configuration  $\forall i \in [n], x'_i = y_i$  is valid since  $\forall i \in [n], y_i = u'_i$  and also has a higher flow, thus the *maxFlow* algorithm will prefer the configuration with the higher flow. Thus we deduce that  $\forall i \in [n], x'_i = u'_i$ .  $\square$

**Theorem 6.3** (Trust flow theorem - TOCHECK).

$Tr_{A \rightarrow B} = MaxFlow_{A \rightarrow B}$  (Treating trusts as capacities)

*Proof.*

Suppose that the flow graph  $FG$  is composed of  $V(FG)$  nodes and  $E(FG)$  edges. Each edge  $e_{vw}$  has a corresponding capacity  $u_{vw}$  which is constant and a corresponding flow  $x_{vw}$  which can change depending to the flow assignment  $X$  we choose. In flow context, for an assignment  $X$  to be valid, two properties must hold:

1.  $\forall e_{vw} \in E(FG), x_{vw} \leq u_{vw}$
2.  $\forall v \in V(FG) \setminus \{A, B\}, \sum_{w \in N^+(v)} x_{vw} = \sum_{w \in N^-(v)} x_{vw}$

(p.709 Introduction to algorithms (CLRS), third edition) First we will show that each valid execution of algorithm 6 corresponds to a valid flow to  $A$  and afterwards we will show that the *MaxFlow* can be a result of a valid execution of 6. Thus we will have proven that  $Tr_{A \rightarrow B} = MaxFlow_{A \rightarrow B}$ .

- We will first that for any valid execution of algorithm 6 there exists at least one valid flow from  $A$  to  $B$ ,  $X$ , such that  $Loss_A = \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} x_{Av}$ . Let  $j$  be a turn where 6 has converged ( $j$  exists, according to theorem 6.1). Then  $Loss_{A,j} = out_{A,j_0} - out_{A,j}$ . Let  $\forall v \in N^+(A), x_{Av} = DTr_{A \rightarrow v, j_0} - DTr_{A \rightarrow v, j}$ . For any conservative player  $v \in N^+(A)$ , let  $\forall w \in N^+(v), x_{vw} \leq DTr_{v \rightarrow w, j_0} - DTr_{v \rightarrow w, j}$ ,  $\sum_{w \in N^+(v)} x_{vw} = x_{Av}$ . This is possible because  $v$  is conservative, thus the value she stole from  $A$  must have been stolen previously from her. More generally,  $\forall v \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{A, B\}, \forall w \in N^+(v), x_{vw} \leq DTr_{v \rightarrow w, j_0} - DTr_{v \rightarrow w, j}$ ,  $\sum_{w \in N^+(v)} x_{vw} = \sum_{w \in N^-(v)} x_{vw}$ . Since the graph we build is a DAG, which corresponds to a partial order, there always exists a minimal element. Thus, by choosing to calculate the outgoing

flows only of minimal elements, it is possible to create a valid flow network from  $A$  to  $B$  in exactly  $|V(FG)| - 1$  iterations of the above steps.

- We will now show that there exists an execution of algorithm 6 such that  $Loss_A = maxFlow_{A \rightarrow B}$ . Let  $X$  be the flows as returned by an execution of the  $maxFlow_{A \rightarrow B}$  algorithm. It is known that all flows are DAGs [citation needed] and that all DAGs have a maximal element [citation needed] based on the partial ordering  $x_{vw} > 0 \Rightarrow v < w$ . The maximal element is a node that does not have any outgoing flow. It is obvious that removing any node from a DAG cannot create a cycle, thus the graph that remains after removing a node from a DAG is also a DAG, thus it has a maximal node as well. If a player represented in turn  $j > j_0$  by a maximal node  $v$  is chosen to play for the first time by 6, she is able to steal value equal at least to her outgoing flow on turn  $j_0$ , since she has already been stolen at least  $\sum_{w \in N^+(v)} x_{vw}$  (since she is maximal on turn  $j$ , she has no outgoing flow) and conform with the conservative strategy. Furthermore, she will pass her turn on all subsequent turns she plays, since no additional value can be stolen from her because of her maximal status on turn  $j$  (wrong). Thus if the algorithm chooses only maximal nodes, after exactly  $|V(FG)| - 1$  turns (we do not count idle player  $A$ ) every evil and conservative player will have stolen at least value equal to the flow passing through them in turn  $j_0$  and player  $A$  will have been stolen value exactly equal to  $maxFlow_{A \rightarrow B} \Rightarrow Loss_A = maxFlow_{A \rightarrow B}$ .

OLD

- The flow to  $A$  is the flow that results from the following process: After the execution of 6, for each sad player iteratively replenish the  $DTr$  stolen from the sad player by the one that stole from her (if multiple players stole from the sad player, then replenish all the stolen  $DTr$ ). Repeat the process until the evil player replenishes the initially stolen  $DTr$ . This is always possible because if there is no player who stole from each one who is replenished, then the  $Steal()$  she did in the first place would not be according to the conservative strategy. Also this process will end with the evil player replenishing  $DTr$  equal to the sum of  $DTr$  that was stolen from sad players because the conservative players cannot avoid replenishing, or else they do not follow the conservative strategy. The  $DTr$  stolen from  $A$  will not be replenished, since the player(s) that have stolen from  $A$  will not replenish the stolen value and, inductively, this value will not be replenished. Thus  $A$  will have been stolen the exact same value that the modified evil player has stolen,  $\forall w, v \in V(FG), DTr_{v \rightarrow w} \geq x_{vw}$  (1st requirement for flows) and there would be no node that gets more flow than it pushes, except for  $A$  and  $B$  (2nd requirement for flows), thus it is a valid flow.
- Let  $X$  be the flows as returned by an execution of the  $maxFlow$  algorithm. The evil player can steal the values denoted by  $X$  and every other player can steal exactly as much as the  $X$  flows denote, since they have the 1st property and thus are stealable in any strategy and also hold the 2nd property, thus they comply with the conservative strategy. More concretely,  $\forall v, w \in V(FG), DTr'_{v \rightarrow w} = x_{vw}$ . Then the two properties of flows hold:

- $\forall v, w \in V(FG), x_{vw} \leq DTr_{v \rightarrow w}$  and thus any set of strategies that include only  $Steal()$  actions such that  $\sum_{y: Steal(y, w) \in Turn_j, Player(j)=v} y = DTr_{v \rightarrow w} - x_{vw}$  is feasible.
- $\forall v \in V(FG) \setminus \{A, B\}, \sum_{w \in N^+(v)} x_{vw} = \sum_{w \in N^-(v)} x_{vw}$  thus  $\forall v \in V(FG) \setminus \{A, B\}, Strategy(v) = Conservative$ .

Thus the maximum value  $A$  can lose if  $B$  is evil is  $Tr_{A \rightarrow B} = maxFlow_{A \rightarrow B}$ . □

#### Theorem 6.4 (Conservative world theorem).

*If everybody follows the conservative strategy, nobody steals any amount from anybody.*

*Proof.*

Suppose that there exists a subseries of History,  $(Turn_{j_k})$ , where  $Turn_{j_k} = \{Steal(y_1, B_1), \dots, Steal(y_m, B_m)\}$ . This subseries must have an initial element,  $Turn_{j_1}$ . However,  $Player(j_1)$  follows the conservative strategy, thus somebody must have stolen from her as well, so  $Player(j_1)$  cannot be the initial element. We have a contradiction, thus there cannot exist a series of stealing actions when everybody is conservative. □

**Theorem 6.5** (Trust transfer theorem (flow terminology)).

Let  $s$  source,  $t$  sink,  $n = N^+(s)$


$X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$  outgoing flows from  $s$ ,

$U = \{u_1, \dots, u_n\}$  outgoing capacities from  $s$ ,

$V$  the value to be transferred.

Nodes apart from  $s, t$  follow the conservative strategy.

Obviously  $\maxFlow = F = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ .



We create a new graph where

$$1. \sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = F - V$$

$$2. \forall i \in [n] u'_i \leq x_i$$

It holds that  $\maxFlow' = F' = F - V$ .

*Proof.* From theorem 6.2 we can see that  $x'_i = u'_i$ . It holds that  $F' = \sum_{i=1}^n x'_i = \sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = F - V$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 6.2** (Flow limit lemma).

It is impossible for the outgoing flow  $x_i$  from  $A$  to an out neighbour of  $A$  to be greater than  $F_{A_i \rightarrow B}$ . More formally,  $x_i \leq F_{A_i \rightarrow B}$ .

*Proof.* Suppose a configuration where  $\exists i : x_i > F_{A_i \rightarrow B}$ . If we reduce the capacities  $u_k, k \neq i$  the flow that passes from  $i$  in no case has to be reduced. Thus we can set  $\forall k \neq i, u'_k = 0$  and  $u'_i = u_i$ . Then  $\forall k \neq i, x'_k = 0, x'_i = x_i$  is a valid configuration and thus by definition  $F_{A_i \rightarrow B} = x'_i = x_i > F_{A_i \rightarrow B}$ , which is a contradiction. Thus  $\forall i \in [N^+(A)], x_i \leq F_{A_i \rightarrow B}$ .  $\square$

**Theorem 6.6** (Trust-saving Theorem).

A configuration  $U' : u'_i = F_{A_i \rightarrow B}$  for some  $i \in [N^+(A)]$  can yield the same  $\maxFlow$  with a configuration  $U'' : u''_i = u_i, \forall k \in [N^+(A)], k \neq i, u''_k = u'_k$ .

*Proof.* We know that  $x_i \leq F_{A_i \rightarrow B}$  (lemma 6.2), thus we can see that any increase in  $u'_i$  beyond  $F_{A_i \rightarrow B}$  will not influence  $x_i$  and subsequently will not incur any change on the rest of the flows.  $\square$

**Theorem 6.7** (Invariable trust reduction with naive algorithms).

Let  $A$  source,  $n = |N^+(A)|$  and  $u'_i$  new direct trusts. If  $\forall i \in [n], u'_i \leq x_i$ , Trust Reduction  $\|\delta_i\|_1$  is independent of  $x_i, u'_i \forall$  valid configurations of  $x_i$

*Proof.* Since  $\forall i \in [n], u'_i \leq x_i$  it is (according to 6.2)  $x'_i = u'_i$ , thus  $\delta_i = u_i - x'_i$ . We know that  $\sum_{i=1}^n x'_i = F - V$ ,

so we have  $\|\delta_i\|_1 = \sum_{i=1}^n \delta_i = \sum_{i=1}^n (u_i - x'_i) = \sum_{i=1}^n u_i - F + V$  independent from  $x'_i, u'_i$   $\square$

**Theorem 6.8** (Dependence impossibility theorem).

$\frac{\partial x_k}{\partial x_i} = 0$  with  $x_i$  the flow from  $\maxFlow \Rightarrow \forall x'_i \leq x_i, \frac{\partial x_k}{\partial x_i} = 0$  ceteris paribus

*Proof.* TODO □

Note: The  $\text{maxFlow}$  is the same in the following two cases: When a player chooses the evil strategy and when the same player chooses a variation of the evil strategy where she does not nullify her outgoing direct trust.

**Theorem 6.9** (Trust to multiple players).

Let  $S \subset \mathcal{V}$ ,  $T$  auxiliary player such that  $\forall B \in S, DTr_{B \rightarrow T} = \infty$ . It holds that  $\forall A \in \mathcal{V} \setminus S, Tr_{A \rightarrow S} = \text{maxFlow}(A, T)$ .

*Proof.* If  $T$  chooses the evil strategy and all players in  $S$  play according to the conservative strategy, they will have to steal all their incoming direct trust, thus they will act in a way identical to following the evil strategy as far as  $\text{maxFlow}$  is concerned, thus, by 6.3,  $Tr_{A \rightarrow T} = \text{maxFlow}(A, T) = Tr_{A \rightarrow S}$ . □

One of the primary aims of this system is to mitigate the danger for sybil attacks whilst maintaining fully decentralized autonomy. Let Eve be a possible attacker. Since participation in the network does not require any kind of registration, Eve can create any number of players. We will call the set of these players  $\mathcal{C}$ . Moreover, Eve can invest any amount she chooses, thus she can arbitrarily set the direct trusts of any player  $C \in \mathcal{C}$  to any player  $P \in \mathcal{V}$  ( $DTr_{C \rightarrow P}$ ) and can also steal all incoming direct trust to these players. Additionally, we give Eve a set of players  $B \in \mathcal{B}$  that she has corrupted, so she fully controls their direct trusts to any player  $P \in \mathcal{V}$  ( $DTr_{B \rightarrow P}$ ) and can also steal all incoming direct trust to these players. The players  $B \in \mathcal{B}$  are considered to be legitimate before the corruption, thus they can be directly trusted by any player  $P \in \mathcal{V}$  ( $DTr_{P \rightarrow B} \geq 0$ ). However, players  $C \in \mathcal{C}$  can be trusted only by players  $D \in \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}$  ( $DTr_{D \rightarrow C} \geq 0$ ) and not by players  $A \in \mathcal{V} \setminus (\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C})$  ( $DTr_{A \rightarrow C} = 0$ ).

**Theorem 6.10** (Sybil resistance).

Let  $\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{V}$  ( $\mathcal{B} \cap \mathcal{C} = \emptyset$ ) be a collusion of players who are controlled by an adversary, Eve. Eve also controls the number of players in  $\mathcal{C}$ ,  $|\mathcal{C}|$ , but players  $C \in \mathcal{C}$  are not directly trusted by players outside the collusion, contrary to players  $B \in \mathcal{B}$  who may be directly trusted by any player in  $\mathcal{V}$ . It holds that  $Tr_{A \rightarrow \mathcal{B}} = Tr_{A \rightarrow \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}}$ .

*Proof.* Suppose that there exist  $|\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}|$  consecutive turns during which all the colluding players choose actions according to the evil strategy. More formally, suppose that  $\exists j : \forall d \in [|\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}|], \text{Player}(j + d) \in \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C} \wedge \forall d_1, d_2 \in [|\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}|], d_1 \neq d_2, \text{Player}(j + d_1) \neq \text{Player}(j + d_2) \wedge \forall d \in [|\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}|], \text{Strategy}(\text{Player}(j + d)) = \text{Evil}$ . Let  $T$  be an auxiliary player such that  $\forall B \in \mathcal{B}, DTr_{B \rightarrow T} = \infty$  and  $T'$  be another auxiliary player such that  $\forall D \in \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}, DTr_{D \rightarrow T'} = \infty$ . According to 6.9,  $Tr_{A \rightarrow \mathcal{B}} = \text{maxFlow}(A, T)$ ,  $Tr_{A \rightarrow \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}} = \text{maxFlow}(A, T')$ . Consider the partition of  $\mathcal{V}$ ,  $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V} \setminus (\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C})\} = \{P_1, P_2\}$ . The edges from  $P_2$  to  $P_1$  will carry a flow  $X_P, X_{P'}$  and the edges inside of  $P_1$  will carry a flow  $X_T, X_{T'}$  from the calculation of  $\text{maxFlow}(A, T), \text{maxFlow}(A, T')$  respectively.  $\text{maxFlow}(A, T) \leq \text{maxFlow}(A, T')$  because the maximal configuration of  $X_T$  can be part of a valid configuration of  $X_{T'}$  since edges in  $\mathcal{B}$  are edges in  $\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}$ . If both  $\text{maxFlows}$  are not infinite, then their  $\text{MinCut}$  is either entirely in  $P_2$  or in  $P_1$  and the edges from  $P_2$  to  $P_1$ , because otherwise  $\text{minCut} = \infty$  since it contains saturated infinite edges. However, then in both cases the  $\text{minCut}$  is the same, thus  $\text{maxFlow}(A, T) = \text{maxFlow}(A, T')$ . Finally, we will show that if  $\text{maxFlow}(A, T') = \infty$ , then  $\text{maxFlow}(A, T) = \infty$ . If  $\text{maxFlow}(A, T') = \infty$ , then there is infinite flow entering  $P_1$  and, because all endpoints of flows entering  $P_1$  are in  $\mathcal{B}$ , the same infinite flow can be assigned in the case of  $\text{maxFlow}(A, T)$ , thus  $\text{maxFlow}(A, T) = \infty$ . Thus we conclude that  $Tr_{A \rightarrow \mathcal{B}} = Tr_{A \rightarrow \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}}$ . □

We have proven that controlling  $|\mathcal{C}|$  is irrelevant for Eve, thus Sybil attacks are meaningless.

Here we show three naive algorithms for calculating new direct trusts so as to maintain invariable risk when paying a trusted party. To prove the correctness of the algorithms, it suffices to prove that  $\forall i \in [n] u'_i \leq x_i$  and that  $\sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = F - V$  where  $F = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ .

**Algorithm 7:** First-come, first-served trust transfer**Input** :  $x_i$  flows,  $n = |N^+(s)|$ ,  $V$  value**Output:**  $u'_i$  capacities

---

```

1  $F \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ 
2 if  $F < V$  then
3   | return  $\perp$ 
4  $F_{cur} \leftarrow F$ 
5 for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $n$  do
6   |  $u'_i \leftarrow x_i$ 
7  $i \leftarrow 1$ 
8 while  $F_{cur} > F - V$  do
9   |  $reduce \leftarrow \min(x_i, F_{cur} - F + V)$ 
10  |  $F_{cur} \leftarrow F_{cur} - reduce$ 
11  |  $u'_i \leftarrow x_i - reduce$ 
12  |  $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
13 return  $U' = \bigcup_{k=1}^n \{u'_k\}$ 

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*Proof of correctness for algorithm 7.*

- We will show that  $\forall i \in [n] u'_i \leq x_i$ .  
Let  $i \in [n]$ . In line 6 we can see that  $u'_i = x_i$  and the only other occurrence of  $u'_i$  is in line 11 where it is never increased ( $reduce \geq 0$ ), thus we see that, when returned,  $u'_i \leq x_i$ .

- We will show that  $\sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = F - V$ .

$$F_{cur,0} = F$$

If  $F_{cur,i} \geq F - V$ , then  $F_{cur,i+1}$  does not exist because the *while* loop breaks after calculating  $F_{cur,i}$ .

Else  $F_{cur,i+1} = F_{cur,i} - \min(x_{i+1}, F_{cur,i} - F + V)$ .

If for some  $i$ ,  $\min(x_{i+1}, F_{cur,i} - F + V) = F_{cur,i} - F + V$ , then  $F_{cur,i+1} = F - V$ , so if  $F_{cur,i+1}$  exists,

$$\text{then } \forall k < i, F_{cur,k} = F_{cur,k-1} - x_k \Rightarrow F_{cur,i} = F - \sum_{k=1}^i x_k$$

$$\text{Furthermore, if } F_{cur,i+1} = F - V \text{ then } u'_{i+1} = x_{i+1} - F_{cur,i} + F - V = x_{i+1} - F + \sum_{k=1}^{i-1} x_k + F - V = \sum_{k=1}^i x_k - V,$$

$$\forall k \leq i, u'_k = 0 \text{ and } \forall k > i + 1, u'_k = x_k.$$

$$\text{In total, we have } \sum_{k=1}^n u'_k = \sum_{k=1}^i x_k - V + \sum_{k=i+1}^n x_k = \sum_{k=1}^n x_k - V \Rightarrow \sum_{k=1}^n u'_k = F - V.$$

□

*Complexity of algorithm 7.*

First we will prove that on line 13  $i \leq n + 1$ . Suppose that  $i > n + 1$  on line 13. This means that  $F_{cur,n}$  exists and  $F_{cur,n} = F - \sum_{i=1}^n x_i = 0 \leq F - V$  since, according to the condition on line 2,  $F - V \geq 0$ . This means however that the *while* loop on line 8 will break, thus  $F_{cur,n+1}$  cannot exist and  $i = n + 1$  on line 13, which is a contradiction, thus  $i \leq n + 1$  on line 13. Since  $i$  is incremented by 1 on every iteration of the *while* loop (line 12), the complexity of the *while* loop is  $O(n)$  in the worst case. The complexity of lines 2-4 and 7 is  $O(1)$  and the complexity of lines 1, 5-6 and 13 is  $O(n)$ , thus the total complexity of algorithm 7 is  $O(n)$ . □

**Algorithm 8:** Absolute equality trust transfer ( $\|\Delta_i\|_\infty$  minimizer)

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**Input** :  $x_i$  flows,  $n = |N^+(s)|$ ,  $V$  value  
**Output**:  $u'_i$  capacities

---

```

1  $F \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ 
2 if  $F < V$  then
3   return  $\perp$ 
4 for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $n$  do
5    $u'_i \leftarrow x_i$ 
6  $reduce \leftarrow \frac{V}{n}$ 
7  $reduction \leftarrow 0$ 
8  $empty \leftarrow 0$ 
9  $i \leftarrow 0$ 
10 while  $reduction < V$  do
11   if  $u'_i > 0$  then
12     if  $x_i < reduce$  then
13        $empty \leftarrow empty + 1$ 
14       if  $empty < n$  then
15          $reduce \leftarrow reduce + \frac{reduce - x_i}{n - empty}$ 
16        $reduction \leftarrow reduction + u'_i$ 
17        $u'_i \leftarrow 0$ 
18     else if  $x_i \geq reduce$  then
19        $reduction \leftarrow reduction + u'_i - (x_i - reduce)$ 
20        $u'_i \leftarrow x_i - reduce$ 
21    $i \leftarrow (i + 1) \bmod n$ 
22 return  $U' = \bigcup_{k=1}^n \{u'_k\}$ 

```

---

We will start by showing some results useful for the following proofs. Let  $j$  be the number of iterations of the **while** loop for the rest of the proofs for algorithm 8 (think of  $i$  from line 20 without the  $\bmod n$ ).

First we will show that  $empty \leq n$ .  $empty$  is only modified on line 12 where it is incremented by 1. This happens only when  $u'_i > 0$  (line 11), which is assigned the value 0 on line 16. We can see that the incrementation of  $empty$  can happen at most  $n$  times because  $|U'| = n$ . Since  $empty_0 = 0$ ,  $empty \leq n$  at all times of the execution.

Next we will derive the recursive formulas for the various variables.

$$empty_0 = 0$$

$$empty_{j+1} = \begin{cases} empty_j, & u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} = 0 \\ empty_j + 1, & u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1) \bmod n} < reduce_j \\ empty_j, & u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1) \bmod n} \geq reduce_j \end{cases}$$

$$reduce_0 = \frac{V}{n}$$

$$reduce_{j+1} = \begin{cases} reduce_j, & u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} = 0 \\ reduce_j + \frac{reduce_j - x_{(j+1) \bmod n}}{n - empty_{j+1}}, & u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1) \bmod n} < reduce_j \\ reduce_j, & u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1) \bmod n} \geq reduce_j \end{cases}$$

$$reduction_0 = 0$$

$$reduction_{j+1} = \begin{cases} reduction_j, & u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} = 0 \\ reduction_j + u'_{(j+1) \bmod n}, & u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1) \bmod n} < reduce_j \\ reduction_j + u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} - x_{(j+1) \bmod n} + reduce_{j+1}, & u'_{(j+1) \bmod n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1) \bmod n} \geq reduce_j \end{cases}$$

In the end,  $r = reduce$  is such that  $r = \frac{\sum_{x \in S} x}{n - |S|}$  where  $S = \{\text{flows } y \text{ from } s \text{ to } N^+(s) \text{ according to } maxFlow :$



$y < r\}$ . Also,  $\sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = \sum_{i=1}^n \max(0, x_i - r)$ . TOPROVE

*Proof of correctness for algorithm 8.*

- We will show that  $\forall i \in [n] u'_i \leq x_i$ .  
On line 9,  $\forall i \in [n] u'_i = x_i$ . Subsequently  $u'_i$  is modified on line 16, where it becomes equal to 0 and on line 19, where it is assigned  $x_i - \text{reduce}$ . It holds that  $x_i - \text{reduce} \leq x_i$  because initially  $\text{reduce} = \frac{V}{n} \geq 0$  and subsequently  $\text{reduce}$  is modified only on line 14 where it is increased ( $n > \text{empty}$  because of line 13 and  $\text{reduce} > x_i$  because of line 11, thus  $\frac{\text{reduce} - x_i}{n - \text{empty}} > 0$ ). We see that  $\forall i \in [n], u'_i \leq x_i$ .
- We will show that  $\sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = F - V$ .  
The variable  $\text{reduction}$  keeps track of the total reduction that has happened and breaks the **while** loop when  $\text{reduction} \geq V$ . We will first show that  $\text{reduction} = \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - u'_i)$  at all times and then we will prove that  $\text{reduction} = V$  at the end of the execution. Thus we will have proven that  $\sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i - V = F - V$ .
  - On line 9,  $u'_i = x_i \Rightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - u'_i) = 0$  and  $\text{reduction} = 0$ .  
On line 16,  $u'_i$  is reduced to 0 thus  $\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - u'_i)$  is increased by  $u'_i$ . Similarly, on line 15  $\text{reduction}$  is increased by  $u'_i$ , the same as the increase in  $\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - u'_i)$ .  
On line 19,  $u'_i$  is reduced by  $u'_i - x_i + \text{reduce}$  thus  $\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - u'_i)$  is increased by  $u'_i - x_i + \text{reduce}$ . On line 18,  $\text{reduction}$  is increased by  $u'_i - x_i + \text{reduce}$ , which is equal to the increase in  $\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - u'_i)$ .  
We also have to note that neither  $u'_i$  nor  $\text{reduction}$  is modified in any other way from line 10 and on, thus we conclude that  $\text{reduction} = \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - u'_i)$  at all times.
  - Suppose that  $\text{reduction}_j > V$  on the line 21. Since  $\text{reduction}_j$  exists,  $\text{reduction}_{j-1} < V$ . If  $x_{j \bmod n} < \text{reduce}_{j-1}$  then  $\text{reduction}_j = \text{reduction}_{j-1} + u'_{j \bmod n}$ . Since  $\text{reduction}_j > V$ ,  $u'_{j \bmod n} > V - \text{reduction}_{j-1}$ . TOCOMPLETE

□

*Complexity of algorithm 8.*

In the worst case scenario, each time we iterate over all capacities only the last non-zero capacity will become zero and every non-zero capacity must be recalculated. This means that every  $n$  steps exactly 1 capacity becomes zero and eventually all capacities (maybe except for one) become zero. Thus we need  $O(n^2)$  steps in the worst case. □

A variation of this algorithm using a Fibonacci heap with complexity  $O(n)$  can be created, but that is part of further research.

*Proof that algorithm 8 minimizes the  $\|\Delta_i\|_\infty$  norm.*

Suppose that  $U'$  is the result of an execution of algorithm 8 that does not minimize the  $\|\Delta_i\|_\infty$  norm. Suppose that  $W$  is a valid solution that minimizes the  $\|\Delta_i\|_\infty$  norm. Let  $\delta$  be the minimum value of this norm. There exists  $i \in [n]$  such that  $x_i - w_i = \delta$  and  $u'_i < w_i$ . Because both  $U'$  and  $W$  are valid solutions ( $\sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = \sum_{i=1}^n w_i = F - V$ ), there must exist a set  $S \subset U'$  such that  $\forall u'_j \in S, u'_j > w_j$  TOCOMPLETE. □

**Algorithm 9:** Proportional equality trust transfer

---

**Input** :  $x_i$  flows,  $n = |N^+(s)|$ ,  $V$  value  
**Output**:  $u'_i$  capacities

```

1  $F \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ 
2 if  $F < V$  then
3   | return  $\perp$ 
4 for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $n$  do
5   |  $u'_i \leftarrow x_i - \frac{V}{F}x_i$ 
6 return  $U' = \bigcup_{k=1}^n \{u'_k\}$ 

```

---

*Proof of correctness for algorithm 9.*

- We will show that  $\forall i \in [n] \ u'_i \leq x_i$ .  
 According to line 5, which is the only line where  $u'_i$  is changed,  $u'_i = x_i - \frac{V}{F}x_i \leq x_i$  since  $x_i, V, F > 0$  and  $V \leq F$ .
- We will show that  $\sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = F - V$ .

With  $F = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ , on line 6 it holds that  $\sum_{i=1}^n u'_i = \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - \frac{V}{F}x_i) = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i - \frac{V}{F} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i = F - V$ .

□

*Complexity of algorithm 9.*

The complexity of lines 1, 4-5 and 6 is  $O(n)$  and the complexity of lines 2-3 is  $O(1)$ , thus the total complexity of algorithm 9 is  $O(n)$ . □

Naive algorithms result in  $u'_i \leq x_i$ , thus according to 6.7,  $\|\delta_i\|_1$  is invariable for any of the possible solutions  $U'$ , which is not necessarily the minimum (usually it will be the maximum). The following algorithms concentrate on minimizing two  $\delta_i$  norms,  $\|\delta_i\|_\infty$  and  $\|\delta_i\|_1$ .

**Algorithm 10:**  $\|\delta_i\|_\infty$  minimizer

---

**Input** :  $X = \{x_i\}$  flows,  $n = |N^+(s)|$ ,  $V$  value,  $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2$   
**Output**:  $u'_i$  capacities

```

1 if  $\epsilon_1 < 0 \vee \epsilon_2 < 0$  then
2   | return  $\perp$ 
3  $F \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ 
4 if  $F < V$  then
5   | return  $\perp$ 
6  $\delta_{max} \leftarrow \max_{i \in [n]} \{u_i\}$ 
7  $\delta^* \leftarrow \text{BinSearch}(0, \delta_{max}, F - V, n, X, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)$ 
8 for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $n$  do
9   |  $u'_i \leftarrow \max(u_i - \delta^*, 0)$ 
10 return  $U' = \bigcup_{k=1}^n \{u'_k\}$ 

```

---

Since trust should be considered as a continuous unit and binary search dissects the possible interval for the solution on each recursive call, inclusion of the  $\epsilon$ -parameters in BinSearch is necessary for the



algorithm to complete in a finite number of steps.

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**Algorithm 10: function** BinSearch
 

---

```

Input  :  $bot, top, F', n, X, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2$ 
Output:  $\delta^*$ 
1 if  $bot = top$  then
2   | return  $bot$ 
3 else
4   | for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $n$  do
5     |  $u'_i \leftarrow \max(0, u_i - \frac{top+bot}{2})$ 
6     | if  $maxFlow < F' - \epsilon_1$  then
7       | return BinSearch( $bot, \frac{top+bot}{2}, F', n, X, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2$ )
8     | else if  $maxFlow > F' + \epsilon_2$  then
9       | return BinSearch( $\frac{top+bot}{2}, top, F', n, X, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2$ )
10    | else
11    | return  $\frac{top+bot}{2}$ 

```

---

*Proof that  $maxFlow(\delta)$  is strictly decreasing for  $\delta : maxflow(\delta) < F$ .*

Let  $maxFlow(\delta)$  be the  $maxFlow$  with  $\forall i \in [n], u'_i = \max(0, u_i - \delta)$ . We will prove that the function  $maxFlow(\delta)$  is strictly decreasing for all  $\delta \leq \max_{i \in [n]} \{u_i\}$  such that  $maxFlow(\delta) < F$ .

Suppose that  $\exists \delta_1, \delta_2 : \delta_1 < \delta_2 \wedge maxFlow(\delta_1) \leq maxFlow(\delta_2) < F$ . We will work with configurations of  $x'_{i,j}$  such that  $x'_{i,j} \leq x_i, j \in \{1, 2\}$ .

Let  $S_j = \{i \in N^+(s) : i \in MinCut_j\}$ . It holds that  $S_1 \neq \emptyset$  because otherwise  $MinCut_1 = MinCut_{\delta=0}$  which is a contradiction because then  $maxFlow(\delta_1) = F$ . Moreover, it holds that  $S_1 \subseteq S_2$ , since  $\forall u'_{i,2} > 0, u'_{i,2} < u'_{i,1}$ . Every node in the  $MinCut_j$  is saturated, thus  $\forall i \in S_1, x'_{i,j} = u'_{i,j}$ . Thus  $\sum_{i \in S_1} x_{i,2} < \sum_{i \in S_1} x_{i,1}$  and, since  $maxFlow(\delta_1) \leq maxFlow(\delta_2)$ , we conclude that for the same configurations,  $\sum_{i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1} x_{i,2} > \sum_{i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1} x_{i,1}$ .

However, since  $x'_{i,j} \leq x_i, j \in \{1, 2\}$ , the configuration  $[x''_{i,1} = x'_{i,2}, i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1], [x''_{i,1} = x'_{i,1}, i \in S_1]$  is valid for  $\delta = \delta_1$  and then  $\sum_{i \in S_1} x''_{i,1} + \sum_{i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1} x''_{i,1} = \sum_{i \in S_1} x'_{i,1} + \sum_{i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1} x'_{i,2} > maxFlow(\delta_1)$ , contradiction. Thus  $maxFlow(\delta)$  is strictly decreasing.  $\square$

We can see that if  $V > 0, F' = F - V < F$  thus if  $\delta \in (0, \max_{i \in [n]} \{u_i\}] : maxFlow(\delta) = F' \Rightarrow \delta = \min \|\delta_i\|_\infty : maxFlow(\|\delta_i\|_\infty) = F'$ .

*Proof of correctness for function 11.*

Supposing that  $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset [maxFlow(top), maxFlow(bot)]$ , or equivalently  $maxFlow(top) \leq F' - \epsilon_1 \wedge maxFlow(bot) \geq F' + \epsilon_2$ , we will prove that  $maxFlow(\delta^*) \in [F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2]$ .

First of all, we should note that if an invocation of BinSearch returns without calling BinSearch again (line 2 or 11), its return value will be equal to the return value of the initial invocation of BinSearch, as we can see on lines 7 and 9, where the return value of the invoked BinSearch is returned without any modification. The case where BinSearch is called again is analyzed next:

- If  $maxFlow(\frac{top+bot}{2}) < F' - \epsilon_1 < F'$  (line 6) then, since  $maxFlow(\delta)$  is strictly decreasing,  $\delta^* \in [bot, \frac{top+bot}{2})$ . As we see on line 7, the interval  $(\frac{top+bot}{2}, top]$  is discarded when the next BinSearch is called. Since  $F' + \epsilon_2 \leq maxFlow(bot)$ , we have  $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset [maxFlow(\frac{top+bot}{2}), maxFlow(bot)]$  and the length of the available interval is divided by 2.
- Similarly, if  $maxFlow(\frac{top+bot}{2}) > F' + \epsilon_2 > F'$  (line 8) then  $\delta^* \in (\frac{top+bot}{2}, top]$ . According to line 9, the interval  $[bot, \frac{top+bot}{2})$  is discarded when the next BinSearch is called. Since  $F' - \epsilon_1 \geq maxFlow(top)$ , we have  $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset (maxFlow(top), maxFlow(\frac{top+bot}{2})]$  and the length of the available interval is divided by 2.

As we saw,  $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset [maxFlow(top), maxFlow(bot)]$  in every recursive call and  $top - bot$  is divided by 2 in every call. From topology we know that  $A \subset B \Rightarrow |A| < |B|$ , so the recursive calls

cannot continue infinitely.  $||F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2|| = \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2$ . Let  $bot_0, top_0$  the input values given to the initial invocation of `BinSearch`,  $bot_j, top_j$  the input values given to the  $j$ -th recursive call of `BinSearch` and  $len_j = |[bot_j, top_j]| = top_j - bot_j$ . We have  $\forall j > 0, len_j = top_j - bot_j = \frac{top_{j-1} - bot_{j-1}}{2} \Rightarrow \forall j > 0, len_j = \frac{top_0 - bot_0}{2^j}$ . We understand that in the worst case  $len_j = \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2 \Rightarrow 2^j = \frac{top_0 - bot_0}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2} \Rightarrow j = \log_2(\frac{top_0 - bot_0}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2})$ . Also, as we saw earlier,  $\delta^*$  is always in the available interval, thus  $maxFlow(\delta^*) \in [F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2]$ .  $\square$

*Complexity of function 11.*

Lines 1-2 have complexity  $O(1)$ , lines 4-5 have complexity  $O(n)$ , lines 6-11 have complexity  $O(maxFlow) + O(BinSearch)$ . As we saw in the proof of correctness for function 11, we need at most  $\log_2(\frac{top - bot}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2})$  recursive calls of `BinSearch`. Thus the function 11 has worst-case complexity  $O((maxFlow + n) \log_2(\frac{top - bot}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2}))$ .  $\square$

*Proof of correctness for algorithm 10.*

We will show that  $maxFlow \in [F - V - \epsilon_1, F - V + \epsilon_2]$ , with  $u'_i$  decided by algorithm 10.

Obviously  $maxFlow(0) = F, maxFlow(\max_{i \in [n]} \{u_i\}) = 0$ , thus  $\delta^* \in \max_{i \in [n]} \{u_i\}$ . According to the proof of correctness for function 11, we can directly see that  $maxFlow(\delta^*) \in [F - V - \epsilon_1, F - V + \epsilon_2]$ , given that  $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2$  are chosen so that  $F - V - \epsilon_1 \geq 0, F - V + \epsilon_2 \leq F$ , so as to satisfy the condition  $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset [maxFlow(top), maxFlow(bot)]$ .  $\square$

*Complexity of algorithm 10.*

The complexity of lines 1,2 and 4-6 is  $O(n)$  and the complexity of line 3 is  $O(BinSearch) = O((maxFlow + n) \log_2(\frac{\delta_{max}}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2}))$ , thus the total complexity of algorithm 10 is  $O((maxFlow + n) \log_2(\frac{\delta_{max}}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2}))$ .  $\square$

However, we need to minimize  $\sum_{i=1}^n (u_i - u'_i) = ||\delta_i||_1$ .

## 7 Related Work

## 8 Further Research

While our trust network can form a basis for risk-invariant transactions in the anonymous and decentralized setting, more research is required to achieve other desirable properties. Some directions for future research are outlined below.

### 8.1 Zero knowledge

Our network evaluates indirect trust by computing the max flow in the graph of lines-of-credit. In order to do that, complete information about the network is required. However, disclosing the network topology may be undesirable, as it subverts the identity of the participants even when participants are treated pseudonymously, as deanonymization techniques can be used. To avoid such issues, exploring the ability to calculate flows in a zero knowledge fashion may be desirable. However, performing network queries in zero knowledge may allow an adversary to extract topological information. More research is required to establish how flows can be calculated effectively in zero knowledge and what bounds exist in regards to information revealed in such fashion.

## 9 References