Trust Is Risk: Introducing a decentralized platform for financial trust

Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos
National Technical University of Athens
orfeas.litos@hotmail.com

Dionysis Zindros[†]
University of Athens
dionyziz@di.uoa.gr

1   Abstract

Reputation in centralized systems typically uses stars and review-based trust. These systems require extensive manual intervention and secrecy to avoid manipulation. In decentralized systems this luxury is not available as the reputation system should be autonomous and open source. Previous peer-to-peer reputation systems define trust abstractly and do not allow for financial arguments pertaining to reputation. We propose a concrete sybil-resilient decentralized reputation system in which direct trust is defined as lines-of-credit using bitcoin's 1-of-2 multisig. We introduce a new model for bitcoin wallets in which user coins are split among trusted friends. Indirect trust is subsequently defined using a transitive property. This enables formal game theoretic arguments pertaining to risk analysis. Using our reputation model, we define financial risk and prove that risk and max flows are equivalent. We then propose several algorithms for the redistribution of trust so that a decision can be made on whether an anonymous third party can be indirectly trusted. In such a setting, the risk incurred by making a purchase from an anonymous vendor remains invariant. Finally, we prove the correctness of our algorithms and provide optimality arguments for various norms.

2   Introduction

3   Keywords

decentralized, trust, web-of-trust, bitcoin, multisig, line-of-credit, trust-as-risk, flow

4   Key points

5   Definitions

Definition 5.1 (Graph).
TrustIsRisk is represented by a sequence of wheighted directed graphs $(\mathcal{G}_j)$ where $\mathcal{G}_j = (\mathcal{V}_j, \mathcal{E}_j), j \in \mathbb{N}$. Members of $\mathcal{E}_j$ are tuples of two nodes from $\mathcal{V}_j$. More formally, $e \in \mathcal{E}_j \Rightarrow \exists A, B \in \mathcal{V}_j : e = (A, B)$. Also, since the graphs are wheighted, there exists a sequence of functions (c_j) with $c_j : \mathcal{E}_j \to \mathbb{R}^+$.

Definition 5.2 (Players).
The set $\mathcal{V}_j = V(\mathcal{G}_j)$ is the set of all players in the network, otherwise understood as the set of all pseudonymous identities.

Definition 5.3 (Capital of A, Cap_A).
Total amount of value that exists in P2PKH in the UTXO and can be spent by A. We also define $Cap_{A,j}$ as the total amount of value that exists in P2PKH in the UTXO and can be spent by A during turn j.

Definition 5.4 (Direct Trust from A to B after turn j, $DTr_{A \to B,j}$).
Total amount of value that exists in $1/\{A, B\}$ multisigs in the UTXO in the end of turn j, where the money is deposited by A.

$$DTr_{A \to B,j} = \begin{cases} c_j(A, B), & if (A, B) \in \mathcal{E}_j \\ 0, & if (A, B) \notin \mathcal{E}_j \end{cases}$$

A function or algorithm that has access to the graph $\mathcal{G}_j$ has implicitly access to all direct trusts of this graph. The exception are the oracles, which in this case have access only to their incoming and outgoing direct trusts.

Definition 5.5 ((In/Out) Neighbourhood of A on turn j, $N^+(A)_j, N^-(A)_j, N(A)_j$)**.**

1. Let $N^+(A)_j$ be the set of players B that A directly trusts with any positive value at the end of turn j. More formally, $N^+(A)_j = \{B \in \mathcal{V}_j : DTr_{A \to B,j} > 0\}$. $N^+(A)_j$ is called out neighbourhood of A on turn j. Let also $S \subset \mathcal{V}_j$. $N^+(S)_j = \bigcup_{A \in S} N^+(A)_j$.

2. Let $N^-(A)_j$ be the set of players B that directly trust A with any positive value at the end of turn j. More formally, $N^-(A)_j = \{B \in \mathcal{V}_j : DTr_{B \to A,j} > 0\}$. $N^-(A)_j$ is called in neighbourhood of A on turn j. Let also $S \subset \mathcal{V}_j$. $N^-(S)_j = \bigcup_{A \in S} N^-(A)_j$.

3. Let $N(A)_j$ be the set of players B that either directly trust or are directly trusted by A with any positive value at the end of turn j. More formally, $N(A)_j = N^+(A)_j \cup N^-(A)_j$. $N(A)_j$ is called neighbourhood of A on turn j. Let also $S \subset \mathcal{V}_j$. $N(S)_j = N^+(S)_j \cup N^-(S)_j$.

4. Let $N(A)_{j,i}$ (respectively $N^+(A)_{j,i}, N^-(A)_{j,i}, N(S)_{j,i}, N^+(S)_{j,i}, N^-(S)_{j,i}, S \subset \mathcal{V}_j$) be the i-th element of set $N(A)_j$ (respectively of $N^+(A)_j, N^-(A)_j, N(S)_j, N^+(S)_j, N^-(S)_j$), according to an arbitrary but fixed enumeration of the set players.

Definition 5.6 (Total incoming/outgoing trust of A in turn j, $in_{A,j}, out_{A,j}$)**.**

$$in_{A,j} = \sum_{v \in N^-(A)_j} DTr_{v \to A,j}$$

$$out_{A,j} = \sum_{v \in N^+(A)_j} DTr_{A \to v,j}$$

Definition 5.7 (Turns)**.**
The game we are describing is turn-based. Let $DTr_{B \to A,j}$ be B's direct trust to A in turn j. In each turn j exactly one player $A \in \mathcal{V}, A = Player(j)$, chooses an action (according to a certain strategy) that can be one of the following, or a finite combination thereof:

1. Steal value $y_B, 0 \le y_B \le DTr_{B \to A,j-1}$ from $B \in N^-(A)$. $DTr_{B \to A,j} = DTr_{B \to A,j-1} - y_B$. $(Steal(y_B, B))$

2. Add value $y_B, -DTr_{A \to B,j-1} \le y_B$ to $B \in \mathcal{V}$. $DTr_{A \to B,j} = DTr_{A \to B,j-1} + y_B$. When $y_B < 0$, we say that A reduces her trust to B by $-y_B$, when $y_B > 0$, we say that A increases her trust to B by y_B. If $DTr_{A \to B,j-1} = 0$, then we say that A starts directly trusting B. $(Add(y_B, B))$

If player A chooses no action in her turn, we say that she passes her turn. Also, let Y_{st}, Y_{add} be the total value to be stolen and added respectively by A in her turn, j. For a turn to be feasible, it must hold that $Y_{add} - Y_{st} \le Cap_{A,j-1}$. We set $Cap_{A,j} = Cap_{A,j-1} + Y_{st} - Y_{add}$. Moreover, player A is not allowed to choose two actions of the same kind against the same player in the same turn.
The set of actions a player makes in turn j is $Turn_j$. Examples:

- $Turn_{j_1} = \emptyset$

- $Turn_{j_2} = \{Steal(y, B), Add(w, B)\}$ (given that $DTr_{B \to A,j_2-1} \le y \wedge -DTr_{A \to B,j_2-1} \le w \wedge y - w \le Cap_{A,j_2-1}$, where $A = Player(j_2)$)

- $Turn_{j_3} = \{Steal(x, B), Add(y, C), Add(w, D)\}$ (given that $DTr_{B \to A,j_3-1} \le x \wedge -DTr_{A \to C,j_3-1} \le y \wedge -DTr_{A \to D,j_3-1} \le w \wedge x - y - w \le Cap_{A,j_3-1}$, where $A = Player(j_3)$)

- $Turn_{j_4} = \{Steal(x, B), Steal(y, B)\}$ is not a valid turn because it contains two $Steal()$ actions against the same player. If $x + y \le DTr_{B \to A}$, the correct alternative would be $Turn_{j_4} = \{Steal(x + y, B)\}$, where $A = Player(j_4)$.

Definition 5.8 (Previous/Next turn of a player).
Let $j \in \mathbb{N}$ a turn with $Player(j) = A$. We define $prev(j), next(j)$ as the previous and next turn that A is chosen to play respectively. If j is the first turn that A plays, $prev(j) = 0$. More formally,

$$prev(j) = \begin{cases} \max\{k \in \mathbb{N} : k < j \wedge Player(k) = A\}, & \{k \in \mathbb{N} : k < j \wedge Player(k) = A\} \neq \emptyset \\ 0, & \{k \in \mathbb{N} : k < j \wedge Player(k) = A\} = \emptyset \end{cases}$$

$$next(j) = \min\{k \in \mathbb{N} : k > j \wedge Player(k) = A\}$$

$next(j)$ is always well defined with the assumption that eventually everybody plays.

Definition 5.9 (A is stolen x).
Let j, j' be two consecutive turns of A ($next(j) = j'$). We say that A has been stolen a value x between j and j' if $out_{A,j} - out_{A,j'} = x > 0$. If turns are not specified, we implicitly refer to the current and the previous turns.

Definition 5.10 (History).
We define History, $\mathcal{H} = (\mathcal{H}_j)$, as the sequence of all the tuples containing the sets of actions and the corresponding player. $\mathcal{H}_j = (Player(j), Turn_j)$.

Definition 5.11 (Conservative strategy).
A player A is said to follow the conservative strategy in turn j if for any value x that has been stolen from her since the previous turn she played, she substitutes it in her turn by stealing from others that trust her value equal to $\min(x, in_{A,j})$ and she takes no other action. More formally, let $j' = prev(j), Damage_j = out_{A,j'} - out_{A,j-1}$. If $Strategy(A) = Conservative$, then $\forall j \in \mathbb{N} : Player(j) = A$ it is

$$Turn_j = \begin{cases} \emptyset, & Damage_j \leq 0 \\ \bigcup_{i=1}^{k}\{Steal(y_i, v_i)\}, & Damage_j > 0, N^-(A)_j = \{v_1, ..., v_k\} \end{cases}$$

In the second case, it is $\sum_{i=1}^{k} y_i = \min(in_{A,j-1}, Damage_j)$.

As we can see, the definition covers a multitude of options for the conservative player, since in case $0 < Damage_j < in_{A,j-1}$ she can choose to distribute the $Steal(s)()$ in any way she chooses, as long as $\forall i, y_i \leq DTr_{N^-(A)_{j,i} \to A, j-1} \wedge \sum_{i=1}^{|N^-(A)_j|} y_i = Damage_j$. The oracle remembers $PrevOutTrust = out_{A,j'}$ for $j' = prev(j)$ and can observe all incoming and outgoing direct trusts of player A, $\forall v \in N^-(A)_{j-1}, DTr_{v \to A, j-1}, \forall v \in N^+(A)_{j-1}, DTr_{A \to v, j-1}$. We note that $N(A)_{j-1} = N(A)_j$.

Algorithm 1: Conservative Oracle

   Input   : previous graph $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$
   Output: $Turn_j$

1 $\mathcal{O}_{cons}(\mathcal{G}_{j-1})$:

2 $NewOutTrust \leftarrow \sum\limits_{v \in N^+(A)_{j-1}} DTr_{A \rightarrow v, j-1}$

3 $NewInTrust \leftarrow \sum\limits_{v \in N^-(A)_{j-1}} DTr_{v \rightarrow A, j-1}$

4 $Damage \leftarrow PrevOutTrust - NewOutTrust$

5 **if** $Damage > 0$ **then**

6   **if** $Damage \geq NewInTrust$ **then**

7 $Turn_j \leftarrow \emptyset$

8   **for** $v \in N^-(A)_{j-1}$ **do**

9 $Turn_j \leftarrow Turn_j \cup \{Steal(DTr_{v \rightarrow A, j-1}, v)\}$

10   **else**

11 $(y_1, ..., y_{|N^-(A)_{j-1}|}) \leftarrow \texttt{SelectSteal}(DTr_{N^-(A)_{j-1,1} \rightarrow A, j-1}, ...,$
         $DTr_{N^-(A)_{j-1,|N^-(A)_{j-1}|} \rightarrow A, j-1}, Damage)$

12 $Turn_j \leftarrow \emptyset$

13   **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ **to** $|N^-(A)_{j-1}|$ **do**

14 $Turn_j \leftarrow Turn_j \cup \{Steal(y_i, N^-(A)_{j-1,i})\}$

15 **else**

16 $Turn_j \leftarrow \emptyset$

17 **return** $Turn_j$

$\texttt{SelectSteal()}$ returns $y_i, i \in [|N^-(A)_j|] : \forall i, y_i \leq DTr_{N^-(A)_{j,i} \rightarrow A}, \sum\limits_{i=1}^{|N^-(A)_j|} y_i = Damage.$

Definition 5.12 (Idle strategy).
A player A is said to follow the idle strategy if she passes in her turn. More formally, if $Strategy(A) = Idle$, then $\forall j \in \mathbb{N} : Player(j) = A$ it is $Turn_j = \emptyset$.

Algorithm 2: Idle Oracle

   Input   : previous graph $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$
   Output: $Turn_j$

1 $\mathcal{O}_{idle}(\mathcal{G}_{j-1})$:

2 **return** $\emptyset$

Definition 5.13 (Evil strategy).
A player A is said to follow the evil strategy if she steals value $y_B = DTr_{B \rightarrow A, j-1} \forall B \in N^-(A)_j$ (steals all incoming direct trust) and reduces her trust to C by $DTr_{A \rightarrow C, j-1} \forall C \in N^+(A)_j$ (nullifies her outgoing direct trust) in her turn. More formally, if $Strategy(A) = Evil$, then $\forall j \in \mathbb{N} : Player(j) = A$ it is $Turn_j = \{Steal(y_1, N^-(A)_{j,1}), ..., Steal(y_m, N^-(A)_{j,m}), Add(w_1, N^+(A)_{j,1}), ..., Add(w_l, N^+(A)_{j,l})\}$ where $m = |N^-(A)_j|, l = |N^+(A)_j|, \forall i \in [m], y_i = DTr_{N^-(A)_{j,i} \rightarrow A, j-1}, \forall i \in [l], w_i = -DTr_{A \rightarrow N^+(A)_{j,i}, j-1}$. We note again that $N(A)_{j-1} = N(A)_j$.

Algorithm 3: Evil Oracle

   Input   : previous graph $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$
   Output: $Turn_j$

1 $\mathcal{O}_{evil}(\mathcal{G}_{j-1})$:

2 $Turn_j \leftarrow \emptyset$

3 **for** $v \in N^-(A)_{j-1}$ **do**

4 $Turn_j \leftarrow Turn_j \cup \{Steal(DTr_{v \rightarrow A, j-1}, v)\}$

5 **for** $w \in N^+(A)_{j-1}$ **do**

6 $Turn_j \leftarrow Turn_j \cup \{Add(-DTr_{A \rightarrow v, j-1}, w)\}$

7 **return** $Turn_j$

Definition 5.14 (Indirect trust from $A \in \mathcal{V}_j$ to $B \in \mathcal{V}_j$, $Tr_{A \to B,j}$)**.**
Maximum possible value that can be stolen from A if B follows the evil strategy, A follows the idle strategy and everyone else ($\mathcal{V} \setminus \{A, B\}$) follows the conservative strategy. More formally,

$$Tr_{A \to B,j} = \max_{j':j'>j,configurations} [out_{A,j} - out_{A,j'}]$$

where $Strategy(A) = Idle, Strategy(B) = Evil, \forall C \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{A, B\}, Strategy(C) = Conservative.$

Definition 5.15 (Indirect trust from $A \in \mathcal{V}_j$ to $S \subset \mathcal{V}_j$, $Tr_{A \to S,j}$)**.**
Maximum possible value that can be stolen from A if all players in S follow the evil strategy, A follows the idle strategy and everyone else ($\mathcal{V} \setminus (S \cup \{A\})$) follows the conservative strategy. More formally,

$$Tr_{A \to S,j} = \max_{j':j'>j,configurations} [out_{A,j} - out_{A,j'}]$$

where $Strategy(A) = Idle, \forall E \in S, Strategy(E) = Evil, \forall C \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{A, E\}, Strategy(C) = Conservative.$

Definition 5.16 (Trust Reduction)**.**
Let $A, B \in \mathcal{V}, x_i$ flow to $N^+(A)_i$ resulting from $maxFlow(A, B), u_i = DTr_{A \to N^+(A)_i,j-1}, u'_i = DTr_{A \to N^+(A)_i,j},$
$i \in [|N^+(A)|], j \in \mathbb{N}.$

1. The Trust Reduction on neighbour i, δ_i is defined as $\delta_i = u_i - u'_i$.

2. The Flow Reduction on neigbour i, Δ_i is defined as $\Delta_i = x_i - u'_i$.

We will also use the standard notation for 1-norm and ∞-norm, that is:

1. $||\delta_i||_1 = \sum\limits_{i \in N^+(A)} \delta_i$

2. $||\delta_i||_\infty = \max\limits_{i \in N^+(A)} \delta_i.$

Definition 5.17 (Restricted Flow)**.**
Let $A, B \in \mathcal{V}, i \in [|N^+(A)|].$

1. Let $F_{A_i \to B}$ be the flow from A to $N^+(A)_i$ as calculated by the $maxFlow(A, B)$ (x'_i) when $u'_i = u_i,$
   $u'_k = 0 \; \forall k \in [|N^+(A)|] \wedge k \neq i.$

2. Let $S \subset N^+(A)$. Let $F_{A_S \to B}$ be the sum of flows from A to S as calculated by the $maxFlow(A, B)$
   ($\sum\limits_{i=1}^{|S|} x'_i$) when $u'_C = u_C \; \forall C \in S, u'_D = 0 \; \forall D \in N^+(A) \setminus S.$

The following algorithm has read access to direct trusts in $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$ and write access to direct trusts in $\mathcal{G}_j$.

6   Theorems-Algorithms

Algorithm 4: Execute Turn

    Input   : player A, old graph $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$, old capital $Cap_{A,j-1}$, $ProvisionalTurn$

    Output: new graph $\mathcal{G}_j$, new capital $Cap_{A,j}$, new history $\mathcal{H}_j$

1 executeTurn(A, $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$, $Cap_{A,j-1}$, $ProvisionalTurn$) :

2 $(Turn_j, NewCap) \leftarrow$ validateTurn(A, $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$, $Cap_{A,j-1}$, $ProvisionalTurn$)

3 **return** commitTurn(A, $mathcalG_{j-1}$, $NewCap$, $Turn_j$)

Algorithm 5: Validate Turn

    Input   : player A, old graph $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$, old capital $Cap_{A,j-1}$, $ProvisionalTurn$

    Output: $Turn_j$, new capital $Cap_{A,j}$

1 validateTurn(A, $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$, $Cap_{A,j-1}$, $ProvisionalTurn$) :

2 $Y_{st} \leftarrow 0$

3 $Y_{add} \leftarrow 0$

4 **for** $action \in ProvisionalTurn$ **do**

5 $action$ **match do**

6   **case** $Steal(y,w)$ **do**

7   **if** $y > DTr_{w \to A,j-1} \vee y < 0$ **then**

8 | **return** $\emptyset$, $Cap_{A,j-1}$

9   **else**

10 | $Y_{st} \leftarrow Y_{st} + y$

11   **case** $Add(y,w)$ **do**

12   **if** $y < -DTr_{A \to w,j-1}$ **then**

13 | **return** $\emptyset$, $Cap_{A,j-1}$

14   **else**

15 | $Y_{add} \leftarrow Y_{add} + y$

16 **if** $Y_{add} - Y_{st} > Cap_{A,j-1}$ **then**

17   **return** $\emptyset$, $Cap_{A,j-1}$

18 **else**

19   **return** $ProvisionalTurn$, $Cap_{A,j-1} + Y_{st} - Y_{add}$

Algorithm 6: Commit Turn

    Input   : player A, old graph $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$, old capital $Cap_{A,j-1}$, $ProvisionalTurn$

    Output: new graph $\mathcal{G}_j$, new capital $Cap_{A,j}$, new history $\mathcal{H}_j$

1 commitTurn(A, $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$, $Cap_{A,j-1}$, $Turn_j$) :

2 **for** $(v,w) \in \mathcal{E}_j$ **do**

3 $DTr_{v \to w,j} \leftarrow DTr_{v \to w,j-1}$

4 **for** $action \in Turn_j$ **do**

5 $action$ **match do**

6   **case** $Steal(y,w)$ **do**

7 $DTr_{w \to A,j} \leftarrow DTr_{w \to A,j-1} - y$

8   **case** $Add(y,w)$ **do**

9 $DTr_{A \to w,j} \leftarrow DTr_{A \to w,j} + y$

10 $Cap_{A,j} \leftarrow NewCap$

11 $\mathcal{H}_j \leftarrow (Player(j), Turn_j)$

12 **return** $\mathcal{G}_j$, $Cap_{A,j}$, $\mathcal{H}_j$

Algorithm 7: TrustIsRisk Game

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1 $j \leftarrow 0$

2 **while** $True$ **do**

3 $j \leftarrow j + 1$

4 $v \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{V}_j$

5 $ProvisionalTurn \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_v(\mathcal{G}_{j-1})$

6 $(G_j, Cap_{v,j}, H_j) \leftarrow$ executeTurn(v, $\mathcal{G}_{j-1}$, $Cap_{v,j-1}$, $ProvisionalTurn$)

On turn 0, there is already a network in place.

Algorithm 8: Transitive Steal

    Input : A idle player, E evil player
    Output: $\mathcal{H}$ history

1   $Angry \leftarrow \emptyset$
2   $Happy \leftarrow \emptyset$
3   $Sad \leftarrow \emptyset$
4   **for** $v \in \mathcal{V}_0 \setminus \{E\}$ **do**
5     $Loss_v \leftarrow 0$
6   **if** $v \neq A$ **then**
7       $Happy \leftarrow Happy \cup \{v\}$
8   $j \leftarrow 0$
9   **while** $True$ **do**
10    $j \leftarrow j + 1$
11    $v \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{V}_j \setminus \{A\}$
12    $Turn_j \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_v(\mathcal{G}_{j-1})$
13   executeTurn $(\mathcal{G}_{j-1}, Cap_{v,j-1}, Turn_j)$
14   **for** $action \in Turn_j$ **do**
15      $action$ **match do**
16   **case** $Steal(y, w)$ **do**
17      $exchange \leftarrow y$
18      $Loss_w \leftarrow Loss_w + exchange$
19   **if** $v \neq E$ **then**
20        $Loss_v \leftarrow Loss_v - exchange$
21   **if** $w \neq A$ **then**
22        $Happy \leftarrow Happy \setminus \{w\}$
23   **if** $in_{w,j} = 0$ **then**
24          $Sad \leftarrow Sad \cup \{w\}$
25   **else**
26          $Angry \leftarrow Angry \cup \{w\}$
27    $Angry \leftarrow Angry \setminus \{v\}$
28   **if** $in_{v,j} = 0 \wedge Loss_v > 0$ **then**
29      $Sad \leftarrow Sad \cup \{v\}$
30   **if** $Loss_v = 0$ **then**
31      $Happy \leftarrow Happy \cup \{v\}$

Let j_0 be the first turn on which E is chosen to play. Until then, according to theorem 6.4, all players will pass their turn. Given that $Damage_{v,j} = out_{v,j'} - out_{v,j}$ where $j' = prev(j)$, the algorithm generates turns:

$$Turn_j = \begin{cases} \emptyset, & Damage_{v,j-1} = 0 \\ \bigcup_{i=1}^{k} \{Steal(y_i, v_i)\}, & Damage_j > 0, N^-(A)_j = \{v_1, ..., v_k\} \end{cases}$$

In the second case, it is $\sum_{i=1}^{k} y_i = \min(in_{v,j-1}, Damage_{v,j-1})$. From the definition of $Damage_{v,j}$ and knowing that no strategy in this case can increase any direct trust, it is obvious that $Damage_{v,j} \geq 0$. Also, we can see that $Loss_{v,j} \geq 0$ because if $Loss_{v,j} < 0$, then v has stolen more value than she has been stolen, thus she would not be following the conservative strategy.

Lemma 6.1 (*Loss* equivalent to *Damage*).
Let $j \in \mathbb{N}, v \in \mathcal{V}_j \setminus \{A, E\}, v = Player(j)$. Then $\min(in_{v,j}, Loss_{v,j}) = \min(in_{v,j}, Damage_{v,j})$.

Proof. $j \in \mathbb{N} : v = Player(j)$.

- $v \in Happy_{j-1}$. Then

1. $v \in Happy_j$ because $Turn_j = \emptyset$,

2. $Loss_{v,j} = 0$ because otherwise $v \notin Happy_j$,

3. $Damage_{v,j} = 0$, or else any reduction in direct trust to v would increase equally $Loss_{v,j}$ (line 18), which cannot be decreased again but during an Angry player's turn (line 20).

4. $in_{v,j} \geq 0$

Thus $\min(in_{v,j}, Damage_{v,j}) = \min(in_{v,j}, Loss_{v,j}) = 0$.

- $v \in Sad_{j-1}$. Then

  1. $v \in Sad_j$ because $Turn_j = \emptyset$,

  2. $in_{v,j} = 0$ (lines 28-29),

  3. $Damage_{v,j} \geq 0 \wedge Loss_{v,j} \geq 0$.

  Thus $\min(in_{v,j}, Damage_{v,j}) = \min(in_{v,j}, Loss_{v,j}) = 0$.

- $v \in Angry_{j-1} \wedge v \in Happy_j$. Then the same argument as in the first case holds, if we ignore the argument (1).

- $v \in Angry_j \wedge v \in Sad_j$. Then the same argument as in the second case holds, if we ignore the argument (1).

$\square$

Theorem 6.1 (Trust convergence theorem)**.**
Let $A, E \in \mathcal{V} : Strategy(A) = Idle, Strategy(E) = Evil, \forall C \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \{A, E\}, Strategy(C) = Conservative$ and $j_0 \in \mathbb{N} : Player(j_0) = E$. Given that all players eventually play, there exists a turn $j' > j_0 : \forall j \geq j', Turn_j = \emptyset$.

Proof. First of all, $\forall j > j_0 : Player(j) = E \Rightarrow Turn_j = \emptyset$ because E has already nullified his incoming and outgoing direct trusts in $Turn_{j_0}$, the evil strategy does not contain any case where direct trust is increased or where the evil player starts directly trusting another player and the other players do not follow a strategy in which they can choose to $Add()$ trust to E, thus player E can do nothing $\forall j > j_0$. Also $\forall j > j_0 : Player(j) = A \Rightarrow Turn_j = \emptyset$ because of the idle strategy that A follows. As far as the rest of the players are concerned, consider the algorithm 8, which is a variation of the TrustIsRisk Game. As we can see from lines 5 and 18-20, $\forall j, \sum_{v \in \mathcal{V}_j} Loss_v = in_{E,j_0-1}$, that is the total loss is constant and equal to the total value stolen by E. Also, as we can see in lines 3 and 29, which are the only lines where the Sad set is modified, once a player enters the Sad set, it is impossible to exit from this set. Also, we can see that players in $Sad \cup Happy$ always pass their turn. We will now show that eventually the $Angry$ set will be empty, or equivalently that eventually every player will pass their turn. Suppose that it is possible to have an infinite amount of turns that players do not choose to pass. We know that the number of nodes is finite, thus this is possible only if $\exists j_1 : \forall j \geq j_1, |Angry_j \cup Happy_j| = c > 0 \wedge Angry_j \neq \emptyset$ (the total number of angry and happy players cannot increase because no player leaves the Sad set and if it were to be decreased, it would eventually reach 0). Since $Angry_j \neq \emptyset$, a player v that will not pass her turn will eventually be chosen to play. According to algorithm 8, v will either deplete her incoming trust and enter the Sad set (line 29), which is contradicting $|Angry_j \cup Happy_j| = c$, or will steal enough value to enter the $Happy$ set, that is v will achieve $Loss_{v,j} = 0$. Suppose that she has stolen m players. They, in their turn, will steal total value at least equal to the value stolen by v (since they cannot go sad, as explained above). However, this means that, since the total value being stolen will never be reduced and the turns this will happen are infinite, the players must steal an infinite amount of value, which is impossible because the direct trusts are finite in number and in value. More precisely, let $\forall j \in \mathbb{N}, DTr_j = \sum_{w,w' \in \mathcal{V}} DTr_{w \to w',j}$. Also, without loss of generality, suppose that $\forall j \geq j_1, out_{A,j} = out_{A,j_1}$.
In $Turn_{j_1}$, v steals $St_{j_1} = \sum_{i=1}^{m} y_i$. Thus $DTr_{j_1} = DTr_{j_1-1} - St_{j_1}$. Eventually there is a turn j_2 when every

player in $N^-(v)$ will have played. Then $S_{j_2} \leq DTr_{j_1} - St_{j_1} = DTr_{j_1-1} - 2St_{j_1}$, since all players in $N^-(v)$ follow the conservative strategy, except maybe for A, who will not have been stolen anything due to the supposition.

Suppose that $\exists k > 1 : j_k > j_{k-1} > j_1 \Rightarrow DTr_{j_k} \leq DTr_{j_{k-1}} - St_{j_1}$. Then there exists a subset of the *Angry* players, S, that have been stolen at least value St_{j_1} in total between the turns j_{k-1} and j_k, thus there exists a turn j_{k+1} such that all players in S will have played and thus $DTr_{j_{k+1}} \leq DTr_{j_k} - St_{j_1}$. We have proven by induction that $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}, \exists j_n \in \mathbb{N} : DTr_{j_n} \leq DTr_{j_1-1} - nSt_{j_1}$. However $DTr_{j_1-1}, St_{j_1} \in \mathbb{N}$, thus $\exists n' \in \mathbb{N} :$ $n'St_{j_1} > DTr_{j_1-1} \Rightarrow DTr_{j'_n} < 0$. We have a contradiction because $\forall w, w' \in \mathcal{V}, \forall j \in \mathbb{N}, DTr_{w \to w', j} \geq 0$, thus eventually $Angry = \emptyset$ and everybody passes. $\qquad\square$

Theorem 6.2 (Saturation theorem).

Let s source, $n = |N^+(s)|$, $x_i, i \in [n]$, flows to s's neighbours as calculated by the maxFlow algorithm, u'_i new direct trusts to the n neighbours and x'_i new flows to the neighbours as calculated by the maxFlow algorithm with the new direct trusts, u'_i. It holds that $\forall i \in [n], u'_i \leq x_i \Rightarrow x'_i = u'_i$.

Proof. $\forall i \in [n], x'_i > u'_i$ is impossible because a flow cannot be higher than its corresponding capacity. Thus $\forall i \in [n], x'_i \leq u'_i$. (1)

In the initial configuration of u_i and according to the flow problem setting, a combination of flows y_i such that $\forall i \in [n], y_i = u'_i$ is a valid, albeit not necessarily maximum, configuration with a flow $\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i$. Suppose that $\exists k \in [n] : x'_k < u'_k$ as calculated by the maxFlow algorithm with the new direct trusts, u'_i. Then for the new maxFlow F' it holds that $F' = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x'_i < \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i$ since $x'_k < y_k$ and (1) which is impossible because the configuration $\forall i \in [n], x'_i = y_i$ is valid since $\forall i \in [n], y_i = u'_i$ and also has a higher flow, thus the maxFlow algorithm will prefer the configuration with the higher flow. Thus we deduce that $\forall i \in [n], x'_i = u'_i$. $\qquad\square$

Theorem 6.3 (Trust flow theorem - TOCHECK).

$Tr_{A \to B} = MaxFlow_{A \to B}$ *(Treating direct trusts as capacities)*

Proof.

Suppose that the flow graph FG is composed of $V(FG)$ nodes and $E(FG)$ edges. Each edge e_{vw} has a corresponding capacity u_{vw} which is constant and a corresponding flow x_{vw} which can change depending on the flow assignment $X = [x_{vw}]_{V(FG) \times V(FG)}$ we choose. In flow context, for an assignment X to be valid, two properties must hold:

1. $\forall e_{vw} \in E(FG), x_{vw} \leq u_{vw}$

2. $\forall v \in V(FG) \setminus \{A, B\}, \sum_{w \in N^+(v)} x_{wv} = \sum_{w \in N^-(v)} x_{vw}$

(p.709 Introduction to algorithms (CLRS), third edition) First we will show that the MaxFlow can be a result of a valid execution of 8 and afterwards we will show that each valid execution of algorithm 8 corresponds to a valid flow from A to B. Thus we will have proven that $Tr_{A \to B} = MaxFlow_{A \to B}$.

- We will first show that there exists an execution of algorithm 8 such that $Loss_A = maxFlow_{A \to B}$. Let X be the flows as returned by an execution of the $maxFlow_{A \to B}$ algorithm on $\mathcal{G}_0$. It is known that all flows are DAGs [citation needed] and that all DAGs are a partial order of their nodes based on the partial ordering $x_{vw} > 0 \Rightarrow v < w$ [citation needed]. From this partial order, we can create a total order with an algorithm such as topoSort [citation needed]. The maximum element of the total order is a node that does not have any outgoing flow. It is obvious that removing any node from a DAG cannot create a cycle, thus the graph that remains after removing a node from a DAG is also a DAG, thus it has a total order as well, which can be chosen to be the same total order as before removing the node, except for the removed node. If the removed node was maximum or minimum, the new total order is obvious.

  Player B is the maximum node in turn 0 because she is the sink of the MaxFlow algorithm, thus she is the first to be chosen to play and steals all her incoming and outgoing trust. $\forall v \in N^-(B)_0, x_{vB} \leq$ $DTr_{v \to B, 0}$ and $\sum_{v \in N^-(B)_0} x_{vB} = maxFlow_{A \to B}$. The graph $FG_1 = FG_0 \setminus \{B\}$ is also a DAG and

corresponds to the previous total order if we remove the maximum element, B.

Suppose that $\forall j \in [k], k > 0$, the player v corresponding to the maximum element is chosen to play for the first time, that $\forall w \in N^-(v)_{j-1}(= N^-(v)_0), x_{wv} \leq y$ where $Steal(y, w) \in Turn_k \wedge \sum_{w \in N^-(v)_0} x_{wv} = \sum_{w \in N^+(v)_0} x_{vw}$.

For $j = k+1$, $Player(k+1) = v'$ corresponds to the maximum element of the previous total order with the element v removed and it is the first time player v' plays, since $v > v'$ in all previous steps thus v' was not maximum. It also holds that $\forall w \in N^-(v)_0, x_{wv'} \leq DTr_{w \to v', 0}$ since the $x_{wv'}$ are chosen by the maxFlow algorithm with corresponding capacities the direct trusts and, since $\sum_{w \in N^-(v')_0} x_{wv'} = \sum_{w \in N^+(v')_0} x_{v'w}$ and player v' has already been stolen value equal to $\sum_{w \in N^+(v')_0} x_{v'w}$ (since she has no outgoing flow in turn j), player v' can choose to steal from each player $w \in N^-(v')_0$ value at least equal to $x_{wv'}$ without violating the conservative strategy.

We have proven using induction that if the algorithm chooses only maximum nodes, after exactly $|V(FG)| - 1$ turns (we do not count idle player A) every evil and conservative player will have stolen at least value equal to the flow passing through them and player A will have been stolen value exactly equal to $maxFlow_{A \to B} \Rightarrow Loss_A = maxFlow_{A \to B}$.

- We will now show that for any valid execution of algorithm 8 there exists at least one valid flow from A to B, X, such that $Loss_A = \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} x_{Av}$. Let j be a turn where 8 has converged (j exists, according to theorem 6.1). Then $Loss_{A,j} = out_{A,0} - out_{A,j}$. We create a new graph FG' such that $V(FG') = V(FG), E(FG') = E(FG), \forall (v, w) \in V(FG'), c'(v, w) = DTr_{v \to w, 0} - DTr_{v \to w, j}$. We execute the $MaxFlow_{A \to B}$ algorithm on FG' and we get a flow X'. We will show that flow $X = X'$ is also valid for the initial graph FG and that $\sum_{v \in N+(A)} x_{Av} = Loss_{A,j}$.

  - The flow X is obviously valid for the initial graph because $\forall (v, w) \in E(FG), c(v, w) = DTr_{v \to w, 0} \geq DTr_{v \to w, 0} - DTr_{v \to w, j} = c'(v, w) \geq x_{vw}$ and it already holds that $\forall v \in V(FG'), \sum_{w \in N^-(v)} x'_{wv} = \sum_{w \in N^+(v)} x'_{vw}$, thus it also holds for the flows of X.

  - We can easily see that $Loss_{A,j} \geq \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} x_{Av}$ because $Loss_{A,j} = out_{A,0} - out_{A,j} = \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} c'(A, v)$. To show that $Loss_{A,j} \leq \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} x_{Av}$, we first suppose that $Loss_{A,j} > \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} x_{Av}$. We will now prove that there exists a residual path from A to B. $Loss_{A,j} = \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} (DTr_{A \to v, 0} - DTr_{A \to v, j}) = \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} c_{Av}$. From the supposition we can see that $\sum_{v \in N^+(A)} c_{Av} > \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} x_{Av} \Rightarrow \exists v \in N^+(A) : c_{Av} > x_{Av}$.

    We will now show that $\forall v \in V(FG) \setminus \{A, B\}, (\exists w \in V(FG) : c_{wv} > x_{wv} \Rightarrow \exists u \in V(FG) : c_{vu} > x_{vu})$. Suppose that the previous statement is false. Then it would hold that $\exists v \in V(FG) \setminus \{A, B\} : (\exists w \in V(FG) : c_{wv} > x_{wv} \wedge \forall u \in V(FG), c_{vu} = x_{vu})$ (1). But then we have $\sum_{w \in V(FG)} c_{wv} \overset{(1)}{>} \sum_{w \in V(FG)} x_{wv} \overset{flow}{=} \sum_{w \in V(FG)} x_{vw} \overset{(1)}{=} \sum_{w \in V(FG)} c_{vw} \overset{conservative}{=} \sum_{w \in V(FG)} c_{wv} \Rightarrow \sum_{w \in V(FG)} c_{wv} > \sum_{w \in V(FG)} c_{wv}$ which is a contradiction. Thus we showed that $\forall v \in V(FG) \setminus \{A, B\}, (\exists w \in V(FG) : c_{wv} > x_{wv} \Rightarrow \exists u \in V(FG) : c_{vu} > x_{vu})$.

    Thus, the supposition $Loss_{A,j} > \sum_{v \in N^+(A)} x_{Av}$ combined with the previous result shows that there exists a residual path from A to B since we can start from A and find a series of sequential edges that all have flows smaller than the corresponding capacities and eventually reach B in at most $|E(FG)|$ steps, thus X' is not a maximum flow, which is a contradiction. Thus $Loss_{A,j} \leq \sum_{v \in N+(A)} x_{Av}$ and, since also $Loss_{A,j} \geq \sum_{v \in N+(A)} x_{Av}$, we deduce that

$$Loss_{A,j} = \sum_{v \in N+(A)} x_{Av}.$$

We finally conclude that $Tr_{A \to B} = MaxFlow_{A \to B}$. □

Theorem 6.4 (Conservative world theorem).
If everybody follows the conservative strategy, nobody steals any amount from anybody.

Proof.
Suppose that there exists a subseries of History, $(Turn_{j_k})$, where $Turn_{j_k} = \{Steal(y_1, B_1), ..., Steal(y_m, B_m)\}$. This subseries must have an initial element, $Turn_{j_1}$. However, $Player(j_1)$ follows the conservative strategy, thus somebody must have stolen from her as well, so $Player(j_1)$ cannot be the initial element. We have a contradiction, thus there cannot exist a series of stealing actions when everybody is conservative. □

Theorem 6.5 (Trust transfer theorem (flow terminology)).
*Let s source, t sink, $n = N^+(s)$*
$X = \{x_1, ..., x_n\}$ outgoing flows from s,
$U = \{u_1, ..., u_n\}$ outgoing capacities from s,
V the value to be transferred.
Nodes apart from s, t follow the conservative strategy.
Obviously $maxFlow = F = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i$.

```
      /                    ....              \
     /  x_s1/u_s1                 x_1t/u_1t   \
    /                                          \
   /                                            \
  /  x_s2/u_s2                       x_2t/u_2t   \
 s-------------           ....       -----------t
  \            .                          .    /
   \           .                          .   /
    \          .                          .  /
     \  x_sn/u_sn          ....    x_mt/u_mt /
      \                                     /
```

We create a new graph where

1. $\sum_{i=1}^{n} u'_i = F - V$

2. $\forall i \in [n]\ u'_i \leq x_i$

It holds that $maxFlow' = F' = F - V$.

Proof. From theorem 6.2 we can see that $x'_i = u'_i$. It holds that $F' = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x'_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} u'_i = F - V$. □

Lemma 6.2 (Flow limit lemma).
It is impossible for the outgoing flow x_i from A to an out neighbour of A to be greater than $F_{A_i \to B}$. More formally, $x_i \leq F_{A_i \to B}$.

Proof. Suppose a configuration where $\exists i : x_i > F_{A_i \to B}$. If we reduce the capacities $u_k, k \neq i$ the flow that passes from i in no case has to be reduced. Thus we can set $\forall k \neq i, u'_k = 0$ and $u'_i = u_i$. Then $\forall k \neq i, x'_k = 0, x'_i = x_i$ is a valid configuration and thus by definition $F_{A_i \to B} = x'_i = x_i > F_{A_i \to B}$, which is a contradiction. Thus $\forall i \in [|N^+(A)|], x_i \leq F_{A_i \to B}$. □

Theorem 6.6 (Trust-saving Theorem).
A configuration $U' : u'_i = F_{A_i \to B}$ for some $i \in [|N^+(A)|]$ can yield the same maxFlow with a configuration $U'' : u''_i = u_i, \forall k \in [|N^+(A)|], k \neq i, u''_k = u'_k$.

Proof. We know that $x_i \leq F_{A_i \to B}$ (lemma 6.2), thus we can see that any increase in u'_i beyond $F_{A_i \to B}$ will not influence x_i and subsequently will not incur any change on the rest of the flows. □

Theorem 6.7 (Invariable trust reduction with naive algorithms).
Let A source, $n = |N^+(A)|$ and u_i' new direct trusts. If $\forall i \in [n], u_i' \leq x_i$, Trust Reduction $||\delta_i||_1$ is independent of $x_i, u_i' \ \forall$ valid configurations of x_i

Proof. Since $\forall i \in [n], u_i' \leq x_i$ it is (according to 6.2) $x_i' = u_i'$, thus $\delta_i = u_i - x_i'$. We know that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i' = F - V$,

so we have $||\delta_i||_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \delta_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (u_i - x_i') = \sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i - F + V$ independent from x_i', u_i' $\square$

Theorem 6.8 (Dependence impossibility theorem).
$\frac{\partial x_k}{\partial x_i} = 0$ with x_i the flow from MaxFlow $\Rightarrow \forall x_i' \leq x_i, \frac{\partial x_k}{\partial x_i} = 0$ ceteris paribus

Proof. TODO $\square$

Note: The maxFlow is the same in the following two cases: When a player chooses the evil strategy and when the same player chooses a variation of the evil strategy where she does not nullify her outgoing direct trust.

Theorem 6.9 (Trust to multiple players).
Let $S \subset \mathcal{V}, T$ auxiliary player such that $\forall B \in S, DTr_{B \to T} = \infty$. It holds that $\forall A \in \mathcal{V} \setminus S, Tr_{A \to S} = maxFlow(A, T)$.

Proof. If T chooses the evil strategy and all players in S play according to the conservative strategy, they will have to steal all their incoming direct trust, thus they will act in a way identical to following the evil strategy as far as maxFlow is concerned, thus, by 6.3, $Tr_{A \to T} = maxFlow(A, T) = Tr_{A \to S}$. $\square$

One of the primary aims of this system is to mitigate the danger for sybil attacks whilst maintaining fully decentralized autonomy. Let Eve be a possible attacker. Since participation in the network does not require any kind of registration, Eve can create any number of players. We will call the set of these players $\mathcal{C}$. Moreover, Eve can invest any amount she chooses, thus she can arbitrarily set the direct trusts of any player $C \in \mathcal{C}$ to any player $P \in \mathcal{V}$ ($DTr_{C \to P}$) and can also steal all incoming direct trust to these players. Additionally, we give Eve a set of players $B \in \mathcal{B}$ that she has corrupted, so she fully controls their direct trusts to any player $P \in \mathcal{V}$ ($DTr_{B \to P}$) and can also steal all incoming direct trust to these players. The players $B \in \mathcal{B}$ are considered to be legitimate before the corruption, thus they can be directly trusted by any player $P \in \mathcal{V}$ ($DTr_{P \to B} \geq 0$). However, players $C \in \mathcal{C}$ can be trusted only by players $D \in \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}$ ($DTr_{D \to C} \geq 0$) and not by players $A \in \mathcal{V} \setminus (\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C})$ ($DTr_{A \to C} = 0$).

Theorem 6.10 (Sybil resilience).
Let $\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{V}(\mathcal{B} \cap \mathcal{C} = \emptyset)$ be a collusion of players who are controlled by an adversary, Eve. Eve also controls the number of players in $\mathcal{C}, |\mathcal{C}|$, but players $C \in \mathcal{C}$ are not directly trusted by players outside the collusion, contrary to players $B \in \mathcal{B}$ who may be directly trusted by any player in $\mathcal{V}$. It holds that $Tr_{A \to \mathcal{B}} = Tr_{A \to \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}}$.

Proof. Suppose that there exist $|\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}|$ consecutive turns during which all the colluding players choose actions according to the evil strategy. More formally, suppose that $\exists j : \forall d \in [|\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}|], Player(j + d) \in \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C} \wedge \forall d_1, d_2 \in [|\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}|], d_1 \neq d_2, Player(j + d_1) \neq Player(j + d_2) \wedge \forall d \in [|\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}|], Strategy(Player(j + d)) = Evil$. Let T be an auxiliary player such that $\forall B \in \mathcal{B}, DTr_{B \to T} = \infty$ and T' be another auxiliary player such that $\forall D \in \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}, DTr_{D \to T'} = \infty$. According to 6.9, $Tr_{A \to \mathcal{B}} = maxFlow(A, T), Tr_{A \to \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}} = maxFlow(A, T')$. Consider the partition of $\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{V} \setminus (\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C})\} = \{P_1, P_2\}$. The edges from P_2 to P_1 will carry a flow $X_P, X_{P'}$ and the edges inside of P_1 will carry a flow $X_T, X_{T'}$ from the calculation of $maxFlow(A, T), maxFlow(A, T')$ respectively. $maxFlow(A, T) \leq maxFlow(A, T')$ because the maximal configuration of X_T can be part of a valid configuration of $X_{T'}$ since edges in $\mathcal{B}$ are edges in $\mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}$. If both maxFlows are not infinite, then their MinCut is either entirely in P_2 or in P_2 and the edges from P_2 to P_1, because otherwise $minCut = \infty$ since it contains saturated infinite edges. However, then in both cases the minCut is the same, thus $maxFlow(A, T) = maxFlow(A, T')$. Finally, we will show that if $maxFlow(A, T') = \infty$, then $maxFlow(A, T) = \infty$. If $maxFlow(A, T') = \infty$, then there is infinite flow entering P_1 and, because all endpoints of flows entering P_1 are in $\mathcal{B}$, the same infinite flow can be assigned in the case of $maxFlow(A, T)$, thus $maxFlow(A, T) = \infty$. Thus we conclude that $Tr_{A \to \mathcal{B}} = Tr_{A \to \mathcal{B} \cup \mathcal{C}}$. $\square$

We have proven that controlling $|\mathcal{C}|$ is irrelevant for Eve, thus Sybil attacks are meaningless.

Here we show three naive algorithms for calculating new direct trusts so as to maintain invariable risk when paying a trusted party. To prove the correctness of the algorithms, it suffices to prove that $\forall i \in [n]\, u_i' \leq x_i$ and that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i' = F - V$ where $F = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i$.

Algorithm 9: First-come, first-served trust transfer

Input : x_i flows, $n = |N^+(s)|$, V value
Output: u_i' capacities

1 $F \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i$
2 **if** $F < V$ **then**
3 $\quad$ **return** $\perp$
4 $F_{cur} \leftarrow F$
5 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ *to* n **do**
6 $\quad u_i' \leftarrow x_i$
7 $i \leftarrow 1$
8 **while** $F_{cur} > F - V$ **do**
9 $\quad reduce \leftarrow \min(x_i, F_{cur} - F + V)$
10 $\quad F_{cur} \leftarrow F_{cur} - reduce$
11 $\quad u_i' \leftarrow x_i - reduce$
12 $\quad i \leftarrow i + 1$
13 **return** $U' = \bigcup_{k=1}^{n} \{u_k'\}$

Proof of correctness for algorithm 9.

- We will show that $\forall i \in [n]\, u_i' \leq x_i$.
  Let $i \in [n]$. In line 6 we can see that $u_i' = x_i$ and the only other occurence of u_i' is in line 11 where it is never increased ($reduce \geq 0$), thus we see that, when returned, $u_i' \leq x_i$.

- We will show that $\sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i' = F - V$.

  $F_{cur,0} = F$
  If $F_{cur,i} \geq F - V$, then $F_{cur,i+1}$ does not exist because the *while* loop breaks after calculating $F_{cur,i}$.
  Else $F_{cur,i+1} = F_{cur,i} - \min(x_{i+1}, F_{cur,i} - F + V)$.
  If for some i, $\min(x_{i+1}, F_{cur,i} - F + V) = F_{cur,i} - F + V$, then $F_{cur,i+1} = F - V$, so if $F_{cur,i+1}$ exists,
  then $\forall k < i, F_{cur,k} = F_{cur,k-1} - x_k \Rightarrow F_{cur,i} = F - \sum_{k=1}^{i} x_k$

  Furthermore, if $F_{cur,i+1} = F - V$ then $u_{i+1}' = x_{i+1} - F_{cur,i} + F - V = x_i - F + \sum_{k=1}^{i-1} x_k + F - V = \sum_{k=1}^{i} x_k - V$,
  $\forall k \leq i, u_k' = 0$ and $\forall k > i + 1, u_k' = x_k$.
  In total, we have $\sum_{k=1}^{n} u_k' = \sum_{k=1}^{i} x_k - V + \sum_{k=i+1}^{n} x_k = \sum_{k=1}^{n} x_k - V \Rightarrow \sum_{k=1}^{n} u_k' = F - V$.

  $\square$

Complexity of algorithm 9.
First we will prove that on line 13 $i \leq n + 1$. Suppose that $i > n + 1$ on line 13. This means that $F_{cur,n}$ exists and $F_{cur,n} = F - \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i = 0 \leq F - V$ since, according to the condition on line 2, $F - V \geq 0$. This means however that the *while* loop on line 8 will break, thus $F_{cur,n+1}$ cannot exist and $i = n + 1$ on line 13, which is a contradiction, thus $i \leq n + 1$ on line 13. Since i is incremented by 1 on every iteration of the *while* loop (line 12), the complexity of the *while* loop is $O(n)$ in the worst case. The complexity of lines 2-4

and 7 is $O(1)$ and the complexity of lines 1, 5-6 and 13 is $O(n)$, thus the total complexity of algorithm 9 is $O(n)$.   □

Algorithm 10: Absolute equality trust transfer ($||\Delta_i||_\infty$ minimizer)

Input : x_i flows, $n = |N^+(s)|$, V value
Output: u_i' capacities

1 $F \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i$
2 **if** $F < V$ **then**
3   **return** $\perp$
4 **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ *to* n **do**
5      $u_i' \leftarrow x_i$
6 $reduce \leftarrow \frac{V}{n}$
7 $reduction \leftarrow 0$
8 $empty \leftarrow 0$
9 $i \leftarrow 0$
10 **while** $reduction < V$ **do**
11   **if** $u_i' > 0$ **then**
12   **if** $x_i < reduce$ **then**
13            $empty \leftarrow empty + 1$
14   **if** $empty < n$ **then**
15               $reduce \leftarrow reduce + \frac{reduce - x_i}{n - empty}$
16            $reduction \leftarrow reduction + u_i'$
17            $u_i' \leftarrow 0$
18   **else if** $x_i \geq reduce$ **then**
19            $reduction \leftarrow reduction + u_i' - (x_i - reduce)$
20            $u_i' \leftarrow x_i - reduce$
21      $i \leftarrow (i+1) \bmod n$
22 **return** $U' = \bigcup_{k=1}^{n} \{u_k'\}$

We will start by showing some results useful for the following proofs. Let j be the number of iterations of the **while** loop for the rest of the proofs for algorithm 10 (think of i from line 20 without the $mod\ n$).

First we will show that $empty \leq n$. $empty$ is only modified on line 12 where it is incremented by 1. This happens only when $u_i' > 0$ (line 11), which is assigned the value 0 on line 16. We can see that the incrementation of $empty$ can happen at most n times because $|U'| = n$. Since $empty_0 = 0$, $empty \leq n$ at all times of the execution.

Next we will derive the recursive formulas for the various variables.

$empty_0 = 0$

$$empty_{j+1} = \begin{cases} empty_j, & u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} = 0 \\ empty_j + 1, & u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} < reduce_j \\ empty_j, & u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} \geq reduce_j \end{cases}$$

$reduce_0 = \frac{V}{n}$

$$reduce_{j+1} = \begin{cases} reduce_j, & u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} = 0 \\ reduce_j + \frac{reduce_j - x_{(j+1)\ mod\ n}}{n - empty_{j+1}}, & u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} < reduce_j \\ reduce_j, & u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} \geq reduce_j \end{cases}$$

$reduction_0 = 0$

$$reduction_{j+1} = \begin{cases} reduction_j, & u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} = 0 \\ reduction_j + u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n}, & u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} < reduce_j \\ reduction_j + u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} - x_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} + reduce_{j+1}, & u'_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} > 0 \wedge x_{(j+1)\ mod\ n} \geq reduce_j \end{cases}$$

In the end, $r = reduce$ is such that $r = \frac{V - \sum\limits_{x \in S} x}{n - |S|}$ where $S = \{$flows y from s to $N^+(s)$ according to $maxFlow$: $y < r\}$. Also, $\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} u'_i = \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} \max(0, x_i - r)$. TOPROVE

Proof of correctness for algorithm 10.

- We will show that $\forall i \in [n]\, u'_i \leq x_i$.
  On line 9, $\forall i \in [n]\, u'_i = x_i$. Subsequently u'_i is modified on line 16, where it becomes equal to 0 and on line 19, where it is assigned $x_i - reduce$. It holds that $x_i - reduce \leq x_i$ because initially $reduce = \frac{V}{n} \geq 0$ and subsequently $reduce$ is modified only on line 14 where it is increased ($n > empty$ because of line 13 and $reduce > x_i$ because of line 11, thus $\frac{reduce - x_i}{n - empty} > 0$). We see that $\forall i \in [n], u'_i \leq x_i$.

- We will show that $\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} u'_i = F - V$.
  The variable $reduction$ keeps track of the total reduction that has happened and breaks the **while** loop when $reduction \geq V$. We will first show that $reduction = \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - u'_i)$ at all times and then we will prove that $reduction = V$ at the end of the execution. Thus we will have proven that $\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} u'_i = \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} x_i - V = F - V$.

  - On line 9, $u'_i = x_i \Rightarrow \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - u'_i) = 0$ and $reduction = 0$.
    On line 16, u'_i is reduced to 0 thus $\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - u'_i)$ is increased by u'_i. Similarly, on line 15 $reduction$ is increased by u'_i, the same as the increase in $\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - u'_i)$.
    On line 19, u'_i is reduced by $u'_i - x_i + reduce$ thus $\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - u'_i)$ is increased by $u'_i - x_i + reduce$. On line 18, $reduction$ is increased by $u'_i - x_i + reduce$, which is equal to the increase in $\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - u'_i)$. We also have to note that neither u'_i nor $reduction$ is modified in any other way from line 10 and on, thus we conclude that $reduction = \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - u'_i)$ at all times.
  - Suppose that $reduction_j > V$ on the line 21. Since $reduction_j$ exists, $reduction_{j-1} < V$. If $x_{j \bmod n} < reduce_{j-1}$ then $reduction_j = reduction_{j-1} + u'_{j \bmod n}$. Since $reduction_j > V$, $u'_{j \bmod n} > V - reduction_{j-1}$. TOCOMPLETE

$\square$

Complexity of algorithm 10.
In the worst case scenario, each time we iterate over all capacities only the last non-zero capacity will become zero and every non-zero capacity must be recalculated. This means that every n steps exactly 1 capacity becomes zero and eventually all capacities (maybe except for one) become zero. Thus we need $O(n^2)$ steps in the worst case. $\square$

A variation of this algorithm using a Fibonacci heap with complexity $O(n)$ can be created, but that is part of further research.

Proof that algorithm 10 minimizes the $||\Delta_i||_\infty$ norm.
Suppose that U' is the result of an execution of algorithm 10 that does not minimize the $||\Delta_i||_\infty$ norm. Suppose that W is a valid solution that minimizes the $||\Delta_i||_\infty$ norm. Let δ be the minimum value of this norm. There exists $i \in [n]$ such that $x_i - w_i = \delta$ and $u'_i < w_i$. Because both U' and W are valid solutions ($\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} u'_i = \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} w_i = F - V$), there must exist a set $S \subset U'$ such that $\forall u'_j \in S, u'_j > w_j$ TOCOMPLETE. $\square$

Algorithm 11: Proportional equality trust transfer

Input : x_i flows, $n = |N^+(s)|$, V value
Output: u_i' capacities

1   $F \leftarrow \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} x_i$
2   **if** $F < V$ **then**
3   **return** $\perp$
4   **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ *to* n **do**
5     $u_i' \leftarrow x_i - \frac{V}{F}x_i$
6   **return** $U' = \bigcup\limits_{k=1}^{n}\{u_k'\}$

Proof of correctness for algorithm 11.

- We will show that $\forall i \in [n]\; u_i' \le x_i$.
  According to line 5, which is the only line where u_i' is changed, $u_i' = x_i - \frac{V}{F}x_i \le x_i$ since $x_i, V, F > 0$ and $V \le F$.

- We will show that $\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} u_i' = F - V$.

  With $F = \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} x_i$, on line 6 it holds that $\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} u_i' = \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n}(x_i - \frac{V}{F}x_i) = \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} x_i - \frac{V}{F}\sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} x_i = F - V$.

$\hfill \square$

Complexity of algorithm 11.
The complexity of lines 1, 4-5 and 6 is $O(n)$ and the complexity of lines 2-3 is $O(1)$, thus the total complexity of algorithm 11 is $O(n)$. $\hfill \square$

Naive algorithms result in $u_i' \le x_i$, thus according to 6.7, $||\delta_i||_1$ is invariable for any of the possible solutions U', which is not necessarily the minimum (usually it will be the maximum). The following algorithms concentrate on minimizing two δ_i norms, $||\delta_i||_\infty$ and $||\delta_i||_1$.

Algorithm 12: $||\delta_i||_\infty$ minimizer

Input : $X = \{x_i\}$ flows, $n = |N^+(s)|$, V value, ϵ_1, ϵ_2
Output: u_i' capacities

1   **if** $\epsilon_1 < 0 \vee \epsilon_2 < 0$ **then**
2   **return** $\perp$
3   $F \leftarrow \sum\limits_{i=1}^{n} x_i$
4   **if** $F < V$ **then**
5   **return** $\perp$
6   $\delta_{max} \leftarrow \max\limits_{i \in [n]}\{u_i\}$
7   $\delta^* \leftarrow \texttt{BinSearch}(0,\delta_{max},F\text{-}V,n,X,\epsilon_1,\epsilon_2)$
8   **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ *to* n **do**
9     $u_i' \leftarrow \max(u_i - \delta^*, 0)$
10 **return** $U' = \bigcup\limits_{k=1}^{n}\{u_k'\}$

Since trust should be considered as a continuous unit and binary search dissects the possible interval for the solution on each recursive call, inclusion of the ϵ-parameters in $\texttt{BinSearch}$ is necessary for the

algorithm to complete in a finite number of steps.

Algorithm 12: function `BinSearch`

> **Input** : bot, top, F', n, X, ϵ_1, ϵ_2
> **Output:** δ^*

1 **if** $bot = top$ **then**
2 | **return** bot
3 **else**
4 | **for** $i \leftarrow 1$ to n **do**
5 | | $u'_i \leftarrow \max\left(0, u_i - \frac{top+bot}{2}\right)$
6 | **if** $maxFlow < F' - \epsilon_1$ **then**
7 | | **return** `BinSearch`$(bot, \frac{top+bot}{2}, F', n, X, \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)$
8 | **else if** $maxFlow > F' + \epsilon_2$ **then**
9 | | **return** `BinSearch`$(\frac{top+bot}{2}, top, F', n, X. \epsilon_1, \epsilon_2)$
10 | **else**
11 | | **return** $\frac{top+bot}{2}$

Proof that $maxFlow(\delta)$ is strictly decreasing for $\delta : maxflow(\delta) < F$.
Let $maxFlow(\delta)$ be the $maxFlow$ with $\forall i \in [n], u'_i = max(0, u_i - \delta)$. We will prove that the function $maxFlow(\delta)$ is strictly decreasing for all $\delta \leq \max_{i \in [n]}\{u_i\}$ such that $maxFlow(\delta) < F$.
Supppose that $\exists \delta_1, \delta_2 : \delta_1 < \delta_2 \wedge maxFlow(\delta_1) \leq maxFlow(\delta_2) < F$. We will work with configurations of $x'_{i,j}$ such that $x'_{i,j} \leq x_i, j \in \{1,2\}$.
Let $S_j = \{i \in N^+(s) : i \in MinCut_j\}$. It holds that $S_1 \neq \emptyset$ because otherwise $MinCut_1 = MinCut_{\delta=0}$ which is a contradiction because then $maxFlow(\delta_1) = F$. Moreover, it holds that $S_1 \subseteq S_2$, since $\forall u'_{i,2} > 0, u'_{i,2} < u'_{i,1}$. Every node in the $MinCut_j$ is saturated, thus $\forall i \in S_1, x'_{i,j} = u'_{i,j}$. Thus $\sum_{i \in S_1} x_{i,2} < \sum_{i \in S_1} x_{i,1}$ and, since $maxFlow(\delta_1) \leq maxFlow(\delta_2)$, we conclude that for the same configurations, $\sum_{i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1} x_{i,2} > \sum_{i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1} x_{i,1}$.
However, since $x'_{i,j} \leq x_i, j \in \{1,2\}$, the configuration $[x''_{i,1} = x'_{i,2}, i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1], [x''_{i,1} = x'_{i,1}, i \in S_1]$ is valid for $\delta = \delta_1$ and then $\sum_{i \in S_1} x''_{i,1} + \sum_{i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1} x''_{i,1} = \sum_{i \in S_1} x'_{i,1} + \sum_{i \in N^+(s) \setminus S_1} x'_{i,2} > maxFlow(\delta_1)$, contradiction. Thus $maxFlow(\delta)$ is strictly decreasing. $\square$

We can see that if $V > 0, F' = F - V < F$ thus if $\delta \in (0, \max_{i \in [n]}\{u_i\}] : maxFlow(\delta) = F' \Rightarrow \delta = \min ||\delta_i||_\infty : maxFlow(||\delta_i||_\infty) = F'$.

Proof of correctness for function 13.
Supposing that $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset [maxFlow(top), maxFlow(bot)]$, or equivalently $maxFlow(top) \leq F' - \epsilon_1 \wedge maxFlow(bot) \geq F' + \epsilon_2$, we will prove that $maxFlow(\delta^*) \in [F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2]$.
First of all, we should note that if an invocation of `BinSearch` returns without calling `BinSearch` again (line 2 or 11), its return value will be equal to the return value of the initial invocation of `BinSearch`, as we can see on lines 7 and 9, where the return value of the invoked `BinSearch` is returned without any modification. The case where `BinSearch` is called again is analyzed next:

- If $maxFlow(\frac{top+bot}{2}) < F' - \epsilon_1 < F'$ (line 6) then, since $maxFlow(\delta)$ is strictly decreasing, $\delta^* \in [bot, \frac{top+bot}{2})$. As we see on line 7, the interval $(\frac{top+bot}{2}, top]$ is discarded when the next `BinSearch` is called. Since $F' + \epsilon_2 \leq maxFlow(bot)$, we have $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset [maxFlow(\frac{top+bot}{2}), maxFlow(bot)]$ and the length of the available interval is divided by 2.

- Similarly, if $maxFlow(\frac{top+bot}{2}) > F' + \epsilon_2 > F'$ (line 8) then $\delta^* \in (\frac{top+bot}{2}, top]$. According to line 9, the interval $[bot, \frac{top+bot}{2})$ is discarded when the next `BinSearch` is called. Since $F' - \epsilon_1 \geq maxFlow(top)$, we have $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset (maxFlow(top), maxFlow(\frac{top+bot}{2})]$ and the length of the available interval is divided by 2.

As we saw, $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset [maxFlow(top), maxFlow(bot)]$ in every recursive call and $top - bot$ is divided by 2 in every call. From topology we know that $A \subset B \Rightarrow |A| < |B|$, so the recursive calls

cannot continue infinitely. $|[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2]| = \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2$. Let bot_0, top_0 the input values given to the initial invocation of `BinSearch`, bot_j, top_j the input values given to the j-th recursive call of `BinSearch` and $len_j = |[bot_j, top_j]| = top_j - bot_j$. We have $\forall j > 0, len_j = top_j - bot_j = \frac{top_{j-1} - bot_{j-1}}{2} \Rightarrow \forall j > 0, len_j = \frac{top_0 - bot_0}{2^j}$. We understand that in the worst case $len_j = \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2 \Rightarrow 2^j = \frac{top_0 - bot_0}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2} \Rightarrow j = \log_2(\frac{top_0 - bot_0}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2})$. Also, as we saw earlier, δ^* is always in the available interval, thus $maxFlow(\delta^*) \in [F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2]$. $\square$

Complexity of function 13.
Lines 1-2 have complexity $O(1)$, lines 4-5 have complexity $O(n)$, lines 6-11 have complexity $O(maxFlow) + O(BinSearch)$. As we saw in the proof of correctness for function 13, we need at most $\log_2(\frac{top - bot}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2})$ recursive calls of `BinSearch`. Thus the function 13 has worst-case complexity $O((maxFlow + n)\log_2(\frac{top - bot}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2}))$. $\square$

Proof of correctness for algorithm 12.
We will show that $maxFlow \in [F - V - \epsilon_1, F - V + \epsilon_2]$, with u_i' decided by algorithm 12. Obviously $maxFlow(0) = F, maxFlow(\max_{i \in [n]}\{u_i\}) = 0$, thus $\delta^* \in \max_{i \in [n]}\{u_i\}$. According to the proof of correctness for function 13, we can directly see that $maxFlow(\delta^*) \in [F - V - \epsilon_1, F - V + \epsilon_2]$, given that ϵ_1, ϵ_2 are chosen so that $F - V - \epsilon_1 \geq 0, F - V + \epsilon_2 \leq F$, so as to satisfy the condition $[F' - \epsilon_1, F' + \epsilon_2] \subset [maxFlow(top), maxFlow(bot)]$. $\square$

Complexity of algorithm 12.
The complexity of lines 1,2 and 4-6 is $O(n)$ and the complexity of line 3 is $O(BinSearch) = O((maxFlow + n)\log_2(\frac{\delta_{max}}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2}))$, thus the total complexity of algorithm 12 is $O((maxFlow + n)\log_2(\frac{\delta_{max}}{\epsilon_1 + \epsilon_2}))$. $\square$

However, we need to minimize $\sum_{i=1}^{n}(u_i - u_i') = ||\delta_i||_1$.

7   Related Work

8   Further Research

While our trust network can form a basis for risk-invariant transactions in the anonymous and decentralized setting, more research is required to achieve other desirable properties. Some directions for future research are outlined below.

8.1   Zero knowledge

Our network evaluates indirect trust by computing the max flow in the graph of lines-of-credit. In order to do that, complete information about the network is required. However, disclosing the network topology may be undesirable, as it subverts the identity of the participants even when participants are treated pseudonymously, as deanonymization techniques can be used. To avoid such issues, exploring the ability to calculate flows in a zero knowledge fashion may be desirable. However, performing network queries in zero knowledge may allow an adversary to extract topological information. More research is required to establish how flows can be calculated effectively in zero knowledge and what bounds exist in regards to information revealed in such fashion.

9   References