Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PayNet}}$ – interface

– from $\mathcal{E}$:
- (REGISTER, delay, relayDelay)
- (TOPPEDUP)
- (OPENCHANNEL, *Alice*, *Bob*, x, *tid*)
- (CHECKFORNEW, *Alice*, *Bob*, *tid*)
- (PAY, *Bob*, x, $\overrightarrow{\texttt{path}}$, `receipt`)
- (CLOSECHANNEL, `receipt`, *pchid*)
- (FORCECLOSECHANNEL, `receipt`, *pchid*)
- (POLL) - obsolete
- (PUSHFULFILL, *pchid*) - obsolete
- (PUSHADD, *pchid*) - obsolete
- (COMMIT, *pchid*) - obsolete
- (FULFILLONCHAIN) - obsolete
- (GETNEWS)

– to $\mathcal{E}$:
- (REGISTER, *Alice*, `delay`(*Alice*), `relayDelay`(*Alice*), pubKey)
- (REGISTERED)
- (NEWS, newChannels, closedChannels, updatesToReport)

– from $\mathcal{S}$:
- (REGISTERDONE, *Alice*, pubKey)
- (CHANNELANNOUNCED, *Alice*, $p_{Alice,F}, p_{Bob,F}$, *fchid*, *pchid*, *tid*)
- (UPDATE, `receipt`, *Alice*) - obsolete
- (CLOSEDCHANNEL, `channel`, *Alice*)
- (RESOLVEPAYS, *payid*, `charged`) - obsolete

– to $\mathcal{S}$:
- (REGISTER, *Alice*, delay, relayDelay)
- (OPENCHANNEL, *Alice*, *Bob*, x, *fchid*, *tid*)
- (CHANNELOPENED, *Alice*, *fchid*)
- (PAY, *Alice*, *Bob*, x, $\overrightarrow{\texttt{path}}$, `receipt`, *payid*) - obsolete
- (CONTINUE) - obsolete
- (CLOSECHANNEL, *fchid*, *Alice*)
- (FORCECLOSECHANNEL, *fchid*, *Alice*)
- (POLL, Σ_{Alice}, *Alice*) - obsolete
- (PUSHFULFILL, *pchid*, *Alice*) - obsolete
- (PUSHADD, *pchid*, *Alice*) - obsolete
- (COMMIT, *pchid*, *Alice*) - obsolete
- (FULFILLONCHAIN, t, *Alice*) - obsolete

Fig. 1.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PayNet}}$ – registration and corruption

Initialisation:
    `channels`, `pendingPay`, `pendingOpen`, `corrupted`, $\Sigma \leftarrow \emptyset$

Upon receiving (REGISTER, delay, relayDelay) from *Alice*:
    `delay` (*Alice*) $\leftarrow$ delay // Must check chain at least once every `delay`(*Alice*) blocks
    `relayDelay` (*Alice*) $\leftarrow$ relayDelay
    `updatesToReport` (*Alice*), `newChannels` (*Alice*) $\leftarrow \emptyset$
    `polls` (*Alice*) $\leftarrow \emptyset$
    `focs` (*Alice*) $\leftarrow \emptyset$
    send (READ) to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ as *Alice*, store reply to Σ_{Alice}, add Σ_{Alice} to Σ and add largest block number to `polls`(*Alice*)
    `checkClosed`(Σ_{Alice})
    send (REGISTER, *Alice*, delay, relayDelay) to $\mathcal{S}$

Upon receiving (REGISTERDONE, *Alice*, pubKey) from $\mathcal{S}$:
    `pubKey` (*Alice*) $\leftarrow$ pubKey
    send (REGISTER, *Alice*, `delay`(*Alice*), `relayDelay`(*Alice*), pubKey) to *Alice*

Upon receiving (TOPPEDUP) from *Alice*:
    send (READ) to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ as *Alice* and store reply to Σ_{Alice}
    `checkClosed`(Σ_{Alice})
    assign the sum of all output values that are exclusively spendable by *Alice* to `onChainBalance`
    send (REGISTERED) to *Alice*

Upon receiving any message (M) except for (REGISTER) or (TOPPEDUP) from *Alice*:
    if if haven't received (REGISTER) and (TOPPEDUP) from *Alice* (in this order) **then**
        send (INVALID, M) to *Alice* and ignore message
    end if

Fig. 2.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PayNet}}$ – open

1: Upon receiving (openChannel, *Alice*, *Bob*, x, *tid*) from *Alice*:
2: ensure *tid* hasn't been used by *Alice* for opening another channel before
3: choose unique channel ID *fchid*
4: `pendingOpen`(*fchid*) $\leftarrow$ (*Alice*, *Bob*, x, *tid*)
5: send (openChannel, *Alice*, *Bob*, x, *fchid*, *tid*) to $\mathcal{S}$

6: Upon receiving (channelAnnounced, *Alice*, $p_{Alice,F}$, $p_{Bob,F}$, *fchid*, *pchid*, *tid*) from $\mathcal{S}$:
7: ensure that there is a `pendingOpen`(*fchid*) entry with temporary id *tid*
8: add $p_{Alice,F}, p_{Bob,F}$, *pchid* and mark "*Alice* announced" to `pendingOpen`(*fchid*)

9: Upon receiving (checkForNew, *Alice*, *Bob*, *tid*) from *Alice*:
10: ensure there is a matching `channel` in `pendingOpen`(*fchid*), marked with "*Alice* announced"
11: (funder, fundee, x, $p_{Alice,F}$, $p_{Bob,F}$) $\leftarrow$ `pendingOpen`(*fchid*)
12: send (read) to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ as *Alice* and store reply to Σ_{Alice}
13: `checkClosed`(Σ_{Alice})
14: ensure that there is a TX $F \in \Sigma_{Alice}$ with a $(x, (p_{\text{funder},F} \wedge p_{\text{fundee},F}))$ output
15: mark `channel` with "waiting for fundingLocked"
16: send (fundingLocked, *Alice*, Σ_{Alice}, *fchid*) to $\mathcal{S}$

17: Upon receiving (fundingLocked, *fchid*) from $\mathcal{S}$:
18: ensure a `channel` is in `pendingOpen`(*fchid*), marked with "waiting for fundingLocked" and replace mark with "waiting for channelOpened"
19: send (read) to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ as *Bob* and store reply to Σ_{Bob}
20: `checkClosed`(Σ_{Bob})
21: ensure that there is a TX $F \in \Sigma_{Bob}$ with a $(x, (p_{\text{funder},F} \wedge p_{\text{fundee},F}))$ output
22: add `receipt`(`channel`) to `newChannels`(*Bob*)
23: send (fundingLocked, *Bob*, Σ_{Bob}, *fchid*) to $\mathcal{S}$

24: Upon receiving (channelOpened, *fchid*) from $\mathcal{S}$:
25: ensure a `channel` is in `pendingOpen`(*fchid*), marked with "waiting for channelOpened" and remove mark
26: offChainBalance (funder) $\leftarrow$ offChainBalance (funder) $+ x$
27: onChainBalance (funder) $\leftarrow$ onChainBalance (funder) $- x$
28: `channel` $\leftarrow$ (funder, fundee, x, 0, 0, *fchid*, *pchid*)
29: add `channel` to `channels`
30: add `receipt`(`channel`) to `newChannels`(*Alice*)
31: clear `pendingOpen`(*fchid*) entry

Fig. 3.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PayNet}}$ – pay (updated)

1: Upon receiving $\left(\text{PAY}, \mathit{Bob}, x, \overrightarrow{\texttt{path}}\right)$ from *Alice*:
2: ensure that $\overrightarrow{\texttt{path}}$ consists of open channels that form a path of capacity at least x (in the right direction) from *Alice* to *Bob*
3: starting on $|\overrightarrow{\texttt{path}}|$ clock ticks after receiving this message, on every clock tick, channel $\in \overrightarrow{\texttt{path}}$, reduce balance of party closer to payer by x and increase balance of party closer to payee by x in the next channel on the $\overrightarrow{\texttt{path}}$ and add `receipt` of new balance to both parties' `updatesToReport`, starting from the unique channel in which the payee is participating

Fig. 4.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PayNet}}$ – close

1: Upon receiving (CLOSECHANNEL, `receipt`, *pchid*) from *Alice*
2: ensure that there is a `channel` $\in$ `channels` : `receipt`(`channel`) = `receipt` with ID *pchid*
3: retrieve *fchid* from `channel`
4: add (*fchid*, `receipt`(`channel`), ∞) to `pendingClose`(*Alice*)
5: do not serve any other (PAY, CLOSECHANNEL) message from *Alice* for this channel
6: send (CLOSECHANNEL, `receipt`, *pchid*, *Alice*) to $\mathcal{S}$

7: Upon receiving (FORCECLOSECHANNEL, `receipt`, *pchid*) from *Alice*
8: retrieve *fchid* from `channel`
9: add (*fchid*, `receipt`(`channel`), $\perp$) to `pendingClose`(*Alice*)
10: do not serve any other (PAY, CLOSECHANNEL, FORCECLOSECHANNEL) message from *Alice* for this channel
11: send (FORCECLOSECHANNEL, `receipt`, *pchid*, *Alice*) to $\mathcal{S}$

12: Upon receiving (CLOSEDCHANNEL, `channel`, *Alice*) from $\mathcal{S}$:
13: remove any (*fchid* of channel, `receipt`(`channel`), ∞) from `pendingClose`(*Alice*)
14: add (*fchid* of channel, `receipt`(`channel`), $\perp$) to `closedChannels`(*Alice*) // trust $\mathcal{S}$ here, check on `checkClosed`()
15: send (CONTINUE) to $\mathcal{S}$

Fig. 5.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PayNet}}$ – `checkClosed`()

function `checkClosed`(Σ_{Alice}) // Called after every (READ), ensures requested closes eventually happen
  if there is any closing/commitment transaction in Σ_{Alice} with no corresponding entry in `pendingClose`($Alice$) $\cup$ `closedChannels`($Alice$) **then**
    add ($fchid$, `receipt`, $\perp$) to `closedChannels`($Alice$), where $fchid$ is the ID of the corresponding `channel`, `receipt` comes from the latest `channel` state
  end if
  for all entries ($fchid$, `receipt`, h) $\in$ `pendingClose`($Alice$) $\cup$ `closedChannels`($Alice$) **do**
    if there is a closing/commitment transaction in Σ_{Alice} for open `channel` with ID $fchid$ with a balance that corresponds to `receipt` **then**
      let x, y $Alice$'s and `channel` counterparty Bob's balances respectively
      offChainBalance ($Alice$) $\leftarrow$ offChainBalance ($Alice$) $- x$
      onChainBalance ($Alice$) $\leftarrow$ onChainBalance ($Alice$) $+ x$
      offChainBalance (Bob) $\leftarrow$ offChainBalance (Bob) $- y$
      onChainBalance (Bob) $\leftarrow$ onChainBalance (Bob) $+ y$
      remove `channel` from `channels` & entry from `pendingClose`($Alice$)
      if there is an ($fchid$, _, _) entry in `pendingClose`(Bob) **then**
        remove it from `pendingClose`(Bob)
      end if
    else if there is a tx in Σ_{Alice} that is not a closing/commitment tx and spends the funding tx of the `channel` with ID $fchid$ **then**
      halt // DS forgery
    else if there is a commitment transaction in block of height h in Σ_{Alice} for open `channel` with ID $fchid$ with a balance that does not correspond to the `receipt` and the delayed output has been spent by the counterparty **then**
      if `polls`($Alice$) contains an entry in $[h, h + \texttt{delay}(Alice) - 1]$ **then**
        halt
      else
        `negligent`($Alice$) $\leftarrow$ `true`
      end if
    else if there is no such closing/commitment transaction $\wedge$ $h = \perp$ **then**
      assign largest block number of Σ_{Alice} to h of entry
    else if there is no such closing/commitment transaction $\wedge$ $h \neq \perp$ $\wedge$ (largest block number of Σ_{Alice}) $\geq h + (2 + r)$ `windowSize` **then**
      halt
    end if
  end for
  if $Alice$ has no open channels in Σ_{Alice} AND `negligent`($Alice$) = `false` **then**
    if offChainBalance($Alice$) $\neq 0$ OR onChainBalance($Alice$) is not equal to the total funds exclusively spendable by $Alice$ in Σ_{Alice} **then**
      halt
    end if
  end if
end function

Fig. 6.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PayNet}}$ – get news (updated)

1: Upon receiving (GETNEWS) from *Alice*:

2: clear `newChannels`(*Alice*), `closedChannels`(*Alice*), `updatesToReport`(*Alice*) and send them to *Alice* with message name NEWS, stripping *fchid* and h from `closedChannels`(*Alice*)

Fig. 7.

– The functionality above provides unobservability of off-chain payments and can be realised by a protocol in which all players communicate with every other player on every round – sending garbage to the ones with which they don't have to interact. Such a protocol has n^2 communication cost. Indistinguishability holds only in case of a global passive adversary (no corruptions).
– We can also assert unobservability for paths that consist of honest parties only in the case where there is a system-wide maximum path length l and corruptions activate only after $2l$ clock ticks. Both the functionality and the protocol would be the same.
– In case of a normal corruption model, the functionality has to leak the previous and next player on the path, along with the payment value, to a corrupted player that is to receive its message on this clock tick. Also, the functionality has to wait for confirmation from the corrupted player before sending the message to the next player (but this isn't strictly about privacy).