

# Elmo: Recursive Virtual Payment Channels for Bitcoin

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**Abstract.** A dominant approach towards the solution of the scalability problem in blockchain systems has been the development of layer 2 protocols and specifically payment channel networks (PCNs) such as the Lightning Network (LN) over Bitcoin. Routing payments over LN requires the coordination of all path intermediaries in a multi-hop round trip that encumbers the layer 2 solution both in terms of responsiveness as well as privacy. The issue is resolved by “virtual channel” protocols that, capitalizing on a suitable setup operation, enable the two endpoints to engage as if they had a direct payment channel between them.

Apart from communication efficiency, virtual channel constructions have three natural desiderata. A virtual channel constructor is *recursive* if it can also be applied on pre-existing virtual channels, *variadic* if it can be applied on any number of pre-existing channels and *symmetric* if it encumbers in an egalitarian fashion all channel participants both in optimistic and pessimistic execution paths. We put forth the first Bitcoin-suitable recursive variadic virtual channel construction. Furthermore our virtual channel constructor is symmetric and offers optimal round complexity both in the optimistic and pessimistic execution paths. Our virtual channels can be implemented over Bitcoin assuming the **ANYPREVOUT** signature type, a feature that we prove necessary for any efficient protocol that has parties maintain a set of Bitcoin transactions in their local state. We express and prove the security of our construction in the universal composition setting.

## 1 Introduction

The popularity of blockchain protocols in recent years has stretched their performance exposing a number of scalability considerations. In particular, Bitcoin and related blockchain protocols exhibit very high latency (e.g. Bitcoin has a latency of 1h [1]) and a very low throughput (e.g., Bitcoin can handle at most 7 transactions per second [2]), both significant shortcomings that jeopardize wider use and adoption and are to a certain extent inherent [2]. To address these considerations a prominent approach is to optimistically handle transactions off-chain via a “Payment Channel Network” (PCN) (see, e.g., [3] for a survey) and only use the underlying blockchain protocol as an arbiter in case of dispute.

The key primitive of PCN protocols is a payment (or more generally, state) channel. Two parties initiate the channel by locking some funds on-chain and subsequently exchange direct messages to update the state of the channel. The key feature is that state updates are not posted on-chain and hence they remain unencumbered by the performance limitations of the underlying blockchain protocol. Given this primitive, multiple overlapping payment channels can be combined and form the PCN.

Closing a channel is an operation that involves posting the state of the channel on-chain; it is essential that any party individually can close a channel as otherwise a malicious counterparty (i.e. the other channel participant) could prevent an honest party from accessing their funds. This functionality however raises an important design consideration: how to prevent malicious parties from posting old states of the channel. Addressing this issue can be done with some suitable use of transaction “timelocks”, a feature that prevents a transaction or a specific script from being processed on-chain prior to a specific time (measured in block height). For instance, diminishing transaction timelocks facilitated the Duplex Micropayment Channels (DMC) [4] at the expense of bounding the overall lifetime of a channel. Using script timelocks, the Lightning Network (LN) [5] provided a better solution that enabled channels staying open for an arbitrary duration: the key idea was to duplicate the state of the channel between the two counterparties, say Alice and Bob, and facilitate a punishment mechanism that can be triggered by Bob whenever Alice posts an old state update and vice-versa. The script timelocking is essential to allow an honest counterparty some time to act.

Interconnecting state channels in LN enables any two parties to transmit funds to each other as long as they can find a route of payment channels that connects them. The downside of this mechanism is that it requires the direct involvement of all the parties along the path for each payment. Instead, “virtual payment channels”, suggest the more attractive approach of putting a one-time initialization step to set up a virtual payment channel, which subsequently can be used for direct payments with complexity—in the optimistic case— independent of the length of the path. Initial constructions for virtual channels essentially capitalized on the extended functionality of Ethereum, e.g., Perun [6] and GSCN [7], while more recent work [8] brought them closer to Bitcoin-compatibility (by leveraging adaptor signatures [9]).

A virtual channel constructor can be thought of as an *operator* over the underlying primitive of a state channel. We can identify three natural desiderata for this operator.

- Recursive. A recursive virtual channel constructor can operate over channels that themselves could be the results of previous applications of the operator. This is important in the context of PCNs since it allows building virtual channels on top of pre-existing virtual channels.
- Variadic. A variadic virtual channel constructor can virtualize any number of input state channels directly, i.e. without leveraging recursion. This is important in the context of PCNs since it enables applying the operator to

build virtual channels of arbitrary length, without the undue overhead of opening, managing and closing multiple virtual channels only to use the one at the “top” of the recursion.

- Symmetric. A symmetric virtual channel constructor offers setup and closing operations that are symmetric in terms of cost between the two “endpoints” or the “intermediaries” (but not a mix of both) for the optimistic and pessimistic execution paths. This is important in the context of PCNs since it ensures that no party is worse-off or better-off after an application of the operator in terms of accessing the basic functionality of the channel.

Endpoints are the two parties that share the virtual channel, intermediaries are the parties that take part in any of underlying channels.

We note that recursiveness, while identified already as an important design property (e.g., see [7]) it has not been achieved in the context of Bitcoin-compatible channels (it was achieved only for DCN-like fixed lifetime channels in [10] and left as an open question for LN-type channels in [8]). The reason behind this are the severe limitations imposed in the design by the scripting language of Bitcoin-compatible systems. With respect to the other two properties, observe that successive applications of a recursive *binary* virtual channel operator to make it variadic will break symmetry (since the sequence of operator applications will impact the participants’ functions with respect to the resulting channel). This is of particular concern since all previous virtual channel constructors proposed are binary, cf. [7,8,10].

**Our Contributions.** We present the first Bitcoin-suitable recursive virtual channel constructor that is recursive and supports channels with an indefinite lifetime. In addition, our constructor, Elmo (named after St. Elmo’s fire), is variadic and symmetric. In our constructor, both optimistic and pessimistic execution paths are optimal in terms of round complexity: issuing payments between the two endpoints requires just three messages of size independent of the length of the channel while closing the channel requires up to two on-chain transactions for any involved party (endpoint or intermediary) also independent of the channel’s length. Our construction is also compatible with the current version of any blockchain that supports Turing-complete smart contracts, such as Ethereum [11].

We achieve the above by leveraging on a sophisticated virtual channel setup protocol which, on the one hand, enables endpoints to use an interface that is invariant between on-chain and off-chain (i.e. virtual) channels, while on the other, intermediaries can act following any arbitrary activation sequence when the channel is closed. The latter is achieved by making it feasible for anyone becoming an initiator towards closing the channel, while subsequent respondents, following the activation sequence, can choose the right action to successfully complete the closure process by posting a single transaction each.

We formally prove the security of the constructor protocol in the UC [12] setting; our ideal functionality is global, according to the definition of [13]. The construction relies on the ANYPREVOUT signature type, which does not sign the hash

of the transaction it spends, therefore allowing for a single pre-signed transaction to spend any output with a suitable script. We further discuss the limitations of any constructor primitive that does not rely on ANYPREVOUT in Section 6. In particular in Theorem 3, we prove that any virtual channel constructor protocol that has participants store transactions in their local state and offers an efficient closing operation via  $O(1)$  transactions will have an exponentially large state in the number of intermediaries, unless ANYPREVOUT is available.

**Related work** The first proposal for PCNs was due to [14] which only enabled unidirectional payment channels. As mentioned previously, DMCs [4] with their decrementing timelocks have the shortcoming of limited channel lifetime. This was ameliorated by LN [5] which has become the dominant paradigm for designing PCNs for Bitcoin-compatible systems. LN is currently implemented and operational for Bitcoin. It has also been adapted for Ethereum [11], where it is known as the Raiden Network [15].

A number of attacks have been identified against LN. The wormhole attack [16] against LN allows colluding parties in a multi-hop payment to steal the fees of the intermediaries between them and Flood & Loot [17] analyses the feasibility of an attack in which too many channels are forced to close in a short amount of time, reducing the blockchain liveness and enabling a malicious party to steal off-chain funds.

Payment routing [18,19,20] is another research area that aims to improve the network efficiency without sacrificing privacy. Actively rebalancing channels [21] can further increase network efficiency by preventing routes from becoming unavailable due to lack of well-balanced funds.

An alternative payment channel construction that aspires to be the successor of Lightning is eltoo [22]. It has a conceptually simpler construction, smaller on-chain footprint and a more forgiving attitude towards submitting an old channel state than Lightning, but it needs the ANYPREVOUT sighash flag to be added to Bitcoin. Generalized Bitcoin-Compatible Channels [9] enable the creation of state channels on Bitcoin, extending channel functionality from simple payments to arbitrary Bitcoin scripts.

Sprites [23] leverages the scripting language of Ethereum to decrease the time collateral is locked up compared to Lightning. Perun [6] and GSCN [7] exploit the Turing-complete scripting language of Ethereum to provide virtual state channels, i.e. channels that can open without an on-chain transaction and that allow for arbitrary scripts to be executed off-chain. Similar features are provided by Celer [24]. Hydra [25] provides state channels for the Cardano [26] blockchain which combines a UTXO type of model with general purpose smart contract functionality that are also isomorphic, i.e. Hydra channels can accommodate any script that is compatible with the underlying blockchain.

BDW [27] shows how pairwise channels over Bitcoin can be funded with no on-chain transactions by allowing parties to form groups that can pool their funds together off-chain and then use those funds to open channels. ACUM [28] allows for multi-path atomic payments with reduced collateral, enabling new applications such as crowdfunding conditional on reaching a funding target.

TEE-based [29] solutions [30,31,32,20] improve the throughput and efficiency of PCNs by an order of magnitude or more, at the cost of having to trust TEEs. Brick [33] uses a partially trusted committee to extend PCNs to fully asynchronous networks.

Solutions alternative to PCNs include sidechains (e.g., [34,35,36]), non-custodial chains (e.g., [37,38,39,40]), and partially centralised payment networks that entirely avoid using a blockchain [41,42,43,44].

Last but not least, a number of works propose virtual channel constructions for Bitcoin. Lightweight Virtual Payment Channels [10] enables a virtual channel to be opened on top of two preexisting channels and uses a technique similar to DMC. Let “simple channels” be those built directly on-chain, i.e. channels that are not virtual. Bitcoin-Compatible Virtual Channels [8] also enables virtual channels on top of two preexisting simple channels and offers two protocols, the first of which guarantees that the channel will stay off-chain for an agreed period, while the second allows the single intermediary to turn the virtual into a simple channel. We remark that the above strategy has the shortcoming that even if it is made recursive (a direction left open in [8]) after  $k$  applications of the constructor the virtual channel participant will have to publish on-chain  $k$  transactions in order to close the channel if all intermediaries actively monitor the blockchain.

Furthermore, Donner [45] is the first work to achieve variadic virtual channels without the need for recursion nor features that are not yet available in Bitcoin. This is achieved by having the funder use funds that are external to the “base channels” (i.e. the channels that the virtual channel is based on), so a party that has all its coins in channels cannot fund a Donner channel; additionally, we conjecture that using external coins precludes variadic virtual channel designs that are not encumbered with limited lifetime. Donner also relies on placeholder outputs which, due to the minimum coins they need to carry to exceed Bitcoin’s “dust limit”, may skew the incentives of rational players and adds to the opportunity cost of maintaining a channel. Furthermore, its design complicates future iterations that lift its current restriction that only one of the two channel parties can fund the virtual channel. Donner is more efficient than the present work in terms of storage, computation and communication complexity, and boasts a simpler design, but has less room for optimisations.

We refer the reader to Table 1 for a comparison of the features and limitations of virtual channel protocols, including the one put forth in the current work.

## 2 High Level Explanation

Conceptually, Elmo is split into three main actions: channel opening, payments and closing. A channel  $(P_1, P_n)$  between parties  $P_1$  and  $P_n$  may be opened directly on-chain, in which case the two parties follow an opening procedure similar to that of LN, or it can be opened on top of a path of preexisting channels  $(P_1, P_2), (P_2, P_3), \dots, (P_{n-2}, P_{n-1}), (P_{n-1}, P_n)$ . In the latter case all parties  $P_i$  on the path follow our novel protocol, setting aside funds in their channels

**Table 1.** Features & requirements comparison of virtual channel protocols

	Unlimited lifetime	Recursive	Variadic	Script requirements
LVPC [10]	✗	● <sup>a</sup>	✗	Bitcoin
BCVC [8]	✓	✗	✗	Bitcoin
Perun [6]	✓	✗	✗	Ethereum
GSCN [7]	✓	✓	✗	Ethereum
Donner [45]	✗	✗	✓	Bitcoin
this work	✓	✓	✓	Bitcoin + ANYPREVOUT

<sup>a</sup> lacks security analysis

as collateral for the new virtual channel that is being opened. Once all intermediaries are done,  $P_1$  and  $P_n$  finally create (and keep off-chain) their initial “commitment” transaction, following a logic similar to Lightning and thus their channel is open.

A payment over an established channel follows a procedure heavily inspired by LN, but without the use of HTLCs. To be completed, a payment needs three messages to be exchanged by the two parties.

Finally, the closing procedure of a channel  $C$  can be completed unilaterally and consists of signing and publishing a number of transactions on-chain. As we will discuss later, the exact transactions that a party will publish vary depending on the actions of the parties controlling the channels that form the “base” of  $C$  and the channels that are based on  $C$ . Our protocol can be augmented with a more efficient optimistic collaborative closing procedure, which however is left as future work.

Note that a virtual channel is built on top of two or more so-called “base” channels, which, due to the recursive property, may themselves be simple or virtual. The parties that control the base channels are called “base parties”. The fact that more than two base channels can be used by a single virtual channel is ensured by the variadic property.

In more detail, to open a channel (c.f. Figure 28) the two counterparties (a.k.a. “endpoints”) first create new keypairs and exchange the resulting public keys (2 messages), then prepare the underlying base channels if the new channel is virtual ( $12 \cdot (n-1)$  total messages, i.e. 6 outgoing messages per endpoint and 12 outgoing messages per intermediary, for  $n-2$  intermediaries), next they exchange signatures for their respective initial commitment transactions (2 messages) and lastly, if the channel is to be opened directly on-chain, the “funder” signs and publishes the “funding” transaction to the ledger. As we alluded to earlier, a channel with its funding transaction on-chain is called “simple”. A channel is either simple or virtual, not both. We here note that like LN, only one of the two parties, the funder, provides coins for a new channel. This limitation simplifies the execution model and the analysis, but can be lifted at the cost of additional protocol complexity.


Let us now introduce some notation used in figures with transactions. Reflecting the UTXO model, each transaction is represented by a cylindrical, named

node with one incoming edge per input and one outgoing edge per output. Each output can be connected with at most one input of another transaction; cycles are not allowed. Above an input or an output edge we note the number of coins it carries. In some figures the coins are omitted. Below an input we place the data carried and below an output its spending conditions (a.k.a script). For a connected input-output pair, we omit the data carried by the input.  $\sigma_K$  is a signature on the transaction by  $sk_K$ ; in all cases, signatures are carried by inputs. An output marked with  $pk_K$  needs a signature by  $sk_K$  to be spent.  $m/\{pk_1, \dots, pk_n\}$  is an  $m$ -of- $n$  multisig ( $m \leq n$ ) that needs signatures from  $m$  distinct keys among  $sk_1, \dots, sk_n$ . If  $k$  is a spending condition, then  $k + t$  is the same spending condition but with a relative timelock of  $t$ . Spending conditions or data can be combined with logical “AND” ( $\wedge$ ) and “OR” ( $\vee$ ), so an output  $a \vee b$  can be spent either by matching the condition  $a$  or the condition  $b$ , and an input  $\sigma_a \wedge \sigma_b$  carries signatures from  $sk_a$  and  $sk_b$ .

Note that all signatures for all multisig outputs use the **ANYPREVOUT** hash type.

## 2.1 Simple Channels

In a similar vein to earlier UTXO-based PCN proposals, having an open channel essentially means having very specific keys, transactions and signatures at hand, as well as checking the ledger periodically and being ready to take action if misbehaviour is detected. Let us first consider a simple channel that has been established between *Alice* and *Bob* where the former owns  $c_A$  and the latter  $c_B$  coins. There are three sets of transactions at play: A “funding” transaction that is put on-chain, off-chain “commitment” transactions that spend the funding output on channel closure and off-chain “revocation” transactions that spend commitment outputs in case of misbehaviour (c.f. Figure 1).



**Fig. 1.** Funding, commitment and revocation transactions

In particular, there is a single on-chain funding transaction that spends  $c_A + c_B$  coins (originally belonging to the funder), with a single output that is encumbered with a  $2/\{pk_{A,F}, pk_{B,F}\}$  multisig and carries  $c_A + c_B$  coins.

Next, there are two commitment transactions, one for each party, each of which can spend the funding tx and produce two outputs with  $c_A$  and  $c_B$  coins each. The two txs differ in the outputs’ spending conditions: The  $c_A$  output in *Alice*’s commitment tx can be spent either by *Alice* after it has been on-chain for a pre-agreed period (i.e. it is encumbered with a “timelock”), or by

a “revocation” transaction (discussed below) via a 2-of-2 multisig between the counterparties, whereas the  $c_B$  output can be spent only by *Bob* without a timelock. *Bob*’s commitment tx is symmetric: the  $c_A$  output can be spent only by *Alice* without timelock and the  $c_B$  output can be spent either by *Bob* after the timelock expiration or by a revocation tx. When a new pair of commitment txs are created (either during channel opening or on each update) *Alice* signs *Bob*’s commitment tx and sends him the signature (and vice-versa), therefore *Alice* can later unilaterally sign and publish her commitment tx but not *Bob*’s (and vice-versa).

Last, there are  $2m$  revocation transactions, where  $m$  is the total number of updates of the channel. The  $j$ th revocation tx held by an endpoint spends the output carrying the counterparty’s funds in the counterparty’s  $j$ th commitment tx. It has a single output spendable immediately by the aforementioned endpoint. Each endpoint stores  $m$  revocation txs, one for each superseded commitment tx. This creates a disincentive for an endpoint to cheat by using any other commitment transaction than its most recent one to close the channel: the timelock on the commitment output permits its counterparty to use the corresponding revocation transaction and thus claim the cheater’s funds. Endpoints do not have a revocation tx for the last commitment transaction, therefore these can be safely published. For a channel update to be completed, the endpoints must exchange the signatures for the revocation txs that spend the commitment txs that just became obsolete.


Observe that the above logic is essentially a simplification of LN.

## 2.2 Virtual Channels

In order to gain intuition on how virtual channels function, consider  $n - 1$  simple channels established between  $n$  honest parties as before.  $P_1$  (the funder) and  $P_n$  want to open a virtual channel over these base channels. Before opening the virtual, each base channel is entirely independent, having different unique keys, separate on-chain funding outputs, a possibly different balance and number of updates. After the  $n$  parties follow our novel virtual channel opening protocol, they will all hold off-chain a number of new, “virtual” transactions that spend their respective funding transactions and can themselves be spent by new commitment transactions in a manner that ensures fair funds allocation for all honest parties.


In particular, apart from the transactions of simple channels, each of the two endpoints also has an “initiator” transaction that spends the funding output of its only base channel and produces two outputs: one new funding output for the base channel and one “virtual” output (c.f. Figures 2, 44). If the initiator transaction ends up on-chain, the latter output carries coins that will directly or indirectly fund the funding output of the virtual channel. This virtual funding output can in turn be spent by a commitment transaction that is negotiated and updated with direct communication between the two endpoints in exactly the same manner as the payments of simple channels.






**Fig. 2.**  $A - E$  virtual channel:  $A$ 's initiator transaction. Spends the funding output of the  $A - B$  channel. Can be used if  $B$  has not published a virtual transaction yet.

Intermediaries on the other hand store three sets of virtual transactions (Figure 43): “initiator” (Figure 3), “extend-interval” (Figure 4) and “merge-intervals” (Figure 5). Each intermediary has one initiator tx, which spends the party's two funding outputs and produces four: one funding output for each base channel, one output that directly pays the intermediary coins equal to the total value in the virtual channel, and one “virtual output”, which carries coins that can potentially fund the virtual channel. If both funding outputs are still unspent, publishing its initiator tx is the only way for an intermediary to close either of its channels.




**Fig. 3.**  $A - E$  virtual channel:  $B$ 's initiator transaction. Spends the funding outputs of the  $A - B$  and  $B - C$  channels. Can be used if neither  $A$  nor  $C$  have published a virtual transaction yet.

Furthermore, each intermediary has  $O(n)$  extend-interval transactions. Being an intermediary, the party is involved in two base channels, each having its own funding output. In case exactly one of these two outputs has been spent honestly and the other is still unspent, publishing an extend-interval transaction is the only way for the party to close the base channel corresponding to the unspent



**Fig. 4.**  $A-E$  virtual channel: One of  $B$ 's extend interval transactions.  $\sigma$  is the signature. Spends the virtual output of  $A$ 's initiator transaction and the funding output of the  $B-C$  channel. Can be used if  $A$  has already published its initiator transaction and  $C$  has not published a virtual transaction yet.



**Fig. 5.**  $A - E$  virtual channel: One of  $B$ 's merge intervals transactions. Spends the virtual outputs of  $A$ 's and  $C$ 's virtual transactions. Can be used if both  $A$  and  $C$  have already published their initiator transactions. Notice that the interval of  $C$ 's virtual output only contains  $C$ , which can only happen if  $C$  has published its initiator and not any other of its virtual transactions.

output and take its funds. Such a transaction consumes two outputs: the only available funding output and a suitable virtual output, as discussed below. An extend-interval tx has three outputs: A funding output replacing the one just spent, one output that directly pays the intermediary coins equal to the total value of the virtual channel, and one virtual output.

Last, each intermediary has  $O(n^2)$  merge-intervals transactions. If both base channels' funding outputs of the party have been spent honestly, publishing a merge-intervals transaction is the only way for the party to close either base channel. Such a transaction consumes two suitable virtual outputs, as discussed below. It has two outputs: One that directly pays the intermediary coins equal to the total value of the virtual channel, and one virtual output.

To understand why this multitude of virtual transactions is needed, we now zoom out from the individual party and discuss the dynamic of the system as a whole. The first party  $P_i$  that wishes to close a base channel observes that its funding output(s) remain(s) unspent and publishes its initiator transaction. First, this allows  $P_i$  to use its commitment transaction to close the base channel. Second, in case  $P_i$  is an intermediary, it directly regains the coins it has locked for the virtual channel. Third, it produces a virtual output that can only be consumed by  $P_{i-1}$  and  $P_{i+1}$ , the parties adjacent to  $P_i$  (if any) with specific extend-interval transactions. The virtual output of this extend-interval transaction can in turn be spent by specific extend-interval transactions of  $P_{i-2}$  or  $P_{i+2}$  that have not published a virtual transaction yet (if any) and so on for the next neighbours. The idea is that each party only needs to publish a single virtual transaction to “collapse” the virtual layer and each virtual output uniquely defines the continuous interval of parties that have already published a virtual transaction and only allows parties at the edges of this interval to extend it. This prevents malicious parties from indefinitely replacing a virtual output with a new one. As the name suggests, merge-intervals transactions are published by parties that are adjacent to two parties that have already published their virtual transactions and in effect joins the two intervals into one.

Each virtual output can also be used as the funding output for the virtual channel after a timelock, to protect from unresponsive parties blocking the virtual channel indefinitely. This in turn means that if an intermediary observes either of its funding outputs being spent, it has to publish its suitable virtual transaction before the timelock expires to avoid losing funds. What is more, all virtual outputs need the signature of all parties to be spent before the timelock (i.e. they have an  $n$ -of- $n$  multisig) in order to prevent colluding parties from faking the intervals progression. To ensure that parties have an opportunity to react, the timelock of a virtual output is the maximum of the required timelocks of the intermediaries that can spend it. Let  $p$  be a global constant representing the maximum number of blocks a party is allowed to stay offline between activations without becoming negligent (the latter term is explained in detail later), and  $s$  the maximum number of blocks needed for an honest transaction to enter the blockchain after being published, as in Proposition 1 of Section 12. The required

timelock of a party is  $p + s$  if its channel is simple, or  $p + \sum_{j=2}^{n-1} (s - 1 + t_j)$  if the channel is virtual, where  $t_j$  is the required timelock of the base channel of the  $j$ th intermediary's channel. The only exception are virtual outputs that correspond to an interval that includes all parties, which can only be used as funding outputs for the virtual channel as its interval cannot be further extended, therefore the two separate spending methods and the associated timelock are dropped.


Many extend-interval and merge-intervals transactions have to be able to spend different outputs, depending on the order other base parties publish their virtual transactions. For example,  $P_3$ 's extend-interval tx that extends the interval  $\{P_1, P_2\}$  to  $\{P_1, P_2, P_3\}$  must be able to spend both the virtual output of  $P_2$ 's initiator transaction and  $P_2$ 's extend-interval transaction which has spent  $P_1$ 's initiator transaction. The same issue is faced by commitment transactions of a virtual channel, as any virtual output can potentially be used as the funding output for the channel. In order for the received signatures for virtual and commitment txs to be valid for multiple previous outputs, the previously proposed **ANYPREVOUT** sighash flag [46] is needed to be added to Bitcoin. We show in Theorem 3 that variadic recursive virtual channels with  $O(1)$  on-chain and subexponential number of off-chain transactions for each party cannot be constructed in Bitcoin without this flag. We hope this work provides additional motivation for this flag to be included in the future.

Note also that the newly established virtual channel can itself act as a base for further virtual channels, as its funding output can be unilaterally put on-chain in a pre-agreed maximum number of blocks. This in turn means that, as we discussed above, a further virtual channel must take the delay of its virtual base channels into account to determine the timelocks needed for its own virtual outputs.

As for the actual protocol needed to establish a virtual channel, 6 rounds of communication are needed, each starting from the funder and hop by hop reaching the fundee and back (c.f. Figure 24). The first communicates parties' identities, their funding keys and their neighbours' channel balances, the second creates new commitment transactions, the third communicates keys for virtual transactions (a.k.a. virtual keys), all parties' coins and desired timelocks, the fourth and the fifth communicate signatures for the virtual transactions (signatures for virtual outputs and funding outputs respectively) and the sixth shares revocation signatures for the old channel states.

In order to better grasp the manner in which the construction described achieves its intended goals, let us now turn to an example. Consider an established virtual channel on top of 4 preexisting simple base channels. Let  $A$ ,  $B$ ,  $C$ ,  $D$  and  $E$  be the relevant parties, which control the  $(A, B)$ ,  $(B, C)$ ,  $(C, D)$  and  $(D, E)$  base channels, along with the  $(A, E)$  virtual channel. After carrying out some payments,  $A$  decides to close the virtual channel. It therefore publishes its initiator transaction, thus consuming the funding output of  $(A, B)$  and producing (among others) a virtual output with the interval  $\{A\}$ .  $B$  notices this before the timelock of the virtual output expires and publishes its extend-interval

transaction that consumes the aforementioned virtual output and the funding output of  $(B, C)$ , producing a virtual output with the interval  $\{A, B\}$ .  $C$  in turn publishes the corresponding extend-interval transaction, consuming the virtual output of  $B$  and the funding output of  $(C, D)$  while producing a virtual output with the interval  $\{A, B, C\}$ . Finally  $D$  publishes the last extend-interval transaction, thus producing an interval with all players. Instead of a virtual output, it produces the funding output for the virtual channel  $(A, E)$ . Now  $A$  can spend this funding output with its latest commitment transaction. The entire process is depicted schematically in Figure 6. Note that if any of  $B$ ,  $C$  or  $D$  does not act within the timelock prescribed in their consumed virtual output, then  $A$  or  $E$  can spend the virtual output with their latest commitment transaction, thus eventually  $A$  can close its virtual channel in all cases.



**Fig. 6.** 4 simple channels supporting a virtual.  $A$  initiates the closing procedure and no party is negligent. Virtual outputs are marked with their interval.

### 3 Preliminaries

#### 3.1 Universal Composition Framework

In this work we embrace the Universal Composition (UC) framework [12] to model parties, network interactions, adversarial influence and corruptions, as well as formalise and prove security.

UC closely follows and expands upon the paradigm of simulation-based security [47]. For a particular real world protocol, the main goal of UC is allow us to provide a simple “interface”, the ideal world functionality, that describes what the protocol achieves in an ideal way. The functionality takes the inputs of all protocol parties and knows which parties are corrupted, therefore it normally can achieve the intention of the protocol in a much more straightforward manner. At a high level, once we have the protocol and the functionality defined, our goal is to prove that no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) Interactive Turing Machine (ITM) can distinguish whether it is interacting with the real world protocol or the ideal world functionality. If this is true we then say that the protocol UC-realises the functionality.

The principal contribution of UC is the following: Once a functionality that corresponds to a particular protocol is found, any other higher level protocol that internally uses the former protocol can instead use the functionality. This allows cryptographic proofs to compose and obviates the need for re-proving the security of every underlying primitive in every new application that uses it, therefore vastly improving the efficiency and scalability of the effort of cryptographic proofs.

An Interactive Turing Instance (ITI) is a single instantiation of an ITM. In UC, a number of ITIs execute and send messages to each other. At each moment only one ITI is executing (has the “execution token”) and when it sends a message to another ITI, it transfers the execution token to the receiver. Messages can be sent either locally (inputs, outputs) or over the network. There is no notion of time built in UC – the only requirement is that the total number of execution steps each ITI takes throughout the experiment is polynomial in the security parameter.

The first ITI to be activated is the environment  $\mathcal{E}$ . This can be an instance of any PPT ITM. This ITI encompasses everything that happens around the protocol under scrutiny, including the players that send instructions to the protocol. It also is the ITI that tries to distinguish whether it is in the real or the ideal world. Put otherwise, it plays the role of the distinguisher.

After activating and executing some code,  $\mathcal{E}$  may input a message to any party. If this execution is in the real world, then each party is an ITI running the protocol  $\Pi$ . Otherwise if the execution takes place in the ideal world, then each party is a dummy that simply relays messages to the functionality  $\mathcal{F}$ . An activated real world party then follows its code, which may instruct it to parse its input and send a message to another party via the network.

In UC the network is fully controlled by the so called adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ , which may be any PPT ITI. Once activated by any network message, this machine can read

the message contents and act adaptively, freely communicate with  $\mathcal{E}$  bidirectionally, choose to deliver the message right away, delay its delivery arbitrarily long, even corrupt it or drop it entirely. Crucially, it can also choose to corrupt any protocol party (in other words, UC allows adaptive corruptions). Once a party is corrupted, its internal state, inputs, outputs and execution comes under the full control of  $\mathcal{A}$  for the rest of the execution. Corruptions take place covertly, so other parties do not necessarily learn which parties are corrupt. Furthermore, a corrupted party cannot become honest again.

The fact that  $\mathcal{A}$  controls the network in the real world is modelled by providing direct communication channels between  $\mathcal{A}$  and every other machine. This however poses an issue for the ideal world, as  $\mathcal{F}$  is a single party that replaces all real world parties, so the interface has to be adapted accordingly. Furthermore, if  $\mathcal{F}$  is to be as simple as possible, simulating internally all real world parties is not the way forward. This however may prove necessary in order to faithfully simulate the messages that the adversary expects to see in the real world. To solve these issues an ideal world adversary, also known as simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ , is introduced. This party can communicate freely with  $\mathcal{F}$  and completely engulfs the real world  $\mathcal{A}$ . It can therefore internally simulate real world parties and generate suitable messages so that  $\mathcal{A}$  remains oblivious to the fact that this is the ideal world. Normally messages between  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{E}$  are just relayed by  $\mathcal{S}$ , without modification or special handling.

From the point of view of the functionality,  $\mathcal{S}$  is untrusted, therefore any information that  $\mathcal{F}$  leaks to  $\mathcal{S}$  has to be carefully monitored by the designer. Ideally it has to be as little as possible so that  $\mathcal{S}$  does not learn more than what is needed to simulate the real world. This facilitates modelling privacy.

At any point during one of its activations,  $\mathcal{E}$  may return a binary value (either 0 or 1). The entire execution then halts. Informally, we say that  $\Pi$  UC-realises  $\mathcal{F}$ , or equivalently that the ideal and the real worlds are indistinguishable, if  $\forall \text{ PPT } \mathcal{A}, \exists \text{ PPT } \mathcal{S} : \forall \text{ PPT } \mathcal{E}$ , the distance of the distributions over the machines' random tapes of the outputs of  $\mathcal{E}$  in the two worlds is negligibly small. Note the order of quantifiers:  $\mathcal{S}$  depends on  $\mathcal{A}$ , but not on  $\mathcal{E}$ .

### 3.2 $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ Functionality

In this work we choose to model the Bitcoin ledger with the  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  functionality as defined in [48] and further refined in [49].  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  formalizes an ideal data structure that is distributed and append-only, akin to a blockchain. Participants can read from  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , which returns an ordered list of transactions. Additionally a party can submit a new transaction which, if valid, will eventually be added to the ledger when the adversary decides, but necessarily within a predefined time window. This property is named liveness. Once a transaction becomes part of the ledger, it then becomes visible to all parties at the discretion of the adversary, but necessarily within another predefined time window, and it cannot be reordered or removed. This is named persistence.

Moreover,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  needs the  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Clock}}$  functionality [50], which models the notion of time. Any  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Clock}}$  participant can request to read the current time (which

is initially 0) and inform  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{CLOCK}}$  that her round is over.  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{CLOCK}}$  increments the time by one once all parties have declared the end of their round. We further note that both  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{CLOCK}}$  are global functionalities [51] and therefore can be accessed directly by the environment.

### 3.3 Modelling time

The protocol and functionality defined in this work do not use  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{CLOCK}}$  directly. Indeed, the only notion of time in our work is provided by the blockchain height, as reported by  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ . We therefore omit it in the statement of our lemmas and theorems for simplicity of notation; it should normally appear as a hybrid together with  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ .

Our protocol is fully asynchronous, i.e., the adversary can delay any network message arbitrarily long. The protocol is robust against such delays, as an honest party can unilaterally prevent loss of funds even if some of its incoming and outgoing network messages are dropped by  $\mathcal{A}$ , as long as the party has input-output communication with the ledger. We also note that, following the conventions of single-threaded UC execution model, the duration of local computation is not taken into account in any way (as long as it does not exceed its polynomial bound).

## 4 Model & Construction

### 4.1 Model

In this section we will examine the architecture and the details of our model, along with possible attacks and their mitigations. We follow the UCGS framework [13] to formulate the protocol and its security. We list the ideal-world global functionality  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  in Section 10 (Figures 7-11) and a simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  (Figures 19-20), along with a real-world protocol  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  (Figures 21-55) that UC-realizes  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  (Theorem 2). We give a self-contained description in this section, while pointing to figures in Sections 10 and 11, in case the reader is interested in a pseudocode style specification.

As in previous formulations, (e.g., [52]), the role of  $\mathcal{E}$  corresponds to two distinct actors in a real world implementation. On the one hand  $\mathcal{E}$  passes inputs that correspond to the desires of human users (e.g. open a channel, pay, close), on the other hand  $\mathcal{E}$  is responsible with periodically waking up parties to check the ledger and act upon any detected counterparty misbehaviour, similar to an always-on “daemon” of real-life software that periodically nudges the implementation to perform these checks.

Since it is possible that  $\mathcal{E}$  fails to wake up a party often enough,  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  explicitly checks whether it has become “negligent” every time it is activated and all security guarantees are conditioned on the party not being negligent. A party is deemed negligent if more than  $p$  blocks have been added to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  between any consecutive pair of activations. The need for explicit negligence



checking stems from the fact that party activation is entirely controlled by  $\mathcal{E}$  and no synchrony limitations are imposed (e.g. via the use of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{LOCK}}$ ), therefore it can happen that an otherwise honest party is not activated in time to prevent a malicious counterparty from successfully using an old commitment transaction. If a party is marked as negligent, no balance security guarantees are given (c.f. Lemma 1).

## 4.2 Ideal world functionality $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$

Our ideal world functionality  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  represents a single channel, either simple or virtual. It acts as a relay between  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{E}$ , leaking all messages. This simplifies the functionality and facilitates the indistinguishability argument by having  $\mathcal{S}$  simply running internally the real world protocols of the channel parties  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  with no modifications. Furthermore, the communication of parties with  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  is handled by  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ : when a simulated honest party in  $\mathcal{S}$  needs to send a message to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ ,  $\mathcal{S}$  instructs  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  to send this message to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  on this party's behalf.  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  internally maintains two state machines, one per channel party (c.f. Figures 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18) that keep track of whether the parties are corrupted or negligent, whether the channel has opened, whether a payment is underway, which ITIs are to be considered *kindred* parties (as they correspond to other channels owned by the same human user, discussed below) and whether the channel has closed. The single security check performed is *whether the on-chain coins are at least equal to the expected balance once the channel closes*. If this check fails,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  halts. Since the protocol  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  (which realises  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ , c.f. Theorems 1 and 2) never halts, this ideal world check corresponds to the security guarantee offered by  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$ . Note that this check is not performed for negligent parties, as  $\mathcal{S}$  notifies  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  if a party becomes negligent and the latter omits the check. Thus indistinguishability between the real and the ideal world is not violated in case of negligence.

Observe that a human user may participate in various channels, therefore it corresponds to more than one ITMs. This is the case for example for the funder of a virtual channel and the corresponding party of the first base channel. Such parties are called *kindred*. They communicate locally (i.e. via inputs and outputs, without using the adversarially controlled network) and balance guarantees concern their aggregate coins. Formally this communication is modelled by having a virtual channel using its base channels as global subroutines, as defined in [13].

If we were using plain UC, the above would constitute a violation of the subroutine respecting property that functionalities have to fulfill. We leverage the concept of global functionalities put forth in [13] to circumvent the issue. More specifically, we say that a simple channel functionality is of “level” 1, which is written as  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1$ . Inductively, a virtual channel functionality that is based on channels of any “level” up to and including  $n - 1$  has a “level”  $n$ , which we write as  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^n$ . Then  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^n$  is  $(\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1, \dots, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^{n-1})$ -subroutine respecting, according to the definition of [13]. The same structure is used in the real world between protocols as well. This technique ensures that the necessary conditions for the

validity of the functionality and the protocol are met and that the realisability proof can go through, as we will see in Section 5 in more detail.

Note that we could instead contain all the channels in a single, monolithic functionality (following the approach of [52]) and we believe that we could still carry out the security proof. Nevertheless, having the functionality correspond to a single channel has no drawbacks, as all desired security guarantees are provided by our modular architecture, and instead brings two benefits. Firstly, the functionality is easier to intuitively grasp, as it handles less tasks. Having a simple and intuitive functionality aids in its reusability and is an informal goal of the simulation-based paradigm. Secondly, this approach permits our functionality to be global, as defined in [13]. Furthermore, the ideal functionality defined in [9] is unsuitable for our case, as it requires direct access to the ledger, which is not the case for a  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  corresponding to a virtual channel.

### 4.3 Real world protocol $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$

Our real world protocol  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$ , ran by party  $P$ , consists of two subprotocols: the Lightning-inspired part, dubbed LN (Figures 21-40) and the novel virtual layer subprotocol, named VIRT (Figures 41-55). A simple channel that is not the base of any virtual channel leverages only LN, whereas a simple channel that is the base of at least one virtual channel does leverage both LN and VIRT. A virtual channel uses both LN and VIRT.

**LN subprotocol** The LN subprotocol has two variations depending on whether  $P$  is the channel funder (*Alice*) or the fundee (*Bob*). It performs a number of tasks: Initialisation takes a single step for fundees and two steps for funders. LN first receives a public key  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  from  $\mathcal{E}$ . This is the public key that should eventually own all  $P$ 's coins after the channel is closed. LN also initialises its internal variables. If  $P$  is a funder, LN waits for a second activation to generate a keypair and then waits for  $\mathcal{E}$  to endow it with some coins, which will be subsequently used to open the channel (Figure 21).

After initialisation, the funder *Alice* is ready to open the channel. Once  $\mathcal{E}$  gives to *Alice* the identity of *Bob*, the initial channel balance  $c$  and, (looking forward to Subsubsection 4.3) in case it is a virtual, the identities of the base channel owners (Figure 28), *Alice* generates and sends *Bob* her funding and revocation public keys ( $pk_{A,F}$ ,  $pk_{A,R}$ , used for the funding and revocation outputs respectively) along with  $c$ ,  $pk_{A,\text{out}}$ , and the base channel identities (if any). Given that *Bob* has been initialised, it generates funding and revocation keys and replies to *Alice* with  $pk_{B,F}$ ,  $pk_{B,R}$ , and  $pk_{B,\text{out}}$  (Figure 23).

The next step prepares the base channels (Figure 24). If our channel is a simple one, then *Alice* simply generates the funding tx. If it is a virtual and assuming all base parties (running LN) cooperate, a chain of messages from *Alice* to *Bob* and back via all base parties is initiated (Figures 30 and 31). These messages let each successive neighbour know the identities of all the base parties. Furthermore each party instantiates a new “host” party that runs VIRT. It also generates new funding keys and communicates them, along with its “out” key

$pk_{P,\text{out}}$  and its leftward and rightward balances. If this circuit of messages completes, *Alice* delegates the creation of the new virtual layer transactions to its new VIRT host, which will be discussed later in detail. If the virtual layer is successful, each base party is informed by its host accordingly, intermediaries return to the OPEN state (i.e., they have completed their part and are ready to accept instructions for, e.g., new payments) and *Alice* and *Bob* continue the opening procedure. In particular, *Alice* and *Bob* exchange signatures on the initial commitment transactions, therefore ensuring that the funding output can be spent (Figure 25). After that, in case the channel is simple the funding transaction is put on-chain (Figure 26) and finally  $\mathcal{E}$  is informed of the successful channel opening.

There are two facts that should be noted: Firstly, in case the opened channel is virtual, each intermediary necessarily partakes in two channels. However each protocol instance only represents a party in a single channel, therefore each intermediary is in practice realised by two kindred  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  instances that communicate locally, called “siblings”. Secondly, our protocol is not designed to gracefully recover if other parties do not send an expected message at any point in the opening or payment procedure. Such anti-Denial-of-Service measures would greatly complicate the protocol and are left as a task for a real world implementation. It should however be stressed that an honest party with an open channel that has fallen victim to such an attack can still unilaterally close the channel, therefore no coins are lost in any case.

Once the channel is open, *Alice* and *Bob* can carry out an unlimited number of payments in either direction, only needing to exchange 3 direct network messages with each other per payment, therefore avoiding the slow and costly on-chain validation. The payment procedure is identical for simple and virtual channels and crucially it does not implicate the intermediaries (and therefore *Alice* and *Bob* do not incur any delays such an interaction with intermediaries would introduce). For a payment to be carried out, the payee is first notified by  $\mathcal{E}$  (Figure 35) and subsequently the payer is instructed by  $\mathcal{E}$  to commence the payment (Figure 34).

If the channel is virtual, each party also checks that its upcoming balance is lower than the balance of its sibling’s counterparty and that the upcoming balance of the counterparty is higher than the balance of its own sibling, otherwise it rejects the payment. This is to mitigate a “griefing” attack (i.e. one that does not lead to financial gain) where a malicious counterparty uses an old commitment transaction to spend the base funding output, therefore blocking the honest party from using its initiator virtual transaction. This check ensures that the coins gained by the punishment are sufficient to cover the losses from the blocked initiator transaction. If the attack takes place, other local channels based directly or indirectly on it are informed and are moved to a failed state. Note that this does not bring a risk of losing any of the total coins of all local channels. We conjecture that this balance constraint can be lifted if the current Lightning-inspired payment method is replaced with an eltoo-inspired one [22].

Subsequently each of the two parties builds the new commitment transaction of its counterparty, signs it and sends over the signature, then the revocation transactions for the previously valid commitment transactions are generated, signed and the signatures are exchanged. To reduce the number of messages, the payee sends the two signatures in one message. This does not put it at risk of losing funds, since the new commitment transaction (for which it has already received a signature and therefore can spend) gives it more funds than the previous one.

$\mathcal{H}_{\text{Chan}}$  also checks the chain for outdated commitment transactions by the counterparty and publishes the corresponding revocation transaction in case one is found (Figure 37). It also keeps track of whether the party is activated often enough and marks it as negligent otherwise (Figure 21). In particular, at the beginning of every activation while the channel is open, LN checks if the party has been activated within the last  $p$  blocks (where  $p$  is an implementation-dependent global constant) by reading from  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and comparing the current block height with that of the last activation.

When either party is instructed by  $\mathcal{E}$  to close the channel (Figure 39), it first asks its host to close (details on the exact steps are discussed later) and once that is done, the ledger is checked for any transaction spending the funding output. In case the latest remote commitment tx is on-chain, then the channel is already closed and no further action is necessary. If an old commitment transaction is on-chain, the corresponding revocation transaction is used for punishment. If the funding output is still unspent, the party attempts to publish the latest commitment transaction after waiting for any relevant timelock to expire. Until the funding output is irrevocably spent, the party still has to periodically check the blockchain and again be ready to use a revocation transaction if an old commitment transaction spends the funding output after all (Figure 37).

**VIRT subprotocol** This subprotocol acts as a mediator between the base channels and the Lightning-based logic. Put otherwise, its responsibility is putting on-chain the funding output of the channel when needed. When first initialised by a machine that executes the LN subprotocol (Figure 41), it learns and stores the identities, keys, and balances of various relevant parties, along with the required timelock and other useful data regarding the base channels. It then generates a number of keys as needed for the rest of the base preparation. If the initialiser is also the channel funder, then the VIRT machine initiates 4 “circuits” of messages. Each circuit consists of one message from the funder  $P_1$  to its neighbour  $P_2$ , one message from each intermediary  $P_i$  to the “next” neighbour  $P_{i+1}$ , one message from the fundee  $P_n$  to its neighbour  $P_{n-1}$  and one more message from each intermediary  $P_i$  to the “previous” neighbour  $P_{i-1}$ , for a total of  $2 \cdot (n - 1)$  messages per circuit.

The first circuit (Figure 42) communicates all “out”, virtual and funding keys (both old and new), all balances and all timelocks among all parties. In the second circuit (Figure 49) every party receives and verifies all signatures for all inputs of its virtual transactions that spend a virtual output. It also produces and sends its own such signatures to the other parties. Each party generates and circulates

$$S = \sum_{i=2}^{n-2} (n - 3 + \chi_{i=2} + \chi_{i=n-1} + 2(i - 2 + \chi_{i=2})(n - i - 1 + \chi_{i=n-1})) \in O(n^3)$$

signatures (where  $\chi_A$  is the characteristic function that equals 1 if  $A$  is true and 0 else), which is derived by calculating the total number of virtual outputs of all parties' virtual transactions – we remind that each virtual output can be spent by a  $n$ -of- $n$  multisig. On a related note, the number of virtual transactions stored by each party is 1 for the two endpoints (Figure 44) and  $n - 2 + \chi_{i=2} + \chi_{i=n-1} + (i - 2 + \chi_{i=2})(n - i - 1 + \chi_{i=n-1}) \in O(n^2)$  for the  $i$ -th intermediary (Figure 43). The latter is derived by counting the number of extend-interval and merge-intervals transactions held by the intermediary, which are equal to the number of distinct intervals that the party can extend and the number of distinct pairs of intervals that the party can merge respectively, plus 1 for the unique initiator transaction of the party. The third circuit concerns sharing signatures for the funding outputs (Figure 50). Each party signs all transactions that spend a funding output relevant to the party, i.e. the initiator transaction and some of the extend-interval transactions of its neighbours. The two endpoints send 2 signatures each when  $n = 3$  and  $n - 2$  signatures each when  $n > 3$ , whereas each intermediary sends  $2 + \chi_{i+1 < n}(n - 2 + \chi_{i=n-2}) + \chi_{i-1 > 1}(n - 2 + \chi_{i=3}) \in O(n)$  signatures each. The last circuit of messages (Figure 51) carries the revocations of the previous states of all base channels. After this, base parties can only use the newly created virtual transactions to spend their funding outputs. In this step each party exchanges a single signature with each of its neighbours.

When VIRT is instructed to close by party  $R$  (Figure 53), it first notifies its VIRT host (if any) and waits for it to close. After that, it signs and publishes the unique valid virtual transaction. It then repeatedly checks the chain to see if the transaction is included (Figure 54). If it is included, the virtual layer is closed and VIRT informs (i.e. outputs (CLOSED) to)  $R$ . The instruction to close has to be received potentially many times, because a number of virtual transactions (the ones that spend the same output) are mutually exclusive and therefore if another base party publishes an incompatible virtual transaction contemporaneously and that remote transaction enters the chain, then our VIRT party has to try again with another, compatible virtual transaction.

## 5 Security

The first step to formally arguing about the security of Elmo is to clearly delineate the exact security guarantees it provides. To that end, we first prove two similar claims regarding the conservation of funds in the real and ideal world, Lemmas 4 and 5 respectively. Informally, the first establishes that an honest, non-negligent party which was implicated in an already closed channel on which a number of payments took place will have at least the expected funds on-chain.

**Lemma 1 (Real world balance security (informal)).** *Consider a real world execution with  $P \in \{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}$  honest LN ITI. Assume that all of the following are true:*

- $P$  is not negligent,
- $P$  successfully opened the channel, with initial balance  $c$  ( $c = 0$  if  $P$  is a fundee)
- $P$  is the host of  $n$  channels, where the  $i$ th channel is funded with  $f_i$  coins,
- $P$  has successfully sent  $m$  payments, where the  $i$ th payment involved  $d_i$  coins,
- $P$  has successfully received  $l$  payments, where the  $i$ th payment involved  $c_i$  coins.

If  $P$  closes its channel, eventually its view of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  will contain  $h$  outputs spendable only by  $P$  or another kindred party, each of value  $c_i$ , such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^h c_i \geq c - \sum_{i=1}^n f_i - \sum_{i=1}^m d_i + \sum_{i=1}^l e_i . \quad (1)$$

The formal statement, Lemma 4, is deferred to the Appendix.

The second lemma states that for an ideal party in a similar situation, the balance that  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  has stored for it is at least equal to the expected funds.

**Lemma 2 (Ideal world balance (informal)).** *Consider an ideal world execution with functionality  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  and simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ . Let  $P \in \{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}$  one of the two parties of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ . Assume that all of the following are true:*

- $P$  is not corrupted or negligent, nor the any member of the transitive closure of its hosts has published a revocation transaction,
- $P$  successfully opened the channel, with initial balance  $c$  ( $c = 0$  if  $P$  is a fundee)
- $P$  is the host of  $n$  channels, where the  $i$ th channel is funded with  $f_i$  coins,
- $P$  has successfully sent  $m$  payments, where the  $i$ th payment involved  $d_i$  coins,
- $P$  has successfully received  $l$  payments, where the  $i$ th payment involved  $c_i$  coins.

Let  $\text{balance}_P$  be the balance that  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  stores internally for  $P$ . If the channel is closed, then the following holds with overwhelming probability on the security parameter:

$$\text{balance}_P = c - \sum_{i=1}^n f_i - \sum_{i=1}^m d_i + \sum_{i=1}^l e_i \quad (2)$$

The formal statement, Lemma 5, is deferred to the Appendix.

In both cases the expected funds are [initial balance - funds for supported virtuals - outbound payments + inbound payments]. Note that the funds for supported virtuals only refer to those funds used by the funder of the virtual channel, not the rest of the base parties.

Both proofs follow the various possible execution paths, keeping track of the resulting balance in each case and coming to the conclusion that balance is secure in all cases, except if signatures are forged.

It is important to note that in fact  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  provides a stronger guarantee, namely that an honest, non-negligent party with an open channel can unilaterally

close it and obtain the expected funds on-chain within a known number of blocks, given that  $\mathcal{E}$  sends the necessary “daemon” messages. This stronger guarantee is sufficient to make this construction reliable enough for real-world applications. However a corresponding ideal world functionality with such guarantees would have to be aware of the specific transactions and signatures, therefore it would be essentially as complicated as the protocol, thus violating the spirit of the simulation-based security paradigm.

Subsequently we prove Lemma 3, which informally states that if an ideal party and all its kindred parties are honest, then  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  does not halt with overwhelming probability.

**Lemma 3 (No halt).** *In an ideal execution with  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  and  $\mathcal{S}$ , if the kindred parties of the honest parties of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  are themselves honest, then the functionality halts with negligible probability in the security parameter (i.e. l. 21 of Fig. 11 is executed negligibly often).*

This is proven by first arguing that if the conditions of Lemma 5 for the ideal world hold, then the conditions of Lemma 4 also hold for the equivalent real world execution, therefore in this case  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  does not halt. We then argue that also in case the conditions of Lemma 5 do not hold,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  may never halt as well, therefore concluding the proof.

A salient observation regarding an instance  $s$  of  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  is that, in order to open a virtual channel, it passes inputs to another  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  instance  $s'$  that belongs to a different extended session. This means that  $s$  (and therefore  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$ ) is not *subroutine respecting*, as defined in [12]. To address this issue, we first annotate  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  with a numeric superscript, i.e.  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^n$ .  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^1$  is always a simple (i.e. on-chain) channel. To achieve this,  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  undergoes a modification under which it ignores all  $(\text{OPEN}, x, \text{hops} \neq \text{“ledger”}, \dots)$  messages. Likewise we define  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1$  as a version of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  that ignores  $(\text{OPEN}, x, \text{hops} \neq \text{“ledger”}, \dots)$  messages. As for the rest of the superscripts,  $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}^*$ ,  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^{n+1}$  is a virtual channel protocol  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  of which the base channels have a maximum superscript  $n$ . It then holds that  $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}^*$ ,  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^n$  is  $(\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}, \Pi_{\text{Chan}}^1, \dots, \Pi_{\text{Chan}}^{n-1})$ -subroutine respecting, as defined in [13]. Likewise,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^{n+1}$  is a virtual channel functionality  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  of which the base channels have a maximum superscript  $n$ . It then holds that  $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}^*$ ,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^n$  is  $(\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1, \dots, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^{n-1})$ -subroutine respecting.

We now formulate and prove Theorem 1, which states that  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^1$  UC-realises  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1$ .

**Theorem 1 (Simple Payment Channel Security).** *The protocol  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^1$  UC-realises  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1$  in the presence of a global functionality  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assuming the security of the underlying digital signature. Specifically,*

$$\forall \text{ PPT } \mathcal{A}, \exists \text{ PPT } \mathcal{S} : \forall \text{ PPT } \mathcal{E} \text{ it is } \text{EXEC}_{\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^1, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}} \approx \text{EXEC}_{\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{E}}^{\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}}$$

The corresponding proof is a simple application of Lemma 3, the fact that  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  is a simple relay and that  $\mathcal{S}$  faithfully simulates  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}$  internally.



*Proof (Proof of Theorem 1).* By inspection of Figures 7 and 19 we can deduce that for a particular  $\mathcal{E}$ , in the ideal world execution  $\text{EXEC}_{S_{\mathcal{A}}, \mathcal{E}}^{\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}}$ ,  $S_{\mathcal{A}}$  simulates internally the two  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^1$  parties exactly as they would execute in  $\text{EXEC}_{\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^1, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}}$ , the real world execution, in case  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1$  does not halt. Indeed,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1$  only halts with negligible probability according to Lemma 3, therefore the two executions are computationally indistinguishable.

Lastly we prove that  $\forall$  integers  $n \geq 2$ ,  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^n$  UC-realises  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^n$  in the presence of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1, \dots, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^{n-1}$  (leveraging the relevant definition from [13]).

**Theorem 2 (Recursive Virtual Payment Channel Security).**  $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}^* \setminus \{1\}$ , the protocol  $\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^n$  UC-realises  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^n$  in the presence of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1, \dots, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^{n-1}$  and  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , assuming the security of the underlying digital signature. Specifically,

$$\forall n \in \mathbb{N}^* \setminus \{1\}, \forall \text{ PPT } \mathcal{A}, \exists \text{ PPT } \mathcal{S} : \forall \text{ PPT } \mathcal{E} \text{ it is}$$

$$\text{EXEC}_{\Pi_{\text{Chan}}^n, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^1, \dots, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^{n-1}} \approx \text{EXEC}_{S_{\mathcal{A}}, \mathcal{E}}^{\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}^n, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}}$$

*Proof (Proof of Theorem 2).* The proof is exactly the same as that of Theorem 1, replacing superscripts 1 for  $n$ .

Formal proofs for the three lemmas can be found in Section 13.

## 6 On the necessity of ANYPREVOUT

As our protocol relies on the ANYPREVOUT sighash flag, it cannot be deployed on Bitcoin until it is introduced. We here argue that any efficient protocol that achieves goals similar to ours and has parties maintain Bitcoin transactions in their local state requires the proposed sighash flag.

**Definition 1 (Off-chain base protocol).** An off-chain base protocol of  $n \geq 2$  parties is a generalisation of pairwise channels to  $n$  participants, in which a number of coins are locked in one or more outputs, each of which requires an  $n$ -of- $n$  multisig in order to be spent (with 1 signature per participant) and where each party can unilaterally spend these outputs with one or more alternative transactions specified by the protocol, thus terminating (closing) the protocol.

**Theorem 3 (ANYPREVOUT is necessary).** Consider  $n$  independent, ordered off-chain base protocols such that every pair of consecutive protocols  $(\Pi_{i-1}, \Pi_i)$  for  $i \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}$  has a common party  $P_i$ . Also consider a protocol that establishes a virtual channel (i.e. a payment channel that does not need to add any txs on-chain when opening) between two parties  $P_1, P_n$  that take part in the first and last off-chain protocols respectively. If this protocol:

1. guarantees that each honest protocol party (either endpoint or intermediary) needs to put at most  $O(1)$  transactions on-chain for unilateral closure,



2. ensures that for each honest party  $P$ , if after establishing the virtual channel, no other party communicates off-chain with  $P$ , then in all scenarios  $P$  will regain its fair share of coins exclusively from one or more transactions that are descendants of one or more of the multisig outputs of the base protocol(s) in which it is implicated and
3. needs to have at most a subexponential (in  $n$ ) number of transactions available off-chain,

then the protocol needs the **ANYPREVOUT** sighash flag.

*Proof (Proof of Theorem 3).* **[Orfeas: the next paragraph is wrong]** When an off-chain protocol is closed, there has to be some form of on-chain enforceable information and coin flow to at least one of its neighbouring protocols. This is to ensure that the virtual channel will be funded exactly once if at least one of its participants is honest and that no honest intermediary will be charged. If such information flow is lacking, then we have a partition of the path, making it possible to have no common party in the two partitions. In that case, there is no party that has to either provide its signature to both partitions in order for the protocol to progress or risk losing coins. This in turn, combined with the fact that all payments in the  $(P_1, P_n)$  virtual channel happen without the need to inform any intermediary, means that the participants of the partition that contains  $P_1$  (w.l.o.g.) can collude and give to  $P_1$  any sum of money they agree on, without giving an opportunity to  $P_n$  to object in case this sum does not correspond to the  $(P_1, P_n)$  channel balance, therefore violating the rules of the virtual channel.

**[Orfeas: the next sentence is wrong: it would be more correct if it asked for atomic spending of the two base protocol outputs or their “descendants”]** Due to the way the UTXO model works and respecting the second theorem rule, such information or coin flow can happen only by having intermediaries atomically spend the outputs of one of their base protocols together with the outputs of the other base protocol. This need for atomic spending also holds for any outputs that carry the relevant information or coins and are created when other protocol participants spend the base protocol outputs – such “successor” outputs must exist in order to permit the required information/coin flow. Such atomic spends can only be carried out via a single transaction that consumes all relevant outputs. There is no other possible manner of on-chain enforceable information and coin flow that is compatible with the theorem requirements. Indeed, coins can only cross from one base protocol to the next via a transaction that involves both protocols. Note that adaptor signatures [9] do not constitute an exception, as they facilitate coin exchange only if the parties and all base protocols for this particular virtual channel were known when the off-chain protocols were opened (contradicting off-chain protocol independence) or if new on-chain transactions are introduced when opening the virtual channel (contradicting off-chain opening).

Therefore each party must have different transactions available to close its off-chain protocol(s), each corresponding to a different order of actions taken by participants of other off-chain protocols. This is true because if a party could

close its protocol in an identical way whether one of its neighbouring protocols had already closed or not, it would then fail to make use of and possibly propagate to the other side the relevant coins and information. We will now prove by induction in the number  $m = n - 1$  of base protocols that the number of these transactions  $T_m$  is exponential if ANYPREVOUT is not available, by calculating a lower bound, specifically, that  $T_m \geq 2^{m-1}$ .

If  $m = 2$ , then there is a single intermediary  $P_2$ . It needs at least 2 different transactions: one if it moves first and one if it moves second, after a member in the off-chain protocol to its right, e.g.  $P_3$ . From this it follows immediately that  $T_2 \geq 2$ .

If  $m = k > 2$ , then assume that  $P_2$  needs to have  $f \geq 2^{m-1}$  transactions available to be able to unilaterally close its protocols in all scenarios in which all parties  $P_i$  for  $i \in \{3, \dots, k+1\}$  act before  $P_2$ . Each of those transactions corresponds to one or more orderings of the closing actions of the parties of the other base protocols. No two transactions correspond to the same ordering.

For the induction step, consider a virtual channel over  $m = k + 1$  base protocols.  $P_2$  would still need  $f$  different transactions, each corresponding to the same orderings of parties' actions as in the induction hypothesis. These transactions are possibly different to the ones they correspond to in the case of the induction hypothesis, but their total number is the same. For each of these orderings we produce two new orderings: one in which the new party  $P_{k+2}$  acts right before and one in which it acts right after  $P_{k+1}$ . Given such an ordering  $o$ , consider the neighbor relation between the set of parties that have been activated and take its reflexive and transitive closure  $\sim_o$ . Now consider any party  $P_i$  with the following properties: (i) it acts after  $P_{k+2}$  and  $P_{k+1}$  (e.g.,  $P_2$  is such a party), and (ii) at least one of its neighbours belongs to the equivalence class of  $\sim_o$  that contains  $P_{k+1}$ . Observe that such party  $P_i$  is always well defined. Since  $P_{k+1}$  must necessarily use a different transaction for each of the two orderings with  $P_{k+2}$ , and since there is a continuous chain of parties between  $P_{k+1}$  and  $P_i$  that have already acted, it is the case that  $P_i$  must have a different transaction for each of these two cases as well, as without ANYPREVOUT, an input of a transaction can only spend a specific output of a specific transaction. Finally, given that  $P_2$  will have to act in response to at least as many of the above options, we deduce that  $P_2$  needs to have at least  $2f \geq 2^m$  transactions available. This completes the induction step.

As a result, we conclude that party  $P_2$  needs at least  $2^{m-1} \in O(2^n)$  transactions to be able to unilaterally close its protocol.

Note that in case of a protocol that resembles ours but does not make use of ANYPREVOUT, the situation is further complicated in two distinct ways: First, virtual channel parties would have to generate and sign an at least exponential number of new commitment transactions on each update, one for each possible virtual output, therefore making virtual channel payments unrealistic. Second, if one of the base channels of a virtual channel is itself virtual, then the new channel needs a different set of virtual transactions for each of the (exponentially many)

possible funding outputs of the base virtual channel, thus further compounding the issue.

## 7 Efficiency Evaluation

We offer here a comparison of this work with LVPC [10], BCVC [8] and Donner [45] in terms of communication efficiency when opening and updating and in terms of on-chain footprint when non-cooperatively closing a virtual channel, both in size and number of transactions, aggregated for all parties. The comparison is performed both for channels of length 2 and for channels of length  $n$ . In the second comparison BCVC is not included, since only LVPC and Donner offer a way to open virtual channels of length greater than 2 (since LVPC is recursive and Donner is variadic).

BCVC proposes 4 configurations, each with different efficiency characteristics: over Generalised Channels [9] (GC) or Lightning, and with or without validity (V or NV respectively); we include all of them here. We refer the reader to [8] for more details.

**Table 2.** Efficiency comparison of virtual channel protocols with 3 parties

	Open		Update		Close	
	#txs	size	#txs	size	#txs	size
LVPC	14	100000	2	100000	10	100000
BCVC-GC-NV	7	2829	2	695	7	2829
BCVC-GC-V	8	2803	2	695	6	2108
BCVC-LN-NV	16	7704	8	2824	3	1800
BCVC-LN-V	14	5722	4	1412	4	1778
Donner	14	4721	2	695	10	3438
this work	1000	100000	1000	100000	1000	100000

**Table 3.** Efficiency comparison of virtual channel protocols with  $n$  parties

	Open		Update		Close	
	#txs	size	#txs	size	#txs	size
LVPC	$7(n-1)$	$34n^2 + 1240n + 695$	2	695	$5n-5$	$1082n + 192$
Donner	$4n-2$	100000	2	100000	$3n+1$	100000
this work	1000	100000	1000	100000	1000	100000

TODO: lpvc values don't seem right

## 8 Discussion and Future work

A number of features can be added to our protocol for additional efficiency, usability and flexibility. First of all, a new subprotocol for cooperatively closing a virtual channel can be created. In the optimistic case, a virtual channel would then be closed with no on-chain transactions and its base channels would become independent once again. To achieve this goal, cooperation is needed between all base parties of the virtual channel and possibly parties implicated in other virtual channels that use the same base channels.

In our current construction, each time a particular channel  $C$  acts as a base channel for a new virtual channel, one more “virtualisation layer” is added. When one of its owners wants to close  $C$ , it has to put on-chain as many transactions as there are virtualisation layers. Also the timelocks associated with closing a virtual channel increase with the number of virtualisation layers of its base channels. Both these issues can be alleviated by extending the opening subprotocol with the ability to cooperatively open multiple virtual channels in the same layer, either simultaneously or as an amendment to an existing virtualisation layer.

Due to the possibility of the griefing attack discussed in Subsubsection 4.3, the range of balances a virtual channel can support is limited by the balances of neighbouring channels. We believe that this limitation can be lifted if instead of using a Lightning-based construction for the payment layer, we instead replace it with an eltoo-based [22] construction. Since in eltoo a maliciously published old state can be simply re-spent by the honest latest state, the griefing attack is completely avoided. What is more, our protocol shares with eltoo the need for the `ANYPREVOUT` sighash flag, therefore no additional requirements from the Bitcoin protocol would be added by this change. Lastly, due to the separation of intermediate layers with the payment layer in our pseudocode implementation as found in Section 11 (i.e. the distinction between the LN and the VIRT protocols), this change should in principle not need extensive changes in all parts of the protocol.

As it currently stands, the timelocks calculated for the virtual channels are based on  $p$  (Figure 21) and  $s$  (Figure 25), which are global constants that are immutable and common to all parties. The parameter  $s$  stems from the liveness guarantees of Bitcoin, as discussed in Proposition 1 and therefore cannot be tweaked. However,  $p$  represents the maximum time (in blocks) between two activations of a non-negligent party, so in principle it is possible for the parties to explicitly negotiate this value when opening a new channel and even renegotiate it after the channel has been opened if need be. We leave this usability-augmenting protocol feature as future work.

As we mentioned earlier, our protocol is not designed to “gracefully” recover from a situation in which halfway through a subprotocol, one of the counterparties starts misbehaving. Currently the only solution is to unilaterally close the channel. This however means that DoS attacks (that still do not lead to financial losses) are possible. A practical implementation of our protocol would need to expand the available actions and states to be able to transparently and gracefully recover from such problems, avoiding closing the channel where possible,

especially when the problem stems from network issues and not from malicious behaviour.

Furthermore, any deployment of the protocol has to explicitly handle the issue of transaction fees. These include miner fees for on-chain transactions and intermediary fees for the parties that own base channels and facilitate opening virtual channels. These fees should take into account the fact that each intermediary has quadratic storage requirements, whereas endpoints only need constant storage, creating an opportunity for amplification attacks. Our protocol is compatible with any such fee parameterization and we leave for future work the incentive analyses that can determine concrete values for such intermediary fees.

In order to increase readability and to keep focus on the salient points of the construction, our protocol does not exploit a number of possible optimisations. These include a number of techniques employed in Lightning that drastically reduce storage requirements, along with a variety of possible improvements to our novel virtual subprotocol. Most notably, the Taproot [53] update that is planned for Bitcoin will allow for a drastic reduction in the size of transactions, as in the optimistic case only the hash of the Script has to be added to the blockchain and the  $n$  signatures needed to spend a virtual output can be replaced with their aggregate, resulting in constant size storage. As this work is mainly a proof of feasibility, we leave these optimisations as future work.

Additionally, our protocol does not feature one-off multi-hop payments like those possible in Lightning. This however is a useful feature in case two parties know that they will only transact once, as opening a virtual channel needs substantially more network communication than performing an one-off multi-hop payment. It would be therefore fruitful to also enable the multi-hop payment technique used in Lightning and allow human users to choose which method to use in each case.

Moreover, the result of Theorem 3 excludes a large class of variadic recursive protocols that do not make use of **ANYPREVOUT** from achieving practical performance, but it does not preclude the existence of such protocols. Specifically, there may be some as of yet unknown protocol technique that allows parties to generate only the transactions that they need to put on-chain during the closing procedure, from a master secret-key that has been received when opening. This would permit parties to circumvent the need for exchanging and storing an exponential number of signatures and transactions even without **ANYPREVOUT**; we note that the theorem is not invalidated: there are still exponentially many signatures that are required to be accessible. It is just that there is a way to compress the information needed to generate them in the state of each party. The existence of such state compression techniques is left as an interesting future direction.

Last but not least, the current analysis gives no privacy guarantees for the protocol, as it does not employ onion packets [54] like Lightning. Furthermore,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  leaks all messages to the ideal adversary therefore theoretically no privacy is offered at all. Nevertheless, onion packets can be incorporated in the current construction and intuitively our construction leaks less data than Lightning for

the same multi-hop payments, as intermediaries in our case do not learn the new balance after every payment, contrary to Lightning. Therefore a future extension can improve the privacy of the construction and formally demonstrate exact privacy guarantees.

## 9 Conclusion

In this work we presented Recursive Virtual Payment Channels for Bitcoin, a construction which enables the establishment of pairwise payment channels without the need for posting on-chain transactions. Such a channel can be opened over a path of consecutive base channels of arbitrary length, i.e., the virtual channel constructor is variadic.

The base channels themselves can be virtual, therefore the novel recursive nature of the construction. A key performance characteristic of our construction is that it has optimal round complexity for channel closing: a single transaction is required by any participant to turn the virtual channel into a simple one and one more transaction is needed to close it, be it an end-point or an intermediary.

We formally described the protocol in the UC setting, provided a corresponding ideal functionality and simulator and finally proved the indistinguishability of the protocol and functionality, along with the balance security property that ensures no loss of funds for honest, non-negligent parties. This is achieved through the use of the **ANYPREVOUT** sighash flag, which is a proposed feature for Bitcoin, also required by the eltoo improvement to lightning, [22].

We also proved that any construction as efficient as ours will require from channel intermediaries to access an exponential number of different transactions in the number of base channels, unless a sighash flag such as **ANYPREVOUT** is available. Barring the existence of a state compression method that manages to compress this exponentially large set of transactions into a polynomial size private state of some form, our work serves as further evidence for the usefulness of including this flag into the Bitcoin protocol.

## 10 Functionality & Simulator

### Functionality $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ – general message handling rules

- On receiving input  $(\text{msg})$  by  $\mathcal{E}$  addressed to  $P \in \{Alice, Bob\}$ , handle it according to the corresponding rule in Fig. 8, 9, 11, or 10 (if any) and subsequently send  $(\text{RELAY}, \text{msg}, P, \mathcal{E}, \text{input})$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- On receiving  $(\text{msg})$  by party  $R$  addressed to  $P \in \{Alice, Bob\}$  by means of  $\text{mode} \in \{\text{output}, \text{network}\}$ , handle it according to the corresponding rule in Fig. 8, 9, 11, or 10 (if any) and subsequently send  $(\text{RELAY}, \text{msg}, P, \mathcal{E}, \text{mode})$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . // all messages are relayed to  $\mathcal{A}$
- On receiving  $(\text{RELAY}, \text{msg}, P, R, \text{mode})$  by  $\mathcal{A}$  ( $\text{mode} \in \{\text{input}, \text{output}, \text{network}\}$ ,  $P \in \{Alice, Bob\}$ ), relay  $\text{msg}$  to  $R$  as  $P$  by means of  $\text{mode}$ . //  $\mathcal{A}$  fully controls outgoing messages by  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$
- On receiving  $(\text{INFO}, \text{msg})$  by  $\mathcal{A}$ , handle  $(\text{msg})$  according to the corresponding rule in Fig. 8, 9, 11, or 10 (if any). After handling the message or after an “ensure” fails, send  $(\text{HANDLED}, \text{msg})$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ . //  $(\text{INFO}, \text{msg})$  messages by  $\mathcal{S}$  always return control to  $\mathcal{S}$  without any side-effect to any other ITI, except if  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  halts
- $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  keeps track of two state machines, one for each of *Alice*, *Bob*. If there are more than one suitable rules for a particular message, or if a rule matches the message for both parties, then both rule versions are executed. // the two rules act on different state machines, so the order of execution does not matter

Fig. 7.

Note that in UCGS [13], just like in UC, every message to an ITI may arrive via one of three channels: input, output and network. In the session of interest, input messages come from the environment  $\mathcal{E}$  in the real world, whereas in the ideal world each input message comes from the corresponding dummy party, which forwards it as received by  $\mathcal{E}$ . Outputs may be received from any subroutine (local or global). This means that the “sender field” of inputs and outputs cannot be tampered with by  $\mathcal{E}$  or  $\mathcal{A}$ . Network messages only come from  $\mathcal{A}$ ; they may have been sent from any machine but are relayed (and possibly delayed, reordered, modified or even dropped) by  $\mathcal{A}$ . Therefore, in contrast to inputs and outputs, network messages may have a tampered “sender field”.

### Functionality $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ – open state machine, $P \in \{Alice, Bob\}$

- 1: On first activation: // before handing the message
- 2:  $pk_P \leftarrow \perp$ ;  $\text{balance}_P \leftarrow 0$ ;  $\text{State}_P \leftarrow \text{UNINIT}$
- 3:  $\text{enabler}_P \leftarrow \perp$  // if we are a virtual channel, the ITI of  $P$ ’s base channel
- 4:  $\text{host}_P \leftarrow \perp$  // if we are a virtual channel, the ITI of the common host of this channel and  $P$ ’s base channel

```

5: On (BECAME CORRUPTED OR NEGLIGENT,  $P$ ) by  $\mathcal{A}$  or on output (ENABLER
   USED REVOCATION) by  $\text{host}_P$  when in any state:
6:    $\text{State}_P \leftarrow \text{IGNORED}$ 

7: On (INIT,  $pk$ ) by  $P$  when  $\text{State}_P = \text{UNINIT}$ :
8:    $pk_P \leftarrow pk$ 
9:    $\text{State}_P \leftarrow \text{INIT}$ 

10: On (OPEN,  $x$ , "ledger", ...) by  $Alice$  when  $\text{State}_A = \text{INIT}$ :
11:   store  $x$ 
12:    $\text{State}_A \leftarrow \text{TENTATIVE BASE OPEN}$ 

13: On (BASE OPEN) by  $\mathcal{A}$  when  $\text{State}_A = \text{TENTATIVE BASE OPEN}$ :
14:    $\text{balance}_A \leftarrow x$ 
15:    $\text{State}_A \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 

16: On (BASE OPEN) by  $\mathcal{A}$  when  $\text{State}_B = \text{INIT}$ :
17:    $\text{State}_B \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 

18: On (OPEN,  $x$ ,  $\text{hops} \neq \text{"ledger"}$ , ...) by  $Alice$  when  $\text{State}_A = \text{INIT}$ :
19:   store  $x$ 
20:    $\text{enabler}_A \leftarrow \text{hops}[0].\text{left}$ 
21:   add  $\text{enabler}_A$  to  $Alice$ 's kindred parties
22:    $\text{State}_A \leftarrow \text{PENDING VIRTUAL OPEN}$ 

23: On output (FUNDED,  $\text{host}$ , ...) to  $Alice$  by  $\text{enabler}_A$  when
    $\text{State}_A = \text{PENDING VIRTUAL OPEN}$ :
24:    $\text{host}_A \leftarrow \text{host}[0].\text{left}$ 
25:    $\text{State}_A \leftarrow \text{TENTATIVE VIRTUAL OPEN}$ 

26: On output (FUNDED,  $\text{host}$ , ...) to  $Bob$  by ITI  $R \in \{\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}, \text{LN}\}$  when
    $\text{State}_B = \text{INIT}$ :
27:    $\text{enabler}_B \leftarrow R$ 
28:   add  $\text{enabler}_B$  to  $Bob$ 's kindred parties
29:    $\text{host}_B \leftarrow \text{host}$ 
30:    $\text{State}_B \leftarrow \text{TENTATIVE VIRTUAL OPEN}$ 

31: On (VIRTUAL OPEN) by  $\mathcal{A}$  when  $\text{State}_P = \text{TENTATIVE VIRTUAL OPEN}$ :
32:   if  $P = Alice$  then  $\text{balance}_P \leftarrow x$ 
33:    $\text{State}_P \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 

```

Fig. 8.



**Functionality**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  – payment state machine,  $P \in \{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}$

```

1: On (PAY,  $x$ ) by  $P$  when  $\text{State}_P = \text{OPEN}$ : //  $P$  pays  $\bar{P}$ 
2:   store  $x$ 
3:    $\text{State}_P \leftarrow \text{TENTATIVE PAY}$ 

4: On (PAY) by  $\mathcal{A}$  when  $\text{State}_P = \text{TENTATIVE PAY}$ : //  $P$  pays  $\bar{P}$ 
5:    $\text{State}_P \leftarrow (\text{SYNC PAY}, x)$ 

6: On (GET PAID,  $y$ ) by  $P$  when  $\text{State}_P = \text{OPEN}$ : //  $\bar{P}$  pays  $P$ 
7:   store  $y$ 
8:    $\text{State}_P \leftarrow \text{TENTATIVE GET PAID}$ 

9: On (PAY) by  $\mathcal{A}$  when  $\text{State}_P = \text{TENTATIVE GET PAID}$ : //  $\bar{P}$  pays  $P$ 
10:   $\text{State}_P \leftarrow (\text{SYNC GET PAID}, x)$ 

11: When  $\text{State}_P = (\text{SYNC PAY}, x)$ :
12:   if  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}} \in \{\text{IGNORED}, (\text{SYNC GET PAID}, x)\}$  then
13:      $\text{balance}_P \leftarrow \text{balance}_P - x$ 
14:     // if  $\bar{P}$  honest, this state transition happens simultaneously with l. 21
15:      $\text{State}_P \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 
16:   end if

17: When  $\text{State}_P = (\text{SYNC GET PAID}, x)$ :
18:   if  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}} \in \{\text{IGNORED}, (\text{SYNC PAY}, x)\}$  then
19:      $\text{balance}_P \leftarrow \text{balance}_P + x$ 
20:     // if  $\bar{P}$  honest, this state transition happens simultaneously with l. 15
21:      $\text{State}_P \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 
22:   end if

```

**Fig. 9.**

**Functionality**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  – funding state machine,  $P \in \{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}$

```

1: On input (FUND ME,  $x, \dots$ ) by ITI  $R \in \{\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}, \text{LN}\}$  when  $\text{State}_P = \text{OPEN}$ :
2:   store  $x$ 
3:   add  $R$  to  $P$ 's kindred parties
4:    $\text{State}_P \leftarrow \text{PENDING FUND}$ 

5: When  $\text{State}_P = \text{PENDING FUND}$ :
6:   if we intercept the command “define new VIRT ITI host” by  $\mathcal{A}$ , routed
   through  $P$  then
7:     store host

```

```

8:       $State_P \leftarrow \text{TENTATIVE FUND}$ 
9:      continue executing  $\mathcal{A}$ 's command
10:   end if

11: On (FUND) by  $\mathcal{A}$  when  $State_P = \text{TENTATIVE FUND}$ :
12:    $State_P \leftarrow \text{SYNC FUND}$ 

13: When  $State_P = \text{OPEN}$ :
14:   if we intercept the command “define new VIRT ITI host” by  $\mathcal{A}$ , routed
      through  $P$  then
15:     store host
16:      $State_P \leftarrow \text{TENTATIVE HELP FUND}$ 
17:     continue executing  $\mathcal{A}$ 's command
18:   end if
19:   if we receive a RELAY message with  $\text{msg} = (\text{INIT}, \dots, \text{fundee})$  addressed
      from  $P$  by  $\mathcal{A}$  then
20:     add fundee to  $P$ 's kindred parties
21:     continue executing  $\mathcal{A}$ 's command
22:   end if

23: On (FUND) by  $\mathcal{A}$  when  $State_P = \text{TENTATIVE HELP FUND}$ :
24:    $State_P \leftarrow \text{SYNC HELP FUND}$ 

25: When  $State_P = \text{SYNC FUND}$ :
26:   if  $State_{\bar{P}} \in \{\text{IGNORED}, \text{SYNC HELP FUND}\}$  then
27:      $\text{balance}_P \leftarrow \text{balance}_P - x$ 
28:      $\text{host}_P \leftarrow \text{host}$ 
29:     // if  $\bar{P}$  honest, this state transition happens simultaneously with l. 36
30:      $State_P \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 
31:   end if

32: When  $State_P = \text{SYNC HELP FUND}$ :
33:   if  $State_{\bar{P}} \in \{\text{IGNORED}, \text{SYNC FUND}\}$  then
34:      $\text{host}_P \leftarrow \text{host}$ 
35:     // if  $\bar{P}$  honest, this state transition happens simultaneously with l. 30
36:      $State_P \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 
37:   end if

```

**Fig. 10.**

**Functionality**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  – close state machine,  $P \in \{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}$

1: On (CLOSE) by  $P$  when  $State_P = \text{OPEN}$ :

```

2:    $State_P \leftarrow \text{CLOSING}$ 

3: On input (BALANCE) by  $R$  addressed to  $P$  where  $R$  is kindred with  $P$ :
4:   if  $State_P \notin \{\text{UNINIT}, \text{INIT}, \text{PENDING VIRTUAL OPEN}, \text{TENTATIVE VIRTUAL OPEN}, \text{TENTATIVE BASE OPEN}, \text{IGNORED}, \text{CLOSED}\}$  then
5:     reply (MY BALANCE,  $\text{balance}_P$ ,  $pk_P$ ,  $\text{balance}_{\bar{P}}$ ,  $pk_{\bar{P}}$ )
6:   else
7:     reply (MY BALANCE, 0,  $pk_P$ , 0,  $pk_{\bar{P}}$ )
8:   end if


9: On (CLOSE,  $P$ ) by  $\mathcal{A}$  when  $State_P \notin \{\text{UNINIT}, \text{INIT}, \text{PENDING VIRTUAL OPEN}, \text{TENTATIVE VIRTUAL OPEN}, \text{TENTATIVE BASE OPEN}, \text{IGNORED}\}$ :
10:  input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  as  $P$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
11:   $\text{coins} \leftarrow$  sum of values of outputs exclusively spendable or spent by  $pk_P$  in  $\Sigma$ 
12:   $\text{balance} \leftarrow \text{balance}_P$ 
13:  for all  $P$ 's kindred parties  $R$  do
14:    input (BALANCE) to  $R$  as  $P$  and extract  $\text{balance}_R$ ,  $pk_R$  from response
15:     $\text{balance} \leftarrow \text{balance} + \text{balance}_R$ 
16:     $\text{coins} \leftarrow \text{coins} +$  sum of values of outputs exclusively spendable or spent by  $pk_R$  in  $\Sigma$ 
17:  end for
18:  if  $\text{coins} \geq \text{balance}$  then
19:     $State_P \leftarrow \text{CLOSED}$ 
20:  else // balance security is broken
21:    halt
22:  end if

```


Fig. 11.

**Simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  – general message handling rules**


- On receiving (RELAY,  $\text{in\_msg}$ ,  $P$ ,  $R$ ,  $\text{in\_mode}$ ) by  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  ( $\text{in\_mode} \in \{\text{input}, \text{output}, \text{network}\}$ ,  $P \in \{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}$ ), handle ( $\text{in\_msg}$ ) with the simulated party  $P$  as if it was received from  $R$  by means of  $\text{in\_mode}$ . In case simulated  $P$  does not exist yet, initialise it as an LN ITI. If there is a resulting message  $\text{out\_msg}$  that is to be sent by simulated  $P$  to  $R'$  by means of  $\text{out\_mode} \in \{\text{input}, \text{output}, \text{network}\}$ , send (RELAY,  $\text{out\_msg}$ ,  $P$ ,  $R'$ ,  $\text{out\_mode}$ ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ .
- On receiving by  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  a message to be sent by  $P$  to  $R$  via the network, carry on with this action (i.e. send this message via the internal  $\mathcal{A}$ ).
- Relay any other incoming message to the internal  $\mathcal{A}$  unmodified.
- On receiving a message ( $\text{msg}$ ) by the internal  $\mathcal{A}$ , if it is addressed to one of the parties that correspond to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ , handle the message internally with the corresponding simulated party. Otherwise relay the message to its intended



**Fig. 12.**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  state machine up to INIT (both parties)



**Fig. 13.**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  state machine from INIT up to OPEN (funder)




**Fig. 14.**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  state machine from INIT up to OPEN (fundee)

recipient unmodified. // Other recipients are  $\mathcal{E}$ ,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  or parties unrelated to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$   
 Given that  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  relays all messages and that we simulate the real-world machines that correspond to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ , the simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from the real world.


**Fig. 19.**

**Simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  – notifications to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$**


- “ $P$ ” refers one of the parties that correspond to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ .
  - When an action in this Figure interrupts an ITI simulation, continue simulating from the interruption location once action is over/ $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  hands control back.
- 1: On (CORRUPT) by  $\mathcal{A}$ , addressed to  $P$ :
  - 2:   // After executing this code and getting control back from  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  (which always happens, c.f. Fig. 7), deliver (CORRUPT) to simulated  $P$  (c.f. Fig. 19).
  - 3:   send (INFO, BECAME CORRUPTED OR NEGLIGENT,  $P$ ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$
  - 4: When simulated  $P$  sets variable **negligent** to True (Fig. 21, l. 7/Fig. 22, l. 26):
  - 5:   send (INFO, BECAME CORRUPTED OR NEGLIGENT,  $P$ ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$
  - 6: When simulated honest *Alice* receives (OPEN,  $x$ , **hops**, ...) by  $\mathcal{E}$ :
  - 7:   store **hops** // will be used to inform  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  once the channel is open




**Fig. 15.**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  state machine for funding new virtuals (both parties)



**Fig. 16.**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  state machine for payments (both parties)



**Fig. 17.**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  state machine for channel closure (both parties)



**Fig. 18.**  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  state machine for corruption, negligence or punishment of the counterparty of a lower layer (both parties)



```

8: When simulated honest Bob receives (OPEN,  $x$ , hops, ...) by Alice:
9:   if Alice is corrupted then store hops // if Alice is honest, we already have
    hops. If Alice became corrupted after receiving (OPEN, ...), overwrite hops

10: When the last of the honest simulated  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ 's parties moves to the OPEN State
    for the first time (Fig. 25, l. 19/Fig. 27, l. 5/Fig. 28, l. 18):
11:   if hops = "ledger" then
12:     send (INFO, BASE OPEN) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ 
13:   else
14:     send (INFO, VIRTUAL OPEN) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ 
15:   end if

16: When (both  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ 's simulated parties are honest and complete sending and
    receiving a payment (Fig. 33, ll. 6 and 21 respectively), or (when only one
    party is honest and (completes either receiving or sending a payment)): // also
    send this message if both parties are honest when Fig. 33, l. 6 is executed by
    one party, but its counterparty is corrupted before executing Fig. 33, l. 21
17:   send (INFO, PAY) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ 

18: When honest  $P$  executes Fig. 30, l. 20 or (when honest  $P$  executes Fig. 30,
    l. 18 and  $\bar{P}$  is corrupted): // in the first case if  $\bar{P}$  is honest, it has already
    moved to the new host, (Fig 51, ll. 7, 23): lifting to next layer is done
19:   send (INFO, FUND) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ 

20: When one of the honest simulated  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ 's parties  $P$  moves to the CLOSED
    state (Fig. 37, l. 8 or l. 11):
21:   send (INFO, CLOSE,  $P$ ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ 

```

Fig. 20.

## 11 Protocol

### Process LN – init

```

1: // When not specified, input comes from and output goes to  $\mathcal{E}$ .
2: // The ITI knows whether it is Alice (funder) or Bob (funde). The activated
    party is  $P$  and the counterparty is  $\bar{P}$ .
3: On every activation, before handling the message:
4:   if last_poll  $\neq \perp \wedge$  State  $\neq$  CLOSED then // channel is open

```

```

5:   input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
6:   if  $\text{last\_poll} + p < |\Sigma|$  then //  $p$  is a global parameter
7:        $\text{negligent} \leftarrow \text{True}$ 
8:   end if
9: end if

10: On (INIT,  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$ ):
11:   ensure  $State = \perp$ 
12:    $State \leftarrow \text{INIT}$ 
13:   store  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$ 
14:    $(c_A, c_B, \text{locked}_A, \text{locked}_B) \leftarrow (0, 0, 0, 0)$ 
15:    $(\text{paid\_out}, \text{paid\_in}) \leftarrow (\emptyset, \emptyset)$ 
16:    $\text{negligent} \leftarrow \text{False}$ 
17:    $\text{last\_poll} \leftarrow \perp$ 
18:   output (INIT OK)

19: On (TOP UP):
20:   ensure  $P = \text{Alice}$  // activated party is the funder
21:   ensure  $State = \text{INIT}$ 
22:    $(sk_{P,\text{chain}}, pk_{P,\text{chain}}) \leftarrow \text{KEYGEN}()$ 
23:   input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
24:   output (TOP UP TO,  $pk_{P,\text{chain}}$ )
25:   while  $\neg \exists tx \in \Sigma, c_{P,\text{chain}} : (c_{P,\text{chain}}, pk_{P,\text{chain}}) \in tx.\text{outputs}$  do
26:       // while waiting, all other messages by  $P$  are ignored
27:       wait for input (CHECK TOP UP)
28:       input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
29:   end while
30:    $State \leftarrow \text{TOPPED UP}$ 
31:   output (TOP UP OK,  $c_{P,\text{chain}}$ )

32: On (BALANCE):
33:   ensure  $State^P \in \{\text{OPEN}, \text{CLOSED}\}$ 
34:   output (BALANCE,  $c_A, pk_{A,\text{out}}, c_B, pk_{B,\text{out}}, \text{locked}_A, \text{locked}_B$ )

```

**Fig. 21.**

**Process LN – methods used by VIRT**

```

1: REVOKEPREVIOUS():
2:   ensure  $State \in \text{WAITING FOR (OUTBOUND) REVOCATION}$ 
3:    $R_{\bar{P},i} \leftarrow \text{TX} \{\text{input: } C_{P,i}.\text{outputs}.P, \text{output: } (C_{P,i}.\text{outputs}.P.\text{value},$ 
4:        $pk_{\bar{P},\text{out}})\}$ 
5:    $\text{sig}_{A,R,i} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(R_{\bar{P},i}, sk_{P,R})$ 
6:   if  $State = \text{WAITING FOR REVOCATION}$  then

```

```

6:    $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR INBOUND REVOCATION}$ 
7: else //  $State = \text{WAITING FOR OUTBOUND REVOCATION}$ 
8:    $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
9:    $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR HOSTS READY}$ 
10: end if
11:  $host_P \leftarrow host'_P$  // forget old host, use new host instead
12:  $layer \leftarrow layer + 1$ 
13: return  $sig_{P,R,i}$ 

14: PROCESSREMOTEREVOCATION( $sig_{\bar{P},R,i}$ ):
15:   ensure  $State = \text{WAITING FOR (INBOUND) REVOCATION}$ 
16:    $R_{P,i} \leftarrow \text{TX } \{\text{input: } C_{\bar{P},i}.\text{outputs}.P, \text{ output: } (C_{\bar{P},i}.\text{outputs}.\bar{P}.\text{value},$ 
     $pk_{P,\text{out}})\}$ 
17:   ensure  $\text{VERIFY}(R_{P,i}, sig_{\bar{P},R,i}, pk_{\bar{P},R}) = \text{True}$ 
18:   if  $State = \text{WAITING FOR REVOCATION}$  then
19:      $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR OUTBOUND REVOCATION}$ 
20:   else //  $State = \text{WAITING FOR INBOUND REVOCATION}$ 
21:      $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
22:      $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR HOSTS READY}$ 
23:   end if
24:   return (OK)

25: NEGLIGENT():
26:   negligent  $\leftarrow \text{True}$ 
27:   return (OK)

```

Fig. 22.

**Process LN.EXCHANGEOPENKEYS()**

```

1:  $(sk_{A,F}, pk_{A,F}) \leftarrow \text{KEYGEN}()$ ;  $(sk_{A,R}, pk_{A,R}) \leftarrow \text{KEYGEN}()$ 
2:  $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR OPENING KEYS}$ 
3: send (OPEN,  $c$ , hops,  $pk_{A,F}$ ,  $pk_{A,R}$ ,  $pk_{A,\text{out}}$ ) to fundee
4: // colored code is run by honest fundee. Validation is implicit
5: ensure we run the code of Bob
6: ensure  $State = \text{INIT}$ 
7: store  $pk_{A,F}$ ,  $pk_{A,R}$ ,  $pk_{A,\text{out}}$ 
8:  $(sk_{B,F}, pk_{B,F}) \leftarrow \text{KEYGEN}()$ ;  $(sk_{B,R}, pk_{B,R}) \leftarrow \text{KEYGEN}()$ 
9: if hops = "ledger" then // opening base channel
10:    $layer \leftarrow 0$ 
11:    $t_P \leftarrow s + p$  //  $s$  is the upper bound of  $\eta$  from Lemma 7.19 of [48]
12:    $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR COMM SIG}$ 
13: else // opening virtual channel
14:    $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR CHECK KEYS}$ 

```

```

15: end if
16: reply (ACCEPT CHANNEL,  $pk_{B,F}$ ,  $pk_{B,R}$ ,  $pk_{B,out}$ )
17: ensure  $State = \text{WAITING FOR OPENING KEYS}$ 
18: store  $pk_{B,F}$ ,  $pk_{B,R}$ ,  $pk_{B,out}$ 
19:  $State \leftarrow \text{OPENING KEYS OK}$ 

```

Fig. 23.

**Process LN.PREPAREBASE()**

```

1: if hops = "ledger" then // opening base channel
2:    $F \leftarrow \text{TX}$  {input:  $(c, pk_{A,chain})$ , output:  $(c, 2/\{pk_{A,F}, pk_{B,F}\})$ }
3:    $host_P \leftarrow \text{"ledger"}$ 
4:    $layer \leftarrow 0$ 
5:    $t_P \leftarrow s + p$ 
6: else // opening virtual channel
7:   input (FUND ME, Alice, Bob, hops,  $c$ ,  $pk_{A,F}$ ,  $pk_{B,F}$ ) to hops[0].left and
   expect output (FUNDED,  $host_P$ ,  $funder\_layer$ ,  $t_P$ ) // ignore any other
   message
8:    $layer \leftarrow funder\_layer$ 
9: end if

```

Fig. 24.

**Process LN.EXCHANGEOPENSIGS()**

```

1: //  $s = (2 + q)\text{windowSize}$ , where  $q$  and  $\text{windowSize}$  are defined in
   Proposition 1
2:  $C_{A,0} \leftarrow \text{TX}$  {input:  $(c, 2/\{pk_{A,F}, pk_{B,F}\})$ , outputs:  $(c, (pk_{A,out} + (p + s)) \vee$ 
    $2/\{pk_{A,R}, pk_{B,R}\})$ ,  $(0, pk_{B,out})$ }
3:  $C_{B,0} \leftarrow \text{TX}$  {input:  $(c, 2/\{pk_{A,F}, pk_{B,F}\})$ , outputs:  $(c, pk_{A,out})$ ,  $(0,$ 
    $(pk_{B,out} + (p + s)) \vee 2/\{pk_{A,R}, pk_{B,R}\})$ }
4:  $\text{sig}_{A,C,0} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(C_{B,0}, sk_{A,F})$ 
5:  $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR COMM SIG}$ 
6: send (FUNDING CREATED,  $(c, pk_{A,chain})$ ,  $\text{sig}_{A,C,0}$ ) to fundee
7: ensure  $State = \text{WAITING FOR COMM SIG}$  // if opening virtual channel, we have
   received (FUNDED,  $host\_fundee$ ) by hops[-1].right (Fig 27, l. 10)
8: if hops = "ledger" then // opening base channel
9:    $F \leftarrow \text{TX}$  {input:  $(c, pk_{A,chain})$ , output:  $(c, 2/\{pk_{A,F}, pk_{B,F}\})$ }
10: end if
11:  $C_{B,0} \leftarrow \text{TX}$  {input:  $(c, 2/\{pk_{A,F}, pk_{B,F}\})$ , outputs:  $(c, pk_{A,out})$ ,  $(0,$ 
    $(pk_{B,out} + (p + s)) \vee 2/\{pk_{A,R}, pk_{B,R}\})$ }
12: ensure  $\text{VERIFY}(C_{B,0}, \text{sig}_{A,C,0}, pk_{A,F}) = \text{True}$ 

```

```

13:  $C_{A,0} \leftarrow \text{TX} \{ \text{input: } (c, 2/\{pk_{A,F}, pk_{B,F}\}), \text{ outputs: } (c, (pk_{A,\text{out}} + (p + s)) \vee$   

    $2/\{pk_{A,R}, pk_{B,R}\}), (0, pk_{B,\text{out}}) \}$   

14:  $\text{sig}_{B,C,0} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(C_{A,0}, sk_{B,F})$   

15: if hops = “ledger” then // opening base channel  

16:    $\text{State} \leftarrow \text{WAITING TO CHECK FUNDING}$   

17: else // opening virtual channel  

18:    $c_A \leftarrow c; c_B \leftarrow 0; i \leftarrow 0$   

19:    $\text{State} \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$   

20: end if  

21: reply (FUNDING SIGNED,  $\text{sig}_{B,C,0}$ )  

22: ensure  $\text{State} = \text{WAITING FOR COMM SIG}$   

23: ensure  $\text{VERIFY}(C_{A,0}, \text{sig}_{B,C,0}, pk_{B,F}) = \text{True}$ 

```

Fig. 25.

**Process LN.COMMITBASE()**

```

1:  $\text{sig}_F \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(F, sk_{A,\text{chain}})$   

2: input (SUBMIT,  $(F, \text{sig}_F)$ ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  // enter “while” below before sending  

3: while  $F \notin \Sigma$  do  

4:   wait for input (CHECK FUNDING) // ignore all other messages  

5:   input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$   

6: end while

```

Fig. 26.

**Process LN – external open messages for Bob**

```

1: On input (CHECK FUNDING):  

2:   ensure  $\text{State} = \text{WAITING TO CHECK FUNDING}$   

3:   input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$   

4:   if  $F \in \Sigma$  then  

5:      $\text{State} \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$   

6:     reply (OPEN OK)  

7:   end if  

8: On output (FUNDED,  $\text{host}_P$ ,  $\text{funder\_layer}$ ,  $t_P$ ) by hops[-1].right:  

9:   ensure  $\text{State} = \text{WAITING FOR FUNDED}$   

10:  store  $\text{host}_P$  // we will talk directly to  $\text{host}_P$   

11:   $\text{layer} \leftarrow \text{funder\_layer}$   

12:   $\text{State} \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR COMM SIG}$   

13:  reply (FUND ACK)

```

```

14: On output (CHECK KEYS,  $(pk_1, pk_2)$ ) by hops[-1].right:
15:   ensure  $State = \text{WAITING FOR CHECK KEYS}$ 
16:   ensure  $pk_1 = pk_{A,F} \wedge pk_2 = pk_{B,F}$ 
17:    $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR FUDNED}$ 
18:   reply (KEYS OK)

```

Fig. 27.

**Process LN – On (OPEN,  $c$ , hops, fundee):**

```

1: // fundee is Bob
2: ensure we run the code of Alice // activated party is the funder
3: if hops = "ledger" then // opening base channel
4:   ensure  $State = \text{TOPPED UP}$ 
5:   ensure  $c = c_{A,\text{chain}}$ 
6: else // opening virtual channel
7:   ensure  $\text{len}(\text{hops}) \geq 2$  // cannot open a virtual over 1 channel
8: end if
9: LN.EXCHANGEOPENKEYS()
10: LN.PREPAREBASE()
11: LN.EXCHANGEOPENSIGS()
12: if hops = "ledger" then
13:   LN.COMMITBASE()
14: end if
15: input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
16: last_poll  $\leftarrow |\Sigma|$ 
17:  $c_A \leftarrow c$ ;  $c_B \leftarrow 0$ ;  $i \leftarrow 0$ 
18:  $State \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 
19: output (OPEN OK,  $c$ , fundee, hops)

```

Fig. 28.

**Process LN.UPDATEFORVIRTUAL()**

```

1:  $C_{\bar{P},i+1} \leftarrow C_{\bar{P},i}$  with  $pk'_{P,F}$  and  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$  instead of  $pk_{P,F}$  and  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  respectively,
   reducing the input and  $P$ 's output by  $c_{\text{virt}}$ 
2:  $\text{sig}_{P,C,i+1} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(C_{\bar{P},i+1})$  // kept by  $\bar{P}$ 
3: send (UPDATE FORWARD,  $\text{sig}_{P,C,i+1}$ ) to  $\bar{P}$ 
4: //  $P$  refers to payer and  $\bar{P}$  to payee both in local and remote code
5:  $C_{\bar{P},i+1} \leftarrow C_{\bar{P},i}$  with  $pk'_{P,F}$  and  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$  instead of  $pk_{P,F}$  and  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  respectively,
   reducing the input and  $P$ 's output by  $c_{\text{virt}}$ 

```

```

6: ensure VERIFY( $C_{\bar{P},i+1}$ ,  $\text{sig}_{P,C,i+1}$ ,  $pk'_{P,F}$ ) = True
7:  $C_{P,i+1} \leftarrow C_{P,i}$  with  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$  and  $pk'_{P,F}$  instead of  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  and  $pk_{P,F}$  respectively,
   reducing the input and  $P$ 's output by  $c_{\text{virt}}$ 
8:  $\text{sig}_{\bar{P},C,i+1} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(C_{P,i+1}, sk'_{\bar{P},F})$  // kept by  $P$ 
9: reply (UPDATE BACK,  $\text{sig}_{\bar{P},C,i+1}$ )
10:  $C_{P,i+1} \leftarrow C_{P,i}$  with  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$  and  $pk'_{P,F}$  instead of  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  and  $pk_{P,F}$  respectively,
   reducing the input and  $P$ 's output by  $c_{\text{virt}}$ 
11: ensure VERIFY( $C_{P,i+1}$ ,  $\text{sig}_{\bar{P},C,i+1}$ ,  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$ ) = True

```

Fig. 29.

**Process LN – virtualise start and end**

```

1: On input (FUND ME,  $c_{\text{virt}}$ , fundee, hops,  $pk_{A,V}$ ,  $pk_{B,V}$ ) by funder:
2:   ensure  $State = \text{OPEN}$ 
3:   ensure  $c_P - \text{locked}_P \geq c_{\text{virt}}$ 
4:    $State \leftarrow \text{VIRTUALISING}$ 
5:    $(sk'_{P,F}, pk'_{P,F}) \leftarrow \text{KEYGEN}()$ 
6:   define new VIRT ITI  $\text{host}'_P$ 
7:   send (VIRTUALISING,  $\text{host}'_P$ ,  $pk'_{P,F}$ , hops, fundee,  $c_{\text{virt}}$ , 2,  $\text{len}(\text{hops})$ ) to  $\bar{P}$ 
   and expect reply (VIRTUALISING ACK,  $\text{host}'_{\bar{P}}$ ,  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$ )
8:   ensure  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$  is different from  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  and all older  $\bar{P}$ 's funding public keys
9:   LN.UPDATEFORVIRTUAL()
10:   $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR REVOCATION}$ 
11:  input (HOST ME, funder, fundee,  $\text{host}'_{\bar{P}}$ ,  $\text{host}_P$ ,  $c_P$ ,  $c_{\bar{P}}$ ,  $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $pk_{A,V}$ ,  $pk_{B,V}$ ,
    $(sk'_{P,F}, pk'_{P,F})$ ,  $(sk_{P,F}, pk_{P,F})$ ,  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$ ,  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$ ,  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$ ,  $\text{len}(\text{hops})$ ) to  $\text{host}'_P$ 

12: On output (HOSTS READY,  $t_P$ ) by  $\text{host}_P$ : //  $\text{host}_P$  is the new host, renamed
   in Fig. 22, l. 12
13:   ensure  $State = \text{WAITING FOR HOSTS READY}$ 
14:    $State \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 
15:   move  $pk_{P,F}$ ,  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  to list of old funding keys
16:    $(sk_{P,F}, pk_{P,F}) \leftarrow (sk'_{P,F}, pk'_{P,F})$ ;  $pk_{\bar{P},F} \leftarrow pk'_{\bar{P},F}$ 
17:   if  $\text{len}(\text{hops}) = 1$  then // we are the last hop
18:     output (FUNDED,  $\text{host}_P$ , layer,  $t_P$ ) to fundee and expect reply (FUND
   ACK)
19:   else if we have received input FUND ME just before we moved to the
   VIRTUALISING state then // we are the first hop
20:      $c_P \leftarrow c_P - c_{\text{virt}}$ 
21:     output (FUNDED,  $\text{host}_P$ , layer,  $t_P$ ) to funder // do not expect reply
   by funder
22:   end if
23:   reply (HOST ACK)

```



Fig. 30.

**Process LN – virtualise hops**

- 1: On (VIRTUALISING,  $\text{host}'_{\bar{P}}, pk'_{\bar{P},F}, \text{hops}, \text{fundee}, c_{\text{virt}}, i, n$ ) by  $\bar{P}$ :
- 2:   ensure  $\text{State} = \text{OPEN}$
- 3:   ensure  $c_{\bar{P}} - \text{locked}_{\bar{P}} \geq c; 1 \leq i \leq n$
- 4:   ensure  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$  is different from  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  and all older  $\bar{P}$ 's funding public keys
- 5:    $\text{State} \leftarrow \text{VIRTUALISING}$
- 6:    $\text{locked}_{\bar{P}} \leftarrow \text{locked}_{\bar{P}} + c$  // if  $\bar{P}$  is hosting the funder,  $\bar{P}$  will transfer  $c_{\text{virt}}$  coins instead of locking them, but the end result is the same
- 7:    $(sk'_{P,F}, pk'_{P,F}) \leftarrow \text{KEYGEN}()$
- 8:   **if**  $\text{len}(\text{hops}) > 1$  **then** // we are not the last hop
- 9:     define new VIRT ITI  $\text{host}'_P$
- 10:    input (VIRTUALISING,  $\text{host}'_P, (sk'_{P,F}, pk'_{P,F}), pk'_{\bar{P},F}, pk_{P,\text{out}}, \text{hops}[1:], \text{fundee}, c_{\text{virt}}, c_{\bar{P}}, c_P, i, n$ ) to  $\text{hops}[1].\text{left}$  and expect reply (VIRTUALISING ACK,  $\text{host\_sibling}, pk_{\text{sib},\bar{P},F}$ )
- 11:    input (INIT,  $\text{host}_P, \text{host}'_{\bar{P}}, \text{host\_sibling}, (sk'_{P,F}, pk'_{P,F}), pk'_{\bar{P},F}, pk_{\text{sib},\bar{P},F}, (sk_{P,F}, pk_{P,F}), pk_{\bar{P},F}, pk_{P,\text{out}}, c_P, c_{\bar{P}}, c_{\text{virt}}, i, t_P, \text{"left"}, n$ ) to  $\text{host}'_P$  and expect reply (HOST INIT OK)
- 12:    **else** // we are the last hop
- 13:     input (INIT,  $\text{host}_P, \text{host}'_{\bar{P}}, \text{fundee}=\text{fundee}, (sk'_{P,F}, pk'_{P,F}), pk'_{\bar{P},F}, (sk_{P,F}, pk_{P,F}), pk_{\bar{P},F}, pk_{P,\text{out}}, c_P, c_{\bar{P}}, c_{\text{virt}}, t_P, i, \text{"left"}, n$ ) to new VIRT ITI  $\text{host}'_P$  and expect reply (HOST INIT OK)
- 14:    **end if**
- 15:     $\text{State} \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR REVOCATION}$
- 16:    send (VIRTUALISING ACK,  $\text{host}'_P, pk'_{P,F}$ ) to  $\bar{P}$
- 17: On input (VIRTUALISING,  $\text{host\_sibling}, (sk'_{P,F}, pk'_{P,F}), pk_{\text{sib},\bar{P},F}, pk_{\text{sib},\text{out}}, \text{hops}, \text{fundee}, c_{\text{virt}}, c_{\text{sib},\text{rem}}, c_{\text{sib}}, i, n$ ) by **sibling**:
- 18:   ensure  $\text{State} = \text{OPEN}$
- 19:   ensure  $c_P - \text{locked}_P \geq c$
- 20:   ensure  $c_{\text{sib},\text{rem}} \geq c_P \wedge c_{\bar{P}} \geq c_{\text{sib}}$  // avoid value loss by griefing attack: one counterparty closes with old version, the other stays idle forever
- 21:    $\text{State} \leftarrow \text{VIRTUALISING}$
- 22:    $\text{locked}_P \leftarrow \text{locked}_P + c$
- 23:   define new VIRT ITI  $\text{host}'_P$
- 24:   send (VIRTUALISING,  $\text{host}'_P, pk'_{P,F}, \text{hops}, \text{fundee}, c_{\text{virt}}, i+1, n$ ) to  $\text{hops}[0].\text{right}$  and expect reply (VIRTUALISING ACK,  $\text{host}'_{\bar{P}}, pk'_{\bar{P},F}$ )
- 25:   ensure  $pk'_{\bar{P},F}$  is different from  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  and all older  $\bar{P}$ 's funding public keys
- 26:   LN.UPDATEFORVIRTUAL()
- 27:   input (INIT,  $\text{host}_P, \text{host}'_{\bar{P}}, \text{host\_sibling}, (sk'_{P,F}, pk'_{P,F}), pk'_{\bar{P},F}, pk_{\text{sib},\bar{P},F}, (sk_{P,F}, pk_{P,F}), pk_{\bar{P},F}, pk_{\text{sib},\text{out}}, c_P, c_{\bar{P}}, c_{\text{virt}}, i, \text{"right"}, n$ ) to  $\text{host}'_P$  and expect reply (HOST INIT OK)
- 28:    $\text{State} \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR REVOCATION}$

29: output (VIRTUALISING ACK,  $\text{host}'_P, pk'_{\bar{P},F}$ ) to sibling

Fig. 31.

**Process LN.SIGNATURESROUNDTRIP()**

```

1:  $C_{\bar{P},i+1} \leftarrow C_{\bar{P},i}$  with  $x$  coins moved from  $P$ 's to  $\bar{P}$ 's output
2:  $\text{sig}_{P,C,i+1} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(C_{\bar{P},i+1}, sk_{P,F})$  // kept by  $\bar{P}$ 
3:  $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR COMMITMENT SIGNED}$ 
4: send (PAY,  $x$ ,  $\text{sig}_{P,C,i+1}$ ) to  $\bar{P}$ 
5: //  $P$  refers to payer and  $\bar{P}$  to payee both in local and remote code
6: ensure  $State = \text{WAITING TO GET PAID} \wedge x = y$ 
7:  $C'_{\bar{P},i+1} \leftarrow C_{\bar{P},i}$  with  $x$  coins moved from  $P$ 's to  $\bar{P}$ 's output
8: ensure  $\text{VERIFY}(C'_{\bar{P},i+1}, \text{sig}_{P,C,i+1}, pk_{P,F}) = \text{True}$ 
9:  $C_{P,i+1} \leftarrow C_{P,i}$  with  $x$  coins moved from  $P$ 's to  $\bar{P}$ 's output
10:  $\text{sig}_{\bar{P},C,i+1} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(C_{P,i+1}, sk_{\bar{P},F})$  // kept by  $P$ 
11:  $R_{P,i} \leftarrow \text{TX}$  {input:  $C_{\bar{P},i}.\text{outputs}.P$ , output:  $(c_{\bar{P}}, pk_{P,\text{out}})$ }
12:  $\text{sig}_{\bar{P},R,i} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(R_{P,i}, sk_{\bar{P},R})$ 
13:  $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING FOR PAY REVOCATION}$ 
14: reply (COMMITMENT SIGNED,  $\text{sig}_{\bar{P},C,i+1}, \text{sig}_{\bar{P},R,i}$ )
15: ensure  $State = \text{WAITING FOR COMMITMENT SIGNED}$ 
16:  $C_{P,i+1} \leftarrow C_{P,i}$  with  $x$  coins moved from  $P$ 's to  $\bar{P}$ 's output

```

Fig. 32.

**Process LN.REVOCATIONSROUNDTRIP()**

```

1: ensure  $\text{VERIFY}(C_{P,i+1}, \text{sig}_{\bar{P},C,i+1}, pk_{\bar{P},F}) = \text{True}$ 
2:  $R_{P,i} \leftarrow \text{TX}$  {input:  $C_{\bar{P},i}.\text{outputs}.\bar{P}$ , output:  $(c_{\bar{P}}, pk_{P,\text{out}})$ }
3: ensure  $\text{VERIFY}(R_{P,i}, \text{sig}_{\bar{P},R,i}, pk_{\bar{P},R}) = \text{True}$ 
4:  $R_{\bar{P},i} \leftarrow \text{TX}$  {input:  $C_{P,i}.\text{outputs}.P$ , output:  $(c_P, pk_{\bar{P},\text{out}})$ }
5:  $\text{sig}_{P,R,i} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(R_{\bar{P},i}, sk_{P,R})$ 
6: add  $x$  to paid_out
7:  $c_P \leftarrow c_P - x; c_{\bar{P}} \leftarrow c_{\bar{P}} + x; i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
8:  $State \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 
9: if  $\text{host}_P \neq \text{"ledger"} \wedge$  we have a host_sibling then // we are intermediary channel
10:   input (NEW BALANCE,  $c_P, c_{\bar{P}}$ ) to host_P
11:   relay message as input to sibling // run by VIRT
12:   relay message as output to guest // run by VIRT
13:   store new sibling balance and reply (NEW BALANCE OK)
14:   output (NEW BALANCE OK) to sibling // run by VIRT

```

```

15:   output (NEW BALANCE OK) to guest // run by VIRT
16: end if
17: send (REVOKE AND ACK,  $\text{sig}_{P,R,i}$ ) to  $\bar{P}$ 
18: ensure  $State = \text{WAITING FOR PAY REVOCATION}$ 
19:  $R_{\bar{P},i} \leftarrow \text{TX}$  {input:  $C_{P,i}.\text{outputs}.\bar{P}$ , output:  $(c_P, pk_{\bar{P},\text{out}})$ }
20: ensure  $\text{VERIFY}(R_{\bar{P},i}, \text{sig}_{P,R,i}, pk_{P,R}) = \text{True}$ 
21: add  $x$  to paid_in
22:  $c_P \leftarrow c_P - x; c_{\bar{P}} \leftarrow c_{\bar{P}} + x; i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
23:  $State \leftarrow \text{OPEN}$ 
24: if  $\text{host}_P \neq \text{"ledger"} \wedge \bar{P}$  has a host_sibling then // we are intermediary
    channel
25:   input (NEW BALANCE,  $c_{\bar{P}}, c_P$ ) to host_ $\bar{P}$ 
26:   relay message as input to sibling // run by VIRT
27:   relay message as output to guest // run by VIRT
28:   store new sibling balance and reply (NEW BALANCE OK)
29:   output (NEW BALANCE OK) to sibling // run by VIRT
30:   output (NEW BALANCE OK) to guest // run by VIRT
31: end if

```

Fig. 33.

**Process LN – On (PAY,  $x$ ):**

```

1: ensure  $State = \text{OPEN} \wedge c_P \geq x$ 
2: if  $\text{host}_P \neq \text{"ledger"} \wedge P$  has a host_sibling then // we are intermediary
    channel
3:   ensure  $c_{\text{sib},\text{rem}} \geq c_P - x \wedge c_{\bar{P}} + x \geq c_{\text{sib}}$  // avoid value loss by griefing
    attack: one counterparty closes with old version, the other stays idle forever
4: end if
5: LN.SIGNATURESROUNDTRIP()
6: LN.REVOCATIONSTRIP()
7: // No output is given to the caller, this is intentional

```

Fig. 34.

**Process LN – On (GET PAID,  $y$ ):**

```

1: ensure  $State = \text{OPEN} \wedge c_{\bar{P}} \geq y$ 
2: if  $\text{host}_P \neq \text{"ledger"} \wedge P$  has a host_sibling then // we are intermediary
    channel
3:   ensure  $c_P + y \leq c_{\text{sib},\text{rem}} \wedge c_{\text{sib}} \leq c_{\bar{P}} - y$  // avoid value loss by griefing attack
4: end if
5: store  $y$ 

```

6:  $State \leftarrow \text{WAITING TO GET PAID}$

**Fig. 35.**

**Process LN – On (CHECK FOR LATERAL CLOSE):**

```

1: if  $host_P \neq \text{"ledger"}$  then
2:   input (CHECK FOR LATERAL CLOSE) to  $host_P$ 
3: end if

```

**Fig. 36.**

**Process LN – On (CHECK CHAIN FOR CLOSED):**

```

1: ensure  $State \notin \{\perp, \text{INIT}, \text{TOPPED UP}\}$  // channel open
2: // even virtual channels check  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  directly. This is intentional
3: input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign reply to  $\Sigma$ 
4:  $last\_poll \leftarrow |\Sigma|$ 
5: if  $\exists 0 \leq j < i : C_{\bar{P},j} \in \Sigma$  then // counterparty has closed maliciously
6:    $State \leftarrow \text{CLOSING}$ 
7:   LN.SUBMITANDCHECKREVOCATION( $j$ )
8:    $State \leftarrow \text{CLOSED}$ 
9:   output (CLOSED)
10: else if  $C_{P,i} \in \Sigma \vee C_{\bar{P},i} \in \Sigma$  then
11:    $State \leftarrow \text{CLOSED}$ 
12:   output (CLOSED)
13: end if

```

**Fig. 37.**

**Process LN.SUBMITANDCHECKREVOCATION( $j$ )**

```

1:  $sig_{P,R,j} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(R_{P,j}, sk_{P,R})$ 
2: input (SUBMIT, ( $R_{P,j}$ ,  $sig_{P,R,j}$ ,  $sig_{\bar{P},R,j}$ )) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ 
3: while  $\neg \exists R_{P,j} \in \Sigma$  do
4:   wait for input (CHECK REVOCATION) // ignore other messages
5:   input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
6: end while
7:  $c_P \leftarrow c_P + c_{\bar{P}}$ 
8: if  $host_P \neq \text{"ledger"}$  then

```

```

9:   input (USED REVOCATION) to hostP
10: end if

```

**Fig. 38.**

**Process LN – On (CLOSE):**

```

1: ensure  $State \notin \{\perp, \text{INIT}, \text{TOPPED UP}, \text{CLOSED}, \text{BASE PUNISHED}\}$  // channel open
2: if hostP  $\neq$  "ledger" then // we have a virtual channel
3:    $State \leftarrow \text{HOST CLOSING}$ 
4:   input (CLOSE) to hostP and keep relaying any (CHECK IF CLOSING) or
   (CLOSE) input to hostP until receiving output (CLOSED) by hostP
5:   hostP  $\leftarrow$  "ledger"
6: end if
7:  $State \leftarrow \text{CLOSING}$ 
8: input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
9: if  $C_{\bar{P},i} \in \Sigma$  then // counterparty has closed honestly
10:  no-op // do nothing
11: else if  $\exists 0 \leq j < i : C_{\bar{P},j} \in \Sigma$  then // counterparty has closed maliciously
12:  LN.SUBMITANDCHECKREVOCATION( $j$ )
13: else // counterparty is idle
14:  while  $\nexists$  unspent output  $\in \Sigma$  that  $C_{P,i}$  can spend do // possibly due to
  an active timelock
15:    wait for input (CHECK VIRTUAL) // ignore other messages
16:    input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
17:  end while
18:   $\text{sig}'_{P,C,i} \leftarrow \text{SIGN}(C_{P,i}, sk_{P,F})$ 
19:  input (SUBMIT,  $(C_{P,i}, \text{sig}_{P,C,i}, \text{sig}'_{P,C,i})$ ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ 
20: end if

```

**Fig. 39.**

**Process LN – On output (ENABLER USED REVOCATION) by **host<sub>P</sub>**:**

```

1:  $State \leftarrow \text{BASE PUNISHED}$ 

```

**Fig. 40.**

# Process VIRT

```

1: On every activation, before handling the message:
2:   if last_poll  $\neq \perp$  then // virtual layer is ready
3:     input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
4:     if last_poll +  $p < |\Sigma|$  then
5:       for  $P \in \{\text{guest}, \text{funder}, \text{fundee}\}$  do // at most 1 of funder, fundee
is defined
6:         ensure  $P.\text{NEGLIGENT}()$  returns (OK)
7:       end for
8:     end if
9:   end if

10: // guest is trusted to give sane inputs, therefore a state machine and input
    verification are redundant
11: On input (INIT, host $_P$ ,  $\bar{P}$ , sibling, fundee, ( $sk_{\text{loc}, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{loc}, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ ),
     $pk_{\text{rem}, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{sib}, \text{rem}, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ , ( $sk_{\text{loc}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{loc}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ ),  $pk_{\text{rem}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ ,
     $pk_{\text{loc}, \text{out}}$ ,  $c_P$ ,  $c_{\bar{P}}$ ,  $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $t_P$ ,  $i$ , side,  $n$ ) by guest:
12:   ensure  $1 < i \leq n$  // host_funder ( $i = 1$ ) is initialised with HOST ME
13:   ensure side  $\in \{\text{"left"}, \text{"right"}\}$ 
14:   store message contents and guest // sibling,  $pk_{\text{sib}, \bar{P}, F}$  are missing for
    endpoints, fundee is present only in last node
15:   ( $sk_{i, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ ,  $pk_{i, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ )  $\leftarrow$  ( $sk_{\text{loc}, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{loc}, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ )
16:    $pk_{\text{myRem}, \text{fund}, \text{new}} \leftarrow pk_{\text{rem}, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ 
17:   if  $i < n$  then // we are not last hop
18:      $pk_{\text{sibRem}, \text{fund}, \text{new}} \leftarrow pk_{\text{sib}, \text{rem}, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ 
19:   end if
20:   if side = "left" then
21:     side'  $\leftarrow$  "right"; myRem  $\leftarrow i - 1$ ; sibRem  $\leftarrow i + 1$ 
22:   else // side = "right"
23:     side'  $\leftarrow$  "left"; myRem  $\leftarrow i + 1$ ; sibRem  $\leftarrow i - 1$ 
24:   end if
25:   ( $sk_{i, \text{side}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ ,  $pk_{i, \text{side}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ )  $\leftarrow$  ( $sk_{\text{loc}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{loc}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ )
26:    $pk_{\text{myRem}, \text{side}', \text{fund}, \text{old}} \leftarrow pk_{\text{rem}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ 
27:   if side = "left" then
28:      $pk_{i, \text{out}} \leftarrow pk_{\text{loc}, \text{out}}$ 
29:   end if // otherwise sibling will send  $pk_{i, \text{out}}$  in KEYS AND COINS FORWARD
30:   ( $c_{i, \text{side}}$ ,  $c_{\text{myRem}, \text{side}'}$ ,  $t_{i, \text{side}}$ )  $\leftarrow$  ( $c_P$ ,  $c_{\bar{P}}$ ,  $t_P$ )
31:   last_poll  $\leftarrow \perp$ 
32:   if side = "left"  $\wedge i \neq n$  then
33:     ( $sk_{i, j, k}$ ,  $pk_{i, j, k}$ ) $_{j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}} \leftarrow \text{KEYGEN}()^{(n-2)(n-1)}$ 
34:   end if
35:   output (HOST INIT OK) to guest

36: On input (HOST ME, funder, fundee,  $\bar{P}$ , host $_P$ ,  $c_P$ ,  $c_{\bar{P}}$ ,  $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{left}, \text{virt}}$ ,
     $pk_{\text{right}, \text{virt}}$ , ( $sk_{1, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ ,  $pk_{1, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ ), ( $sk_{1, \text{right}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ ,  $pk_{1, \text{right}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ ),
     $pk_{2, \text{left}, \text{fund}, \text{old}}$ ,  $pk_{2, \text{left}, \text{fund}, \text{new}}$ ,  $pk_{1, \text{out}}$ ,  $n$ ) by guest:
37:   last_poll  $\leftarrow \perp$ 

```

```

38:    $i \leftarrow 1$ 
39:    $c_{1,\text{right}} \leftarrow c_P; c_{2,\text{left}} \leftarrow c_{\bar{P}}$ 
40:    $(sk_{1,j,k}, pk_{1,j,k})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}} \leftarrow \text{KEYGEN}^{(n-2)(n-1)}$ 
41:   ensure VIRT.CIRCULATEKEYSCoinsTimes() returns (OK)
42:   ensure VIRT.CIRCULATEVIRTUALSIGs() returns (OK)
43:   ensure VIRT.CIRCULATEFUNDINGSIGs() returns (OK)
44:   ensure VIRT.CIRCULATEREVOCATIONS() returns (OK)
45:   output (HOSTS READY,  $p + \sum_{j=2}^{n-1} (s-1 + t_j)$ ) to guest //  $p$  is every how
many blocks we have to check the chain

```

Fig. 41.

**Process VIRT.CIRCULATEKEYSCoinsTimes(left\_data):**

```

1: if left_data is given as argument then // we are not host_funder
2:   parse left_data as  $((pk_{j,\text{fund,new}})_{j \in [i-1]}, (pk_{j,\text{left,fund,old}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, i-1\}},$ 
 $(pk_{j,\text{right,fund,old}})_{j \in [i-1]}, (pk_{j,\text{out}})_{j \in [i-1]}, (c_{j,\text{left}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, i-1\}}, (c_{j,\text{right}})_{j \in [i-1]},$ 
 $(t_j)_{j \in [i-1]}, pk_{\text{left,virt}}, pk_{\text{right,virt}}, (pk_{h,j,k})_{h \in [i-1], j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}})$ 
3:   if we have a sibling then // we are not host_fundee
4:     input (KEYS AND COINS FORWARD, (left_data,  $(sk_{i,\text{left,fund,old}},$ 
 $pk_{i,\text{left,fund,old}}), pk_{i,\text{out}}, c_{i,\text{left}}, t_{i,\text{left}}, (sk_{i,j,k}, pk_{i,j,k})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}})$  to
sibling
5:     store input as left_data and parse it as  $((pk_{j,\text{fund,new}})_{j \in [i-1]},$ 
 $(pk_{j,\text{left,fund,old}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, i\}}, (pk_{j,\text{right,fund,old}})_{j \in [i-1]}, (pk_{j,\text{out}})_{j \in [i]}, (c_{j,\text{left}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, i\}},$ 
 $(c_{j,\text{right}})_{j \in [i-1]}, (t_j)_{j \in [i-1]}, sk_{i,\text{left,fund,old}}, t_{i,\text{left}}, pk_{\text{left,virt}}, pk_{\text{right,virt}},$ 
 $(pk_{h,j,k})_{h \in [i], j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}, (sk_{i,j,k})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}})$ 
6:      $t_i \leftarrow \max(t_{i,\text{left}}, t_{i,\text{right}})$ 
7:     replace  $t_{i,\text{left}}$  in left_data with  $t_i$ 
8:     remove  $sk_{i,\text{left,fund,old}}$  and  $(sk_{i,j,k})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}$  from left_data
9:     call VIRT.CIRCULATEKEYSCoinsTimes(left_data) of  $\bar{P}$  and assign
returned value to right_data
10:    parse right_data as  $((pk_{j,\text{fund,new}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}},$ 
 $(pk_{j,\text{left,fund,old}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}}, (pk_{j,\text{right,fund,old}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n-1\}}, (pk_{j,\text{out}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}},$ 
 $(c_{j,\text{left}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}}, (c_{j,\text{right}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n-1\}}, (t_j)_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}},$ 
 $(pk_{h,j,k})_{h \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}, j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}})$ 
11:    output (KEYS AND COINS BACK, right_data,  $(sk_{i,\text{right,fund,old}},$ 
 $pk_{i,\text{right,fund,old}}), c_{i,\text{right}}, t_i)$ 
12:    store output as right_data and parse it as  $((pk_{j,\text{fund,new}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}},$ 
 $(pk_{j,\text{left,fund,old}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}}, (pk_{j,\text{right,fund,old}})_{j \in \{i, \dots, n-1\}}, (pk_{j,\text{out}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}},$ 
 $(c_{j,\text{left}})_{j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}}, (c_{j,\text{right}})_{j \in \{i, \dots, n-1\}}, (t_j)_{j \in \{i, \dots, n\}},$ 
 $(pk_{h,j,k})_{h \in \{i+1, \dots, n\}, j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}, sk_{i,\text{right,fund,old}})$ 
13:    remove  $sk_{i,\text{right,fund,old}}$  from right_data
14:    return (right_data,  $pk_{i,\text{fund,new}}, pk_{i,\text{left,fund,old}}, pk_{i,\text{out}}, c_{i,\text{left}})$ 
15:  else // we are host_fundee

```

```

16:     output (CHECK KEYS,  $(pk_{\text{left,virt}}, pk_{\text{right,virt}})$ ) to fundee and expect
    reply (KEYS OK)
17:     return  $(pk_{n,\text{fund,new}}, pk_{n,\text{left,fund,old}}, pk_{n,\text{out}}, c_{n,\text{left}}, t_n)$ 
18:   end if
19: else // we are host_funder
20:   call VIRT.CIRCULATEKEYSCOINSTIMES( $pk_{1,\text{fund,new}}, pk_{1,\text{right,fund,old}}, pk_{1,\text{out}},$ 
     $c_{1,\text{right}}, t_1, pk_{\text{left,virt}}, pk_{\text{right,virt}}, (pk_{1,j,k})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}}$ ) of  $P$  and assign
    returned value to right_data
21:   parse right_data as  $((pk_{j,\text{fund,new}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n\}}, (pk_{j,\text{left,fund,old}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n\}},$ 
     $(pk_{j,\text{right,fund,old}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}}, (pk_{j,\text{out}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n\}}, (c_{j,\text{left}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n\}},$ 
     $(c_{j,\text{right}})_{j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}}, (t_j)_{j \in \{2, \dots, n\}}, (pk_{h,j,k})_{h \in \{2, \dots, n\}, j \in \{2, \dots, n-1\}, k \in [n] \setminus \{j\}})$ 
22:   return (OK)
23: end if

```

Fig. 42.

#### Process VIRT

```

1: GETMIDTXS( $i, n, c_{\text{virt}}, c_{\text{rem,left}}, c_{\text{loc,left}}, c_{\text{loc,right}}, c_{\text{rem,right}}, pk_{\text{rem,left,fund,old}},$ 
     $pk_{\text{loc,left,fund,old}}, pk_{\text{loc,right,fund,old}}, pk_{\text{rem,right,fund,old}}, pk_{\text{rem,left,fund,new}},$ 
     $pk_{\text{loc,left,fund,new}}, pk_{\text{loc,right,fund,new}}, pk_{\text{rem,right,fund,new}}, pk_{\text{left,virt}}, pk_{\text{right,virt}},$ 
     $pk_{\text{loc,out}}, (pk_{p,j,k})_{p \in [n], j \in [n-1] \setminus \{1\}, k \in [n-1] \setminus \{1,j\}}, (pk_{p,2,1})_{p \in [n]}, (pk_{p,n-1,n})_{p \in [n]},$ 
     $(t_j)_{j \in [n-1] \setminus \{1\}}$ ):
2:   ensure  $1 < i < n$ 
3:   ensure  $c_{\text{rem,left}} \geq c_{\text{virt}} \wedge c_{\text{loc,left}} \geq c_{\text{virt}}$  // left parties fund virtual channel
4:   ensure  $c_{\text{rem,left}} \geq c_{\text{loc,right}} \wedge c_{\text{rem,right}} \geq c_{\text{loc,left}}$  // avoid griefing attack
5:    $c_{\text{left}} \leftarrow c_{\text{rem,left}} + c_{\text{loc,left}}; c_{\text{right}} \leftarrow c_{\text{loc,right}} + c_{\text{rem,right}}$ 
6:    $\text{left\_old\_fund} \leftarrow 2/\{pk_{\text{rem,left,fund,old}}, pk_{\text{loc,left,fund,old}}\}$ 
7:    $\text{right\_old\_fund} \leftarrow 2/\{pk_{\text{loc,right,fund,old}}, pk_{\text{rem,right,fund,old}}\}$ 
8:    $\text{left\_new\_fund} \leftarrow 2/\{pk_{\text{rem,left,fund,new}}, pk_{\text{loc,left,fund,new}}\}$ 
9:    $\text{right\_new\_fund} \leftarrow 2/\{pk_{\text{loc,right,fund,new}}, pk_{\text{rem,right,fund,new}}\}$ 
10:   $\text{virt\_fund} \leftarrow 2/\{pk_{\text{left,virt}}, pk_{\text{right,virt}}\}$ 
11:  for all  $j \in [n-1] \setminus \{1\}, k \in [n-1] \setminus \{1,j\}$  do
12:     $all_{j,k} \leftarrow n/\{pk_{1,j,k}, \dots, pk_{n,j,k}\} \wedge "k"$ 
13:  end for
14:  if  $i = 2$  then
15:     $all_{2,1} \leftarrow n/\{pk_{1,2,1}, \dots, pk_{n,2,1}\} \wedge "1"$ 
16:  end if
17:  if  $i = n-1$  then
18:     $all_{n-1,n} \leftarrow n/\{pk_{1,n-1,n}, \dots, pk_{n,n-1,n}\} \wedge "n"$ 
19:  end if
20:  // After funding is complete,  $A_j$  has the signature of all other parties for
    all  $all_{j,k}$  inputs, but other parties do not have  $A_j$ 's signature for this input,
    therefore only  $A_j$  can publish it.

```



```

21:    //  $\text{TX}_{i,j,k}$  :=  $i$ -th move,  $j, k$  input interval start and end.  $j, k$  unneeded for
     $i = 1, k$  unneeded for  $i = 2$ .
22:     $\text{TX}_1 \leftarrow \text{TX}$ :
23:        inputs:
24:            ( $c_{\text{left}}$ , left_old_fund),
25:            ( $c_{\text{right}}$ , right_old_fund)
26:        outputs:
27:            ( $c_{\text{left}} - c_{\text{virt}}$ , left_new_fund),
28:            ( $c_{\text{right}} - c_{\text{virt}}$ , right_new_fund),
29:            ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{loc,out}}$ ),
30:            ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,
31:                (if  $(i - 1 > 1)$  then  $\text{all}_{i-1,i}$  else False)
32:                 $\vee$  (if  $(i + 1 < n)$  then  $\text{all}_{i+1,i}$  else False)
33:                 $\vee$  (
34:                    if  $(i - 1 = 1 \wedge i + 1 = n)$  then virt_fund
35:                    else if  $(i - 1 > 1 \wedge i + 1 = n)$  then virt_fund +  $t_{i-1}$ 
36:                    else if  $(i - 1 = 1 \wedge i + 1 < n)$  then virt_fund +  $t_{i+1}$ 
37:                    else  $/*i - 1 > 1 \wedge i + 1 < n*/$  virt_fund +  $\max(t_{i-1}, t_{i+1})$ 
38:                )
39:            )
40:    if  $i = 2$  then
41:         $\text{TX}_{2,1} \leftarrow \text{TX}$ :
42:            inputs:
43:                ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $\text{all}_{2,1}$ ),
44:                ( $c_{\text{right}}$ , right_old_fund)
45:            outputs:
46:                ( $c_{\text{right}} - c_{\text{virt}}$ , right_new_fund),
47:                ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{loc,out}}$ ),
48:                ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,
49:                    if  $(n > 3)$  then  $(\text{all}_{3,2} \vee (\text{virt\_fund} + t_3))$ 
50:                    else virt_fund
51:                )
52:    end if
53:    if  $i = n - 1$  then
54:         $\text{TX}_{2,n} \leftarrow \text{TX}$ :
55:            inputs:
56:                ( $c_{\text{left}}$ , left_old_fund),
57:                ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $\text{all}_{n-1,n}$ )
58:            outputs:
59:                ( $c_{\text{left}} - c_{\text{virt}}$ , left_new_fund),
60:                ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{loc,out}}$ ),
61:                ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,
62:                    if  $(n - 2 > 1)$  then  $(\text{all}_{n-2,n-1} \vee (\text{virt\_fund} + t_{n-2}))$ 
63:                    else virt_fund

```

```

64:         )
65:     end if
66:     for all  $k \in \{2, \dots, i-1\}$  do //  $i-2$  txs
67:         TX2,k ← TX:
68:             inputs:
69:                 ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $all_{i,k}$ ),
70:                 ( $c_{\text{right}}$ ,  $right\_old\_fund$ )
71:             outputs:
72:                 ( $c_{\text{right}} - c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $right\_new\_fund$ ),
73:                 ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{loc,out}}$ ),
74:                 ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,
75:                     (if  $(k-1 > 1)$  then  $all_{k-1,i}$  else False)
76:                      $\vee$  (if  $(i+1 < n)$  then  $all_{i+1,k}$  else False)
77:                      $\vee$  (
78:                         if  $(k-1 = 1 \wedge i+1 = n)$  then  $virt\_fund$ 
79:                         else if  $(k-1 > 1 \wedge i+1 = n)$  then  $virt\_fund + t_{k-1}$ 
80:                         else if  $(k-1 = 1 \wedge i+1 < n)$  then  $virt\_fund + t_{i+1}$ 
81:                         else  $/^*k-1 > 1 \wedge i+1 < n^*/ virt\_fund + \max(t_{k-1}, t_{i+1})$ 
82:                     )
83:                 )
84:     end for
85:     for all  $k \in \{i+1, \dots, n-1\}$  do //  $n-i-1$  txs
86:         TX2,k ← TX:
87:             inputs:
88:                 ( $c_{\text{left}}$ ,  $left\_old\_fund$ )
89:                 ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $all_{i,k}$ ),
90:             outputs:
91:                 ( $c_{\text{left}} - c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $left\_new\_fund$ ),
92:                 ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,  $pk_{\text{loc,out}}$ ),
93:                 ( $c_{\text{virt}}$ ,
94:                     (if  $(i-1 > 1)$  then  $all_{i-1,k}$  else False)
95:                      $\vee$  (if  $(k+1 < n)$  then  $all_{k+1,i}$  else False)
96:                      $\vee$  (
97:                         if  $(i-1 = 1 \wedge k+1 = n)$  then  $virt\_fund$ 
98:                         else if  $(i-1 > 1 \wedge k+1 = n)$  then  $virt\_fund + t_{i-1}$ 
99:                         else if  $(i-1 = 1 \wedge k+1 < n)$  then  $virt\_fund + t_{k+1}$ 
100:                        else  $/^*i-1 > 1 \wedge k+1 < n^*/$ 
101:                         $virt\_fund + \max(t_{i-1}, t_{k+1})$ 
102:                    )
103:                 )
104:     end for
105:     if  $i = 2$  then  $m \leftarrow 1$  else  $m \leftarrow 2$ 
106:     if  $i = n-1$  then  $l \leftarrow n$  else  $l \leftarrow n-1$ 
107:     for all  $(k_1, k_2) \in \{m, \dots, i-1\} \times \{i+1, \dots, l\}$  do //  $(i-m) \cdot (l-i)$  txs

```

```

107:   TX3,k1,k2 ← TX:
108:   inputs:
109:     (cvirt, alli,k1),
110:     (cvirt, alli,k2)
111:   outputs:
112:     (cvirt, pkloc,out),
113:     (cvirt,
114:      (if (k1 - 1 > 1) then allk1-1,min(k2,n-1) else False)
115:      ∨ (if (k2 + 1 < n) then allk2+1,max(k1,2) else False)
116:      ∨ (
117:        if (k1 - 1 ≤ 1 ∧ k2 + 1 ≥ n) then virt_fund
118:        else if (k1 - 1 > 1 ∧ k2 + 1 ≥ n) then virt_fund + tk1-1
119:        else if (k1 - 1 ≤ 1 ∧ k2 + 1 < n) then virt_fund + tk2+1
120:        else /*k1 - 1 > 1 ∧ k2 + 1 < n*/
121:          virt_fund + max(tk1-1, tk2+1)
122:      )
123:   )
124: end for
125: return (
126:   TX1,
127:   (TX2,k)k ∈ {m,...,l} \ {i},
128:   (TX3,k1,k2)(k1,k2) ∈ {m,...,i-1} × {i+1,...,l}
129: )

```

Fig. 43.

#### Process VIRT

```

1: // left and right refer to the two counterparties, with left being the one closer
   to the funder. Note difference with left/right meaning in VIRT.GETMIDTXS.
2: GETENDPOINTTX(i, n, cvirt, cleft, cright, pkleft,fund,old, pkright,fund,old,
   pkleft,fund,new, pkright,fund,new, pkleft,virt, pkright,virt, (pkall,j)j ∈ [n], t):
3:   ensure i ∈ {1, n}
4:   ensure cleft ≥ cvirt // left party funds virtual channel
5:   ctot ← cleft + cright
6:   old_fund ← 2/{pkleft,fund,old, pkright,fund,old}
7:   new_fund ← 2/{pkleft,fund,new, pkright,fund,new}
8:   virt_fund ← 2/{pkleft,virt, pkright,virt}
9:   if i = 1 then // funder's tx
10:     all ← n/{pkall,1, ..., pkall,n} ∧ "1"
11:   else // fundee's tx
12:     all ← n/{pkall,1, ..., pkall,n} ∧ "n"
13:   end if

```

```

14:   TX1 ← TX: // endpoints only have an “initiator” tx
15:   inputs:
16:     (ctot, old_fund)
17:   outputs:
18:     (ctot - cvirt, new_fund),
19:     (cvirt, all ∨ (virt_fund + t))
20:   return TX1

```

Fig. 44.

**Process** VIRT.SIBLINGSIGS()

```

1: parse input as sigsbyLeft
2: if i = 2 then m ← 1 else m ← 2
3: if i = n - 1 then l ← n else l ← n - 1
4: (TXi,1, (TXi,2,k)k ∈ {m,...,l} \ {i}, (TXi,3,k1,k2)(k1,k2) ∈ {m,...,i-1} \ {i+1,...,l}) ←
  VIRT.GETMIDTXS(i, n, cvirt, ci-1,right, ci,left, ci,right, ci+1,left,
  pki-1,right,fund,old, pki,left,fund,old, pki,right,fund,old, pki+1,left,fund,old,
  pki-1,fund,new, pki,fund,new, pki,fund,new, pki+1,fund,new, pkleft,virt, pkright,virt,
  pki,out, (pki,j,k)i ∈ [n], j ∈ [n-1] \ {1}, k ∈ [n-1] \ {1,j}, (pki,2,1)i ∈ [n], (pki,n-1,n)i ∈ [n],
  (ti)i ∈ [n-1] \ {1})

5: // notation: sig(TX, pk) := sig with ANYPREVOUT flag such that
  VERIFY(TX, sig, pk) = True
6: ensure that the following signatures are present in sigsbyLeft and store them:
  - // (l - m) · (i - 1) signatures
7:   ∀k ∈ {m, ..., l} \ {i}, ∀j ∈ [i - 1] :
8:     sig(TXi,2,k, pkj,i,k)
  - // 2 · (i - m) · (l - i) · (i - 1) signatures
9:   ∀k1 ∈ {m, ..., i - 1}, ∀k2 ∈ {i + 1, ..., l}, ∀j ∈ [i - 1] :
10:    sig(TXi,3,k1,k2, pkj,i,k1), sig(TXi,3,k1,k2, pkj,i,k2)
11: sigstoRight ← sigsbyLeft

12: for all j ∈ {2, ..., n - 1} \ {i} do
13:   if j = 2 then m' ← 1 else m' ← 2
14:   if j = n - 1 then l' ← n else l' ← n - 1
15:   (TXj,1, (TXj,2,k)k ∈ {m',...,l'} \ {i}, (TXj,3,k1,k2)(k1,k2) ∈ {m',...,i-1} \ {i+1,...,l'}) ←
    GETMIDTXS(j, n, cvirt, cj-1,right, cj,left, cj,right, cj+1,left, pkj-1,right,fund,old,
    pkj,left,fund,old, pkj,right,fund,old, pkj+1,left,fund,old, pkj-1,fund,new, pkj,fund,new,
    pkj,fund,new, pkj+1,fund,new, pkleft,virt, pkright,virt, pkj,out,
    (pkk,p,s)k ∈ [n], p ∈ [n-1] \ {1}, s ∈ [n-1] \ {1,p}, (pkk,2,1)k ∈ [n], (pkk,n-1,n)k ∈ [n],
    (tk)k ∈ [n-1] \ {1})
16:   if j < i then sigs ← sigstoLeft else sigs ← sigstoRight

```

```

17:   for all  $k \in \{m', \dots, l'\} \setminus \{j\}$  do
18:     add  $\text{SIGN}(\text{TX}_{j,2,k}, sk_{i,j,k}, \text{ANYPREVOUT})$  to sigs
19:   end for
20:   for all  $k_1 \in \{m', \dots, j-1\}, k_2 \in \{j+1, \dots, l'\}$  do
21:     add  $\text{SIGN}(\text{TX}_{j,3,k_1,k_2}, sk_{i,j,k_1}, \text{ANYPREVOUT})$  to sigs
22:     add  $\text{SIGN}(\text{TX}_{j,3,k_1,k_2}, sk_{i,j,k_2}, \text{ANYPREVOUT})$  to sigs
23:   end for
24: end for
25: if  $i+1 = n$  then // next hop is host_fundee
26:    $\text{TX}_{n,1} \leftarrow \text{VIRT.GETENDPOINTTX}(n, n, c_{\text{virt}}, c_{n-1,\text{right}}, c_{n,\text{left}},$ 
      $pk_{n-1,\text{right},\text{fund},\text{old}}, pk_{n,\text{left},\text{fund},\text{old}}, pk_{n-1,\text{fund},\text{new}}, pk_{n,\text{fund},\text{new}}, pk_{\text{left},\text{virt}},$ 
      $pk_{\text{right},\text{virt}}, (pk_{j,n-1,n})_{j \in [n]}, t_{n-1})$ 
27: end if

28: call  $\bar{P}.\text{CIRCULATEVIRTUALSIGS}(\text{sigs}_{\text{toRight}})$  and assign returned value to
    $\text{sigs}_{\text{byRight}}$ 
29: ensure that the following signatures are present in  $\text{sigs}_{\text{byRight}}$  and store them:
   - //  $(l-m) \cdot (n-i)$  signatures
30:    $\forall k \in \{m, \dots, l\} \setminus \{i\}, \forall j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\} :$ 
31:      $\text{sig}(\text{TX}_{i,2,k}, pk_{j,i,k})$ 
   - //  $2 \cdot (i-m) \cdot (l-i) \cdot (n-i)$  signatures
32:    $\forall k_1 \in \{m, \dots, i-1\}, \forall k_2 \in \{i+1, \dots, l\}, \forall j \in \{i+1, \dots, n\} :$ 
33:      $\text{sig}(\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2}, pk_{j,i,k_1}), \text{sig}(\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2}, pk_{j,i,k_2})$ 
34: output  $(\text{VIRTUALSIGSBACK}, \text{sigs}_{\text{toLeft}}, \text{sigs}_{\text{byRight}})$ 

```

Fig. 45.

**Process**  $\text{VIRT.INTERMEDIARYSIGS}()$

```

1: if  $i = 2$  then  $m \leftarrow 1$  else  $m \leftarrow 2$ 
2: if  $i = n-1$  then  $l \leftarrow n$  else  $l \leftarrow n-1$ 
3:  $(\text{TX}_{i,1}, (\text{TX}_{i,2,k})_{k \in \{m, \dots, l\} \setminus \{i\}}, (\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2})_{(k_1,k_2) \in \{m, \dots, i-1\} \setminus \{i+1, \dots, l\}}) \leftarrow$ 
    $\text{VIRT.GETMIDTXS}(i, n, c_{\text{virt}}, c_{i-1,\text{right}}, c_{i,\text{left}}, c_{i,\text{right}}, c_{i+1,\text{left}},$ 
      $pk_{i-1,\text{right},\text{fund},\text{old}}, pk_{i,\text{left},\text{fund},\text{old}}, pk_{i,\text{right},\text{fund},\text{old}}, pk_{i+1,\text{left},\text{fund},\text{old}},$ 
      $pk_{i-1,\text{fund},\text{new}}, pk_{i,\text{fund},\text{new}}, pk_{i,\text{fund},\text{new}}, pk_{i+1,\text{fund},\text{new}}, pk_{\text{left},\text{virt}}, pk_{\text{right},\text{virt}},$ 
      $pk_{i,\text{out}}, (pk_{i,j,k})_{i \in [n], j \in [n-1] \setminus \{1\}}, (pk_{i,2,1})_{i \in [n]}, (pk_{i,n-1,n})_{i \in [n]},$ 
      $(t_i)_{i \in [n-1] \setminus \{1\}})$ 
4: // not verifying our signatures in  $\text{sigs}_{\text{byLeft}}$ , our (trusted) sibling will do that
5: input  $(\text{VIRTUALSIGS FORWARD}, \text{sigs}_{\text{byLeft}})$  to sibling
6:  $\text{VIRT.SIBLINGSIGS}()$ 
7:  $\text{sigs}_{\text{toLeft}} \leftarrow \text{sigs}_{\text{byRight}} + \text{sigs}_{\text{toLeft}}$ 
8: if  $i = 2$  then // previous hop is host_funder
9:    $\text{TX}_{1,1} \leftarrow \text{VIRT.GETENDPOINTTX}(1, n, c_{\text{virt}}, c_{1,\text{right}}, c_{2,\text{left}}, pk_{1,\text{right},\text{fund},\text{old}},$ 
      $pk_{2,\text{left},\text{fund},\text{old}}, pk_{1,\text{fund},\text{new}}, pk_{2,\text{fund},\text{new}}, pk_{\text{left},\text{virt}}, pk_{\text{right},\text{virt}}, (pk_{j,2,1})_{j \in [n]}, t_2)$ 

```

```

10: end if
11: return sigstoLeft

```

Fig. 46.

**Process VIRT.HOSTFUNDEESIGS()**

```

1: TXn,1 ← VIRT.GETENDPOINTTX(n, n, cvirt, cn-1,right, cn,left,
   pkn-1,right,fund,old, pkn,right,fund,old, pkn-1,fund,new, pkn,fund,new, pkleft,virt,
   pkright,virt, (pkj,n-1,n)j∈[n], tn-1)
2: for all j ∈ [n - 1] \ {1} do
3:   if j = 2 then m ← 1 else m ← 2
4:   if j = n - 1 then l ← n else l ← n - 1
5:   (TXj,1, (TXj,2,k)k∈{m,...,l} \ {j}, (TXi,3,k1,k2)(k1,k2)∈{m,...,i-1}{i+1,...,l}) ←
   VIRT.GETMIDTXS(j, n, cvirt, cj-1,right, cj,left, cj,right, cj+1,left,
   pkj-1,right,fund,old, pkj,left,fund,old, pkj,right,fund,old, pkj+1,left,fund,old,
   pkj-1,fund,new, pkj,fund,new, pkj,fund,new, pkj+1,fund,new, pkleft,virt, pkright,virt,
   pkj,out, (pkj,s,k)j∈[n],s∈[n-1] \ {1},k∈[n-1] \ {1,s}, (pkj,2,1)j∈[n], (pkj,n-1,n)j∈[n],
   (tj)j∈[n-1] \ {1})
6:   sigstoLeft ← ∅
7:   for all k ∈ {m, ..., l} \ {j} do
8:     add SIGN(TXj,2,k, skn,j,k, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoLeft
9:   end for
10:  for all k1 ∈ {m, ..., j - 1}, k2 ∈ {j + 1, ..., l} do
11:    add SIGN(TXj,3,k1,k2, skn,j,k1, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoLeft
12:    add SIGN(TXj,3,k1,k2, skn,j,k2, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoLeft
13:  end for
14: end for
15: return sigstoLeft

```

Fig. 47.

**Process VIRT.HOSTFUNDERSIGS()**

```

1: for all j ∈ [n - 1] \ {1} do
2:   if j = 2 then m ← 1 else m ← 2
3:   if j = n - 1 then l ← n else l ← n - 1
4:   (TXj,1, (TXj,2,k)k∈{m,...,l} \ {j}, (TXi,3,k1,k2)(k1,k2)∈{m,...,i-1}{i+1,...,l}) ←
   VIRT.GETMIDTXS(j, n, cvirt, cj-1,right, cj,left, cj,right, cj+1,left,
   pkj-1,right,fund,old, pkj,left,fund,old, pkj,right,fund,old, pkj+1,left,fund,old,
   pkj-1,fund,new, pkj,fund,new, pkj,fund,new, pkj+1,fund,new, pkleft,virt, pkright,virt,

```

```

 $pk_{j,\text{out}}, (pk_{j,s,k})_{j \in [n], s \in [n-1] \setminus \{1\}, k \in [n-1] \setminus \{1,s\}}, (pk_{j,2,1})_{j \in [n]}, (pk_{j,n-1,n})_{j \in [n]},$ 
 $(t_j)_{j \in [n-1] \setminus \{1\}}$ 
5:   sigstoRight  $\leftarrow \emptyset$ 
6:   for all  $k \in \{m, \dots, l\} \setminus \{j\}$  do
7:     add SIGN(TXj,2,k, sk1,j,k, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoRight
8:   end for
9:   for all  $k_1 \in \{m, \dots, j-1\}, k_2 \in \{j+1, \dots, l\}$  do
10:    add SIGN(TXj,3,k1,k2, sk1,j,k1, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoRight
11:    add SIGN(TXj,3,k1,k2, sk1,j,k2, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoRight
12:  end for
13: end for
14: call VIRT.CIRCULATEVIRTUALSIGS(sigstoRight) of  $\bar{P}$  and assign output to
    sigsbyRight
15: TX1,1  $\leftarrow$  VIRT.GETENDPOINTTX(1, n, cvirt, c1,right, c2,left, pk1,right,fund,old,
    pk2,left,fund,old, pk1,fund,new, pk2,fund,new, pkleft,virt, pkright,virt, (pkj,2,1)j ∈ [n], t2)
16: return (OK)

```

Fig. 48.

**Process** VIRT.CIRCULATEVIRTUALSIGS(sigs<sub>byLeft</sub>)

```

1: if  $1 < i < n$  then // we are not host_funder nor host_fundee
2:   return VIRT.INTERMEDIARYSIGS()
3: else if  $i = 1$  then // we are host_funder
4:   return VIRT.HOSTFUNDERSIGS()
5: else if  $i = n$  then // we are host_fundee
6:   return VIRT.HOSTFUNDEESIGS()
7: end if // it is always  $1 \leq i \leq n$  - c.f. Fig. 41, l. 12 and l. 39

```

Fig. 49.

**Process** VIRT.CIRCULATEFUNDINGSIGS(sigs<sub>byLeft</sub>)

```

1: if  $1 < i < n$  then // we are not endpoint
2:   if  $i = 2$  then  $m \leftarrow 1$  else  $m \leftarrow 2$ 
3:   if  $i = n - 1$  then  $l \leftarrow n$  else  $l \leftarrow n - 1$ 
4:   ensure that the following signatures are present in sigsbyLeft and store them:
   - // 1 signature
5:     sig(TXi,1, pki-1,right,fund,old)
   - //  $n - 3 + \chi_{i=2} + \chi_{i=n-1}$  signatures
6:      $\forall k \in \{m, \dots, l\} \setminus \{i\}$ 

```

```

7:      sig(TXi,2,k, pki-1,right,fund,old)
8:  input (VIRTUAL BASE SIG FORWARD, sigsbyLeft) to sibling
9:  extract and store sig(TXi,1, pki-1,right,fund,old) and  $\forall k \in \{m, \dots, l\} \setminus \{i\}$ 
  sig(TXi,2,k, pki-1,right,fund,old) from sigsbyLeft // same signatures as sibling
10:  sigstoRight  $\leftarrow$  {SIGN(TXi+1,1, ski,right,fund,old, ANYPREVOUT)}
11:  if  $i + 1 < n$  then
12:    if  $i + 1 = n - 1$  then  $l' \leftarrow n$  else  $l' \leftarrow n - 1$ 
13:    for all  $k \in \{2, \dots, l'\}$  do
14:      add SIGN(TXi+1,2,k, ski,right,fund,old, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoRight
15:    end for
16:  end if
17:  call VIRT.CIRCULATEFUNDINGSIGS(sigstoRight) of  $\bar{P}$  and assign returned
  values to sigsbyRight
18:  ensure that the following signatures are present in sigsbyRight and store
  them:
  - // 1 signature
19:    sig(TXi,1, pki+1,left,fund,old)
  - //  $n - 3 + \chi_{i=2} + \chi_{i=n-1}$  signatures
20:     $\forall k \in \{m, \dots, l\} \setminus \{i\}$ 
21:    sig(TXi,2,k, pki+1,right,fund,old)
22:  output (VIRTUAL BASE SIG BACK, sigsbyRight)
23:  extract and store sig(TXi,1, pki+1,right,fund,old) and  $\forall k \in \{m, \dots, l\} \setminus \{i\}$ 
  sig(TXi,2,k, pki+1,right,fund,old) from sigsbyRight // same signatures as sibling
24:  sigtoLeft  $\leftarrow$  {SIGN(TXi-1,1, ski,left,fund,old, ANYPREVOUT)}
25:  if  $i - 1 > 1$  then
26:    if  $i - 1 = 2$  then  $m' \leftarrow 1$  else  $m' \leftarrow 2$ 
27:    for all  $k \in \{m', \dots, n - 1\}$  do
28:      add SIGN(TXi-1,2,k, ski,left,fund,old, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoLeft
29:    end for
30:  end if
31:  return sigstoLeft
32: else if  $i = 1$  then // we are host_funder
33:   sigstoRight  $\leftarrow$  {SIGN(TX2,1, sk1,right,fund,old, ANYPREVOUT)}
34:   if  $2 = n - 1$  then  $l' \leftarrow n$  else  $l' \leftarrow n - 1$ 
35:   for all  $k \in \{3, \dots, l'\}$  do
36:     add SIGN(TX2,2,k, sk1,right,fund,old, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoRight
37:   end for
38:   call VIRT.CIRCULATEFUNDINGSIGS(sigstoRight) of  $\bar{P}$  and assign returned
  value to sigsbyRight
39:   ensure that sig(TX1,1, pk2,left,fund,old) is present in sigsbyRight and store it
40:   return (OK)
41: else if  $i = n$  then // we are host_fundee
42:   ensure sig(TXn,1, pkn-1,right,fund,old) is present in sigsbyLeft and store it
43:   sigstoLeft  $\leftarrow$  {SIGN(TXn-1,1, skn,left,fund,old, ANYPREVOUT)}
44:   if  $n - 1 = 2$  then  $m' \leftarrow 1$  else  $m' \leftarrow 2$ 
45:   for all  $k \in \{m', \dots, n - 2\}$  do

```



```

46:         add SIGN(TXn-1,2,k, skn,left,fund,old, ANYPREVOUT) to sigstoLeft
47:     end for
48:     return sigstoLeft
49: end if // it is always  $1 \leq i \leq n$  - c.f. Fig. 41, l. 12 and l. 39

```

Fig. 50.

**Process** VIRT.CIRCULATEREVOCATIONS(revoc\_by\_prev)

```

1: if revoc_by_prev is given as argument then // we are not host_funder
2:   ensure guest.PROCESSREMOTEREVOCATION(revoc_by_prev) returns (OK)
3: else // we are host_funder
4:   revoc_for_next ← guest.REVOKEPREVIOUS()
5:   input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
6:   last_poll ←  $|\Sigma|$ 
7:   call VIRT.CIRCULATEREVOCATIONS(revoc_for_next) of  $\bar{P}$  and assign
   returned value to revoc_by_next
8:   ensure guest.PROCESSREMOTEREVOCATION(revoc_by_next) returns (OK)
   // If the “ensure” fails, the opening process freezes, this is intentional. The
   channel can still close via (CLOSE)
9:   return (OK)
10: end if
11: if we have a sibling then // we are not host_fundee nor host_funder
12:   input (VIRTUAL REVOCATION FORWARD) to sibling
13:   revoc_for_next ← guest.REVOKEPREVIOUS()
14:   input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
15:   last_poll ←  $|\Sigma|$ 
16:   call VIRT.CIRCULATEREVOCATIONS(revoc_for_next) of  $\bar{P}$  and assign
   output to revoc_by_next
17:   ensure guest.PROCESSREMOTEREVOCATION(revoc_by_next) returns (OK)
18:   output (HOSTS READY,  $t_i$ ) to guest and expect reply (HOST ACK)
19:   output (VIRTUAL REVOCATION BACK)
20: end if
21: revoc_for_prev ← guest.REVOKEPREVIOUS()
22: if  $1 < i < n$  then // we are intermediary
23:   output (HOSTS READY,  $t_i$ ) to guest and expect reply (HOST ACK) //  $p$  is
   every how many blocks we have to check the chain
24: else // we are host_fundee, case of host_funder covered earlier
25:   output (HOSTS READY,  $p + \sum_{j=2}^{n-1} (s - 1 + t_j)$ ) to guest and expect reply
   (HOST ACK)
26: end if
27: return revoc_for_prev

```

Fig. 51.

**Process VIRT – poll**

```

1: On input (CHECK FOR LATERAL CLOSE) by  $R \in \{\text{guest, funder, fundee}\}$ :
2:   input (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and assign output to  $\Sigma$ 
3:    $k_1 \leftarrow 0$ 
4:   if  $\text{TX}_{i-1,1}$  is defined and  $\text{TX}_{i-1,1} \in \Sigma$  then
5:      $k_1 \leftarrow i - 1$ 
6:   end if
7:   for all  $k \in [i - 2]$  do
8:     if  $\text{TX}_{i-1,2,k}$  is defined and  $\text{TX}_{i-1,2,k} \in \Sigma$  then
9:        $k_1 \leftarrow k$ 
10:    end if
11:  end for
12:   $k_2 \leftarrow 0$ 
13:  if  $\text{TX}_{i+1,1}$  is defined and  $\text{TX}_{i+1,1} \in \Sigma$  then
14:     $k_2 \leftarrow i + 1$ 
15:  end if
16:  for all  $k \in \{i + 2, \dots, n\}$  do
17:    if  $\text{TX}_{i+1,2,k}$  is defined and  $\text{TX}_{i+1,2,k} \in \Sigma$  then
18:       $k_2 \leftarrow k$ 
19:    end if
20:  end for
21:   $\text{last\_poll} \leftarrow |\Sigma|$ 
22:  if  $k_1 > 0 \vee k_2 > 0$  then // at least one neighbour has published its TX
23:    ignore all messages except for (CHECK IF CLOSING) by  $R$ 
24:     $\text{State} \leftarrow \text{CLOSING}$ 
25:     $\text{sigs} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
26:  end if
27:  if  $k_1 > 0 \wedge k_2 > 0$  then // both neighbours have published their TXs
28:    add  $(\text{sig}(\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2}, pk_{p,i,k_1}))_{p \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$  to sigs
29:    add  $(\text{sig}(\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2}, pk_{p,i,k_2}))_{p \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$  to sigs
30:    add  $\text{SIGN}(\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2}, sk_{i,i,k_1}, \text{ANYPREVOUT})$  to sigs
31:    add  $\text{SIGN}(\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2}, sk_{i,i,k_2}, \text{ANYPREVOUT})$  to sigs
32:    input (SUBMIT,  $\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2}$ , sigs) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ 
33:  else if  $k_1 > 0$  then // only left neighbour has published its TX
34:    add  $(\text{sig}(\text{TX}_{i,2,k_1}, pk_{p,i,k_1}))_{p \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$  to sigs
35:    add  $\text{SIGN}(\text{TX}_{i,2,k_1}, sk_{i,i,k_1}, \text{ANYPREVOUT})$  to sigs
36:    add  $\text{SIGN}(\text{TX}_{i,2,k_1}, sk_{i,\text{left},\text{fund},\text{old}}, \text{ANYPREVOUT})$  to sigs
37:    input (SUBMIT,  $\text{TX}_{i,2,k_1}$ , sigs) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ 
38:  else if  $k_2 > 0$  then // only right neighbour has published its TX
39:    add  $(\text{sig}(\text{TX}_{i,2,k_2}, pk_{p,i,k_2}))_{p \in [n] \setminus \{i\}}$  to sigs
40:    add  $\text{SIGN}(\text{TX}_{i,2,k_2}, sk_{i,i,k_2}, \text{ANYPREVOUT})$  to sigs
41:    add  $\text{SIGN}(\text{TX}_{i,2,k_2}, sk_{i,\text{right},\text{fund},\text{old}}, \text{ANYPREVOUT})$  to sigs
42:    input (SUBMIT,  $\text{TX}_{i,2,k_2}$ , sigs) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ 
43:  end if

```

Fig. 52.





Fig. 53.



```

5:   ensure that there exists an output with  $c_P + c_{\bar{P}} - c_{\text{virt}}$  coins and a
       $2/\{pk_{1,\text{fund,new}}, pk_{2,\text{fund,new}}\}$  spending method with expired/non-existent
      timelock in  $\Sigma$  // new base funding output
6:   ensure that there exists an output with  $c_{\text{virt}}$  coins and a
       $2/\{pk_{\text{left,virt}}, pk_{\text{right,virt}}\}$  spending method with expired/non-existent timelock
      in  $\Sigma$  // virtual funding output
7: else if  $i = n$  then // we are host_fundee
8:   ensure that there exists an output with  $c_P + c_{\bar{P}} - c_{\text{virt}}$  coins and a
       $2/\{pk_{n-1,\text{fund,new}}, pk_{n,\text{fund,new}}\}$  spending method with expired/non-existent
      timelock in  $\Sigma$  // new base funding output
9:   ensure that there exists an output with  $c_{\text{virt}}$  coins and a
       $2/\{pk_{\text{left,virt}}, pk_{\text{right,virt}}\}$  spending method with expired/non-existent timelock
      in  $\Sigma$  // virtual funding output
10: else // we are intermediary
11:   if side = "left" then  $j \leftarrow i - 1$  else  $j \leftarrow i + 1$  // side is defined for all
      intermediaries – c.f. Fig. 41, l. 11
12:   ensure that there exists an output with  $c_P + c_{\bar{P}} - c_{\text{virt}}$  coins and a
       $2/\{pk_{i,\text{fund,new}}, pk_{j,\text{fund,new}}\}$  spending method with expired/non-existent
      timelock and an output with  $c_{\text{virt}}$  coins and a  $pk_{i,\text{out}}$  spending method with
      expired/non-existent timelock in  $\Sigma$ 
13: end if
14:  $State \leftarrow \text{CLOSED}$ 
15: output (CLOSED) to  $R$ 

```

Fig. 54.

#### Process VIRT – punishment handling

```

1: On input (USED REVOCATION) by guest: // (USED REVOCATION) by
   funder/fundee is ignored
2:    $State \leftarrow \text{GUEST PUNISHED}$ 
3:   input (USED REVOCATION) to  $\text{host}_P$ , expect reply (USED REVOCATION OK)
4:   if funder or fundee is defined then
5:     output (ENABLER USED REVOCATION) to it
6:   else // sibling is defined
7:     output (ENABLER USED REVOCATION) to sibling
8:   end if

9: On input (ENABLER USED REVOCATION) by sibling:
10:   $State \leftarrow \text{GUEST PUNISHED}$ 
11:  output (ENABLER USED REVOCATION) to guest

12: On output (USED REVOCATION) by  $\text{host}_P$ :
13:   $State \leftarrow \text{GUEST PUNISHED}$ 
14:  if funder or fundee is defined then

```

```

15:     output (ENABLER USED REVOCATION) to it
16:  else // sibling is defined
17:     output (ENABLER USED REVOCATION) to sibling
18:  end if

```

Fig. 55.

## 12 Liveness

**Proposition 1.** *Consider a synchronised honest party that submits a transaction  $\mathbf{tx}$  to the ledger functionality [49] by the time the block indexed by  $h$  is added to  $\mathbf{state}$  in its view. Then  $\mathbf{tx}$  is guaranteed to be included in the block range  $[h + 1, h + s]$ , where  $s = (2 + q)\mathit{windowSize}$  and  $q = \lceil (\mathit{maxTime}_{\mathit{window}} + \frac{\mathit{Delay}}{2}) / \mathit{minTime}_{\mathit{window}} \rceil$ .*

The proof can be found in [52].

## 13 Omitted Proofs

**Lemma 4 (Real world balance security).** *Consider a real world execution with  $P \in \{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}$  honest LN ITI and  $\bar{P}$  the counterparty ITI. Assume that all of the following are true:*

- the internal variable **negligent** of  $P$  has value “False”,
- $P$  has transitioned to the OPEN State for the first time after having received  $(\text{OPEN}, c, \dots)$  by either  $\mathcal{E}$  or  $\bar{P}$ ,
- $P$  [has received  $(\text{FUND ME}, f_i, \dots)$  as input by another LN ITI while State was OPEN and subsequently  $P$  transitioned to OPEN State]  $n$  times,
- $P$  [has received  $(\text{PAY}, d_i)$  by  $\mathcal{E}$  while State was OPEN and  $P$  subsequently transitioned to OPEN State]  $m$  times,
- $P$  [has received  $(\text{GET PAID}, e_i)$  by  $\mathcal{E}$  while State was OPEN and  $P$  subsequently transitioned to OPEN State]  $l$  times.

Let  $\phi = 1$  if  $P = \text{Alice}$ , or  $\phi = 0$  if  $P = \text{Bob}$ . If  $P$  receives (CLOSE) by  $\mathcal{E}$  and, if  $\mathbf{host}_P \neq \text{“ledger”}$  the output of  $\mathbf{host}_P$  is (CLOSED), then eventually the state obtained when  $P$  inputs (READ) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  will contain  $h$  outputs each of value  $c_i$  and that has been spent or is exclusively spendable by  $pk_{R,\text{out}}$  such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^h c_i \geq \phi \cdot c - \sum_{i=1}^n f_i - \sum_{i=1}^m d_i + \sum_{i=1}^l e_i \quad (3)$$

with overwhelming probability in the security parameter, where  $R$  is a local, kindred machine (i.e. either  $P$ ,  $P$ 's *sibling*, the party to which  $P$  sent FUND ME if such a message has been sent, or the *sibling* of one of the transitive closure of hosts of  $P$ ).

*Proof (Proof of Lemma 4).* We first note that, as signature forgeries only happen with negligible probability and only a polynomial number of signatures are verified by honest parties throughout an execution, the event in which any forged signature passes the verification of an honest party or of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  happens only with negligible probability. We can therefore ignore this event throughout this proof and simply add a computationally negligible distance between  $\mathcal{E}$ 's outputs in the real and the ideal world at the end.

We also note that  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  has been provided by  $\mathcal{E}$ , therefore it can freely use coins spendable by this key. This is why we allow for any of the  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  outputs to have been spent.

Define the *history* of a channel as  $H = (F, C)$ , where each of  $F, C$  is a list of lists of integers. A party  $P$  which satisfies the Lemma conditions has a unique, unambiguously and recursively defined history: If the value **hops** in the (OPEN,  $c$ , **hops**, ...) message was equal to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , then  $F$  is the empty list, otherwise  $F$  is the concatenation of the  $F$  and  $C$  lists of the party that sent (FUNDED, ...) to  $P$ , as they were at the moment the latter message was sent. After initialised,  $F$  remains immutable. Observe that, if **hops**  $\neq \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , both aforementioned messages must have been received before  $P$  transitions to the OPEN state.

The list  $C$  of party  $P$  is initialised to  $[[g]]$  when  $P$ 's *State* transitions for the first time to OPEN, where  $g = c$  if  $P = \text{Alice}$ , or  $g = 0$  if  $P = \text{Bob}$ ; this represents the initial channel balance. The value  $x$  or  $-x$  is appended to the last list in  $C$  when a payment is received (Fig. 33, l. 21) or sent (Fig. 33, l. 6) respectively by  $P$ . Moving on to the funding of new virtual channels, whenever  $P$  funds a new virtual channel (Fig. 30, l. 20),  $[-c_{\text{virt}}]$  is appended to  $C$  and whenever  $P$  helps with the opening of a new virtual channel, but does not fund it (Fig. 30, l. 23),  $[0]$  is appended to  $C$ . Therefore  $C$  consists of one list of integers for each sequence of inbound and outbound payments that have not been interrupted by a virtualisation step and a new list is added for every new virtual layer. We also observe that a non-negligent party with history  $(F, C)$  satisfies the Lemma conditions and that the value of the right hand side of the inequality (3) is equal to  $\sum_{s \in C} \sum_{x \in s} x$ , as all inbound and outbound payment values and new channel funding values that appear in the Lemma conditions are recorded in  $C$ .

Let party  $P$  with a particular history. We will inductively prove that  $P$  satisfies the Lemma. The base case is when a channel is opened with **hops** =  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and is closed right away, therefore  $H = ([], [g])$ , where  $g = c$  if  $P = \text{Alice}$  and  $g = 0$  if  $P = \text{Bob}$ .  $P$  can transition to the OPEN *State* for the first time only if all of the following have taken place:

- It has received (OPEN,  $c$ , ...) while in the INIT *State*. In case  $P = \text{Alice}$ , this message must have been received as input by  $\mathcal{E}$  (Fig. 28, l. 1), or in

- case  $P = Bob$ , this message must have been received via the network by  $\bar{P}$  (Fig. 23, l. 3).
- It has received  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$ . In case  $P = Bob$ ,  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  must have been contained in the (OPEN, ...) message by  $\bar{P}$  (Fig. 23, l. 3), otherwise if  $P = Alice$   $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  must have been contained in the (ACCEPT CHANNEL, ...) message by  $\bar{P}$  (Fig. 23, l. 16).
  - It internally holds a signature on the commitment transaction  $C_{P,0}$  that is valid when verified with public key  $pk_{\bar{P},F}$  (Fig. 25, ll. 12 and 23).
  - It has the transaction  $F$  in the  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  state (Fig. 26, l. 3 or Fig. 27, l. 5).

We observe that  $P$  satisfies the Lemma conditions with  $m = n = l = 0$ . Before transitioning to the OPEN State,  $P$  has produced only one valid signature for the “funding” output  $(c, 2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\})$  of  $F$  with  $sk_{P,F}$ , namely for  $C_{\bar{P},0}$  (Fig. 25, ll. 4 or 14), and sent it to  $\bar{P}$  (Fig. 25, ll. 6 or 21), therefore the only two ways to spend  $(c, 2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\})$  are by either publishing  $C_{P,0}$  or  $C_{\bar{P},0}$ . We observe that  $C_{P,0}$  has a  $(g, (pk_{P,\text{out}} + (t+s)) \vee 2/\{pk_{P,R}, pk_{\bar{P},R}\})$  output (Fig. 25, l. 2 or 3). The spending method  $2/\{pk_{P,R}, pk_{\bar{P},R}\}$  cannot be used since  $P$  has not produced a signature for it with  $sk_{P,R}$ , therefore the alternative spending method,  $pk_{P,\text{out}} + (t+s)$ , is the only one that will be spendable if  $C_{P,0}$  is included in  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , thus contributing  $g$  to the sum of outputs that contribute to inequality (3). Likewise, if  $C_{\bar{P},0}$  is included in  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , it will contribute at least one  $(g, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output to this inequality, as  $C_{\bar{P},0}$  has a  $(g, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output (Fig. 25, l. 2 or 3). Additionally, if  $P$  receives (CLOSE) by  $\mathcal{E}$  while  $H = ([, [g])$ , it attempts to publish  $C_{P,0}$  (Fig. 39, l. 19), and will either succeed or  $C_{\bar{P},0}$  will be published instead. We therefore conclude that in every case  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  will eventually have a state  $\Sigma$  that contains at least one  $(g, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output, therefore satisfying the Lemma consequence.

Let  $P$  with history  $H = (F, C)$ . The induction hypothesis is that the Lemma holds for  $P$ . Let  $c_P$  the sum in the right hand side of inequality (3). In order to perform the induction step, assume that  $P$  is in the OPEN state. We will prove all the following (the facts to be proven are shown with emphasis for clarity):

- If  $P$  receives (FUND ME,  $f$ , ...) by a (local, kindred) LN ITI  $R$ , subsequently transitions back to the OPEN state (therefore moving to history  $(F, C')$  where  $C' = C + [-f]$ ) and finally receives (CLOSE) by  $\mathcal{E}$  and (CLOSED) by  $\text{host}_P$  before any further change to its history, then *eventually  $P$ 's  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  state will contain  $h$  transaction outputs each of value  $c_i$  exclusively spendable or already spent by  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  that are descendants of an output with spending method  $2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\}$  such that  $\sum_{i=1}^h c_i \geq \sum_{s \in C'} \sum_{x \in s} x$* . Furthermore, given that  $P$  moves to the OPEN state after the (FUND ME, ...) message, it also sends (FUNDED, ...) to  $R$  (Fig. 30, l. 21). If subsequently the state of  $R$  transitions to OPEN (therefore obtaining history  $(F_R, C_R)$  where  $F_R = F + C$  and  $C_R = [[f]]$ ), and finally receives (CLOSE) by  $\mathcal{E}$  and (CLOSED) by  $\text{host}_R$  ( $\text{host}_R = \text{host}_P$  – Fig. 27, l. 10) before any further change to its history, then *eventually  $R$ 's  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  state will contain  $k$  transaction outputs each of value  $c_i^R$  exclusively spendable or already spent by  $pk_{R,\text{out}}$  that are*

descendants of an output with spending method  $2/\{pk_{R,F}, pk_{\bar{R},F}\}$  such that

$$\sum_{i=1}^k c_i^R \geq \sum_{s \in C_R} \sum_{x \in s} x.$$

- If  $P$  receives (VIRTUALISING, ...) by  $\bar{P}$ , subsequently transitions back to OPEN (therefore moving to history  $(F, C')$  where  $C' = C + [0]$ ) and finally receives CLOSE by  $\mathcal{E}$  and (CLOSED) by  $\text{host}_P$  before any further change to its history, then *eventually*  $P$ 's  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  state will contain  $h$  transaction outputs each of value  $c_i$  exclusively spendable or already spent by  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  that are descendants of an output with spending method  $2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\}$  such that
$$\sum_{i=1}^h c_i \geq \sum_{s \in C} \sum_{x \in s} x.$$
 Furthermore, given that  $P$  moves to the OPEN state after the (VIRTUALISING, ...) message and in case it sends (FUNDED, ...) to some party  $R$  (Fig. 30, l. 18), the latter party is the (local, kindred) **fundee** of a new virtual channel. If subsequently the state of  $R$  transitions to OPEN (therefore obtaining history  $(F_R, C_R)$  where  $F_R = F + C$  and  $C_R = [[0]]$ ), and finally receives (CLOSE) by  $\mathcal{E}$  and (CLOSED) by  $\text{host}_R$  ( $\text{host}_R = \text{host}_P$  – Fig. 27, l. 10) before any further change to its history, then *eventually*  $R$ 's  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  state will contain an output with a  $2/\{pk_{R,F}, pk_{\bar{R},F}\}$  spending method.
- If  $P$  receives (PAY,  $d$ ) by  $\mathcal{E}$ , subsequently transitions back to OPEN (therefore moving to history  $(F, C')$  where  $C'$  is  $C$  with  $-d$  appended to the last list of  $C$ ) and finally receives CLOSE by  $\mathcal{E}$  and (CLOSED) by  $\text{host}_P$  (the latter only if  $\text{host}_P \neq \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  or equivalently  $F \neq []$ ) before any further change to its history, then *eventually*  $P$ 's  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  state will contain  $h$  transaction outputs each of value  $c_i$  exclusively spendable or already spent by  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  that are descendants of an output with a  $2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\}$  spending method such that
$$\sum_{i=1}^h c_i \geq \sum_{s \in C'} \sum_{x \in s} x.$$
- If  $P$  receives (GET PAID,  $e$ ) by  $\mathcal{E}$ , subsequently transitions back to OPEN (therefore moving to history  $(F, C')$  where  $C'$  is  $C$  with  $e$  appended to the last list of  $C$ ) and finally receives CLOSE by  $\mathcal{E}$  and (CLOSED) by  $\text{host}_P$  (the latter only if  $\text{host}_P \neq \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  or equivalently  $F = []$ ) before any further change to its history, then *eventually*  $P$ 's  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  state will contain  $h$  transaction outputs each of value  $c_i$  exclusively spendable or already spent by  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  that are descendants of an output with a  $2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\}$  spending method

such that  $\sum_{i=1}^h c_i \geq \sum_{s \in C'} \sum_{x \in s} x.$

By the induction hypothesis, before the funding procedure started  $P$  could close the channel and end up with on-chain transaction outputs exclusively spendable or already spent by  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  with a sum value of  $c_P$ . When  $P$  is in the OPEN state and receives (FUND ME,  $f$ , ...), it can only move again to the OPEN state after doing the following state transitions: OPEN  $\rightarrow$  VIRTUALISING  $\rightarrow$  WAITING FOR REVOCATION  $\rightarrow$  WAITING FOR INBOUND REVOCATION  $\rightarrow$  WAITING FOR HOSTS READY  $\rightarrow$  OPEN. During this sequence of events, a new  $\text{host}_P$




is defined (Fig. 30, l. 6), new commitment transactions are negotiated with  $\bar{P}$  (Fig. 30, l. 9), control of the old funding output is handed over to  $\text{host}_P$  (Fig. 30, l. 11),  $\text{host}_P$  negotiates with its counterparty a new set of transactions and signatures that spend the aforementioned funding output and make available a new funding output with the keys  $pk'_{P,F}, pk'_{\bar{P},F}$  as  $P$  instructed (Fig. 48 and 50) and the previous valid commitment transactions of both  $P$  and  $\bar{P}$  are invalidated (Fig. 22, l. 1 and l. 14 respectively). We note that the use of the **ANYPREVOUT** flag in all signatures that correspond to transaction inputs that may spend various different transaction outputs ensures that this is possible, as it avoids tying each input to a specific, predefined output. When  $P$  receives (CLOSE) by  $\mathcal{E}$ , it inputs (CLOSE) to  $\text{host}_P$  (Fig. 39, l. 4). As per the Lemma conditions,  $\text{host}_P$  will output (CLOSED). This can happen only when  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  contains a suitable output for both  $P$ 's and  $R$ 's channel (Fig. 54, and 5 ll. 6 respectively).

If the **host** of  $\text{host}_P$  is  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , then the funding output  $o_{1,2} = (c_P + c_{\bar{P}}, 2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\})$  for the  $P, \bar{P}$  channel is already on-chain. Regarding the case in which  $\text{host}_P \neq \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , after the funding procedure is complete, the new  $\text{host}_P$  will have as its **host** the old  $\text{host}_P$  of  $P$ . If the (CLOSE) sequence is initiated, the new  $\text{host}_P$  will follow the same steps that will be described below once the old  $\text{host}_P$  succeeds in closing the lower layer (Fig. 53, l. 6). The old  $\text{host}_P$  however will see no difference in its interface compared to what would happen if  $P$  had received (CLOSE) before the funding procedure, therefore it will successfully close by the induction hypothesis. Thereafter the process is identical to the one when the old  $\text{host}_P = \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ .

Moving on,  $\text{host}_P$  is either able to publish its  $\text{TX}_{1,1}$  (it has necessarily received a valid signature  $\text{sig}(\text{TX}_{1,1}, pk_{\bar{P},F})$  (Fig. 50, l. 39) by its counterparty before it moved to the OPEN state for the first time), or the output  $(c_P + c_{\bar{P}}, 2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\})$  needed to spend  $\text{TX}_{1,1}$  has already been spent. The only other transactions that can spend it are  $\text{TX}_{2,1}$  and any of  $(\text{TX}_{2,2,k})_{k>2}$ , since these are the only transactions that spend the aforementioned output and that  $\text{host}_P$  has signed with  $sk_{P,F}$  (Fig. 50, ll. 33-37). The output can be also spent by old, revoked commitment transactions, but in that case  $\text{host}_P$  would not have output (CLOSED);  $P$  would have instead detected this triggered by a (CHECK CHAIN FOR CLOSED) message by  $\mathcal{E}$  (Fig. 37) and would have moved to the CLOSED state on its own accord (lack of such a message by  $\mathcal{E}$  would lead  $P$  to become **negligent**, something that cannot happen according to the Lemma conditions). Every transaction among  $\text{TX}_{1,1}, \text{TX}_{2,1}, (\text{TX}_{2,2,k})_{k>2}$  has a  $(c_P + c_{\bar{P}} - f, 2/\{pk'_{P,F}, pk'_{\bar{P},F}\})$  output (Fig. 44, l. 18 and Fig. 43, ll. 27 and 91) which will end

up in  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  – call this output  $o_P$ . We will prove that at most  $\sum_{i=2}^{n-1} (t_i + p + s - 1)$  blocks after (CLOSE) is received by  $P$ , an output  $o_R$  with  $c_{\text{virt}}$  coins and a  $2/\{pk_{R,F}, pk_{\bar{R},F}\}$  spending condition without or with an expired timelock will be included in  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ . In case party  $\bar{P}$  is idle, then  $o_{1,2}$  is consumed by  $\text{TX}_{1,1}$  and the timelock on its virtual output expires, therefore the required output  $o_R$  is on-chain. In case  $\bar{P}$  is active, exactly one of  $\text{TX}_{2,1}, (\text{TX}_{2,2,k})_{k>2}$  or  $(\text{TX}_{2,3,1,k})_{k>2}$  is a descendant of  $o_{1,2}$ ; if the transaction belongs to one of the two last transaction

groups then necessarily  $\text{TX}_{1,1}$  is on-chain in some block height  $h$  and given the timelock on the virtual output of  $\text{TX}_{1,1}$ ,  $\bar{P}$ 's transaction can be at most at block height  $h + t_2 + p + s - 1$ . If  $n = 3$  or  $k = n - 1$ , then  $\bar{P}$ 's unique transaction has the required output  $o_R$  (without a timelock). The rest of the cases are covered by the following sequence of events:



**Fig. 56.**

In every case  $o_P$  and  $o_R$  end up on-chain in at most  $s$  and  $\sum_{i=2}^{n-1} (t_i + p + s - 1)$  blocks respectively from the moment (CLOSE) is received. The output  $o_P$  can be spent either by  $C_{P,i}$  or  $C_{\bar{P},i}$ . Both these transactions have a  $(c_P - f, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output. This output of  $C_{P,i}$  is timelocked, but the alternative spending method cannot be used as  $P$  never signed a transaction that uses it (as it is reserved for revocation, which has not taken place yet in this virtualisation layer). We have now proven that if  $P$  completes the funding of a new channel then it can close its channel for a  $(c_P - f, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output that is a descendant of an output with spending method  $2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\}$  and that lower bound of value holds for the

duration of the funding procedure, i.e. we have proven the first claim of the first bullet.

We will now prove that the newly funded party  $R$  can close its channel securely. After  $R$  receives  $(\text{FUNDED}, \text{host}_P, \dots)$  by  $P$  and before moving to the OPEN state, it receives  $\text{sig}_{\bar{R}, C_{R,0}} = \text{sig}(C_{R,0}, pk_{\bar{R},F})$  and sends  $\text{sig}_{R, C_{R,0}} = \text{sig}(C_{R,0}, pk_{R,F})$ . Both these transactions spend  $o_R$ . As we showed before, if  $R$  receives (CLOSE) by  $\mathcal{E}$  then  $o_R$  eventually ends up on-chain. After receiving (CLOSED) from  $\text{host}_P$ ,  $R$  attempts to add  $C_{R,0}$  to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , which may only fail if  $C_{R,0}$  ends up on-chain instead. Similar to the case of  $P$ , both these transactions have an  $(f, pk_{R,\text{out}})$  output. This output of  $C_{R,0}$  is timelocked, but the alternative spending method cannot be used as  $R$  never signed a transaction that uses it (as it is reserved for revocation, which has not taken place yet) so the timelock will expire and the desired spending method will be available. We have now proven that if  $R$ 's channel is funded to completion (i.e.  $R$  moves to the OPEN state for the first time) then it can close its channel for a  $(f, pk_{R,\text{out}})$  output that is a descendant of  $o_R$ . We have therefore proven the first bullet.

We now move on to the second bullet. In case  $P$  is the **funder** (i.e.  $i = n$ ), then the same arguments as in the previous bullet hold here with “WAITING FOR INBOUND REVOCATION” replaced with “WAITING FOR OUTBOUND REVOCATION”,  $o_{1,2}$  with  $o_{n-1,n}$ ,  $\text{TX}_{1,1}$  with  $\text{TX}_{n,1}$ ,  $\text{TX}_{2,1}$  with  $\text{TX}_{n-1,1}$ ,  $(\text{TX}_{2,2,k})_{k>2}$  with  $(\text{TX}_{n-1,2,k})_{k<n-1}$ ,  $(\text{TX}_{2,3,1,k})_{k>2}$  with  $(\text{TX}_{n-1,3,n,k})_{k<n-1}$ ,  $t_2$  with  $t_{n-1}$ ,  $\text{TX}_{i,3,2,k}$  with  $\text{TX}_{i,3,n-1,k}$ ,  $i$  is initialized to  $n - 2$  in l. 2 of Fig. 56,  $i$  is decremented instead of incremented in l. 12 of the same Figure and  $f$  is replaced with 0. This is so because these two cases are symmetric.

In case  $P$  is not the **funder** ( $1 < i < n$ ), then we only need to prove the first statement of the second bullet. By the induction hypothesis and since **sibling** is kindred, we know that both  $P$ 's and **sibling**'s funding outputs either are or can be eventually put on-chain and that  $P$ 's funding output has at least  $c_P = \sum_{s \in C} \sum_{x \in s} x$  coins. If  $P$  is on the “left” of its **sibling** (i.e. there is an untrusted party that sent the (VIRTUALISING, ...) message to  $P$  which triggered the latter to move to the VIRTUALISING state and to send a (VIRTUALISING, ...) message to its own **sibling**), the “left” funding output  $o_{\text{left}}$  (the one held with the untrusted party to the left) can be spent by one of  $\text{TX}_{i,1}$ ,  $(\text{TX}_{i,2,k})_{k>i}$ ,  $\text{TX}_{i-1,1}$ , or  $(\text{TX}_{i-1,2,k})_{k<i-1}$ , as these are the only transactions that  $P$  has signed with  $sk_{P,F}$ . All these transactions have a  $(c_P + c_{\bar{P}} - f, 2/\{pk_{P,F'}, pk_{\bar{P},F'}\})$  output that can in turn be spent by either  $C_{P,0}$  or  $C_{\bar{P},0}$ , both of which have an output of value  $c_P$  and a  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  spending method and no other spending method can be used (as  $P$  has not signed the “revocation” spending method of  $C_{P,0}$ ).

In the case that  $P$  is to the right of its **sibling** (i.e.  $P$  receives by **sibling** the (VIRTUALISING, ...) message that causes  $P$ 's transition to the VIRTUALISING state), the “right” funding output  $o_{\text{right}}$  (the one held with the untrusted party to the right) can be spent by one of  $\text{TX}_{i,1}$ ,  $(\text{TX}_{i,2,k})_{k<i}$ ,  $\text{TX}_{i+1,1}$ , or  $(\text{TX}_{i+1,2,k})_{k>i+1}$ , as these are the only transactions that  $P$  has signed with  $sk_{P,F}$ . All these transactions have a  $(c_P + c_{\bar{P}} - f, 2/\{pk_{P,F'}, pk_{\bar{P},F'}\})$  output that can in turn be spent by either  $C_{P,0}$  or  $C_{\bar{P},0}$ , both of which have an output

of value  $c_P - f$  and a  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  spending method and no other spending method can be used (as  $P$  has not signed the “revocation” spending method of  $C_{P,0}$ ).  $P$  can get the remaining  $f$  coins as follows:  $\text{TX}_{i,1}$  and all of  $(\text{TX}_{i,2,k})_{k < i}$  already have an  $(f, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output. If instead  $\text{TX}_{i+1,1}$  or one of  $(\text{TX}_{i+1,2,k_2})_{k_2 > i+1}$  spends  $o_{\text{right}}$ , then  $P$  will publish  $\text{TX}_{i,2,i+1}$  or  $\text{TX}_{i,2,k_2}$  respectively if  $o_{\text{left}}$  is unspent, otherwise  $o_{\text{left}}$  is spent by one of  $\text{TX}_{i-1,1}$  or  $(\text{TX}_{i-1,2,k_1})_{k_1 < i-1}$  in which case  $P$  will publish one of  $\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,i+1}$ ,  $\text{TX}_{i,3,i-1,k_2}$ ,  $\text{TX}_{i,3,i-1,i+1}$  or  $\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2}$ . In particular,  $\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,i+1}$  is published if  $\text{TX}_{i-1,2,k_1}$  and  $\text{TX}_{i+1,1}$  are on-chain,  $\text{TX}_{i,3,i-1,k_2}$  is published if  $\text{TX}_{i-1,1}$  and  $\text{TX}_{i+1,2,k_2}$  are on-chain,  $\text{TX}_{i,3,i-1,i+1}$  is published if  $\text{TX}_{i-1,1}$  and  $\text{TX}_{i+1,1}$  are on-chain, or  $\text{TX}_{i,3,k_1,k_2}$  is published if  $\text{TX}_{i-1,2,k_1}$  and  $\text{TX}_{i+1,2,k_2}$  are on-chain. All these transactions include an  $(f, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output. We have therefore covered all cases and proven the second bullet.

Regarding now the third bullet, once again the induction hypothesis guarantees that before  $(\text{PAY}, d)$  was received,  $P$  could close the channel resulting in on-chain outputs exclusively spendable or already spent by  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  that are descendants of an output with a  $2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\}$  spending method that have a sum value of  $c_P = \sum_{s \in C} \sum_{x \in s} x$ . (Note that  $\sum_{s \in C'} \sum_{x \in s} x = d + \sum_{s \in C} \sum_{x \in s} x$ .) When  $P$  receives  $(\text{PAY}, d)$  while in the OPEN state, it moves to the WAITING FOR COMMITMENT SIGNED state before returning to the OPEN state. It signs (Fig. 32, l. 2) the new commitment transaction  $C_{\bar{P},i+1}$  in which the counterparty owns  $d$  more coins than before that moment (Fig. 32, l. 1), sends the signature to the counterparty (Fig. 32, l. 4) and expects valid signatures on its own updated commitment transaction (Fig. 33, l. 1) and the revocation transaction for the old commitment transaction of the counterparty (Fig. 33, l. 3). Note that if the counterparty does not respond or if it responds with missing/invalid signatures, either  $P$  can close the channel with the old commitment transaction  $C_{P,i}$  exactly like before the update started (as it has not yet sent the signature for the old revocation transaction), or the counterparty will close the channel either with the new or with the old commitment transaction. In all cases in which validation fails and the channel closes, there is an output with a  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  spending method and no other useable spending method that carries at least  $c_P - d$  coins. Only if the verification succeeds does  $P$  sign (Fig. 33, l. 5) and send (Fig. 33, l. 17) the counterparty’s revocation transaction for  $P$ ’s previous commitment transaction.

Similarly to previous bullets, if  $\text{host}_P \neq \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  the funding output can be put on-chain, otherwise the funding output is already on-chain. In both cases, since the closing procedure continues, one of  $C_{P,i+1}$  ( $C_{\bar{P},j}$ ) $_{0 \leq j \leq i+1}$  will end up on-chain. If  $C_{\bar{P},j}$  for some  $j < i+1$  is on-chain, then  $P$  submits  $R_{P,j}$  (we discussed how  $P$  obtained  $R_{P,i}$  and the rest of the cases are covered by induction) and takes the entire value of the channel which is at least  $c_P - d$ . If  $C_{\bar{P},i+1}$  is on-chain, it has a  $(c_P - d, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output. If  $C_{P,i+1}$  is on-chain, it has an output of value  $c_P - d$ , a timelocked  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  spending method and a non-timelocked spending method that needs the signature made with  $sk_{P,R}$  on  $R_{P,i+1}$ .  $P$  however has not generated that signature, therefore this spending method cannot be used and the timelock will expire, therefore in all cases outputs that descend from the

funding output, can be spent exclusively by  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  and carry at least  $c_P - d$  coins are put on-chain. We have proven the third bullet.

For the fourth and last bullet, again by the induction hypothesis, before (GET PAID,  $e$ ) was received  $P$  could close the channel resulting in on-chain outputs exclusively spendable or already spent by  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  that are descendants of an output  $o_F$  with a  $2/\{pk_{P,F}, pk_{\bar{P},F}\}$  spending method and have a sum value of  $c_P = \sum_{s \in C} \sum_{x \in s} x$ . (Note that  $e + \sum_{s \in C'} \sum_{x \in s} x = \sum_{s \in C} \sum_{x \in s} x$  and that  $o_F$  either is already on-chain or can be eventually put on-chain as we have argued in the previous bullets by the induction hypothesis.) When  $P$  receives (GET PAID,  $e$ ) while in the OPEN state, if the balance of the counterparty is enough it moves to the WAITING TO GET PAID state (Fig. 35, l. 6). If subsequently it receives a valid signature for  $C_{P,i+1}$  (Fig. 32, l. 8) which is a commitment transaction that can spend the  $o_F$  output and gives to  $P$  an additional  $e$  coins compared to  $C_{P,i}$ . Subsequently  $P$ 's state transitions to WAITING FOR PAY REVOCATION and sends signatures for  $C_{\bar{P},i+1}$  and  $R_{\bar{P},i}$  to  $\bar{P}$ . If the  $o_F$  output is spent while  $P$  is in the latter state, it can be spent by one of  $C_{P,i+1}$  or  $(C_{\bar{P},j})_{0 \leq j \leq i+1}$ . If it is spent by  $C_{P,i+1}$  or  $C_{\bar{P},i+1}$ , then these two transactions have a  $(c_P + e, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output. (Note that the former is encumbered with a timelock, but the alternative spending method cannot be used as  $P$  has not signed  $R_{\bar{P},i+1}$ .) If it is spent by  $C_{\bar{P},i}$  then a  $(c_P, pk_{P,\text{out}})$  output becomes available instead, therefore  $P$  can still get the  $c_P$  coins that correspond to the previous state. If any of  $(C_{\bar{P},j})_{0 \leq j < i}$  spends  $o_F$  then it makes available a  $pk_{P,\text{out}}$  output with the coins that  $P$  had at state  $j$  and additionally  $P$  can publish  $R_{P,j}$  that spends  $\bar{P}$ 's output of  $C_{\bar{P},j}$  and obtain the entirety of  $\bar{P}$ 's coins at state  $j$  for a total of  $c_P + c_{\bar{P}}$  coins. Therefore in every case  $P$  can claim at least  $c_P$  coins. In the case that  $P$  instead subsequently receives a valid signature to  $R_{P,i}$  (Fig. 33, l. 20) it finally moves to the OPEN state once again. In this state the above analysis of what can happen when  $o_F$  holds similarly, with the difference that if  $\bar{P}$  spends  $o_F$  with  $C_{\bar{P},i}$  now  $P$  can publish  $R_{P,i}$  which gives  $P$  the coins of  $\bar{P}$ . Therefore with this difference  $P$  is now guaranteed to gain at least  $c_P + e$  coins upon channel closure. We have therefore proven the fourth bullet.

**Lemma 5 (Ideal world balance).** *Consider an ideal world execution with functionality  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  and simulator  $\mathcal{S}$ . Let  $P \in \{\text{Alice}, \text{Bob}\}$  one of the two parties of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ . Assume that all of the following are true:*

- $\text{State}_P \neq \text{IGNORED}$ ,
- $P$  has transitioned to the OPEN State at least once. Additionally, if  $P = \text{Alice}$ , it has received (OPEN,  $c, \dots$ ) by  $\mathcal{E}$  prior to transitioning to the OPEN State,
- $P$  [has received (FUND ME,  $f_i, \dots$ ) as input by another  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}/\text{LN}$  ITI while  $\text{State}_P$  was OPEN and  $P$  subsequently transitioned to OPEN State]  $n$  times,
- $P$  [has received (PAY,  $d_i$ ) by  $\mathcal{E}$  while  $\text{State}_P$  was OPEN and  $P$  subsequently transitioned to OPEN State]  $m$  times,
- $P$  [has received (GET PAID,  $e_i$ ) by  $\mathcal{E}$  while  $\text{State}_P$  was OPEN and  $P$  subsequently transitioned to OPEN State]  $l$  times.

Let  $\phi = 1$  if  $P = \text{Alice}$ , or  $\phi = 0$  if  $P = \text{Bob}$ . If  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  receives  $(\text{CLOSE}, P)$  by  $\mathcal{S}$ , then the following holds with overwhelming probability on the security parameter:

$$\text{balance}_P = \phi \cdot c - \sum_{i=1}^n f_i - \sum_{i=1}^m d_i + \sum_{i=1}^l e_i \quad (4)$$

*Proof (Proof of Lemma 5).* We will prove the Lemma by following the evolution of the  $\text{balance}_P$  variable.

- When  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  is activated for the first time, it sets  $\text{balance}_P \leftarrow 0$  (Fig. 8, l. 1).
- If  $P = \text{Alice}$  and it receives  $(\text{OPEN}, c, \dots)$  by  $\mathcal{E}$ , it stores  $c$  (Fig. 8, l. 11). If later  $\text{State}_P$  becomes OPEN,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  sets  $\text{balance}_P \leftarrow c$  (Fig. 8, ll. 14 or 32). In contrast, if  $P = \text{Bob}$ , it is  $\text{balance}_P = 0$  until at least the first transition of  $\text{State}_P$  to OPEN (Fig. 8).
- Every time that  $P$  receives input  $(\text{FUND ME}, f_i, \dots)$  by another party while  $\text{State}_P = \text{OPEN}$ ,  $P$  stores  $f_i$  (Fig. 10, l. 1). The next time  $\text{State}_P$  transitions to OPEN (if such a transition happens),  $\text{balance}_P$  is decremented by  $f_i$  (Fig. 10, l. 27). Therefore, if this cycle happens  $n \geq 0$  times,  $\text{balance}_P$  will be decremented by  $\sum_{i=1}^n f_i$  in total.
- Every time  $P$  receives input  $(\text{PAY}, d_i)$  by  $\mathcal{E}$  while  $\text{State}_P = \text{OPEN}$ ,  $d_i$  is stored (Fig. 9, l. 2). The next time  $\text{State}_P$  transitions to OPEN (if such a transition happens),  $\text{balance}_P$  is decremented by  $d_i$  (Fig. 9, l. 13). Therefore, if this cycle happens  $m \geq 0$  times,  $\text{balance}_P$  will be decremented by  $\sum_{i=1}^m d_i$  in total.
- Every time  $P$  receives input  $(\text{GET PAID}, e_i)$  by  $\mathcal{E}$  while  $\text{State}_P = \text{OPEN}$ ,  $e_i$  is stored (Fig. 9, l. 7). The next time  $\text{State}_P$  transitions to OPEN (if such a transition happens)  $\text{balance}_P$  is incremented by  $e_i$  (Fig. 9, l. 19). Therefore, if this cycle happens  $l \geq 0$  times,  $\text{balance}_P$  will be incremented by  $\sum_{i=1}^l e_i$  in total.

On aggregate, after the above are completed and then  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  receives  $(\text{CLOSE}, P)$

by  $\mathcal{S}$ , it is  $\text{balance}_P = c - \sum_{i=1}^n f_i - \sum_{i=1}^m d_i + \sum_{i=1}^l e_i$  if  $P = \text{Alice}$ , or else if  $P = \text{Bob}$ ,

$$\text{balance}_P = - \sum_{i=1}^n f_i - \sum_{i=1}^m d_i + \sum_{i=1}^l e_i.$$

*Proof (Proof of Lemma 3).* We prove the Lemma in two steps. We first show that if the conditions of Lemma 5 hold, then the conditions of Lemma 4 for the real world execution with protocol LN and the same  $\mathcal{E}$  and  $\mathcal{A}$  hold as well for the same  $m, n$  and  $l$  values.

For  $\text{State}_P$  to become IGNORED, either  $\mathcal{S}$  has to send  $(\text{BECAME CORRUPTED OR NEGLIGENT}, P)$  or  $\text{host}_P$  must output  $(\text{ENABLER USED REVOCATION})$  to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  (Fig. 8, l. 5). The first case only happens when either  $P$  receives  $(\text{CORRUPT})$  by  $\mathcal{A}$  (Fig. 20, l. 1), which means that the simulated  $P$  is not honest anymore, or

when  $P$  becomes **negligent** (Fig. 20, l. 4), which means that the first condition of Lemma 4 is violated. In the second case, it is  $\text{host}_P \neq \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$  and the state of  $\text{host}_P$  is **GUEST PUNISHED** (Fig. 55, ll. 1 or 12), so in case  $P$  receives (**CLOSE**) by  $\mathcal{E}$  the output of  $\text{host}_P$  will be (**GUEST PUNISHED**) (Fig. 53, l. 4). In all cases, some condition of Lemma 4 is violated.

For  $\text{State}_P$  to become **OPEN** at least once, the following sequence of events must take place (Fig. 8): If  $P = \text{Alice}$ , it must receive (**INIT**,  $pk$ ) by  $\mathcal{E}$  when  $\text{State}_P = \text{UNINIT}$ , then either receive (**OPEN**,  $c$ ,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ , ...) by  $\mathcal{E}$  and (**BASE OPEN**) by  $\mathcal{S}$  or (**OPEN**,  $c$ , **hops** ( $\neq \mathcal{G}_{\text{Ledger}}$ ), ...) by  $\mathcal{E}$ , (**FUNDED**, **HOST**, ...) by **hops[0].left** and (**VIRTUAL OPEN**) by  $\mathcal{S}$ . In either case,  $\mathcal{S}$  only sends its message only if all its simulated honest parties move to the **OPEN** state (Fig. 20, l. 10), therefore if the second condition of Lemma 5 holds and  $P = \text{Alice}$ , then the second condition of Lemma 4 holds as well. The same line of reasoning can be used to deduce that if  $P = \text{Bob}$ , then  $\text{State}_P$  will become **OPEN** for the first time only if all honest simulated parties move to the **OPEN** state, therefore once more the second condition of Lemma 5 holds only if the second condition of Lemma 4 holds as well. We also observe that, if both parties are honest, they will transition to the **OPEN** state simultaneously.

Regarding the third Lemma 5 condition, we assume (and will later show) that if both parties are honest and the state of one is **OPEN**, then the state of the other is also **OPEN**. Each time  $P$  receives input (**FUND ME**,  $f$ , ...) by  $R \in \{\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}, \text{LN}\}$ ,  $\text{State}_P$  transitions to **PENDING FUND**, subsequently when a command to define a new **VIRT ITI** through  $P$  is intercepted by  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ ,  $\text{State}_P$  transitions to **TENTATIVE FUND** and afterwards when  $\mathcal{S}$  sends (**FUND**) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ ,  $\text{State}_P$  transitions to **SYNC FUND**. In parallel, if  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}} = \text{IGNORED}$ , then  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}}$  transitions directly back to **OPEN**. If on the other hand  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}} = \text{OPEN}$  and  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  intercepts a similar **VIRT ITI** definition command through  $\bar{P}$ ,  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}}$  transitions to **TENTATIVE HELP FUND**. On receiving the aforementioned (**FUND**) message by  $\mathcal{S}$  and given that  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}} = \text{TENTATIVE HELP FUND}$ ,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  also sets  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}}$  to **SYNC HELP FUND**. Then both  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}}$  and  $\text{State}_P$  transition simultaneously to **OPEN** (Fig. 10). This sequence of events may repeat any  $n \geq 0$  times. We observe that throughout these steps, honest simulated  $P$  has received (**FUND ME**,  $f$ , ...) and that  $\mathcal{S}$  only sends (**FUND**) when all honest simulated parties have transitioned to the **OPEN** state (Fig. 20, l. 18 and Fig. 30, l. 12), so the third condition of Lemma 4 holds with the same  $n$  as that of Lemma 5.

Regarding the fourth Lemma 5 condition, we again assume that if both parties are honest and the state of one is **OPEN**, then the state of the other is also **OPEN**. Each time  $P$  receives input (**PAY**,  $d$ ) by  $\mathcal{E}$ ,  $\text{State}_P$  transitions to **TENTATIVE PAY** and subsequently when  $\mathcal{S}$  sends (**PAY**) to  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$ ,  $\text{State}_P$  transitions to (**SYNC PAY**,  $d$ ). In parallel, if  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}} = \text{IGNORED}$ , then  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}}$  transitions directly back to **OPEN**. If on the other hand  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}} = \text{OPEN}$  and  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  receives (**GET PAID**,  $d$ ) by  $\mathcal{E}$  addressed to  $\bar{P}$ ,  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}}$  transitions to **TENTATIVE GET PAID**. On receiving the aforementioned (**PAY**) message by  $\mathcal{S}$  and given that  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}} = \text{TENTATIVE GET PAID}$ ,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  also sets  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}}$  to **SYNC GET PAID**. Then both  $\text{State}_P$  and  $\text{State}_{\bar{P}}$  transition simultaneously to **OPEN** (Fig. 9). This se-



quence of events may repeat any  $m \geq 0$  times. We observe that throughout these steps, honest simulated  $P$  has received (PAY,  $d$ ) and that  $\mathcal{S}$  only sends (PAY) when all honest simulated parties have completed sending or receiving the payment (Fig. 20, l. 16), so the fourth condition of Lemma 4 holds with the same  $m$  as that of Lemma 5. As far as the fifth condition of Lemma 5 goes, we observe that this case is symmetric to the one discussed for its fourth condition above if we swap  $P$  and  $\bar{P}$ , therefore we deduce that if Lemma 5 holds with some  $l$ , then Lemma 4 holds with the same  $l$ .

As promised, we here argue that if both parties are honest and one party moves to the OPEN state, then the other party will move to the OPEN state as well. We already saw that the first time one party moves to the OPEN state, it will happen simultaneously with the same transition for the other party. We also saw that, when a party transitions from the SYNC HELP FUND or the SYNC FUND state to the OPEN state, then the other party will also transition to the OPEN state simultaneously. Furthermore, we saw that if one party transitions from the SYNC PAY or the SYNC GET PAID state to the OPEN state, the other party will also transition to the OPEN state simultaneously. Lastly we notice that we have exhausted all manners in which a party can transition to the OPEN state, therefore we have proven that transitions of honest parties to the OPEN state happen simultaneously.

Now, given that  $\mathcal{S}$  internally simulates faithfully both LN parties and that  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  relinquishes to  $\mathcal{S}$  complete control of the external communication of the parties as long as it does not halt, we deduce that  $\mathcal{S}$  replicates the behaviour of the aforementioned real world. By combining these facts with the consequences of the two Lemmas and the check that leads  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  to halt if it fails (Fig. 11, l. 18), we deduce that if the conditions of Lemma 5 hold for the honest parties of  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  and their kindred parties, then the functionality halts only with negligible probability.

In the second proof step, we show that if the conditions of Lemma 5 do not hold, then the check of Fig. 11, l. 18 never takes place. We first discuss the  $State_P = \text{IGNORED}$  case. We observe that the IGNORED *State* is a sink state, as there is no way to leave it once in. Additionally, for the balance check to happen,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  must receive (CLOSED,  $P$ ) by  $\mathcal{S}$  when  $State_P \neq \text{IGNORED}$  (Fig. 11, l. 9). We deduce that, once  $State_P = \text{IGNORED}$ , the balance check will not happen. Moving to the case where  $State_P$  has never been OPEN, we observe that it is impossible to move to any of the states required by l. 9 of Fig. 11 without first having been in the OPEN state. Moreover if  $P = \text{Alice}$ , it is impossible to reach the OPEN state without receiving input (OPEN,  $c, \dots$ ) by  $\mathcal{E}$ . Lastly, as we have observed already, the three last conditions of Lemma 5 are always satisfied. We conclude that if the conditions to Lemma 5 do not hold, then the check of Fig. 11, l. 18 does not happen and therefore  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  does not halt.

On aggregate,  $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Chan}}$  may only halt with negligible probability in the security parameter.



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