TABLE I: Guidelines for	or design.	implementation a	nd evaluation	of anti-ph	ishing interventions

	TIDEE 1. Guidennes for design,	implementation and evaluation of anti-pinsing interventions
No	Guidelines	Rationale
G1	Remove deceptive user interface elements for unver-	• Disabling misleading UI elements (e.g., profile photo, email history) for unverified sender
	ified emails and incorporate an alert icon within the	addresses will reduce user confusion [P16].
	email client to indicate potentially fraudulent emails.	• Placing a security indicator for unverified email delivered to the user acts as a forcing
		function for the sender domain to configure their SPF/DMRC/DKIM correctly [P7, P16].
G2	Clearly display the underlying URL of a suspicious	• Clearly displaying the underlying URL of a suspicious link in the email client (link-focused
	link in the email client	warning) make it easier for users to notice where the links' actual destination [P25].
G3	Incorporate progressive disclosure in the design and	• Progressive design and learn more buttons help to facilitate general advice, satisfy user
-0.4	add a learn more button.	curiosity, and support user investigations [P4, P5, P25, P51].
G4	Use visual examples and explanations and avoid	• Avoiding technical details in the content can make them understandable to non-expert users
	technical jargon in the content.	[P1].
		 Integrating visual examples and explanations on phishing cues presented helps users memorize and understand better [P42].
G5	Present abstract information and leverage situated	Leveraging situated learning in the design can make the intervention interesting and
G5	learning in the content.	engaging, and also improves learning outcomes [P5, P10, P19, P28, P34, P36, P37, P61,
	remning in the content	P62].
		• Too much information in the content can be unappealing to inexperienced users [P1, P5,
		P13, P18, P41].
		• Adopting situated learning is beneficial as learning science suggest that simply asking users
		to follow some advice would not be helpful [P5].
G6	Introduce varieties in the content and keep the infor-	• Including varieties in the content can help users tackle new and emerging phishing attacks
	mation up to date.	[P19, P57, P58, P59, P61, P65].
G7	Minimize the functions and frequency of intervention	• Limiting the frequency of the warnings reduce warning fatigue [P4].
	users need to encounter.	• Minimum number of functionalities in the game can help finish the game easily, easy for
		users to remember when functionalities are less [P10].
G8	Design phishing warnings differently from standard	• Variation in the design increases the likelihood for users to read it, ensures they are taken
	warnings.	seriously and prevent habituation [P1, P2, P14].
G9	Make the critical information easily accessible and	• To make users easily notice the warnings [P1, P4, P8, P25], increase warning adherence
G10	visible to the users. Create uniform phishing indicators across different	[P25] and to impose forced attention [P8, P25].• This will reduce the susceptibility of mobile device users [P16].
GIU	browsers and mobile interfaces.	This will reduce the susceptibility of mobile device users [1 10].
G11	Provide users clear choices and actionable items to	• Active interruption and actionable items minimize the user's workload, are naturally
	proceed.	noticeable and users can use their time efficiently [P1, P2, P4, P5, P7, P20, P22, P24, P25
	Ī	P41, P43, P44]
G12	Offer intervention immediately after users fall for	• Avoiding delay in displaying warnings minimizes users' confusion [P5]. The right timing
	phishing.	of training intervention provides instant education [P2].
G13	Perform usability tests and collect user feedback.	• Collecting users' feedback from usability testing can improve future intervention design
-014		[P18, P22, P57, P61, P66, P67].
G14	Provide an explanation to the users on anti-phishing system reliability and decision-making and clarify	• Feedback on the anti-phishing system increases users' trust [P7, P8, P11, P14, P33, P39, P43], helps users perceive potential danger [P20], increases user understanding and improves
	users about the objective of the intervention.	user ability to detect phishing [P18, P39].
	users about the objective of the intervention.	• Making it clear to the users why they have displayed the intervention or not taken to the
		website to avoid their confusion [P5,P14].
G15	Use both technical and human-centric defence mech-	Prevent user's over-reliance on technology, provide additional defence in detecting unpre-
	anisms to cope with phishing.	dictable, highly dynamic, and increasingly sophisticated phishing attacks [P3, P5, P12, P17,
	1 1 0	P18, P26, P27, P28, P38, P41, P51, P53, P57, P58, P59].
		• Educating users about the security properties of different interventions remove their
		misunderstanding that leads to mistake [P14].
		• Training all individual who has access to the organization increase the organization's
		robustness [P53].
		Human-centric defence mechanisms organized by C-suit employees can help low-level
		employees in the organization to learn about phishing [P21, P38, P40, P56, P57, P59, P61,
C16	Damanaliza the intervention style and medium based	P67, P68, P69].
010	Personalize the intervention style and medium based on the target user's demographic.	• Personalized phishing training can take into account user's preferences (e.g., individual preferred training method [P15, P21], content relevant to the organization [P16, P58], roles
	on the target user's demographic.	and responsibilities [P40, P53, P58, P60], age [P21, P35]) to ensure users receive targeted
		education and training [P7, P13, P15, P16, P21, P26, P35, P36, P40, P48, P52, P53, P57,
		P58, P59, P60, P61, P62, P64, P66, P67].
G17	Consider the decision-making process and vulnera-	• Taking into account the vulnerabilities and decision-making processes of the user (e.g.,
	bilities of humans in the design.	users' misconceptions and perspectives [P11], perceived threat [P9]) increases the effective-
	č	ness of anti-phishing interventions for end users and assist to develop the tailored approach
		[P4, P6, P7, P9, P11, P18, P24].
G18	Configure IT system for phishing training.	• Preparing IT system to avoid simulated email being filtered by technical filters helps users
		being missed for training [P69].
		• Verifying if inventory management software is utilizing scanning, analysis, or probing
		techniques help detect abnormally high levels of external IP addresses [P54].
G19	Design visually distinct user-friendly URL bar.	• Noticeable and consistent URL bar helps users differentiate legitimate and malicious
C20	Has automated platforms and immediate 1 C	domains easily [P2, P8, P46].
G20	Use automated platforms and improved tools for phishing training, incident management and report-	• Automated approaches help to better support managing complex situations, delivering personalized content and threat identification [P61, P63, P67, P50].
	ing.	personanzed content and uncut identification [101, 103, 107, 130].
	0-	Continued on next page

G32 Conduct phishing simulation that adheres to the guidelines of the data privacy policy appropriate to

ing.

No

- G33 Provide users immediate feedback on their perfor-
- G34 Use realistic and equally difficult training emails. Use challenging questions to test phishing knowl-
- G35 Implement progressive and self-adaptive phishing training.
- G36 Adopt video and interactive education and training materials.
- Utilize the expertise of external service providers to aid in phishing knowledge assessment and awareness material development.
- Choose evaluation metrics and baselines that are useful and relevant.
- behaviour.
- Train users how to report phishing and reward secure
- G40 Conduct multiple cycles of follow-up training.
- G41 Avoid frequent reminders and over-training and keep the reminders short and simple.

- their phishing knowledge in their regular environment [P7, P10, P31].
- Realistic and equally difficult email helps to test the persistence of the training's effect
- An extensive test with challenging questions reduce repetitive training costs and can help avoid the ceiling effect [P21].
- Dynamic and self-adaptive phishing training improve user sensitivity to deception cues [P24, P63, P64, P66].
- Video and interactive training are more effective as users do not need refreshment very quickly [P5, P11, P19, P34, P36]
- Leveraging external service providers can support better phishing knowledge assessment and awareness material development [P54, P60].
- Click-through rate should be normalized based on the persuasiveness of the training template to produce a sound analysis and evaluation [P32, P54, P56, P58, P59, P60, P61, P68].
- Training users on how to report phishing incidents and explaining the benefits of reporting can help to establish a phishing reporting culture [P26, P50, P58, P60, P69].
- · Rewarding employees for their secure behaviour can motivate and encourage them to perform better [P30, P61, P66].
- Help to assess users' short-term and long-term knowledge retention after training [P26, P31, P52, P54, P57, P58].
- · Repetitive training in a short period helps users learn a second time if they had difficulty understanding in the first time [P5, P7, P24, P27, P34, P53, P56, P57, P62, P67, P68, P69].
- · Follow-up training (for children) to counter knowledge decay of the ability to identify
- Avoiding frequent risk notifications and over-training reminders can reduce training fatigue [P34, P52, P53, P58, P60, P61, P62, P69].
- · Including a lower bound of information in the reminder measures can reduce security fatigue [P34].