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Is Group Membership Necessary for Understanding Generalized Prejudice? A Re-Evaluation of Why Prejudices Are Interrelated

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Many scholars have proposed that people who reject one outgroup tend to reject other outgroups. Studies examining a latent factor behind different prejudices (e.g., toward ethnic and sexual minorities) have referred to this as generalized prejudice. Such research has also documented robust relations between latent prejudice factors and basic personality traits. However, targets of generalized prejudice tend to be lower in power and status and thus it remains an open question as to whether generalized prejudice, as traditionally studied, is about devaluing outgroups or devaluing marginalized groups. We present 7 studies, including experiments and national probability samples (N = 9,907 and 4,037) assessing the importance of outgroup devaluation, versus status- or power based devaluations, for understanding the nature of generalized prejudice, and its links to personality. Results show that (a) personality variables do not predict ingroup/outgroup biases in settings where power and status differences are absent, (b) women and overweight people who score high on generalized prejudice devalue their own groups, and (c) personality variables are far more predictive of prejudice toward low-compared with high-status targets. Together, these findings suggest that the personality explanation of prejudice including the generalized prejudice concept is not about ingroups versus outgroups per se, but rather about devaluing marginalized groups.

Keywords: generalized prejudice, ingroup biases, personality, power, status

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What makes people prejudiced? In the quest to answer this question, scholars have chosen various independent routes. For example, to ask what makes *most people* prejudiced in a certain context is not the same as asking what makes *some specific individuals* more prejudiced than other individuals (Pettigrew, 1958). Similarly, to ask what makes some individuals prejudiced toward one particular group is not the same asking what makes some individuals stand out as more prejudiced across a whole range of group domains (Zick et al., 2008). By conventional statistical practices, these different subquestions imply orthogonal inquiries, focusing on mean-level differences versus individual differences and specific versus communal variance. By extension, an explanation of prejudice can be true in one sense (e.g., accounting for changing mean-levels), but false in another sense (e.g., not accounting for individual difference communalities). In this paper we suggest that the potential existence of simultaneous truism and falsehood has been overlooked for one of the most widespread ideas in the literature—that prejudice is based on a psychology of "us" versus "them."

Throughout the history of prejudice research, ingroup–outgroup theorizing has always been central (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954; Mackie,

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Devos & Smith, 2000; Sherif, 1966; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). For example, decades of social identity research suggests that people *on average* display prejudice and discrimination based on merely identifying with arbitrary groups (e.g., (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). A number of related perspectives also corroborate the importance of ingroup-outgroup processes for understanding individual differences in *specific* expressions of prejudices (e.g., Mackie & Smith, 2015; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). However, these perspectives have never engaged in the question why the most prejudiced individuals in one group domain (e.g., ethnicity) often stand out as the most prejudiced in other, seemingly dissimilar, domains as well (e.g., sexuality and religion). More broadly, this issue of communalities has not been of much interest to social psychologists; it has primarily been a realm of personality research (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Duckitt, 2001). Indeed, the notion that certain individuals repeatedly set themselves apart as more prejudiced, over time and across different contexts, fits well with overarching themes in personality psychology (see, e.g., Funder, 2001). Nonetheless, the so-called personality approach to prejudice has one thing in common with the social identity approach—it has a clear emphasis on ingroup-outgroup dynamics (see, e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The founding assertion of this paper is that the personality approach, from the 1950s and to this day, may have been wrong to adopt that premise.

Generalized Prejudice

Individuals who devalue ethnic minorities tend to also devalue women, gays and a whole range of other groups. This is one of the oldest lessons in the prejudice literature, which Adorno et al. (1950) referred to as ethnocentrism. Yet contrary to the intuition that this term should focus on ethnic groups, their studies included a much broader set of targets. For that reason, Allport (1954) preferred to discuss this pattern in terms of "prejudice as a generalized attitude" (p. 68). As Allport's writing more accurately describe the phenomenon at hand, and because this paper is not about ethnocentrism as discussed in the contemporary literature (e.g., Bizumic, Duckitt, Popadic, Dru, & Krauss, 2009), we adopt the term generalized prejudice to the describe the focal concept of this paper (see also McFarland, 2010).[1]

In defining generalized prejudice the real question is what constitutes prejudice. As for this question, Dovidio and Gaertner (2010) suggested that "prejudice represents a negative (or a less positive) evaluative or affective response, or both, to others in a given context based on their group membership" (p. 1085). With two caveats, this is also the definition that we will adopt here. As a first caveat, we consider the parenthetical note about "less positive" to be rather important. Prejudice typically involves biases against groups, and a bias does not necessitate absolute negativity. For example, ageism and sexism are not marked by overall antipathy, but rather a mix of benevolence and negativity (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Glick & Fiske, 2001). Nonetheless, both sexism and ageism fit with the "less positive" feature of prejudice. They involve biases where women and older adults might be evaluated positively, but are nonetheless held in *lower* regard than men and young people (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 2001; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). Similarly, the concepts of aversive, modern, and subtle prejudice do not capture blatant negativity as classic prejudice does, but these measures all share a common core of devaluing sentiments (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). These arguments are particularly relevant when discussing generalized prejudice because it manifests itself equally well in contexts marked by ambivalence (e.g., ageism) and clear animus (e.g., prejudice against Muslims; see Zick et al., 2008). As such, definitions of generalized prejudice being limited to antipathy (cf. Allport, 1954) fail to account for its actual breadth.

The second thing of note is the connection between prejudice and group membership. The role of group membership has a dual meaning in prejudice research, and these are sometimes lumped together. There is much consensus in the literature that prejudice is about (explicitly or implicitly) evaluating people based on their group membership (e.g., Banaji & Greenwald, 2013; Crandall, Ferguson, & Bahns, 2013; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). For clarity, this refers to the group membership of the *target*. However, definitions differ in whether they put the group membership of the target in contrast to the group membership of the *observer* (/respondent). Quite often, the term prejudice is treated as synonymous with evaluations of outgroups (e.g., Brown, 2010; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Thus, the relevance of group membership applies to both the target (members of the outgroup) and the observer/respondent (members of the ingroup). Still, other scholars study prejudice without having an ingroup-outgroup dynamic built into the definition. The case of sexism is again illustrative: When women are devalued compared with men, it is typically seen as prejudice regardless of whether it is expressed by a man or woman (e.g., Glick & Fiske, 2001). From this perspective, the respondent's group membership is a potential *explanation* for different levels of prejudice, but not an axiom in its definition. This is a critical note for the purposes of this paper.

With these issues considered we define generalized prejudice as generalization of devaluing sentiments across different group domains, as reflected in broad individual difference coherences. As such we diverge from other definitions of generalized prejudice in one critical regard—we make no assumption that the targets are outgroups (see also next heading). Furthermore, the direction of bias is not given a priori; both anti-White and anti-Black biases would qualify as prejudice by definition. Still, the empirical question is whether there exists a pattern in terms of what groups which are typically devalued, and here we will argue for a simple alternative to ingroup-outgroup dynamics.

Definitions aside, the empirical approach to studying generalized prejudice has been straightforward and it has generated robust findings. Generalized prejudice is reflected in correlated group devaluations and the latent factors underlying them, and such findings have been documented numerous times across a range of cultural contexts (e.g., Akrami, Ekehammar, & Bergh, 2011; Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010; Bierly, 1985; Bratt, 2005; Bäck-

[1] Papers on correlated prejudices and latent prejudice factors often treat generalized prejudice and ethnocentrism as synonymous concepts (e.g., Kinder & Kam, 2009; McFarland, 2010), but many who primarily focus on ethnocentrism treat their concept as more multifaceted (e.g., Bizumic et al., 2009; LeVine & Campbell, 1972). The key concept of this paper is generalized prejudice, and we are only interested in the term ethnocentrism insofar as it is used to describe the empirical observation otherwise called generalized prejudice (see, e.g., Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004).

ström & Björklund, 2007; Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004; Hartley, 1946; McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina-Paap, 1993; Zick et al., 2008). Further, the generalization across targets is consistent with both self- and peer ratings, thus ruling out a self-presentation confound as an explanation for the correlations (Cohrs, Kämpfe-Hargrave, & Riemann, 2012).

The Mismatch Between Theory and Data

With correlated prejudices at hand, Allport (1954) turned to theorize about what they represent. His answer was simple—some people are "anti–any outgroup" (p. 68). Ever since the anti outgroup notion has been widely endorsed by scholars studying generalized prejudice, and it has been built into the definition of the concept. In fact, within this literature every single definition of generalized prejudice (to our knowledge) discusses the targets as outgroups. To illustrate that point, consider the Appendix where we have summarized definitions of generalized prejudice since the year 2000. Many of the listed publications are only a few years old, but the total number of citations exceeds 2,500 on Google Scholar. This would suggest that Allport's view is alive and well. This also implies that if the original description was wrong, then the contemporary literature on generalized prejudice is still working from an inaccurate premise.

As fruitful as the "anti any outgroup" framework has been, there are (at least) three problems with conceptualizing generalized prejudice in this way, while empirically studying correlated group devaluations. First, studies within the generalized prejudice literature fail to meet the most basic criteria for studying ingroup biases or outgroup negativity—that the targets of prejudice should be *outgroups* to all participants. For example, many studies include sexist attitudes while using samples where a majority of participants are female (see Adorno et al., 1950; Akrami et al., 2011; Bierly, 1985; Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Zick et al., 2008). Another example is found in studies using prejudice toward gays without excluding gay participants (Cunningham et al., 2004). To our knowledge, there is only one single study on generalized prejudice that keeps a strict outgroup criteria for all target groups (see Cohrs et al., 2012).

A second and related problem is that many targets of prejudice have fuzzy and undefined boundaries. Evidently, generalized prejudice manifests itself in devaluations of people being old, overweight or poor (e.g., Bergh, Akrami, & Ekehammar, 2012a; Bierly, 1985; Cunningham et al., 2004), but the argument that this represents ingroup biases begs a simple question: Where should we draw the line between ingroups and outgroups (old/young, poor/nonpoor, overweight/thin)? This is a nonissue from the perspective that prejudice can entail more than ingroup biases, but it is fundamental for scholars equating the two concepts. For example, to argue that prejudice toward overweight people represents an ingroup-outgroup bias it would be necessary to know that all participants can be classified as normal- or underweight. This issue has never been addressed in work on generalized prejudice (or ethnocentrism studies using such targets).

Both of these problems might seem minor to some readers—after all it is unlikely that gay participants would make up more than a small portion of the samples, so the results could be expected to be similar if these participants were excluded. Consequently, it would be tempting to conclude that most studies of generalized prejudice provide evidence of a generic ingroup bias for a vast majority of participants. However, there is a pitfall in this reasoning. If participants belonging to the target groups show the same pattern of attitudes then group membership could not possibly be the sole explanation for the observed biases. This leads to the third and most fundamental problem. The final problem with inferring ingroup biases from correlated prejudices is that the empirical observations could have alternative explanations. More specifically, every single study (to our knowledge) within the generalized prejudice literature is based on evaluations of groups that are best described as marginalized or stigmatized—they are "deviant" compared with the majority group or comparably low in social status and/or power (see also Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012).[2] Thus, it is impossible to know whether prejudiced White heterosexuals, for example, devalue Blacks and gays because they look down on most any outgroup, or because they look down on marginalized groups. In essence, generalized prejudice studies confound the impact of group membership, group status and group power. Taken together, there are no studies on generalized prejudice that provide direct evidence of a broad-spectrum ingroup-outgroup bias. Generally prejudiced individuals, as we know them from the literature, might be better described as being anti–any marginalized group.

It is not a trivial issue whether generalized prejudice is about outgroups or marginalized groups, and it is hardly a matter of semantics. For example, if seemingly xenophobic individuals do not care that much about "us" and "them," but rather about upholding status and power differences between groups, then we should be advised to construe prejudice interventions accordingly. Most prejudice interventions today focus on intergroup contact and/or altered group categorization (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). However, if the essence of prejudice is not ingroup biases then they may, to some extent, be treating an epiphenomenon. For this reason it would seem relevant to know what generalized prejudice really represents, as well as what predisposes people toward it. This would seem particularly pressing as generalized prejudice can account up to 65% of the individual differences in quite distinct group attitudes (Bergh et al., 2012a).

Prejudiced Personalities: Disliking Outgroups or Devaluing Marginalized People?

The fundamental premise behind the authoritarian personality project was that the coherent patterns in a person's political and social convictions should have their origin in "deeplying trends in his personality" (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 1). Yet the contemporary

[2] In support of Adorno et al. (1950) and Allport's (1954) perspective it is sometimes remarked that prejudice toward known ethnic groups is correlated with prejudice toward fictitious groups (Hartley, 1946), and that this indicates a generic bias toward outgroups (e.g., Krauss, 2002). However, most Americans in the 20th century would probably be familiar with countries such as Germany, Russia/USSR, and China. So coming across a group that they had not heard of, the chances are that they would assume that it is comparably low in power. Then add the fact the participants in these studies came from the most powerful country in the world (U.S.A.), and we have again a confound between the role of group membership and that of power and status. Thus, the fictitious group argument does not satisfactorily show that generalized prejudice captures biases driven by group membership.

literature is practically consensual in the verdict that authoritarianism (including its derivative right-wing authoritarianism; Altemeyer, 1981) is not particularly "deep-lying". In personality terminology it is not considered a *basic* or *core* trait (as compared to, e.g., the Big Five factors). The same remark has been made about social dominance orientation (see, e.g., Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004). On this note, Duckitt (2001) argued that a personality approach to prejudice could probe deeper than "just" linking one set of attitudes (prejudice) to other sets of attitudes (authoritarianism and social dominance). Indeed, the last 15 years have shown a surge of such research, linking generalized prejudice to basic traits. These include low agreeableness and openness to experience (henceforth openness) from the Five-Factor Model of personality (for a meta-analysis, see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), low honesty-humility from the HEXACO model (Sibley, Harding, Perry, Asbrock, & Duckitt, 2010) and low empathy (McFarland, 2010).

The question we ask here is *why* basic personality relates to generalized prejudice. To date the most elaborate answer to that question has come from the Dual Process Model of Ideology and Prejudice (DPM; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, in press). Duckitt (2001) suggested that socially conforming individuals (marked by low openness) develop prejudice toward norm-threatening outgroups because they fear a societal collapse, and they see authorities and a traditional order as the rescue (as indicated by high scores on authoritarianism). In parallel, it is argued that tough-minded individuals (marked by low agreeableness) see the world as inherently competitive, endorse group hierarchies (as indexed by SDO) and direct prejudice toward disadvantaged outgroups that they want to "keep in place." However, while focusing on these different motives the DPM overlooks their communality—namely that both conforming and tough-minded individuals should endorse attitudes that preserve power and status differences between groups. Why? Because such attitudes promote a traditional and predictable order (what conforming individuals prefer) as well as dominance (what tough-minded individuals prefer). In this paper we posit that this overarching commonality is what generalized prejudice is all about, and moving beyond the DPM we propose that it has little to do with "us" and "them."

Research on the DPM clearly extends the classic literature (cf. Allport, 1954), but it does not challenge its ingroup-outgroup focus. Specifically, Duckitt (2001) suggested that prejudice generalizes across *some* outgroups, but not *all* outgroups. Yet he did not discuss the possibility that generalized prejudice may also involve ingroups. Tough-minded or conformist tendencies concern social aspects of people's lives, but they are not confined to situations involving an "us" versus "them" categorization. As far as we know there are no personality models describing agreeableness, openness, honesty-humility or empathy as traits confined to intergroup situations. On the contrary, all of these traits have interpersonal behavioral consequences (e.g., Ashton & Lee, 2008; Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Graziano, Bruce, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007; Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007; McCrae, 1996). More importantly, concerns about hierarchies, status, and power can cut across interpersonal and intergroup contexts, just as one could expect for the expressions of global personality traits (Grina, Bergh, Akrami, & Sidanius, 2016). This suggests that factors being orthogonal to ingroup-outgroup dynamics might account for the personality roots of generalized prejudice.

Another reason to expect that certain individuals will endorse a generic devaluation of low status and low power groups is given in system justification theory and social dominance theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius, 1993). System justification theory holds that people are driven by motives of ego justification and group justification (leading to ingroup biases), but also system justification as related to, for example, societal inequality (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Indeed, both system-justification theory and social dominance theory make the prediction that prejudice and stereotypes should be asymmetric across groups as a function of their status and power (see Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Sidanius, Cotterill, Sheehy-Skeffington, Kteily, & Carvacho, in press). For high-status groups, group and system justifying motives align to produce prejudice toward low status groups. In contrast, group and system justifying motives collide for low status groups in their views of high status groups, and the result can be ambivalent evaluations or even outgroup preference (e.g., Jost et al., 2004). This reasoning is critical for the discussion about the personality underpinning of generalized prejudice. If generalized prejudice represents a generic bias toward outgroups, then systematically prejudiced individuals should devalue most any outsider regardless of the ingroup's status or power. However, if generally prejudiced individuals were rather motivated by system justification then this should only be true for evaluations of groups of low status or power.

Aims and Overview of Studies

As reviewed above, scholars have repeatedly argued, but never directly shown, that generalized prejudice and its personality correlates centers on devaluing outgroups. To address this issue, we asked two questions. First, does generalized prejudice represent a broad-spectrum ingroup bias, or does it represent a devaluation of marginalized groups (Q1)? Second, do "prejudiced personalities" (as identified in the literature) predict bias toward outgroups, or do they rather predict biases toward marginalized groups (Q2)? Whereas the first question focuses on the nature of generalized prejudice, the second question focuses on what personality does, and does not, predict. Thus, our aim was to disentangle the role of group membership from that of status and power for understanding why some people, with certain personalities, are generally more prejudiced than others.

To explore these issues we conducted seven studies and two accompanying pilots. First, in Study 1 as well as the two pilots, we experimentally isolated the role of group membership as an explanation for prejudice, and we examined how these "pure" ingroup biases relate to generalized prejudice (Q1) and personality (Q2). In Studies 2, 3, and 4 we examined whether the factor structure of generalized prejudice would change if one of the targets was an ingroup (Q1). If it would not, and if it would be predicted by personality as usual (Q2), then it would suggest that ingroup-outgroup dynamics represent an unnecessary premise for understanding generalized prejudice.

In Study 5 we examined whether a preference between *two outgroups* of high versus low status (i.e., no ingroup-outgroup dynamic involved) would load onto a generalized prejudice factor (Q1). In both Studies 5 and 6 we also hypothesized that ingroup

biases would be predicted by personality insofar that they are lower in status than one's own group, but *not* when the outgroup has higher status (Q2). Finally, in Study 7 we hypothesized that generalized prejudice is only coherent toward low status targets, whereas a high status "mirror" factor should be fragmented (Q1). In addition, we expected stronger personality effects for the low status factor (Q2). In this case we also contrasted the status perspective with a value conflict alternative (see, e.g., Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013).

Study 1 and Pilots: Minimal Group Experiments

These studies examined how the established findings in the literature on generalized prejudice and its personality correlates map onto a "pure" and generic index of ingroup bias. Specifically, we used the minimal groups paradigm as a well-validated method for isolating the effect of group membership and identification on group biases, while controlling for other sources of prejudice and discrimination (real conflicts, existing power differences et cetera; see, e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).

The minimal group notion of a generic ingroup bias, stripped of a history of conflicts, is a close approximation of how scholars have described generalized prejudice (or ethnocentrism, when this term has been used to describe correlated prejudices). For example, Cunningham et al. (2004) suggested that the generalized prejudice data "have been taken to suggest that individuals high in ethnocentrism [operationalized as generalized prejudice] will *derogate any outgroup regardless of contact and in the absence of group competition*" (p. 1333, emphasis added). Thus, if generalized prejudice was synonymous to generic outgroup derogation then one should expect strong positive correlations between minimal group attitudes and an index of generalized prejudice (e.g., targeting immigrants and gays). As such, we addressed Q1 by examining the correlation between these experimentally induced ingroup biases and generalized prejudice.

The (minimal) ingroup–outgroup sentiments were primarily operationalized through adjective ratings. If participants rated positive attributes as more descriptive of the ingroup, and/or negative attributes as more descriptive of the outgroup, then that would provide evidence of an ingroup bias (see also Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). We also examined biases on positive and negative attributes separately, as well as ingroup positivity and outgroup denigration in an absolute sense. Thus, we wanted to examine how important the "us" versus "them" distinction is for generalized prejudice, both when it is approached as antipathy (i.e., absolute negativity) or a relative devaluation (i.e., positivity–negativity biases).

We further examined whether basic personality characteristics would predict minimal group attitudes (Q2). Some studies have found minimal group outcomes to be weakly related to authoritarianism and social dominance (see, e.g., Amiot & Bourhis, 2005; Reynolds et al., 2007). However, compared with the strong relationship of these variables show with generalized prejudice (e.g., Ekehammar et al., 2004; McFarland & Adelson, 1996), they seem less relevant for predicting ingroup biases in isolation. Also, as authoritarianism and social dominance are perhaps best characterized as ideological beliefs (Duckitt, 2001), these studies do not necessarily speak to the role of personality in ingroup biases.

Following the reasoning above, we conducted three minimal group studies. The first two were pilots in which we tested our method of assessing ingroup biases (henceforth pilot 1 and 2). The main study employed a larger sample to detect even minor influences of personality on ingroup bias, or weak correlations between these biases and generalized prejudice ($r < .20$, for power analyses see Supplemental materials, p. 1).

Method

Participants. Pilot 1, Pilot 2, and the main experiment were conducted in Sweden and included 55, 76, and 158 participants respectively (35/44/100 women in each study). One multivariate outlier was excluded from Pilot 1 (see Supplementary materials, Figure S1a–S1b for details). The median age in each sample was 22, 23, and 24 years (SD = 4.02/4.19/6.03). Most participants were (nonpsychology) students. Participants in Pilot 1 were rewarded with a cinema (≈ \$10) voucher and participants in Pilot 2 received two cinema vouchers and a snack coupon (≈ \$25, for two data collections; see also Bergh et al., 2012a) and those in the main experiment received two cinema vouchers (≈ \$20). Twelve participants were excluded from the main experiment because of multiple entries and/or familiarity with the minimal group paradigm (i.e., results based on 146 participants).

Materials and procedure. Personality was assessed with Agreeableness and Openness from the Swedish NEO-PI-R (Bergman, 2003) in the pilots, as well as the main experiment (αs > .88). The main experiment also included measures of Empathetic concern (α = .86), and Perspective taking (α = .84) from Davis' (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (for a Swedish validation, see Cliffordson, 2002). Finally, we used 7 items to assess HEXACO Honesty-humility (α = .66) as adopted from Sibley (2009). Items for right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation were also collected, but because our focus was on basic personality, rather than ideological value constructs (see introduction and general discussion), we did not analyze these data. These variables were also available in Studies 3, 4, 5 and 6, but there they remain unanalyzed there as well.

In the minimal group manipulation participants were randomly assigned to one of two fictional groups: GHP-Type I and GHP-Type II in Pilot 1 (n = 28/27) and Pilot 2 (n = 34/42), and GHP-J and GHP-P in the main experiment (n = 74/76).[3] Participants in all experiments read a cover story stating that the study concerned differences between two broad categories of people in the population. They were also told that research had shown differences between the groups and that the current study examined how people from the two groups perceive each other (for a similar approach, see Reynolds et al., 2007). Following the cover story, participants received feedback on their supposed (in reality random) group membership. Finally, participants rated how descriptive (1 = *not at all descriptive*, 5 = *highly descriptive*) they thought that a number of positive and negative attributes were of their group, as well as the other group (e.g., Sidanius et al., 1994). The rating scale consisted of 12 adjectives in the pilots and 18 in the main experiment (e.g., kind and dishonest). From these ratings we derived five indices: *overall bias* (ingroup ratings minus

[3] The change of group names in the main experiment was based on the notion that type-1 might indicate some primacy over type-2.

outgroup ratings after reversing negative items; α = .83/.79/.86 in Pilot 1/Pilot 2/main experiment), *bias on positive attributes* (ingroup ratings minus outgroup ratings; αs = .75/.73/.73), *bias on negative attributes* (outgroup ratings minus ingroup ratings [i.e., higher scores = more ingroup bias]; αs = .62/.62/.78), *absolute ingroup positivity* (reversed negative items; αs = .86/.84/.87), *absolute outgroup negativity* (reversed positive items; αs = .80/.78/.85). The main experiment also included a five-item measure of identification with one's minimal group (α = .63) and a two-item social distance measure for ingroup biases (α = .75).[4] All items in these instruments, as well as additional details about these experiments, are presented in the Supplemental materials (Table S1a).

Generalized prejudice in Pilot 2 was operationalized as a mean-score (α = .65) of prejudice toward ethnic minorities (Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000), overweight people, and older adults (see Bergh, 2013). In the main experiment we operationalized generalized prejudice as the mean-score (α = .84) of the measures in Pilot 2 plus the Scandinavian version of the modern sexism scale (Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2000) and prejudice toward people with disabilities (Akrami, Ekehammar, Claesson, & Sonnander, 2006). Here we also derived an outgroup-only index of generalized prejudice (α = .72) by focusing on prejudice toward ethnic minorities, older adults and people with disabilities. For this index we excluded 44 participants with immigrant background and participants older than 45 years (i.e., using a conservative cut-off to exclude 'old' individuals).

Results

Preliminary results. We tested the experimental manipulation by analyzing the mean of the attribute ratings (negative ones reversed) using a 2 (Membership: Group 1 vs. Group 2) by 2 (Positivity rating: Group 1 vs. Group 1) mixed ANOVA. Significant interaction effects confirmed an adequate manipulation and indicated ingroup favoritism for both groups in all three experiments, $F(1, 53) = 10.68$, $p = .002$, $\eta_p^2 = .17$; $F(1, 74) = 31.03$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .30$; $F(1, 144) = 96.29$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .40$, in Pilots 1, 2, and the main experiment, respectively (see Figure S1c–S1e in the Supplemental materials).

Correlation analyses. Next we examined the correlations between all five minimal group indices and generalized prejudice. These analyses addressed whether generalized prejudice is synonymous to generic ingroup-outgroup sentiments, as reflected in strong positive interrelations (Q1). In reality, these correlations were uniformly negligible and/or negative (rs < .14, see Table 1). Furthermore, we examined the relation between identification and ingroup bias as well as generalized prejudice in the main experiment. The results showed that identification was significantly related to all minimal group biases and sentiments (rs = .19 to .39, ps ≤ .01) except absolute outgroup negativity, $r = .07$, $p = .40$. In contrast, minimal group identification was unrelated to generalized prejudice, $r = .03$, $p = .72$.

Regression analyses. In a series of regressions we examined the personality relations with ingroup biases and generalized prejudice.[5] In other words, we examined the second overarching question—whether personality predicts generic ingroup-outgroup sentiments in the same fashion as generalized prejudice (Q2). Here, as well as in all other confirmatory factor analyses, path and structural equation model (SEM) analyses throughout the paper, we used the robust maximum likelihood (MLR) estimator in Mplus (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). This estimator is robust to non-normality in the data (see Yuan & Bentler, 2000), which was expected for some of the prejudice measures.

Table 1
Correlations Between Generalized Prejudice and Minimal Group Sentiments in Pilot 2 and Main Experiment in Study 1

		Main experiment	
Minimal group sentiments	Pilot 2	All targets	Outgroups only[a]
Ingroup bias	.02	−.18*	−.18
Ingroup bias—positive attributes	−.08	−.13	−.14
Ingroup bias—negative attributes	−.14	−.20*	−.20*
Absolute ingroup positivity	−.05	−.23*	−.33*
Absolute outgroup negativity	.07	−.03	.05
Social distance	—	.11	.03

[a] $N = 102$ after exclusion of participants from target groups.
* $p < .05$.

The results of these analyses showed that the effects of the personality variables on (minimal) ingroup-outgroup sentiments were small and negligible (Pilots & main experiment), whereas those on generalized prejudice were significant and strong (Pilot 2 & main experiment). This was true for all ingroup-outgroup indices. It was also true with the inclusion of a broader range of personality predictors in the main experiment. All personality effects are summarized in Table 2.

Discussion

The minimal group experiments provided an initial test of whether generic ingroup bias can be described as synonymous with generalized prejudice (Q1) and whether basic personality variables predict this bias (Q2). We found that the minimal group evaluations were largely unrelated to generalized prejudice, and this conclusion held up for all experimental outcomes. It was also true when the index of generalized prejudice toward real groups was defined strictly based on outgroup evaluations. Further, the personality variables accounted for a modest amount of the variance in the evaluations of the minimal groups, especially when compared with corresponding results for generalized prejudice (see Table 2). Noteworthy, the strongest effects of personality,

[4] Like Reynolds et al., (2007) we used bogus information in Study 1 (pilot 2 and the main experiment) that group membership would reflect meaningful differences based on personality and attitude responses. This could potentially create anchoring effects in the adjective ratings such that participants describe the ingroup with characteristics that they consider indicative of themselves. However, any anchoring effects should boost the effects of personality on ingroup biases and attenuate the contrast with generalized prejudice. Thus, such a confound works *against* the notion that personality is unrelated to ingroup biases. Second, and most importantly, the social distance measure in Experiment 3 was introduced specifically to rule out method artifacts in the adjective ratings.

[5] In general we modeled generalized prejudice as a latent factor, but we chose the simpler (manifest) regression approach here due to the small sample sizes. Also, while trying to maintain a 5:1 participant to free parameter ratio, we have typically opted to model latent personality variables with a single (mean-score) indicator and fixing the error variance based on the reliability of the scale ($[1 - \alpha]^* s^2$; see, e.g., Muthén, 2005).

Table 2
Standardized Personality Effects on Ingroup–Outgroup Attitudes and Generalized Prejudice in Pilot 1/Pilot 2/Main Experiment in Study 1

Variable	Agreeableness	Openness	Empathetic concern	Perspective taking	Honesty–humility	Total effect (R^2)
Ingroup–outgroup attitudes						
Ingroup bias	.24/.01/.20	−.11/.12/−.14	.28*	−.12	−.00	.07/.01/.13*
Ingroup bias—positive attributes	.27/−.04/.17	−.04/.23*/−.15	.27*	−.18	.01	.08/.05/.11*
Ingroup bias—negative attributes	.13/.12/.21	−.17/−.13/−.12	.27*	−.06	−.02	.05/.01/.13*
Absolute ingroup positivity	.23/.13/.18	−.26*/.11/−.06	.32*	−.11	−.05	.12/.04/.13*
Absolute outgroup negativity	.07/−.13/.13	.16/.05/−.16	.11	−.07	−.05	.03/.02/.05
Outgroup social distance	.04	−.28*	.19	.12	−.11	.06
Generalized prejudice						
All targets	—/−.51*/−.29*	—/−.07†/−.24*	−.31*	.05	−.13*	—/.29*/.50*
Outgroups only	−.32*	−.31*	−.29*	.11	.06	.50*

† Zero-order $r = -.22$, $p = .06$, suggests atypical covariance with agreeableness in this sample. Cells with only one coefficient represent the main experiment.
* $p < .05$.

those for empathic concern, were also of opposite sign compared with what has been established for generalized prejudice (see McFarland, 2010). Possibly, empathic people feel warmer toward most everyone (explaining less biases toward marginalized groups), but care most about those closest to them (explaining more positivity for ingroups). More importantly though, regardless of whether this represents true or a chance effects it suggests that ingroup biases do not share the same personality underpinnings as generalized prejudice. Also, in terms of Brewer's (1999) distinction between ingroup love and outgroup hate, we found generalized prejudice to be largely orthogonal to *both* of these concepts (i.e., absolute ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity).

Taken together, these findings constitute an important challenge to the common assumption that generalized prejudice reflects broad-spectrum ingroup biases and that some personalities are anti any outgroup. Yet although the data seem clear-cut, critics might still argue that it is unreasonable to expect any variable to predict minimal group biases to the same extent as generalized prejudice, because real groups will always have the upper hand. Still, it was not the case that all variables failed to predict ingroup biases while predicting generalized prejudice. Group identification revealed an opposite pattern. This double dissociation is a strong case for a conceptual distinction between ingroup biases and generalized prejudice, and it suggests that the findings are more than method artifacts. It is also relevant to consider *why* real groups would have the upper hand compared with minimal groups. One answer is that more factors are at play for real groups, and that these possibly reinforce each other. However, many scholars have presumed that the essence of generalized prejudice is one sole factor—group membership. In this study, we isolated that factor and showed that it plays a minor role at best. Nonetheless, the remaining studies focused on nonfictional groups to further explore whether a broad-spectrum ingroup bias can explain the glue that binds together different kinds of real-life prejudice.

Study 2

If generalized prejudice was equivalent to a broad-spectrum ingroup bias (or absolute negativity toward outgroups for that matter), then a simple prediction should hold: Generalized prejudice should never be consensual across different groups of participants. For example, men and women should have two different versions of generalized prejudice such that generally prejudiced men devalue women and generally prejudiced women should devalue men. We tested this assumption about generalized prejudice by comparing the factor structures for male and female participants when including sexist stereotypes as an indicator. These groups are ideal for examining the role of group membership in generalized prejudice because the group boundaries are very clear and provide (evenly) large subsamples for multigroup factor analysis. Also, competing and mutually exclusive hypotheses are readily available for different perspectives of what generalized prejudice represents (Q1).

In this study we used data from a large, nationally representative sample of Swedish teenagers. Upon exclusion of Jewish, Muslim, and gay participants, the traditional definition of generalized prejudice would imply the same factor structure for male and female participants with Jews, Muslims, and gays as targets. However, whereas sexism should also load on this factor for male respondents, it should not for female respondents. In contrast, if generalized prejudice centers on status and power, then the individual differences in prejudice should follow the same pattern for men and women. The prediction implies that women who devalue ethnic and sexual minorities, overweight people and so on, should also devalue women in comparison with men.

Method

Participants. We analyzed a dataset from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention in cooperation with the Living History Forum in Sweden. The survey focused on group intolerance in a national representative sample of Swedish teenagers and young adults, aged 13 to 21 ($Mdn = 16$). The response rate was 76.2%, thus providing a final sample of 10,600 individuals (50.4% females). For more details about the sample, see Ring and Morgentau (2005).

As we focused on prejudice toward Muslims, Jews, and gays, we excluded participants from these groups as well as we could. Sexual orientation was not a demographic variable in the dataset, so exclusion of gays and lesbians was done on a proxy basis.

Participants were removed if they reported having a girl- or boyfriend of the same sex, and/or whether they reported being targeted by negative treatment because others thought they were gay. Combining this procedure with exclusion of Jews and Muslims, the sample consisted of 9,907 participants (50.2% women).

Materials. To model a generalized prejudice factor we used four types of targets as indicators: Muslims, Jews, gays, and women. The first three were mirror instruments with six items each, three of these reversed (α = .82, .85 and .86 for Muslims, Jews, and gays respectively). Example items were "there are far too many Muslims [Jews/gays] in Sweden" and "most Muslims [Jews/gays] are no doubt decent people" (reversed scoring).

In addition to these scales, six items were used to measure stereotypic norms concerning boys and girls (α = .86). An example item was "a girl who has been with a lot of guys doesn't deserve respect." This measure was used as a proxy for sexism defined as a devaluing attitude of women. These stereotypes were also correlated with a binary (yes/no) item asking whether it was best for men to decide things in the family, $r = .28$, $p < .001$. The instruments used in the main analyses involve all balanced and continuous group ratings in the dataset. The complete dataset is described in Ring and Morgentau (2005).

Results

As a preliminary analysis we examined whether this representative sample of teenagers would replicate the basic generalized prejudice finding from adults and university student samples. Indeed, a principal component analysis revealed that one factor (generalized prejudice) accounted for as much as 68% of the variance in attitudes toward Muslims, Jews, gays, and women. All loadings were above .68. Thus, the findings are consistent with those from convenience samples in Sweden (e.g., Bergh et al., 2012a).

Next we addressed the main question of the study in a series of multigroup (male vs. female participants) confirmatory factor analyses (CFA). Here we examined competing hypotheses about generalized prejudice being based on group membership or marginalization. Specifically, we modeled prejudice toward Muslims, Jews, gays and women as indicators of a generalized prejudice factor.[6] Factor loadings, except the one for sexism, were always held equal in the two groups, to make sure that the generalized prejudice factor had a similar meaning for both sexes (i.e., assuring as much measurement invariance as we could produce). More important, to test the plausibility of an ingroup-outgroup versus marginalization model of generalized prejudice, the loading for sexism was specified in three different ways. Comparing the fit of these alternative models would address Q1—whether generalized prejudice represents a broad-spectrum ingroup bias or devaluation of marginalized groups.

In the baseline (comparison) model the loading of sexism was free to vary between male and female participants. In the ingroup bias model the loading for sexism was constrained to be zero for women. In other words, this model tested the (strong) assumption that if generally prejudiced women are only biased toward outgroups then these attitudes should be disconnected from devaluing sentiments about their own gender. In the marginalization model, these loadings were constrained to be equal for men and women. In other words, this model tested the (strong) assumption that group membership has no influence on what targets fit into a generalized prejudice factor.

After adding a residual correlation between the religious targets (Muslims and Jews),[7] the baseline model with free loadings for men and women on sexism showed good fit; scaled $\chi^2(4) = 49.48$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .99, *RMSEA* = .05, 90% CI [.04, .06], *SRMR* = .02, *AIC* = 78764.83, *BIC* = 78937.65. The standardized loading of sexism was .55 for men and .48 for women (see Figure 1, for full model results see Supplemental Materials, Figure S2a–S2d). Next, we tested the ingroup-outgroup model in which the sexism loading was fixed to 0 among women (in line with the assumption that generally prejudiced women are not prejudiced toward their own group). This constraint produced a dramatically worse fit; scaled $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 508.08$, $p < .001$. Indeed, applying this constraint resulted in a poorly fitting model; scaled $\chi^2(5) = 677.92$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .92, *RMSEA* = .16, 90% CI [.15, .18], *SRMR* = .12, *AIC* = 79731.33, *BIC* = 79896.95. Finally, we tested the marginalization model assuming sexism to be equally indicative of generalized prejudice for men and women (i.e., constraining the unstandardized coefficients as equal). The marginalization model deteriorated the fit as well, but much less than the ingroup-outgroup model; scaled $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 9.02$, $p = .003$. In fact, the marginalization model had equally good fit as the baseline model on most fit indices; scaled $\chi^2(5) = 58.60$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .99, *RMSEA* = .05, 90% CI [.04, .06], *SRMR* = .02, *AIC* = 78775.35, *BIC* = 78940.98.

Discussion

Based on a large national representative sample, this study provided a powerful demonstration that a generalized prejudice factor can remain the same even when a person's own group is modeled as a target of this prejudice (Q1). The ingroup–outgroup model, assuming that generally prejudiced women do not hold prejudiced attitudes toward their own group, had very poor fit. In contrast, the marginalization model, assuming sexism to be equally indicative of a generalized prejudice factor for men and women, had a very good fit. These young women who were generally prejudiced toward Muslims, Jews, and gays devalued their *own* gender group as well.

Study 3

The first aim of this study was to replicate the findings from Study 2 with more well-established prejudice measures. Indeed, a

[6] Intercepts for all indicators except anti-Semitism, as well as the factor means, were free to vary between male and female respondents, as modification indices in preliminary results indicated non-negligible mean differences. We fixed the intercepts for the indicator with the smallest mean gender difference for model identification (anti-Semitism here, ethnic prejudice in Study 3), although the choice is arbitrary and it does not influence the model fit. In general we identified the latent factor variances by fixing them to 1 (and set free in the second group in the multigroup analyses). We also examined models without a mean structure, and while this was associated with mediocre fit in Study 2, the interpretation of the main results remains the same.

[7] Whenever we added correlated residuals to improve the model fit (Study 2, 5, and 7), we also tested main results and hypotheses based on the original (uncorrelated) specifications. Although the fit is consistently poor in these cases (due to unaccounted covariances) the personality effects, for example, were always consistent with the main results.



Figure 1. Standardized results from multigroup (women and men) confirmatory factor analyses in Study 2 and Study 3. In the presented models the unstandardized loadings were constrained as equal for men and women, except for sexism.

limitation of Study 2 was the use of a proxy measure for sexism (sexist stereotypes) rather than a clear-cut attitudinal measure. Thus, in this study we focused on modern sexism (see Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) as it is one of the most well-established instruments assessing sexist prejudice against women. Another important aim was to also examine the effects of personality on generalized prejudice for men and women separately. If prejudiced personalities were biased toward outgroups, as typically assumed, then the effects of personality should be stronger for men. However, if prejudiced personalities are rather defending inequalities between groups, then the personality relations could be expected to be the same for men and women with a generalized prejudice factor including sexism. As such the personality relations would speak to Q2—whether personality predicts prejudice as involving ingroup biases or devaluation of marginalized groups.

Method

Participants. For this inquiry we reanalyzed data from Akrami et al. (2011). The sample analyzed consisted of eight subsamples, comprising a total of 861 participants (612 women), the median age was 23 years (SD = 11.46).

Materials. Two personality and four prejudice variables were used for this study. The personality predictors were Agreeableness and Openness as measured in Study 1 (α = .90 and .87, respectively, see also Bergman, 2003). We used ethnic prejudice (α = .84, Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000), sexism (α = .77, Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2000 [the modern sexism scale as adopted for a Scandinavian context]), prejudice toward people with disabilities (α = .76, Akrami et al., 2006), and sexual prejudice (directed toward gays; α = .92, Ekehammar, Bergh, & Akrami, 2013) as indicators of a generalized prejudice factor. Having reversed appropriate items, scale scores were formed by averaging across item responses.

Results

Multigroup CFA. The first set of analyses in this study was based on the same multigroup CFA framework as in Study 2. Again, this would address Q1—whether generalized prejudice is best approximated by a broad-spectrum ingroup bias, or alternatively, a devaluation of marginalized groups. In this case, ethnic prejudice, sexism, sexual prejudice, and prejudice toward people with mental disabilities were modeled as indicators of a generalized prejudice factor.[8] Again, ingroup–outgroup and marginalization models were tested by applying different constraints to the sexism loadings.

The baseline model had good fit; scaled $\chi^2(6) = 14.39$, $p = .03$, $CFI = .98$, $RMSEA = .06$, 90% CI [.02, .09], $SRMR = .04$, $AIC = 6219.32$, $BIC = 6324.00$. The standardized loading of sexism on generalized prejudice was .79 for men and .65 for women (see Figure 1, for full model results see Supplemental Materials, Figure S3a–S3d). In other words, the loading was higher for men, but the loading for women was nonetheless far from negligible. The ingroup-outgroup model (with the constraint of the sexism loading to zero among women) produced a misfit that was quite dramatic; scaled $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 136.66$, $p < .001$. Indeed, this was evident across the board of fit indices; scaled $\chi^2(7) = 165.99$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .66$, $RMSEA = .23$, 90% CI [.20, .26], $SRMR = .17$, $AIC = 6435.11$, $BIC = 6535.03$. In the marginalization model, we constrained the unstandardized loadings to be equal, and this resulted in a somewhat worse fitting model compared to the baseline one; scaled $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 5.85$, $p = .02$. In other words, the loading for sexism on generalized prejudice was significantly higher for men than for women, but the size of the effect was fairly small. In fact, this model fit the data well and almost matched the unconstrained model; scaled $\chi^2(7) = 19.62$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .97$, $RMSEA = .07$, 90% CI [.03, .10], $SRMR = .06$, $AIC = 6223.87$, $BIC = 6323.79$.

Multigroup SEM. Testing the overarching question Q2, we next examined whether the effects of personality on generalized prejudice would be different when a person's own group represents one of the targets (as is the case for the female participants in this study). This was examined with a multigroup SEM in which generalized prejudice was modeled as in the baseline CFA model above. In addition, we modeled latent factors for agreeableness and openness to experience with three parcels each (items randomly assigned), and specified them as predictors of generalized prejudice. All loadings and intercepts for the personality variables were held equal for men and women to assure measurement invariance.

[8] The loadings for ethnic minorities, gays/lesbians, and people with disabilities were held equal across men and women to impose as much measurement invariance as possible in the model.

In the first model, the structural relations of agreeableness and openness with generalized prejudice were free to vary between men and women. This model fit the data adequately; scaled $\chi^2(74) = 251.39$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .95, *RMSEA* = .08, 90% CI [.07, .09] *SRMR* = .07. The standardized effect of agreeableness on generalized prejudice was −.31 for men and −.37 for women (*p*s <.001). The corresponding effects for openness were −.48 for men and −.47 for women (*p*s <.001). Full model results are presented in the Supplemental Materials (Figure S3e—S3h). In the next step we constrained the (unstandardized) personality relations to be equal for men and women. The change in fit was hardly noticeable, scaled $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 0.19$, $p = .66$, and the model had equally good fit, scaled $\chi^2(76) = 251.79$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .95, *RMSEA* = .07, 90% CI [.06, .08], *SRMR* = .07.

Discussion

This study replicated the results from Study 2 using more conventional prejudice measures. The results from the CFA were similar here; the marginalization model held up very well whereas the ingroup-outgroup model provided a poor fit to the data (thus addressing Q1). Again we found that generally prejudiced women also scored higher on sexism, thus displaying prejudice toward their own gender.

This study also suggests that the personality relations with generalized prejudice were the same for men and women even though the factor includes prejudice toward the ingroup in the latter case (addressing Q2). In other words, people with prejudiced personalities do not necessarily pay attention to their own group membership when choosing groups to target with devaluating sentiments. In sum, both Study 2 and 3 demonstrate that generalized prejudice should not be described as synonymous to a broad-spectrum ingroup bias, and prejudiced personalities are not characterized by being anti–any outgroup. Also, although we are not the first to show that women also express sexism toward their own gender (e.g., Roets, Van Hiel, & Dhont, 2012; Sibley, Overall, & Duckitt, 2007), this is the first direct evidence that such self-directed biases comprise an integrated piece of a broad pattern of prejudiced attitudes (i.e., generalized prejudice).

A limitation of Studies 2 and 3 is that we only examined the role of group membership in terms of gender for defining a generalized prejudice factor. Ideally, we would have shown the same effect for another categorization, such as examining the factor structure for religious minorities in Study 2. However, the huge discrepancy in group size makes such an inquiry difficult. For example, even within a sample with more than 10,000 participants we only had data for 11 Jews. Thus, in Studies 4, 5, and 6 we introduced alternative setups of competing models to establish that the findings so far are not confined to gender or minimal groups.

Study 4

In this study we examined how generally prejudiced people express prejudice toward overweight people, as a function of their own weight. Crandall (1994) showed that prejudice toward overweight people is unrelated to people's own weight, but related to symbolic racism. Those findings are much in line with our results from Study 2 and 3 on gender, sexism, and generalized prejudice. Still, we propose that the mentality underpinning correlations between prejudice toward overweight and Black people is broader than an "ideology of blame" (Crandall, 1994, p. 882). We suggest that the correlation reflects a devaluation of low status and low power groups more broadly, and represents one of many manifestations of generalized prejudice. Therefore, we predicted that overweight people would devalue other overweight people if they are high on generalized prejudice, just like prejudiced women devalued their own group in Studies 2 and 3.

Once again, this setup would address whether generalized prejudice represents ingroup-outgroup sentiments, or a devaluation of low status and low power groups (Q1). If the phenomenon at hand was one concerning ingroups versus outgroups, then prejudice toward overweight people should not be indicative of generalized prejudice among overweight people themselves. Finally, to address the question whether personality predicts devaluation of outgroups or marginalized groups, we compared the personality relations among normal- and overweight participants (Q2). If personality variables primarily predict outgroup devaluation in particular then stronger relations should be expected among normal weight participants (see also rationale in Study 3).

Method

Participants. Four hundred forty-four participants took part in the study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The study was only open to Americans, and participants were excluded if they failed to pass three attention checks (e.g., "to monitor quality, please respond with a seven for this item"), leaving 415 respondents for the analyses. The median age was 30 years (*SD* = 11.54), 55% were women. In terms of ethnicity 76% identified as White, 8% as Asian, 6% as Black, 4% as Latino, 2% as Native American, and the remaining 4% as mixed/other/no reply. Compensations were set at $2.00.

Instruments and procedure. In the first part of the study, we introduced the agreeableness (α = .89), openness (α = .86), and honesty-humility (α = .86) factors from the HEXACO PI-R 100-item inventory (16 items each, see Ashton & Lee, 2008). We also included four items that double-load on the agreeableness and honesty-humility factors, labeled as altruism items (α = .69). These were expected to be conceptually close to the empathetic concern scale in Davis' (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index, which was also included here (α = .90). Because of the high correlation between the last two measures ($r = .77$, $p < .001$) we combined them into a single empathy measure (α = .91)**.**

In the second part of the study we asked participants to consider a set of nine silhouette figures of men and women that ranged from *very thin* (1) to *very heavy* (9). Variations of these figures, as introduced by Stunkard, Sørensen, and Schulsinger (1983), are among the most commonly used to assess body image, and belong to the few which have undergone validation (see, e.g., Fallon & Rozin, 1985; Lo, Ho, Mak, & Lam, 2012). Participants were instructed to select the first male and female figure (from left to right) who they considered overweight and the first male and female figure (from the right) that they considered underweight. In other words, we asked participants to provide their perceived group boundaries for under-, normal-, and overweight people. We further asked participants to choose the figure that best represented their own body image.

This section also included questions about preferences between all pairwise combinations of under-, normal-, and overweight people (overweight vs. underweight, overweight vs. normal weight, normal weight vs. underweight). For each contrast (counterbalanced for presentation on the left vs. right) we asked the following two questions: "In general, which group of people would you rather socialize with (romantic situations aside)?" and "which group of people would you rather cooperate with on a work project?" Answers were given on a 10-point scale, and averaged across the two questions for each weight category contrast (αs $>$ .73). For ease of interpretation, we always scored the preference measures to assess more bias toward the predicted lower status group (i.e., higher scores indicating prejudice toward overweight compared to normal and underweight people, and toward underweight compared to normal weight people). As control variables we asked about perceived status differences between the weight categories ("which group of people do you think has higher status?"), and preferences between these weight-categories in romantic situations (the latter have not been analyzed here). The order of the instruments in this part (perceptions of weight categories in general, own body image, and preferences between weight categories) was counterbalanced. At the end of the study we asked participants for their weight and height (to calculate their body mass index for further validation of their perceptual ratings).

In the third section participants completed prejudice scales targeting ethnic minorities (α = .91, McConahay, 1986), women (α = .91, Swim et al., 1995), and gays (α = .91, Wright, Adams, & Bernat, 1999). In addition, we included four statements from a 10-item instrument assessing prejudice toward overweight people (Bergh, 2013), and here we introduced mirror statements for prejudice toward underweight people. These included statements such as "I don't like fat people much" (see also Allison, Basile, & Yuker, 1991; Crandall, 1994) and "I don't like skinny people much". The use of the four overweight items had been preexamined for reliability using the Study 1 data (α = .81), and in this sample the αs were .86 and .80 for prejudice toward over- and underweight people respectively. All construed prejudice instruments are reported in their entirety in the Supplemental materials (Table S4a–S4c).

Results

Preliminary results. Because our overarching hypothesis was that generalized prejudice capitalizes on biases toward groups of low status or power, we first examined status perceptions for weight. Specifically, we used a one-sample *t* test to examine whether the status ratings for normal weight versus overweight people would diverge from the midpoint (5.5) of the scale. Indeed, they did. On average, normal weight people were associated with higher status than overweight people, $t(410) = 32.03$, $p < .001$. In two additional one-sample *t* tests we found that normal weight people were seen as higher in status than underweight people, $t(409) = 11.85$, $p < .001$, and underweight people were seen as higher than overweight people, $t(409) = 15{,}76$, $p < .001$.

Next we divided participants into normal- or underweight people versus overweight people by comparing their self-rated body image to the median/mode rating of the first overweight figure (see instruments). Self-rated body image was correlated at .72 ($p <$ .001) with body mass index (see also Lo et al., 2012), and most participants rated figure six (both the female and male figure) as the first overweight figure (i.e., *Mdn* and *Mode* = 6).[9] Thus, anyone rating himself/herself at six or above was coded as overweight (n = 135). Similarly, 23 participants rated themselves below/at the perception of underweight (*Mdn* and *Mode* = 2), but because of the small n we combined under- and normal weight people into the same weight-group (n = 277). Three participants did not provide the necessary responses for classification.

To test our hypotheses we first modeled all five measures of prejudice involving weight (Likert-scale of prejudice toward underweight and overweight people as well as bipolar preferences for normal- vs. overweight, normal- vs. underweight, underweight- vs. overweight). However, factor analyses revealed two sources of measurement variance (between the mirror Likert scales, and between all the bipolar ratings) that produced poorly fitting models when left unaccounted for (e.g., *RMSEA* $>$ .17, *CFI* $<$ .65). Attempts to model this variance were associated with nonidentification. Thus, to achieve a functioning measurement model, and as our main focus was on biases toward overweight people, we dropped the Likert-ratings of underweight people and the preferences between under- and normal weight people.

Multigroup CFA. As in Studies 2 and 3, we aimed to test the influence of group membership (normal/underweight vs. overweight) on the structure of generalized prejudice. Again, this analysis addressed the question of whether generalized prejudice centers on a devaluation of outgroups or marginalized groups (Q1). Generalized prejudice was modeled as a second-order construct, and at the first level we specified four factors for racism, sexism, sexual prejudice, and prejudice toward overweight people respectively. Prejudice toward overweight people had three indicators (Likert-instrument, preferences normal- vs. overweight and underweight- vs. overweight), whereas the other first-order factors (racism, sexism, sexual prejudice) used mean-score variables as single indicators.[10] This hierarchical model allowed us to put prejudice toward overweight people on par with the other group biases in defining generalized prejudice, while still modeling several weight indices (a nonhierarchical model would instead be dominated by antioverweight prejudice, and the supposed generalized prejudice factor would not be particularly "general"). The loading for overweight people was specified in three different ways, just as the sexism loading was in Studies 2 and 3.

In the baseline model we freely estimated the loading of prejudice toward overweight people in both of the weight groups (normal/underweight vs. overweight). The model had reasonable fit on most indices; scaled $\chi^2(24) = 57.16$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .91, *RMSEA* = .08, 90% CI [.06, .11], *SRMR* = .08, *AIC* = 7703.86, *BIC* = 7824.49. Prejudice toward overweight people had a standardized loading of 0.60 among normal-/underweight partici-

[9] An alternative strategy would be to classify everyone as overweight when their own body image matches or exceeds their *own* perception of overweight (as opposed to the mean, median, or type rating of overweight). In this case, however, distorted body images could bias the results if, for example, anorectic individuals rate themselves as overweight and they also show more antioverweight biases. Nonetheless, similar results were obtained through this kind a division into normal- and overweight.

[10] Model identification was established by fixing the loadings to 1.00 and specifying each error term ($[1 - \alpha]^* s^2$). These parameters were set equal in the two groups. All loadings were kept equal across groups, except the one for prejudice toward overweight people on generalized prejudice.

pants,[11] and 0.36 among overweight individuals (see Figure 2, for full model results see Supplemental Materials, Figure S4a–S4d). Next, we tested the assumption that generalized prejudice is about outgroups, and hence not-indicated by antioverweight prejudice among overweight people (i.e., loading set to 0 for participants in this group). This assumption was associated with a significant deterioration of the model fit, scaled $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 23.82$, $p < .001$. Because the large discrepancy seemed to be mainly associated with the scaling factor (Satorra & Bentler, 2001), we also tested the difference under assumptions of normality (i.e., regular ML). This procedure showed a less dramatic effect, but still a significantly worse fitting model, $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 8.31$, $p = .004$. Indeed, the ingroup-outgroup model was worse than the baseline on all indices; scaled $\chi^2(25) = 65.72$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .90, *RMSEA* = .09, 90% CI [.06, .12], *SRMR* = .10, *AIC* = 7710.16, *BIC* = 7826.77.

In comparison the marginalization model did not impact the fit as much, $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 2.20$, $p = .14$. Under assumptions of normality the difference was significant, $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 4.53$, $p = .03$. More important though, unlike the ingroup-outgroup model the absolute fit of this model was as good as the baseline model, $\chi^2(25) = 59.24$, $p = .001$, *CFI* = .91, *RMSEA* = .08, 90% CI [.06, .11], *SRMR* = .09, *AIC* = 7706.39, *BIC* = 7823.00.

Multigroup SEM. Returning to the baseline CFA solution for prejudice, we subsequently added agreeableness, empathy, openness, and honesty-humility as predictors of generalized prejudice.[12] In the first model, the structural relations between all personality variables and generalized prejudice were free to vary between weight classes. The fit of this model seemed marginally adequate on some indices but somewhat inadequate on other ones; scaled $\chi^2(64) = 161.09$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .88, *RMSEA* = .09, 90% CI [.07, .10] *SRMR* = .08.

Although this fit was suboptimal, we wanted parallel models for prejudice in the CFAs and SEMs, so we refrained from introducing model improvements at this stage. More important, the main hypothesis was not about the absolute fit but rather about the *fit difference* of models with unconstrained versus constrained personality effects in the two weight classes. Indeed we found that a constrained model, that assumed all effects of personality on generalized prejudice to be the same for normal- and overweight participants, closely matched the fit of the original SEM model; scaled $\chi^2(68) = 165.13$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .88, *RMSEA* = .08, 90% CI [.07, .10], *SRMR* = .09. The fit difference was insignificant; scaled $\Delta\chi^2(4) = 4.43$, $p = .35$.



Figure 2. Standardized results from multigroup (normal-/underweight and overweight) confirmatory factor analyses in Study 4. In the presented models the unstandardized loadings were constrained as equal in the two weight classes, except for anti-overweight prejudice.

Openness was the strongest personality predictor of generalized prejudice. The effects of empathy and honesty-humility were weaker than what we found in Study 1. Both effects were nonsignificant among overweight participants, and the honesty-humility effect was also nonsignificant in the better powered (normal weight) subsample. Further, and surprisingly, agreeableness displayed a positive effect on prejudice among normal weight people. However, this should be interpreted with caution as the zero-order relation indicates a suppressor effect, $r = -.10$, $p = .14$. Overall, the personality variables explained 32% ($p < .001$) of the variance in generalized prejudice among normal- and underweight participants, and 19% ($p = .02$) among overweight participants. The effects of personality on generalized prejudice are illustrated in Figure 3 (for full model results see Supplemental Materials, Figure S4e–S4h).

Moderated SEM. In addition to testing the personality effects in a multigroup SEM, we also adopted a test with greater statistical power. Specifically, we examined whether body-image (continuous measure from thin to overweight) interacted with the personality variables in determining generalized prejudice. We modeled interaction effects following the latent approach suggested by Klein and Moosbrugger (2000; see also Muthén & Muthén, 2012). None of the interaction effects were significant ($ps > .44$). For full model specification and results, see Supplemental Materials, Figure S4i).

Discussion

For the most part, this study replicated the findings of Studies 2 and 3 that generally prejudiced individuals who belong to a group of lower power or status tend to be biased toward their own groups. Just like generally prejudiced women devalued their own gender, we found that generally prejudiced overweight people devalued their own weight group (Q1). Specifically, the CFA disclosed a substantial loading of antioverweight prejudice on generalized prejudice, and this was true in both of the examined weight categories of participants. Although it was lower among overweight people it was nonetheless considerable. Also, the robust $\Delta\chi^2$ test (as recommended over conventional ones when there are missing data and/or much skew, see Yuan & Bentler, 2000) indicated a nonsignificant impact of assuming an equal loading for normal- and overweight participants. Most importantly, regardless what statistical test we looked at, the alternative theoretical model

[11] Excluding underweight people ($n = 14$) had no substantial impact on this estimate; for normal weight participants the standardized loading was 0.58.

[12] For each personality characteristic we specified a latent construct using the mean score variable as a single indicator. Model identification was established by specifying each error term ($[1 - \alpha]^* s^2$), and this was set equal in the two groups. Noteworthy, this would impose some degree of measurement invariance across the two groups, and correct for reliability attenuation, while limiting free parameters.



Figure 3. Structural equation models showing standardized effects of personality on generalized prejudice for normal-/underweight and overweight people in Study 4. Solid lines indicate significant relations ($p < .05$).

of generalized prejudice, stressing status, fit the empirical data better than a model based on ingroup-outgroup dynamics.

As for the relation with personality, the findings were theoretically murky in terms of the individual coefficients, but clearer in terms of the overall pattern. The effects of openness were robust, but for empathy and honesty–humility they were weak at best and absent at worst, and finally there was an unintuitive suppressor effect for agreeableness. In terms of the specific effects, more data would be needed to tell what reflects true relations versus what is just random variation. From a bird's eye view, however, the variation across weight categories had a minor influence for understanding the fit of the different models (as evident from the constrained model results). In other words, to understand how personality influences prejudice a person's own group membership seems to be a secondary concern (Q2), just as it was in Studies 1 and 3.

Study 5

In Study 1 we compared generalized prejudice to experimentally "pure" ingroup biases, and in Studies 2, 3, and 4 we examined whether generalized prejudice would extend to biases toward low status *ingroups*. In this study we introduced two additional ways to examine the nature of generalized prejudice (Q1). The first was to examine a multitude of ingroup biases toward targets that vary in status. For that purpose, we contrasted evaluations of the participants own country (Sweden) with people from eight other countries, hypothesized to fall into a high (e.g., Luxembourg) or low status cluster (e.g., Haiti). More importantly, we also asked participants to compare people from their own neighborhood with people from other neighborhoods of high or low status. This allowed us to better control for spatial proximity and other differences between the high and low status targets. In sum, all four of these measures had the ingroup-outgroup distinction in common, but two of them involved low status comparisons while the other two involved high status ones.

We used these four measures to test a model assuming that generalized prejudice is about devaluating low status or power targets, rather than biases based on group membership. Specifically, we modeled a "standard" generalized prejudice factor based on evaluations of immigrants, women and overweight people, and all country and neighborhood evaluations were included as indicators of an ingroup bias factor. However, the critical part of the model concerned the treatment of the ingroup biases toward low status countries and low status neighborhoods. These measures included the ingroup-outgroup distinction, but also devaluation of low status groups that we hypothesized to be characteristic of generalized prejudice. Thus, we took advantage of the fact that manifest variables can be specified as double-loading in a CFA or SEM analysis, and we modeled loadings of these groups on the generalized prejudice factor as well. Thus, while low status and group outgroup features were confounded on the measurement level, we could nonetheless model "pure" status and group membership constructs on the latent level.

The second way in which we addressed the nature of prejudice was by asking two questions: What can we infer from people showing preferences for one outgroup over another outgroup? And more importantly, can preferences between two outgroups be indicative of generalized prejudice? Unlike the ingroup–outgroup perspective on generalized prejudice, we hypothesized that it can, especially if one group is high in status and the other one is low in status. Thus, in addition to asking how much people preferred people from their own neighborhood over "outsiders," we asked how much the preferred people from rich neighborhoods compared to people from poor neighborhoods. In other words, such questions would strip away ingroup-outgroup dynamics. Instead, the participants' answers should reflect rather pure status biases. In extension, if this measure loaded on generalized prejudice, it would (further) corroborate the argument that generalized prejudice is about status and power differences between groups in a society, and not ingroup-outgroup distinctions per se (Q1). Lastly, we hypothesized that personality would predict the generalized prejudice factor, but not the ingroup bias factor (Q2).

Method

Participants. Two hundred forty-nine Swedish participants (60% women) took part in this online study, most of whom were (nonpsychology) students. The median age was 24 years (*SD* =

8.38). Participants were rewarded with a cinema voucher and a snack coupon (~$13). Participants who lived in any of the target neighborhoods, or who came from (/having at least one parent from) any of the target countries, were excluded ($n = 12$). Participants who had previously done studies on prejudice were also excluded ($n = 9$).[13] Using these exclusion criteria, and accounting for missing data, the analyzed sample included 223 participants.

Instruments. The study was conducted as an online survey. First participants completed the 100-item HEXACO-PI-R (Ashton & Lee, 2008). We analyzed data for agreeableness ($\alpha = .86$), altruism ($\alpha = .62$), openness ($\alpha = .80$), and honesty-humility ($\alpha = .83$), the remaining factors were included for a psychometric analysis of the Swedish translation of the instrument. To avoid content overlap between the independent and dependent variables we removed two openness items specifically asking about geography and different countries.

Participants were subsequently asked to evaluate people from different neighborhoods. We chose three of the most prestigious neighborhoods in Stockholm as high status targets (Lidingö, Djursholm, and Östermalm), and three stigmatized neighborhoods as low status targets (Rinkeby, Tensta, and Fittja). We contrasted these neighborhoods with participants' own, by asking two questions: "Which neighborhood would you prefer to meet people from?" and "which neighborhood do you think has more nice people?" Answers were given on a 10-point scale, with "own neighborhood" anchored at one end and the outgroup neighborhood at the other end. Positions of the ingroup and outgroup to the left and right were balanced across trials. After assessing these ingroup biases in relation to neighborhoods, we also asked about the contrast between the high and low status neighborhoods (i.e., no evaluation of one's own group involved). The measures are presented in the Supplemental materials (Table S5a–S5b).

Next, participants completed prejudice scales targeting ethnic minorities ($\alpha = .90$, Akrami et al., 2000), women ($\alpha = .85$, Ekehammar et al., 2000), and overweight people ($\alpha = .83$, Bergh, 2013). This was followed by assessing ingroup biases comparing Swedes to people from other countries. More specifically, we asked about people from France, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Japan to assess biases toward rich countries (high status). In contrast, we used the Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, and Syria[14] represent less affluent countries (low status). These questions had the same format as the neighborhood ratings (but with the word "neighborhood" replaced with "country"). Finally, we asked about participants' absolute positivity/negativity toward people from the different countries and neighborhoods. Specifically, for each country and neighborhood we asked "In general, are you positive to meet people from the following country [/neighborhood]?" ranging from 1 (*absolutely not*) to 7 (*absolutely*). All responses were reversed to assess outgroup negativity.

After examining the factor structure of the country and neighborhood evaluations (see preliminary results below), we created four mean indices of ingroup biases: biases toward high status neighborhoods ($\alpha = .88$), low status neighborhoods ($\alpha = .93$), high status countries ($\alpha = .76$), and low status countries ($\alpha = .92$). In addition we created an index based on contrasts for people from high versus low status neighborhoods (i.e., evaluations of two outgroups). This was based on the mean of all nine pairwise comparisons of the three high and three low status areas ($\alpha = .98$). In the last part of the study we asked about the perceived status and wealth of the neighborhoods and countries. We also assessed factual knowledge about the different countries to make sure that familiarity would not account for differential biases across the high and low status targets (for details, see Supplemental materials, p. 27).

Results

Preliminary results. Preliminary analyses focused on testing if the ingroup biases toward other countries and neighborhoods would reveal four factors (biases toward people from high status neighborhoods [3 items], low status neighborhoods [3 items], high status countries [4 items], and low status countries [4 items]). Indeed, a four-factor CFA had good fit; scaled $\chi^2(71) = 125.81$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .95$, $RMSEA = .06$, 90% CI [.04, .08], $SRMR = .06$. Thus, we created four scales by averaging the biases toward high status neighborhoods, low status neighborhoods, high status countries, and low status countries respectively.

Next we ran an identical four-factor CFA but with the biases measures replaced with the absolute positivity/negativity ratings. This model had good fit as well; scaled $\chi^2(71) = 114.24$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .97$, $RMSEA = .05$, 90% CI [.03, .07], $SRMR = .04$. Thus, we created four additional scales by averaging the negativity toward high status neighborhoods, low status neighborhoods, high status countries, and low status countries respectively.

Finally, and as expected, participants perceived the high status countries to be far wealthier than the low status ones, $t(222) = 50.15$, $p < .001$, $d = 3.36$. They also considered the high status neighborhoods to be wealthier than the low status ones, $t(222)$ 47.45, $p < .001$, $d = 3.18$. Finally, there were no systematic patterns suggesting that differential familiarity with high versus low status countries was related to status ratings or biases ($rs \leq .20$, for details see Supplemental materials, p. 27).

CFA. In this analysis we modeled two prejudice factors. The first is henceforth referred to as the generalized prejudice factor and the second as the ingroup bias factor. Ratings of ethnic minorities, women and overweight people were indicators of generalized prejudice, and all ingroup biases toward other countries and neighborhood were modeled as indicators of

[13] This exclusion criteria applied to all Swedish studies to avoid resampling of the same participants in multiple studies (applying the same criteria to the US [MTurk] samples would be untenable). In the lab sessions, taking place in Sweden, the screening for previous study participation would occur before the studies had been initiated, and they would not have to be excluded afterward (as in this online study).

[14] These countries were chosen based on a study of ours in the United States (currently unpublished). In that study we validated the bipolar preference measures for contrasts of different countries, and we also established the status difference between these two clusters (France, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Japan vs. Republic of Congo, Haiti, Kosovo, and Syria). Thus, rather than initiating a new validation process in Sweden, we adopted the same set of countries. The initial introduction of the measures, including the use of Syria as a target, was done in the spring of 2014, before Western media began extensive coverage on the rise of the Islamic State, and long before the refugee crisis in Europe.

the ingroup bias factor.[15] More important, as previously described, we assumed double-loadings for ingroup biases toward low status countries and low status neighborhoods. Finally, the "pure" status measure, with biases between high and low status neighborhoods, was added as an indicator of generalized prejudice (see study introduction for rationales).

After adding four residual correlations the described model had good fit; scaled $\chi^2(16) = 25.71$, $p = .01$, $CFI = .98$, $RMSEA = .05$, 90% CI [.00, .09], $SRMR = .08$. All correlated residuals were readily interpreted as method variance not accounted for by the factors, such as between modern racism and modern sexism (see Supplemental materials, Figure S5a). All loadings were significant. Most important, the results provided good evidence that the generalized prejudice factor was defined by biases driven by status and power differentials across groups. Specifically, the measure involving a status differential but no ingroup bias (high vs. low status neighborhoods) was a marker item for generalized prejudice (standardized $\lambda = .70$).

SEM. To examine the effects of personality on generalized prejudice and ingroup biases we extended the CFA model into a SEM model with agreeableness, altruism, honesty–humility, and openness as manifest predictor variables. We chose to model the personality predictors as manifest variables because of multicollinearity problems with altruism in a fully latent model (for full model specification see Supplemental materials, Figure S5b). The model had a marginally acceptable fit; scaled $\chi^2(40) = 95.64$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .92$, $RMSEA = .08$, 90% CI [.06, .10], $SRMR = .08$. All personality variables except Agreeableness predicted the factor centering on status (i.e., generalized prejudice) and the overall explained variance was 43% ($p < .001$). In contrast, only Openness predicted ingroup biases, and overall the personality variables explained a much smaller and nonsignificant portion of the variance (11%, $p = .22$). All standardized structural relations are presented in Figure 4.

Complementary analyses—Absolute outgroup negativity. We also tested models in which we replaced the ingroup bias factor as described above with an absolute outgroup negativity factor (as based on negativity toward high status neighborhoods [3 items], low status neighborhoods [3 items], high status countries [4 items], and low status countries respectively [4 items]). Generalized prejudice was modeled as before (with the exception of preferences between high vs. low neighborhoods), and low status neighborhoods and countries were again modeled as double-loading on the two latent factors (see model description above). To account for method variance we added residual correlations between the neighborhood measures, specifically between low status neighborhoods and high status countries, and between modern racism and modern sexism. This CFA showed adequate fit; scaled $\chi^2(11) = 25.31$, $p = .008$, $CFI = .97$, $RMSEA = .08$, 90% CI [.04, .12], $SRMR = .07$. Low status neighborhoods and countries loaded significantly on both factors.

Having established the measurement model, we ran a SEM with all the personality variables as (manifest) predictors, as in the analyses under the previous heading. The fit was reasonably good; scaled $\chi^2(31) = 69.95$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .94$, $RMSEA = .08$, 90% CI [.05, .10], $SRMR = .06$ (for full model specifications of both CFA and SEM see Supplemental materials, Figure S5c—S5d). In this model, the personality variables explained 43% ($p < .001$) of the variance in generalized prejudice, and 17% ($p = .002$) in outgroup negativity. The individual coefficients were similar as in the main SEM analyses, except in this case we found a negative relation between altruism/empathy and outgroup negativity, $\beta = .32$, $p < .001$. That is, empathic people were more positive to meet people from different neighborhoods and countries, but otherwise the results were similar to the model focusing on ingroup biases.



Figure 4. Standardized structural relations between personality and a generalized prejudice factor based on status and power differentials across groups, and a factor based on ingroup biases in Study 5. Solid lines indicate significant relations ($p < .05$).

Discussion

This study provided a clear demonstration that personality strongly predicts biases against low status or power groups, but much less so when the biases are based on group membership (Q2). Openness did predict ingroup biases, but overall it seems that most of the explanatory power of personality for understanding prejudice has to do with status and power. Also, the findings that altruism/empathy predicted absolute outgroup negativity is readily interpreted as a reflection of general warmth and it may not say much about intergroup biases, as indicated by the main analyses. Also important is the fact that a measure with no ingroup-outgroup dynamic, yet involving a clear power and status differential, fit well into a generalized prejudice factor. Preferences for affluent over nonaffluent people were clearly indicative of the prejudiced mindset that personality predicts. This suggests that generalized prejudice is more about devaluing marginalized groups, as compared with looking down on outgroups (Q1).

[15] The loadings of the different ingroup biases were constrained to equality to prevent either high or low status targets dominating the defining features of the factor. This was important for a subsequent SEM analysis using this measurement model, because the personality effect could otherwise be (too) strongly influenced by the low or high status targets. Put differently, this constraint allowed us to examine the question whether a theoretically "pure" ingroup bias factor, while removing the influence of status, would be predicted by personality. Introducing this constraint we also set the variances of the latent factors to 1.00, as opposed to fixing the first loading to 1.00. A model with free loadings and no correlated residuals (necessary for identification in this case) had poor fit, but provided results consistent with the main analyses.

Study 6

In this study we tested the hypothesis that personality predicts devaluation of low status ethnic groups within a society, as opposed to high status ones. We did so in a national probability sample in New Zealand. Here we examined biases among two ethnic groups differing in social power and status: European New Zealanders (the majority group) and Māori (the indigenous group in New Zealand). European New Zealanders enjoy the highest status and power relative to the other ethnic groups in New Zealand across many status-relevant domains (Sibley, Stewart, et al., 2011). Given this status difference, we hypothesized that personality would predict biases among European New Zealanders toward all ethnic minorities (Māori, Asians, and Pacific Islanders). More important, we reasoned that if generalized prejudice is simply a broad-spectrum ingroup bias then Māori should show a similar pattern and not differentiate between Europeans, Asians and Pacific Islanders. Also, if prejudiced personalities were simply anti outgroup, then the personality effects should be the same for all of these targets. However, if prejudiced personalities are rather sensitive to status and power differentials, then personality should predict Māori biases toward Asians, and Pacific Islanders, but not toward European New Zealanders. That is, we expected the biases of Māori to mirror those of European New Zealanders when evaluating new immigrant groups, but not when evaluating a group at the top of the social hierarchy (i.e., European New Zealanders). In other words, the critical test (addressing Q2) was whether or not the personality of Māori participants would predict biases toward European New Zealanders.

Method

Participants. We analyzed data from the second wave of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS-2010). The New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study was initiated in 2009 based on a random sample from the New Zealand electoral roll. Although providing a smaller sample, the second wave was used because it included additional ratings of ethnic groups compared to the first wave. We limited the analyses to participants who were either European New Zealanders or Māori. If the participant had not completed both ratings for each ethnic group evaluated, then their prejudice score was coded as missing. This left us with 3,347 European New Zealanders and 690 Māori. Fuller technical details about the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study, such as sample details and items included in each wave, are described in papers by Sibley (2014) and Sibley and Greaves (2014).

Instruments and procedure. There were two items available to assess biases between ethnic groups (European New Zealanders, Māori, Asians, and Pacific Islanders).[16] The first was a feeling thermometer asking how warm participants felt toward each group, ranging from 1 (*feel least warm toward this group*) to 7 (*feel most warm toward this group*). The second item asked about anger toward the same groups, responses ranging from 1 (*feel no anger toward this group*) to 7 (*feel anger toward this group*). Consequently, we had one positive and one negative evaluation, and we reversed the anger items to arrive at mean positivity rating of each group. We then created three indices of evaluative biases for European New Zealanders by subtracting the ratings of Māori, Asians, and Pacific Islanders from the ingroup rating. Finally, we did the same for Māori, subtracting ratings for European New Zealanders, Asians, and Pacific Islanders from the ingroup rating. Consequently, higher scores on the final instrument indicate more favorable evaluations of the ingroup compared with outgroups for European New Zealanders and Māori respectively.

As personality predictors, we used very brief scales (see Sibley, Luyten, et al., 2011) with four items each for agreeableness (α = .69), openness (α = .67) and honesty-humility (α = .79). Like the prejudice items, participants responded to the personality statements on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (*very inaccurate*) to 7 (*very accurate*).

Results

To test our hypothesis we ran two SEM models for European New Zealanders and Māori respectively. Noteworthy, the manifest dependent variables were conceptually identical for these groups (ingroup ratings minus outgroup ratings), but they were naturally statistically different (e.g., warmth European New Zealanders—Asians ≠ warmth Māori—Asians). For that reason we ran two separate models rather than a single multigroup analysis.[17] For European New Zealanders a generalized prejudice factor was specified with biases toward all three ethnic minorities as indicators. For Māori a latent factor was specified with the two recent immigrant groups as indicators (Asians and Pacific Islanders), and the loading for these were constrained to equality for model identification. In addition, biases toward Europeans served as a second (manifest) dependent variable, and this was correlated with the immigrant factor.[18] Finally, for both European New Zealanders and Māori relations were modeled between the three personality constructs and the prejudice outcomes (see Figure 5).

The model fit the data well among European New Zealanders; scaled $\chi^2(6) = 30.47$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .99, *RMSEA* = .04, 90% CI [.02, .05], *SRMR* = .01, and it fit adequately on most indices among Māori, scaled $\chi^2(4) = 24.26$, $p = .32$, *CFI* = .96, *RMSEA* = .09, 90% CI [.06, .12], *SRMR* = .03. Generalized prejudice was predicted by openness and honesty-humility, but not agreeableness, among European New Zealanders. The explained variance in generalized prejudice was 8%, $p < .001$. More importantly, for Māori the effects of personality were similar in relation to new immigrant groups. Honesty–humility was slightly less predictive among Māori, and agreeableness displayed a marginally higher relation, but the pattern was exactly the same. The explained variance in biases toward new immigrants was 6%, $p = .02$. In contrast, Māori biases toward Europeans were not predicted by any of the personality variables, $R^2 = .01$, $p = .41$. All relations

[16] There are other target groups available in the dataset, but they either represent a superordinate category to most other groups (immigrants), or subgroups (Chinese and Indians, as nested in Asians), or lacking a contrast group to create an index of bias (overweight people).

[17] We modeled latent personality constructs as in Study 4 using the mean score variables and fixing the error terms ($[1 - \alpha]^* s^2$). Again, these parameters were fixed to the same values in the two groups.

[18] Because there was only one group to represent antimajority biases (Europeans), we could not model a conventional latent factor, and thus correct for attenuation. However, to check the robustness of the findings with a correction for attenuation, we also tested a model at the item level (i.e., separate biases for the anger and warmth ratings). Results were consistent with those from the main analyses (see Supplemental materials, p. 35 for details).

Figure 5. Standardized effects of personality on prejudice for European New Zealanders and Māori in Study 6. Solid lines indicate significant relations ($p < .05$).

are presented in Figure 5 (for full model results see Supplemental Materials, Figure S6a–S6b).

Finally we tested a model among Māori in which the personality relations with attitudes toward ethnic minorities were set equal to the personality relations with attitudes toward European New Zealanders. Introducing these constraints the model fit became significantly poorer, scaled $\Delta\chi^2(3) = 8.52$, $p = .04$. This indicates that overall there are different personality psychologies behind antimajority and antiminority sentiments.

Discussion

Overall, the pattern of personality effects turned out as predicted—Māori biases toward newer immigrants mirrored those of European New Zealanders in relation to all ethnic minorities, but Māori biases toward Europeans were not predicted by personality. Like the results from Study 5, this suggests that personality mainly predicts prejudice toward the "easy" targets in a societal hierarchy, but not against those at the top (Q2).

It was surprising to note that agreeableness, once more, did not predict any biases. However, this is a consistent finding in the Sweden and New Zealand samples when we have been using HEXACO measures. Noteworthy, factor analyses have shown that the introduction of honesty-humility changes the meaning of the Agreeableness factor in HEXACO as compared to the Big Five. More specifically, characteristics such as sympathy, softheartedness, and generosity no longer load on Agreeableness in the six-dimensional model (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Critically, these are precisely the kind of aspects of the factor that are known to be most predictive when using NEO-PI-R (Ekehammar & Akrami, 2007). Thus, it seems like Agreeableness no longer predicts prejudice once these aspects are considered in particular.

In this study the explained variance was low overall compared to all the other studies. This could be due to brevity of the measures. All the personality and prejudice measures were based on as little as two or four items. We used latent variables where we could to counteract reliability deficits, but it is quite possible that we still suffered from not having more nuanced scales. As noted above, it is known that some aspects of the factors are more predictive of prejudice than others (Ekehammar & Akrami, 2007). Thus, without the most prejudice-relevant elements represented in the instruments, lower explanatory power is to be expected.

Study 7

Related to the role of ingroup-outgroup dynamics in prejudice is the idea that people are biased against dissimilar others (e.g., Rokeach, 1960). Indeed, group identification processes are typically argued to start from a division of people according to perceived similarities (among "us") versus differences (as compared to "them"; see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Still, aversion toward dissimilar others could also target ingroup members, and this introduces an alternative interpretation to our findings. Especially when dissimilarity is defined in ideological terms, or as conflicting values, there are reasons to expect that intolerance toward immigrants shares a common psychology with, for example, anti-Gay sentiments (e.g., Brandt, Chambers, Crawford, Wetherell, & Reyna, 2015; Chambers et al., 2013; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Crawford, 2014). Still, it remains an unanswered question whether generalized prejudice could be conceptualized as generic intolerance toward people with dissimilar values, and more specifically dissimilar compared to conservative political values. The question remains unanswered because of confound issues in generalized prejudice studies (see introduction), and a neglect of that common variance in studies on value conflicts.

In this study we aimed to test our perspective on generalized prejudice, as based on status and power, as contrasted with a value conflict alternative. A key prediction from the latter perspective is the existence of symmetrical biases against groups (stereotypically) associated with the "other side" of the political spectrum (Chambers et al., 2013). In terms of generalized prejudice this would lead to an expectation of a mirror antiestablishment prejudice factor against powerful and high status groups. In that case the status and power dimension would simply be a confounding factor to the role of divergent values. However, an extensive literature suggests that power and status differentials produce an asymmetric scope of prejudice against groups at the top versus at the bottom of a societal hierarchy (e.g., Jost et al., 2004; Nosek et al., 2002; Pratto et al., 2006). This is also true in situations where group values cannot be inferred (Mullen et al., 1992). Here we suggest that prejudice is not only asymmetric in scope, but also in *coherence* (i.e., the extent to which individual differences are systematic). Importantly, this is not to predict that intolerance against conservative values and associated groups is nonexisting, but rather that it should be comparably disjointed.

Testing this reasoning we examined prejudice in relation to 18 high and low status corporeal, vocational/occupational and ethnic groups. We chose high and low status vocational groups that would also be value-laden and associated with different sociopolitical ideals (e.g., military officers vs. Greenpeace canvassers). The ethnic groups were also chosen to allow for value-stereotyping and divergent political sympathies (e.g., Scottish Americans vs. Colombian Americans). In vivid contrast, however, we also focused on high and low status corporeal groups that should be value neutral, and dissociated from political standpoints (e.g., attractive vs. unattractive people). Using such groups we could make a number of predictions about the clustering of prejudice based on values versus status. First, from a value dissimilarity perspective there is no reason to expect biases in favor of high status corporeal groups as compared to low status ones (because they should both be value-neutral). Second and more importantly, from this perspective there is no reason to anticipate an association between biases toward low status corporeal groups and low status value-laden groups (vocational and ethnic). However, such communalities are precisely what to expect if generalized prejudice is shaped by status and power differentials, as we suggest. In extension we expected to find a coherent pattern of attitudes and biases against low status groups (generalized prejudice), but dispersed attitudes in relation to the high status targets (Q1). Finally, we expected personality to be more predictive of a conventional generalized prejudice factor than any mirror counterpart (Q2).

Method

Participants. Four hundred forty-eight participants took part in the study on Amazon Mechanical Turk. The invitation was open to Americans only. Participants were excluded if they failed to pass three attention checks (e.g., "to monitor quality, please respond with a seven for this item"). This left us with 419 respondents for the analyses. The median age was 33 years (SD = 11.14), 54% were women. 80% identified as White, 5% as Asian, 6% as Black, 4% as Latino, 1% as Native American, and the remaining 4% as mixed/pacific islander/other/no reply. On a 7-point scale for political identification 55% gave responses on the liberal side (question based on the same format as in the American National Election Studies; see also Brandt et al., 2015). Participants received $2.00 for completing the survey.

Instruments. In the first part of the study, we introduced the openness (α = .86), and honesty-humility (α = .86) items from the HEXACO 100-item inventory (Ashton & Lee, 2008). We also included the same empathy and altruism items as in Study 4 (α = .80). We did not include agreeableness here, as the HEXACO instruments seem to render it unrelated to prejudice (see results from Study 4–6).

Part two of the survey focused on assessing prejudice. As noted, we examined evaluations for six occupational/vocational groups (*high-status*: CEOs, corporate lawyers, & military officers; *low-status*: Wall Street protesters, human-rights workers, & Greenpeace canvassers), six ethnic groups (*high-status*: Dutch Americans, Scottish Americans, & Swiss Americans; *low-status*: Colombian Americans, Filipino Americans, & Nigerian Americans), and six corporeal groups (*high-status*: very tall, athletic, & attractive people; *low-status*: very short, overweight, & unattractive people).

We assessed prejudice in two formats. First, we used a relative preference measure for pairwise contrasts of the groups (see also Study 4–5). In the vocational and ethnic domain we posed the question of "Which group do you like more?" for all pairwise contrasts of high and low status groups (e.g., Dutch Americans vs. Filipino Americans). Thus, the vocational and ethnic domains included 9 ratings each (α = .94 and .95). For the corporeal groups we asked the same question but we limited the contrasts to those involving opposites on the same dimension (e.g., attractive vs. unattractive people; α = .61 [3 items]). High and low status groups were presented in a counterbalanced order on the left and right hand side.

As our second prejudice assessment, we used two social distance items as adapted from Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005). Specifically, for each of the 18 groups we asked "how willing or unwilling would you be to have someone who is a [. . .] to marry into your family?" and "how unwilling or willing would you be to have someone who is [. . .] as a close personal friend?" For each target, we aggregated these two questions into a mean-score of social distance (αs > .68). To reduce method variance when the examined cross-domain communalities, we switched the position of "willing" and "unwilling" between the blocks for corporeal versus vocational and ethnic groups. The prejudice instruments are presented in their entirety in the Supplemental materials (Table S7a–S7b).

Finally, we asked participants to rate the perceived status and belief dissimilarity for each of the 18 groups. As for value and belief differences we used the following statement (see also Brandt et al., 2015): "Indicate the extent to which you think that [. . .] have similar or different values or beliefs than yourself" (1 = *very similar . . .* , 4 = *neither similar nor different . . .* , 7 = *very different*). To assess perceived status we asked participants to consider the following statement: "Indicate the extent to which you think that [. . .] have low or high status in society" (from 1 = *lowest possible status*, to 7 = *highest possible status*). The last part of the study included demographic questions about, for example, political identity.

Results

Preliminary results. From the perspective that generalized prejudice centers on status and power dynamics, we first examined the status perceptions for our corporeal, occupational and ethnic groups. As expected, the mean status rating for athletic, tall and attractive people was clearly higher than the mean status rating for overweight, short and unattractive people, $t(409) = 37.01$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.83$. The same was true for CEOs, corporate lawyers, and military officers in comparison to Wall Street protesters, human-rights workers, and Greenpeace canvassers, $t(409) = 39.52$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.97$, as well as Dutch-, Scottish- and Swiss Americans in comparison to Colombian-, Filipino- and Nigerian Americans, $t(409) = 22.81$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.13$.

Having established the status differences, we next examined whether participants considered some groups to be more dissimilar than others. Indeed, there were differences in the occupational and ethnic domains, $t(409) = 8.34$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.41$, and $t(409) = -10.15$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.50$. That is, participants considered themselves to diverge more from the high status occupations in their values, and more from the low status ethnicities.

More importantly, participants found themselves to be equally similar to the corporeal groups in terms of values and beliefs, $t(409) = -0.10$, $p = .92$, $d = -0.005$.

CFA and SEM for bias measures. Preferential liking of high status vocational, ethnic, and corporeal groups should go hand in hand from a status perspective of generalized prejudice (operationalized through bias measures; see also Study 5). However, that should not be the case if group biases were based on dissimilarity because the corporeal groups were not differentiated on those grounds (see preliminary results). To test these propositions we ran a CFA with factors for preferences between high and low status groups within each domain: Corporeal attributes, vocations, and ethnicity. Each of these domain factors was subsequently modeled as loading on a superordinate bias factor (generalized prejudice).

To achieve adequate model fit we added a number of correlated residuals. These involved ratings where one group reoccurred in different contrasts (e.g., military officers vs. Greenpeace canvassers and military officers vs. human-right activists, for details see Supplemental materials, Figure S7a). The fit of the final model was as follows: Scaled $\chi^2(172) = 555.93$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .91, *RMSEA* = .07, 90% CI [.07, .08], *SRMR* = .05). More importantly, all loadings were significant and the second-order ones were substantial (standardized $\lambda = 0.59$, 0.48, and 0.48 for the corporeal, vocational, and ethnic factors respectively, ps $< .001$). To avoid overfitting we also tested a simpler model based on mean aggregates of biases within each domain. The results were consistent; the corporeal, vocational, and ethnic biases all loaded on a generalized prejudice factor (standardized $\lambda = 0.47$, 0.47, and 0.52, respectively, ps $< .001$).

Next we extended the item-level model into a SEM with personality predictors of the second-order factor. As in Study 4, altruism/empathy, honesty-humility, and openness were modeled as factors with a single indicator and fixed error variances to limit free parameters. With the addition of personality variables the fit remained adequate, scaled $\chi^2(232) = 672.55$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .91, *RMSEA* = .07, 90% CI [.06, .07], *SRMR* = .05. Together the personality variables explained 31% ($p < .001$) of the variance in generalized biases against low status groups. Altruism was unrelated to this factor, whereas both honesty–humility and openness displayed rather strong relations ($\beta = -0.44$ and -0.28, respectively, ps $< .001$). The absence of an altruism effect seemed to be due to it competing for the same prejudice variance as honesty-humility and openness. Specifically, when empathy was entered as sole predictor, a (zero-order) relation was evident ($\beta = -0.37$, $p < .001$). Both the CFA and SEM results are presented in their entirety in the Supplemental materials (Figure S7b–S7c).

CFA social distance. To examine the existence (or nonexistence) of a mirror antiestablishment factor, as compared to conventional generalized prejudice, it was necessary to use absolute prejudice measures rather than relative (bias) assessments. The social distance ratings fulfilled this requirement, and they formed the basis of our main analyses. Specifically, to test our hypotheses, while setting aside the domain-specific and method variance, we used a bifactor model for these measures.[19] We specified one factor for each domain (physical attributes, vocations, and ethnicity) and orthogonal factors based on status. Specifically, we modeled social distance toward all low status groups as loading on one factor and all high status groups on a second factor.

This model had adequate fit, scaled $\chi^2(113) = 435.70$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .92, *RMSEA* = .08, 90% CI [.08, .09], *SRMR* = .06. More importantly, all low status groups loaded significantly on the low status factor (in line with generalized prejudice findings; median standardized $\lambda = .43$). In contrast, the high status factor was not coherent and two thirds of the loadings were quite low (median standardized $\lambda = .15$). The ethnic groups were the only ones showing substantial loadings on the high status factor. All standardized loadings are presented in Figure 6 (for more details see Supplemental materials, Figure S7d).

SEM social distance. This analysis extended the bifactor CFA model for the social distance ratings to also include personality predictors (see also previous heading and Study 4). Like the CFA counterpart this model had adequate fit, scaled $\chi^2(161) = 569.90$, $p < .001$, *CFI* = .92, *RMSEA* = .08, 90% CI [.07, .09], *SRMR* = .08. Together the personality variables explained 24% of the variance in prejudice toward low status groups ($p < .001$), as compared with 4% ($p = .11$) for the high status targets. Also, constraining the personality paths to equality (for each trait in relation to the high and low status factors) deteriorated the fit, scaled, $\Delta\chi^2(3) = 46.19$, $p < .001$.

In terms of the individual coefficients, the relation between honesty-humility and prejudice against low status targets was the only significant one ($\beta = -0.39$, $p < .001$). All standardized coefficients are presented in the Supplemental materials (see Figure S7e). Still, behind the nonsignificant unique effects, the zero-order relations provided additional insights. Specifically, when the personality variables were examined one at the time, they all predicted prejudice toward low status groups (βs $= -0.36$, -0.47, -0.19, ps $<$ .01, for empathy, honesty-humility, and openness). For high status targets there was a significant, albeit weaker, relationship with empathy ($\beta = -0.18$, $p = .01$), an openness effect on par with the effect for low status targets ($\beta = -0.17$, $p = .03$). There was no significant relation with honesty-humility ($\beta = -0.12$, $p = .07$).

Discussion

In this study we compared the role of status and power in generalized prejudice with the role of ideological value differences (a politically construed "us" and "them"; Brandt et al., 2015). To tease these perspectives apart we examined attitudes against value-laden groups of high or low status, but also value-neutral groups differing in status. The results disclosed that biases against low status vocational and ethnic groups (value-laden) do not diverge from biases against low status corporeal groups (value neutral). That is, to understand why there is a general pattern of preferences for some groups over others it is critical to consider their relative status, but *not* necessarily the ideological values they might be associated with. Also, this generic devaluation of low status groups was (once again) strongly predicted by basic personality differences (with an explained variance of 30%).

[19] This type of model was chosen to sidestep the influence of response sets. Specifically, bipolar preference ratings are by definition free of variance for liking or disliking *anything*, but it is certainly possible to desire social distance to anyone, *regardless of status or values*. That is, the correlations between domains, with absolute measures, are expected to be boosted by method variance, and bifactor models help to set this irrelevant variance aside.



Figure 6. Standardized loadings for the bifactor model of social distance prejudice in Study 7. Solid lines indicate significant relations ($p < .05$).

When we examined prejudice against low and high status groups separately (operationalized as social distance), we found a clearly coherent factor in the former case but not the latter. Further, although there was only one unique personality effect in this study, the overall predictability was in line with the hypothesis. Specifically, low status generalized prejudice was strongly predicted by personality but the mirror factor was not (24 vs. 4% explained variance). Taken together, this suggests that low status binds together different prejudices and creates generalized biases, and these sentiments have personality signatures. In contrast, prejudice against high status targets cannot be traced to a coherent underlying factor, and these attitudes are not as strongly influenced by personality differences.

Finally, the personality trait most clearly associated with prejudice against high status groups was openness. As such, this study aligns with Studies 1 and 5 in showing a particular link between low openness and a generic desire to maintain social distance to outgroups and dissimilar others. Indeed, if there was one personality variable that should be associated with dislike of the unfamiliar, then it should be openness (Flynn, 2005). On the other hand, this seems to be the exception that proves the rule that personality is unrelated to ingroup-outgroup dynamics. As previously noted these effects seem to account for a couple of percent of the variance in ingroup biases, as compared with the 25% to 50% that personality accounts for in prejudice against low status/power groups (see results from Studies 1, 4, 5, & 7). This pattern is also of interest for the debate about political intolerance and how that is linked to openness (Brandt et al., 2015). More specifically, this suggests that findings on openness and symmetric political intolerance among liberals and conservatives do not necessarily apply to conclusions about personality and prejudice more broadly.

General Discussion

We opened this paper with the observation that the distinction between ingroups and outgroups has been, and continues to be, a fundamental premise in explaining prejudice (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Amodio, 2014; Brown, 2010; Christ et al., 2014; Cikara, Bruneau, Van Bavel, & Saxe, 2014; Gray et al., 2014; Mackie & Smith, 2015; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, rather than trying to extend the ingroup–outgroup framework further, we went back to basics and asked about its necessity. Specifically, we asked how important it is for understanding why individual differences in prejudice are systematic across targets. As further noted in the introduction, this is an aspect of variance that has traditionally received little attention in the

social psychological literature, but all the more in personality research.

The findings of this inquiry suggest that generalized prejudice does not primarily center on an "us" versus "them" mentality, but rather a psychology related to status and power. As such we challenge the ingrained belief that some individuals, more than others, are "anti any outgroup" (see Allport, 1954, see also the Appendix). More broadly, what generalized prejudice represents is relevant because it tells us something about the essence of prejudice. Indeed, it is a commonplace phenomenon (e.g., Cantal, Milfont, Wilson, & Gouveia, 2015; McFarland et al., 1993), practically universal in the Western world (Meeusen & Kern, 2016), and it can account for more than half of the individual differences in different prejudices (Bergh et al., 2012a). Thus, as far as this portion of variance is concerned, there is reason to doubt the idea that "us" and "them" represents the vital core of prejudice attitudes.

This conclusion reflects the cumulative insights from seven studies and two pilots, including three experiments, two national probability samples, and more than 15,000 participants. Study 1 and its pilots showed that once ingroup biases have been experimentally stripped of confounds, they are unrelated to generalized prejudice. They also lack the well-established personality signatures of generalized prejudice (but they are predicted by identification). Furthermore, in Studies 2, 3, and 4 we found that as long as groups are marginalized they will fit within a generalized prejudice factor, even when they represent ingroups to the participants. Generally prejudiced women were most sexist (toward women), and overweight people devalued other overweight people. Thus, the attitudinal pattern and the personality correlates reflected devaluing sentiments toward marginalized groups, but not necessarily toward outgroups. Importantly, such patterns have been shown for specific prejudices (e.g., Crandall, 1994; Roets et al., 2012), but we showed that these trends are highly systematic and apply to the common core of quite distinct prejudices.

In Study 5 we further showed that most prejudice-predictive personality traits are unrelated to a generic ingroup bias factor, capturing social distance toward high and low status neighborhoods, as well as rich and poor foreign countries. However, shifting focus to a generalized prejudice factor, including marginalized groups and low status neighborhoods/countries only, the effects of personality were strong and mirrored the established findings in the literature. We also found that biases focusing on status perfectly fit within that factor, even when lacking an ingroup-outgroup dynamic. Similarly, Study 6 showed that personality was indicative of directing (generalized) prejudice downward in social hierarchies, but not of directing prejudice against those at the top. Finally, Study 7 showed that the key determinants of the clustering of different prejudices, as well as its personality underpinnings, are related to status and power, and not perceived value conflicts. The high status factor was fragmented, whereas the low status factor was coherent and more strongly related to basic personality.

Given the quantity of data the entirety of the results also allows us to draw conclusions that would be far more tentative if based on any single study. For example, the dissociation between generalized prejudice and minimal group biases might seem unsurprising to some, but we also showed that there is an analogous discrepancy in attitudes toward real groups. Specifically, when we nullified the impact of low status and power the explanatory power of personality consistently plummeted—the explained variance in ingroup biases never reached above 13%, as compared to 52% in status-based (generalized) prejudice. Further, although there was some variation unaccounted for in the personality effects, the most robust statistics (e.g., R^2 values) were consistently in line with our hypotheses. Indeed, rather than twisting and turning individual results, we now turn to the broader questions of how the gist of our results and arguments fit into the broader literature.

Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate—Or Neither?

For some results it could argued that the dissociation between generalized prejudice and ingroup biases is due to the former tapping outgroup negativity, whereas ingroup biases tend to be driven by ingroup positivity. Such an argument might seem logical in light of Brewer's (1999) notion that ingroup love is distinct from outgroup hate, and that biases tend to driven more by the former. However, it must be stressed that our work here has a different focus. What we have argued is that anything related to group membership (whether it is "in" or "out") is overemphasized for understanding the nature of generalized prejudice and its personality underpinnings. As such, Brewer's distinction becomes peripheral to the current inquiry. More importantly, the minimal group studies support the idea that generalized prejudice is practically orthogonal to both ingroup love and outgroup hate. Likewise, Study 5 showed that generalized prejudice is distinct from *both* ingroup-outgroup biases (relative measure) *and* outgroup negativity (absolute measure). The personality correlates tell the same story. Finally, neither ingroup love nor outgroup hate accounts for the findings for generally prejudiced women in Studies 2 and 3, or the overweight participants in Study 4. If anything, they would be *outgroup lovers* or *ingroup haters*. Finally, it is relevant to note that none of this is to say that Brewer's reasoning is unimportant for understanding ingroup biases—we believe it is critical. Yet her reasoning is largely disconnected from the question of why individual differences in many prejudices generalize across distinct domains. For this latter question, we find it all the more important to consider Glick and Fiske's (2001) suggestion that "the crux of prejudice may not be antipathy but social inequality" (p. 110; see also Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Reconciling Personality and Social Identity

Personality and social identity theorists have been engaged in one of the most long-lived disputes in the prejudice literature (Hodson, 2009), and the current paper lands in the middle of this controversy. On the one hand side, social identity theorists have argued that personality approaches are altogether misguided in explaining prejudice (e.g., Brown, 2010; Reynolds et al., 2007). In response, personality oriented researchers have argued that research on core personality models (e.g., Big-Five) suggest otherwise (Ekehammar & Akrami, 2007; Hodson, 2009). A series of papers also support personality hypotheses for individual differences in prejudice, while leaving mean levels to be explained by social psychological and contextual factors (Akrami, Ekehammar, Bergh, Dahlstrand, & Malmsten, 2009; Bergh, Akrami, & Ekehammar, 2010, 2012b). Not surprisingly, we concur with the arguments that personality matters for a fuller understanding of prejudice—the evidence thereof is hard to refute today (for a

meta-analysis, see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Even so, we do not interpret our results as disproving a social identity approach. Instead, the findings hint at an important twist to critical arguments in this debate, and this twist could provide a key to reconciliation.

The twist is embedded in the argument that prejudice implies group devaluation, and ingroup biases represent one particular kind of devaluation (the kind that is driven specifically by one's own group membership). This inquiry suggests that personality maps onto devaluations along other dimensions than group membership (status and power), and consequently a simple conclusion follows: Personality predicts (some) prejudice, but not ingroup biases. From this perspective, the personality and social identity approaches each get one thing right, but another thing wrong. As far as we can tell, social identity researchers have been right that personality is largely irrelevant for ingroup biases (see Reynolds et al., 2007), but they have also been wrong about the personality-prejudice relationship more broadly. In contrast, personality researchers have been right that basic person characteristics predict prejudice, but they have been wrong about ingroup biases. In conclusion, we argue that the personality and social identity approaches to prejudice are not contradictory; they are complementary. If social identity theorists acknowledged the existence of generalized prejudice, and if personality psychologists could recognize that it has been poorly defined, then there is no reason why these perspectives could not exist in harmony.

Differences *AND* Communalities in Prejudice

Generalized prejudice has played an important historical role in the prejudice literature (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954), but it has a more peripheral role in contemporary research. Why is that? One reason is probably that many scholars have argued that a comprehensive view of prejudice requires more attention to target characteristics. They discuss prejudices in plural (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005), not prejudice in any generic sense. Clearly this would seem intuitively at odds to the notion of generalized prejudice. Still, a closer inspection suggests that it is an illusory contradiction.

The view that different groups are associated with different emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske et al., 2007; Mackie & Smith, 2015), capitalizes on the specific or unique variance in different measures. In contrast, generalized prejudice is about the common variance. As noted, this implies two inquires being statistically *independent* and complementary to each other. Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of prejudice is not achieved by merely shifting focus from the communalities to the unique; it comes from incorporating *both* parts of the variance pie-chart (Akrami et al., 2011; Meeusen & Dhont, 2015; Meeusen & Kern, 2016; Zick et al., 2008). This kind of reasoning also applies to arguments about the contextual nature of prejudice. For example, Eagly and Diekman (2005) suggested that prejudice should be understood as a devaluation of people stereotypically mismatched for a role. Yet this does not rule out the possibility that some individuals are more sensitive in principle to role violations (Duckitt, 1989).

More broadly, Crandall et al. (2013) suggested that prejudiced personalities are marked by a "resistance to social change that upsets status hierarchies" (p. 64). Indeed, their view comes close to what we have discussed as the glue that binds together generalized prejudice (see also next heading). In line with our data, such resistance could also be independently predicted by dogmatism (low openness), beliefs in inherent superiority of some people (low honesty–humility) and lacking sympathy for people worse off in the hierarchy (low empathic concern). Yet the independence of these effects does not take away from the significance of an attitudinal pattern that serves the purposes of all of these personalities. Again, it should also be noted that this reasoning does not contradict the notion that mean-levels of specific prejudices change over time (Akrami et al., 2009, 2011). Indeed, this is also a key theme in the perspective of Crandall and associates (2013). When the focus shifts to variance associated with specific targets, there is no doubt that prejudice is contextually shaped (see Eagly & Diekman, 2005).

Finally, the stereotype content model (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) provides yet another perspective that has motivated a shift away from the classic theorizing about generalized prejudice (see Asbrock et al., 2010). The model suggests that people have different emotional reactions, stereotypes and prejudices toward different groups depending on their perceived warmth and competence. Still, when Fiske and colleagues (2002) proposed their taxonomy of stereotypes and prejudices the unit of analysis was the target group, and responses were aggregated across participants. As such it speaks to whether mean ratings of stereotypes vary across different domains, but it does not speak to the question whether individual differences in prejudice reproduce across domains. Generalized prejudice studies speak to the latter question (but not the first) and show that devaluing attitudes spread across targets placed in different clusters of the stereotype content model, such as Jews, gays and poor people (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2004). Indeed, whereas cross-cultural examinations of stereotypes reveal a consistent multitude of stereotype clusters in Western Europe (Cuddy et al., 2009), there is simultaneous evidence of a consistent generalized prejudice factor in the same geographic region (Meeusen & Kern, 2016). Clearly, these patterns are not mutually exclusive, neither statistically nor conceptually (based on distinctions between stereotypes and prejudice).

Prejudice Facets and Superordinate Factors

Through the lens of psychometrics it is only natural that a focus on specific or communal variance leads to different conclusions about the nature of prejudice. Still, there is also a gray zone to consider—a portion of the variance that is neither purely specific nor purely shared (e.g., Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). This variance simply reflects that some measures (prejudices in this case) are more strongly correlated than others. In an exploratory factor analysis this is the variance giving multiple factors, but more importantly, it can also be modeled as midlevel factors, or facets, in hierarchical structure with some superordinate factor(s). This observation is critical for making sense of how our view on generalized prejudice relates to a number of perspectives emphasizing, for example, group threats (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), fear and derogation (Duckitt, 2001), authoritarianism and social dominance (Altemeyer, 1998; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), stigmata (e.g., Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998), and system-justification (Jost & Banaji, 1994).

Integrated threat theory and the DPM are two examples of perspectives suggesting that different prejudices should cluster

into different factors in terms of individual differences. In the first case, certain prejudices are characterized as stemming from a symbolic (e.g., clashing value) outgroup threat, whereas other prejudices stem from a realistic (e.g., economic) outgroup threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Similarly, the DPM holds that some individuals are sensitive to threats related to security and cohesion (related to low openness and authoritarianism) whereas others are sensitive to resource-based and competitive threats (related to low agreeableness and social dominance; Duckitt & Sibley, in press; see also Altemeyer, 1998; Sidanius et al., in press). Still, from our perspective these differentiations describe facets of an overarching (generalized prejudice) factor, just like organization and endurance are different facets of a conscientious personality factor (Paunonen & Ashton, 2001). Thus, the question is not whether prejudice displays unity or multidimensionality (since the only sensible answer in a hierarchical structure is "both"), but rather what explains the higher-order communalities (see also Bergh & Akrami, in press). Put differently, without denying that gays and disabled people, for example, are associated with different threat perceptions (and different emotional responses; Mackie & Smith, 2015), we asked why prejudices against these groups nonetheless reveal such robust communalities (see, e.g., Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Cohrs et al., 2012). What the results of this paper suggest is that when we shift focus from specific prejudices and different facets to a superordinate factor (generalized prejudice), we also need to shift our thinking from an ingroup-outgroup framework to something else.

To understand why different prejudices go hand in hand we believe that threat perceptions are important, just as emphasized in the DPM and integrated threat theory. However, we find it worth asking what the threats are directed against—is it a matter of outgroups threatening ingroups (as traditionally studied), or could it be most any threat to a societal (and/or interpersonal) order? Having shown that generalized prejudice is not primarily about ingroup-outgroup dynamics, but rather status and power differentials, we would argue that the highest-order communalities in prejudice are better explained by the latter alternative. What we promote is essentially a marriage of the threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and system justification literatures (Jost et al., 2004) to explain how generalized prejudice can involve both ingroup and outgroup targets, and span across groups that could challenge the societal order in a symbolic (e.g., gays; Zick et al., 2008) and realistic sense (e.g., poor people; Cunningham et al., 2004). It should also be noted that attitudes that seem nonsensical today from a threat perspective (e.g., negativity against HIV patients and unattractive people), could still be psychologically meaningful from an evolutionary perspective (see Kurzban & Leary, 2001).

The notion that generalized prejudice represents a superordinate system justification tendency for different group attitudes can also be approached from the stigma literature. Just like the threat literature, the stigma literature has, at least for the last couple of decades, had a preoccupation with identifying different dimensions (facets) rather than explaining their overarching communalities (see, e.g., Crocker et al., 1998; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Still, based on definitions of stigma as involving "some attribute, or characteristic, that conveys a social identity that is devalued in a particular social context" (Crocker et al., 1998, p. 505) it is not far-fetched to think of generalized prejudice as generalized stigmatization. This idea fits with the observation that power and status differences create asymmetric stigmatization, and that these processes can be orthogonal to ingroup-outgroup dynamics (e.g., Crocker et al., 1998; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Also, Kurzban and Leary's (2001) functionalist perspective provides a conceptual link between stigmatization and the role of threats in prejudice (e.g., parasite threats → aesthetic stigmatization and social distance). It is also worth noting that most of the stigmatized groups as discussed by Kurzban and Leary figure in the generalized prejudice literature as well (e.g., people being old, overweight, poor, and disabled). However, what distinguishes this paper from most work on stigma is the shift from discussing different dimensions to emphasizing that they also have robust empirical communalities (generalized prejudice), as anchored in basic personality. Again, our perspective does not imply a denial of specific threat effects and ingroup-outgroup dynamics, but we view them as explanations at the facet level whereas system justification would apply to the higher-order factor level.

Concluding Remarks

To achieve a comprehensive understanding of prejudice it is important to recognize that different perspectives can aspire to explain separate aspects of variance. Ingroup favoritism and system justification are two broad explanatory forces, and although they have both been extensively studied it has not been asked whether they apply to distinct components of the prejudice variance. In this paper we proposed that for one large chunk of variance, often neglected in the mainstream contemporary literature, system justification seems to get the better of ingroup favoritism. Specifically, generalized prejudice captures the individual difference variance that is broadly communal across different group domains, and this paper suggests that rather than a factor based on generic ingroup-outgroup attitudes it seems to center on a generic devaluation of low status and low power groups. This also casts a new light on the supposed nature of prejudiced personalities. The results suggest that there are no anti outgroup personalities per se, but there seem to be a number of personalities that, in general, devalue groups with low status or power.

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(*Appendix follows*)

Appendix

Descriptions of Generalized Prejudice (or Ethnocentrism in Studies Primarily Focusing on Correlated Prejudices, i.e. Generalized Prejudice)

1. "It seems reasonable to assume that prejudice toward one group indicates an increased tendency to harbor prejudice toward other groups. Such a position is consistent with Allport's (1954) view that 'people who reject one out-group will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti- any out-group' (p. 68). This point also has been made more recently by Ray and Lovejoy (1986), who hold that 'to be ethnocentric . . . implies that one will dislike all out-groups. To dislike just one out-group would be incoherent' (p. 563)" (Agnew, Thompson, & Gaines, 2000, p. 405).
2. "Allport (1954/1979) argued that prejudice towards multiple different outgroups are often so highly correlated as to constitute a 'generality of prejudice'. [. . .] Two individual differences constructs [. . . RWA & SDO] have been shown to be strong and complementary predictors of generalized prejudice in the decades following Allport's observation. Recent research also supports Allport's conceptualization" [. . .]These studies typically show high correlations between attitude measures referring to different outgroups, indicating that persons reporting favourable attitudes towards some outgroups tend to be generally more favourable towards other outgroups, while persons who are hostile or prejudiced towards certain outgroups tend to be generally less favourable towards others" (Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010, pp. 325–326)
3. ". . . prejudices toward a variety of target groups are found to be highly correlated indicating a generalized tendency (e.g., Akrami, Ekehammar, & Bergh, 2011). Importantly, the observation of such a generalized tendency across targets laid the very foundation for the personality approach to prejudice (see Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954). The guiding idea here is quite simple: If individuals displaying prejudice toward one out-group also do it toward other out-groups (including nonexisting ones, see Hartley, 1946) then it makes sense to start looking for an explanation within the individual" (Bergh, Akrami, & Ekehammar, 2012a, p. 614).
4. "A prejudiced person might develop a general outgroup attitude when confronted with several ethnic outgroups. Starting from this perspective, the present study considers attitudes among adolescent majority members encountering several non-Western immigrant groups. [new paragraph] The theory of an authoritarian personality suggests that people with negative outgroup attitudes should also maintain a general outgroup attitude. Even other individualistic explanations of prejudice (e.g. Allport, 1954/1979) may suggest that individuals can develop a generally prejudiced personality and thus also a general and negative attitude toward several outgroups" (Bratt, 2005, pp. 447–448).
5. "We are particularly interested in understanding individual differences in generalized prejudice (GP), i.e., the tendency to dislike outgroup members no matter which particular group they belong to" (Bäckström & Björklund, 2007, p. 10).
6. "The historical roots of this finding that prejudices are generalized across outgroups can be traced back to the seminal work of Adorno and colleagues (1950), who used the term ethnocentrism popularized by Sumner (1906) (see Bizumic, 2014) to define this disposition for individuals to generalize their prejudices. However, this definition is theoretically distinct from the original meaning of ethnocentrism as the tendency to view one's own ingroup as the centre of everything and to devalue outgroups because of an overvaluation of the ingroup (Sumner, 1906). For this reason, Allport (1954) used the term generalized attitude to refer to the disposition to hold many prejudices. [new paragraph] This generalized prejudice idea suggests that individuals' negative attitudes towards distinct outgroups will all tend to be positively correlated and factor together as a single prejudice dimension" (Cantal, Milfont, Wilson, Gouveia, 2015, p. 17).
7. "An individual differences account of prejudice builds on the observation that people prejudiced against one outgroup typically tend to be prejudiced against other outgroups as well (e.g. Allport, 1954). In several studies prejudices against a range of outgroups were so highly correlated that they could reasonably be treated as indicators of a generalised prejudice factor" (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009, p. 270).
8. "Consistent with notions that prejudice typically generalizes across different target groups (e.g., Akrami, Ekehammar, & Bergh, 2011; Altemeyer, 1998; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; McFarland, 2010; Zick et al., 2008), we focus on generalized prejudice rather than prejudices toward specific groups. [. . .] because we measured prejudice in relation to gay men and lesbians, people with disabilities, and foreigners (see below), only data from participants who indicated that they were of German nationality, did not live with a disability, and had a heterosexual orientation were kept for the analyses" (Cohrs, Kämpfe-Hargrave, & Riemann, 2012, pp. 344, 347).
9. "Whereas prejudice may be seen as negative evaluation of and hostility toward a social group, ethnocentrism includes the tendency to form and maintain negative evaluations and hostility toward multiple groups that are not one's own. Evidence for an ethnocentric disposition comes from consistently high correlations between prejudices toward various outgroups. [. . .] [generalized prejudice studies] have been taken to suggest that individuals high in ethnocentrism will derogate any outgroup regardless of contact and in the absence of group competition" (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 2004, p. 1333).
10. "More than half a century ago, Gordon W. Allport noted that "[o]ne of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject other outgroups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group" (Allport 1954: 68). In other words, prejudice is understood as a unitary phenomenon by this research group. We build upon these approaches and consider enmity toward different minority groups as being closely related to each other and deriving from a generalized attitude toward out-groups" (Davidov, Thörner, Schmidt, Gosen, & Wolf, 2011, p. 483).
11. "Prejudice tends to be generalized over targets. Persons who are less favorable to one out-group or minority tend to be less favorable to other out-groups or minorities. This has been documented empirically by strong positive correlations between attitudes to different out-groups" (Duckitt, 2001, p. 41).
12. "This means that persons reporting favourable attitudes to some outgroups tend to be generally more favourable toward other outgroups, while persons who are hostile or prejudiced to certain outgroups tend to be generally less favourable to others. These findings suggest that there should be just one broad dimension of generalized prejudice directed across all or most outgroups. They also suggest that some relatively stable characteristic of individuals makes them prone to be prejudiced against socially rejected outgroups and minorities in general (Adorno et al., Allport). The current study examines the degree to which (a) there are consistencies between negative attitudes toward a range of different groups held by the individual" (Duckitt & Sibley, 2007, pp. 113–114).

(*Appendix continues*)

Appendix (*continued*)

13. "Attitudes to various out-groups seem to be highly correlated among people irrespective of their social background. Thus, this generalized prejudice (cf. Allport, 1954) can be seen as deriving from one or more basic personality traits" (Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003, p. 450).
14. "Generalized prejudice is a tendency to respond with prejudice toward any outgroup (Allport, 1954; Duckitt, 1989)" (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004, p. 464).
15. As observed by Allport (1954): 'One of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group'. (p. 68) [new paragraph] Such patterns of generalised prejudice have been observed in multiple studies, across multiple types of outgroups, in multiple cultures" (Hodson & Dhont, 2015, p. 4).
16. "By ethnocentrism we refer to a deep-seated psychological predisposition that partitions the world into ingroups and outgroups—into "us" and "them." [. . .] Ethnocentrism divides the world into two opposing camps. From an ethnocentric point of view, groups are either "friend" or they are "foe," eliciting loyalty and favoritism on the one hand or suspicion and disdain on the other. Ethnocentrism is commonly expressed through stereotypes. [. . .] After being asked to judge whites on this score [hardworking vs lazy and intelligent vs unintelligent], respondents are asked to make the same judgment, this time about blacks, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans" (Kam & Kinder, 2012, p. 326–328).
17. "Insofar as ethnocentrism entails hostility directed not at a single out-group but at many out-groups, these applications of realistic group conflict theory, however successful they may be in explaining particular instances of conflict, simply do not speak to ethnocentrism as we conceive it. Front the perspective of group conflict theory, generalized prejudice is possible only in the presence of multiple and simultaneous intergroup conflicts. But we are interested in ethnocentrism in precisely this sense. Ethnocentrism is generalized prejudice. If our question is why some people are ethnocentric while others are not, why some but not others are predisposed to take many kinds of difference as warrant for condescension or contempt, then group conflict theory cannot take us very far. More promising, as we are about to see, is the theory of authoritarianism. [. . .] These results, summarized in table 6.3, offer clear support for the conception of ethnocentrism as generalized prejudice" (Kinder & Kam, 2009, p. 11, 139).
18. "Generalized prejudice, which Adorno et al. (1950) labeled "ethnocentrism," is a prejudice against all outgroups, whether they are ethnic, sexual, or even fictional" (Krauss, 2002, p. 1257)
19. "The tendency for prejudices against different outgroups to be correlated has been found in many times and places (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport and Kramer, 1946; Altemeyer, 1998; Bierly, 1985; Hartley, 1946; McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina, 1993). When balanced-scale measures are used, the typical correlation between two prejudices is about .50 (Duckitt, 1989). That figure sustains Allport's assertion, while leaving plenty of room for different prejudices to be influenced by prejudice-specific causes (Whitley, 1999) and for social norms and ethnic conflicts to intensify some prejudices but not others (Prothro, 1952; Pettigrew, 1958). [new paragraph] But why, as the correlation suggests, are some people more disposed toward prejudice against outgroups than are others? That is the question explored here. This disposition was first labeled "ethnocentrism" (Adorno et al., 1950), adopting a term introduced by Sumner (1906). But because the disposition includes many non-ethnic prejudices—sexism, religious hostilities, antihomosexuality, etc. -- Allport (1954) referred to prejudice as a "generalized attitude." Because the correlations extend even to fictitious groups such as "Danireans" and "Wallonians" (Hartley, 1946), a generalized tendency to respond with prejudice toward many outgroups is apparent. Following Allport, the term "generalized prejudice" is used here. [new paragraph] Because the correlation among prejudices suggested a source "deep within the structure of the person," (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 223), the construct of the authoritarian personality was developed as an effort to understand "the kinds of psychological dispositions—fears, anxieties, values, impulses" (Sanford, 1956, p. 267) that undergird ethnocentrism (or here, generalized prejudice)" (McFarland, 2001, p. 1).
20. ". . . a generalized tendency to respond with prejudice toward many outgroups is evident. Adorno et al. (1950) adopted Sumner's (1906) term "ethnocentrism" to describe this disposition to hold many prejudices. Because the disposition includes many nonethnic prejudices —sexism, antihomosexuality, etc., along with extreme ingroup patriotism (called "pseudopatriotism" by Adorno et al., p. 107) — Allport (1954) referred to it as a "generalized attitude." Following Allport, the term "generalized prejudice" is used here" (McFarland, 2010, p. 453–454).
21. ". . . prejudices against outgroups are highly correlated and reflect a general disposition to reject outgroups that the Adorno group called ethnocentrism [. . .] Are prejudices against outgroups highly correlated among Russians as they are among Western populations? The Soviet Union had different outgroups than does the West, but a similar pattern was expected. Communists are an outgroup victim of prejudice among Western authoritarians, and prejudice against communists is highly correlated with other racial, ethnic, and sexual prejudices (see McFarland, 1989). In the Soviet Union, capitalists, dissidents, and champions of democracy were appropriate outgroups, and negative attitudes toward these groups were expected to be correlated with the common prejudices based on race, sex and age." [Participants were not excluded for belonging to any of these groups]. (McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina, 1993, pp. 201–202).
22. "prejudice targeting different outgroups are strongly correlated (e.g. Akrami et al., 2011; Allport, 1954; Bierly, 1985). The idea is that if one holds negative attitudes toward some outgroups, e.g. immigrants, one will also dislike other outgroups, like homosexuals, religious minorities or disabled people, a phenomenon referred to as 'generalized prejudice' or a 'general devaluation of outgroups' (Bäckström and Björklund, 2007; Duckitt and Sibley, 2007; Zick et al., 2008)" (Meeusen & Kern, 2016, p. 1).
23. "different forms of prejudice, targeting different out-groups (e.g. homosexuals, immigrants, Muslims), are typically correlated (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954). Scholars have considered this 'generality of prejudice' as a strong indication that individual differences in prejudice vary as a function of stable personality attributes (e.g. Altemeyer, 1981; Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; for a review, see Hodson & Dhont, 2015)" (Meeusen & Dhont, 2015, para 1)
24. "The predisposition of individuals to respond with prejudice to any out-group is denoted as generalized prejudice (GP) following Allport's (1954) terminology. GP is conceptualized as a personality trait that is based on empirical findings showing that, for example, racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, or negative attitudes toward homosexuals were highly correlated among people, so they could be reduced to form one GP factor (e.g., Bierly, 1985; Ekehammar et al., 2004)" (Roth & von Collani, 2007, p. 141)
25. "The predisposition of individuals to respond with prejudice to any kind of out-group is denoted as generalized prejudice following Allport's (1954) terminology". (von Collani & Grumm, 2009, p. 111).
26. "The GFE syndrome encompasses prejudices toward different groups that are, within a stable structure, substantially interrelated over a period of time even though the level of approval can vary across time, cultures, and individuals. They are proposed to be interrelated because they all mirror a generalized devaluation of out-groups, that is, GFE". (Zick, Wolf, Küpper, Davidov, Schmidt, & Heitmeyer, 2008, p. 364).

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