
CTF-WRITEUPS

PicoCTF:

1. Classic Crackme 0x100



I successfully downloaded the challenge binaries. Let's start analyzing them to extract the flag!

Now, let's run the challenge to observe its behavior and interact with the command line (if available).

First, ensure the file is executable:

chmod +x ./crackme100

Since we trust picoCTF, we proceed to execute it:

./crackme100

Result:

When running the binary, the program prompts for input:

```
root@ossama:/home/ossama/Downloads# ./crackme100 Enter the secret password:`
```

It always comes to mind to brute force the input password, but this isn't certain. Since the exercise seems simple, let's try reversing it like master reverse engineers!

with a random password i got:

```
root@ossama:/home/ossama/Downloads# ./crackme100 Enter the secret password:
gggggggggg
FAILED
```

then,

I used the file command to check the type of the binary and interpret the result. The output reveals the following information about crackmel00:

root@ossama:/home/ossama/Downloads# file crackme100 crackme100: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=ece9fb88da586271de7c10da6c167388d3699e88, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, with debug_info, not stripped

This tells us that the file is an ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) for 64-bit Linux systems, dynamically linked, and includes debugging information, which can be useful for reverse engineering.

then,

I used the ltrace tool to analyze the program's function calls during execution. ltrace is a command-line utility that traces library function calls made by a program, showing their arguments and return values. This helps us understand the program's behavior, especially when trying to identify potential vulnerabilities [not that much important in our case :()].

In the output, we observe several important function calls:

```
\label{eq:cotons} $$ \operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{\operatorname{cotons}_{c
```

The key functions here are __isoc99_scanf (which handles user input) and memcmp (which compares the entered password with the expected value). The scanf function could be vulnerable to a buffer overflow if the input isn't properly validated, but based on the strlen and memcmp calls, it appears the input is being processed correctly for this context. There doesn't seem to be an immediate buffer overflow vulnerability in this trace.


The program compares the entered password with a predefined one, and if they don't match, it prints "FAILED!" and exits. To complete the challenge, we need to determine the correct password by further analyzing the binary, likely by reversing the program to locate the correct value or password check mechanism.

Now,



Ghidra is a powerful reverse engineering tool used for analyzing and decompiling binaries. Other tools with similar functionality include IDA Pro and Radare2. I prefer Ghidra because it's free, open-source, and has a user-friendly interface with strong support for various architectures and file formats.

Opening our file in Ghidra gives :



Opening our file in Ghidra, we go straight to the main function. We see this code:

```
int main(void)
  uint uVar1;
  int iVar2;
  size t sVar3;
  char input[51];
  char output[51];
  int random2;
  int random1;
  char fix;
  int secret3;
  int secret2;
  int secret1;
  int len;
  int i 1;
  int i;
  output[0] = 'z';
  output[1] = 't';
  output[2] = 'q';
  output[3] = 'i';
  output[4] = 't';
  output[5] = 't';
```

```
output[6] = 'w';
output[7] = 't';
output[8] = 'x';
output[9] = 't';
output[10] = 'i';
output[0xb] = 'e';
output[0xc] = 'y';
output[0xd] = 'f';
output[0xe] = 'r';
output[0xf] = 's';
output[0\times10] = 'l';
output[0 \times 11] = 'g';
output[0 \times 12] = 't';
output[0x13] = 'z';
output[0x14] = 'u';
output[0x15] = 'x';
output[0x16] = 'o';
output[0x17] = 'v';
output[0 \times 18] = 'l';
output[0 \times 19] = 'f';
output[0x1a] = 'd';
output[0x1b] = 'n';
output[0x1c] = 'b';
output[0x1d] = 'r';
output[0x1e] = 's';
output[0x1f] = 'n';
output[0 \times 20] = 'l';
output[0x21] = 'r';
output[0x22] = 'v';
output[0x23] = 'y';
output[0x24] = 'h';
output[0x25] = 'h';
output[0x26] = 's';
output[0 \times 27] = 'd';
output[0x28] = 'x';
output[0x29] = 'x';
output[0x2a] = 'r';
output[0x2b] = 'f';
output[0x2c] = 'o';
output[0x2d] = 'x';
output[0x2e] = 'n';
output[0 \times 2f] = 'j';
output[0 \times 30] = 'b';
output[0x31] = 'l';
output[0 \times 32] = '\0';
```

```
setvbuf(stdout,(char *)0x0,2,0);
  printf("Enter the secret password: ");
 isoc99 scanf(&DAT 00402024,input);
 i = 0:
  sVar3 = strlen(output);
  for (; i < 3; i = i + 1) {
    for (i 1 = 0; i 1 < (int)sVar3; i 1 = i 1 + 1) {
      uVar1 = (i 1 % 0xff >> 1 & 0x55U) + (i_1 % 0xff & 0x55U);
      uVar1 = ((int)uVar1 >> 2 \& 0x33U) + (uVar1 \& 0x33);
      iVar2 = ((int)uVar1 >> 4) + input[i 1] + -0x61 + (uVar1 & 0xf);
      input[i 1] = (char)iVar2 + (char)(iVar2 / 0x1a) * -0x1a + 'a';
   }
  }
 iVar2 = memcmp(input,output,(long)(int)sVar3);
 if (iVar2 == 0) {
   printf("SUCCESS! Here is your flag: %s\n","picoCTF{sample flag}");
 }
 else {
   puts("FAILED!");
 }
 return 0;
}
```

In this program, the input is transformed by a for loop before being compared to the expected flag. If we enter 'a' as the first character of our input, it gets modified during the loop, so what is actually compared is not the original flag but a transformed version of it. This transformation is controlled by the for loop. We can think of this for loop as a function, denoted as f(x), where it takes a character x and returns a transformed character f(x).

Let's define our input as i and the correct solution (or password) as s. The comparison is effectively checking if:

```
f(i) = s
```

To control the input and reverse the transformation, we need to find a way to undo the transformation function f. This means we need to solve for i in terms of s, so we have: $i = f^{-1}(s)$

Where f^{-1} represents the inverse of the transformation function. Now, we need to reverse the function f and determine how to obtain the original input i that would result in the correct solution s.

I made this solution using C:

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
int main() {
    char output[51];
    output[0] = 'z';
    output[1] = 't';
    output[2] = 'q';
    output[3] = 'i';
    output[4] = 't';
    output[5] = 't';
    output[6] = 'w';
    output[7] = 't';
    output[8] = 'x';
    output[9] = 't';
    output[10] = 'i';
    output[0xb] = 'e';
    output[0xc] = 'y';
    output[0xd] = 'f';
    output[0xe] = 'r';
    output[0xf] = 's';
    output[0 \times 10] = 'l';
    output[0 \times 11] = 'g';
    output[0x12] = 't';
    output[0 \times 13] = 'z';
    output[0x14] = 'u';
    output[0 \times 15] = 'x';
    output[0x16] = 'o';
    output[0x17] = 'v';
    output[0x18] = 'l';
    output[0x19] = 'f';
    output[0x1a] = 'd';
    output[0 \times 1b] = 'n';
    output[0 \times 1c] = 'b';
    output[0x1d] = 'r';
    output[0x1e] = 's';
    output[0x1f] = 'n';
    output[0x20] = 'l';
    output[0x21] = 'r';
    output[0 \times 22] = 'v';
    output[0 \times 23] = 'y';
    output[0 \times 24] = 'h';
    output[0 \times 25] = 'h';
    output[0x26] = 's';
    output[0 \times 27] = 'd';
    output[0 \times 28] = 'x';
```

```
output[0x29] = 'x';
    output[0x2a] = 'r';
    output[0x2b] = 'f';
    output[0x2c] = 'o';
    output[0x2d] = 'x';
    output[0x2e] = 'n';
    output[0x2f] = 'j';
    output[0 \times 30] = 'b';
    output[0x31] = 'l';
    output[0 \times 32] = '\0';
    char p[strlen(output) + 1];
    int i, j, var1, var2, x, y;
    for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
        for (j = 0; j < strlen(output); j++) {
            var1 = (85 \& (j % 255)) + (85 \& ((j % 255) >> 1));
            var2 = (var1 & 51) + (51 & (var1 >> 2));
            x = (output[j] - 'a') % 26;
            y = (x - ((var2 \& 15) + (15 \& (var2 >> 4)))) % 26;
            p[j] = y + 'a';
        }
        for (j = 0; j < strlen(output); j++) {
            output[j] = p[j];
        }
    }
    output[strlen(output)] = '\0';
    printf("%s\n", output);
    return 0;
}
```

after running our c code:

ossama@ossama:~/Desktop\$./a.out zqncqnqkunc\s]igianqoofjf][bYfg_ilppb_jXroiZflb[\c So solution is: `zqncqnqkunc\s]igianqoofjf][bYfg_ilppb_jXroiZflb[\c let's try to connect to the validation server to verify:D: ``nc titan.picoctf.net 64798
`Enter the secret password: zqncqnqkunc\s]igianqoofjf][bYfg_ilppb_jXroiZflb[\c

I can't give you the flag directly: (Sorry, it's forbidden.