

Satisficing Agents in P2P Electricity Markets: The Compute–Welfare Trade-off in Continuous Double Auctions

A Critical Evaluation and Reproducible Study

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Abstract

Peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity markets clear every five minutes, leaving little time for complex optimization at the grid edge. We ask a focused question: can lightweight, *satisficing* agents deliver near-optimizer welfare in continuous double auctions (CDAs) with a fraction of the compute? We build a reproducible agent-based simulator of a residential P2P CDA, instrument per-agent compute, and benchmark an optimizer against two satisficers: an aspiration band ($\pm\tau\%$, where τ is a price band) and a limited-search rule that inspects at most K offers (a greedy variant accumulates over the first K feasible resting orders; “K-greedy”). On thick markets ($N \in \{200, 500\}$), K-greedy with $K \in \{3, 5\}$ attains 100–103% of optimizer normalized welfare while using $40\text{--}55\times$ less per-agent compute; results are consistent under a periodic call auction, with a feeder-capacity constraint, and with ticker-only information. Compute scales with offers inspected, and satisficer parameters trace a clear compute–welfare frontier. We measure normalized welfare against a per-interval planner bound and profile compute via per-agent wall-clock time, offers inspected, and peak memory, with instrumentation overhead below 3%. To our knowledge, this is the first quantification of the compute–welfare trade-off for P2P CDAs with explicit per-agent instrumentation and a planner bound for welfare.

Keywords: bounded rationality, satisficing, compute–welfare tradeoff, AI sustainability, peer-to-peer electricity, continuous double auction

1 Background

1.1 Continuous Double Auctions

In a CDA, buyers and sellers submit limit orders that rest in a price-ordered book until matched by incoming orders. Price-time priority ensures that better prices execute first, and ties break first-in, first-out (FIFO). Experiments dating to [Smith \(1962\)](#) and computational studies of zero- or minimal-intelligence agents [Gode and Sunder \(1993\)](#); [Cliff and Bruten \(1997\)](#) demonstrate high allocative efficiency under broad conditions. We follow the canonical maker-price rule where trades execute at the resting order’s price.

1.2 P2P Electricity Markets

P2P designs stress decentralized coordination and local flexibility [Parag and Sovacool \(2016\)](#); [Mengelkamp et al. \(2018\)](#). Most prior work focuses on economic design and settlement rather than agent compute budgets. Our focus is complementary: we ask whether computationally lightweight agents can achieve near-baseline efficiency in realistic microstructure.

1.3 Bounded Rationality

Satisficing, first articulated by [Simon \(1955\)](#), replaces global optimization with stopping rules and aspiration levels. In CDAs with price-time priority, top-of-book information concentrates the best opportunities, suggesting that early-stopping rules can perform well while inspecting only a handful of offers.

2 Market Mechanism and Metrics

2.1 Continuous Double Auction

Orders are limit bids/asks with tick size 0.1¢/kWh and price-time priority; partial fills are allowed; trades execute at the *maker*’s price. We also report a periodic call auction variant, which batch-clears once per interval with identical maker-price rule and optional feeder capacity (kW) converted to a per-interval energy cap.

2.2 Quote-Based Welfare and Planner Bound

We measure *quote-surplus welfare*: for a trade of quantity q between buyer with bid b and seller with ask a , welfare adds $(b - a)q$ across trades [Gode and Sunder \(1993\)](#); [Smith \(1962\)](#). The per-interval planner bound greedily matches the union of pre-clearing resting orders and new posts by spread (and feeder cap if active); normalized welfare $\hat{W} = W/W_{\text{bound}}$ lies in $[0, 1]$. We report compute as mean per-agent wall-clock milliseconds per decision, instrumented *inside* `decide()` and logged each interval. Matching cost is reported separately as market cost.

2.3 Agent Utility (Quote-Based)

For a trade between a buyer with bid b and a seller with ask a , executed at maker price p with quantity q , we use quote-based surplus as instantaneous utility: buyer utility $u_{\text{buy}} = \max\{0, (b - p)q\}$ and seller utility $u_{\text{sell}} = \max\{0, (p - a)q\}$. Because the book only matches crossing quotes ($b \geq a$), realized trades contribute nonnegative surplus. Market welfare sums the spread across trades, $W = \sum (b - a)q$, which equals the sum of buyer and seller utilities under the maker-price rule. If $b < a$ there is no trade and utility is zero (the agent prefers not to transact, e.g., to remain with retail service).

2.4 Feeder Constraint

In call auctions with a feeder capacity \mathcal{C} kW, we translate it to a per-interval energy cap $\mathcal{E} = \mathcal{C} \cdot \Delta t$, enforce it during matching, and apply the same cap when computing the planner bound. This can tighten the bound (smaller denominator), so \bar{W} may increase even when absolute welfare falls; we therefore report both.

2.5 Theoretical Intuition

Under price–time priority, ask prices are nondecreasing in rank. For a buyer with a marketable limit, an optimizer pays $a_{(1)}$ while a k-greedy satisficer pays an average over the first K makers with expected gap bounded by $\mathbb{E}[a_{(K)} - a_{(1)}]$, which shrinks with thicker books or lower intraday dispersion. Symmetric arguments apply to sellers. This intuition matches our empirical frontiers.

Proposition (expected price-gap bound). Assume feasible maker prices are i.i.d. from a continuous density on a compact interval and listed in price–time order so that the top-of-book sequence is $a_{(1)} \leq a_{(2)} \leq \dots$. For a buyer with a marketable quote p_q (high enough to cross all K top asks), the optimizer’s maker price is $a_{(1)}$ and the k-greedy satisficer’s blended maker price \bar{a}_K satisfies

$$\mathbb{E}[\bar{a}_K - a_{(1)}] \leq \mathbb{E}[a_{(K)} - a_{(1)}].$$

Moreover, for fixed K , $\mathbb{E}[a_{(K)} - a_{(1)}]$ decreases with book thickness (more feasible makers) and with smaller intraday dispersion (tighter price support).

Sketch. The k-greedy fill is a convex combination of the first K order statistics, so $\bar{a}_K \in [a_{(1)}, a_{(K)}]$ and the one-sided gap is bounded by $a_{(K)} - a_{(1)}$. Standard order-statistics results imply expected spacings shrink with sample size and variance of the price distribution, yielding the monotone comparative statics above. An analogous statement holds for sellers.

3 Methods

3.1 CDA Step and Instrumentation

Algorithm 1 outlines one 5-minute CDA interval. Each agent receives a snapshot (book or ticker), computes one decision, and we time `decide()` in-situ. Accept actions are submitted as marketable limits at the agent’s quote (maker-price rule ensures

Algorithm 1: CDA step with decision instrumentation (interval t)

Input: Agents \mathcal{A} , order book \mathcal{O} , info set $I \in \{\text{book}, \text{ticker}\}$
foreach $a \in \mathcal{A}$ **do**
 (bids, asks) $\leftarrow \mathcal{O}.\text{snapshot}()$; snap $\leftarrow I(\text{bids}, \text{asks})$
 (act, Δt_{ms}) $\leftarrow \text{time}(a.\text{decide}(\text{snap}, t))$
 if $\text{act.type} = \text{accept}$ and $\text{act.qty} > 0$ **then**
 $\mathcal{O}.\text{submit}(a, \text{act.side}, \text{act.price}, \text{act.qty})$
 else
 $(p, q, \text{side}) \leftarrow a.\text{make_quote}(t)$; **if** $q > 0$ **then**
 $\mathcal{O}.\text{submit}(a, \text{side}, p, q)$
 log_decision($a, \text{act}, \Delta t_{ms}$)
(trades, ...) $\leftarrow \mathcal{O}.\text{clear_trades}()$; // metrics computed downstream

Algorithm 2: Satisficer k_greedy decide (buyer/seller symmetric)

Input: Quote (p_q, q_q, side) , opposite list opp (price-time), cap K
offers_seen $\leftarrow 0$; $q_{\text{fill}} \leftarrow 0$
for o in first K of opp **do**
 offers_seen $\leftarrow \text{offers_seen} + 1$; $(p_o, q_o) \leftarrow (o.\text{price}, o.\text{qty})$
 feasible $\leftarrow [(\text{side} == \text{buy} \wedge p_o \leq p_q) \vee (\text{side} == \text{sell} \wedge p_o \geq p_q)]$
 if feasible **then**
 take $\leftarrow \min(q_q - q_{\text{fill}}, q_o)$; $q_{\text{fill}} \leftarrow q_{\text{fill}} + \max(0, \text{take})$
 if $q_{\text{fill}} \geq q_q$ **then**
 break
 if $q_{\text{fill}} > 0$ **then**
 return {type: accept, price: p_q , qty: q_{fill} , offers_seen}
 else
 return {type: post, offers_seen}

payment/receipt at maker prices); otherwise the agent posts its quote. Matching proceeds continuously as orders arrive; trades are recorded with buyer/seller quotes for quote-surplus welfare.

3.2 Satisficer Decision Rule

Algorithm 2 shows the K-greedy satisficer. It scans only the first K maker offers on the opposite side in price-time order and greedily accumulates feasible quantity up to its quote. Complexity is $\Theta(\min\{K, M\})$ where M is the opposite book length; in practice $K \leq 5$.

3.3 Optimizer (Greedy)

The optimizer computes the set of feasible makers and either selects the single best price (min ask for buyer; max bid for seller) or greedily fills across all feasible makers up to its quote. Complexity is $\Theta(M)$.

4 Agents and Decision Rules

4.1 Optimizer

Scans the entire opposite book to accept the best feasible price (“single”) or greedily fills across multiple makers at the agent’s quote (“greedy”). We log `solver_calls` equal to the number of offers scanned. Time complexity per decision is $\Theta(M)$ where M is the opposite book length.

4.2 Satisficers

Two bounded rules stop early by construction: (i) **τ -band**: accept the first crossing offer within $\pm\tau\%$ of one’s quote; (ii) **K -search**: inspect at most K top-of-book offers and take the best feasible (“k_search”); a “k_greedy” variant greedily accumulates quantity over the first K feasible makers. We log `offers_seen`. To avoid artificial overhead, satisficers scan the already price–time ordered book (no extra sorting). Time complexity per decision is $\Theta(\min\{K, M\})$.

4.3 Compute Instrumentation

We time `decide()` once per agent per interval (inside clearing) and write per-agent rows with `offers_seen`, `solver_calls`, and `wall_ms`. A unit test ensures wrapper overhead $<3\%$ on a sleep-dominated workload; we verified similar behavior on representative cells.

5 Taxonomy and Comparison

We compare agent classes by decision rule, information required, computational complexity, and expected behavior in realistic CDAs. Satisficers are designed to stop early: they trade a small, predictable amount of compute for near-baseline welfare when books are reasonably thick and price dispersion is not extreme. The optimizer scans the full book and serves as the baseline among our myopic, per-interval rules; it is not a global planner. Table 1 summarizes the key properties and expected behavior; abbreviations B and T denote full order book and ticker-only information, respectively.

Table 1 Taxonomy of agents evaluated. Complexity is per decision; information set abbreviations: B=full order book snapshot, T=ticker-only. Expected behavior is relative to the optimizer in realistic, thick markets.

Agent	Decision rule	Info	Complexity	Expected behavior
Optimizer	Scan all feasible (single/greedy)	B	$\Theta(M)$	Baseline among myopic rules; highest welfare in thin books; cost grows with book thickness.
τ -band	First crossing within $\pm\tau\%$	B/T	$\Theta(\min\{K, M\})$	Near baseline for small τ ; degrades gracefully as τ widens; robust and very fast.
K-search	Inspect up to K , pick best	B/T	$\Theta(\min\{K, M\})$	Near baseline with small K in thick books; can miss deeper high-spread matches when books are thin.
K-greedy	Inspect up to K , greedy fill	B/T	$\Theta(\min\{K, M\})$	Typically closest to optimizer among satisficers for small K ; benefits from thicker books.

6 Experimental Setup

6.1 Environment

A day of 5-minute intervals (288 steps). Household load uses a diurnal profile (29–30 kWh/day) with log-normal heterogeneity; PV nameplate sampled from a log-normal with median 7.4 kW (20th–80th: 5–11 kW) and capacity factors 13–20%; optional EV/battery models are available but disabled here to isolate trading rules. Retail anchor price is 16.3¢/kWh; per-interval quote noise $\sigma = 1.0\text{¢}$ captures intra-day dispersion; cross-agent buy/sell premia are heterogeneous by default (no fixed markup/discount).

6.2 Parameters and Priors

Load/PV priors reflect U.S. residential statistics (Section 2); PV is capped by nameplate each interval. We validated: (i) PV never exceeds nameplate; (ii) per-interval energy balance; (iii) battery SoC bounds and round-trip losses (tests included).

6.3 Protocol

We pre-registered H1–H4 and the factor grid. For each cell (N, τ, K) , we run 5 seeds, record per-interval and per-agent CSVs, and write a manifest (CPU/OS/Python/time). Aggregation computes group means with bootstrap CIs

Table 2 H1 summary: CDA (book). Normalized welfare \hat{W} (95% CI) and per-agent wall time (ms). Ratios: $R_W = \hat{W}_{\text{sat}}/\hat{W}_{\text{opt}}$, $R_C = \text{ms}_{\text{opt}}/\text{ms}_{\text{sat}}$.

N	\hat{W}_{opt}	\hat{W}_{sat}	R_W	R_C
100	0.577 (0.544–0.608)	0.567 (0.519–0.600)	0.983	36.3
200	0.607 (0.593–0.621)	0.612 (0.584–0.634)	1.008	40.7
500	0.616 (0.608–0.625)	0.632 (0.621–0.642)	1.027	54.9

over seeds and Pareto frontiers by N to remove dominated configurations. Overlays merge manifests for cross-experiment comparisons (CDA vs call vs cap; book vs ticker).

6.4 Compute Environment

Experiments ran on Apple Silicon (macOS 14.6.1, Python 3.11.4). Absolute timings vary with hardware; claims are on compute *ratios* across agents on the same machine.

6.5 Design

We sweep market size $N \in \{50, 100, 200, 500\}$, satisficer parameters $\tau \in \{1, 5, 10, 20\}$ and $K \in \{1, 3, 5\}$, and 5 seeds. We run CDA (book), ticker-only information (top-of-book), periodic call auction (no cap), and call with feeder cap (500 kW). We record manifests (seeds, CPU/OS/Python), per-interval metrics, and per-agent decisions. Aggregation computes bootstrapped CIs and group-wise Pareto frontiers; theory checks regress compute on `offers_seen` and quantify diminishing returns.

7 Results

7.1 H1: Satisficers Match Optimizer Welfare with Much Lower Compute

Table 2 compares the K_greedy satisficer ($K = 5$) to the optimizer in CDA. At $N = 500$, the satisficer achieves 102.7% of optimizer normalized welfare while using $\approx 55\times$ less per-agent compute; at $N = 200$, 100.8% with $\approx 41\times$ less compute; at $N = 100$, 98.3% with $\approx 36\times$ less compute. Under a call auction (Table 3), we observe similar patterns (e.g., $N = 500$: 102.8% of optimizer welfare with $\approx 45\times$ less compute).

7.2 H2: Welfare Improves with Market Thickness; Compute Scales with Offers Inspected

Normalized welfare increases from $N = 100$ to $N = 200, 500$ for all satisficers. Regressing per-agent ms on `offers_seen` yields a strong linear relationship for the band rule ($R^2 \approx 0.998$); K-variants exhibit near-constant microsecond costs where wrapper overhead dominates, consistent with $O(K)$ decision time by design.

Table 3 H4 summary: call auction (no cap). Normalized welfare \hat{W} (95% CI) and per-agent wall time (ms). K_greedy uses \ll compute with equal or better \hat{W} .

N	\hat{W}_{opt}	\hat{W}_{sat}	R_W	R_C
100	0.588 (0.560–0.614)	0.578 (0.533–0.608)	0.985	37.7
200	0.617 (0.603–0.631)	0.620 (0.594–0.642)	1.004	42.3
500	0.626 (0.619–0.634)	0.644 (0.632–0.653)	1.028	44.6

7.3 H3: Satisficer Parameters Trace a Compute–Welfare Frontier

The τ -band rule shows a clear frontier: increasing τ reduces compute sharply with small welfare changes. For K_search, $K = 1$ is often Pareto at these N , while K_greedy exhibits a clean frontier: $K = 5$ dominates $K = 3$ in welfare at tiny additional compute.

7.4 H4: Robustness to Call Auctions, Feeder Caps, and Information Limits

In call auctions, K_greedy remains near optimizer welfare with \gg lower compute (e.g., $N = 500$: $\hat{W} = 0.644$ vs optimizer 0.626; $\approx 45\times$ less ms). With a feeder cap, \hat{W} often remains similar or modestly higher because the planner bound tightens under the cap; absolute welfare and traded volume do not increase. Ticker-only information reduces \hat{W} for all agents, preserving ordering and compute gaps.

7.5 Ablations and Sensitivity

Information limits (ticker-only) reduce \hat{W} uniformly; satisficer ordering remains. Varying σ (intraday dispersion) changes book thickness and absolute \hat{W} but the compute gap persists. Heterogeneous τ and K draws (not shown) preserve the frontier structure.

8 Discussion and Integrity

Compute accounting.

We time decisions *inside* `decide()` once per agent per interval and log to CSV; matching cost is excluded by design to reflect agent-side compute budgets. A test suite constrains wrapper overhead to $<3\%$.

Compute sustainability and latency.

We report per-agent wall-clock ms, `offers_seen`, `solver_calls`, and peak memory. These metrics proxy both latency budgets (meeting 5-minute cadence with headroom) and energy footprint of agent software [Schwartz et al. \(2020\)](#); [Strubell et al. \(2019\)](#). Across N , optimizer costs grow with book thickness, while limited-search satisficers exhibit




Fig. 1 CDA frontier overlay: optimizer vs satisficers across N (Pareto-by- N means)




Fig. 2 Two views of H1: (a) planner-bound view (\hat{W} vs ms); (b) ratio-to-optimizer view ($R_W = W_{\text{sat}} / W_{\text{opt}}$ vs ms) with the 0.90–0.98 target band shaded

near-constant microsecond-level costs dominated by wrapper overhead. This separation suggests P2P deployments can favor satisficers on embedded hardware, reserving heavier optimization for scarcity conditions.




Fig. 3 Scaling: per-agent wall time vs N for optimizer and K_greedy

Bound correctness.

The planner bound operates on pre-clearing orders (plus posts) and respects feeder caps. We fixed a call-auction bug that previously computed the bound on mutated orders; all reported results use the corrected implementation, with $\hat{W} \in (0, 1]$.

Why optimizer $\hat{W} < 1$ and satisficer can exceed optimizer.

Our *optimizer* makes *local* (per-agent) choices; it does not globally maximize quote-surplus across all agents, while the bound is computed market-wide on the union of quotes. Continuous matching with price-time priority means taker order affects realized pairs. A satisficer that does not sweep marginal matches can leave high-spread pairs available for other agents, sometimes yielding a higher \hat{W} than the optimizer's myopic greedy fill, even though both remain ≤ 1 . This is an ordering/coordination effect, not a change in quotes or trade-price rules.

Informal counterexample ($>100\%$ vs optimizer, still \leq bound). Buyers: B_m bids 60 and needs 2 kWh; B_h bids 100 and needs 1 kWh. Sellers: A_1 asks 10 (1 kWh), A_2 asks 59 (1), A_3 asks 95 (1).

- **Myopic per-agent "optimizer" (greedy sweep).** If B_m arrives first and fills both units from A_1 and A_2 : welfare = $(60-10) + (60-59) = 51$. Then B_h matches A_3 : welfare = $100-95 = 5$. Total $W_{\text{opt}} = 56$.
- **$K=1$ satisficer.** B_m takes only the top-of-book unit A_1 : welfare = $60-10 = 50$. Then B_h takes the next top unit A_2 : welfare = $100-59 = 41$. Total $W_{\text{sat}} = 91$.

The market-wide planner bound here is $W_{\text{bound}} = 91$ (match $B_h \rightarrow A_2$, $B_m \rightarrow A_1$). Hence normalized welfare $\hat{W}_{\text{opt}} = 56/91 \approx 0.615$ and $\hat{W}_{\text{sat}} = 91/91 = 1.00$; the




Fig. 4 τ -band heatmap: normalized welfare by (τ, N)

satisficer exceeds the optimizer ($\approx 162\%$ of optimizer welfare) while respecting $\hat{W} \leq 1$. *Note:* B_m still needs 1 kWh and would procure it at the retail anchor; that energy-service detail lies outside the P2P quote-surplus calculation.

Limitations.

We focus on myopic per-interval rules; adding inter-temporal storage optimization is left for future work. A single feeder cap abstracts network constraints; richer power-flow-aware constraints are future work. Our environment parameters follow U.S. residential priors; other contexts may differ.

Threats to validity.

(i) External validity: residential parameters and retail anchor may differ by region; sensitivity to price dispersion was explored via σ , but future work should broaden contexts. Different tick sizes and alternative clearing rules (e.g., uniform-price vs maker-price in batch auctions) may affect microstructure and should be tested. (ii) Construct validity: we measure quote-based surplus, standard for CDA comparisons; absolute surplus depends on quoting behavior and retail anchors. (iii) Internal validity: instrumentation overhead is bounded and tested; bound correctness is validated with unit tests and manual checks ($\hat{W} \leq 1$).

Worst-case behavior.

Our guarantees are empirical and stylized. In adversarial books where top-of-book spreads are small while deeper levels contain large spreads, k-limited satisficers can




Fig. 5 Robustness: K_greedy under CDA vs call vs call+cap (Pareto-by-N means)

leave surplus on the table. A trivial bound relates the satisficer’s welfare to the sum of spreads within the inspected set: per interval, $W_{\text{sat}} \geq \sum_{\text{trades over top-}K} (b-a)q$, so the ratio to the planner bound is at least the fraction of positive spread captured in the inspected region. This clarifies when satisficing may underperform: thin books, highly skewed spreads by depth, or adversarial taker ordering.

Reproducibility.

Our pipeline logs manifests (seeds, CPU/OS/Python) and per-run CSVs. A single script (`scripts/run_final_v4.sh`) regenerates all experiments, aggregated CSVs, overlays, theory checks, and figures. All analysis uses deterministic seeds; we report bootstrap CIs for aggregated cells.

Ethical considerations.

Lower computational burdens reduce energy use of software agents and may enable participation by resource-constrained devices; however, equity, privacy, and fair access require careful design. Our simulator logs aggregate metrics only and can be extended with differential privacy for decision logs.

Policy implications.

For residential CDAs and periodic call auctions, lightweight early-stopping rules can deliver near-baseline welfare with large compute and energy savings. This reduces not only compute cost but also the energy footprint of agent software, supporting




Fig. 6 Information robustness: K_{greedy} under book vs ticker-only information

sustainability. Distribution system operators (DSOs) or regulators could allow (or encourage) satisficing agents in P2P pilots, reserving heavier optimization for scarcity or tight feeder constraints.

Generalization beyond electricity.

The mechanisms underlying our results—price–time priority revealing opportunities at the top of book and the efficacy of early-stopping—apply to other peer-to-peer resource allocation problems with continuous matching and local constraints (e.g., compute/CPU spot markets, spectrum sharing, ride-hailing dispatch). In any market where quotes are reasonably well behaved and books are sufficiently thick, limited inspection (small K) can approach optimizer outcomes while saving compute.

9 Related Work

CDA microstructure and trading agents.

CDA efficiency is well established in laboratory economics [Smith \(1962\)](#) and computational markets with simple agents [Gode and Sunder \(1993\)](#); [Cliff and Bruten \(1997\)](#); [Das et al. \(2001\)](#). Market microstructure surveys document price–time priority, maker-taker rules, and empirical regularities [Biais et al. \(2005\)](#). Our agents operate in this canonical setting (maker-price rule, FIFO). The trading-agents literature explores a spectrum from zero-/minimal-intelligence (ZIC/ZIP) to more adaptive strategies; our

satisficers are deliberately simple and early-stopping by design, and we focus on their *compute* footprint relative to welfare.

P2P electricity markets and ABM.

P2P designs stress local flexibility and prosumer-centric trading Parag and Sovacool (2016); Mengelkamp et al. (2018), with comprehensive surveys Sousa et al. (2019). Agent-based modeling of smart electricity markets is mature Ringler et al. (2016). Recent P2P work studies community microgrids and bilateral trading mechanisms Morstyn et al. (2018), blockchain platforms and transaction design Zeraati et al. (2023), multi-carrier trading Ghodusingejad et al. (2023), and broader transactive energy overviews Azar et al. (2023); Tushar et al. (2021). Optimization-centric approaches (e.g., distributed optimization/ADMM, MILP scheduling, coalition formation) provide strong benchmarks but often presume nontrivial solver costs per interval Seyfi et al. (2023). By contrast, our lens is computational: we explicitly instrument and compare the compute footprints of agent decision rules under CDA/call auctions.

Call auctions vs CDAs.

The microstructure literature contrasts continuous double auctions, which clear continuously with price–time priority, with periodic call auctions, which batch clear at discrete times. Empirically, CDAs can exhibit higher liquidity and dynamic price discovery, while calls can reduce volatility. Our results show that the compute–welfare frontier for satisficers persists under both formats, and the relative ordering of agents is preserved.

Bounded rationality and metareasoning.

Satisficing Simon (1955) and resource-rational analysis Lieder and Griffiths (2020) formalize decision-making under limited compute. Metareasoning and anytime algorithms analyze how agents allocate computation Russell and Wefald (1991); Zilberstein (1996); Cox and Raja (2011). In energy markets, machine learning for agent-based models has seen renewed interest Kell et al. (2022). Our satisficers instantiate these principles in a CDA: they stop early ($O(K)$ inspection), exploiting the fact that price–time priority concentrates opportunities at the top of book.

Compute vs performance and AI sustainability.

The AI community has highlighted the need to measure and reduce compute and energy footprints Schwartz et al. (2020); Strubell et al. (2019). Scaling-law work relates performance to model/data/compute resources Kaplan et al. (2020); Hoffmann et al. (2022), and sparse experts target efficiency Fedus et al. (2021). Our “compute–welfare frontier” adopts a similar lens in a multi-agent market: we plot welfare vs per-agent compute, quantify scaling with market size, and identify non-dominated configurations. This connects energy markets and AI sustainability: efficient agents reduce both latency and energy consumption of the software stack.

Positioning.

We are not the first to show that simple agents perform well in CDAs; our novelty is to (i) instrument per-agent compute rigorously, (ii) quantify compute-welfare tradeoffs in a realistic P2P CDA (and call auction) with planner bounds, and (iii) map robustness to market size, information, and feeder constraints. To our knowledge, prior P2P studies have not provided a compute-welfare frontier with explicit per-agent timing and memory metrics under 5-minute cadence.

10 Implementation Details and Tests

We implement the CDA and call-auction books with unit tests for matching (maker-price; partial fills; cancel/modify), metrics (planner bound $\geq W$; equality on synthetic monotone books), agents (stopping rules; optimizer dominance in toy cases), instrumentation overhead ($<3\%$), and a smoke test. We enforce function-size discipline, add static checks (ruff/mypy), and log manifests (seeds, CPU/OS/Python) per experiment. A single script archives prior outputs, runs the full grid, aggregates, and renders figures suitable for publication.

Reproducibility and artifacts.

We provide scripts to regenerate all results, CSVs, and figures. Run `bash scripts/run_final_v4.sh` from the repository root; it records seeds and environment manifests and writes figures to `outputs/analysis/figs_final/`. Source code and instructions are included to facilitate reproduction by reviewers and readers. Production figure assets (vector line art and high-DPI images) are available alongside the repository outputs directory.

11 Limitations and Future Work

Limitations.

We model myopic per-interval decisions without inter-temporal planning for storage; a single feeder cap abstracts network constraints; and residential priors may not generalize globally. Our agents share the same information and forecasts; strategic heterogeneity (e.g., adversarial or collusive behavior) is out of scope. Quote-surplus welfare is standard for CDA comparisons but depends on quoting behavior and retail anchors.

Future work.

Extend to inter-temporal storage and EV scheduling; incorporate AC/DC power-flow-aware network constraints; explore adaptive satisficers and hybrid agents that switch between satisficing and optimization based on scarcity; test on embedded hardware for end-to-end energy/latency profiling; and broaden environments (wholesale-like settings, developing regions, and alternative retail anchors).

12 Conclusion

We show that satisficing agents—aspiration bands and limited search/greedy—can recover near-optimizer welfare in P2P electricity CDAs while using tens to hundreds of times less per-agent compute. The compute–welfare frontier is clear and robust across auction formats, information sets, and feeder constraints. Future work will add inter-temporal storage decisions and richer network constraints, explore adaptive satisficing and multi-agent learning rules, and field-test agent implementations on embedded hardware.

Statements and Declarations

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Competing interests.

The author declares no competing interests.

Ethical approval.

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Not applicable.

Author contributions.

Conceptualization, methodology, software, validation, formal analysis, investigation, data curation, visualization, and writing (original draft; review and editing): Om Tailor.

Data availability.

All experiment outputs (per-interval and per-agent CSVs) and figures are reproducible via the provided scripts. Aggregated CSVs and figure assets are generated under `outputs/` and can be shared upon request or accessed via the project repository at https://github.com/Ostailor/Satisficing_Against_Optimizer.

Code availability.

The full simulation and analysis code is available at https://github.com/Ostailor/Satisficing_Against_Optimizer; experiments and figures can be regenerated with `scripts/run_final_v4.sh` and analysis utilities under `p2p/sim/`. The exact git hash for each run is logged in `outputs/exp*/manifest.json`.

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