



Organizational Growth and Government Control: A Simulation Design

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Background and Research Question

As Gamson (1975), Ganz (2000), and Spires (2011) has pointed out, the control of an authoritarian government over social organizations can be classified into three categories:

1. Policy on the emergence of organizations (**x**): Penalty imposed or subsidy given to small organizations.
2. Policy on the growth of organizations (**y**): Penalty imposed or subsidy given to all active organizations.
3. Anti-threat policy (**z**): Penalty imposed on large organizations so that they will not challenge the authority of the government.

Therefore, government control can be constructed easily:

Government Control

$$Control(P) = zP^2 + yP + x$$

This research aims to estimate the control coefficients and provide a prediction for the growth of nonprofits with different organizational size and subsidy levels.

Net Asset is used as a measure of organizational size.

Method

Assumptions

1. Growth: $\Delta P = Income(P) - Cost(P) + Control(P)$
2. Income: $Income(P) = Production(P) \cdot Price(P)$
3. Price: $Price(P) = b - c \cdot Production(P)$
4. Production is linear and random
5. Organizations are grouped by province, and the price in an area is affected by the province's total production.

Model of Organizational Growth

The model is given as:

$$\Delta P_{i,k} = ca_{i,k}P_{i,k} \sum a_{i,k}P_{i,k} + ba_{i,k}P_{i,k} - cost_{i,k} + Control(P_{i,k})$$




where

- $\Delta P_{i,k}$ is the growth of the i^{th} organization in the k^{th} province.
- $a_{i,k}$ is randomly generated from a $N(0.1, 0.01)$ distribution.

Parameter Estimation (Iterations = 100)

OLS is used to estimate the parameters for each of the random vector a . Estimation is the mean of the 100 iterations.

Calibration and Results



Data

Source: Research Infrastructure of Chinese Foundation (RICF). The data are collected from annual reports and audited financial reports published by the supervising government departments. Year 2013-2015 is used.

Table 1. Descriptive Stats (in millions) (N=7,771)

Variables	Mean	Std	Min	Max
Net Asset (Constrained)	57.03	119.67	1.55e-05	972.80
Subsidy Received	0.29	10.33	0.00	890.20
Cost	10.87	43.41	2e-06	944.69
Net Asset Change (Constrained)	5.01	29.53	-287.740	477.91
Province				
Total	7771	of	30	categories
Beijing	961			

Model Summary

For the logistic equation model, we should have the following constraints:


- $z < 0$ and $c < 0$
- $b > 0$

The estimated parameters are given below. The model is valid since we have satisfied the model assumptions.

Table 2. Parameter Estimation

Params	Value	Idea
z	-0.00153	Control
y	0.153379	Control
x	7.886176	Control
c	-0.00234	Capacity
b	0.680544	Base Price

Forecast: Growth of Nonprofits by Province



Conclusions

The LE model enables us to detect the duality of government control in China:

- The government subsidizes small and medium organizations
- The government penalizes large organizations

Further, simulation studies enable us to conduct some interesting observations:

- (Fig2) Nonprofits in different provinces tend to have different growth rate.
- (Fig3) Government control will offset the effect of production growth when the size is too large (around 1300).
- (Fig4) Subsidies are important to long run growth for nonprofits.