



22145331



International Baccalaureate®
Baccalauréat International
Bachillerato Internacional

HISTORY

ROUTE 2

HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL

PAPER 1 – THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 1945–79

Wednesday 14 May 2014 (afternoon)

1 hour

INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.
- The maximum mark for this examination paper is *[25 marks]*.

Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses ... ; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the role of the United States in the Middle East (1973–1978).

SOURCE A Extract from “*The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords*” by D Little, in ***The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 2: Crises and Détente***, 2010. D Little is an American professor of History.

Throughout the fall [autumn] of 1973 and into the new year Kissinger solidified his unofficial contacts with Anwar Sadat, who quickly concluded that the road to resolution of the Egyptian–Israeli conflict ran through Washington not Moscow. Relying on what came to be known as “shuttle diplomacy”, Kissinger pressed both Tel Aviv and Cairo, step by reluctant step towards a disengagement agreement in the Sinai and then raised the possibility of a broader peace settlement. Kissinger’s breakthrough on the Egyptian–Israeli front was a crucial factor in OPEC’s [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] decision to lift the oil embargo in the spring of 1974.

Eager to break the deadlock in the Middle East and sustain détente with the Soviet Union, the Carter administration proposed a peace conference at Geneva, where Washington and Moscow could sit down with their regional friends to press for a comprehensive settlement. Begin, Israel’s newly elected Prime Minister, was dead set against the Geneva Conference, because representatives of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] were likely to be present. Sadat was worried that Carter might strike a deal with Brezhnev to preserve détente which would jeopardise Egypt’s improved relations with the United States. In an unexpected move Sadat flew to Jerusalem in November 1977, where he embraced Begin and announced that Egypt was willing to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel.

SOURCE B

*Cartoon published in the British newspaper **The Sun**, 23 May 1974, depicting US secretary of state Henry Kissinger on a Middle East tour.*

Please go to this link: http://www.cartoons.ac.uk/browse/cartoon_item/artist=Arthur%20Horner?publication=The%20Sun&page=8

TRAVELLING HOPEFULLY

SOURCE C

*Timeline of events in the Middle East (1973–1977), from **The Longman Companion to the Middle East Since 1914** (second edition), by Ritchie Ovendale, 1998. Ritchie Ovendale was professor of International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK.*

- 20 October 1973: Henry Kissinger flies to Moscow and together with Brezhnev drafts a ceasefire agreement, which puts a ceasefire in place and calls for the implementation of UN resolution 242 of 1967 after the ceasefire. It also calls for a just and lasting peace. This is accepted by both sides with 22 October as the day for implementation.
- 5 November 1973: Kissinger starts shuttle diplomacy between Arab countries and Israel following the conclusion of the October War.
- 18 January 1974: First disengagement agreement signed; it allows limited Egyptian troops on the East Bank of the Suez Canal, a no man's land supervised by the United Nations in the western parts of Sinai, and limited Israeli forces west of the Giddi and Mitla passes.
- 31 May 1974: Kissinger manages to convince the Israelis that the Syrian leader Assad is genuine in his assurances that the Golan would not become guerrilla territory. Israel and Syria sign an agreement for separation of forces in the Golan to be supervised and inspected by the United Nations Disengagement and Observer Force.
- August 1976: Kissinger concludes a second disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt, each side moves their forces further from each other.

SOURCE D

Extract from United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, 25 October 1973.

The Security Council,

1. *Demands* that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 4:50pm on 22 October 1973;
2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as an immediate step, to increase the number of United Nations military observers on both sides;
3. *Decides* to set up immediately, under its authority, a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from member states of the United Nations except the permanent members of the Security Council and requests the Secretary-General to report on this within 24 hours.

SOURCE E

Extract from a speech by Harold H Saunders, US assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, to the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the US Congress, 1975.

The framework for the negotiations that have taken place and the agreements they have produced involving Israel, Syria and Egypt have been provided for by UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

In accepting the framework, all of the parties have accepted that the objective is peace between them based on mutual recognition, territorial integrity, political independence, the right to live in peace between secure and recognized borders and the resolution of specific issues which comprise the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We have not devised an American solution, nor would it be appropriate for us to do so. This is the responsibility of the parties and the purpose of the negotiating process. But we have not closed our minds to any reasonable solution which can contribute to progress toward our overriding objective in the Middle East – an Arab-Israeli peace. The step-by-step approach to negotiations which we have pursued has been based partly on the understanding that issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict take time to mature.

1. (a) What, according to Source A, were the problems of peacemaking in the Middle East between 1973 and 1978? [3 marks]
 - (b) What is the message conveyed by Source B? [2 marks]
 2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources C and E about the peacemaking process in the Middle East in the 1970s. [6 marks]
 3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source D for historians studying the peace process in the Middle East. [6 marks]
 4. "The US was the driving force in the peace process in the Middle East between 1973 and 1978." Using the sources and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with this statement? [8 marks]
-