

Defensive Security Project by: SOC Analysts (VSI)

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Monitoring Environment

Scenario

- . We are SOC analysts at a small company called **Virtual Space Industries (VSI)**, which designs virtual-reality programs for businesses.
- . VSI has heard rumors that a competitor, **JobeCorp**, may launch cyberattacks to disrupt VSI's business.
- . As SOC analysts, we are tasked with using Splunk to monitor potential attacks on our systems and applications.
- . The VSI products that we have been tasked with monitoring include:
 - An Apache web server, which hosts the administrative webpage
 - A Windows operating system, which runs many of VSI's back-end operations
- . Our networking team has provided us with past logs to help us develop baselines and create reports, alerts, dashboards, and more.

“WHOIS” App

WHOIS - Summary

This app implements investigative actions that query the whois database

Supported Actions

- Test connectivity: Validate the configuration for connectivity
- Whois domain: Execute a whois lookup on the given domain
- Whois ip: Execute a whois lookup on the given IP

WHOIS – Scenario Illustrating Benefits

Suspicious Activity Detected

SIEM alerts us to a series of failed login attempts targeting VSI's internal developer portal. The attempts originate from multiple IP addresses that are unfamiliar to us. Concerned, we pivot to Splunk to investigate further.

Using the WHOIS Add-on for Threat Attribution

To quickly determine if these IPs are linked to a known adversary, we utilize the WHOIS Splunk add-on to enrich our logs with domain registration details. Within seconds, we discover:

- Several of the flagged IPs are registered under a hosting provider frequently used for malicious activity.
- One domain, jobe-secureddev.com, was registered just days ago using privacy masking. The name is suspiciously similar to our competitor JobeCorp.
- The WHOIS information reveals that the registrar is the same one JobeCorp has used in the past for legitimate domains.

Escalation & Defensive Action

With this intelligence, our SOC team correlates the failed logins with previously observed phishing attempts impersonating VSI's internal services. We escalate the case to leadership, who notify legal and IT security.

- IT blocks all traffic from the suspicious IPs to prevent further login attempts.
- We update firewall rules and SIEM alerts to monitor for future activity from similar IP ranges.
- SOC initiates proactive threat hunting, using WHOIS lookups to identify other potentially related domains.

Outcome: Attack Disrupted, Security Strengthened

Thanks to the WHOIS add-on in Splunk, we quickly linked the attack attempts to our competitor and took preventive measures before an actual breach could occur. Moving forward, we integrate automated WHOIS lookups into our SIEM workflows to enhance our threat detection capabilities.

WHOIS - Images

Apps

Browse more apps

Install app from file

Showing 26-30 of 30 items

filter

Q

25

« Prev 1

Name ↕	Folder name ↕	Version ↕	Update checking ↕	Visible ↕	Sharing ↕	Status ↕	Actions
Splunk Analytics Workspace	splunk_metrics_workspace	2.52.0	Yes	Yes	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Launch app Edit properties View objects
Monitoring Console	splunk_monitoring_console	10.2.1	Yes	Yes	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Launch app Edit properties View objects
Splunk RapidDiag	splunk_rapid_diag	1.9.1	Yes	Yes	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Launch app Edit properties View objects
Splunk Secure Gateway	splunk_secure_gateway	3.8.38	No	Yes	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Launch app Edit properties View objects
whois	whois		Yes	No	App Permissions	Enabled Disable	Edit properties View objects

splunk>enterprise

Apps

Administrator

1 Messages

Settings

Activity

Help

Find

Q

Default View

Home

Search & Reporting

Audit Trail

Splunk Secure Gateway

Upgrade Readiness App

whois

Manage Apps

Find More Apps

App whois

enter s

No Ever

> Sea

All time

Q

Verbose Mode

How to Search

If you are not familiar with the search features, or want to learn more, or see your available data, see one of the following resources.

Documentation

Tutorial

Data Summary

Analyze Your Data with Table Views

Table Views let you prepare data without using SPL. First, use a point-and-click interface to select data. Then, clean and transform it for analysis in Analytics Workspace, Search, or Pivot!

Learn more about Table Views, or view and manage your Table Views with the Datasets listing page.

Create Table View

Logs Analyzed

1

Windows Logs

This Server contains the properties of VSI's next generation virtual-reality programs

2

Apache Logs

Logs for VSI's Main Public website

Windows Logs

Reports—Windows

Designed the following reports:

Report Name	Report Description
Associated Signature IDs	A report of IDs associated with Windows activities that are attached with specific signature
Severity %	A quick report of Informational and High Percentages showcasing the severity level of the Logs being viewed
Success and Failure Activities	A report that showcases if there are any suspicious activity of failure or success on the server

Images of Reports—Windows

Associated Signature IDs

source="windows_server_logs.csv" | table signature signature_id | dedup signature

All time

4,764 events (before 3/25/25 12:11:25.000 PM)

No Event Sampling

Job

Events (4,764)

Patterns

Statistics (15)

Visualization

Show: 20 Per Page

Format

Preview: On

signature	signature_id
A user account was deleted	4726
A user account was created	4720
A computer account was deleted	4743
An account was successfully logged on	4624
Special privileges assigned to new logon	4672
An attempt was made to reset an accounts password	4724
System security access was granted to an account	4717
A privileged service was called	4673
A logon was attempted using explicit credentials	4648
A user account was locked out	4740

Severity %

source="windows_server_logs.csv" | top severity

All time

4,764 events (before 3/25/25 12:12:34.000 PM)

No Event Sampling

Job

Events (4,764)

Patterns

Statistics (2)

Visualization

Show: 20 Per Page

Format

Preview: On

severity	count	percent
informational	4435	93.094039
high	329	6.905961

Success and Failure Activities

source="windows_server_logs.csv" | top status

All time

4,764 events (before 3/25/25 12:13:48.000 PM)

No Event Sampling

Job

Events (4,764)

Patterns

Statistics (2)

Visualization

Show: 20 Per Page

Format

Preview: On

status	count	percent
success	4622	97.019312
failure	142	2.980688

Alerts—Windows

Designed the following alerts:

Alert Name	Alert Description	Alert Baseline	Alert Threshold
VSI Failure Alert	Threshold of Failed Windows Activity being reached	6	10

JUSTIFICATION: Looking through the data we noticed that with the average number of failed activity being around 6 it can be determined that this would be the baseline. After looking at the data again we came to the decision that since none of the data hit an activity count of 10 we choose that to be the threshold for alerts.

Alerts—Windows

Designed the following alerts:

Alert Name	Alert Description	Alert Baseline	Alert Threshold
VSI Successful Log In	Threshold of Successful Logged on	12	30

JUSTIFICATION: With the data presenting an average of about 12 to make the baseline for use we noticed that it as well never came close to our threshold of 30 but if it were to reach 30 then that would trigger our suspicious activity alert.


Alerts—Windows

Designed the following alerts:



Alert Name	Alert Description	Alert Baseline	Alert Threshold
VSI Account Deleted	Threshold for Deleted User Accounts	13	40

JUSTIFICATION: Through the data an average of 13 determined our baseline and after looking at the data more having a threshold of 40 would trigger a suspicious alert.

Dashboards—Windows



Dashboards—Windows



Apache Logs

Reports—Apache

Designed the following reports:

Report Name	Report Description
Apache Methods	Shows which HTTP Methods are being requested the most
Apache Top Domains	Shows the top domains that are associated to VSI's website
Apache Response Codes	Shows the HTTP codes and the count of how frequent is it being used

Images of Reports—Apache

Apache Response Codes

source="apache_logs.txt" | top status

10,000 events (before 3/25/25 12:50:32.000 PM) No Event Sampling

Events (10,000) Patterns Statistics (8) Visualization

Show: 20 Per Page Format Preview: On

status	count	percent
200	9126	91.260000
304	445	4.450000
404	213	2.130000
301	164	1.640000
206	45	0.450000
500	3	0.030000
416	2	0.020000
403	2	0.020000

Apache Top Domains

source="apache_logs.txt" | top limit=10 referer_domain

10,000 events (before 3/25/25 12:49:18.000 PM) No Event Sampling

Events (10,000) Patterns Statistics (10) Visualization

Show: 20 Per Page Format Preview: On

referer_domain	count	percent
http://www.semicomplete.com	3038	51.256960
http://semicomplete.com	2001	33.760756
http://www.google.com	123	2.075249
https://www.google.com	105	1.771554
http://stackoverflow.com	34	0.573646
http://www.google.fr	31	0.523030
http://s-chassis.co.nz	29	0.489286
http://logstash.net	28	0.472414
http://www.google.es	25	0.421799
https://www.google.co.uk	23	0.388055

Apache Methods

source="apache_logs.txt" | top method

10,000 events (before 3/25/25 12:47:27.000 PM) No Event Sampling

Events (10,000) Patterns Statistics (4) Visualization

Show: 20 Per Page Format Preview: On

method	count	percent
GET	9851	98.510000
POST	106	1.060000
HEAD	42	0.420000
OPTIONS	1	0.010000

Alerts—Apache

Designed the following alerts:

Alert Name	Alert Description	Alert Baseline	Alert Threshold
VSI Outside USA Activity	Creates an Alert if the Threshold is triggered by increased Activity outside of the USA	85	160

JUSTIFICATION: After reviewing the data and noticing an average of 85 events being standards in the logs but with some events being in the 100s as well creating a threshold of 160 would create a large suspicious radar as none of the data came close to that data number.



Alerts—Apache

Designed the following alerts:


Alert Name	Alert Description	Alert Baseline	Alert Threshold
VSI HTTP POST Count	Triggers when the threshold count is reached during its hourly check of POST method for HTTP	3	10

JUSTIFICATION: The average through the data was between the low numbers of 1 and 4 and by creating a threshold that doubles the amount from the average would trigger suspicious.

Dashboards—Apache



Dashboards—Apache



Attack Analysis

Attack Summary—Windows

Summarize your findings from your reports when analyzing the attack logs.

- Upon analyzing the attack logs, we observed notable shifts in severity levels that suggest potential suspicious activity. The percentage of informational severity incidents decreased from 93% to 80%, marking a 13% decline, while high-severity incidents rose from 7% to 20%, reflecting a corresponding 13% increase. This significant change indicates a possible escalation in threat levels, warranting further investigation into the nature of these high-severity events. However, when examining failed window activities, we found no major fluctuations that would suggest unusual behavior. Successful activities increased slightly from 97% to 98%, while failed attempts decreased from 3% to 2%, indicating a minor shift but nothing indicative of a widespread attack or significant breach attempt. While the failed activity report does not raise immediate concerns, the increase in high-severity incidents suggests a potential emerging threat that requires closer monitoring to determine the root cause and mitigate any risks.

Attack Summary—Windows

Summarize your findings from your alerts when analyzing the attack logs. Were the thresholds correct?


- When analyzing the attack logs, we detected a suspicious volume of both failed Windows activity and successful logins, both of which triggered our alert thresholds. The failed Windows activity spiked to 35 events at 8 AM on March 25, surpassing our threshold of greater than 10, confirming that the alert system functioned as expected. Similarly, we observed an unusual volume of successful logins, with 94 events occurring at 2 AM, primarily associated with User_A. This activity also triggered our alert, reinforcing the reliability of our threshold settings. Upon review, we determined that our predefined thresholds were appropriate and did not require adjustment, as they effectively captured these anomalies. Additionally, we found no suspicious volume of deleted accounts, indicating no immediate concerns in that area. Overall, our alert system correctly identified and flagged potentially concerning activities, supporting its effectiveness in monitoring and responding to security threats.

Attack Summary—Windows


Summarize your findings from your dashboards when analyzing the attack logs.

- Upon analyzing the attack logs through our dashboards, we identified several suspicious activities that were consistently reflected across multiple data visualizations. In the time chart of signatures, the "Other" category was the most prominent, indicating an anomaly that warranted further scrutiny. The most notable signatures included a locked-out user account and an attempt to reset an account password, occurring between 12 AM and 3 AM and 8 AM and 11 AM, respectively. The peak count for account lockouts reached 856, while password reset attempts peaked at 1,258, suggesting a potentially targeted attack or unauthorized access attempt. Additionally, user activity data revealed two specific users, User_A and User_K, who exhibited unusually high activity during these same timeframes, with peak counts of 984 and 1,256, respectively. The consistency of these findings was reinforced through bar, graph, and pie chart visualizations, which further highlighted the same two suspicious periods. Our analysis of user activity with statistical charts confirmed these trends, reinforcing our concerns while also providing a broader perspective on user behavior. Overall, our dashboard analysis effectively identified and validated unusual activity, confirming the need for closer monitoring and potential security measures to mitigate any risks associated with these anomalies.


Screenshots of Attack Logs



Screenshots of Attack Logs



Screenshots of Attack Logs



Attack Summary—Apache

Summarize your findings from your reports when analyzing the attack logs.

- Upon analyzing the attack logs through our reports, we identified suspicious changes in HTTP methods, specifically in the POST and GET requests. However, when reviewing referrer domains, we did not detect any significant changes that would raise security concerns. Additionally, our analysis of HTTP response codes revealed a minor fluctuation in the number of 404 errors, but this change was not substantial enough to be considered suspicious. While the HTTP methods anomaly warrants further investigation to determine if it is linked to any malicious activity, the overall findings from the referrer domains and response codes suggest no immediate widespread security threat.

Attack Summary—Apache

Summarize your findings from your alerts when analyzing the attack logs. Were the thresholds correct?


- Upon analyzing the attack logs through our alerts, we identified a significant spike in both international activity and HTTP POST requests, both occurring at 8 PM on March 25th. The international activity primarily originated from Ukraine, with a total count of 1,369 during the spike, which was substantial enough to trigger our alert system. Similarly, we observed an unusually high volume of HTTP POST requests, reaching 1,269 within the same timeframe. However, after reviewing the established thresholds, we determined that no changes were necessary, as they effectively detected and highlighted the anomalies. The consistency in detection across both international activity and HTTP POST logs further validated the accuracy of our threshold settings.

Attack Summary—Apache


Summarize your findings from your dashboards when analyzing the attack logs.

- Upon analyzing the attack logs through our dashboards, we identified multiple suspicious activities across different metrics, indicating a potential security threat. The time chart of HTTP methods revealed a significant spike in GET request activity between 5:00 PM and 7:00 PM, with a peak count of 729, suggesting a targeted attempt to access specific resources. The cluster map analysis further reinforced this concern, showing an unusual surge in activity from Kiev and Kharkiv, Ukraine, with respective counts of 439 and 432. This unexpected international activity aligns with the suspicious HTTP request patterns, indicating that the source of the attack may be originating from these regions. Additionally, the URI data analysis identified two specific endpoints—/VSI_Account_logon.php and files/logstash/logstash-1.3.2-monolithic.jar—as the most frequently accessed during the attack window. Given that one of these URIs is related to account logins, it suggests that the attacker may be attempting credential stuffing, brute-force login attempts, or unauthorized access to user accounts. The repeated access to the Logstash JAR file could also indicate an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities within the system's logging infrastructure. These findings, combined with the geographical anomalies and method-specific attack patterns, highlight a coordinated attack effort that warrants immediate investigation and enhanced security measures to prevent further exploitation.



Screenshots of Attack Logs



Screenshots of Attack Logs



Screenshots of Attack Logs



Summary and Future Mitigations

Project 3 Summary

- What were your overall findings from the attack that took place?

Our overall findings revealed a coordinated attack involving credential-based attempts (brute force password spamming), international activity spikes, and suspicious HTTP methods on March 25. VSI experienced different attacks that varied on both servers (Windows and Apache) from all different regions of the globe.

- To protect VSI from future attacks, what future mitigations would you recommend?
 - A strong Two factor authentications which will work as creating stronger password policies to ensure safety from brute force attacks
 - We would recommend to lock users after a certain amount of attempts of getting a login incorrect or noticing a login success within a short amount of time from one user