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A Discursive Approach

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Lukáš Tichý
Institute of International Relations
Prague, Czech Republic

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Contents

List of Abbreviations

Bcm	Billion cubic metres
BEMIP	Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan
BTE	Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline
CEF	Connecting Europe Facility
CoEU	Council of the European Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EC	European Commission
ECoun	European Council
ECT	Energy Charter Treaty
EEAS	European External Action Service
EP	European Parliament
ESPO	Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean oil pipeline
EU	European Union
FBS (FPS)	Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation/Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
FIS (SVR)	Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation
FSS (FSB)	Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GILP	Gas Interconnectors between Lithuania and Poland
IAP	Ionian–Adriatic Pipeline
IGB	Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria
ISO	Independent System Operator
ITGI	Interconnector Turkey–Greece–Italy
LT	Lisbon Treaty
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PCI	Projects of Common Interest
PPC	Permanent Partnership Council
RF	Russian Federation
TANAP	Trans-Anatolian Pipeline
TAP	Trans-Adriatic Pipeline

TEN-E	Trans-European Networks for Energy
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TSO	Transmission System Operator
VP	Vice-President
WTO	World Trade Organization

Chapter 1
The EU-Russia Energy Relations Between Nondiscursive and Discursive Approaches: An Introduction

1.1 The Importance of Energy Security in EU-Russia Relations

Energy has long been one of the most debated issues in international relations, and this is also true for talks between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation (RF). In fact, both parties have given the matter of energy their long-term attention. For the EU, as one of the largest global consumers and importers of energy resources, energy and energy security are key topics for both domestic politics (liberalizing the domestic electricity and gas market, connecting the energy infrastructure of member states) and foreign policy (energy relations with major producers) (see cf. Birchfield and Duffield 2011; Marín-Quemada et al. 2012; Knodt 2018, pp. 224–240). Similarly, for the RF, as one of the main energy producers with a strong dependence on the sale and export of energy materials, energy play an important role both in domestic politics (it is the decisive determinant of economic growth) and in foreign policy (there are close ties between energy and security policies, and energy is an influential tool of global politics) (see cf. Bušuev 2003; Aalto 2012; Demakova and Godzimirski 2012; Oxenstierna and Tynkkynen 2014; Godzimirski 2016, pp. 89–112).

The difference in position of the European Union and the Russian Federation in the global energy supply chain, which has ushered both parties into a state of interdependence further augmented by their geographic proximity and joint history, has brought the matter of energy to the fore as one of the most debated topics of the current relations between the EU and its largest eastern neighbour, Russia. Although energy security discussions between the EU and the RF are not limited merely to the supply of oil and gas from the east, energy relations are a focal point for both parties. At the same time, the RF's impact on European energy security is nothing new—the EU has been dealing with the issue since the early 1990s, if not sooner.

At the turn of the millennium, the debate increased in intensity—both at the EU level (e.g. in the European Parliament or in the European Commission) and within separate member states—in connection with the Russian economic boom and the

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occurrence of disputes between the RF and its western neighbours, Ukraine and Belarus, regarding the price of gas and oil in the years 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2010 (see Larsson 2006; Pirani 2012, pp. 169–188; Mišík 2013, pp. 99–103). Concurrently, the RF, having escaped its 1990s economic depression and experiencing increasing state intervention in the energy industry in the years 2003–2004 and the rise of global prices of oil and gas in the years 2004–2008, saw energy dominate the political discourse both in the State Duma and in the government and the relevant ministries; energetics are also a frequent topic of speeches made by the Russian president (Balzer 2005, pp. 210–225; Milov 2006; Monaghan 2007, pp. 275–288).

The energy issue has dominated interactions between the European Union and the Russian Federation with varying degrees of intensity also in the first half of the second decade of the twenty-first century. Mutual energy relations have become a focal point, especially for Russia, mainly due to the global economic crisis, which led to the stagnation of energy consumption in the EU and thus to a decrease in the import of oil and gas from the RF. Conversely, energy is currently the number one topic in the EU following the 2014 crisis between the RF and Ukraine, which led the EU to impose repeated political, economic, and individual sanctions against Russia, which may in consequence lead to the partial reduction or complete cut-off of the supply of energy materials (especially gas and oil) into Europe from the Russian Federation via Ukraine, thus endangering the EU's energy security.

1.2 The State of the Art

The importance and immediacy of the matter at hand are further evidenced by the growing number of expert publications devoted to EU-RF energy relations (cf. Aalto 2008a; Johnson and Robinson 2008; Emeljanova 2009; Avšarov 2012; Aalto 2012; Oxenstierna and Tynkkynen 2014). The question of energy relations between the EU and the RF has also provoked a proliferation of academic studies (cf. Milov 2008; Liutho 2009; Böhme 2011; Belikova 2013 Georgiou and Rocco 2017; Marocchi 2017) and scientific articles (cf. Haukalla 2008, pp. 317–331; Proedrou 2010, pp. 95–104; Kirchner and Berk 2010, pp. 829–880; Machnač 2013; Dannreuther 2016).

Nevertheless, all these theoretical, empirical, analytical publications, monographs, studies, and articles almost exclusively focus on the material circumstances of EU-RF energy relations and on the institutional structures of these relations set in an extra-discursive framework. And contrarily, the generalised aspects of these EU-RF relations, which could lead to a deeper understanding of the overall problem of energy relations between the European Union and Russia, have hardly been given any attention at all in the scientific literature, bar a few exceptions (cf. Youngs 2009; Repyeuskaya 2013). Other questions, such as the perception of the RF in the EU and vice versa, the impact of energy relations on EU and Russian identity, the effect of ideological values on energy relations (Sharples 2011; Kuzemko 2014, pp. 58–75), or the formation of energy interests (Harriman 2009; Khasson 2009; Romanova 2016,

pp. 857–879), which would be better answered by a discursive approach, are currently suffering from a lack of attention in academic circles (cf. Aalto 2008b, pp. 23–42; Dias 2013, pp. 256–271; Siddi 2018, pp. 251–274).

1.3 The Focus of the Monograph, the Main Goal, and the Research Question

The present monograph explores the energy relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation in the years 2004–2014. The focus, however, is not on the material factors of the EU-Russia energy interaction, or on the technical and institutional structure of the energy relations, i.e. the nondiscursive aspects. The monograph focuses on a less frequently analysed aspect of the EU energy relations with the Russian Federation—the ideational and discursive framework which gives meaning to the material resources and institutional structures and influences our actions and thinking.

In this context, the main goal of the monograph is to define and categorise the main approaches to the EU energy discourse in relation to the Russian Federation and vice versa and compare and interpret the contents and the basic themes of the EU and Russian discourses on their mutual energy relations. This monograph will seek to achieve the main goal by finding an answer to the main research question:

> What basic discursive complexes related to the energy relations of the EU towards Russia and vice versa can be identified, and are there any overlaps or different features between these individual energy discourses of the EU and the RF?

On the EU side, the main focus will be on the energy discourse within the European Commission (EC) and to a limited degree also within the European Parliament (EP), the European Council (ECoun), and the Council of the European Union (CoEU). The Russian discourse on the energy relations will be given a similar treatment, with the emphasis placed mainly on the modes of speech of the Russian president, the prime minister, the chairman of the State Duma, and the ministers responsible for energy policy and security in relation to the EU. The timeframe covers the period from 2004 to 2014, which is delineated by the two periods in which José M. Barroso headed the European Commission, during which a number of major events that fundamentally impacted the EU-Russian energy relations took place—mainly the 2006 and 2009 energy transit crises, the 2008 Russian–Georgian war, the inauguration of Nord Stream in 2011–2012, the launch of the antitrust investigation against Gazprom, and the 2014 Ukraine crisis.

The answer to the above-mentioned research question should help build a deeper understanding of the importance of the discourse in the EU-RF energy relations. At the same time, the answer to the main question should bring new findings regarding the energy relations between the EU and Russia, and they should contest some of the conclusions of extra-discursive research, which pertain, for example, to the widespread notion of a negative perception of Russia in the EU or to the unilateral focus

on the security aspect of the EU-RF energy relations. Last but not least, the fulfilment of the goal by answering the given research question should provide a foundation for further research of important topics, such as identity, interests, norms, and values, that the extra-discursive approach theory either ignores or regards as fixed and unchangeable facts (cf. Morgenthau 1951; Waltz 1979; Keohane 1989; Baldwin 1993). This monograph should then help one to understand the current deterioration in the energy relations between Russia and the EU due to the annexation of Crimea by the RF in 2014 and Russia's following military and political involvement in eastern Ukraine, which resulted in a fear of a disruption of the gas and oil flows from the RF to Europe, which also go through Ukraine, as such a disruption would be a danger to EU energy security.

The monograph will not limit itself to a mere description of the contents of documents or speeches made by the EU or the RF representatives, but it will instead explore the role of discourse in relation to the extra-discursive reality (framed by a material and institutional character) of the EU-RF energy relations together with the meanings assigned to them by representatives of both parties. It will be argued that the energy discourse has a major influence on negotiations between political representatives of the EU and the RF and that it impacts their behaviour, which differs from reality in the context of the mutual energy interactions. Simultaneously, it will be argued that the discourse is a strong determinant of the stances taken by the EU and the RF, and their security in the mutual energy relations while they promote their own values, and that it forms the identity and interests of both parties.

Although the monograph focuses primarily on the ideational (discursive) level of energy interaction between the EU and Russia, the significance of the institutional and material (nondiscursive) level of the EU-Russia energy relations cannot be overlooked when examining the issue (see Chap. 2). On the one hand, this institutional and material structure affects the content and character of the energy discourse of both actors, and on the other hand, the EU and Russia are active via their discourses on this extra-discursive structure of energy relations when determining its content and character, creating the initial framework in the process of exploring the interaction of discursive and extra-discursive reality.

Conversely, with regard to the main goal, the monograph does not aim to interpret the energy discourse within individual European countries or to explore their interactions with the RF. Therefore, to maintain the focus on the EU level, the European discourse will not include strategic documents and speeches of select political representatives of member states. In the same way, the monograph does not aim to analyse the stances and degrees of influence of member states during EU negotiations of the external energy relations with the RF, although the author is aware of the impact that member states have on creating the external dimensions of energy security in the European Union.

In this context, the author regards the EU as a supranational, multilateral international organisation with a distinctive system of integration, which achieved its legal personality when the Lisbon Treaty (LT) entered into force in December 2009, augmenting the EU's foreign relations role. These changes have enabled select European institutions, such as the European Commission, to interact with foreign

parties and enter into agreements with them on behalf of the EU (for more on this, cf. Braun 2011).

1.4 The Theoretical Framework

At the theoretical level, the monograph is based on the conviction that international relations are not merely the result of material and physical power but that they are also a phenomenon that is socially constructed via ideological factors, such as norms, discourses, and discursive power, which comprises the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideologies, and language (see Cox 1981). Subsequently, these discourses are not just a mere reflection of material or physical reality, but they have the ideological power to change the actions and behaviour of the interacting parties. Without them, our actions would be based solely on material interests, and as such they would become purely mechanical.

In the context of this theoretical base, the fulfilment of the designated goal will be accomplished via a theoretical framework founded on the approach of social constructivism (see cf. Wendt 1999; Adler 1997; Hopf 1998; Cho 2009). The fundament of constructivism is the conviction that "the socio-political world is constructed by human interactions and the objects of our cognition are dependent on our interpretations and our language. Which means that different collective meanings are connected to the material world in two ways, firstly as social reality and secondly as scientific knowledge" (Fiala 2007, translation). At the same time, constructivism provides a much less deterministic relation both between ideas and interests and between participants and structures, which makes it possible (a) to bring the participants back into the analysis, (b) to better integrate the ideological dimension of institutional structures and material factors through an analysis of social processes, and (c) to focus more intensely on the communicative aspect of these mutual relations and their interpretation (see, cf. Carta and Morin 2014, p. 4).

The complexity of the matter and its immediate relation to the research issue of the discourse of energy interactions between the EU and the RF highlight the need for the construction of a broader theoretical framework based on theoretical pluralism (Jokela 2011; Checkel 2013, p. 221; Adler 1997, pp. 321–323), which enables multiple select theories or approaches to be combined together. Specifically, the present monograph uses theoretical pluralism as a basis on which to combine the main findings of conventional and critical constructivism within the framework of social constructivism (Karacasulu and Uzgören 2007; Simmerl 2011) in connection with the concept of discourse in an attempt to create a comprehensive theoretical framework of a constructivist discursive approach, which will be used to examine discursive complexes in EU-RF energy discourses.

This theoretical framework will be used with the discourse to identify the relations between the main concepts, such as norms, values, or rules, and the international identity and foreign interests of both parties. Apart from this, the framework will focus on the concept of intersubjectivity in energy relations between the European Union

and the Russian Federation with the aim to interpret the shared and divergent meanings that each of the parties assign to both the discursive and the extra-discursive reality (for more on this, Makarychev 2014, pp. 27–32).

1.5 The Methodological Framework

The basic methodological approach, used in this monograph to examine the question of energy relations between the EU and the RF, is a discourse analysis that draws from the findings of social constructivism (cf. Phillips and Hardy 2002, pp. 1–17; Paltridge 2012; Johnstone 2018, pp. 1–31). Discourse analysis, which is mostly connected either with the linguistic structure of a report or text or with the rhetorical or augmentative organisation of a text or speech (McNabb 2016), is able to form reality and define actions (cf. Fairclough 1995). In other words, discourse analysis attempts to explore certain displays of discourse with the aim to understand and explain what they say about socially constructed reality and power relations in general. Discourse analysis then stems both from a constructivist ontology, which presupposes that reality is socially constructed via discourses, and from a constructivist epistemology based on the presumption that the discourse produces meanings and forms reality in ways that may be postulated with the help of interpretive methods (cf. Carta and Morin 2014, p. 8).

Discourse analysis will not be perceived as a specific method in this monograph. As in the case of the theoretical framework, the author builds on methodological pluralism with regard to discourse analysis, which combines a number of theoretical approaches and methods (cf. MacDonnel 1986; Potter and Wetherell 1996; Carta and Morin 2014, pp. 2–3). Various theoretical perspectives help understand the extent and functions of discourse analysis as a set of related methods that can be implemented. In this regard, the monograph sees discourse analysis as an overarching methodology within which it is possible to combine various theoretical approaches and methods of data analysis (Hynek and Střítecký 2010a, p. 8).

The main method of data analysis, through which the publication will examine the existence of discursive approaches in the EU and Russia and within which the main themes will be interpreted, is thematic analysis (cf. Braun and Clarke 2006; Clarke and Braun 2014). "The key is to discover the patterns of content organisation and relations within the analysed data, through which the emerging themes become analytical categories that are further structured into thematic patterns" (Hynek and Střítecký 2010b, p. 88, translation). These discovered thematic patterns will then correspond to the main discursive approaches in the analysis of the discourse of European Union and Russian Federation energy relations.

Another method used in this monograph is that of the case study (cf. Kořan 2008, pp. 29–61; Yin 2003; George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2006). Its advantage lies in the depth of analysis that it offers the researcher, allowing for a rather extensive scope of facts and the possibility of accessing their full value. The last method used herein is a comparative method consisting of a comparison in which one

phenomenon is assigned to another to discover the differences and similarities of both of them. It constitutes one of ways of testing theoretical statements and claims in political sciences and international relations (Hopkin 2010, pp. 285–286, 289–293; Lijphart 1971; Collier 1991).

Both methods will be used simultaneously—the comparative method will be used to compare individual discursive approaches of the European Union and the Russian Federation from a thematic and temporal perspective at the level of individual case studies for the periods 2004–2009 and 2010–2014, while at the same time, the case studies will also be compared with each other in the form of the comprehensive energy discourses of the EU and the RF in 2004–2014. The aim of this comparison is to show the similarities and differences between individual discursive approaches with regard to the EU and RF discourses concerning energy relations.

1.6 Literature and Sources

The author will draw from both primary and secondary literature with regard to the purpose and main goal of the work but also with regard to the stated research question. The use of primary and secondary literature will always reflect the character of the given section/chapter of the monograph.

The main primary sources used to analyse the energy discourse of the EU and the RF will be text documents containing speeches, discussions, and documents of a strategic nature, which deal with the matter of EU-RF energy relations. For the EU side of the issue, these will consist of strategic documents of the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the European Union, and speeches, public statements, and discussions of select representatives of the European Commission, but also of the High Representative of the Union for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the president of the European Parliament, and the president of the European Council. For the Russian perspective, the sources will consist of strategic documents and speeches of select political representatives (such as the president of Russia, the prime minister of Russia, the chairman of the State Duma, or key ministers), who influence the formation of RF energy policy and its relations with the European Union. Text documents will be divided according to a temporal criterion into two phases, the years 2004–2009 and the years 2010–2014, which are delineated by the two periods of office of the European Commission headed by José M. Barroso.

The secondary literature is divided according to whether it relates to the theoretical framework, that is, social constructivism and its connection with the core concepts, namely, discourse, interests, identity, and norms and values (cf. Wendt 1999; Milliken 1999; Buzan et al. 1997; Hansen 2006; Cho 2009; Balzacq 2010), or to the methodological framework, that is, discourse analysis and the main methods (cf. Fairclough 1992; Phillips and Hardy 2002; Jorgensen and Phillips 2002; Hopkin 2010; Hynek and Střítecký 2010a, b; Braun and Clarke 2012, pp. 58–59; Johnstone

2018; Paltridge 2012). Use will also be made of literature the contents of which relate to the issue of the energy policies of the EU and the RF and the influence of the respective institutional bodies and political representatives on its formation (see more, cf. Birchfield and Duffield 2011; Oxenstierna and Tynkkynen 2014; Godzimirski 2016).

1.7 The Structure of the Monograph

The book is composed of five main chapters, the introduction and the conclusion. The content of each chapter is described in the following paragraphs.

The introduction describes the meaning of the topic, which focuses on the discourses of the EU and the RF regarding energy relations in the years 2004–2014. The introduction also mentions the main goal and research question of the monograph. Also, a brief overview is made of the theoretical and methodological framework. Finally, the introduction describes the main bibliographical sources and the structure of the monograph.

Chapter 2, focusing on the main aspects of the EU-Russia energy relations, is divided into several parts. The first describes the legislative and institutional framework of the EU-Russia energy relations. The second and third parts analyse the energy policy of the EU and the RF, with each energy policy focusing on key actors as well as the basic objectives, tools, and interests of EU and Russian energy policy. The last part focuses on the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and its impact on the further development of EU-Russia energy relations. As the discursive plane of EU-Russia energy relations, which is the main content of this monograph, focuses on the period 2004–2014, Chap. 2 is also devoted to the period until 2014 with slight overlaps.

Chapter 3 gives a theoretical and methodological overview. The first part focuses on constructing a theoretical framework based on a broader understanding of social constructivism that combines conventional and critical constructivism and their approaches to the matter of discourse. This is followed by the second part, which deals with a number of key concepts of the EU/RF energy discourse in the perspective of the theoretical framework. Similarly, the third part begins by introducing the methodological framework of the dissertation in the form of discourse analysis, after which it highlights the individual methods used, that is, case studies and comparisons. The next, fourth subchapter characterises the main actors, or rather, the political representatives of the EU and the RF, who are the key impactors of the energy discourse in question. Part five details the set of criteria used to select the textual documents of EU and RF institutions, speeches, public communication, and dialogues of political functionaries of the two parties used in the study. These criteria are then applied to categorising textual units into separate period-specific corpora of documents. The last, sixth part of chapter one deals with the classification of various discursive approaches and the specification of their content with regard to the EU/RF energy discourse. This chapter provides an important theoretical–methodological basis for the analysis of the energy discourse between the EU and the RF and related issues.

Chapters 4 and 5 consist of a detailed examination of the individual discursive approaches with regard to the EU-RF energy discourses in the years 2004–2014. Both chapters focus on the discourse of chosen institutions of the EU, on the one hand, and on the RF discourse represented by the president, the prime minister, and select ministries/ministers on the other. At the same time, each discursive approach of the European Union and the Russian Federation is analysed and interpreted in its content, its main themes, the perception of Russia by the EU and vice versa, and also in the relation of norms and values to international identity and interests with the aim of answering the main question. Last, but not least, each chapter compares the differences and similarities of discursive approaches in the EU and Russian energy discourses with regard to their content and the tracked concepts in the period 2004–2009 and 2010–2014.

Chapter 6 offers a comparison of all the energy discourses of the EU and the RF in the years 2004–2014. In the first part, the monograph focuses on a comparison of the content and main themes of each of the energy discourses of the EU and Russia; a temporal comparison of the discourses in the two periods of 2004–2009 and 2010–2014 is also be provided. Similarly, the second part of Chap. 6 focuses on the comparison of the external identities and interests of the European Union and the Russian Federation in the context of the importance and influence of norms and values in each of the energy discourses.

The conclusion summarises the key findings of the analysis of EU and RF energy discourses in the years 2004–2014 and formulates conclusions based on the comparisons of these discourses. This section also includes several tables that provide an overview of the findings.

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Chapter 2
Energy Relations Between the EU and Russia

2.1 The Legislative and Institutional Framework of EU-RF Energy Relations

2.1.1 The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

The legal framework of the mutual cooperation between the EU and the RF in the field of energy is defined by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The agreement was signed by representatives of the EU and Russia in 1994 on the island of Corfu, but it did not come into force until 1 December 1997, with a 10-year period of validity.[1] The PCA was to come to an end in December 2007, but Article 106 of the PCA stipulates that when this period comes to an end, the agreement will be automatically renewed each year until it is terminated by one of the parties. The PCA has been the subject of renegotiations since 2008, as both parties have fundamentally different opinions of the content and form of a new agreement (Romanova 2012, pp. 27–28).

The PCA delineated a broad institutional base and a broad system of consultations between both parties. Until the outbreak of the 2014 crisis in Ukraine, a top-level political EU-Russia summit was held biannually; after the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty (LT), the Russian side has been represented at the summit by the Russian President and the appropriate ministers, and the EU side has been represented by the President of the European Council, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the President of the European Commission (EC). At the ministerial level, the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) was instated, where ministers of various departments meet according to current needs and issues—for example, from the departments of foreign affairs,

[1]The lengthy ratification process was influenced by a number of circumstances. The most important event was the postponement of the EU ratification process due to the first Russian war in Chechnya. The subsequent period of peace in Chechnya allowed the ratification process to resume in 1996.

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justice, and the interior. The EU-Russian political dialogue is also effectuated at the meetings of the foreign ministers of the troika, at the monthly meetings of the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the EU with the leadership of the Political and Security Committee, and on the expert level regarding current international issues. Finally, several meetings of the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee comprising members of the EP and the Russian Duma took place each year (Esakova 2012).

The question of energy cooperation in the relations between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation (RF) is addressed by Article 65 of the PCA, which stresses that the cooperation in the field of energy should be based on the principles of the market economy and on the background of the growing integration of energy markets in Europe. Among other things, the energy cooperation should focus on improving the quality and security of energy supplies, the modernisation of energy infrastructure, the shaping of energy policy, and the improvement of energy sector management in connection with the market economy (see more Romanova 2009).[2]

2.1.2 The Four Common Spaces

The energy relations between the EU and the RF remain dependent on broader negotiations between the two actors regarding the so-called Four Common Spaces: (a) the Common Economic Space; (b) the Common Space of Freedom, Security, and Justice; (c) the Common Space of External Security; and (d) the Common Space of Research, Education, and Culture.

The framework agreement on the Four Common Spaces, which builds on the PCA, was signed at the EU-Russia summit in St Petersburg on 31 May 2003. The EU-Russia summit in Moscow on 10 May 2005 created "roadmaps" for the Four Common Spaces, which set some common goals of the mutual relations and the steps necessary for their achievement. In it, the question of energy is mainly mentioned in connection with the Common Economic Space, with the condition that the goal for the energy cooperation is to increase collaboration within the EU-RF dialogue with a special emphasis on the questions of sustainability and reliability of the production, distribution, transport, and consumption of energy, with the last category including energy efficiency, energy savings, and the use of renewable energy sources. The roadmap also stipulates the goal of creating an effective system of cooperation and partnership between the EU and the RF with regard to the access to, usage of, and research of space and the development of space technologies (Romanova 2009).

[2]The PCA is a political document, and it is not legally binding. It does not reflect any institutional instruments that would ensure secure supplies of oil and gas from Russia to the EU or which would solve problems between the EU and Russia.

2.1.3 The EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation

The results achieved in the context of the Four Common Spaces and the negotiations on a new PCA provided the basis for a new level of negotiations within the Partnership for Modernisation between the EU and Russia, which was officially presented at the EU-Russia summit in Rostov-on-Don in June 2010. Besides energy, the related Joint Declaration on Partnership includes a list of other areas of cooperation, ranging from the economy to science, research, and technological cooperation and the convergence of legal regulations (Tichý 2010, pp. 5–6; Larionova 2015).

A major achievement of the Joint Declaration was the establishment of the Partnership Coordinators, who collaborate closely with representatives of the EU-Russia sector dialogues and propose working plans in each field. With regard to the energy cooperation, this has led to the launching of projects aimed at improving energy security, supporting energy efficiency, and reducing energy consumption (Tichý 2010; Delegation of the European Union to Russia n.d.).

2.1.4 The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue

A major milestone in the development of the formal framework of the energy relations between the EU and the RF was reached at the meeting of the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi and the First Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Viktor Khristenko in September 2000, where the opening of an energy dialogue between the two parties was agreed. Subsequently, the EU-Russia summit in Paris on 30 October 2000 saw the launch of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (on the basis of Article 65 of the PCA) as one of the mechanisms for cooperation on energy. The related Joint Declaration identified a number of key areas of complimentary interests, namely, ensuring reliable energy supplies in the short- and medium-term horizon, increasing access to energy markets, and improving the legal basis for the production and transport of energy in the RF, the implementation of European legal regulations related to energy in the RF, and others (see Aalto 2008; Romanova 2009, 2010; Dannreuther 2016).

From 2012, the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue has guided the cooperation in four thematic groups: (1) the Energy Markets and Strategies Group, (2) the Electric Energy Group, (3) the Energy Efficiency and Innovations Group, and (4) the Nuclear Energy Group. The document also founded the Gas Advisory Council, comprised of the representatives of major gas companies in the EU and Russia and experts from academic research organisations that evaluate developments in the gas markets and make recommendations for the long-term cooperation between the EU and Russia in the gas sector (cf. see Esakova 2012; Paškovskaja 2013).

Another expression of the will to continue to strengthen the energy cooperation between the two actors was the Memorandum of Understanding signed in February 2011 by the Energy Commissioner Günther Oettinger and the Russian Energy

Minister Sergey Shmatko. The memorandum was agreed in preparation for the new roadmap for EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, which was finally published in March 2013. The document contains analyses of various scenarios and their impact on EU-RF energy relations. The roadmap until 2050 also claims that despite having different interests, the two actors could maintain a mutually beneficial long-term cooperation. One prerequisite to this is the need to modernise old and build new infrastructure (cf. Lyutova 2013).[3]

The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue is based on the presumption of the two actors' mutual dependence–interdependence (cf. Keohane and Nye 2001), meaning that the EU needs reliable supplies of energy, while the Russian Federation requires investments and reliable export markets. In other words, by exporting its mineral resources, Russia contributes to European energy security, and conversely, its financial income from the EU plays a significant role in Russian economic growth.

The EU imports around 37.5% of Russia's gas, which amounts to approximately 30% of the overall EU gas consumption (Eurogas 2016). At the same time, the EU imports around 30.4% of Russia's oil, which represents almost 30% of the Union's oil consumption (Eurostat 2016a, b). On the other hand, for the RF, oil and gas amount to about 70% of all Russian exports, of which over 60% of the oil exports and 90% of the gas exports go directly to the European market. The income from energy resource exports amounts to approximately 50% of the Russian state budget, with 60% of this income coming from the sale of oil and gas to the EU. Also of note is that the energy sector accounts for about 40% of the Russian GDP (Godzimirski 2016).

Based on these facts, the interdependence of the EU and Russia can be deemed asymmetrical in favour of the EU. While the EU's vulnerability to the potential cutting of Russian oil or gas imports is relatively lower, it can replace a part of its energy consumption with energy from other suppliers (by increasing the imports of Norwegian or North African gas or the imports of Middle Eastern oil) or with other energy sources (nuclear energy, LNG), and its member states can also avail themselves of their own fuel reserves or make use of domestic gas storage tanks (cf. Proedrou 2007; Prill 2012; Martinez et al. 2015). Russia's vulnerability is much greater because it would have no way of replacing its lost revenue. Furthermore, the RF does not currently (or in the short-term future) have a fully equivalent alternative solution, especially with regard to the redirection of its gas flow (Esakova 2012).

This pattern mainly holds true for the old member states of the EU (Martinez et al. 2015). Contrarily, however, Russia is at an advantage in relation to most of the newer EU member states, which are highly dependent on imports of energy commodities, mainly gas and oil, from Russia. This is an asymmetrical interdependence that favours Russia because a complete shutdown of Russian energy supplies could have catastrophic consequences for these EU member states. Furthermore, their

[3]Since 2014 discussions in the framework of the formal Energy Dialogue format have been suspended due to the Ukrainian crisis. However, the regular dialogue continued to take place on an ad hoc basis (in the context of, e.g. the trilateral gas talks between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU with the aim to ensure an uninterrupted supply of gas to and through Ukraine, including after 2019).

considerable dependence on Russian gas and oil makes these states highly vulnerable to the potential consumption of these energy commodities by the RF (Proedrou 2010). A better understanding of the nature of the energy relations between the EU and Russia requires a more detailed overview of the main actors of energy policy in the EU and Russia and, more importantly, of the main goals, instruments, and interests that the EU and the RF promote within their respective energy policies.

2.2 The Energy Policy of the Russian Federation Regarding the EU

The question of energy is a long-term, strategically important economic, political, security, and foreign-policy issue of the national interest of Russia. After the period of the wild privatisation of the energy sector in the 1990s, the energy issue gained a new weight in Russian political thinking at the beginning of the twenty-first century during Vladimir Putin's first two presidential terms (2000–2004 and 2004–2008). Energy also played a major role during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) and the renewed presidency of Putin (2012+). At the present time, the ruling Russian elite sees energy both from the perspective of economic security and as a basic component of the broader issue of national security because the export of energy resources and the income from this export provide the primary impulse for the growth of the Russian economy and the Russian state (Grošelj 2009; Godzimirski 2013, 2016; Oxenstierna and Tynkkynen 2014).

All the fundamental goals and instruments of Russia's energy policy were formulated in November 2009 in the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2030, which expands the time period for the Russian economy's transition into the innovational path of development and pinpoints priorities for the long-term strategic development of the Russian fuel–energy complex. The main goals of the Russian Energy Strategy are to achieve maximal efficiency in the usage of natural resources and the potential of the energy sector to provide sustainable growth for the national economy, to improve living standards for citizens of the Russian Federation, and to reinforce Russia's position on the international scene. At the same time, Russia's energy policy should primarily focus on developing the domestic energy sector, and on investments and modernisation (see more Aalto 2012; Godzimirski 2013).

Less than 5 years later, in late January 2014, the Russian Ministry of Energy published a draft of a new Energy Strategy of Russia for the period until 2035, which mainly attempted to tackle two fundamental problems in the years to come: (1) the changing reality of the external markets, on which the Russian energy sector is strongly dependent, and (2) the decreasing rate of growth of the national economy. At the international level, the key priorities are (1) the support of further development of the common energy market in the Eurasian Economic Space, (2) overcoming the crisis in the relations with European consumers of natural gas through the adaptation of the contractual system with regard to Russia's interests, and (3) the expedient entry

of the Russian Federation (or rather, its energy companies) into the Asian-Pacific energy markets by 2035 in accordance with the strategy of diversifying energy product exports (Mironova 2014).

Both energy strategies show that Russian energy policy, as the main instrument of Russian energy security, is founded on three criteria. The first is the geopolitical vision of Russia as a highly developed supplier of energy. The second criterion is the commodification of the energy relations. The third criterion is the relations in the energy sector as the most effective means of political pressure on the international scene and as an instrument in the negotiations of a new security architecture with the aim of preventing the expansion of foreign influence into Russian territory (Tichý 2012, pp. 190–191). Furthermore, the energy policy of the RF is currently guided by two largely conflicting factors, which oscillate between the desire to achieve maximal profits from the sale of energy resources to lucrative energy markets and the use of energy to gain a dominant economic and political position in the world (Romanova 2009). In this context, the main goals of Russian energy policy include the expansion of Russia's fuel–energy complex by securing an economically justified demand for energy resources and increasing Russia's ability to make effective use of consumers and to improve the stability of the energy sector in relation to external and internal threats (Kaveshnikov 2010, p. 595).

2.2.1 The Main Actors of Energy Policy of the Russian Federation

Before moving on to the analysis of the goals and instruments of Russian energy policy, it is necessary to focus on the key actors who control the Russian energy sector and have a decisive influence on the direction of Russian energy policy, including its relation to the European Union. There are a number of possible approaches to identifying the main actors of the Russian Federation energy sector; in accordance with the aim of this monograph, the focus will be placed on political actors, whereas the influence of state-owned, partly state-owned, and private companies will not be discussed (see more Godzimirski 2013, p. 177; Tkachenko 2008). According to the leading Swedish expert Robert Larsson (2006, pp. 115–140), it is possible to distinguish between three main circles/groups of state political actors who have decisive control of Russian energy sector, namely, (1) the presidential circle, which comprises the president and his closest colleagues; (2) the bureaucratic/governmental circle, which consists of the prime minister and key ministries; and (3) the parliamentary circle with various committees and selected representatives of the Russian Duma and the Federation Council.

The Presidential Circle of Actors and the Russian Energy Sector

At the head of the first circle of state political actors is the President of the Russian Federation, for whom energy is one of the core policy issues of the state and a national priority. The president has a fundamental influence on how the energy

sector works, for example, through his legislative initiatives (both in the form of bills proposed to the parliament and as presidential decrees), and his preparing/proposing of necessary legislative measures in collaboration with the responsible ministries. Furthermore, the Russian President sets the main direction of both the internal and (especially) the external dimension of Russian energy policy in relation to other global actors, including the EU, whose top political representatives he often negotiates with (Godzimirski 2013).

Besides the president, the first circle of the most influential state political actors in the Russian energy sector includes a small group of people, the closest supporters of the president, who can be divided into two clans, which can be termed his "St Petersburg allies" and his *siloviki* allies,[4] whose members are in the leading positions of a number of important state energy companies or have a decisive say in their operation. The difference between the two groups is in their approach to energy. Whereas the St Petersburg allies usually prefer profit-earning energy cooperations, and they are not antagonistic to market principles and foreign investments, the siloviki allies see Russia's natural resources as a strategic national wealth that must be controlled by the state, and they have a negative attitude to foreign investments (see more in Larsson 2006, pp. 115–120; Tkachenko 2008, pp. 170–172).

The Bureaucratic/Governmental Circle of Actors and the Russian Energy Sector

The second circle of dominant political actors of the Russian energy sector centres around the Prime Minister of the RF, who, like the president, has—either directly or through individual ministries—a strong impact on the internal and external dimensions of Russian energy policy. Furthermore, the prime minister negotiates about energy with various EU representatives. The governmental circle also includes certain ministries which have a considerable influence on Russian energy policy and energy relations with the EU (Tkachenko 2008, pp. 172–174).

First, one such ministry is the Ministry of Energy, which was established in May 2008 by a split from the former Ministry of Industry and Energy. On the impetus of or in collaboration with the president or the prime minister, the Ministry of Energy publishes various key documents and formulates the energy strategy, which delineates the long-term interests and goals of the energy policy, defines the instruments with which they are to be implemented, and sets the priority areas/actors of the Russian Federation energy cooperation. The Ministry of Energy also frequently represents Russia in energy relations with the EU. Second, a major role in this respect is played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although it does not directly influence the functioning of the energy sector, nor does it have significant control over it, the question of energy is an important part of the agenda of Russian foreign relations, which are a primary area of responsibility for the Ministry of Foreign

[4] *Siloviki* is a term used to describe politicians from key ministries, such as the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from security services, such as the Federal Security Service (FSB/FSS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS/FPS), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR/FIS), etc. (see Larsson 2006, p. 117).

Affairs. Third, the direction of Russian energy policy and its internal and external dimensions are directly or indirectly shaped or influenced by other ministries, especially the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, and the Ministry of Finance (Larsson 2006, pp. 115–120; Tkachenko 2008, pp. 172–174).

The Parliamentary Circle of Actors and the Russian Energy Sector
Finally, the third circle of actors with a partial influence on the energy sector of the RF comprises the Chairman of the State Duma and its various deputies, whose impact on energy relations includes the ratification of international agreements with the EU, for example; it further includes members of the Committee for Energy and the Committee for Natural Resources, the Environment, and Ecology, the Chairman of the Federation Council, and the members of the Committee for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection (Tkachenko 2008, pp. 174–175).

2.2.2 Goals, Instruments, and Interests of Russian Energy Policy Regarding the EU

The interest of the aforementioned state actors is to use a broad range of political instruments to advance and fulfil the main goals of Russia's energy policy. These goals are economic-, geopolitical-, and security-related.

The Economic Goal: To Strengthen the Position of Gazprom in EU Energy Markets
From the economic perspective, the primary goal of the RF energy policy is to improve its presence in the stable energy markets of the EU. One of the main instruments of this strategy is the gas company Gazprom.[5] Exports to EU member state markets are considered the main source of income for Gazprom, which earns more than 70% of its revenue from sales in European markets and 20% of this sum is contributed to the national budget. Gazprom also provides about 20% of Russia's foreign currency income and accounts for approximately 10% of its GDP (Kirchner and Berk 2010; Bilgin 2011). Therefore, Russia endeavours to strengthen Gazprom's expansion into the energy markets of the EU in several ways (Oxenstierna and Tynkkynen 2014).

First, Gazprom expands into EU energy markets by concluding long-term contracts that help secure specific markets. Gazprom uses these agreements to acquire access to end users, and their long-term validity allows the company to safely invest greater funds into big extraction projects. Gazprom's European strategy is troubled by the difficulty of maintaining the gas extraction and export without additional

[5]Gazprom has a *de iure* monopoly on the export of natural gas from Russia since 2006; Europe (i.e. both the EU and non-EU European countries) is practically the only destination for its gas exports (cf. Proedrou 2010).

billion rouble investments. The long-term contracts, however, allow Gazprom to optimise its expenses for its gas exports to the EU (Proedrou 2010).

Second, Gazprom expands into EU energy markets by establishing joint projects and ventures. In exchange for cooperation, Gazprom offers the largest companies a share in Russian strategic projects. In this way, Gazprom hopes to gain access to new technologies, which are necessary for the long-term development of gas extraction from deeper deposits and offshore fields. The appeal of Russian resources pushes European concerns to allow Russian firms into their markets. For example, Gazprom has succeeded in entering the liberalised market of Great Britain (Laryš 2011).

Third, the gradual liberalisation of the gas market in the EU offers Gazprom the opportunity to invest in property and acquire shares in the gas distribution system. Gazprom is moving into the market by buying shares in companies operating at the retail end of the gas market via its subsidiaries, via jointly owned businesses, and sometimes via firms that are indirectly and unofficially connected with Gazprom. The Russian company also buys sections of European energy infrastructure and EU distribution firms. Furthermore, Gazprom takes part or plans to take part in a system of underground gas storage tanks which are located, for example, in Belgium, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Turkey, Slovakia, and other European countries (Proedrou 2010).

Fourth, Gazprom would also benefit from the future expansion of energy exports to support Russian interests in specific countries. The present-day network of gas pipelines forces both sides to cooperate as the current infrastructure increases their interdependence. Therefore, Gazprom endeavours to strengthen its position in the EU energy market by constructing new gas lines that would transport gas straight to European consumers and reduce its dependence on transit countries (Bilgin 2011). One example of such a gas line is Nord Stream, whose first string with a capacity of 27.5 billion cubic metres of gas per year (bcm/y) was launched in November 2011. A second string with the same capacity was opened in 2012. Nord Stream leads from Vyborg, Russia, to Greifswald, Germany, and passes through exclusive economic zones of the RF, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany.

In October 2012 the shareholders of Nord Stream were presented with the preliminary results of a feasibility study for the construction of two more strings. They decided to go on with the project, which was later termed Nord Stream 2 (Gazprom n.d.). In April 2017 the financing contract for Nord Stream 2 was signed by Nord Stream 2 AG together with the investors ENGIE, Royal Dutch Shell, OMV, Wintershall, and Uniper. The five European energy companies agreed to fund 50% of the total cost of the project. The joint capacity of the two strings of Nord Stream 2 is 55 bcm/y, and gas should begin to be pumped through it from Russia to Germany by the end of next year, that is, 2019 (Gazprom n.d.).

Apart from that, Gazprom also planned to build South Stream, and the construction was launched in late 2012; the route was to lead from Russia to Bulgaria via the Black Sea, with one branch carrying on to Greece and Italy and another branch traversing Serbia, Romania, and Hungary to reach Austria, where it was to connect to the gas pipelines leading to Western Europe. South Stream was to have a capacity of 63 bcm/y (Proedrou 2012, pp. 80–83). However, upon the request of the European

Commission, the Bulgarian government suspended the preparatory work on the pipeline in June 2014, most likely in reaction to the March 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimea by the Russian Federation. The official reason for the European Commission's pressure and Bulgaria's decision to end the negotiations on South Stream was the fact that the planned project was not in compliance with EU legislation, or rather, it was in conflict with the Third Energy Package, which forbids suppliers of gas to also have control of gas pipelines. Furthermore, the EU did not like the idea that the pipeline would belong to the Russian Federation, whose credibility suffered a significant blow in the eyes of its western partners. In response to Bulgaria's decision, Russia announced its termination of the intended construction of the South Stream gas pipeline in early December 2014, as it could not be completed without Bulgarian approval (Richard 2015).

However, that same month Russia agreed with Turkey on the construction of a new 1100-km gas pipeline called Turkish Stream, which should bring Russian gas through the Black Sea to Turkey and then through debated transit routes, such as (1) the Tesla pipeline, which would lead from Greece to Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary and finally to Baumgarten in Austria, and (2) the Eastring pipeline, which would transport gas from the south via Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary and on to Slovakia and the rest of Europe. An agreement for the Turkish Stream project was signed in Istanbul on 10 October 2016 by the energy ministers of Russia and Turkey in the presence of Presidents Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The construction of the first branch of Turkish Stream should be finished in 2018, and the second branch is to be completed in 2019 (EurAsiaDaily 2018).

The first two projects, that is, Nord Stream and South Stream, were based on bilateral agreements with member states and not with the EU itself, which corresponds to Russia's energy strategy of disrupting the potential unity of the EU energy policy through bilateral agreements. The main political and economic goal of the RF is thus to maintain its position of a direct seller or supplier to EU countries, for example, through Russian companies buying parts of the gas network in EU member states or by their participating in pipeline construction projects.

The Geopolitical Goal: To Diversify Russian Transit Routes

On the other hand, in accordance with the Russian Energy Strategies until 2030 and 2035, it is in the long-term interest of the RF energy policy to achieve several interconnected goals.

First, Russia intends to reduce its dependence on EU energy markets, and for this purpose it plans to expand to Asian-Pacific markets, where it wants to export up to 31% of its gas and 32% of its oil supplies by 2035. To meet this target, Russia launched the construction of the Eastern Siberian–Pacific Ocean pipeline (ESPO) with a capacity of up to 80 million tons of oil annually, which is one of the largest present-day projects in the Russian oil industry. ESPO will draw from the enormous deposits in Eastern Siberia to supply oil to China, Japan, and South Korea. The first section, going from Tayshet to Skovorodino, was completed in December 2009. The second leg, going from Skovorodino to Kozmino, was finished in 2012 (Aalto 2012). At the same time, in February 2009 the Russian Federation opened its first gas

liquefaction (LNG) plant as part of the Sakhalin II project with the aim of exporting LNG to China, Japan, and South Korea, and it plans to build several new gas transit systems, such as additions to the Sakhalin–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok route, which is in operation since September 2011, or the Yakutsk–Khabarovsk–Vladivostok route (Aalto 2012; Godzimirski 2013). Apart from that, the Russian company Novatek launched the largest exporting LNG plant in Russia on the Yamal Peninsula in 2017 (see more LNG World News n.d.).

Last but not least, in mid-October 2014 Russia and China concluded an agreement on supplying Russian natural gas to China by an eastern route. China is to receive about 38 bcm/y of gas through the Power of Siberia pipeline within 30 years. "In September 2016, Gazprom and CNPC signed the EPC (engineering, procurement, and construction) contract to construct a crossing under the Amur River within the trans-border section of the Power of Siberia pipeline. [Its] [c]onstruction in the Chinese territory started in April 2017. [The] [g]as supplies to China via the Power of Siberia gas pipeline will commence in December 2019" (Gazprom 2016a, b, 2017)

Second, the RF plans to significantly reduce its dependence on transit countries. In connection with this, in 2014–2017 representatives of Gazprom repeatedly intimated the possibility of completely stopping the transit of Russian gas to the EU via Ukraine by 2019. A very strong political aspect is evident here—the effort to do away with political and economic risks in connection with the transit countries and to avoid potential pressure to provide these countries with special price discounts. The absence of an intermediary also fits Gazprom's plan to maximise its profits and market share; by eliminating transit countries from the equation, the RF also reduces its energy sensitivity (cf. Proedrou 2010).

Third, the RF tries to respond to EU efforts to increase energy security and preclude the construction of competitive transit routes that would circumvent Russia and be contrary to its interests in securing the position of a crucial supplier. For this, the Russian Federation needs to block other countries' access to the European market (this applies to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and theoretically also Iran), maintain good relations with these countries, or, conversely, effectively eliminate their competition and diversify transit routes (Laryš 2011).

The Security Goal: To Use Energy as a Political Instrument

The security goal of Russian energy policy is the alleged use of energy resources as an instrument of foreign policy. The Russian expert Vladimir Milov (2006, 2008) describes four basic scenarios for advancing energy as an instrument of foreign policy: (1) using energy dependence to achieve certain political aims with regard to countries that buy Russian gas and oil, (2) using potential opportunities for future expansions of energy exports via new pipelines to support RF interests in various countries, (3) getting investors and energy firms from countries dependent on Russia's energy supplies to become involved in the management of projects for oil and gas extraction or the expansion of Russian energy reserves with the aim of strengthening bilateral relations with these countries, and (4) gaining control over entities that oversee the import of oil and gas in the given country and over key

energy companies that manage oil and gas pipeline networks in their territory for the purpose of achieving economic and political goals.[6]

The threat of the RF interrupting its supplies to European countries outside the post-Soviet bloc is minimal, but there is a serious danger that Europe could be affected by an interruption of supplies to one of the post-Soviet European countries.[7] Actual proof of Russia's willingness to use its mineral wealth as a political instrument can be seen in the several gas and oil crises between Russia and Ukraine or Belarus, which resulted in brief interruptions of gas or oil supplies to Europe and posed an immediate threat to the energy security of EU member states (Demakova and Godzimirski 2012). Likewise, the Russian Federation used its mineral wealth to intimidate Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Moldavia, and other countries of the former USSR. On the other hand, it is important to realise that the energy sector is a relatively crude and often ineffective weapon, which is hard to aim with precision, and the initiator of such an "attack" can cause itself similar (or greater) harm to itself than to the opponent it is targeting (Laryš 2011).

2.3 The Energy Policy of the European Union Regarding Russia

As in the case of Russia, energy is a long-term priority issue of vital importance to the EU (see more Birchfield and Duffield 2011; Marín-Quemada et al. 2012; Tosun et al. 2015; Knodt 2018, pp. 224–240; Szulecki 2018). Despite a number of attempts throughout the 1990s, a new impulse for the formation of a common EU energy policy only came about in the first decade of the twenty-first century, when a series of key documents (white papers, green papers, action plans, etc.) was published. Nonetheless, these EU documents addressed energy policy and related issues solely at the level of secondary legislation, thus leaving the matter still under the exclusive authority of individual member states.

Probably the most important change in the process of shaping a common energy policy was brought about by the new Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), which is part of the Lisbon Treaty, which is valid as of 1 December 2009. Part Three of the TFEU implements a completely new Title XXI, which formally constitutes the EU energy policy at the level of primary legislation (it is the first time that it was formally constituted at this level), creates a new legal foundation for adopting

[6]The first and fourth scenarios are mainly practised in policies aimed at countries of the former Soviet Union. Conversely, the second and third scenarios focus on relations between the Russian Federation and selected countries of the European Union, such as France or Germany (Milov 2006).

[7]Larsson (2006) outlines several motives that lead the RF to the political use of energy resources: (1) to obtain better prices for oil and gas supplies from its counterparts, (2) to gain control of the distribution infrastructure of other countries' pipelines, (3) to limit the autonomy and foreign-policy outreach of neighbouring states, and (4) to punish neighbouring countries for any pro-Western tendencies and/or disloyalty to Russia and to force economic concessions from them.

measures via legislative acts of secondary legislation, and provides a framework for energy cooperation. The format of the Lisbon Treaty makes it the first contract to explicitly refer to energy policy in the spirit of solidarity with specific goals, such as the functioning of the internal energy market, the security of energy supplies, and the interconnectedness of energy networks, energy efficiency, or environmental protection. Energy is also discussed in Article 194 of the TFEU, which contains three relatively brief paragraphs on it (Gusev 2011; Braun 2011).

The important fact here is that energy and related issues, such as energy security, energy efficiency, the development of new sources of energy, or the creation of a unified energy market, are included among the shared powers of the EU and its member states. Under the impact of the Lisbon Treaty, member states are losing the option to exclusively control this strategic area. Contrarily, however, the measures do not affect the right of individual member states to designate the level of taxation in their energy sector or their composition of energy sources (see more Braun 2011; Birchfield 2011; Judge and Maltby 2017).[8]

The search for a common EU energy policy continued in the second decade of the twenty-first century, when a number of new documents and strategies were released. A major step towards a unified energy policy of the EU was the adoption of the Strategy for the Energy Union in February 2015, which states that the mutually supportive and closely interconnected priorities of the EU's energy policy, the goal of which is to achieve greater energy security, sustainability, and competitiveness, include (1) ensuring the security of energy supplies, solidarity, and trust, such as by securing greater transparency when concluding long-term gas supply contracts, (2) a fully integrated European market for electricity and gas, (3) energy efficiency that should help reduce consumption, (4) a low-carbon economy in the EU in connection with climate protection, and (5) research and innovation in priority areas of the use of renewable energy sources, smart grids, etc. (European Commission 2015a; Szulecki and Westphal 2018). In these areas the EC endeavours to increase its role and gain greater powers to the detriment of member-state sovereignty, in both the internal and the external dimension of EU energy policy.

In order to further strengthen EU's influence in the external dimension of energy policy, the European Commission assumes the mandate to oversee all future negotiations over new gas pipeline projects and also a much greater engagement in the creation of intergovernmental treaties in the area of energy. At the same time, in 2015 the importance of the external dimension of Energy Union was recognised, and greater involvement in the area of energy diplomacy was recommended. On 20 July 2015, the Foreign Affairs Council adopted Council Conclusions on EU Energy Diplomacy, which included an EU Energy Diplomacy Action Plan. The Action Plan has four pillars: (1) strengthen strategic guidance through high-level engagement; (2) establish and further develop energy cooperation and dialogues,

[8] Although the composition of the energy mix remains in the hands of member states, it is indirectly impacted by secondary norms such as the Climate and Energy Package or the Third Energy Package.

particularly in support of diversification of sources, suppliers and routes; (3) support efforts to enhance the global energy architecture and multilateral initiatives; and (4) strengthen common messages and energy diplomacy capacities. The Energy Diplomacy Action Plan "should be implemented by the High Representative, the Commission and the EU Member States, in accordance with their respective roles and mandates as determined by the Treaties" (see Council of the EU 2015, p. 8).

Even so, the EU energy policy is currently still largely limited by a number of structural and political obstacles. For this reason, each of the 28 member states has its own energy policy, which exists in parallel with the slowly forming energy policy of the EU. There are several reasons why it is difficult to promote a common energy policy in the EU and why member states are not especially willing to give up the part of their sovereignty related to energy.

On the side of the member states, at least four reasons exist. First, energy policy has always been considered a component of national security, and countries are thus unwilling to give up this part of their sovereignty. Second, the 28 member states have different aims and approaches with regard to economy, energy, and foreign and security policy, and this disunited attitude plays a significant role in negotiations with major energy suppliers. Third, the different structures of national energy sectors and the related requirements for energy resource composition are key factors preventing a unified energy policy of the EU. Fourth, a number of member states have voiced their concerns that economies could lose competitiveness if overly ambitious targets were set. Therefore, rather than having a consensual and consolidated energy policy, it would be more apt to say that the EU is still in the process of formulating such a policy, which naturally also affects the EU's relations with key energy suppliers.

2.3.1 The Main Actors of Energy Policy of the European Union

As has already been noted, energy policy is an area of shared power between the EU and its member states. The development of the legislative framework of the internal and external dimensions of EU energy policy is thus influenced by the attitudes of both the responsible EU institution and individual member states.

Member States and EU Energy Policy

The member states' stances towards an EU energy policy depend both on the mechanism of negotiation and on their specific domestic conditions. At the same time, the activity of member states within the Union is governed by the energy priorities they try to promote in compliance with their national interests. Finally, some member states still prefer to maintain personal relations with the RF rather than to negotiate with it via the EU. An example of such bilateralism was the Russian–German agreement on the construction of Nord Stream or the Russian–Italian negotiations regarding South Stream.

Nonetheless, although individual member states are still important actors in the field of energy, their room for manoeuvre has steadily decreased in recent years, conversely to the growing importance of the EU. This is also why the monograph refrains from analysing either the impact of member states on EU energy policy or the various bilateral energy relations between the RF and individual member states, which have received significant attention in the past (cf. Bregadze 2003; Westphal 2008; Handl and Ehler 2011; Coticchia et al. 2011; Verhoeff and Niemann 2011), but instead dedicates itself exclusively to energy relations between the RF and the EU as a whole, which is imbued with legal subjectivity and represented primarily by the EC and partly also by the European Council, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2013, p. 392).

The European Commission and EU Energy Policy

The European Commission is a permanent collective organ that represents the interests of the purely European integration; that is, it is a supranational—not intergovernmental—institution, which comprises the President of the EC, several vice presidents, and the separate commissioners, each in charge of a given area and various departments. Together with these departments, which are called Directorate-General (for areas such as energy, transport, etc.), it uses legislative and regulatory political instruments to support the process of EU energy policy integration, provides important impulses for the fulfilment of individual goals, and also proposes legislative measures with regard to energy. To realise some of the goals of EU energy policy in external energy relations, the EC uses instruments of a bilateral and multilateral character, such as various contracts, agreements, dialogues, etc. (Birchfield 2011, pp. 245–246; Goldthau and Sitter 2014, p. 1462; Biesenbender 2015, pp. 26–28).

The European Commission, which discusses energy issues with representatives of non-member countries, including the Russian Federation, and promotes energy projects of "European interest",[9] implements or carries out the external dimension of EU energy policy in two ways. First, it does so through the Vice President for the Energy Union, whose position was created in November 2014 under the new EC President Jean-Claude Juncker. Second, it does so through the Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy (formerly the Commissioner for Energy), who holds negotiations related to EU energy relations with representatives of non-member countries. The EU is further represented in this context by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, whose function was created by the Lisbon Treaty when the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was merged with the function of the Commissioner for External Relations. The High Representative of the Union represents the EU in

[9]Projects of common European interest focus on electric power grids and gas networks and must show a potential economic viability. The assessment of economic viability is based on the analysis of costs and benefits, which takes account of all costs and benefits related to aspects of environmental protection, security of supplies, and benefits to economic and social cohesion (European Commission n.d.).

CFSP matters and conducts political (energy) dialogues with third parties, such as the RF. Her work is assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS),[10] comprising officials of the General Secretariat of the European Commission and the Council of the EU and staff from the diplomatic corps of member states (cf. Braun 2011, p. 5; Biesenbender 2015, pp. 26–28; Andersen et al. 2016, pp. 55–57).

The issue of energy is also on the agenda of the President of the EC, the Commissioner for Trade, the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, the Commissioner for Regional Policy, and the Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship. These commissioners speak of energy both within the European Union and either directly or indirectly as part of their representation of the EU in external relations (Brutschin 2016, pp. 27–44).

The European Council and EU Energy Policy

The European Council (ECoun) is a non-permanent collective organ which represents the interests of member states and gives the European Union the necessary impetus for its development; it defines the EU's general political direction and determines its strategic goals. As far as its external activity is concerned, the European Council as a whole identifies interests and makes decisions in connection with specific countries or thematic areas, such as energy. On the other hand, unlike the EC, the European Council does not fulfil a legislative role with regard to EU energy policy (see more Braun 2011, p. 4; Biesenbender 2015, pp. 32–35).

The European Parliament and EU Energy Policy

The European Parliament (EP) is a non-permanent collective organ that represents the interests of the citizens of the Union. In the institutional system of the EU, it is a supranational body, not an intergovernmental one. In the EP, energy is addressed and debated in the Committee for Industry, Research, and Energy. With the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP gained a more prominent role. For example, agreements in numerous different areas, including energy, to which a proper legislative procedure applies, require the approval of the European Parliament. Furthermore, without EP approval it is not possible to conclude agreements that concern projects of "European interest". The EP is also represented in international organisations and conventions, such as the International Energy Agency, the Energy Charter Treaty, or the Energy Community (cf. Braun 2011, p. 7; Biesenbender 2015, pp. 35–37).

The Council of the European Union and EU Energy Policy

The Council of the EU (CoEU) is a non-permanent collective organ comprising governmental delegates of member states which represents the interests of the member states of the Union; that is to say, it is an intergovernmental body in the

[10]The EEAS is to cooperate with the diplomatic corps of individual EU member states, the Council of the EU, and the European Commission. Its activity is headed by the High Representative of the Union, and the EEAS further consists of EU Special Representatives, who are based in various regions around the world. The EEAS is coordinated by the Executive Secretary General, the "managing director" of the EEAS. The service also comprises numerous specialised departments for specific issues.

institutional system of the EU. Besides individual member states, which can advance energy issues during their respective 6-month presidencies of the council, energy and related matters are addressed within the CoEU by the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council, the General Affairs Council, the Foreign Affairs Council (energy security, the Russian Federation, external relations), the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (energy markets), etc. The Council of the EU also includes the Working Party on Energy (cf. Braun 2011, p. 6; Biesenbender 2015, pp. 28–30).

2.3.2 Goals, Instruments, and Interests of EU Energy Policy Regarding Russia

The interests of member states and the various organs of the EU create a diverse mix of interests of a varying governmental, strategic, geopolitical, even purely economic, or highly particularised nature within EU energy policy. These interests also directly influence the goals of EU energy policy, which, as in the case of the RF, are of an economic-, geopolitical-, and security-related character.

The Economic Goal: To Liberalise the Energy Market

The primary goal of the EU's energy policy is to create a transparent and interconnected internal market with electricity and gas, which is also a necessary prerequisite to ensuring sustainable energy supplies. Its existence is a strategic instrument that will create a stable environment, which is essential for investment and cross-border cooperation, and the market will provide European customers with the option of choosing between various firms that supply natural gas and electricity for affordable prices. The process of liberalisation stipulates these basic goals: (1) to improve comfort and services for end consumers, (2) to increase competitiveness via lower prices of electricity and gas for the industry, and (3) to improve the flexibility and stability of supplies of gas and electricity within the EU (Proedrou 2012).

After the previous two attempts at creating legal conditions for the further liberalisation of the electricity and gas market, both at the level of member states and at the EU level, the European Commission proposed the so-called Third Energy Package in September 2007, which comprises a set of five legislative norms that aim to ensure the functioning of the internal energy market within the European Union. The Third Energy Package came into effect in September 2009, and member states subsequently had 18 months to ensure the package's implementation into national law. Probably the most important aspect of the Third Energy Package is "unbundling" (the separation of ownership of energy production facilities from the transport and distribution of energy). The EC's initially proposed variant of complete unbundling would mean that no supplier company active in the EU would be allowed to own an energy transport network in any of the EU's member states. This was supposed to force firms to sell their transport systems, which would lead to the formation of independent operators of transport and distribution systems.

Production and supplier companies would be prohibited from owning a majority share in transport and distribution companies (see more Eikeland 2011; Herweg 2015, pp. 87–105; Brutschin 2016, pp. 45–66).[11]

Besides being scrutinised by the member states, the Third Energy Package was also closely scrutinised by the RF. The package contains a clause that addresses relations with third countries with a non-liberalised energy sector, including a system of certification for investors from third countries who endeavour to gain control over a transport system or operator (the "Gazprom clause"). The basic principle is to prevent companies from countries outside the EU from buying strategic distribution networks without the approval of the government of the given member state and to force entities from third countries, including the RF, to abide by the same rules that apply to firms located within the EU (Eikeland 2011; Proedrou 2012: 85).[12]

On 8 November 2017, the European Commission issued a proposal to reform the directives on the internal gas market with the goal of improving its functionality and increasing solidarity between member states. The main aim of the proposal was to apply EU internal market rules even to transmission routes between a member state and a third party. This legislative proposal was clearly a response to the debate regarding Nord Stream 2. The feasibility of the project would be threatened by the new rules, as other member states would also have access to the European section of the pipeline, namely, Poland and the Baltic states—thus invalidating the project's original motive. The proposal would also give the Commission a decision-making role in every other negotiation regarding gas pipeline construction between the European Union and a third party (see European Commission 2017).

The Security Goal: To Build Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E), to Connect Them, and to Secure Energy Supplies

One of the requirements for the effective and efficient functioning of the EU energy market, which will also strengthen the EU's energy security, is the connection of transit routes and transport systems between member states, the construction of new power grids, and the increase of investments in this area. A list of strategic initiatives

[11]However, this proposal met with strong resistance from a number of member states, and so its second and third variants were also proposed. The second variant assumes the creation of an independent system operator (ISO), which would function as a company with a separate ownership operating the transport of energy on another company's property. The third variant supposes the creation of an independent transport system operator (ITO), which would mean the legal separation of the transport system from energy production (Eikeland 2011).

[12]To achieve this aim, the EU is resolved to use legislative instruments against entities that act in contradiction to the principles of liberalisation. One proof of the EC's will to enforce rules related to the liberalisation of the energy market was the ordering of police raids in late September 2011 in 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe; the raids were focused on the allegedly unfair business practices of firms providing gas supplies, including subsidiaries of Gazprom. In September 2012 the EC then ordered an investigation of Gazprom due to its possible abuse of its dominant position and its alleged violation of the rules of economic competition in gas markets in Central and Eastern European countries. The European Commission then again accused Gazprom of abusing its dominant position in the market of Central and Eastern European countries in April 2015 (see more Sharples 2015).

for EU energy security can be found in the Green Paper: Towards a Secure, Sustainable and Competitive European Energy Network from 2008. The paper suggests the strategic directions for European investments into new energy networks, which should focus on (1) the Baltic states; (2) building the Mediterranean Energy Circuit; (3) connecting gas and electricity systems in Northern, Southern, Central, and South–Eastern Europe; (4) constructing a distribution network in the North Sea; (5) completing the South Gas Corridor for the transport of natural gas; and (6) improving the efficiency and support for supplies of LNG to Europe (European Commission 2008). The relevance of some of the priorities and problems of EU external relations is evident in these six strategic areas; especially the last three priorities clearly reflect the effort to weaken the EU's continuing energy dependence on Russian gas imports.

The 2013 energy infrastructure package (Regulations 347/2013 and 1391/2013 regarding guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and Regulation 1316/2013 regarding the establishment of the Connecting Europe Facility) provided a significant reform of the trans-European transport network and gave impetus to a number of common interest projects in the gas sector (Brutschin 2016, p. 80). The primary goal was to solve the problem of the isolation of the Baltic states, Finland, and Malta. The newest priority projects are the following:

- Western Europe: the third interconnector between Spain and Portugal; the Spain/France link through Midcat; the construction of the Shannon LNG terminal in Ireland
- Central–Eastern and South–Eastern Europe: the new LNG terminal in Croatia (Krk); the interconnectors between Poland and Slovakia, Serbia and Bulgaria, and Greece and Bulgaria
- The Southern Gas Corridor: the major construction of the South Caucasus Pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline, and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (which are to transport gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Israel, and Cyprus)
- The Baltic Sea region: the new gas interconnectors between Lithuania and Poland (GIPL) and between Estonia and Finland (the Baltic connector) (see Brutschin 2016, pp. 80–81; European Commission 2015b)

One of the problems still present in this regard is the insufficient connection density of energy infrastructure inside the EU. The European Commission is aware of the fact, and in its report titled "Europe 2020 initiative—Energy infrastructure priorities for 2020 and beyond—A Blueprint for an integrated European energy network" from November 2010, it states: "Whilst on an EU level supplies are diversified along three corridors—[the] Northern Corridor from Norway, [the] Eastern corridor from Russia, [and the] Mediterranean Corridor from Africa—and through LNG, single source dependency still prevails in some regions. Every European region should implement infrastructure allowing physical access to at least two different sources" (European Commission 2010). According to the EC, this situation should gradually improve in the future, for example, by connecting the Black, Baltic, Adriatic, and Aegean Seas together through the BEMIP project (the

Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan) and the construction of a north–south corridor in Central, Eastern, and South–Eastern Europe.

In October 2011 the EC announced the historically first ever plan to set aside a part of the European budget to build gas pipelines and power transport systems (for the period of 2014–2020). The infrastructure fund has earmarked 9.1 billion euros for climate action and energy projects (Brutschin 2016). Furthermore, on 29 October 2014, the Council of the EU supported the allocation of almost 6 billion euros within the new Connecting Europe Facility for the 2014–2020 period to finance construction projects for energy infrastructure with the aim of strengthening the stability of energy supplies and supporting the construction of a unified EU energy market (Brutschin 2016).

The interconnectedness of national transport systems and transit routes between member states will allow the free flow of electricity and gas between countries, which will increase competition in energy supplies and consequently reinforce energy security. At the same time, the interconnectedness of gas systems in member states will make it possible to replace Russian gas with gas from other sources in case of an energy crisis-caused partial or complete interruption of energy supplies to EU member states, thus reducing the possible impact of the aggressive use of gas as a political instrument by the RF. Finally, an open and interconnected EU market could receive imports of shale gas in the form of LNG—for instance, from the USA, which launched its LNG supplies in 2016—or it could receive an increased volume of LNG from Qatar or other countries of the Middle East and North/sub-Saharan Africa, which will lead to further growth of economic competition and bolster EU energy security.

Within the Energy Union, the European Commission presented a legislative package on 16 February 2016 regarding the security of gas supplies and efficiency in heating and cooling processes, which consists of four measures, namely, (1) a draft directive on natural gas supply security, (2) a draft decision on intergovernmental agreements on energy, (3) a strategy for LNG and the storage of natural gas, and (4) a strategy for heating and cooling. In the strategy for LNG and gas storage, the EC discusses efforts to diversify gas imports to the EU. The aim of the strategy is both to build LNG terminals along the European coast and to construct connections between these terminals and other countries that do not have access to the global LNG market due to their geographical location (European Commission 2016).

On 2 March 2017, the EP approved a decision pertaining to the package, which introduced mechanisms for the exchange of information on intergovernmental agreements and nonbinding instruments usable in the energy sector between member states and third parties, in an effort to strengthen the security of energy supplies (mainly oil and gas). The new rules require member states to inform the EC of their progress in third-party negotiations about oil and gas supplies. Member states will also be prohibited from concluding deals with third parties until they are commented on by the EC, especially with regard to the contract's compatibility with European law (European Parliament 2017).

Later, in autumn 2017, first the EP (on 12 September) and then the Council of the EU (on 9 October) passed a revised proposal on the energy security of gas supplies

with the intention of bolstering the competitive abilities of gas markets and their resilience in cases of supply interruption. This should also be achieved by increasing the overall transparency of gas markets. A solidarity principle was also adopted, which ensures interstate assistance in cases of supply interruption in order to maintain supplies for households and basic welfare services (such as healthcare). Apart from that, it will be mandatory to report gas supplies with volumes exceeding 28% of the given country's annual domestic consumption (Council of the EU 2017).

The Geopolitical Goal: To Diversify—The Importance of the Planned EU Pipelines

Another long-term goal of the European Union in its efforts to ensure energy security is to diversify suppliers and transit routes (see more Dickel et al. 2014; De Micco 2014; Szulecki 2018; Yorucu and Mehmet 2018). The diversification process of the EU is currently concentrated in two directions—to the east and through the Mediterranean.

In the eastern direction of diversification, the EU plans to build a fourth energy corridor with a number of gas pipelines (Meister and Viëtor 2011; Verda 2016, pp. 69–86), which should bring gas to EU member states from the Middle East and the Caucasus, and possibly from Central Asia. The main project of the Southern Gas Corridor was to be the Nabucco pipeline, which was to transport 31 bcm/y of Caspian and Middle Eastern gas to Central Europe. However, at the present time, Nabucco is practically dead, and the EU cannot even count on its shorter version—Nabucco West, which lost a June 2013 tender for gas supplies from the Azerbaijani field of Shah Deniz II (Weiss 2013; Yorucu and Mehmet 2018, pp. 31–32).

The core projects of the Southern Gas Corridor currently include the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which begins at the Georgian–Turkish border, where it connects to the existing Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline (BTE), which will transport Azerbaijani gas from the Caspian Sea gas field of Shah Deniz II; TANAP will terminate at the Turkish–Greek border. The construction work on this pipeline was launched in March 2015, and the gas line was put into operation 3 years later, in June 2018 (DW 2018). Turkey should receive 6 bcm/y of gas through the pipeline by 2020. Another 10 bcm/y should be transited to Europe. The pipeline's capacity can be expanded to 22 bcm/y or even 31 bcm/y with further investments (Yorucu and Mehmet 2018, pp. 49–52).

Gas from TANAP will flow on into the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will lead from Thessaloniki through Albania and the Adriatic Sea to Italy and further into Europe with a capacity of approximately 10 bcm/y of gas (see Meister and Viëtor 2011). Its construction was launched with great pomp by the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and representatives from four other countries on 18 May 2016; it is to begin operation in 2020 (see Yorucu and Mehmet 2018, pp. 31–32, 49–52).

Gas from TAP could be transported into South–Eastern Europe along the coast of the Adriatic Sea by the Ionian–Adriatic Pipeline (IAP), which will pump up to 5 bcm/y of gas through Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Croatia; it could also be transported via the Interconnector Greece–Bulgaria (IGB). Finally, the pipeline system includes an extension of the Interconnector Turkey–Greece to

include Italy (ITGI) and its undersea section IGI Poseidon (connecting Greece and Italy) with a capacity of 12 bcm/y of gas (Gurbanov 2015).

In contrast, the Mediterranean dimension of the diversification efforts anticipates increasing supplies of gas from the Middle East and North Africa. Already back in the 1980s, the states of Algeria, Tunisia, and Italy collaborated to build the Trans-Med Pipeline, which transports gas from the Hassi R'Mel deposit to Sicily. Its capacity was increased to 27 bcm/y in the 1990s and to 33.5 bcm/y in March 2009. The Maghreb–Europe Gas Pipeline was also launched in the 1990s, connecting Algeria, Morocco, and Spain (Hassi R'Mel–Cordoba) with a capacity of 12 bcm/y; it had been planned as early as the 1960s. The Green Stream pipeline from Wafa, Libya, to Gela, Sicily, with an initial capacity of 8 bcm/y, later increased to 11 bcm/y of gas, was temporarily out of order due to the First Libyan Civil War, but the supplies transported through it were renewed in October 2011 (Dickel et al. 2014, pp. 17–23; De Micco 2014). After the construction of the Galsi pipeline (8 bcm/y) connecting Algeria, Italy, and Sardinia, which was originally supposed to be opened in 2014, the launch of the MedGaz pipeline with a flow of 8 bcm/y in 2011, and the possible expansion of Green Stream, the total capacity of the Mediterranean gas corridor would increase from its current 64.5 bcm/y to 72.5 bcm/y (Proedrou 2012, pp. 109–10; Baconi 2017).

Apart from that, the EU expects further Eastern Mediterranean supplies of gas both in the form of LNG from Egypt, with an approximate 2190 bcm of proven natural gas reserves and the potential for further exploration, and in the form of gas from Israel, where the gas fields of Tamara and Leviathan were discovered in 2009 and 2010 with proven reserves of about 283 bcm and 510 bcm of gas, respectively (Baconi 2017). In December 2017 a memorandum was signed by Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and Italy for the construction of a 2000-km undersea gas pipeline called EastMed, which should bring gas from the newly discovered fields in the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe. The pipeline would connect the Israeli gas field of Leviathan through the Cyprus extraction area of Aphrodite with mainland Greece and Italy. EastMed should be able to carry up to 20 bcm/y. Meanwhile, Europe is expected to require a 100 bcm/y increase of gas imports by 2030 (Reuters 2017; The Times of Israel 2018).

The EU's efforts to diversify transit routes can threaten Russia's position as the leading exporter of oil and gas to the European market. Meanwhile, the construction of new oil and gas pipelines will reduce the EU's energy dependence on Russia.

2.4 The Crisis in Ukraine in 2014 and the Development of EU-RF Energy Relations

The Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and especially the annexation of Crimea by Russia in the spring of that year and Russia's subsequent military activities in Eastern Ukraine brought about a major breakdown in relations, including energy relations and interdependence, between the EU and Russia. At the same time, the political and

security instability of Ukraine and the crisis of the mutual EU-Russian relations provoked a fear among member states regarding energy security in the sense of uninterrupted and stable supplies of Russian oil and gas that travel through Ukrainian territory to Europe.

These fears were further augmented during 2014 by repeated threats issued by the Russian President Vladimir Putin about the possible limitation of gas supplies to Ukraine. On 10 April 2014, Putin sent European representatives a letter, in which he informed them of the "critical situation" caused by the Ukrainian debt for gas[13] and of the possible impact this debt could have on the supplies of this strategic resource going to Europe, and he threatened that Moscow would stop the gas supplies to Ukraine if Kiev did not meet its financial obligations in time. The President of the EC José M. Barroso responded on behalf of the EU on 19 April 2014, emphasising the Union's readiness and willingness to negotiate with Russia and Ukraine regarding Russian gas supplies, and in late May 2014 the Ukrainian state company Naftogaz paid Russia for gas delivered in February and March. In the end, in June 2014 the RF interrupted its supplies of gas to Ukraine because of its unpaid debt (Siddi 2018).

In response to these events, the European Commission had stress tests conducted in all member states of the EU and ten neighbouring countries from June 2014, which were to assess the ability of individual countries to manage an interruption of gas supplies from Russia.[14] The subsequent final report of the European Commission on the "Preparedness for a possible disruption of supplies from the East during the fall and winter of 2014/2015" from 16 October 2014 then clearly showed that a 6-month stoppage of gas exports from Russia to Europe could cause serious shortages of the resource in Bulgaria, Finland, Estonia, and also Romania and Poland (European Commission 2014). Non-member countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or Serbia, would also struggle. According to the EC report (2014), a part of the missing gas could be compensated by increasing imports of LNG from countries outside the EU, such as Qatar or Algeria, or by importing more gas from Norway (Martinez et al. 2015).

To further improve its energy security and limit the import of oil and especially gas from Russia, in 2014 the EU accepted and implemented a number of measures. First, the member states approved a proposal to create the so-called Energy Union, which includes a whole set of measures for strengthening EU energy security (see above). At the same time, the new post of the Vice President of the European Commission for the Energy Union was created, with the Slovak Maroš Šefčovič being the first to enter this office in November 2014. Second, the member states

[13]The crux of the dispute between the two countries was the sum of 16 billion USD, which Ukraine owed Russia. This amount included 11 billion dollars that Russia demanded from Ukraine after the termination of the so-called Kharkiv Pact from April 2010, the repayment of the then recent loan of 3 billion dollars in the form of a Russian purchase of Eurobonds, and roughly 2 billion dollars which Ukraine owed Gazprom for supplies of Russian gas from November 2013 to May 2014 (Sharples 2015).

[14]The stress tests were conducted on the basis of two hypothetical situations: a complete interruption of Russian gas exports and a blocking of the Ukraine transit route (Martinez et al. 2015).

achieved a compromise regarding the 2030 Energy and Climate Package, which should improve energy efficiency and reduce energy consumption and thus partly reduce the import dependence of the member states. In May 2014 the EC also released a document titled European Energy Security Strategy, in which it called for the strengthening of energy security by the completion of the internal market with natural gas, by moving the regulatory authority to the EU level (i.e. to the European Commission) and also by promoting a unified approach to external energy policy in the EU. Third, the member states supported new instruments for financing further construction projects and interconnectivity of energy infrastructure, which should allow alternative supplies of oil and gas to enter the EU from third countries (De Micco 2014).

Although the gas supplies were successfully renewed in November 2014 after a number of negotiations between representatives of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the European Union,[15] and Russia expressed an interest in renewing its cooperation with the EU, the energy relations between the two actors had almost reached a freezing point in late 2014. Besides the aforementioned events, the relations had also been impacted by three waves of sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU. Whereas in March 2014 the European Council suspended the talks with the RF regarding visa liberalisation and a new agreement to address their mutual business relations, in July—though it was effective from September 2014—a second phase of "harder" sanctions was launched with the blocking of selected Russian entities' access to financial markets and the export prohibition of certain devices and technologies related to energy for the Russian Federation. In December 2014 the EU approved a third set of sanctions against Russia, which responded to the EU sanctions by deploying measures in 2014 that limited or prohibited the import of selected agricultural products that originated in the countries that adopted or participated in the sanctions against the Russian Federation (see more Council of the EU 2018a).

2.4.1 The Development of Energy Relations in 2015–2018

The ramifications of the tumultuous events of 2014 had a severe influence on the energy interactions between the two actors, which was further aggravated by a number of contentious issues.

First, at the security level, EU member states continued to fear for their own energy security due to the threat of interruptions of gas supplies going from Russia via Ukraine or to Ukraine, which happened repeatedly, for example, in July and November 2015—despite the fact that in late September 2015, the EU supported the conclusion of a preliminary deal for the "winter package" of supplies of Russian

[15]During the period when Russia interrupted its supplies of gas to Ukraine, there were repeated drops in the volume of Russian gas transported to a number of Central and Eastern European countries (Pirani and Yafimava 2016).

natural gas to Ukraine in the subsequent winter season, that is, from 1 October to 31 March 2016 (Szulecki and Westphal 2018).

Second, there were further aggravations at the financial level when in May 2016 the Deputy Chairman of the Management Committee of Gazprom Alexander Medvedev accused Ukraine of failing to pay a debt of 600 million dollars for supplies of gas to the eastern part of the country, which is controlled by rebels. In connection with Ukraine's debt to Gazprom, in mid-November 2016, Putin warned the German Chancellor Angela Merkel that Ukraine might siphon off gas from supplies designated for Europe (Gotev 2016).

Third, in early March 2018, Gazprom announced that it was immediately launching the procedure to terminate its gas supply and transit contract with the Ukrainian company Naftogaz. The reason for this decision was the ruling of the Stockholm arbitration, which ordered Gazprom to pay more than 2.5 billion dollars to Naftogaz. The verdict was to bring an end to the lengthy legal battle that had paralleled the political conflict between Russia and Ukraine.[16] "But after the court decision, Gazprom did not restart gas supplies to Ukraine, forcing Kiev to take emergency measures to make up for the shortfall and warn that transit flows to Europe were at risk" (Reuters 2018).

Fourth, there were tensions at the energy level when throughout 2015–2018 the Managing Director of Gazprom Alexey Miller repeatedly warned EU states to find other routes for the transit of gas because when Nord Stream 2 is put into operation in 2019/2020, the RF will dramatically decrease its gas output travelling via pipelines in Ukraine to a mere 10–15 bcm/y of gas, which is approximately a tenth of their total potential capacity (Pirani and Yafimava 2016). And yet it is in the interest of the EU, most Central and Eastern European countries, and the European Commission, represented by its Vice President for the Energy Union Šefčovič to maintain Ukraine as a transit country, as about 82.2 bcm of gas passed through its territory from Russia to Europe in 2016, which is 23% more than the previous year, and the decrease of the output would impact its energy security (Siddi 2018).[17]

Fifth, this is related to the criticism of the planned Russian–German gas pipeline Nord Stream 2 by the European Commission, primarily by the Vice President for the Energy Union and by member states mostly from the central and eastern parts of the

[16]Gazprom and Naftogaz had filed suits against each other at the Stockholm Arbitration Institute, which resolves business disputes. It was their second dispute; the court had previously refused Gazprom's 56 billion-dollar claim against Naftogaz in connection with a take-or-pay clause (Eyl-Mazzega 2018).

[17]The importance of Ukraine as a strategic partner for the EU in the field of energy was confirmed on 24 November 2016 by the signing of a new memorandum of understanding at the EU-Ukraine summit in Brussels. Until then EU-Ukrainian energy relations had been governed by a memorandum from 2005. The new document should expand the cooperation into areas including science and research, renewable sources, and efforts to implement low-carbon energy. Apart from that, the EU support for Ukraine after 2014 can also be seen in the continuing reverse supply of natural gas from Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary to Ukraine, which has *de facto* stopped receiving Russian gas from the east (RT 2017).

EU.[18] Nord Stream 2 will traverse the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, avoiding Ukrainian territory (Godzimirski and Nowak 2018). The most vociferous critic was Slovakia, which calculated that it would lose 700 million euros annually from transit fees for Russian gas if the RF used Nord Stream 2 to transport the resource to Europe instead of Ukraine; Poland also complained about it, and in 2016 the Polish antimonopoly authority (UOKiK) accused the joint enterprise of Gazprom and five European firms—the German firms Wintershall and Uniper, the French firm Engie, the British firm Shell, and the Austrian firm OMV—which is responsible for constructing the planned gas pipeline, of endangering the competition in Poland (Dannreuther 2016; Siddi 2018; Pirani and Yafimava 2016). Besides these facts, the main argument of critics of Nord Stream 2 is mainly the concern that it will increase the energy (gas) dependence of the EU, which will thus be more vulnerable to Russia's aggressive measures. Nonetheless, the preparatory work for the construction of the controversial Russian pipeline was started in May 2018 at the pipeline's terminus near Greifswald, off the German coast.

And finally, sixth, at the political level, another disputed issue in the EU-RF energy relations was the decision of the European Commission from 22 April 2015 to launch an investigation into Gazprom due to its alleged abuse of its dominant position in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and its violation of the rules of economic competition. The energy relations between the two actors in the period of 2015–2018 were also negatively impacted by the decision of the EC, which was supported by the member states, to repeatedly prolong the sanctions against the RF, which also touch on the Russian energy sector in a limited way. The most recent renewal of the EU sanctions against Russia was on 5 July 2018, when the Council extended the validity of sanctions targeting specific sectors of the Russian economy until 31 January 2019. "This decision follows an update from President Macron and Chancellor Merkel to the European Council of 28–29 June 2018 on the state of implementation of the Minsk agreements, to which the sanctions are linked. The measures target the financial, energy and defence sectors, and the area of dual-use goods" (Council of the EU 2018b).

On the other hand, the period of 2015–2018 also saw efforts from both the EU and Russia to at least partially repair their mutual energy relations. For example, in 2015 President Putin assured the EU of Russia's interest in retaining its gas transit via Ukraine, and the President of the EC Jean-Claude Juncker and Vice President Šefčovič proposed a restart in the energy relations with Russia. Furthermore, in late October 2016, Putin declared that Russia is prepared to renew its gas supplies to Ukraine if Kiev agrees on payment in advance, and in late November 2016, Šefčovič confirmed that the World Bank would provide Ukraine with 500 million dollars to pay for gas supplies. Apart from that, in December 2016, with EU representatives in

[18]Another notable critic of the planned Russian–German enterprise is the USA and its president, Donald Trump, who regards the project as dangerous due to how it increases the EU energy dependence on Russian gas—thus the USA offers to increase the volume of its LNG supplies to Europe.

attendance, Russia and Ukraine pledged to cooperate closely on ensuring the flow of natural gas from Russia to Ukraine and its transit to the EU.

In early March 2017, Gazprom presented the European Commission with a draft measure that should ensure fair conditions for the countries of Eastern Europe; namely, a contract with Gazprom should no longer include the clause prohibiting the presale of gas to other countries,[19] and in late May 2018, Šefčovič invited the energy ministers of Russia and Ukraine, and representatives of Gazprom and Naftogaz to joint talks where the topic of how to secure the flow of gas through Ukraine after 2019 is to be discussed. However, despite these attempts at improving the energy interactions, the EU-RF energy relations remain damaged and weakened.

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[19]On 24 May 2018, "the European Commission has adopted a decision imposing on Gazprom a set of obligations that address the Commission's competition concerns and enable the free flow of gas at competitive prices in Central and Eastern European gas markets, to the benefit of European consumers and businesses" (European Commission 2018).

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Chapter 3
A Constructivist–Discursive Approach to Studying EU-Russia Energy Relations

3.1 The Theoretical Framework: Constructivism and Discourse

On the theoretical level, the monograph draws on the conviction that international relations (and specifically EU-RF energy relations) can be analysed on three primary levels, which influence each other: the levels of material, institutions, and ideas (see Cox 1981). Similarly, according to Petr Kratochvíl and Lukáš Tichý (2012, p. 96), it must therefore first be asked what is the distribution of material abilities and resources between the two parties, which is related to the question of the symmetrical or asymmetrical interdependence of the EU and the RF. Second, it is necessary to analyse the institutional structures that exist between the two parties, because these structures reflect and also objectify their mutual material and ideational relations, thus forming a kind of "international code" that regulates these relations. Third, attention must also be given to the ideational frameworks that give meaning to both material resources and institutional structures. These ideational frameworks manifest in the mutual communication of both parties and in the interpretation of their mutual connection (cf. Cox 1981).

Whereas much attention has been given to the analysis of material resources and institutional structures in expert literature, both domestic and international (see Chap. 1), this monograph will focus on the third of the aforesaid aspects, that is, the analysis of political discourses, which form the basic interpretive framework of the EU-RF energy cooperation. At the same time, in an effort to overcome the mostly nondiscursive perspective of energy relations between the EU and the RF, the following part of the monograph will provide a broader theoretical framework for discourse analysis, which will have to be constructed for this purpose.

Rather than using a synthesis of select currents within social constructivism, this monograph applies a pluralistic approach (Jokela 2011; Checkel 2013, p. 221; Adler 1997, pp. 321–323) which combines, complements, or expands the core findings of conventional and critical constructivism in connection with the concept of discourse

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in an attempt to create a comprehensive theoretical framework for a constructivist–discursive approach to the analysis of energy discourses between the EU and Russia and the interpretation of their main themes (cf. Simmerl 2011; Weldes et al. 1999; Cho 2009). Unlike more strictly defined methods used to combine two or more theoretical approaches together, such as the so-called bridge-building method, which aim to create a detailed synthesis of certain theories (Kratochvíl and Tulmets 2010, p. 17), the pluralistic approach allows for a looser combination of the chosen theories (Checkel 2013, pp. 221–222; Ocelík and Černoch 2014).

3.1.1 Social Constructivism

The main theory which will serve as the basis of the constructivist framework is social constructivism, which instead of being a homogeneous theory of international relations is, on the contrary, rather an internally diverse approach to the study of international relations (Guzzini 2000). According to the eminent theorist of international relations Stefano Guzzini (2000), "social constructivism is a meta-theory that is characterised as (1) an epistemological stance that emphasises the social construction of meaning (and thus also knowledge); (2) an ontological stance that emphasises the construction of social reality". A similar, but more detailed, definition is proffered by the leading theoretician of international relations Alexander Wendt. He describes social constructivism as a structural theory of the international system which works with several premises: (1) states are the main unit of analysis of international political theory; (2) key structures in the system of state-to-state interaction are more intersubjective than material in nature; and (3) state identities and the interests of individual actors/states are essentially constructed by these social structures rather than being given by human nature (cf. Wendt 1999, p. 1).

On the one hand, the aforementioned definitions suggest that constructivism is characterised by significant theoretical fragmentation and is variously delineated by the two currently key theories of international relations—namely, by positivism on one side and by reflectivism on the other. During the 1990s several base currents of constructivism are developed, and these are distinguished by differing philosophical and social approaches and differing subjects of focus. In this sense, for example, the other prominent theorist of international relations Ted Hopf (1998) talks of "conventional" and "critical" constructivism.

On the other hand, despite the differentiation apparent in social constructivism, there are some attributes that are common to all currents within social constructivism. According to Nilüfer Karacasulu and Elif Uzgören (2007, pp. 32–33), the characteristic marks of social constructivism are as follows: First, constructivists claim that actors do not exist independently from their social environment. State interests are derived from the environment in which the states function, and they are endogenous to the states' interaction with their environments. Concurrently, the social world includes ideas, concepts, languages, expressions, signs, and signals, with the condition that people create the social world, which has meaning in people's

minds (Wendt 1999). Second, constructivists stress the importance of normative or ideational structures on a par with material structures in the process of specifying an individual's meaning and identity (Adler 1997), with the condition that human beings interpret the material environment. In other words, constructivism does not deny the existence of the material world, which is external with regard to thought, but it claims that, besides "gross" data, there are certain facts and realities that only exist because we assigned them a certain function or meaning. Their existence thus depends on an intersubjectively shared set of meanings (Jackson and Sørensen 2003). Third, according to constructivists, norms and shared convictions form the identity and interests of the actor. Constructivists also focus on social identity and the interests of actors that are not fixed and pre-decided but are relative and relational. Interests are based on the actors' social identity in constructivism (Karacasulu and Uzgören 2007, pp. 32–33; Reus-Smit 2005).

Constructivism's focus on the "actor–structure debate" also ponders the nature of international reality and the role of structure in the construction of the actor, with the condition that it regards both as equal components that are constantly connected and influenced each other. The main argument of constructivists is that the basic structures of international politics are more social than material; and these structures form the identities and interests of actors and vice versa (Wendt 1999, p. 392). In this argumentation, constructivists primarily focus on the intersubjective dimension of knowledge because they want to emphasise the social aspect of human existence, that is, the role of shared ideas as ideational and normative structures that limit and shape behaviour.

Within the framework of social constructivism, both conventional and critical constructivism will be combined. Both of these constructivist approaches and their combinations will be described in the following section.

Conventional Constructivism

Conventional constructivism, as a new alternative to the dominant theories in the field of international relations, occupies the middle ground between rationalism,[1] from which it draws a number of premises concerning methodological individualism and positivistic epistemology, and critical social theory (cf. Karacasulu and Uzgören 2007). Conventional constructivism focuses on the concepts of norms, values, rules, and identity and their role in forming interests and international political results while at the same time noting the increased impact of intersubjective conviction on decision-making and political activity. Last but not least, conventional constructivism draws on an understanding of discourse, language, and action as rule-based concepts (Hopf 1998, pp. 171–200).

Unlike realism, which is mainly based on materialistic thinking, conventional constructivism claims that the environment that surrounds states is primarily cultural

[1] According to Petr Kratochvíl and Elsa Tulmets (2010, p. 26), rationalism stems from the conviction that the actors try to maximise their own interests, which can be both material and ideational. At the same time, these actors attempt to rationally manipulate their surroundings, which can also be either material or ideational, in the effort to achieve their own interests.

and institutional, rather than being merely material.[2] Conventional constructivists thus regard ideas as having a key role in the construction of social life, with the condition that this idea-based approach to international politics deals more with social conditions than with material ones. Contrary to liberalism, which focuses on the regulative role of norms, conventional constructivism sees norms as having a deeper effect, either defining identity, or prescribing behaviour, or both (cf. Cho 2009). Conventional constructivism goes on to claim that norms inform states on what to do and what to wish for, and on a deeper level, norms influence what states should be (cf. Checkel 1998, p. 324). The point is that state identity is shaped via norms, which suggest suitable behaviour, with the condition that this identity concurrently forms individual interests of the state (cf. Cho 2009).

The aforesaid argumentation indicates that the role of norms fits into both a regulative and a constitutive context. Mainly, norms have a strong impact on the formation of identity, which comprises a set of interests or preferences with regard to the selection of activities in individual areas and with regard to specific actors (cf. Hopf 1998, p. 172). In other words, identities and interests are shaped by norms, which lead actors to maintain certain socially prescribed rules of suitable behaviour, which is often called the logic of appropriateness. Nonetheless, it is important to note that norms do not determine actions but that they merely create looser conditions for activity (cf. Finnemore 1996, p. 158). The state must then act in accordance with its identity and its interests (cf. Cho 2009).

Critical Constructivism

Critical constructivism, which is understood to mean a radical or consistent constructivism, offers various alternatives for approaching the central themes of the theory of international relations, including the importance of anarchy and the balance of power, the relation between state identity and interest, the development of power, and the possibility of change in global politics (Hopf 1998, p. 173; Dias 2013, p. 257). Despite its dependence on interpretative (post-structuralist) methodology and post-positivistic epistemology and ontology, critical constructivism is ready to expound theory through dialogue with other approaches to international relations, including the Copenhagen school's theory of securitisation[3]/desecuritisation[4] (cf. Simmerl 2011, p. 2; Balzacq 2010). Within its focus on discourse, or rather,

[2]However, conventional constructivism does not claim that material resources and conditions are unimportant; rather, it claims that their impact is always mediated by ideas, which give them meaning (cf. Fearon and Wendt 2005, p. 57).

[3]Securitisation is a dynamic process of the social construction of threats and risks, where a certain matter becomes a security issue not due to the existence of a real threat, but because it is presented and understood as a threat (Buzan et al. 1997). Thierry Balzacq (2005) states that effective securitisation has three preconditions: (1) it is context-dependent, (2) it is audience-focused, and (3) it allows for the aspect of power. This extension is essential for the understanding of the securitisation of energy security.

[4]This happens when a given threat loses its urgency and is moved back down the scale to the sphere of politicisation or when a given threat is completely solved and removed from the political debate (Buzan et al. 1997). This means that topics that no longer pose an existential threat (in the actors'

discursive analysis, critical constructivism (1) analyses language and communication, (2) emphasises (discursive) structures, and (3) takes power relations into consideration in the process of construction (Simmerl 2011, p. 5).

First, critical constructivism understands discourse (both public and political) as principally producing social reality and thus language as its own analytical dimension. Using language means accepting interpretative methods when pondering and searching for answers to questions of which linguistic practices form social reality and in what way. At the same time, the departure from the understanding of identity as an objective entity to favour linguistic forms with various interpretations is based on the substitution of the correspondence theory of belief with the consensual theory of knowledge (see Simmerl 2011, p. 5; Cho 2009, p. 90). Second, under the influence of the post-structuralist theory of discourse, with regard to the relation between (discursive) structure and the (interpretatively designated) actor, critical constructivism tends towards the structural side of the actor–structure debate. In other words, critical constructivism is trying to distance itself from this "hidden" bias and understand the constitutive effects of discursive structure in forming the positions of the subject and intersubjective understanding as the basis for the social order (Simmerl 2011, p. 6). Third, critical constructivism presumes that actors try to control discourses and enforce their interpretation in structured discursive spheres. In the struggle to select the dominant interpretation, seen as a broadly shared intersubjective knowledge, power plays the vital role, not just in a disciplinary and productive sense, which is affected by discursive structures when shaping the extent of the interpretation, but also from the perspective of various capacities of actors when they apply their interpretation (see Zehfuss 2002).

In this context, critical constructivism also deals with the relations between discourse, identity, and interest and their impact on power and security. Critical constructivists believe that the production and reproduction of state identity are essential for its stability and security, with the condition that actions that produce the state itself give meaning to the concept of "identity/difference", which is crucial for security studies of critical constructivism. In other words, identity is constructed in relation to difference, which is itself constructed in relation to identity (Cho 2009, p. 90).[5]

A Broader Definition of Constructivism and Its Principal Assumptions

Despite certain differences between representatives of conventional and critical social constructivism (for more on that, see Karacasulu and Uzgören 2007, p. 31), it is not necessary to perceive the two constructivist approaches as being in conflict with each other. On the contrary, the two currents can be seen as complementing

opinion) are usually relegated to the political agenda, which should ensure that the threat will not reappear.

[5]In this sense, critical constructivists consider it important for this construction of identity and security/threat to take place in the framework of discourse, which enables the (re)production, transformation, and constitution of the interests and power of the actor (Dias 2013, p. 258).

each other, helping researchers to achieve a deeper understanding of global politics through various perspectives of research on international relations (Cho 2009, p. 97).

For instance, Hopf (1998, p. 173) admits that conventional constructivism draws on a number of principal findings of critical constructivism to solve some of its questions, and vice versa, with the condition that both currents share a common theoretical basis. First, both approaches aim to "denaturalise" the social world, that is, to empirically discover and uncover how institutions, procedures, and identities that people consider natural and fixed are actually produced by people, formed by social construction, and influenced by norms, ideas, and values. Second, both constructivist approaches believe that intersubjective reality and meaning are important tools for understanding the social world. Third, both currents insist that all data must be "contextualised", that is, it must be related to and situated within the social environment that it was collected in to allow its meaning to be understood. Fourth, both currents accept the connection or relation between power and knowledge during the forming of the interests of actors, but they also acknowledge the implementation of practice in its disciplinary, that is, productive, mode. Fifth, the two approaches emphasise the reflection of self and society, by which they mean the mutual constitution of actor and structure. And finally, both currents acknowledge and accept, albeit with differences and to various degrees of intensity, the importance of discourse and language.

Conventional and critical constructivism also complement and agree with each other in the following areas, through which they constitute the complex framework of constructivism used in this monograph. First, both approaches are complementary with regard to the relation (or influence) of ideas, norms, and values on the actor's behaviour. Although critical constructivism does not consider ideas, norms, and values to be a key topic of research, it does not rule out their importance in forming the actor's behaviour and actions but instead supplements them with the impact of discursive structures. Likewise, while conventional constructivism points out the influence of ideas, norms, and values in relation to the actor's behaviour, it also accepts that these ideas and norms can be used rationally by the actor to secure strategic advantages for itself. Second, the two currents complement each other on the matter of the importance of foreign and security policies and behaviour in relation to identity. Conventional constructivism stresses the impact of normativity, that is, norms and ideas, and rationality on shaping identity, which forms foreign and security policies and affects the actor's outward behaviour towards others; at the same time this identity is formed by and together with external policy. Critical constructivism, on the other hand, perceives the actor's outward behaviour—in the context of its foreign and security policies—enacted in compliance with its identity, which is discursively constructed in relation to difference, which is, conversely, constructed in relation to identity. Third, the two currents are also complementary with regard to the shaping of national interests and preferences. Whereas conventional constructivism emphasises the fact that the actor's interests are derived from its identity and impacted by norms and ideas, critical constructivism sees national interests and preferences as formed and constructed within discourse, like identity. Fourth, both approaches complement each other in the matter of the effect of

intersubjectivity on discourse and its relation to the structure–actor debate. On the one hand, critical constructivism tends more towards the structural side of the debate with regard to the relation between the discursive structure and interpretation pronounced by the actor, that is, the creator of the discourse; it tries to comprehend the constitutive effects of the discursive structure when setting the positions of the subject, intersubjective understanding, and security/threat awareness. On the other hand, conventional constructivism accentuates the interpretation pronounced by the creator of the discourse when understanding the intersubjectivity of discourse and language as rule-based action.

In other words, both constructivist approaches complement each other with regard to the effect of norms and rationality on the actor's behaviour and identity, and its outward activities and interests constructed in the discourse, which may take on the role of both actor and structure in the process of intersubjectivity while at the same time connecting with extradiscursive reality. This broadly defined framework of constructivism, which constitutes the first part of the theoretical framework of this monograph, will aid in analysing the interactions of norms and values and their relation to identity and the interests of the EU and the RF within their mutual energy discourses.

3.1.2 The Concept of Discourse

The second major section of the theoretical framework consists of the concept of discourse, which can be defined as the construction of meaning via written or oral communication (Simmerl 2011, p. 5). In this perspective, discourse is a disciplined process of construction that consists of the difference between what could be said correctly in one period (by the standards of grammar and logic) and what is actually said (Phillips and Hardy 2002, p. 3). At the same time, we can understand discourse to be a set of thoughts, concepts, and categories that usher meaning into reality (Hajer 1993, pp. 45–46). This means that discourse does not just refer to the form of communication, that is, speeches, conversations, etc., which are instrumental, communicative, and constitutive (Simmerl 2011, p. 5), but is also connected directly to the process of the actor's negotiations. This will be represented herein by the official texts and speeches of the EU and the RF, which will show and elucidate both discursive methods and social practice.

Discourse and Constructivism

Constructivism does not perceive discourse and interpretation merely as abstract thoughts or ways in which people talk, and describe and present things, but it also sees a close connection with institutional and social practices, which have a major impact on the way we live our lives, what we can do, and what can be done for us. According to Jennifer Milliken (1999, pp. 229–230), constructivism reflects three theoretical premises with regard to discourse. First, it is a critically constructivist conviction that discourse represents a semantic structure that constructs social

reality. The basis of the premise is the critically constructivist understanding of meaning, in which meaning is not formed by the things themselves, but by people, who construct the meaning of things through systems of signs. Second, discourse is perceived as a socially productive phenomenon that makes it possible to create or reproduce a discursively defined social reality. In other words, beyond the framework given to language for speaking of phenomena, discourses elucidate certain ways of being and acting in the world while also helping to operationalise, mainly, the mode of truth, even when they rule out other possible means of identity and action. Third, the formation and legitimisation of this scope of effect direct the research of discourse towards dominant discourses. Nonetheless, although dominant discourses are a "grid of intelligibility" for large numbers of people, the third theoretical premise is for all discourses defined as unstable grids requiring work to "articulate" and "re-articulate" their knowledge and identity (the fixing mode of truth) and unlimited grids constituting discourses that are variable and actually historically conditioned (but also Hynek and Střítecký 2010a, p. 85).

These shared foundations and theoretical premises of constructivism and discourse reflect a number of basic notions that are important for research on discourse analysis. At the same time, the interaction between constructivism and discourse creates the basis of the theoretical constructivist–discursive framework of research on discourse and related issues of EU-RF energy relations as a nondiscursive reality.

3.2 The Constructivist–Discursive Approach to Key Concepts

The aforementioned content of discourse and constructivism and their mutual relation constitute the basis of the theoretical framework of the constructivist–discursive approach, which will be used to analyse the energy discourse between the EU and Russia and related key concepts. For this reason, the first part of the second subchapter will mostly focus on specifying the issue of energy discourse as the main concept of this dissertation. The second part will then define other key concepts, such as norms, values, rules, and ideas, and this will be followed by a description of their relation to discourse and identity. This leads to the third part of the second subchapter, which will deal with the construction of identity and the outward behaviour of the EU and Russia in discourse. The fourth part then discusses foreign identity's relation to and influence on the interests of the EU and the RF. The second subchapter is then concluded by an analysis of the question of intersubjectivity in EU-RF energy relations.

3.2.1 Energy Discourse

The main concept applied in this treatise is energy discourse, which is the prism through which EU-RF energy relations will be analysed. Energy discourse tends to be associated with the concept of energy security, which is understood as the ensuring of a stable and uninterrupted supply of energy for acceptable prices. This consumer-oriented definition is complemented by a producer-oriented view of energy security, which requests the ensuring of a sufficient volume of sales of supplied energy for accessible prices.

The question of energy security constitutes a complex and wide-ranging concept, and Alhajji (2014, pp. 113–136) recommends analysing it with regard to six specific aspects. These aspects are the economic, environmental, technological, social, foreign policy, and national security aspects. In the context of these dimensions, the energy discourse is not limited to the perspectives of resources and economy, but it also considers matters of foreign policy and national security. Concurrently, this broader interpretation is applied to the energy discourse, which will include the core findings of both the political discourse and the foreign policy and security discourse. Likewise, energy policy, which stems from identity, which it also reproduces, will be based on knowledge of foreign and security policies and discourse.

Political Discourse

Political discourse is usually identified via its actors, that is, political representatives, with the condition that the vast majority of studies of political discourse focus on documents and speeches of politicians such as presidents, prime ministers, and members of cabinets, parliaments, or political parties or political institutes on local, national, and international levels (van Dijk 1997, p. 12). With respect to these actualities, the political discourse is a set of pronounced judgements, considerations, and opinions in political debates institutionalised by political figures, and its aim is not just attention, but mainly persuasion, with the condition that political direction is the cornerstone of argumentation (Larsen 1997, pp. 25–26).

Although the discourse may differ from the behaviour of a political actor (see Searle 1979), for example, because the actor wants to hide its true motives and intentions behind a certain rhetoric, political discourse plays a major role in social analysis because it always reflects the basic ideational framework of the actor and its cognitive process. The question arises, in what sense is the study of textuality relevant if we allow that the actor can sometimes speak in contradiction to its material interests or institutionalised practice? In this regard, Kratochvíl notes that "political discourse shows us which basic principles the actor's thinking draws on, [and] how it interprets the political reality and its institutional relations with other actors. The study of political discourse also allows us to uncover the internal inconsistency of the given rhetoric or the manipulative techniques that are present in the discourse" (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2012, pp. 97–98, translated).

Within the framework of energy discourse, political discourse will serve as a useful tool for uncovering certain ambivalences and inconsistencies in the speeches and public appearances of political representatives of the EU and Russia. At the

same time, political discourse can help elucidate the different meanings that political figures of the EU and the RF assign to certain terms and concepts.

Foreign Policy Discourse

Political discourse is directly related to foreign policy discourse. According to Guillaume Colin (2004, pp. 8–9), foreign policy discourse can be analysed on two levels. The first level sees this discourse as a practice rooted in social space with a meaning derived with regard to conventions, which define the conditions of its effectivity; however, it must be noted that this practice does not pertain only to foreign policy, but also to domestic policy. In the context of these actualities, the producer of this discourse is also the maker of both foreign/international policy and domestic policy because it must take into account both implemented decisions and internationally enacted measures. On the second level, foreign policy discourse is connected to a different meaning of foreign policy. When speaking of foreign policy, it is often reckoned that everyone is speaking of the same thing, which allows us to place various discourses on the same level—that is, in a certain way that enables us to give meaning to events that are defined by linguistic and cultural contexts and by political culture and imagery (Colin 2004, pp. 8–9).

In relation to energy discourse, foreign policy discourse reflects several key findings. First, within the framework of foreign policy discourse, the creators of the EU/RF energy discourse must consider impulses that come from both the internal and the external dimension of energy policy. Second, the basis of foreign policy discourse in the political field and its cultural foundations in political imagery, which are defined by political culture and the linguistic and cultural context, are regarded as a tool that imbues the EU/RF energy discourse with meaning. Third, in the case of both foreign policy discourse and energy discourse, when an imbalance exists in the construction of the connection between identity and policy, there is an effort to reassert stability on the basis of change.

Security Discourse

Security discourse is likewise often connected with the process of construing something or someone as a threat to security, which includes the mobilisation of discursively impactful "sub-security concepts" such as "strategic interests" and "national interests" (Weldes et al. 1999). Security discourse then gives certain questions higher priority and a certain legitimacy—for example, when allowing governments and political representatives to break free from procedures and rules that they would otherwise be obliged to follow (for more on this, see Hansen 2006, p. 35; Buzan et al. 1997, p. 25). However, this does not mean that there are no limits to what the government can do when something is construed as a security issue. The justification of decisive action in reaction to the construction of something that endangers security is then followed by accountability for the enacted responses to these threats. Nonetheless, when the threat turns back into a political issue, political representatives reformulate the situation within the framework of security discourse in such a way that the threat ceases to be a security issue, and thus, according to Wæver (1995), the given issue (threat) is retroactively desecuritised (but also Hansen 2006, p. 35).

Security discourse represents another, the third, dimension of energy discourse, which draws on a number of findings from security discourse in its emphasis on energy security. These findings mainly pertain to the questions of the securitisation and desecuritisation of specific energy topics within the EU/RF energy discourse.

3.2.2 Norms, Values, and Ideas and Their Relation to Discourse and Identity

In relation to discourse, or rather, through the prism of a constructivist–discursive approach, other key terms will be explored, namely, norms, values, and ideas. Besides defining these terms, which the treatise will make further use of within the EU/RF energy discourse, this part will also focus on the influence and relation of these concepts with regard to identity. Finally, this section will deal with the divergent or convergent attitudes of the EU and Russia towards norms and values.

The Relation Between Discourse and Norms, Values, and Ideas and Their Impact on Identity

There is currently no universal definition of the term "norm". For instance, Martha Finnemore (2004, p. 6) states that norms embody the normative quality of what should be, and they represent a shared moral assessment, and thus also a call to justify and explain actions, while leaving a trail of extensive communications between individual actors. In a broader sense, norms can be defined as shared principles that describe how actors should or should not behave in specific situations.

Various types of norms, which are not static but can change and evolve, work in different ways. Whereas regulative norms order and limit an actor's behaviour, constitutive norms express the actor's identity, which defines interests and shapes conduct; meanwhile evaluative norms describe what is suitable for an actor and what is not (see more Sato and Hirata 2008, pp. 8–9). In accordance with the constructivist emphasis on constitutive norms, this dissertation understands norms to be standards of suitable behaviour for actors with a given identity that have a major impact on the EU/RF energy discourse (see Zehfuss 2002, pp. 16–17).

Norms are of fundamental importance for another concept—values, which are formed under their influence. Although values are important, they are sometimes seen as secondary for essays on power. However, the formation of values should not be limited merely to considerations of state interests and power. Constructivists claim that values evolve through history and create cultural configurations, through which nations form their international attitudes and designate their interests. The dimension of power then comes into play in discourse when national values are promoted externally or protected from external influences (cf. Tsygankov 2015, p. 287).

The last key concept is that of ideas. "The exploration of ideas (that is, discourses and interpretations), which mediate and maintain interpretations of the human world, is no longer a peripheral matter for constructivism, but instead is becoming the very

core of social science research" (Barša and Císař 2008, p. 296, translated). Constructivism sees ideas as more than mere tools for observing the interests of actors, but rather as building blocks of their identity, which ushers forth their interests and the means of observing them (see more Wendt 1999, pp. 113–135). At the same time, according to Pavel Barša and Ondřej Císař (2008, p. 299), ideas and discourses are not the instruments, but the constituents of both actors and systems of interaction. The relation between actors and discourses and interpretations is not an outward one (such as the relation between an owner and a replaceable tool) but an inner one. Actors are constituted by discourses and interpretations—the latter two are not the freely manipulatable property of the former, but rather the source of the definition of their being.

Constructivism then points to the interaction between actors and examines what role they play in the construction of the social and political world, with the condition that these actors are not mere "automatons", but are acknowledged as being imbued with values and ideas. These ideas and values inform about the actors' conduct, while on the other hand, actors construct institutions, which reflect identities and values, whereas these institutions concurrently reflect and form the behaviour and identity of individuals through the existence of certain norms.

Attitudes of the EU and Russia Towards Norms and Values

Apart from this it is necessary to briefly focus on the divergent attitudes, or the different perceptions of these key concepts, that is, rules, ideas, and especially norms and values, of the European Union and the Russian Federation. The interpretations of meaning that the European Union and Russia apply to norms and values are important for the later analysis of the behaviour and conduct, but also the formation of identities and interests of both actors within their energy discourse. Although, according to Andrey Makarychev (2014, pp. 16–17), the two actors interpret and perceive values and norms differently, these differences should not be absolutised, but should be examined in a number of slightly varied contexts.

First, the Russian Federation tries to re-interpret European values through references to the normative order of the EU. For instance, the RF verbally accepts democracy as a value, but it interprets it mainly as the rule of the majority, rather than the protection of minorities in the country. Likewise, the RF has a different interpretation of the norms and rules of the WTO, which, in its interpretation, are to serve Russian interests while being voluntary and nonbinding for Russia. Second, a difference in ideas and values persists on the official level mainly due to the sovereignty of the RF, which tries to manipulate the domestic public opinion through the process of creating an artificial hostile image of the West. From a practical point of view, this means that the more the two societies communicate together without government supervision, the higher the chance to overcome these differences in values—albeit probably sometime in the far future. Third, the EU and Russia cannot share common values, but some common—mostly procedural—norms may form the basis for their bilateral relations. These norms are expressed in key documents and projects of the European Union and the RF, such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (Makarychev 2014, pp. 17–18).

In other words, although political representatives of the EU and the RF often use the same normative vocabulary, European and Russian discourse-makers deliberately assign different meanings to these normative terms. The EU faces no opposition from the RF regarding the terms democracy, identity, and security, but the two parties give these words different meanings. In this way, Russia does not challenge fundamental European norms and values, but instead it tries to offer an alternative understanding of most of them (Makarychev 2014, p. 29).

3.2.3 The Construction of Identity in Discourse

Whereas the previous part discussed the influence of norms and values with regard to identity, the present section will give a more detailed account of the conceptualisation of identity and the theoretical positions of the outward conduct of the actors. Focus will first be placed on the term "identity" and the findings that define it through a constructivist–discursive approach; this will be followed by a description of the relation between identity and foreign and security policy and discourse. Emphasis will also be placed on the relation of two key terms of identity: self and other. The last part of this section will present the characteristic identity traits of the EU and the RF.

Identity and Discourse

Identity, as one of the key topics of the theoretical research of constructivists, is formed by norms and values while also being construed in the social environment of foreign and domestic policy—it enables actors to establish "who I am/who we are" in the position of a social role composed of shared understandings and expectations. That is to say, constructivism sees identity as being shaped under the influence of norms and values in social interaction, with the condition that it does not relate merely to self-identification and allocation of meaning for the self by a given actor, but also to the definitions allocated and produced by others (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, p. 399). Constructivists also claim that identity is formed within the framework of discourse. That is to say, discourses are mainly the ones to construct social identity, which in turn forms the social behaviour of actors by defining their interests and attitudes in international relations.

On the one hand, Hansen (2006, p. 48) states that the relation between discourse and foreign policy, or foreign policy discourse, can be identified as a construction and an articulation of identity that has two dimensions. First, the spatial dimension of identity in foreign policy discourse is connected with the construction of self in relation to the other, that is, the other countries. Second, in foreign policy discourse, the forming of the other as a temporally pervading identity towards the self is possible when the other is construed as having a temporal identity similar to the self or when the other is articulated as an object at a different time than the self. On the other hand, Wendt (1999) argues that identity is the main source of the interests that fuel foreign policy. In this interpretation, identity has two main functions. First, identity determines a specific set of priorities with regard to possible behaviour in

various circumstances, and it is an important building block of foreign policy. In other words, identity is the foundation of the foreign policy conduct of states towards other states. Second, identity means that the state perceives other states on the basis of its already acquired identity, which was reproduced in the course of social interactions (Nia 2012, p. 34).

Identity and security policy are just as closely connected in security discourse. Historically, political leaders legitimised their security policy in the discourse by construing other countries as the other that endangers security and the social structure of the national self. In other words, within the framework of national security discourse, the inside is presented as the desired state of being, whereas the outer world (the other) is presented as being a threat to the security of the state. At the same time, threats and uncertainties are not just potential dangers to the state and things that should be removed, but they also constitute the state, with the condition that only the state knows who or what represents this radical, state-threatening other (Hansen 2006, p. 34). The construction of the national self as a form of spatial identity then leads states to adopt measures with the aim of ensuring their own security in the face of danger from the outer world as the other. In this perspective, security is an ontological necessity for the state, not because the state must be protected from external threats, but because its identity depends on these external threats (Hansen 2006, p. 38). David Campbell (1998, p. 55) emphasises that the ensuring of an ordered self and an ordered world—especially when the scope in which this process functions is as extensive as a state—includes decisive elements that prevent an arrangement in the form of otherness.

These findings on the relation of foreign and security policies to discourse and identity will serve as the basis for the construction of the outer dimension of the energy policy and security of the EU and Russia, as applied in their energy discourse. At the same time, the external energy policy and security of the EU and the RF represent a tool not just for their international conduct, but also for the implementation of their identities, which will be the subject of analysis in the following part of this treatise.

The Identity of the EU and Russia

As was previously mentioned, constructivists emphasise the constitutive effects of ideas and norms when explaining how thoughts and discourse influence the perception of states and their priorities in foreign politics. At the same time, they try to show how cognitive structures determine the ways in which actors newly define themselves, with the condition that these cognitive structures can be defined as the collective expectations of suitable behaviour for a given identity which tells actors who they are, what their goal is, and what role they should play. This premise regarding the formation of identity, influenced by norms and values and conceptualised by the relation between discourse and foreign and security policies, as the basic framework of the energy policy for the outward behaviour and conduct of the EU and Russia, is then directly related to the next section of the text, which contains a brief characterisation of the identities of the EU and the RF.

The Identity of the EU and of Europe

The problem with describing the external European identity of the Self and determining its characteristics is specifically the ambiguous connection between the identity of Europe and that of the EU. According to Risse (2009, pp. 169–170), people can feel a sense of belonging to Europe in general without feeling any connection with the EU and vice versa. Nonetheless, the EU has achieved a hegemony of identity as far as being the ever-increasing determiner of what it means to be a part of Europe. EU membership has a significant impact on the specification of the identities of European states, as states in Europe continue to be defined according to whether they are members of the EU or non-members, or applicant countries. The EU has also achieved a hegemony of identity in the sense that Europe is increasingly depicted as a political and social space occupied by the EU with non-member states being "outside of Europe". For example, this was evident during the eastern expansion of the EU that gave membership to countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which requested to "return to Europe". In this context, Europe is used as a synonym for the EU, and people identify both with Europe and with the European Union, which increasingly fills a substantial part of Europe with specific political and economic content.

Besides the formation of the external European identity of the Self, it is important to realise that Europe/the EU can just as easily appear as the Self or the Other depending on what the Other states within (e.g. European [non-]member states) or without (such as Russia) regard as Europe, as a type of voluntary integration, or, contrarily, as exclusion (cf. Stråth 2010, p. 15). At the same time, according to Ole Wæver (2005), the European Union is usually construed not in opposition to the external spatial Other, but in opposition to the temporal Other of its own past—that is, it is construed a certain way out of a fear of a return to its own violent history (Hansen 2006, p. 49).

The Identity of Russia

The construction of the external identity of the Russian Federation as the self and the other is similarly complex and is impossible to realise in a broader historical perspective without reference to the European experience and practice and vice versa. On the one hand, Russia has coped with its relation to the area west of the territory it has historically controlled from a normative perspective by aspiring to the role of a state fully belonging to the European system of power (Kuchyňková 2010, p. 29). That is to say, Russia as a European country constructs its identity of self in the context of or in accordance with Europe. On the other hand, Russia has met with the phenomenon of otherness, even exclusion, and has built alternative images of a distinctive Russian identity that is aware of its specificity, that of a Russia that should not adopt foreign examples but, on the contrary, has its own "civilisational" mission in its area of domain (White and Feklyunina 2014, pp. 99–134). This means that Russia as a (non-)European country constructs its identity of Self in opposition to Europe as the Other, but Russian identity can just as well be formed as that of the European Other with regard to Europe. In other words, Europe can be seen either as the Russian Self, or as the Russian Other, from both a spatial and a temporal perspective in the

formation of Russian identity, which is well illustrated by the practice of communication between the RF and the EU (cf. Makarychev 2014, p. 19).

At the same time, within the construction of the external identity of the RF and its attitude to the role of the other, that is, Europe, it is important to observe the process of the Russian division of self into "good" and "bad", in which one of these two qualities is always projected in relation to the "other". This process corresponds to the Russian mostly artificial division of Europe into the "weak" and the "strong", the "false" and the "true", and the "old" and the "new", with the condition that the apparent rift within the Russian self provokes and requires corresponding binary sets in the Russian perception of other countries as the other (Makarychev 2014, p. 19).

3.2.4 The Relation of External Identity to Interests

The concept of identity in the constructivist–discursive approach is closely connected to the question of interests. Constructivists do not consider identity and interests to be preordained or fixed variables; instead, they claim that identity is the main source of the creation of interests (Wendt 1992, p. 398). In constructivist theory, it is essential to understand the process through which the identities of actors (states) are constructed by nonmaterial structures, because the social identities of actors are the main basis for the creation of interests in global politics. In other words, whereas identities relate to who or what the actors are and determine social types or states of being, interests refer to what the actors want and designate motivations that help explain behaviour. Therefore, interests presuppose identity, because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is (Wendt 1999, p. 231).

At the same time, the actors' conduct with regard to international relations, together with the interests they hold and the structures within which they act, is defined by social norms and ideas rather than by objective or material circumstances. That is to say, constructivists emphasise the constitutive role of discourse and presuppose the constitutive effects of social norms and institutions, because these rules do not only alter behaviour—that is, they have causal effects—but they also define the social identities of states and their interests (for more on this, see Nia 2012, pp. 35–36; Risse 2000, pp. 4–5, 2009). This part of the dissertation will begin by defining the term "interest", which will be followed by a description of its relation to identity.

For most constructivists, national interest is an important social construct that is considered a key indicator of actors' behaviour. For instance, Jutta Weldes (1996, p. 276) states that national interest is important in international politics for two reasons: "First, it is through the concept of national interest that policy-makers understand the goals to be pursued by a state's foreign policy. [. . .] Second, it functions as a rhetorical device through which the legitimacy of and political support for state action are generated". That is to say, in the discourse of international politics, the concept of national interest is generally used in two independent but related ways. National interest is used to shape political behaviour by serving as a means of defence, and it is also used as an analytical tool for the description,

examination, and evaluation of the appropriateness of national foreign policy. The foundation of both these means of application of national interest is the set of premises for what is best for national communality, with regard to both the domestic and the foreign (see Burchill 2005, p. 23).

The Effect of Identity on Interests

Constructivists also suppose that national interests are formed by actors in the complex processes of social interaction. These processes shape both their identity and their interests. In this perspective, interests are seen as the consequence of a specific identity, which is, in turn, formed by interests. Constructivists do not acknowledge any preconceived interests "from outside"; instead, in their view, interests are developed, discerned, and studied again in the course of time as a result of experience and reflection (cf. Reus-Smit 2005, pp. 189–190). At the same time, it must be stressed that constructivists refuse the idea of permanent and fixed interests that are the basis of realistic thought on this topic, as interests are determined by social interaction and must therefore change together with the changing experience of social interaction in the course of time (cf. Burchill 2005).

It is, of course, natural that political elites attempt to define their interests as national interests, but constructivists see this process as limited by the norms which shaped the identity of the given state. These norms may be formal or informal, international or intranational. The key point is the constructivist claim that norms create this identity, which determines the nature and extent of the moral influence that these subjects can express. In other words, for constructivists, the debate on moral influence and its formation becomes a debate on norms that significantly impact moral behaviour and interests (for more on this, see Burchill 2005, p. 197). Thus constructivism states that ideas that dominate in society are constructed within discourse, with the condition that these ideas determine the society's norms, rules, and political practice (Savigny and Marsden 2011, p. 127). These ideational norms and rules in the context of discourse then create values and form social identity, which describes the material and nonmaterial forces that construct political and social reality (cf. Howarth and Torfling 2005). To understand the behaviour of actors, it is important to understand their collective identity, because only when the actors' identity can change and develop can it determine their interests, which must reflect the political discourse (cf. Tichý and Kratochvíl 2014). In other words, within discourse, the interests of individual actors stem from their identity, which is constructed and formed together with values by norms and rules under the influence of ideas.

In accordance with this constructivist–discursive supposition, this text will analyse the energy interests of the European Union and the Russian Federation within the framework of the individual energy discourses of the two parties. That is to say, in the EU and Russian energy discourses, the interests of the EU and the Russian Federation will be derived from their external identities, which form and create the content and character of the EU and RF energy interests, which may change and converge or diverge from each other in individual discursive approaches under the influence of intersubjectivity.

3.2.5 *Intersubjectivity in EU-RF Energy Relations*

Intersubjectivity is the last concept to be examined through a constructivist–discursive approach in this chapter. This part of the text will provide an analysis of intersubjectivity in EU-RF relations, which can be interpreted differently by the two parties. This is apparent on the example of the EU and Russian discourse on the shaping of mutual identities and interests.

In the narrower sense of the word, intersubjectivity refers to the shared space where two or more parties can communicate together as partners, while at the same time, in the examined case, it is not just the EU that is capable of influencing the RF, as was the case in the 1990s, but the RF also has an impact on the EU. Intersubjectivity presupposes that every type of influence has its other side, a kind of counter-influence to the influence. For instance, for a long time Russia was the object of a number of EU-sponsored programmes with an expected impact on the RF in response to its receiving financial support from the EU. Contrarily, however, the fact that Russia does not fulfil the normative expectations of the EU could be an argument in favour of a policy of strong divergence between the EU and the RF in the sense of the self and the other (Makarychev 2014, p. 27).

In the broader sense of the word, intersubjectivity means more than just the ability to achieve a certain practical influence and change the policies or discourses of other actors, but it also signifies the ability to form their identities and the interests derived from them. In other words, the EU and the RF are not simply mutually dependent, but they shape each other's identities and interests. Russia longs to find its right place in European politics, in the sphere of security and intellectual matters, but in its own way by interpreting key conditions of the hegemonic discourse and filling them with content suitable for its needs/interests and preferences. Intersubjectivity creates a subjective position dependent on an external party that is sensitive to the opinions and inputs of the external others (Makarychev 2014, pp. 27–28).

The term "intersubjectivity" is a tool for understanding the complexity of the relations between the EU and Russia as the interaction of two ontologically dislocated or unstable, different, and loose subjects. The European and Russian identities are mutually dependent, but the role of the EU in forming the Russian identity is stronger than the role of Russia in constructing the EU identity. The Russian discourse is largely Eurocentric, even in negative cases, whereas the EU discourse is not necessarily Russocentric. Therefore, the EU seems to be rooted in the Eurocentric procedure of its own hegemony by means of excluding discursive strategies founded on the devaluation of the other. According to Makarychev (2014, p. 29), this EU policy can be explained by the union's emphasis on normativity, understood as a way of thinking that stresses the central importance of an independent rule of law that limits the arbitrary and personal exercise of political power.

Russia plays a different game in refusing and even contesting its otherness and exteriority, which are ascribed to it by Europe. The list of possible identities of Russia might include roles such as a "Different Europe", the "Non-Western Europe", or a constitutive part of "Wider Europe" or the "Euro-Atlantic civilisation". For this

Table 3.1 Characteristics of the constructivist–discursive framework/approach

Constructivist framework/approach				
Constructivism	Conventional constructivism	Critical constructivism	Result	Discourse
Constructivism can be understood as a broad and internally diversified approach to the study of international relations that sees reality as socially constructed	Conventional constructivism examines the concepts of norms, rules, values, and identity and their influence and impact on the rational behaviour and interests of actors	Critical constructivism focuses on the importance of foreign and security discourse in the process of forming identity and interests and their intersubjective influence on the construction of power and security	Both approaches complement each other with regard to the influence of norms on the foreign and security identity and behaviour of an actor and its interests within the discourse	A set of thoughts, concepts, and categories through which meaning is introduced into reality

Source: Compiled by the author

reason, Russia does not try to cut itself off from the EU completely, but instead it attempts to discursively divide Europe into various segments and create a concept of Europe that is as broad and ambiguous as possible, so that Russia always fits into it somehow. On this basis, the twofold function of the Russian discourse on Europe can be seen: the shaping of a Europe that the Russian Federation can easily communicate and deal with and the building of Russia itself via an emphasis on the role it should play and the quality it should present on the international level.

Seeing that the RF and the EU discursively form each other, their subjective positions are immanently mobile and flexible. With regard to their intersubjective relations, both parties mutually construct their subjective positions; that is to say, these positions are not pre-set. This is why it would be a gross oversimplification to discuss their intersubjective relations as if they were relations between two fixed political subjects. Both subjects of the communication, that is, the European Union and the Russian Federation, are not only in a process of constant formation, but, more importantly, both parties are internally dislocated.

Table 3.1 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the previously defined constructivist–discursive framework. The framework consists firstly of the broader interpretation of social constructivism which combines conventional and critical constructivism, with the condition that both of these approaches complement each other in the chosen theoretical premises. The second core part of the theoretical framework is the concept of discourse, which is connected with the constructivist approach.

Table 3.2 firstly characterises the interaction of the theoretical constructivist–discursive framework/approach with the basic concepts used in this monograph, namely, energy discourse, ideas, norms and values, foreign identity, interests, and intersubjectivity. Table 3.2 also summarises the meanings of these key concepts in

Table 3.2 The key concepts in relation to the constructivist–discursive framework

Concept	Characteristic	Relation to the constructivist–discursive approach	Significance for EU-RF energy relations
Energy discourse	Draws on findings from political and foreign–security discourse with a focus on energy and energy security	The energy discourse is primarily the place for the formation of ideas	The energy discourse helps uncover contradictions in speeches by EU and RF functionaries and forms their ideas
Ideas, norms, rules, and values	Norms, which are connected to value judgements, must be distinguished from ideas, which are not connected with them; norms and rules are of essential importance to values	Ideas (i.e. discourses and interpretations) designate and determine norms, rules, values, and political practice	Ideas determine the norms, rules, and values that the EU and Russia interpret differently
Identity	A state of sameness with some actors and otherness with other actors, which includes the formation of borders dividing the self from the other	Values, rules, and norms impact behaviour and form the foreign identities of actors	Values and norms impact the behaviour of the EU and the RF and affect their foreign identities of self and other
Interests	A key concept for the analysis of the foreign policy of a state and the relations between individual actors of international relations, which can be described as a set of preferences and goals of a nation	Foreign/external identity strongly determines the actor's interests and preferences, which must reflect the political discourse	The identities of the EU and Russia shape their different interests that are constructed in the energy discourse
Intersubjectivity	The ability to change individual policies or discourses of other actors and achieve a certain influence; also the ability to shape their identities and interests	Intersubjectivity constitutes the structure of external identities and interests and frames/affects their relations within the discourse	Intersubjectivity helps us to understand the relations between the identities and interests of the EU and the RF that are formed in the discourse

Source: Compiled by the author

the context of the constructivist–discursive framework/approach with regard to the main focus of this treatise, which is the energy discourse of the EU and the RF and their mutual interaction.

3.3 The Chosen Methodology

The first subchapter discussed discourse as a social construction of reality that builds on a combination of conventional and critical constructivism with the framework of a broader constructivism. In this regard, discourse and constructivism are considered to constitute the overarching theoretical framework which helps examine the interactions and influence between the norms, foreign identities, and interests of the EU the RF and also intersubjectivity (Phillips and Hardy 2002, p. 6). In contrast, the third subchapter provides an analysis of discourse as a methodological instrument/approach, which presupposes the acceptance of both methodological and theoretical findings (Howarth et al. 2000, p. 3).

This methodological part of the work also discusses the content and meaning of two methods, namely, the case study method and the comparative method, which are used to analyse the issue of the discursive character of EU-RF energy relations (cf. Jokela 2011, p. 35). Nonetheless, this treatise does not simply select a method and then apply it on an empirical case. Instead, the author has chosen the principle of the hermeneutic circle, which makes it possible to switch between the empirical and the methodological world and choose methods that are the most suitable and adequate for the given purpose. In other words, the author does not build on the strategy of first choosing a method and then applying it, but instead it seems better to obtain a gradual specification of the chosen approach based on empirical experience (cf. Kratochvíl and Tulmets 2010, p. 11).

3.3.1 Discourse Analysis

Like in a number of similar cases, discourse analysis—the basic methodological instrument applied in this work—has no universal definition. In actual fact, there are several different opinions and perspectives of what discourse analysis currently is. For example, Norman Fairclough (1992, 1995, 2003) states that social science researchers may argue that all their work deals with discourse analysis, and yet they often use the term in their own interpretation and approach discourse analysis in different ways. Sara Mills (2004) made a similar note when she pointed out how the term "discourse analysis" had moved in its brief history from the emphasis of one aspect of language use to another, and concurrently, how the term is used with various meanings and in various ways by researchers.

Defining a Constructivist Discourse Analysis

When defining discourse analysis, a pluralistic view of discourse is used. That is to say, more than one definition or understanding of discourse exists (e.g. speech, writing, suprasentential language, etc.). What this treatise wants to stress is the approach to finding a definition of discourse analysis that presents discourse not as an object but as a means of behaviour/language use. A suitable definition can be found in Potter (1997, p. 146), who states that discourse analysis:

> has an analytic commitment to studying discourse as *texts and talk in social practices*. That is, the focus is not on language as an abstract entity such as a lexicon and set of grammatical rules (in linguistics), a system of differences (in structuralism), [or] a set of rules for transforming statements (in Foucauldian genealogies). Instead, it is the medium for interaction; analysis of discourse becomes, then, analysis of what people do (italics in the original).

In this approach, constructivist discourse analysis regards language as a distinctive phenomenon worthy of scientific attention. It does not see texts as representations of "reality", which we could assess for "objectivity" and "truthfulness". There is no true meaning beyond the linguistic representation that could be referred to (Hansen 2006, p. 18). Language, which constructs the social context in which practice takes place, is an integral part of the political and social reality (one of its primary constitutive elements, in fact), not just an instrument for describing reality. Discourse analysis does not ask about the "truthfulness" of a document; it does not check if a document fits some extratextual "reality". Instead, it assesses how people construct the meaning and importance of objects and activities of the social world via texts or groups of texts (Hajer 2006). Discourse analysis is the most suitable set of methods for uncovering the way in which language in official energy documents and declarations builds patterns and conduct (Karaivanova 2012, pp. 20–22). Finally, discourse analysis is the favourite methodological tool for researching the issue of securitisation and desecuritisation in security studies (Balzacq 2011, p. 31).

Constructivist discourse analysis, which is the main methodological instrument used to study EU and RF discourse in the field of energetics (cf. Karaivanova 2012, pp. 21–22; Wood and Kroger 2000; Phillips and Hardy 2002; Johnstone 2018), will not be understood by this dissertation as a specific method. Discourse analysis will be used as an overarching methodology which embodies a strong social–constructivist view of the social world and within which a number of different data analysis methods may be combined (Phillips and Hardy 2002, p. 3; Hynek and Střítecký 2010b).

Discourse Analysis and Thematic Analysis

The main method of data analysis within the methodology of discourse analysis, through which this treatise will assess the existence and contents of the separate themes of the European Union's energy discourse towards the Russian Federation, and vice versa, is thematic analysis. Although there is no academic consensus on whether thematic analysis can be included among the methods congruent with discourse analysis, this dissertation builds on literature that does not exclude this possibility (cf. Hynek and Střítecký 2010a, p. 88, 2010b; Boyatzis 1998; Rice and Ezzy 1999; Braun and Clarke 2006; Clarke and Braun 2014; Maguire and Delahunt 2017; Javadi and Zarea 2016; Nowell et al. 2017).

Thematic analysis is a widespread qualitative analytical method for identifying, analysing, and evincing patterns (themes) in data (cf. Braun and Clarke 2012, pp. 58–59; Roulston 2001). Concurrently, thematic analysis offers a theoretically accessible, flexible approach to the analysis of qualitative data. Finally, according to Braun and Clarke, thematic analysis is situated both in relation to other qualitative analytical methods that search for motives or patterns and in relation to divergent

epistemological and ontological positions (cf. Braun and Clarke 2012, p. 60; Clarke and Braun 2014, p. 1950). In this sense, thematic analysis is compatible with constructivist ontology and epistemology (see Burr 1995) because within social constructivism, it attempts to theoretise social and cultural contexts and structural conditions that empower and accomplish the various deliberations that are available (cf. Clarke and Braun 2014, pp. 1947–1952).

Thematic analysis is a method that is founded on the strategy and process of searching for and finding key themes to characterise a given phenomenon (cf. Braun and Clarke 2006, p. 79; Daly et al. 1997). In principle, this research strategy quite closely resembles the multiple reading of source texts. The key is to uncover the patterns of content organisation and relations within the analysed data, through which the emerging themes become analytical categories (cf. Hynek and Střítecký 2010a, p. 88, 2010b, pp. 87–88; Burman and Parker 1993). The application of thematic analysis thus provides a more detailed consideration of one specific theme or group of themes within the analyses of the (energy) discourses of the EU and the RF.

3.3.2 The Case Study

Another method used in this monograph is the case study. It will be applied within the methodological framework of discourse analysis to frame the individual energy discourses of the European Union and the Russian Federation. The use of the case study is allowed by the fact that this method does not principally contradict the main premises of constructivist ontology and epistemology. To prepare a successful case study, it is necessary to first delineate and define what the case study design is, what the case is, and what the case study is. These concepts will be discussed in the following part of this dissertation.

Case Study Design
All the case studies proposed in this monograph have a pre-set case study design, which is designated by the choice of analysed studies (Gillham 2000; Eichler and Tichý 2013, p. 11; Gerring 2010).

Case
A case can be defined as "a certain spatially and temporally defined object (phenomenon), an enclosed system that has clear borders, an internal logic of functioning, and a specific essence" (Kořan 2008, p. 32 translated; Gerring 2010, p. 19). With regard to such a definition, the author's first step was the selection of specific cases, which are to mean individual discursive complexes. The purpose for analysing these cases is to interpret the development of the energy discourse of the EU and the RF, the two key actors in this work. The author focused on cases that are typical and thus representative of the interpretation of the given phenomenon, which is the EU/RF energy discourse (Eichler and Tichý 2013, pp. 11–12; Yin 2003).

Case Study

Apart from the case study design and the case itself, note must also be made of the term "case study", which can be understood as "a situation focused on a specific theme, which includes both the theoretical aspect of the problem and its expression in an applied form in a specific environment" (Gillham 2000, p. 2; George and Bennett 2005). With regard to this term, the author sees a case study as "a detailed analysis of the case that was selected as the object of research. Its aim is to provide a profound understanding or a causal explanation" (Kořan 2008, p. 32 translated; Yin 2003; George and Bennett 2005). It allows going into further details, encompassing a relatively large quantity of facts in the study, and striving for their complete evaluation (see more Gerring 2010, p. 49; Eichler and Tichý 2013, p. 13).

In the aforementioned context, the energy discourse is the case study, which comprises a number of discursive energy complexes. Overall, there will be two case studies on the EU/RF energy discourses within the clear temporal boundaries of the years 2004–2014 (2004–2009 and 2010–2014) and one comparative case study covering the years 2004–2014. The main goal is to provide a detailed analysis of the energy discourse of the EU and the RF in an effort to contribute to a deeper understanding of the issue of EU-RF energy relations.

3.3.3 The Comparative Method

The last method used in this work is that of comparison, or the comparative method (see Lijphart 1971; Collier 1991), which is—like the case study—also compatible in its epistemological and ontological position with the theoretical framework of constructivism (for more on this, see Howarth and Torfling 2005; Kantola 2006, pp. 23–27; Jokela 2011). The comparative method, which is used implicitly and explicitly throughout all political sciences, including the field of international relations, is based on a comparison through which we match one phenomenon to another with the aim of finding their differences or similarities (Hopkin 2010). The comparative method offers one way of testing theoretical statements and claims in political sciences. In this way, the "comparative method acts as a substitute for experimental control, which cannot be used in political sciences, unlike in the natural ones" (Hopkin 2010, pp. 285–286; Říchová 2002, p. 21; Hague and Harrop 2010; Harrison and Callan 2013, p. 17).

According to Blanka Říchová (2002, p. 21), the comparative method must be distinguished from plain comparison, which has a technical character. The fundamental rules for comparison in the comparative method are the following four features: (1) to define the object—the subject of comparison (what is being studied), (2) to designate the goal of the comparison (why do it), (3) to establish the criteria of the comparison for the actual analysis of the chosen objects (how to do it), and (4) to relate the comparison to the timeline (in what period).

In this treatise, (1) the object of comparison is the content of the EU/RF energy discourses. (2) The main aim of the comparison is to compare the similarities and differences of the EU and RF energy discourses. (3) This primary goal within the

Table 3.3 The methodological framework and an overview of the main methods

Concepts	Characteristic(s)	Importance for EU/RF discourse
	Methodological framework	
Constructivist discourse analysis	A tool for analysing the argumentative structure of documents and other written or spoken texts; the overarching methodology that allows for the combination of various methods of data analysis	A suitable research instrument for studying the discourses/discursive approaches of the European Union and the Russian Federation with regard to energy
	Overview of the main methods	
Thematic analysis	Founded on the strategy and process of searching for and finding key themes to characterise a given phenomenon	Provides a more detailed consideration of specific themes of the EU/RF energy discourse
Case study	The detailed analysis of a given case, which was chosen as the subject of research	Frames the energy discourse of the EU and Russia
Comparative method	Consists of a comparison through which we match one phenomenon to another with the aim of determining their differences and/or similarities	A comparison of the discursive approaches of the EU and the RF from a thematic, over time and together, and a comparison of the differences and similarities of the EU and RF energy discourses in 2004–2014

Source: Compiled by the author

actual analysis of the chosen objects will be achieved by having the comparison based on a series of criteria, or themes, of individual discursive approaches within the energy discourses of the EU and the RF. (4) With regard to the comparison's relation to the timeline, the monograph opted for a diachronic approach, which makes it possible to assess the development of a specific phenomenon over a longer period of time. That is to say, the monograph compares the phases of the development of the EU/RF energy discourse in the time frame of 10 years, namely, from 2004 to 2014 (Říchová 2002, p. 21; Hopkin 2010, pp. 289–293; Hague and Harrop 2010).

In other words, the treatise will compare cases, that is, individual discursive approaches of the EU and the RF within individual case studies, but at the same time it will also compare the actual case studies to each other in the form of the coherent energy discourses of the EU and Russia in 2004–2009 and 2010–2014. Finally, the author will compare both of the complex energy discourses of the EU and Russia within a single comparative case study for the period 2004–2014. This means that the comparative method will be used to compare individual discursive complexes of the EU and the RF from (1) a thematic and (2) a temporal perspective at the level of individual case studies, while at the same time (3) the case studies will also be compared with each other in the form of the comprehensive energy discourses of the EU and the RF. The aim of this comparison is to show the similarities and differences between individual discursive approaches with regard to EU and RF discourses concerning energy relations. Table 3.3 summarises the characteristics and importance of the methodological approaches and methods with regard to the energy discourses of the EU and the RF.

3.4 The Main Creators of the EU-Russia Energy Discourse

The main aim of the next four subchapters is to identify the key actors or representatives of the EU and the RF who play a crucial role in forming the content and direction of the dominant EU and Russian energy discourses. In addition, this subchapter provides an analysis of the political status of the relevant actors within the individual energy discourses of the EU and the RF. In other words, apart from the question of who the relevant political actors impacting the energy discourse are, an equally important issue is the status or position of these political actors/representatives of the EU and Russia within their respective energy discourses (Epstein 2011).

3.4.1 The Actor of a Discourse and Its Relation to the Discursive Structure/Reality

To achieve these two goals, it is necessary to first focus on an analysis of the mutual relation between the creator/actor of a discourse, on the one hand, and the environment/structure within which the discourse takes place (for more on the relation between structure and actor, see Wendt 1999, pp. 139–192, 1987, pp. 335–370), on the other. This interaction of mutual effect and influence then reflects a number of basic theoretical findings, which are key to further research on the issue.

First, the structural context of the discourse (the discursive structure) determines the preferences of the actor and its identity. That is, the environment in which the discourse takes place affects the status and decisions of the actor/representative who forms the discourse (for more on this, see Carta and Morin 2014, pp. 10–11). In the light of these statements, energy policy can be understood as the activity of producing and reproducing an identity in whose name the responsible actor of the discourse operates energy interests both within its own state and in an international environment in relation to the other foreign actors (Campbell 1998, p. 68). Second, the responsible actors construct the social (discursive) reality via discursive interactions (for more on this, see Guzzini 2000). That is, unlike in the previous paragraph, in this case the relevant representatives/actors of the discourse influence the environment and the structural context in which the given discourse takes place. For example, key representatives of the discourse on security issues determine the security environment and frame individual interpretations of national security and of the nation whose security must be ensured (Campbell 1998; Hansen 2006; Waever 1995; Weldes et al. 1999). Third, in the context of the reality of security, energy security policies and directly related energy issues are structured via the public communication of relevant representatives of the energy discourse. According to Charlotte Epstein (2011), these speeches and communications can be realised primarily by individual states, which is the case for most discourses on key security issues, including energy security.

Besides these facts, it is also important to focus research attention on the central roles of representatives and creators/reproducers of discourse and their relations with the public, because discourse is in its very essence a socially interactive process (cf. Schmidt and Radaelli 2004, p. 195), and the success of the dominant discourse depends both on the identities and roles of the actors and their speech and on the recipients of this information. Generally speaking, it is possible to distinguish between different types of actors that cocreate the discourse. On the production side of the discourse, it can be the creator of the discourse, who strongly determines its contents and direction, or the person responsible for the expressed opinions (for more on this, see Gariup 2009, p. 64). On the reception side of the discourse, it is mainly the primary recipient (the ratified listener), to whom the speech is addressed, but also the secondary recipient (the non-ratified listener), such as someone who overhears the communication by chance (see more Goffman 1981, pp. 325–326; Gariup 2009, pp. 64–65).

3.4.2 Key Representatives of the EU Energy Discourse

As far as the European Union is concerned, as it is a supranational collective actor with complexly split competencies, its energy discourse is based on numerous speeches and public communications by both national representatives and supranational institutions, who fundamentally impact and shape the energy discourse as responsible creators. Nonetheless, as was already noted before, this dissertation puts aside the energy discourses of member states and focuses primarily on the EU energy discourse with regard to Russia—the main actors of which are the institutions of the EU (see Chap 2, Sect. 2.3.1).

The European Commission and the High Representative of the Union

The principal actor in the EU energy discourse is the European Commission, and its individual ministers are the relevant representatives/creators who greatly impact the contents and direction of the dominant EU energy discourse. The Commissioner for Energy is a key figure in this respect, as he represents the EU in external energy relations with other countries and negotiates with the representatives of non-member states (see Braun 2011, p. 5). In the new European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker (2014–) was dismissed function of Commissioner for Energy and replaced by the Commissioner for Climate and Energy, who is dealing with representatives of third countries in EU energy relations. At the same time, in November 2014 was established new position of Vice-President (VP) of the European Commission for Energy Union.

The President of the European Commission also represents the EU in energy dealings with political representatives of other countries; the president often speaks on the topic in his speeches. Other functionaries also touch on energy issues in their sphere of responsibility—for example, the Commissioner for Trade, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, the Commissioner for Regional Policy, and the Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship. These

commissioners mention energetics both within the EU and when advocating the matter outside of the union. Last but not least, the group of relevant creators of the EU energy discourse includes the Ambassador of the Delegation of the European Union to Russia (see Brutschin 2016, pp. 27–44).

Within the agenda of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU is also represented in energy–policy dialogue with top representatives of other countries by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission. The High Representative mentions matters of energy security and directly related topics in her speeches (see Braun 2011).

The Presidents of the European Council and the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union

The President of the European Council is an important creator of the EU energy discourse in external relations and discussions on energy issues with representatives of other countries (including Russia) via the CFSP. Similarly, the President of the EP also contributes to the forming of the EU energy discourse when he speaks on matters of energy security and discusses energy issues at meetings with political functionaries from other countries. Finally, the EU energy discourse is also influenced by conclusions drawn within the Presidency of the Council of the European Union (see Braun 2011; Brutschin 2016).

Table 3.4 gives a clear overview of the main EU actors, that is, the relevant representatives/creators of the EU energy discourse. Table 3.4 also shows the relations and positions of these political representatives to the union's energy discourse.

3.4.3 The Main Representatives of the Russian Energy Discourse

In contrast to the EU, the Russian Federation is considered a unitary actor with a clearly set internal political structure and a framework of competencies divided among its central institutions. This is reflected in the context of the dominant/official energy discourse with regard to the EU, which is formed by a limited number of Russian political representatives (see Chap 2, Sect. 2.2.1).

The Russian President and the Prime Minister of the RF

The President of the Russian Federation plays a critical role in shaping the Russian energy discourse and has a fundamental impact on the direction of energy policy. At the same time, in his scope of authority, the Russian president discusses energy matters and related issues on behalf of the RF with representatives of other countries. The Chairman of the Government of the RF also mentions energy security issues frequently in his speeches, and he, too, influences energy policy and speaks on the topic of energy with political functionaries from other countries. Within the Russian government, the energy discourse is also shaped by responsible ministers via their ministries (Tkachenko 2008).

Table 3.4 The main actors/political representatives of the EU energy discourse

Key EU actors of energy discourse	Division of competencies	The main EU representatives who shape the contents of the union's energy discourse
European Commission	Right of initiative—proposes new legislation to protect EU interests; influences the formation of individual policies; represents the EU in energy relations with the RF	The President of the European Commission, the Commissioner for Energy, (since 2014), the Commissioner for Climate and Energy and VP of the European Commission for Energy Union, the VP of the EC, the Commissioner for Trade, the Commissioner for Regional Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP, the Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship, and the Ambassador of the EU Delegation to Russia; within their respective areas of responsibility, they discuss energy relations with the RF and negotiate energy matters on behalf of the EU with representatives of the RF
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission	Right of initiative; is involved in the formation of select policies; represents the EU in energy relations with the RF	Formerly known as the European Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; in the present form of the office since December 2009; within the framework of the CFSP, she discusses energy issues on behalf of the EU with representatives of the RF
European Council	Decides the priorities of the next direction	The President of the European Council represents the EU and discusses energy issues with representatives of the RF within the framework of the CFSP
European Parliament	Monitors legislative and executive power	The President of the European Parliament represents the EU and discusses energy issues with representatives of the RF within his area of responsibility
Council of the European Union	Member states and individual councils	Conclusions drawn within the Presidency of the Council of the EU influence the formation of the union's energy discourse

Source: Compiled by the author according to Carta and Morin (2014, p. 12)

Responsible Ministers of the RF and the Chairman of the State Duma
It is necessary to make first mention of the Minister of Energy, who is the relevant creator of the Russian energy discourse and frequently negotiates energy issues with foreign representatives and influences the internal and external dimension of the RF energy policy with his speeches. Another major figure in this sense is the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who has the question of energy as an important part of his agenda when negotiating with functionaries from other countries. Further relevant creators of the Russian energy discourse who mention energy in their speeches and public communication are the Minister for Economic Development, the Minister of Industry and Trade, the Minister of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, the Minister of Finance, and also the Permanent Representative of the RF to the EU and the Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Tkachenko 2008).

Table 3.5 shows the main actors or relevant representatives/creators of the energy discourse of Russia. Similarly to Table 3.4, it defines the relation/position of these Russian political representatives to the RF energy discourse.

3.5 The Collection of Data and the Creation of a Corpus of Documents

This fifth subchapter follows up on the previous paragraphs by focusing on the approach used to select documents and the criteria for their classification. The procedure applied to the chosen documents was as follows: first, the author designated what corpus of documents he wanted to analyse and which main criteria he would use, and then he elected an analysis with a narrow temporal and thematic focus as his method.

3.5.1 The Criteria for Choosing EU and Russian Documents

To begin with, four corpora of documents were created, into which individual textual units were placed. All of the corpora, through which the main questions within the EU and RF discourses will be assessed, include mainly written and spoken documents of three kinds, namely: (1) documents published by EU institutions and Russian central organs; (2) written public communications, speeches, and interviews; and (3) press releases that included a speech or statement of a specific political representative of the EU or the RF as a direct quote. In contrast, the corpora of EU and Russian documents include neither joint proclamations nor documents of the European Union and the Russian Federation, nor unprinted communications of political representatives of the Russian Federation and the EU, that is, their television or radio speeches or interviews for which a written transcript did not exist.

Table 3.5 The main actors/political representatives of the RF energy discourse

Key actors of the RF in the formation of energy policy	Division of competencies	The main representatives of Russia who shape the contents of Russian energy discourse
President of the Russian Federation	Has the right of legislative initiative, has a major impact on energy policy, and determines the main vector of the internal and external dimensions of RF energy security	In his scope of authority, the president discusses energy matters and related issues on behalf of the RF with representatives of the EU
Prime Minister/Deputy Prime Ministers of the Government of the RF	In cooperation with select ministries, the prime minister influences the energy security and policy of the RF, signs acts of the president and the government, and represents the RF in energy relations with the EU	Within their respective areas of responsibility, the Russian prime minister, and the various deputy prime ministers of the Russian government negotiate energy issues on behalf of the Russian Federation with political functionaries of the EU
Government of the RF, comprising individual ministries	Publishes key documents and strategies that directly or indirectly influence the direction of the internal and external dimension of the energy policy and security of the RF, and represents Russia on various levels in energy relations/dialogues with the EU	Within their competencies, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Industry and Trade, the Minister of Energy, the Minister for Economic Development, the Minister of Finance, and the Permanent Representative of the RF to the EU discuss energy issues on behalf of the RF with their EU counterparts
State Duma	Approves international agreements and documents, including those pertaining to energy and EU relations	In the scope of his authority, the Chairman of the State Duma speaks about energy with representatives of the EU on behalf of the RF

Source: Compiled by the author

The sample of political representatives of the EU and the RF was chosen based on the premises of the presence of energy-related topics in their public communication. At the same time, the selection also took into account the requirement of three concurrently fulfilled criteria. The first criterion was that the given EU/Russian representative repeatedly mentioned EU-RF energy relations or spoke about Russia in direct connection to EU energy (and vice versa) during his or her period of tenure. The second criterion was the existence of an immediate impact of behaviour or of direct influence in consequence of decisions made by the given political functionary of the EU or the RF with regard to the mutual energy issues. In other words, the second criterion was that of the power potential or decision-making authority of the given representative of the EU or Russia with regard to energy or energy relations between the EU and the RF, both on a foreign policy and security level and on an economic or political one. Therefore, we focus only on the official discourse of the selected political representatives of the EU and Russia. The third

criterion for the selection of core political functionaries of the EU and the RF was that every representative of the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Ambassador of the EU Delegation to Russia was identically mirrored by a political figure on the side of the Russian Federation.

3.5.2 Selecting EU Documents from 2004 to 2009

In the second phase, a clear time period was chosen for the analysis of the documents of the first corpus, which covers the period from the beginning of November 2004 to the end of November 2009, that is, the era of the so-called first Barroso Commission, during which a number of major events took place that fundamentally impacted EU-RF energy relations. The analysis focused only on documents of those EU representatives who frequently spoke about energy relations with Russia.

Specifically, those were the President of the European Commission José M. Barroso; the Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner; the Commissioner for Energy Andris Piebalgs; the Commissioner for Trade Peter Mandelson (2004–2009) and, from October 2008, Catherine Ashton in the same function; the European Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn; and the Ambassador of the EU Delegation to the Russian Federation Marco Franco (2004–2009), with Fernando M. Valenzuela in the same function from November 2009. To avoid an undue concentration solely on members of the European Commission, the analysed sample of documents of the first corpus also included the speeches and interviews of Javier Solana, the High Representative of the EU for the CFSP, together with the public communications of the Presidents of the European Parliament Josep Borrelli Fontelles (2004–2007), Hans-Gert Pöttering (2007–2009), and Jerzy Buzek (2009).

The author only chose those documents of EU politicians that contained the key word “Russia”, “Russian Federation”, or “Russian” together with the word “energy”. In this way, 176 documents were acquired (both official and unofficial speeches, public communications, press releases, and interviews). The selection of these documents necessitates several important remarks. First, more than 95% of the texts (167 documents) were complete and unabridged versions of speeches and interviews of the High Representative of the EU for the CFSP, the President of the European Parliament, and select representatives of the European Commission, and only 5% (9 documents) were press releases. Second, more than 85% (155) of all the interviews and public communications were obtained from the official websites of the individual political representatives of the EU. Only 15% (21) of the interviews and communications, mainly those of the Ambassador of the EU Delegation to the RF, were acquired from the web pages of other institutions and organisations or from the news sites of leading global dailies or TV/radio broadcast companies. The spread of selected speeches, etc. is shown by person and by year in Table 3.6.

An identical process was used to obtain the key documents that deal with relations with the Russian Federation and energy from an EU perspective and that were published by individual EU organs, mainly the EC, the CoEU, the ECoun, and the EP. In all the cases (17), these documents were acquired from the official websites of

Table 3.6 Speeches, press releases, and interviews of select EU representatives

Representatives of the European Commission, the High Representative for the CFSP, the Ambassador of the EU Delegation to Russia, and the President of the European Parliament	Year						Total number of communications per person
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
J. M. Barroso	1	0	5	4	2	11	23
J. Solana	0	1	1	5	5	3	15
B. Ferrero-Waldner	0	1	4	4	6	6	21
A. Piebalgs	1	2	5	8	7	8	31
O. Rehn	1	1	7	1	6	4	20
P. Mandelson	0	3	4	4	2	0	13
C. Ashton	0	0	0	0	1	1	2
M. Franco	0	0	3	5	7	8	23
F. M. Valenzuela	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
J. F. Borrell	2	2	6	2	0	0	12
H.-G. Pöttering	0	0	0	3	4	5	12
J. Buzek	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Total number of communications per year	5	10	35	36	40	50	176

Source: Compiled by the author

the respective EU institutions. At the same time, 90% (15) of them are documents of a legislative nature. Two documents (10%) form exceptions to the body of legislative documents (one working document of the EC and one document from the CoEU). A description of the spread of EU documents between the individual institutions and over the course of time is provided by Table 3.7.

The total number of text items is 193. The set comprises 176 official and unofficial speeches, press releases, and interviews with key representatives of the EU and 17 official EU documents of both a legislative and a non-legislative character.

3.5.3 Selecting Russian Documents from 2004 to 2009

The same approach was used to identify the political representatives of the RF, with the condition that the criteria of repeated statements about energy relations with the EU and the decision-making potential of the given actor were supplemented with the main requirement that each of the chosen EU functionaries should have an approximate counterpart on the side of the RF. These criteria were used to compile the second corpus of documents by selecting speeches, press releases, and interviews of the following political representatives of Russia in the period from 2004 to 2009: the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin (2004–2008) and then, from May

Table 3.7 The documents of select EU institutions

	Number of documents per individual EU organ				
Year	European Commission	Council of the European Union	European Council	European Parliament	Total per year
2004	1	0	0	0	1
2005	0	1	0	0	1
2006	3	1	0	1	5
2007	1	1	1	0	3
2008	3	1	0	1	5
2009	1	1	0	0	2
Total	9	5	1	2	17

Source: Compiled by the author

2008, his successor Dmitry Medvedev; the Chairman of the Government of the RF Mikhail Fradkov (2004–2007) and then, from September 2007, Viktor Zubkov (2007–2008) and, from May 2008, Vladimir Putin in the same position; the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov; the Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko and then from May 2008, when a separate Ministry of Energy was formed, also the Minister of Energy Sergei Shmatko; and the Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref (2004–2007) and then, from September 2007, the new Minister of Economic Development Elvira Nabiullina. As in the case of the EU, to avoid an undue concentration solely on members of the Russian government and the president, the analysed sample of documents of the second corpus also included the speeches and interviews of the Permanent Representative of the RF to the EU (Vladimir Chizhov from September 2005) and the necessary documents of the Chairman of the State Duma in the given period (Boris Gryzlov).

Using these criteria, 210 documents were acquired (both official and unofficial speeches, public communications, press releases, and interviews) which contained at least one of the key words "EU", "European Union", and "European" together with the word "energy". The selection of these documents requires some commentary. First, more than 85% of the texts (177 documents) were complete and unabridged versions of speeches and interviews of top political functionaries of the RF, and only 15% (33 documents) were press releases containing a direct quote of a specific representative of Russia. Second, approximately 80% (168) of all the interviews and public communications were obtained from the official websites of the individual Russian ministries, the prime minister, the head of the State Duma, and the president. Less than 20% (42) of the interviews and communications were acquired from the news sites of Russian and international dailies or TV/radio broadcast companies. The spread of selected speeches, etc. is shown by person and by year in Table 3.8.

A similar process was used to obtain the key documents that deal with relations with the EU and energy from an RF perspective and that were published by individual central organs of the RF, that is, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the President of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Economic Development. In all the cases (9), these documents were acquired from the official websites of the respective RF institutions.

Table 3.8 Speeches, press releases, and interviews of select RF representatives

The President of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Government of the RF, select ministers, the Permanent Representative of the RF to the RU, and the Chairman of the State Duma	Year						Total number of communications per person
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	
V. Putin (as President)	2	6	10	6	2	0	26
D. Medvedev	0	0	0	0	4	7	11
M. Fradkov	1	3	4	2	0	0	10
V. Zubkov	0	0	0	3	1	0	4
V. Putin (as Chairman of the Government)	0	0	0	0	5	15	20
S. Lavrov	1	5	7	7	6	8	34
V. Khristenko	2	13	12	11	3	1	42
S. Shmatko	0	0	0	0	3	7	10
G. Gref	0	2	3	2	0	0	7
E. Nabiullina	0	0	0	3	2	4	9
V. Chizhov	0	3	6	5	5	8	27
B. Gryzlov	0	1	1	3	0	5	10
Total number of communications per year	6	33	43	42	31	55	210

Source: Compiled by the author

Of these, 80% (7) are official documents and only 20% (2) are of an unofficial nature. The description of the spread of RF documents between the individual institutions and over the course of time is provided by Table 3.9.

The total number of text items is 219. The set comprises 210 official and unofficial speeches, press releases, and interviews with top representatives of the RF and 9 official RF documents of both a legislative and a non-legislative character.

3.5.4 Selecting EU Documents from 2010 to 2014

An identical process as in the case of the first corpus of documents was used to compile the third corpus of documents, which covers the period from the beginning of February 2010[6] until the end of October 2014, that is, the period of the so-called second Barroso Commission. The previously designated criteria were used to select

[6]In the time from when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, that is, 1 December 2009, until 30 January 2010, individual commissioners were appointed, and then the whole European Commission was approved with José M. Barroso as its president.

Table 3.9 Documents of the President of the RF and select Russian ministries

Year	Number of documents per institution					
	President of the RF	Ministry of Energy	Ministry of Industry and Trade	Ministry of Economic Development	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Total per year
2004	0	0	0	0	1	1
2005	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	0	1	1
2007	0	0	0	0	1	1
2008	1	0	0	2	1	4
2009	0	1	1	0	0	2
Total	1	1	1	2	4	9

Source: Compiled by the author

speeches, interviews, public communications, and press releases of those top political representatives of the EU who spoke of energy in relation to the RF the most.

Specifically, those were the President of the European Commission José M. Barroso, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the VP of the Commission Catherine Ashton, the Commissioner for Energy and the VP of the Commission Günther Oettinger, the Commissioner for Trade Karel de Gucht, the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle, and the Ambassador of the EU Delegation to the Russian Federation Fernando M. Valenzuela (2009–2013), who was succeeded in September 2013 by Vygaudas Ušackas (2013+). The analysed sample of documents also included the speeches and interviews of the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy and the Presidents of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek (2009–2012) and Martin Schulz (2012+).

In this way, 269 documents were acquired (both official and unofficial speeches, public communications, press releases, and interviews). More than 90% of the texts (242 documents) were complete and unabridged versions of speeches and interviews of select representatives of the EU, and only 10% (27 documents) were press releases. At the same time, more than 90% (242) of all the interviews and public communications were obtained from the official websites of the individual political functionaries of the EU. Only 10% (27) of the interviews and communications were acquired from the web pages of other institutions and organisations or from the news sites of leading global dailies or TV/radio broadcast companies. The spread of selected speeches, etc. is shown by person and by year in Table 3.10.

An identical process was used to obtain the key documents that deal with relations with the Russian Federation and energy from an EU perspective and that were published by individual EU organs, mainly the EC, the CoEU, the ECoun, and the EP. In all the cases (30), these documents were acquired from the official websites of the respective EU institutions. At the same time, almost 85% (26) of them are documents of a legislative nature, and only 15% (4) of them are of a non-legislative nature. The description of the spread of EU documents between the individual institutions and over the course of time is provided by Table 3.11.

Table 3.10 Speeches, press releases, and interviews of select EU representatives

Members of the European Commission, the High Representative of the Union, the President of the European Council, the Ambassador of the EU Delegation to the RF, and the President of the European Parliament	Year					Total number of communications per person
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
J. M. Barroso	10	9	5	11	20	55
H. Van Rompuy	6	9	5	5	7	32
C. Ashton	5	7	5	4	6	27
G. Oettinger	7	6	7	12	14	46
Š. Füle	4	2	4	5	15	30
K. de Gucht	4	3	3	4	5	19
F. M. Valenzuela	1	6	4	1	0	12
V. Ušackas	0	0	0	8	14	22
J. Buzek	7	8	1	0	0	16
M. Schulz	0	0	4	3	3	10
Total number of communications per year	44	50	38	53	84	269

Source: Compiled by the author

Table 3.11 Documents of select EU institutions

Year	Number of documents of individual EU institutions				
	European Commission	Council of the European Union	European Council	European Parliament	Total
2010	1	2	0	0	3
2011	2	4	3	0	9
2012	1	2	0	1	4
2013	1	2	1	1	5
2014	3	3	1	2	9
Total	8	13	5	4	30

Source: Compiled by the author

The total number of text items is 299. The set comprises 269 official and unofficial speeches, press releases, and interviews with key representatives of the EU and 30 official EU documents of both a legislative and a non-legislative character.

3.5.5 Selecting Russian Documents from 2010 to 2014

The last, fourth corpus of documents, which covers the period from 2010 to 2014, contains the speeches, public communications, and interviews of the following

political representatives of Russia: the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) and then, from May 2012, Vladimir Putin again (2012+); the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin (2008–2012) and then, from May 2012, Dmitry Medvedev (2012+); the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov; the Minister of Industry and Energy Viktor Khristenko (2008–2012) and then, from May 2012, Denis Manturov (2012+); the Minister of Energy Sergei Shmatko (2008–2012) and then, from May 2012, Alexandr Novák (2012+); and the Minister of Economic Development Elvira Nabiullina (2007–2012) and then, from May 2012, Andrey Belousov (2012–2013) and, from June 2013, Alexey Ulyukaev (2013+). The fourth corpus also incorporated the speeches, public communications, and interviews of the Permanent Representative of the RF to the EU Vladimir Chizhov and the Chairman of the State Duma Boris Gryzlov and (as of December 2011) Sergey Naryshkin.

Using the aforesaid selection criteria, 334 documents were acquired, both official and unofficial. More than 80% of the texts (267 documents) were complete and unabridged versions of speeches and interviews of top political functionaries of the RF, and only 20% (67 documents) were press releases containing a direct quote of a specific representative of Russia. At the same time, approximately 85% (294) of all the interviews and public communications were obtained from the official websites of the individual Russian ministries, the prime minister, the head of the State Duma, and the president. Less than 15% (40) of the interviews and communications were acquired from the news sites of Russian and international dailies or TV/radio broadcast companies. The spread of selected speeches, etc. is shown by person and by year in Table 3.12.

A similar process was used to obtain the key documents that deal with relations with the EU and energy from an RF perspective and that were published by individual central organs of the RF, that is, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the President of the RF, the Government of the RF, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Finance. In all the cases (8), these documents were acquired from the official websites of the respective RF institutions; they are all of an official character. The description of the spread of RF documents between the individual institutions and over the course of time is provided by Table 3.13.

The total number of text items is 342. The set comprises 334 official and unofficial speeches, press releases, and interviews with top political representatives of the RF and 8 official RF documents of both a legislative and a non-legislative character.

All in all, 1053 text items of the EU and the RF were collected (speeches, public communications, interviews, press releases, and documents), covering the period from 2004–2014; these were divided into four corpora. The first contains 193 EU documents, and the second comprises 219 Russian documents; both of these corpora cover the period of 2004–2009. The period of 2010–2014 is depicted in the third corpus with 299 EU documents and in the fourth corpus with 342 Russian documents.

Table 3.12 Speeches, press releases, and interviews of select RF representatives

The President of the Russian Federation, the Chairman of the Government of the RF, select ministers, the Permanent Representative of the RF to the RU, and the Chairman of the State Duma	Year					Total number of communications per person
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
D. Medvedev (as President)	15	16	1	0	0	32
V. Putin (as President)	0	0	14	16	19	49
V. Putin (as Chairman of the Government)	11	12	5	0	0	28
D. Medvedev (as Chairman of the Government)	0	0	16	17	15	48
S. Lavrov	6	6	10	10	15	47
V. Khristenko	3	3	1	0	0	7
D. Manturov	0	0	1	2	4	7
S. Shmatko	4	5	1	0	0	10
A Novak	0	0	3	13	16	32
E. Nabiullina	2	5	1	0	0	8
A. Belousov	0	0	4	1	0	5
A. Ulyukaev	0	0	0	3	3	6
V. Chizhov	2	9	5	12	15	43
B. Gryzlov	3	3	0	0	0	6
S. Naryshkin	0	0	2	1	3	6
Total number of communications per year	46	59	64	75	90	334

Source: Compiled by the author

Table 3.13 Documents of the President of the RF and select Russian ministries

Year	Number of documents per institution					
	President of the RF	Government of the RF	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Energy	Ministry of Finance	Total per year
2010	0	0	1	0	0	1
2011	0	0	0	0	0	0
2012	1	0	0	0	1	2
2013	2	1	0	0	0	3
2014	0	0	0	2	0	2
Total	3	1	1	2	1	8

Source: Compiled by the author

3.6 Approaches to the EU-Russia Energy Discourse

In the context of the theoretical findings of the constructivist–discursive framework, together with the concept of energy discourse, and based on the preliminary evaluation of the collected EU and RF documents, a three-phase analysis was made of the discursive contents of the EU-RF energy relations. The first, preparatory phase dealt with easily identifiable major narratives which characterise the EU-RF energy relations in a fundamental way and provide a framework within which to understand the main patterns and ongoing ties. This preliminary analysis showed that with regard to the energy relations between the EU and Russia, both the EU and the RF have three main discursive complexes, which dominate the key documents and speeches published by institutions and representatives of the EU and the RF. These three basic approaches can be termed (1) the integration discourse, (2) the liberalisation discourse, and (3) the diversification discourse. In the second phase, a repeat reading was used to identify key words or concepts that are most frequently linked to the individual discursive complexes within the EU-RF energy relations. The key words were inspired by existing collocations, from which the actual diagnostics of the main themes for individual discursive approaches arose. The diagnostics were based on the search for organised links between thematic relations and key words, which was aided by the fact that the chosen documents of the EU and the RF have very similar structures of argumentation, which build on key themes (cf. Hynek and Střítecký 2010a, b). Subsequently, the third phase allowed for a more detailed analysis of the individual documents and their contents via the actual discourses of the EU and the RF. In all three phases, both EU and RF documents were assessed to ensure that the concepts and key words were identifiable in both discourses (Tichý and Kratochvíl 2014, pp. 12–13).

3.6.1 The Integration Discourse

The integration discourse emphasises the positive potential of the mutual relations between the European Union and Russia because it sees both actors as complementary. However, there are certain differences in how this aspect is understood in the integration discourse of the Russian Federation and in that of the EU (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2012, p. 100).

On the one side of the integration discourse, the EU sees itself as the more developed partner and also as more prosperous and democratic. At the same time, because the European Union is much more advanced with regard to integrative experience and support for market integration, Russia must adapt itself to the union's rules. The two parties' mutual cooperation in the field of energy should thus be founded on the gradual acceptance of the EU's *acquis* by the RF. Not only will this ensure the mutual economic compatibility of the two actors, but it will also expedite the economic, social, and political growth of the RF (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2013, p. 394).

On the other side of the integration discourse, while the RF also stresses the need for a deeper integration of both parties, it claims that both the EU and Russia should acknowledge that there is no one-sided asymmetry between them, but rather a mutual dependence. Whereas the RF may be less developed and in need of technology, investments, and payments for natural resources from the EU, the European Union is no less dependent on energy supplies from the RF. For this reason, the integration should not consist of the straightforward transfer of all current EU norms in the field of energy cooperation to Russia, but instead, both parties should contribute to the dynamic by equal shares (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2013, p. 394).

Unlike the liberalisation discourse, the integration discourse emphasises the specific relation between the EU and the RF. The two actors are not mere trade and energy partners, but a special connection exists between them, which is reflected in the need for regular meetings of the EU and Russia regarding their energy dialogue and the need to create special institutions that will regulate the bilateral ties between Russia and the EU.

From a theoretical perspective, the integration discourse draws on the concept of normative power (Manners 2002), which highlights the EU's privileged position as a specific actor whose model of governance should be adopted by the other actors. In this context, in its energy relations with the RF, the EU is the "normative actor" that promotes relevant norms and values regarding economic competition, openness, and the investment climate, which the RF should adopt in varying degrees of intensity in the process of integration and mutual convergence. In contrast, Russia is more of a "normative–rational actor" in the integration discourse and purposefully accepts some relevant values and norms of the EU in anticipation of certain economic advantages (e.g. help with the innovation and modernisation of the Russian economy and the energy sector) on the one hand, while on the other hand, the RF itself promotes economic norms and values in its energy relations with the EU with the aim of ensuring a symmetrical, mutually beneficial energy cooperation for both parties. More general issues related to the liberal–democratic nature of the EU and the question of civic freedoms and human rights are mostly excluded from the integration discourse, with just a few exceptions.

The integration discourse is also connected to another theoretical concept—interdependence. For the very reason that the EU and the RF are mutually dependent (the EU needs Russian resources, and Russia needs EU payments), the theory of complex interdependence maintains that both parties are forced to overcome conflicts and search for long-term, bilaterally beneficial solutions (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2012, p. 100).

3.6.2 The Liberalisation Discourse

The liberalisation discourse is in many ways fundamentally different from integration discourse. Although it also emphasises mainly the economic aspects and not the political–security ones of the EU-RF cooperation, it differs in the interpretation of

the positions of both actors. The integration discourse typically places emphasis on the greater economic development of the EU and the asymmetry between the EU and the RF, which gives rise to the perceived necessity of a one-sided Europeanisation (or rather, "EU-isation") of Russia. The liberalisation discourse builds on the conviction that it is generally necessary to create free trade and other economic ties between actors in the global economy as much as possible, with the aim of minimising the impact of political interventions on their relations. It is more or less irrelevant whether these interventions are sought by an authoritarian government (e.g. that of Russia) or by another regulatory power (e.g. the EU) (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2013, p. 395).

In either way, the key motto of this discourse is not "the convergence of actors", but "the joint effort to achieve the greatest possible transparency and effectivity of the shared economic environment". If the economy was also prioritised in the integration discourse, it is all the more dominant in the liberalisation discourse. In the liberalisation discourse, politics are mentioned only marginally, or they are fully subordinate to economic liberalisation, because in this interpretation the latter can also facilitate political convergence. However, considerable differences exist in how the process of liberalisation is understood by the EU and how it is interpreted by the RF (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2012, pp. 100–101).

While the EU focuses on criticism of the Russian refusal to liberalise and open its energy market for Western investors, the RF's liberalisation discourse complains about obstacles and stresses the limited access of Russian energy companies to the internal energy market of the EU. At the same time, both actors believe that their own level of liberalisation is sufficient, and they are dissatisfied with the supposedly low level of openness of the energy market of their partner. Another difference lies in the impact of politics on the mutual energy relations. According to the EU, a full liberalisation is mainly obstructed by Russia's effort to maintain its monopolistic control of the most valuable Russian energy sources. In contrast, the RF interprets and emphasises the political obstacles to liberalisation both on an internal EU level (some member states' fear of and worries about the economic presence of Russian firms) and on the external EU level (the US pressure to reduce the EU's dependency on Russia).

In this context, the EU—as a "rational–normative actor" in energy relations with the RF—harnesses liberal market norms and values to improve its access to the Russian energy market and effectuate changes in Russian behaviour, which should bring greater openness to the mutual trade and give both parties maximum benefits. Similarly, Russia—as a "rational–normative actor" in energy relations with the EU—harnesses liberal market norms and values to persuade the EU of the need for a greater liberalisation of the energy market, the removal of unwanted barriers, and the provision of equal access to Russian companies, which should bring both sides maximum profits and strengthen their mutual trade.

All the aforementioned points can be explicitly demonstrated on various interpretations of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and especially on the example of the so-called third liberalisation package, which aimed to create legal conditions for the further liberalisation of the electricity and gas market. The political representatives

of Russia claim that this legislation limits the energy cooperation with the EU and impedes the equal access of Russian subjects to member state markets, while conversely, EU functionaries claim that the third liberalisation package will lead to a greater liberalisation of the mutual cooperation with the RF and ensure equal conditions on the energy market for both European and Russian energy firms (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2013, p. 395).

The liberalisation discourse is maintained by using similar arguments as the neoliberal theory of international relations. That is to say, a cooperation founded on comparative benefits and the effort to maximise economic gains which motivates actors to overcome their mutual distrust, which stems from the existence of these actors in an anarchic international system (cf. Keohane 1989; Baldwin 1993). According to neoliberals, however, the decrease of mistrust and the increase of transparency and predictability do not result in an overall reduction of the conflictive potential of the international system. Unlike the integration discourse, which imbues the interdependence of both actors with positive value, the liberalisation discourse remains almost strictly on the economic level and practically ignores politics, not to mention security.

3.6.3 The Diversification Discourse

The third discourse that was identified preliminarily is the diversification discourse. Although this discourse uses the same vocabulary and language as the previous two, it differs from them most abruptly. Whereas the discourses of integration and liberalisation are in some ways related, and it can be imagined that one speaker might apply both discourses simultaneously, the diversification discourse has a different focus. Mainly, while the previous two discourses emphasise the economic aspect of cooperation, the diversification discourse focuses on the political and, especially, the security implications of the EU's energy dependence on the Russian Federation on the one hand, and on the other hand, it notes the RF's attempts to assuage the union's anxieties as much possible (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2012, p. 101).

The diversification discourse mainly gains momentum in times of energy crises or when Russian energy supplies to Europe are endangered. Nonetheless, differences still exist in the ways the EU and the RF interpret these events. The EU—as the "security–rational actor" in the diversification discourse—securitises energy relations with the RF and uses security norms and values with the aim to eliminate potential threats and risks and ensure its energy security. Conversely, the RF—as the "security–normative actor"—attempts to desecuritise the issue of energy security in its energy relations with the EU, using security–economic norms and values with the aim to convince the EU of its reliability and the importance of Russian diversification projects.

At the same time, in this discourse, interdependence is not seen as a positive element that facilitates the stabilisation of the mutual relations, but instead as a risk that should be minimised as much as possible. The RF–EU relations are essentially

symmetrical, but both actors must primarily be seen as rivals whose relations in some ways resemble a zero-sum game: when the EU pushes for the greatest possible openness of the Russian energy sector, the RF acts to prevent such openness; when EU member states want to protect their distribution networks, the RF attempts to gain control of them; when the EU wishes to achieve the greatest possible diversity of supplier states and transport routes, the RF aims to impede this effort; and so on (Bahgad 2006, pp. 961–975; Siddi 2018, pp. 254–256, 263–266).

The main difference lies in the question of the diversification of sources, countries of origin, and transport and transit routes. It is clear that while the EU rates a high dependence on a limited number of producer countries as dangerous, political representatives of the RF reject this interpretation as unsubstantiated and instead speak of the diversification of transit countries, that is, of Russian gas line construction projects, as examples of successful diversification, which will help strengthen EU energy security. The divergent EU and RF interpretations lead to fundamentally different consequences. Whereas the Russian side sees the RF as a reliable and stable energy partner for the EU, which should welcome Russian transport lines, the diversification discourse of the EU does not acknowledge this claim, because its main goal is to reduce its energy dependence on the RF as such (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2013, p. 395).

In the terms of international relations theory, the diversification discourse corresponds to political realism (cf. Gilpin 1984; Morgenthau and Thompson 1985). Both actors find themselves in the classic setting of having to compete for limited resources and, in relation to this, using these resources to strengthen their own political power. The advantageousness or disadvantageousness of the mutual cooperation in the field of energy (just as in any other economic sector) must not be seen from the perspective of economic benefit, but mainly through the prism of the political interests of both actors. Table 3.14 shows the main theoretical concepts and characteristics that define the internal and external relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation in each of the discourses.

Tables 3.15 and 3.16 detail the key defining features that characterise the main political processes and the course of their development in the framework of the individual discourses of the European Union and the Russian Federation.

Table 3.17 provides an overview of the main concepts or key words and terms that are typical for each of the three discourses of the EU and Russia. For the integration discourse of the EU and the RF, the key words, such as *cooperation*, *relations*, and *partnership*, are inspired by the very principle of *integration*, which presupposes a greater interconnectedness based on an institutional and legislative framework, that is, *agreement* and *interdependence*. For the liberalisation discourse of the EU and the RF, words like *transparency*, *effectivity*, *investment*, and *reform* are accompanying terms to the process of *liberalisation* in the sense of the greatest possible openness and modernisation, which is further connected to *market accessibility* and *market rules* as conditions of a successful energy cooperation. In the case of the diversification discourse of the EU and the RF, all the key words, that is, *diversification*, *alternative routes*, *resources*, *and projects*, *unreliability of transit countries*, and *cooperation with other countries*, are derived from the need to ensure *energy security*.

Table 3.14 An overview of the energy discourses and their characteristic features

Discourse	Mutual EU-RF relations	Symmetry/ asymmetry	Dominant aspect of the relation	Theoretical concepts
Integration	Teacher and pupil	Asymmetry	Economy	Normative power, interdependence
Liberalisation	Business partners	Symmetry	Economy	Comparative benefits, neoliberalism
Diversification	Rivals, potential enemies	Symmetry	Security	Zero-sum game, securitisation

Source: Compiled by the author according to Tichý and Kratochvíl (2014, p. 14)

Table 3.15 The main defining features of the three energy discourses of the EU

	Type of discourses		
Main features	Integration	Liberalisation	Diversification
Norms and values	Economic	Market–liberal	Security
Identity and foreign orientation of the EU when dealing with the RF	Normative actor	Rational–normative actor	Security–rational actor
Interests	Normative–integrative	Rational–liberalisation	Security–diversification
Goals	Normative	Strategic	Strategic
Tools	Normative	Normative	Normative

Source: compiled by the author according to Tichý and Kratochvíl (2014, p. 14)

Table 3.16 The main defining features of the three energy discourses of Russia

	Type of discourses		
Main features	Integration	Liberalisation	Diversification
Norms and values	Economic	Market–liberal	Security–economic
Identity and foreign orientation of the RF when dealing with the EU	Normative–rational actor	Rational–normative actor	Security–normative actor
Interests	Normative–economic	Rational–liberalisation	Security–diversification
Goals	Strategic	Strategic	Strategic
Tools	Normative	Normative	Normative

Source: Compiled by the author according to Tichý and Kratochvíl (2014, p. 14)

The application of these key concepts in Table 3.17 necessitates one crucial remark. The mere fact that an analysed document contains a word such as "cooperation" does not mean that this term and the connected sentence or words are automatically part of the integration discourse. A very similar case is that of the term "energy security", which is not necessarily strictly defined or used solely and exclusively with the diversification discourse. On the contrary, these concepts are often mentioned in other analysed texts, where they have much more significance in connection to other terms or phrases that fall under the other discursive complexes

Table 3.17 The concepts related to the individual energy discourses of the EU and Russia

Discourse	Terms connected to the given discourse
Integration	Integration Cooperation Partnership and relations Interdependence Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
Liberalisation	Market access and market rules Liberalisation and investment Transparency Effectivity and reform Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
Diversification	Energy security Diversification Alternative routes, resources, and projects Connecting energy infrastructure (outside of Russia) Cooperation with other countries

Source: Compiled by the author according to Tichý and Kratochvíl (2014, p. 15)

(they can serve as the key term that begins the whole document or is stated as the base principle of explanation). In other words, the use of a given text (paragraph or sentence) as a quote in support of the analysis or interpretation of a specific theme within a given discourse is primarily decided by the key word's connection to or dependence on the context and contents of the sentence in which the concept/term is found.

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Chapter 4
The EU Energy Discourses on the Russian Federation in 2004–2014

4.1 The Integration Discourse of the EU in 2004–2009

4.1.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Integration Discourse

Despite the current media popularity of the term "energy security", which is often connected to the diversification discourse, the integration discourse retains a clear dominance in the analysed documents. The strong presence of the integration discourse and its main themes in the field of energy stems largely from the very essence of the European Commission's mission, which is to ensure continued integration both within the European Union and with regard to its expansion towards its partners beyond the borders. This is evident both from the contents of the EU documents and from the repeated emphasising of the fact in speeches and interviews of most of the scrutinised political representatives of the European Commission (EC), such as the President, the Commissioner for External Relations and the Commissioner for Enlargement (see Tichý and Kratochvíl 2014, p. 15).

However, the EU integration discourse is characterised by a considerable ambivalence. On the one hand, the integration discourse shares an emphasis on mutual beneficence with the liberalisation discourse, where the goal should be to integrate the EU and Russian energy markets, and this should be done in a "mutually beneficial, bilateral, transparent, and non-discriminatory way" (European Commission 2006a, p. 4; also Rehn 2006). Similarly—suggesting a symmetrical understanding of the mutual relations—this emphasis is also apparent in connection with the frequent use of the terms "cooperation", "partnership" and "relations", which highlights the equality of both parties. And so Piebalgs (2008a) can repeatedly state that "we are interested in intense energy cooperation with the RF", or the European Commission (2006b, p. 16) can claim in its Green Book from 2006 that "a true (energy) partnership would offer security and predictability for both sides, paving the way for the necessary long-term investments in new capacity". Similarly, for example, Buzek (2009a) declares: "Let

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me assure you our energy relationship with Russia takes the form of a strategic partnership . . .” The same can also be heard from Rehn (2008a): “The RF is and will remain the main energy partner of the EU now and in the future . . .”

The symmetry between the two partners is often interpreted in a utilitarian sense, that is, in the sense that although the two partners are not in identical situations (due to the fact that Russia owns the resources that the EU needs), their relationship can provide the same benefits to both of them since “Russia is more than just a supplier of oil, it is an economic partner” (Franko 2006a). Therefore, “the EU and Russia should see mutual long term benefits from a new energy partnership, which would seek a balance between [the] expectations and interests of both sides” (European Commission 2006a, p. 3).

However, what is important for the integration discourse is that the symmetry of the benefits of the partnership is associated with a considerable asymmetry in terms of adaptation in the sense of integration, that is, the acceptance of EU norms by Russia with regard to energy and international trade, as, for instance, the EU states that “the RF should accept our norms in the process of energy integration” (Rehn 2008a) because “clear rules and obligations” can “only be a benefit to both parties” (Mendelson 2007a). This is where the integration discourse diverges from the liberalisation discourse.

The second difference between the integration and the liberalisation discourse that the author has identified is the conviction of promoters of energy integration that an important condition for a successful cooperation is not just the liberalisation of markets as such but mainly the formation of a clear institutional framework that would regulate the relations between both actors. Therefore, the term “cooperation” often occurs in connection with the challenges inherent to the creation of a regulatory and legal framework for mutual energy relations or even the creation of “a new model of cooperation between Russia and Europe as a whole” (Franko 2006a, b, 2009a; Ashton 2008).

The main legal instrument governing the energy relations between the EU and Russia should be the reworked Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), “which is intended to replace the current Partnership and Cooperation Agreement . . .” (Rehn 2008b; also Ashton 2008), with the condition that “a part of the new agreement should be to secure energy supplies for the whole EU” (Pöttering 2007a, b). According to Rehn (2004, 2006), there are at least two reasons why the EU and Russia have to conclude a new legally binding contract. First, the new PCA will ensure “a high level of legislative approximation of Russia with the EU . . .” Secondly, although the integration discourse consistently avoids sensitive issues, according to Rehn (2008b, 2009a), “we [the EU] cannot trade human rights for energy. We need both. This is why we need . . . [a] new and legally binding agreement on EU-Russia relations . . .” (see also Valenzuela 2009).

At the same time, the Commission (2006b, p. 4) also claims that it is essential to agree on “the proposed principles of future energy cooperation” (but also Pöttering 2008a). The most frequently cited principle that should be included is the creation of a reliable early warning mechanism for supply outages (cf. Solana 2007, 2009a; Ferrero-Waldner 2007a, 2009a) and regular consultations, whether within the framework of the “EU-Russia energy dialogue”, which “provides a very useful and

practical framework for discussing energy matters" (Piebalgs 2006a), or without it (Ferrero-Waldner 2007a, b; Piebalgs 2007a).

The mutual dependence of both actors is also approached in a very specific way. First of all, all the relevant texts—despite the usual media image—agree that the relation is not a unilateral EU dependence on Russia but rather an interdependence between the two actors: "Russia seeks ways to secure [the] energy demand presented by the EU market. The EU needs Russian resources for its energy security . . . There is a clear interdependence" (Ferrero-Waldner 2009a, p. 2; Piebalgs 2006a, 2007b, 2008a). Sometimes this argument is reinforced by making the assertion that "our mutual dependence is very strong" (Solana 2008a; Piebalgs 2007a), or it is emphasised by the pleonasm "mutual interdependence" (Solana 2007; see also Solana 2008b, p. 2, 2009a; Barroso 2006a), as "energy supplies from the RF play a major role in satisfying the energy demands of Europe, [and represent] almost 30% of oil import[s] to the EU and 44% of our gas imports. In the same way[,] however, 67% of gas and oil exports from Russia go to the European market . . ." (Ferrero-Waldner 2007c). The assessment there is an EU-RF interdependence is only disturbed by Franko (2006c), who states that "Russia is more dependent on the EU" than vice versa.

According to most of the texts, not only is this interdependence going to persist into the future (e.g. "the EU and Russia are and will remain dependent on each other in the field of energy"—Piebalgs 2006a, b; Solana 2007), but its future continuation is not perceived as problematic in any way. For example, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner (2009a, p. 2) confirms that the aim of EU policy is not to eliminate this dependence but rather to "direct it"; she also stresses that the EU "[does] not want to supplant Russia". Similarly, Mendelson (2007a, b) declares that "we [the EU] will continue to depend on Russian energy supplies, and Russia will grow increasingly dependent on our energy demand" (see also Ashton 2008).

However, the analysis revealed that some texts have no difficulty in using arguments and concepts of the integration discourse together with arguments and concepts of the liberalisation discourse. In many instances, EU representatives imply that the EU sees liberalisation and integration as something like communicating vessels or even as practically identical processes. Piebalgs (2007a) summarises this connection most aptly when he says, ". . . we must therefore ensure that we continuously develop closer relations, based on openness, transparency and mutual respect for our legitimate interests" (but also 2007a; Borrell Fontelles 2006a, b; Buzek 2009a), while mentioning the need for a European framework for energy, which would be based on the rule of law and reciprocity (cf. Piebalgs 2006a, 2007b).

Therefore, on the one hand, there is the formation of a common approach to energy relations (which should, however, be more or less based on the approximation of Russia to the EU), while on the other hand, there is a liberal economic interpretation of this approach. This is then reflected in the details of the applied argumentation: that is, one single paragraph or sentence may discuss both the early warning mechanism and liberalisation (Ferrero-Waldner 2007a, p. 2), other times this same mechanism is mentioned together with a "positive investment climate" in Russia (Piebalgs 2006a, b), and the need for a new agreement between the EU and

Russia is proclaimed in parallel with the need for transparency (Ferrero-Waldner 2008a, p. 3, 2008b).

4.1.2 The Impact of Norms of the Integration Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the EU in Its Relations to Russia

Within the framework of the EU integration discourse, a key element is that of normativity in the form of the existence and active effects of norms, rules and values, which determine the EU behaviour with regard to Russia. To give two examples of statements that demonstrate this normativity, "we want to support European values, such as the rule of law, through our dialogue in energy relations with the RF" (Rehn 2008c), and "EU norms, but also the EU's legal model and acquis, which Russia should gradually accept, should become the foundations of our good energy relations" (Mendelson 2008; also Piebalgs 2008a). These norms and values then have a decisive impact on the external identity of the European Union as a "normative actor" which uses normative tools to promote its own norms and values, especially in the economic sense, which the Russian Federation should unilaterally adopt.

And yet the interesting thing here is that although calls for a new PCA or for an early warning mechanism within the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue and other similar provisions stem from negative experiences in the past, the integration discourse increasingly sees the acceptance of such measures in a purely positive manner. These EU requirements show a certain degree of Europeanisation, which can also be seen, for instance, in the recommendation that proposes that "the European acquis could become a referential framework for the reform of the energy sector in the Russian Federation" (European Commission 2004, p. 14). The same EC document also states elsewhere that "the principles of the inner energy market, such as energy efficiency, [and] reform of the electricity and gas sector, should become a part of the referential framework for the restructuralisation of the energy sector in the RF" (European Commission 2004, p. 11).

At the same time, in the context of this normative identity, the EU promotes its normative-integrative interests towards Russia with the normative goal of ensuring the RF's integration in and approximation to the EU, which is supposed to bring both parties stability and predictability in their mutual energy relations, as "the RF, as one of the largest trade and energy partners of the EU and our biggest neighbour, should be the centre of attention for future integration plans" (Piebalgs 2006a), and likewise, Russia "should strive towards a greater integration with the EU" (Mendelson 2007c). This asymmetry is related to the fact that the integration discourse is based on the premise that EU member states are already integrated, and effective energy relations with the RF can mainly be achieved by integrating Russia in the form of its gradual acceptance of EU norms and rules in the field of energy.

The reasons for this unilateral approximation of Russia to the EU are expressed with surprising openness in the analysed documents. For example, Ferrero-Waldner insists that the reason is that "member states will not be willing to discuss everything again" just because of the RF (Ferrero-Waldner 2009a; Piebalgs 2009a). Similarly, Ferrero-Waldner (2009a) states in the same text that "it must be taken into consideration that we have 27 member states here, whom we are negotiating for with one country, a large country [the RF], but all the same we have here one country and on the other side twenty-seven countries" (Rehn 2008b), and so "when negotiating with the RF about the creation of a referential framework" (Barroso 2009a; Buzek 2009b) for EU-RF energy relations, "we must speak with one voice" (Ferrero-Waldner 2008a).

4.2 The Liberalisation Discourse of the EU in 2004–2009

4.2.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Liberalisation Discourse

The previously discussed discourse, that is, the integration discourse, mainly emphasises the institutional framework for the energy cooperation and increased partnership between the EU and Russia through the means of gradual integration. Conversely, the liberalisation discourse is rooted in the conviction that a fully functioning and interconnected EU internal energy market supported by an expansion of EU liberal market norms, values and rules beyond the EU[1] will help secure stable energy supplies, increase competitiveness and improve the predictability of the energy relations (cf. Barroso 2006a, 2007a; European Commission 2006b; Solana 2006). For example, Piebalgs (2007b) claims that "the ongoing liberalisation of the EU energy market . . . also [has] an impact on the EU-Russia bilateral energy cooperation" (see also Ferrero-Waldner 2008a; Barroso 2006b; European Commission 2008a, p. 7).

In the analysed documents and speeches, the EU liberalisation discourse is very often associated with the integration discourse, with which—despite the aforementioned differences—it shares many common aspects. The EU liberalisation discourse, like the integration discourse, mainly favours the economic dimension of EU-RF relations and the mutual importance of both actors in their energy-related interaction, as "the Russian Federation is the EU's most important single supplier of energy products . . . The EU is the most important market for Russia energy exports and generates a significant part of its export revenues" (European Commission 2008a, p. 7; Council of the European Union 2006). And yet, the liberalisation discourse clearly emphasises symmetry rather than asymmetry in EU-Russia relations.

[1]One example of this is the 2005 Energy Community, which aims to ensure a stable investment environment and the creation of an inner market for electricity and natural gas between the European Community and the contracting parties.

Both discourses also agree on the benefits of the bilateral energy cooperation of the EU and Russia based on market principles and the content of a new agreement. For instance, according to Pöttering (2008a): "a new PCA with Russia, which would include a strong energy section, must become a priority for the EU" but also for the RF because "it will bring both parties mutual economic benefits" (Rehn 2006; see also Mendelson 2006a; European Commission 2007, p. 22). The importance of the agreement and the resulting economic benefits are highlighted in one of the speeches of Ferrero-Waldner (2008a): ". . . there is great interest on both sides in negotiating arrangements that [would] allow for an expansion of a Russian and [an] EU-presence in each other's markets" (but also Pöttering 2007b; Solana 2006, 2008c).

The key concepts of the liberalisation discourse are the market for energy products and the reciprocal access to energy markets in Russia and the EU, with the condition that nondiscriminatory access to the energy markets of both the EU and the RF should help increase the efficiency of their cooperation. This idea is very clearly pointed out by Piebalgs (2006a) and Ferrero-Waldner (2006a): "what we need is reciprocity . . . and a truly level playing field, covering market opening and market access . . . to increase stability and predictability in our energy relations . . ." (see also Barroso 2006a, 2007a; Franko 2007; Solana 2008b). An important role is played by the means through which the desired state is to be achieved.

Select documents and speeches discuss successful liberalisation as meaning the opening of the Russian energy market to the EU. For the European Commission (2008a, p. 9), the liberalisation of the Russian energy market is a crucial precondition for an efficient and economically beneficial partnership in this case: "negotiations could in this way facilitate the reform and liberalisation of the energy market in Russia . . ., provide stability and predictability of demand for Russian gas, and clarify the conditions under which Russian companies may invest in the EU" (Piebalgs 2006a, b, 2008b). Liberalisation is seen as a necessary prerequisite for improving investments into the energy sector. This was confirmed by Piebalgs (2007a), when he positively assessed the situation on the Russian electricity market, which "is liberalized and attracted significant investment from European firms".

Conversely, inadequate investments constitute a potential risk. The recent reduction of investments in Russia and the related negative assessment of it can be seen as a change from the previously positive assessment of Russia. For instance, one of the documents of the European Commission (see 2008a, p. 7) expressed the concern that Russia may not be able to adequately meet the growing demand abroad as a result of inadequate investment in Russian production, transportation and distribution of energy products (see also Piebalgs 2008a; Ferrero-Waldner 2006a, b). In this sense, the inadequate investments in the energy sector, expanding domestic demand and low-energy efficiency in Russia also "present potential risks to [the] future energy supply in Russia itself as well as in consumer countries" (Piebalgs 2009a), with the condition that according to "current predictions, production and export capacities of the Russian Federation will be unable to satisfy the needs of the EU unless massive investments are made in Russia" (Rehn 2006).

Nonetheless, the European Union's understanding of how the energy market should be organised and run differs significantly from the opinions and interests of

the Russian Federation. This was confirmed, among others, by Mendelson (2007a): "The EU wants—broadly speaking—competitive markets with strong rules, genuine rights of transit and the separation of energy production from distribution. Russia prefers state ownership, exclusive rights, vertical integration and limited transit rights". Likewise, the European Union and the Russian Federation have divergent views of their mutual access to each other's energy markets. This situation was explicitly described by Rehn (2006): "In this sense, the main problem is the lack of equal conditions." Whereas EU companies, "which can invest in supplier assets in Russia, do not have the right of independent access to the Russian gas transport infrastructure", in the European Union "the right to access gas transport infrastructure is rooted in EU regulations", and so in this context, "the same rules of EU economic competition apply to Gazprom, just as for any other foreign company" (see also Franko 2009b).

A very specific topic which is located on the borderline between the two discourses of integration and liberalisation is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).[2] The ECT belongs to the integration discourse primarily as a legislative framework on the basis of which there "is [a] need to build a genuine energy partnership with Russia" (Ferrero-Waldner 2008b; Barroso 2006a). For the Russian Federation, however, the Energy Charter Treaty is a very controversial topic, and Russia refuses to be bound by the rules of this document. For this reason, besides demanding that ECT principles be upheld in energy relations with Russia, the EU often tried to push Russia "to ratify the ECT" or to "accelerate the ratification of the ECT" (European Commission 2008a; Pöttering 2007b, 2008b; Franko 2009b, c). On the other hand, its demand for an open, transparent and competitive energy market places the Energy Charter Treaty in the scope of the liberalisation discourse (see more Barroso 2006a; Piebalgs 2006a, 2008a; Ferrero-Waldner 2007a, 2008a).

4.2.2 The Impact of the Norms of the Liberalisation Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the EU in Its Relations to Russia

On the one hand, the EU liberalisation discourse shows the clear influence of a rational approach to the behaviour and actions of the European Union, which—in the role of a "rational actor" in its energy relations with the RF—endeavours to obtain benefits from the cooperation via norms. This can be seen, for instance, in Russia's efforts to gain a stronger footing in the EU's internal energy market, which is often confronted with the same demand and expectation from the EU, which wants "a fair

[2]The Energy Charter Treaty was signed in Lisbon in December 1994; it entered into force in April 1998. The main aim of the ECT is to support the long-term cooperation in the area of energy on the basis of complementarity and mutual beneficiency. Although Russia signed the Treaty in 1994, it refused to ratify it.

and equal approach to mutual energy relations . . .” (European Commission 2006b, p. 4) which will benefit the European Union. Barroso spoke out in a similar vein: “We agree that Russia needs predictability from the EU, but we also need predictability from the RF”, and so “we have to admit and use this interdependence to our mutual benefit . . .” (Barroso 2006a).

On the other hand, as in the case of the integration discourse, the EU’s liberalisation discourse—influenced by its normative approach to the RF—promotes its norms and values, which it wants Russia to accept: for instance, the Benita Ferrero-Waldner (2009b) stated that “the Russian Federation should conclude the Energy Charter Treaty and accept its norms, values, and principles” (Piebalgs 2008a; Barroso 2006a) because they are “a key element for ensuring a legally binding agreement, which would lead to the creation of equal conditions in the field of energy” (Ferrero-Waldner 2008a) and would thus form the basis for the creation of a market environment in the mutual energy relations. Therefore, in the context of normativity, the EU liberalisation discourse has the EU approach Russia as a “normative actor”.

In other words, the liberalisation discourse shows the clear influence of norms on the external identity of the European Union, which—as a “rational-normative actor”—rationally uses normative tools in relation to Russia in the form of economic and liberal-market norms and values to improve its access to the Russian energy market and provoke changes in Russia’s behaviour. This should lead to greater openness of the mutual trade and bring mutually beneficial results: for example, the European Commission (2008a, p. 7) stated that “the EU aims to establish a true level playing field (i.e. transparency, non-discrimination, reciprocity of market access, . . .) in the face of continued difficulties that foreign investors experience in accessing the Russian upstream sector”. Similarly, according to Mendelson (2006a): “Europe’s growing market and values of openness will remain a powerful incentive for continued change in Russia” because “clear, transparent rules can create a stable and open environment for the diversification of Russian trade” (Mendelson 2008) together with legal security. According to the documents of the European Commission (2008a, p. 9), “each of these improvements would contribute to making Europe’s sources and Russia’s supply more diversified and reliable” (see also European Commission 2006b, p. 3), which “both sides could benefit from” (Rehn 2008b). Conversely, a “lack of transparency and information [would] undermine mutual trust” (Piebalgs 2008a; also European Commission 2008b).

Within the framework of its rational-normative identity, the EU emphasises rational-liberalisation interests in its energy relations with Russia with the strategic aim of achieving a better and stronger energy cooperation. This condition was explicitly described by Ferrero-Waldner (2006a): “Our common objective should be . . . the liberalisation of the Russian energy sector, market opening and fair and non-discriminatory access to Russian transport networks . . .” which will help “increase efficiency in our energy relations” (Ferrero-Waldner 2007a).

4.3 The Diversification Discourse of the EU in 2004–2009

4.3.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Diversification Discourse

The third discourse analysed in this section is the diversification discourse. Unlike the official EU approach to ensuring energy commodities through a combination of both internal and external measures, the diversification discourse focuses exclusively on the external aspects of energy policy. It is characterised by a strong rhetoric about the European Union's vulnerability, stemming from the need to increase energy imports and by a call for a reduction of the EU's dependence on its major energy suppliers, considering that "the recent gas dispute between the Russian Federation and the Ukraine demonstrated the vulnerability of the European Union in gas security. To reduce the risk of future gas disruptions, we need greater diversity in our gas supplies . . ." (Piebalgs 2009a; Barroso 2009a; Borrell Fontelles 2006c, d). In the context of this discourse, energy security is understood not simply as a requirement of a certain legal environment to ensure equal access for energy market operators but rather as one of the key objectives of EU energy policy in itself, implying that the EU should have a strategy for external energy relations based on security norms and values in the effort to eliminate or minimise potential threats and risks.

The EU diversification discourse differs from the previous two discourses in several respects. While the discourses of liberalisation and integration mainly emphasise the economic aspects of the mutual cooperation, the focus of the diversification discourse is on the political impact and the security implications of the EU's energy dependence on Russia. According to one of the documents of the European Commission (2008a, p. 7) from 2008, ". . . the EU's dependence on Russia as a supplier will remain strong and might be a source of concern". Similarly, Solana (2006, 2009a, b) expressed the view that the "gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine this winter had serious consequences for customers in the EU" (see also Piebalgs 2009a, b).

Therefore, the diversification discourse is often referred to as a securitisation discourse. This is reflected by the shift of the employed arguments towards understanding the energy relations with Russia as a security issue as well as by a strong demand for ensuring energy security in the form of regular, reliable and uninterrupted energy supplies. Therefore, Piebalgs (2009a, b), for instance, claims that the "threat of disruption of [the] supply of natural gas was one of the main reasons for increased interest in the EU's energy security" (Ferrero-Waldner 2008a; European Commission 2006c; European Parliament 2006).

The EU diversification discourse gains intensity and momentum especially when an energy crisis takes place, as was the case during the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflicts in 2006 and 2009 and the Russian-Belarusian oil conflict in 2007, which are acute markers of the rate of energy dependence and vulnerability of the EU; at the same time, these events highlight the need to implement necessary measures to strengthen energy security. This was confirmed, among others, by Borrell Fontelles

(2006c, d), who repeatedly stressed that "the gas supply crisis between Russia and Ukraine showed how dependent we are on energy. Europe has realised its vulnerability in the field of energy" (see also Ferrero-Waldner 2009a, b). At the same time, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis revealed "a cruel absence of joint energy policy and strategy" and clearly showed that "energy is the embodiment of current conflicts in the Union" (Borrell Fontelles 2006d), with the condition that the reasons for this negative situation are to be found in individual member states, which "cling to an outdated version of sovereignty" (Borrell Fontelles 2006d, e).

According to Borrell Fontelles (2006a), there are a number of measures that can be taken to "coordinate the sovereignty of member states with the necessity of reacting to common problems", thus improving the EU's energy security. First, this can be done through the process of the creation of a joint EU energy policy, in which "energy must become a basic component of the Union's external policy . . ." (Borrell Fontelles 2006e; see also Barroso 2009a). Second, it can be done by creating a fully liberalised and interconnected energy market, with the condition that "we must strengthen the interconnectedness of our gas lines and also consider the possibility of the joint procurement of natural gas with the aim of creating a real European market of energy solidarity" (Buzek 2009a). A key factor which should then help fulfil these energy measures is seen in the principle of solidarity, upon which "the EU is founded as a community of values" (Pöttering 2009a, b). And finally, third, an important instrument for ensuring energy security is the diversification of energy sources (cf. Piebalgs 2008b, c; Borrell Fontelles 2006b; Barroso 2009a), suppliers (cf. Franko 2009c, d; Ashton 2008) and transit routes (cf. Franko 2009d; Solana 2006; Mendelson 2008; Barroso 2009b).

Another difference between the EU diversification discourse, on one hand, and the discourses of liberalisation and integration, on the other, is in the perception of the Russian Federation's energy relations with the European Union. While the integration and liberalisation discourses regard the Russian Federation—though with certain exceptions—as a reliable energy supplier, the diversification discourse is much more ambiguous about this. This was demonstrated by Andris Piebalgs' answer (2009a) to the question whether the gas crisis had undermined the credibility of both countries: "It is very difficult to say yes or no. I would say that trust has been undermined, because we can be cut off anytime". Barroso (2009c) also expressed himself critically, stating that "Russia and Ukraine are unable to meet their obligations to some EU member states . . ." Although the author of this treatise did not find any depictions of Russia as a "threat" or an "enemy" or any other collocations that would create a strongly negative image of the RF in the examined documents (though such depictions are commonplace in the media), a certain change can be detected in the perception of Russia by the EU representatives. This change was predominantly caused by several previous disputes about gas pricing between the Russian Federation and Ukraine because "it was utterly unacceptable that European gas consumers were held hostage to this dispute between Russia and Ukraine" (Barroso 2009a).

The diversification discourse also differs from the previous two discourses in regard to the question of the status of the EU and Russia in their energy relations. Compared to the integration and liberalisation discourses, which define the relations between the

EU and Russia as a partnership, the diversification discourse sees both actors primarily as rivals. This was indirectly confirmed, for example, in a summary made by Barroso (2006a): "Russia is an important partner for the EU in energy. But it is not, and should not be, the EU's only partner. That is why the EU has started to develop energy agreements with several of our partners" (see also Mendelson 2007c).

The need to acquire new alternative suppliers of natural gas in addition to Russia was also stressed by Piebalgs (2005) with the justification that "it would be a mistake expecting that all gas will only come from Russia", as there are other sources of gas whose supplies "can be compared with the volume of gas that we get from Russia" (Piebalgs 2009a). Piebalgs (2007a) also hinted at the source areas that the EU should look to for gas supplies: "[T]he largest reserves in absolute terms are at the end of the Nabucco pipe, in the Middle East/Caspian region". Likewise, he said that the EU was "also developing new initiatives with alternative suppliers, in the Caspian Basin, Central Asia, North Africa, and South America" (European Council 2007; Solana 2009b; Rehn 2009b).

The diversification discourse goes beyond mere source areas and countries, and it also mentioned a number of particular projects on which the European Union should focus. According to Barroso (2009a), "projects to diversify sources and routes of gas supply also deserve our support. I am thinking of strategic projects in the Southern [C]orridor, such as Nabucco, to bring gas from the Caspian region . . ." (see also European Commission 2007, p. 10; Solana 2009a; Piebalgs 2007a; Franko 2009c, d).

On the other hand, this diversification in EU-RF relations is not presented as a process of divergence or the termination of the energy interactions in itself, because although "it will be necessary to have more pipelines, more possibilities . . . and even more resources[, . . .] Russia will remain, also in the future, our biggest supplier" (Ferrero-Waldner 2009a). At the same time, Franko (2006a, 2007, 2009e) states that it is normal that "Russia attempts to diversify the number of its clients", and therefore "it is also normal for the European Union to diversify its sources" (see also Piebalgs 2007c).

4.3.2 The Impact of the Norms of the Diversification Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the EU in Its Relations to Russia

The third discussed EU discourse, that is, the diversification discourse, also provides an ambiguous picture of the EU's identity. On the one hand, under the influence of security risks and threats, such as energy crises, the EU shares the identity of a "security actor" which securitises the energy question as a security issue in relation to the Russian Federation. This process of securitisation is then manifested in several fundamental ways in the EU's energy relations with Russia.

First, there is the change of the perception of the RF as a reliable supplier, as, for example, a 2008 document of the European Commission (2008a, p. 7) highlights concerns about the possible instability of Russian energy supplies to the EU: "[W]

hile Russia has been a reliable supplier of energy products to the EU for decades, disputes with transit states . . . raise concerns about future supply". Second, there are concern about the vulnerability and energy dependency of the EU in relation to Russia, as "energy dependency on the RF is an unavoidable part of the short- and probably also the long-term future of the EU" (Mendelson 2007a) and "the primary aim of EU energy policy is to prevent energy vulnerability and dependency on the RF" (Mendelson 2007c). Third, there is the voicing of "concerns" about "using energy as a political instrument" (Mendelson 2007a, c) by Russia or "a stronger presence of Gazprom on the European energy market" (Rehn 2006). Fourth, there is the repeated emphasis on the need to diversify, as "we want to diversify not only because we are afraid of Russia, but also because diversification is generally good . . ." (Piebalgs 2009a; Barroso 2006a, 2007b), but also because "we face an energy crisis" (Buzek 2009a, b).

On the other hand, the energy diversification discourse also evinces the influence of a rational approach on the identity of the EU, which—as a "rational actor"—uses its economic advantages over the RF in the effort to ensure its own energy security, while, for example, "if the EU wants to ensure the safety of its supplies, it must be said that it will need huge investments and expenses to develop new fields and transport", including those in Russia, from which "the RF can profit greatly" (Mendelson 2007a), and "the European call for security of supplies also implies security of demand for the RF, which can benefit from this as the key recipient of this call" (Mendelson 2006b, 2007c).

In other words, in the energy diversification discourse, the identity of the EU as a "security-rational actor" is derived from security norms and values, which it uses rationally as normative-offensive tools in the process of the securitisation of its energy relations with the RF in the effort to minimise or eliminate potential threats and risks, limit its energy dependency on Russia and bolster its negotiating power. At the same time, this identity forms and influences the security-diversification interests of the EU, which uses these tools rationally with regard to the RF with the strategic goal of diversifying transit routes, sources and suppliers and strengthening its energy security. This was confirmed by Piebalgs (2009a), who declared that "if we are to avoid another risk of gas supply cuts", as had happened before, "we need a common energy strategy based on solidarity between member states" and on security norms that "regulate mutual relations" and support specific measures, such as diversification, for "a greater diversification of gas supply" is very important. Conversely, "relying on just one supplier allows the monopoly supplier to dictate prices and influences decisions made by the consumers" (Piebalgs 2007a), which is a danger to energy security. However, because "Europe wants security of energy supply and the RF wants security of demand, the RF needs European investments into its energy sector" (Mendelson 2007a, c).

Table 4.1 The main themes of the three energy discourses of the EU in 2004–2009

Integration discourse	Liberalisation discourse	Diversification discourse
– Emphasis on economic benefits – Emphasis on the terms "relations", "partnership" and "cooperation", which highlight the equal status of the two actors – Preference for an institutional and legal framework as a key condition for a successful cooperation – A focus on the unilateral approximation and the gradual acceptance of the EU acquis by the RF – Emphasis on the economic superiority of the EU and the consequent need to Europeanise the RF – Emphasis on mutual energy connectedness, that is, interdependence	– A focus on the economic aspect of EU-RF energy relations and on economic benefits and profits – Emphasis on the mutual importance of both actors in the energy relations – The idea of a fully functioning and interconnected internal energy market – Emphasis on market principles – A focus on liberalised and transparent energy relations and the Russian Federation and the EU's mutual access to each other's energy markets – Concerns about insufficient investments in the Russian energy sector – Emphasis on the ECT	– Emphasis on the external aspects of energy policy – A focus on the political impact and security consequences of the EU's energy dependency on Russia – A move towards the securitisation of the energy relations with Russia – A focus on the energy security of the EU – A view of the EU and the RF as rivals – Emphasis on reducing the undue dependency of the EU on Russia – A push for the diversification of sources, energy suppliers and alternative transit routes and lines

Source: Compiled by the author according to Kratochvíl and Tichý (2013, p. 399)

4.4 A Comparison of the Three Discourses of the EU in 2004–2009

Table 4.1 summarises the main themes of the EU energy discourses of integration, liberalisation and diversification in the years 2004–2009. These base themes clearly confirm the main features of all three of the EU energy discourses. For instance, whereas the liberalisation and integration discourses assign key importance to themes primarily related to the economic side of the EU-RF energy cooperation, in the case of the diversification discourse, the main emphasis is placed on political and security themes of the EU-RF energy relations.

Table 4.1 is closely connected to Table 4.2, which charts the overlaps and differences between the energy discourses of liberalisation, integration and diversification. Table 4.2 clearly confirms the aforementioned features of all three of the EU discourses, as far as their similarities and divergences are concerned. Whereas the EU integration and liberalisation discourses evince a number of common characteristics despite certain differences, the diversification discourse shares no features with the other two, that is, it has no overlap with the other two EU discourses. Correspondingly, there are major differences between the diversification discourse, on the one hand, and the liberalisation and integration discourses, on the other.

Table 4.2 Overlaps and differences between the three EU energy discourses in 2004–2009

Criteria	Integration discourse	Liberalisation discourse	Diversification discourse
Overlaps	– With the liberalisation discourse: it shares with it an emphasis on mutual benefits in EU-RF energy relations and a symmetrical understanding of their energy-related interactions	– With the integration discourse: it favours the economic dimension of EU-RF relations and maintains the mutual importance of both actors in their energy-related interactions	– No overlaps with the discourses of integration and liberalisation
Differences	– Unlike in the liberalisation discourse, an important condition for a successful cooperation is not just the liberalisation of markets as such but also a clear institutional and legal framework – The discourse of integration typically accentuates the economic primacy of the EU and the ensuing need for Russia's Europeanisation	– Unlike the integration discourse, it does not advocate a rapprochement between the EU and the RF – The liberalisation discourse adopts the view that the relationship is basically equal, whereby this symmetry is again defined exclusively in economic terms	– The focus of the diversification discourse is on the political impact and the security implications of the EU's energy dependency on Russia – While the integration and liberalisation discourses regard Russia as a reliable energy supplier, the diversification discourse is much more ambiguous in this respect while viewing both actors primarily as rivals

Source: Compiled by the author according to Tichý and Kratochvíl (2014, p. 24)

Finally, Table 4.3 is devoted to the answers to the various discussed questions in each of the energy discourses of the European Union, such as the perception of the RF by the EU, the influence of norms and values in energy relations with Russia on the identity of the EU and their influence on EU interests. Whereas in the integration and liberalisation energy discourses of the EU, a positive perception of Russia prevails together with a significant influence of values and norms on the identity of the EU, which forms its energy interests with regard to Russia, the diversification discourse is dominated by a more negative understanding of Russia with only a limited influence of norms and values on the identity of the EU, which promotes its energy interests in relation to the Russian Federation in this context.

4.5 The Integration Discourse of the EU in 2010–2014

4.5.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Integration Discourse

Although the energy integration discourse of the EU in the period of the second Barroso Commission adopts most of the themes and contents of the preceding

Table 4.3 The perception of the RF and the impact of energy-relation norms and values on the identity and interests of the EU in each of the three discourses in 2004–2009

Type of discourse	Perception of the RF by the EU	Impact of norms and values on EU negotiations in energy relations with the RF	Impact of norms and values on the foreign-policy identity and interests of the EU
Integration	Russia as a strategic business and energy partner	The EU promotes economic norms and values in its energy relations with Russia, and Russia should adopt them in the process of its gradual integration and unilateral approximation to the EU; this should give the mutual energy relations predictability	A significant influence of norms and values on the identity of the EU, which—as a "normative actor"—prefers normative-integrative interests vis-à-vis Russia, with a focus on a positive but asymmetrical energy cooperation which will benefit both parties
Liberalisation	Russia as a reliable business and energy partner	The EU employs liberal-market norms and values to improve its access to Russia's energy market and induce changes in Russia's behaviour, which should contribute to a greater openness of the mutual trade and bring maximum benefits for both parties	Norms and values shape the external identity of the EU, which—as a "normative-rational actor"—stresses its rational-liberalisation interests vis-à-vis Russia in the effort to improve and strengthen the mutual energy cooperation
Diversification	Russia as a problematic energy partner	The EU securitises its energy relations with Russia and employs security norms and values as effective tools with the aim of eliminating potential threats and risks, limiting its energy dependency on Russia and increasing its negotiating power	A limited influence of norms and values on the identity of the EU, which—as a "security-rational actor"—advocates its diversification and security interests vis-à-vis Russia in the effort to diversify transit routes and suppliers and bolster its energy security

Source: Compiled by the author according to Tichý and Kratochvíl (2014, p. 25)

discourse, there are certain differences between the two. First, compared to the EU integration discourse of the first Barroso Commission, a slight weakening of the dominant impact of integration discourse appeared towards the end of the target period due to the political crisis in Ukraine. Second, the EU integration discourse in 2010–2014 partly adjusted the character of the mostly complementary energy interaction of EU and Russia to a relation between two parties that may also have naturally divergent energy interests. And third, there was a slight reduction in the intensity of the previous EU request for the unilateral integration and adaptation of the RF to the EU, while a contrarily greater emphasis was placed on the importance of bilateral accommodation in the sense of mutual integration and the creation of a new framework for EU-RF energy relations, which are characterised by the concept of interdependence.

Nonetheless, both EU integration discourses are imbued with a positive attitude towards EU-RF energy cooperation, as "the European Union has invested much into our strategic partnership with Russia under the conviction that our mutual interest is in energy cooperation" (Barroso 2014a, b) or "Russia and the European Union need to cooperate more in the field of energy . . .", which would help make their relations "stronger and not seen as a threat but rather as an opportunity" (Buzek 2010a, b). The concept of cooperation represents a basic requirement for successful energy integration, as "in relations with Russia, energy cooperation should reflect the integration of our economies" (Council of the European Union 2013a, p. 10; see also Barroso 2014a, b; Oettinger 2010a).

Likewise, both EU integration discourses stress the importance of Russia for EU's energy sector, as, for example, "Russia is our most important external supplier of energy resources" (Oettinger 2010a, 2013a, 2014a). Oettinger (2011a) notes, however, that the RF is not merely a producer and exporter of oil, gas, coal, uranium and electrical energy without any deeper connection to the European Union but rather that it is "a key [strategic] energy partner of the EU . . ." (see also Council of the European Union 2011a, p. 10; De Gucht 2012a, b; Barroso 2014a).

The emphasis on the RF's strategic position as main energy partner is then linked throughout the EU integration discourse with the term "partnership", which highlights the country's importance to the energy policy of the EU while also clearly characterising the relationship of both parties. This positive state of strategic partnership is nothing new. On the contrary, Van Rompuy (2013a, b) confirmed this when he stressed that "we have long historical (energy) relations with the RF", while Oettinger (2014b) concluded that "we have developed a close [energy] partnership since the time of the Cold War" (see also Füle 2014a; European Commission 2013), noting that this interest remained valid in present times when the EU "endeavors to deepen the strategic partnership with the RF in the field of energy" (Van Rompuy 2012a, b; Ashton 2012a; Barroso 2013a; Buzek 2010a) and "there is the potential for further expansion of our energy partnership" (Van Rompuy 2011a, b).

Thus on the one hand, the 2010–2014 integration discourse follows on the previous discourse from the first Barroso Commission by stressing the specific relationship between the EU and the RF and the positive potential of their interaction, with that energy cooperation should continue to be systematically developed towards a mutual, symmetrical partnership that "brings both parties joint economic advantages and benefits" (Barroso 2012a, 2013a, b). Besides this utilitarian understanding of EU-Russian partnership, the EU integration discourse also applies a regulatory approach, which stipulates that the energy partnership between the two actors must be primarily based on "the development of a reliable, transparent, and principled framework for mutual energy cooperation" (Council of the European Union 2011b, p 4; see also Schulz 2013; Ashton 2013a, b; Van Rompuy 2010a, b), which should "prevent future energy crises between the EU and Russia" (Oettinger 2010b, c) in combination with an updated version of the early warning mechanism.

On the other hand, as is evidenced by the analysed documents and speeches, both of the EU integration discourses diverge in certain characteristic features related to the cooperative framework of EU-RF energy relations. First, compared to the

previous EU integration discourse, the 2010–2014 integration discourse pays much greater attention both to the complementary aspect of energy relations and to the fact that the two actors are in different positions, which impacts the overall character of energy interactions. This was confirmed, among others, by Oettinger (2013a), when he pointed out that "... our energy relations were not always simple in past years ...", "which is also because the EU and the RF have different energy interests, which cannot always have a common denominator" (Oettinger 2010b). The point was taken even further by Barroso (2013a), who declared that the energy issue "sometimes causes tension in our relations". Barroso (2013a) sees the cause for this in the fact that "our goals in the field of energy were not ... completely intelligible to our Russian partners"; however, "our interest is to explain these actualities and to normalize relations with Russia" (Ušackas 2014a).

Second, the EU integration discourse of the second Barroso Commission differs from its predecessor in a greater focus on the question of bilateral relations of member states with the RF, which disrupt EU efforts to approach energy interactions in a unified manner. Ashton sees the main trouble in that "Russia prefers to negotiate with individual EU member states" and "never deviates from the strong bilateral relations it has" (Ashton 2010a), and "if we maintain 28 different positions, Putin's strategy of 'divide et impera' can be much more successful towards the EU" (Oettinger 2014b). The response to this problem, according to Schulz, must be the EU's resolve to "finally develop a coherent strategy with regard to the RF and to negotiate with a unified voice" (Schulz 2014; see also Valenzuela 2011a).

Another measure with regard to the increasing number of "problems between the EU and the RF in connection with energy" is "to ensure legal clarity" (European Commission 2013, p. 9), which is understood to mean a legislative arrangement in the form of "the negotiation of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement", which "will go beyond WTO rules" (Ashton 2013a) and further extend the boundaries of "measures contained in the present agreements" (Council of the European Union 2010, p. 3; see also Valenzuela 2011b). Negotiations of a new energy agreement "must address fundamental topics, such as access to energy sources, ... reciprocity, crisis prevention, and cooperation, ..." (European Commission 2011, p. 8), although, as a 2013 document of the Commission (2013, p. 9) notes, "the attitude of either party to the energy chapter ... of the new agreement differs", but "we trust that a specific pragmatic solution can be found" (Barroso 2012a, b).

EU-RF energy relations are also regulated by the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, which "contributes significantly to the building of mutual trust between the EU and Russia in the strategically import sector of energy" (Oettinger 2010c; see also Council of the European Union 2012a, p. 4). The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, "as an implement of the mutual convergence of our legislation and standards in the field of energy" (Oettinger 2010c; Füle 2013a), accomplished a number of joint achievements, including the approval of an "updated early warning mechanism, the Roadmap of EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050, the goal of which is to create a pan-European energy space ... and to establish an EU-Russia gas advisory body" (Council of the European Union 2011b, p. 4; see also European Commission 2011, p. 8). That is to say, both a symmetry of benefits and a symmetry of mutual

convergence of the EU and the RF, which demonstrates another considerable shift from the integration discourse of the previous period, which emphasised unilateral adaptation.

Energy cooperation on the institutional level is newly also accomplished via the Partnership for Modernisation, which provides a framework for "the support of specific projects in the field of energy between the EU and the RF" (Oettinger 2010c) and "I trust that it will give a new impetus to our relations and will help develop our cooperation in trade, economics, and energy" (Van Rompuy 2010a, 2012a, b). The Partnership for Modernisation is based partly on the process of gradual integration, that is, Russia's adaptation in the form of modernisation where "it will be useful for our partnership for the modernisation of Russia to take place . . ." (Van Rompuy 2010a), for example, with regard to "energy effectiveness and nuclear technologies" (Van Rompuy 2011b), yet at the same time, Oettinger declares that "modernisation is important for the EU" if it "can help with the mutual convergence of the Russian and EU energy sectors" (Oettinger 2012).

The last base theme of the energy integration discourse is the lasting mutual dependence of the EU and Russia, where "energy trade is a sector where we are strongly interdependent" and the EU and the RF are "the main interdependent partners in the field of energy" (Ušackas 2014b). The state of (energy) interdependence is explained similarly to the previous period, simply as a relationship in which "the RF needs our energy markets just as much as we need its oil and gas" (Füle 2012; Ashton 2013a; Barroso 2012a), or "the Russians want to supply gas and oil, and we will pay them for it. That is the reason for our mutual dependence" (Oettinger 2014c), with that it is important that "this mutual dependence will be retained into the future" (Ušackas 2013, 2014a; see also Buzek 2011a).

4.5.2 The Impact of the Norms of the Integration Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the EU in Its Relations to Russia

As in the case of the previous EU integration discourse, the discourse in 2010–2014 also evinces the existence and impact of norms and values, which determine EU behaviour with regard to Russia, when, for example, "seeing that . . . the EU energy policy in accordance with the principle of conditionality should include the RF . . . under the assumption that the basic founding values of the Union will be shared and promoted" then the European Parliament (2012) "calls upon the Commission to place its main emphasis in energy relations with the RF on the upholding of European norms . . ." The same document emphasises elsewhere that the EU is "resolved to further deepen and develop its [energy] relations with the RF and to fulfil the principles of partnership on the basis . . . of the emphatic advancement of universal values and principles" (European Parliament 2012), which was confirmed by Schulz (2012), who noted that "we are striving to build good energy relations

with the RF, founded on trust and respect for our shared values and rules" (but also Oettinger 2012).

These norms, rules and values have a decisive impact on the foreign-policy identity of the EU as a "normative actor" that uses normative tools to promote its own, mainly economic norms, values and rules, which the RF should accommodate. Thus, for example, Barroso (2014c) can demand that "Russia must respect international norms and values" with regard to energy, and Oettinger (2011b, 2012) can claim that "the Russian economy needs to reform . . . and open its energy sector".

At the same time in the context of this identity, the EU uses tools such as EU rules, norms and values in energy relations with the RF with mostly normative-integrative interests with the aim of ensuring the integration and convergence of Russia and the EU and of achieving stability and predictability in their mutual energy cooperation. This was confirmed, among others, by Ashton (2011a, 2012b) in one of her speeches, in which she clearly stresses that the EU's interest is a "close cooperation with Russia in the energy sector" with the goal of achieving "full integration of the RF into an international rule-based system" because "transparency and predictability are key to good economic, energy, and political relations" (Füle 2010a).

Additionally, the 2010–2014 EU energy integration discourse is all the more aware, in line with its normative-integrative interests, that "the energy policies of the EU and the RF differ" (Council of the European Union 2013b, p. 10) and that "Russia sees the expansion of Union rules, values, and norms as a potentially contentious issue because these rules, values, and norms are not always identical with the interests of the RF" (Füle 2013a, see also Schulz 2012). Therefore, compared to the previous period, the EU as a "normative actor" places much greater emphasis in its integration discourse on integration in the sense of a mutual and symmetrical convergence with the RF "founded on mutual values, bilateral interests, mutual benefits, and mutual respect" (Barroso 2012a) within the framework of modernisation as a process of "the transformation of energy interaction from a purely supplier-consumer relation to more technology-based energy cooperation" (Council of the European Union 2013b, p. 10) or to the transition from "a partnership of necessity to a partnership of choice" through the "negotiation of a new partnership agreement . . ." (Barroso 2014c; De Gucht 2012b).

4.6 The Liberalisation Discourse of the EU in 2010–2014

4.6.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Liberalisation Discourse

The energy liberalisation discourse of the European Union in the period of 2010–2014 also continues all of the main themes, content and structure of the preceding EU discourse of the first Barroso Commission. On the one hand, concurrently with the previous period, the liberalisation discourse of the second Barroso

Commission mainly prioritises the trade and economy aspects of EU-RF energy interactions, implemented through the process of maximum liberalisation in the sense of the greatest possible accessibility of both parties' energy sectors and markets, which should yield mutual benefits and economic advantages.

On the other hand, compared to the years 2004–2009, the EU liberalisation discourse in 2010–2014 introduces three minor shifts. First, the discourse takes much greater note of the importance of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization and the latter's positive influence on the liberalisation of energy cooperation between the EU and the RF. Second, the liberalisation discourse newly places much greater emphasis on the reform and modernisation of the Russian energy sector. And third, the discourse partly abandons the topic of the RF's acceptance of the Energy Charter Treaty and instead discusses Russia's negative attitude to the so-called third liberalisation package, which represents an equally contentious issue in mutual energy relations.

Despite these minor transformations, the foundation of the EU liberalisation discourse in the years 2010–2014 remains the same as in the previous period—the conviction that the creation of a fully functional and interconnected internal energy market within the EU together with the expansion of the norms and rules of liberalisation (or a liberalised energy market) outside the borders of the EU will help secure energy supplies, improve competition and predictability and strengthen energy relations between the EU and Russia (European Council 2011a, b; Barroso 2013a; Oettinger 2013a, b; see also Ušackas 2014b; De Gucht 2014a). This was confirmed, among others, by Barroso, who claimed that "the reality is such that within an open, interconnected and competitive EU energy market, Russian energy supplies will continue to play a very important role" (Barroso 2013a; Van Rompuy 2011c).

The EU energy liberalisation discourse focuses on the trade and economy aspects of EU-RF energy cooperation and emphasises the mutual importance of both actors, with that "the EU energy market—the largest in the world—offers major trade opportunities for Russian companies, and Russia ... will continue to be the main energy supplier for Europe" (Barroso 2013b; see also Füle 2014b; Valenzuela 2011a; Council of the European Union 2011a) because the RF has "a unique and important role in the European market" (European Commission 2011, p. 8; see also Schulz 2012) and the EU is prepared to "further develop and deepen energy relations with Russia" (Oettinger 2010a, b, but also Buzek 2011a). This relationship between the EU and the RF clearly points to the fact that the EU liberalisation discourse stresses symmetry over an asymmetrical position within EU-RF energy interactions.

As in the case of the 2004–2009 discourse, the liberalisation discourse claims that energy cooperation in the EU-RF relations should be based on the existence of free market principles and a new binding agreement, which would form the basic requirements for the successful liberalisation of the energy sectors of the EU and Russia. This was confirmed by Ashton, who declared that the complex new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement would be "beneficial both to our political cooperation and industry dialogues, such as the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, and to our business and investment relations" (Ashton 2012a), with that "negotiations on the energy chapter in the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement must be fully

compatible with Union regulations of the internal energy market" (Council of the European Union 2013a, p. 10) and "should be based on free market principles" (Ashton 2012a; see also Ušackas 2014b), which "will allow us to continue the process of liberalisation" (Oettinger 2013a).

Besides a binding agreement, the liberalisation of EU and Russian energy cooperation should also be impacted by new economic advantages for both actors caused by the Russian Federation's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which the EU "has strongly supported for a long time" (Barroso 2013c, De Gucht 2012b, c) because "this step will help us create a much more reliable legal environment, not just in the energy sector" (Van Rompuy 2011b), and it will "contribute to better economic and energy relations of Russia on the European continent" (Oettinger 2012; Füle 2010a; De Gucht 2011a). At the same time, according to De Gucht (2011b, 2012a, b), "Russia's accession to the WTO would strengthen the multilateral trading system in the energy sector as well", which would further enhance the "international competitiveness of the Russian economy and significantly reinforce the trust of traders and investors"; even greater liberalisation of trade with Russia—also for other commodities—would "further open up access to this huge market to European companies" in the EU (see also Ashton 2012a; Barroso 2012c). In other words, De Gucht (2012c) reckons that WTO principles "could create a more predictable business and investment environment in the Russian Federation", which would, in return, "support domestic and foreign investment into the energy sector, among others", with that these investments would also "help transform the Russian economy and energy sector through the support of technology, innovation, and growth transfer".

The liberalisation framework is directly related to specific measures, namely, the demand for reform and modernisation in the sense of the creation of maximum openness and the full liberalisation of the energy market and sector in the European Union and Russia, which "presents a challenge both for the EU and for the RF" (Oettinger 2012; see also De Gucht 2012c). For example, Oettinger (2012) claims that "the further development of reforms on the Russian gas and electricity markets and clear information on the available capacities for the production of oil and gas will improve the investment climate for European companies in the RF". Likewise, both the EU and Russia will profit from a "market pricing policy that takes into account the interests of both suppliers and buyers" (Oettinger 2012). Besides successful reform, "the Russian and Union energy sector is faced with the need for modernization" (Oettinger 2010c), which together with an "improved investment and business climate and augmented mutual access to energy markets" (Füle 2010a, b) represents one of the main challenges or priorities of the Partnership for Modernisation between the EU and the RF, and "Russia needs EU support in its process of modernising the energy sector" (Van Rompuy 2011b, 2012c).

Contrarily, if the RF would not reform and modernise its energy market and sector, De Gucht (2012c) claims it would have serious problems due to "the strong dependence of the Russian economy on the export of energy resources to the Europena Union" (Oettinger 2014b). At the same time "it is clear that the less Russia reforms its energy sector, the harder it will be for international firms to operate in the Russian energy market, and such an approach would discourage future foreign investments" (De Gucht 2012c).

Last but not least, the set of proposals for the liberalisation of energy cooperation between the EU and Russia with an emphasis on improving both actors' access to mutual energy markets includes transparency and investment protection, when, for example, the EU and the RF "have a common interest in energy relations" to "mutually protect our investment and to create and ensure a high level of investment protection" (Oettinger 2012; Van Rompuy 2011a). Similarly, Oettinger (2010d, 2012) notes that "the gradual removal of obstacles to entry into the Russian gas sector would be an important step in the building of mutual trust and the strengthening of energy cooperation" (see also De Gucht 2012c), with that it should be based on common expectations because "if Russian companies rightly expect transparency and open market conditions in the EU, we should expect the same conditions for European firms in the energy market of the Russian Federation" (Oettinger 2012).

Nonetheless, the European Union's concept of the system and functionality of the energy market naturally differs in some regards compared to Russia. One example of such divergent interests, the relevance of which significantly decreased in comparison to the previous period of 2004–2009, can be seen in the Energy Charter Treaty[3], which Buzek claims should "become the basis of EU and Russian energy relations" (Buzek 2010b) and whose "principles should be reflected by the new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Russia" (Ashton 2010a, b). Nonetheless, as is intimated by a 2014 document of the Council of the European Union, the RF "retracted the provisional application of the ECT and announced that it does not intend to ratify the treaty" (Council of the European Union 2014a, p. 6).

The different approaches of the EU and the RF are probably most visible in the new EU liberalisation discourse on the example of the so-called third liberalisation package, which regulated the EU market with the aim to "create a competitive, open, and interconnected European electricity and gas market" (Van Rompuy 2012a; see also Valenzuela 2011c; Ušackas 2014c; European Council 2014). This was confirmed, among others, by Barroso, who stated that "the EU and Russia have a different opinion of the third liberalisation package" (Barroso 2011a, b; Oettinger 2012), with that the Russian Federation "mainly considers discriminatory what is called ownership unbundling, that is, the proprietary separation of production capacities from the transmission and distribution of energies" (Ušackas 2014c, d), and it "devotes much time to lobbying for its change" (Ashton 2012b).

However, according to Barroso, "the third liberalisation package is fully compatible with the rules and norms of the World Trade Organisation" and "is nondiscriminatory" (Barroso 2011a) because "the applicable rules are the same for everyone—for European firms just as much as for Russian and American companies" (Valenzuela 2011d). In other words, "the third liberalisation package ensures equal treatment to all the entities in the market, including Russian companies" (Van Rompuy 2012a), which it provides with new opportunities to "expand their presence in the internal energy market of the EU" (Valenzuela 2011c).

[3]In 2009 the process of modernising the Energy Charter Treaty was launched with the aim of increasing its attractiveness and relevance.

4.6.2 *The Impact of the Norms of the Liberalisation Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the EU in Its Relations to Russia*

As in the case of the previous EU liberalisation discourse, the discourse in the years 2010–2014 also evinces the impact of normativity and rationality on the formation of the external identity of the EU and its energy relations with the RF. In this context, the norms, rules and values that regulate business and energy relations with Russia should, on the one hand, bring the EU economic advantages, thus shifting the EU's identity towards that of a "rational actor", when, for example, "the advantages of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization to the EU are clearly apparent: European exporters will have easier access to our fourth biggest export market", or "a more predictable regulatory environment will help many European energy companies that have invested in the energy market of the RF" (De Gucht 2012c, p. 3, 2012b; Oettinger 2012). At the same time, according to De Gucht, "the EU must strive to remove all obstacles to the Russian energy market" because "over a longer timescale, the EU can only gain greater income from a more stable energy sector of the RF" (De Gucht 2012c; Füle 2013b).

On the other hand, in the context of the requirement of "ensuring a fully functional, competitive, and stable internal market with energies" (Ušackas 2014b, d) in its liberalisation discourse, the EU shares the identity of the "normative actor", based on EU norms, rules and values, which it promotes towards the RF in an effort to create a legal environment for their mutual energy relations. This was confirmed, among others, by Füle (2010a), who claimed that the basic goal of the EU is to "bind the RF with the international rules and norms of the WTO", or Ušackas (2014c), who stressed that the EU "is now creating a common energy market based on norms and rules that include the so-called third liberalisation package" because if "we manage to bring our energy markets together" (European Commission 2011, p. 8) and "converge the rules on which our individual energy markets function, our energy relations will be simpler" (Oettinger 2010c, d; Council of the European Union 2014b).

In other words, the liberalisation discourse shows the influence of norms and values on the external identity of the EU, which as a "rational-normative actor" in relation to the RF rationally uses tools in the form of economic and liberal-market norms and rules to improve its access to the Russian energy market and to provoke changes in Russia's behaviour, which should lead to greater openness of economic competition and provide the greatest benefits to both parties. For example, Barroso declares that in the context of "our common interest in maintaining a stable energy market to support economic competition and prevent monopolisation" (Barroso 2013a), "Russia should accept the values and principles of a liberalised market" and "ensure easier access of European firms to its energy market" (Ušackas 2014c) because "transparent conditions can provide maximum benefit to both parties" (Oettinger 2012; Ashton 2011a, b; Buzek 2011b).

At the same time, in the context of this identity, the EU emphasises rational-liberalisational interests in its energy relations with the RF with the strategic aim of

achieving a highly liberalised energy market and modernising Russia's energy sector when "our common goal is to have open, transparent, and predictable energy markets" (Barroso 2013c), which "create new opportunities and bring greater competition to energy prices" (Ušackas 2014c, e). Likewise, further liberalisation of the Russian market and modernisation of the energy sector means that the RF can "optimise the social economic benefits gained from the export of energies, and the EU can increase competitiveness in its energy market" (European Commission 2011, p. 8), and so "the RF needs to reflect this development and adapt its attitudes to be more flexible in its approach to buyers and more competitive with regards to prices" (Oettinger 2013a).

4.7 The Diversification Discourse of the EU in 2010–2014

4.7.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Diversification Discourse

Finally, the third EU discourse in the years 2010–2014, that is, energy diversification, adopts all of the main themes, content and characteristic features of the previous period of 2004–2009. As in the case of the diversification discourse of the first Barroso Commission, the EU discourse of the second Barroso Commission is represented both by security rhetoric regarding the energy vulnerability of the EU and the need to reduce its energy dependence on major suppliers, especially the RF, and in the context of these facts also the necessity of enhancing EU energy security, as one of the core pillars of EU energy policy, through the application of security norms and the implementation of a number of measures.

On the other hand, the EU's choice of tools for reducing import dependence and increasing its own energy security testify to a certain shift between the diversification discourses of the two period, as the 2010–2014 discourse places much more emphasis on the importance on internal energy market connections and on closer ties with Africa, and it newly advocates energy cooperation with the USA. Concurrently, influenced by the lasting instability of Ukraine and deteriorating relations with the RF,[4] the EU diversification discourse gained much great prominence and importance towards the end of the second period, which is expressed with much greater openness and frankness by political representatives of the EU in communication with Russia compared to the previous period, which has placed both actors in a position of greater rivalry or even hostility.

The base frame of the EU diversification discourse is the question of energy security, which the EU and Russia have different opinions about. One example can be the negotiations regarding the construction of the South Stream Pipeline, which the RF presented as an important project to improve EU energy security in the process of

[4]For more on the subject, see Chap 2.4, of this monograph.

transmission line diversification. Contrarily, although the EU does "not condemn South Stream" (Valenzuela 2012), "nor does block" (Oettinger 2010a, b, 2014d) the Russian project, "the South Stream Pipeline is not our top priority" (Oettinger 2011a; Barroso 2011b) because "it does not mean more gas from Russia but a greater transmission volume via a pipeline that does not go through Ukraine" (Oettinger 2014e; Ušackas 2014f). Furthermore, "South Stream constitutes competition to the Nabucco Pipeline" (Oettinger 2010b; see also Valenzuela 2012; Barroso 2011c).

As in the previous period, the EU diversification discourse in the years 2010–2014 grows in strength and intensity mainly during energy crises, which negatively influence relations with Russia and contribute to the process of energy securitisation as a security theme, where Oettinger (2014c) claims that "the question of energy security has again become a policy and security priority of the EU as a consequence of the gas crisis between the RF and Ukraine" (Oettinger 2014c) in January 2009. Although there were no breaks in Russian energy supplies to the EU in the 2010–2014 period, experience with previous crises is a major factor in the diversification discourse of the period, which moves the rhetoric from the previously emphasised interdependence to a unilateral energy dependence of the EU to Russia, when, for example, "the partial disruption of gas supplies in the winters of 2006 and 2009 showed us …" (Barroso 2014d) how the EU is "strongly dependent on external energy supplies" (Van Rompuy 2014a; Oettinger 2014b), especially "the import of gas from Russia" (Oettinger 2014f), and "in 2020 its energy dependence on the RF will grow even more" (Oettinger 2014f).

At the same time, this factor is closely connected to the vital need for further improvements to energy security. This was confirmed by Van Rompuy, who stressed that "the previous gas conflicts between the RF and transit countries influenced EU imports" (Van Rompuy 2011d), as a consequence of which "we implemented structural measures on the European Union level with the aim of strengthening energy security" (Van Rompuy 2011a; Barroso 2010).

Bearing these facts in mind, the EU diversification discourse promotes a set of tools and measures that must be taken with the aim of improving EU energy security. First, the EU needs a "pragmatic strategy of energy security", which "will help soften impacts and reduce energy dependence in the short-term" (European Commission 2014a, p. 2). Second, a key prerequisite to energy security improvements is also a "more collective approach" that is founded on the greater importance of "completing a fully functional, sustainable, and competitive internal market for electricity and gas" (Oettinger 2012), together with the call for "increasing investments into new infrastructure and connecting existing transmission lines" (Buzek 2011b, c, 2012) and for "more intense cooperation on both the regional and the pan-European level, newly within the Energy Union" (European Commission 2014a, p. 2; Ashton 2011b). Third, in the process of securing energy security, the EU needs "a more cohesive approach to foreign policy and much greater utilisation of foreign policy tools", which is meant as the "systematic inclusion of energy in meeting agendas, especially on the highest level with strategic partners" (European Commission 2014a, p. 2), such as "Libya, Algeria, Egypt, or Nigeria, who supply us with gas in the form of LNG" (Barroso 2012b; see also Buzek 2010c; Oettinger 2014e) and with whom "we will continue to develop

energy cooperation" (Barroso 2012b, pp. 2–3); and "we ask the RF to respect our choice of energy cooperation with the countries in these regions" (Oettinger 2012, but also Council of the European Union 2012b).

Another of the tools for ensuring energy security, that is, the process of diversification, consists of the EU's openness to countries of Central Asia, the region surrounding the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf states as "the main suppliers of gas for the Southern Gas Corridor" (Oettinger 2011a), which "the EU strongly supports" (Van Rompuy 2012d; Ashton 2014; Oettinger 2011c, d) because "it focuses on the diversification of transmission lines, sources, and suppliers" and "we need to diversify to exclude the possible danger of disruptions of gas supplies from Russia" (Oettinger 2011a; Barroso 2011c). Within the Southern Gas Corridor, the EU then plans to "focus on new routes—gas pipelines, such as Nabucco, ITGI, TAP, and White Stream—and LNG projects" (Oettinger 2011a; see also Buzek 2010d; Barroso 2014c), which are, however, "not aimed against the Russian Federation or Russian companies in any way" (Oettinger 2012, 2014c).

Serious damage to energy relations between the EU and Russia came in 2014 as a consequence of the continued political and military instability of Ukraine and Russia's involvement throughout the crisis, which also affects EU energy security. Whereas under the first Barroso Commission, the EU and the RF were "mere" competitors for resources and transmission lines, during 2014 the crisis in Ukraine caused this attitude to change to that of political and security rivalry or even "hostility" between the two actors, which endangers the very essence of the energy interdependent relations of the EU and the RF. This change is evident in two cases.

First, the perception of Russia. For example, in 2013 Oettinger (2013a) claimed that "the RF has been our main supplier for many decades . . .", and although it "has been changing slightly in recent times with the increasing share of Norway and LNG", the RF will continue to be an important and reliable partner. Contrarily, in 2014 Barroso (2014e) emphasised that Russian actions and behaviour in the field of energy was unacceptable and that "the RF must choose whether it wants to be a strategic energy partner, or a rival". If it elects the second option, to "be a rival, then we would all have to collectively take political, economic, and security measures" (Barroso 2014e), and "the RF will face sanctions in the energy sector" (European Parliament 2014a, p. 7).

Second, the EU's relationship to Russia, which is directly related to the perception of Russia. Whereas in 2012 Oettinger (2012) claimed that "I do not think that the European Union is all that dependent on supplies of Russian gas", and so "we do not have to worry about the increasing volume of Russian gas coming into the EU" (Oettinger 2013a). Two years later, in 2014, a number of European Commission members called for the urgent reduction of the EU's energy dependence on the RF, when, for example, Füle (2014c, d), Van Rompuy (2014b), even Barroso (2014f), or Oettinger (2014g) clearly stressed the need to "focus on how to reduce energy dependence on Russia and how to hasten the reduction of this dependence, which is a priority for the EU", as "the situation in Ukraine and tension with the RF may have a very negative impact on EU energy security".

Apart from the aforementioned measures, Oettinger (2014e) stated that "the situation in Ukraine is an important argument for us to make better use of our own resources, including shale gas" and develop "energy cooperation with the USA for the supply of gas". The US's importance for EU energy security was emphasised by Van Rompuy, who said that "it is important for us see that together with our American partners we can reduce our dependence on Russian gas" (Van Rompuy 2014c, p. 3), but also by De Gucht (2014b, c), who voiced the requirement that the EU receive a guarantee that it "will be able to buy American gas, which will help us when negotiating with the RF".

Apart from that, the European Parliament (2014b, p. 6) stressed that the only suitable way for the EU to "react to the Russian threat" in the Ukrainian crisis is for "member states to keep together and act as one with regard to the RF" and by "a radical improvement of the energy security of the EU, its independence and resistance to external pressure through the consolidation of the energy sector". At the same time, the European Parliament (2014b, p. 6) recommended that the EU should re-evaluate its energy relations with the RF and "create a new, unified approach to Russia, including a strong, shared external energy policy" (European Parliament 2014b, p. 6). This measure can be seen as a slight intimation of the de-escalation of deteriorating energy relations between the EU and the RF, which was further reiterated by Füle (2014e), who noted that "with regard to the medium-term and long-term perspective, the EU and the RF will have to continue building their relations on common interests with the aim of entering a dialogue, especially regarding trade and investments, energy . . ."

4.7.2 The Impact of the Norms of the Diversification Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the EU in Its Relations to Russia

As in the years 2004–2009, the EU diversification discourse in 2010–2014—influenced by security risks and threats, especially the military and political crisis in Ukraine—evinces the development of an EU identity of "security actor", which securitises energy as a security topic in relations with the RF even more than in the preceding period. This was confirmed by Oettinger (2014c): "We want strong and stable partnerships with major energy suppliers, such as the RF, but we cannot become the victims of political and energy blackmail" (European Commission 2014b) as the result of "the unilateral policy of the RF towards Ukraine" (Füle 2014f), which can threaten the EU in the form of a "doubled increase in gas prices" (European Parliament 2014a) and "the disruption of energy supplies to Ukraine" (Oettinger 2014c).

This process of considerable securitisation of EU energy relations with the RF is carried out in several ways. First, by emphasising that "the Ukrainian crisis has strongly reminded us of our vulnerability with regard to our import dependence on the RF" (European Commission 2014c; Schulz 2014) because "6 member states are 100% dependent on the RF" (Oettinger 2014f). Second, by expressing "discontent

with the behaviour of the RF as an unreliable energy partner to the EU" (Ušackas 2014g) and by condemning the fact that "Russia uses energy as a means of pressure in the Ukrainian crisis" and that Putin "sent a letter to the leaders of 18 European states", which "we consider to be an unacceptable threat aimed against EU energy security" (European Parliament 2014a). Third, by repeatedly voicing concern about "other threatening scenarios that Russia could use to exert pressure on member states and test their resistance, such as the application of threats regarding energy supplies" (European Parliament 2014b), which could have "a negative impact on EU energy security" and cause "severe damage to the economies of member states by limiting gas from their energy mix" (Oettinger 2014e). Fourth, by taking measures in relation to the RF, whether in the form of "initiating antitrust procedures against Gazprom" (Oettinger 2013a) or the imposition of "economic sanctions on the financial, energy, and military sectors of Russia" (European Parliament 2014b; Füle 2014g). And finally, five, by repeatedly emphasising the need to "reduce the energy dependence of the European Union on the Russian Federation and continue with diversification" (Ušackas 2014g).

On the other hand, the diversification discourse shows the influence of a rational approach on the EU identity, which—as a "rational actor"—employs its economic advantages towards the RF in the effort to ensure energy security, when "a functioning market improves energy security" and "the EU energy market is more important to the RF than the Russian energy market to the EU" (Oettinger 2012). Oettinger (2013a) stressed that the EU is "the most attractive market for export from Russia, whose budget is highly dependent on income from energy exports to the EU", which is the reason why "we have in recent months very firmly emphasised that energy must not be abused as a political weapon and that if someone does so, they must expect a countereffect" (Barroso 2014d).

The EU's identity as a "security-rational actor" in the diversification discourse is formed with the help of security norms and values, which it uses rationally as normative-offensive tools in the process of the securitisation of energy relations with the Russian Federation in the effort to minimise or eliminate potential threats and risks, to limit its energy dependency on Russia and to bolster its negotiating power. At the same time, this identity forms and influences the security-diversification interests of the EU, which uses these tools rationally with the goal of diversifying transit routes, sources and suppliers and strengthening its energy security. For example, "in the context of the present crisis between the RF and Ukraine" (Oettinger 2014e), the EU endeavours to "act on the Union level and with a unified voice when negotiating with the RF" (European Commission 2014a), which "must respect the market rules, regulations, and norms of the EU while building the South Stream Pipeline" (Oettinger 2011a), which together with efforts to "diversify energy sources and the effort to develop a common Union energy policy" (European Parliament 2014a) will contribute to greater negotiation strength and security of the European Union and reduced dependence on the Russian Federation. However, "mutual dependence ... and the payment for gas with European money is just as important for the Russians because it is a key factor of their national budget and the expenses for financing specific tasks. And that is the reason why I am convinced that no one wants to use gas as a weapon ..." (Oettinger 2014e).

4.8 A Comparison of the EU Discourses in 2010–2014 and 2004–2009

Table 4.4 provides an overview of the main themes of the EU energy discourses of integration, liberalisation and diversification in the years 2010–2014, which again clearly confirm the main features of all three EU energy discourses. Compared to Table 4.1, which summarised the main themes of the three EU discourses in 2004–2009, Table 4.4 contains two fundamental differences. First, Table 4.4 shows the overall increase in the number of themes in all three EU energy discourses, which attests to the greater diversity and richness of the integration, liberalisation and diversification discourses of the EU in the years 2010–2014. Second, the majority of the energy themes from this period were continued from Table 4.1 and supplemented with two or three new themes, which appeared in the analysed EU documents, speeches, public statements and discussions of political representatives of the EU.

Table 4.4 The main themes of the three energy discourses of the EU in 2010–2014

Integration discourse	Liberalisation discourse	Diversification discourse
– Emphasis on mutual economic benefits – Emphasis on the terms "partnership", "relations" and "cooperation", which highlight the symmetrical character of the two actors – Preference for an institutional and legal framework in the form of the PCA, the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue and the Partnership for Modernisation as important conditions for a successful cooperation – Maintaining integrity in negotiations with Russia – A focus on integration in the sense of the mutual convergence/approximation in the modernisation of the EU and RF energy sectors – Emphasis on the mutual energy connectedness, that is, the interdependence of the EU and the Russian Federation	– A focus on the economic and trade aspects of the EU-RF energy relations and the economic benefits and profits they provide – The idea of a fully functioning and interconnected internal energy market – Emphasis on a legal framework and market principles in energy relations – The importance of the Russian membership in the WTO and its influence on the liberalisation of the EU-RF energy cooperation – A focus on liberalisation in the sense of the reform and modernisation of the Russian and EU energy sectors and markets – A focus on liberalised and transparent energy relations and mutual access to the energy markets in the RF and the EU – Emphasis on the third liberalisation package	– Emphasis on the external aspects of energy policy and the need to ensure and strengthen energy security – A focus on energy crises and their security impact on EU energy security with regard to Russia – The move towards a greater securitisation of the energy relations with Russia as a security issue – A view of the RF as a rival that can use energy sources as a political instrument – Emphasis on reducing the undue energy dependency of the EU on Russia – The push for the diversification of energy sources, suppliers (the USA, African countries) and alternative transit routes and lines (the Southern Gas Corridor)

Source: Compiled by the author according to Kratochvíl and Tichý (2013, p. 399)

Table 4.5 Overlaps and differences between the 2004–2009 and 2010–2014 versions of the three EU energy discourses

Criteria	EU integration discourses	EU liberalisation discourses	EU diversification discourses
Differences	– The 1st integration discourse differs from the 2nd in its emphasis on the mostly complementary character of the energy interactions, its disregard for the different interests of both actors and its push for the asymmetrical approximation of Russia to EU rules – The 2nd integration discourse differs from the 1st in its greater focus on solving the problem of the bilateral RF relations with individual EU member states, which damage the integrity and unified stance of the EU, and also in its greater emphasis on mutual and symmetrical integration—the convergence of the EU and the RF	– The 1st liberalisation discourse mainly differs from the 2nd in its much greater emphasis on Russia's acceptance of the Energy Charter Treaty – The 2nd liberalisation discourse mainly differs from the 1st in its emphasis on the importance of Russia's accession to the WTO, its much greater emphasis on the reform and modernisation of the Russian energy sector and newly in its discussion of the negative attitude of the RF toward the so-called third liberalisation package	– The 1st diversification discourse mainly differs from the 2nd in its much greater emphasis on the implementation of the EU gas pipeline project Nabucco – The 2nd diversification discourse mainly differs from the 1st in its greater emphasis on the importance and necessity of a fully functional, interconnected internal energy market, in its promotion of closer energy relations with African countries and newly in its advocacy of the EU-US energy cooperation for gas supplies
Overlaps	– Both discourses emphasise the positive potential of and specific connection between the European Union and the Russian Federation – Both discourses highlight the mutual benefits and advantages of the energy cooperation – Both discourses stress the need for a legislative and institutionalised framework of the mutual energy relations based on interdependence	– Both discourses focus on the economy and trade aspects of the energy relations and the related profits – Both discourses emphasise a fully functional and interconnected internal energy market – Both discourses focus on liberalised and transparent energy relations and the two actors' mutual access to each other's energy markets	– Both discourses place a matching importance on the need to ensure and strengthen energy security – Both discourses agree on the need to reduce the EU's undue energy dependence on the RF – Both discourses emphasise the need to diversify transit lines, sources and suppliers

Source: Compiled by the author

Table 4.4 is closely connected to Table 4.5, which charts the overlaps and differences between the energy discourses of liberalisation, integration and diversification in the years 2004–2009 and 2010–2014. Table 4.5 clearly shows that all three 2010–2014 EU discourses mostly match the content of the previous three discourses from 2004 to 2009 and diverge only in certain aspects.

Table 4.6 The perception of the RF and the impact of energy-relation norms and values on the identity and interests of the EU in each of the three discourses in 2010–2014

Type of discourse	Perception of the RF by the EU	Impact of norms and values on EU negotiations in energy relations with the RF	Impact of norms and values on the foreign-policy identity and interests of the EU
Integration	Russia as a strategically important partner and a major energy supplier with partly different interests	The EU promotes economic norms and values in its energy relations with Russia, which Russia should adopt in the process of mutual integration, that is, bilateral convergence in an effort to ensure stability and predictability in the relations, while acknowledging the divergent interests of the EU and the RF	A strong influence of norms and values on the external identity of the EU, which—as a "normative actor"—prefers normative-integrative interests vis-à-vis Russia with a focus on a positive and symmetrical energy cooperation which will benefit both parties
Liberalisation	Russia as a reliable business and energy partner that can and does naturally have different preferences than the EU	The EU employs liberal market and economic norms and values to improve its access to Russia's energy market and to induce changes in Russia's behaviour, which should contribute to greater economic competition and openness and bring maximum benefits for both parties	Norms, rules and values shape the external identity of the EU, which—as a "normative-rational actor"—stresses its rational-liberalisation interests vis-à-vis Russia with the aim to achieve a greater liberalisation of the energy market and a modernisation of the Russian energy sector
Diversification	Russia as a rival and an unreliable supplier that can use the energy sector as a political means of blackmail	The EU strongly securitises its energy relations with Russia and employs security norms and values as offensive tools with the aim of eliminating potential threats and risks, limiting its energy dependency on Russia and increasing its negotiating power	A partial influence of norms and values on the identity of the EU, which—as a "security-rational actor"—mainly advocates its diversification and security interests vis-à-vis Russia in the effort to diversify and ensure its energy security

Source: Compiled by the author according to Tichý and Kratochvíl (2014, p. 25)

Finally, Table 4.6 is devoted to the results of the various discussed questions in each of the energy discourses of the European Union in the years 2010–2014, such as the perception of the RF by the EU, the influence of norms, rules and values in energy relations with Russia on the identity of the EU and its influence on EU interests. Table 4.6 corroborates Tables 4.4 and 4.5 to confirm that the discussed

questions in all three EU energy discourses in the years 2010–2014 largely match the results of the EU discourses of integration, liberalisation and diversification in the previous period of 2004–2009.

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Chapter 5
The Russian Energy Discourses on the European Union in 2004–2014

5.1 The Integration Discourse of Russia in 2004–2009

5.1.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Integration Discourse

The analysed Russian documents and speeches revealed that among the energy discourses of the Russian Federation, the integration discourse is the one that clearly dominates. The main idea of the Russian integration discourse, which differs substantially from the liberalisation energy discourse, is the need for integration in the sense of a progressive and reciprocal approximation of the asymmetric positions of Russia and the European Union in their energy relations. However, the Russian version of the integration discourse stresses that the integration should be based not only on the transposition of EU norms and value on the Russian side but also on the principles of a mutually beneficial, symmetric energy cooperation, where Russia would be an equal partner of the European Union. The Russian position was clearly expressed by Shmatko (2009a): "what is important for us is dialogue, not a diktat".

Besides the question of integration of the Russian Federation and the European Union, for the Russian integration discourse, what is very important is the distinction between a bilateral energy cooperation between Russia and individual EU member states and a multilateral cooperation with the EU as a whole when "today our energy dialogue is getting deeper both on a bilateral level and within the Russia-EU format" (Putin 2006a; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2007; Gref 2005a; Gryzlov 2007; Nabiullina 2007, 2009a). The main economic and energy partners of Russia in the EU are France, Italy, and Spain. According to Putin (2004, 2005a, 2006b, c, d), Russia is also going to develop its relations with "Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, and Hungary".

Germany has a privileged place in the EU energy relations with Russia and is the main importer of Russian oil and gas. This fact was clearly confirmed by Putin (2006a), who emphasised the following point: "We know that the supplies of energy

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resources are very important for our German partners …" (as well as Nabiullina 2008; Lavrov 2008a). At the same time, Germany is considered the main EU energy partner for Russia, and Putin said the following about it: " … the energy sector remains a priority area of our bilateral relations. Our countries have an interest in ensuring global and European energy security …" (Putin 2006a). The bilateral energy relations of the RF with Germany and other selected European countries are in line with the strategy of Russia, which in this way de facto bypasses the EU's position and undermines its efforts to create a single energy policy on the one hand. On the other hand, the Russian Federation rejects the allegations that it does this and considers bilateral relations as a natural process and part of its energy policy towards the European Union.

In the integration as well as the liberalisation discourse, Russia sees its mutual energy cooperation with the European Union in a positive way. Firstly, Russia highlights the current state of affairs: "I can only say that in our relations with the European Union energy holds one of the central places. This is natural … [because] … the EU is our main partner … [with which] … we have identical interests" (Lavrov 2007a, 2008a, but also Khristenko 2007a; Gryzlov 2007; Ministerstvo ekonomičeskovo razvitija Rossijskoj Federacii 2008a, p. 25; Putin 2006e). Secondly, it recalls the past, when "Russia and Europe have developed a close and trusting relationship. We reliably supplied natural gas to Europe for 40 years, even in difficult circumstances of the Cold War …" (Shmatko 2009b, but also Putin 2006f). Thirdly, it also highlights the future efforts that "will lead to [a] mutually beneficial energy cooperation" (Putin 2006g), and in the words of Shmatko (2009a), "we want more and closer cooperation with the EU …" (but also see Gryzlov 2009a; Gref 2005b).

The integration discourse of the RF then conditions the energy cooperation and the development of the partnership between the EU and Russia by several factors. The energy cooperation between the EU and the RF currently takes place within the framework of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, where Russia and the EU are trying to identify common approaches; Russian representatives said the following about it: "we would very much like the cooperation in this field to be not only mutually beneficial, but also based on common approaches and principles" (Putin 2006c, d, but also Nabiullina 2009b) such as "the predictability and stability of energy markets" (Khristenko 2005a), because "… [w]e have no interest [in] end[ing] this dialogue" (Putin 2007a). In addition, the energy cooperation should be implemented within the framework of the Common Economic Space of Russia and the EU, "which should be based on common rules and harmonized administrative procedures …" (Ministry ekonomičeskovo razvitija Rossijskoj federations 2008a, p. 25, 2008b).

However, an effective energy cooperation can only exist "on an equal rights and mutually advantageous basis" (Putin 2006a, h, i, 2007b, but also Shmatko 2009c; Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoii Federatsii 2004). The legal framework for the cooperation between the Russian Federation and the EU is the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997. According to Lavrov (2008b, 2009a), Russia and the EU should set themselves a target for an early conclusion of "a new Strategic Partnership Framework Agreement, which we regard as a vehicle for deepening our partner relations, above all in areas such as energy security". Also, in addition to the

framework agreement, "a series of narrowly specialised agreements on economic cooperation, energy … should be prepared" (Lavrov 2008b). In other words, the new agreement on the strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the European Union, consisting of a series of specialised and defined extensive agreements focused mainly on energy and economic cooperation, is regarded as a tool to deepen partnerships in the energy sector, because Putin (2007b, c) said: "I believe it is very important to have a common overall framework for energy relations". Simultaneously, the EU-Russia energy partnership should be based on principles which were agreed earlier, primarily the ones that were agreed at the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, and "which rest on a mutual consideration of interests, a balance of interests of producer countries, consumer countries and transit countries" (Lavrov 2007b, 2008a, c, but also Khristenko 2005b, c, 2007b; Fradkov 2006a).

The second key theme of Russia's integration discourse is the question of the energy interdependence between the EU and Russia, which is simply defined as a mutual dependence where "you need gas, and we need the money" (Chizhov 2008). This means that the energy interdependence allows Russia to ensure significant budgetary receipts, and vice versa the EU brings the energy supplies necessary for sustainable economic development. However, the Russian integration discourse manifests a certain degree of ambivalence in relation to the interdependence.

On the one hand, for example, Putin (2006c) and Lavrov (2007a) see the energy relations between the EU and Russia through the prism of symmetrical interdependence: "undoubtedly Russia and the EU are natural partners in this area. Our interdependence only strengthens energy security on the European continent"; "our interdependence shows itself most vividly in the energy sector". The energy interdependence is then perceived positively as a "cementing factor of the established relations and this factor ought to be regarded as a thing of positive value and not as a threat" (Lavrov 2007b, but also Zubkov 2008; Fradkov 2006b; Chizhov 2008).

On the other hand, Putin (2006c) talks about a rather asymmetrical interdependence or even Russia's dependence on the European Union in the same place: "I said to our colleagues … 44 percent of the EU's gas imports come from Russia, [and] then 67 percent of Russia's gas exports go to Europe. This means that in actual fact Russia today depends even more on European consumers than they depend on their suppliers". In contrast, Lavrov (2007a) hinted at the possibility that this interdependence might not be a permanent phenomenon, as the volume of Russian oil exports to the European Union has been steadily growing, both in relative and in absolute terms: "By the year 2030, according to the EU's own forecasts, its dependence on [the] external supply of gas and oil will rise. We have no doubts that the European Union can't do without Russia in this respect". Similarly, Shmatko (2009a) expressed the following argument: "According to our estimates, Europe [will consume] about 620 billion cubic meters of gas in 2020 … Our supply agreements are structured for the long term, so that our position as [a] supplier to the EU over the next 25 years [would] not [be] in jeopardy" (but also Putin 2009a).

Factors which can then damage the interdependence and partnership between the Russian Federation and the European Union are, according to Putin (2006b), mainly attempts by some European countries to prevent the development of energy relations

between Russia and Europe because they "probably have considered that it is not in their interest . . .". This is particularly connected to the US efforts to convince some European states not to subscribe to energy supplies from Russia, as Putin (2008a) said, "we know how our American partners . . . dialogue in Europe, [as they] encouraged some countries that did not import our raw materials [to] try to find new routes. . . I think it is bad politics and stupidity . . . because it has politicized our relations".

5.1.2 The Impact of the Norms of the Integration Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the RF in Its Relations to the EU

In its integration discourse and in its relations with the European Union, Russia is under the influence of normativity, on the one hand, when as a "normative actor", it promotes its norms and values that the EU should gradually accept in its integration process as the two actors grow closer together. This was confirmed, for example, by Putin (2007b), according to whom Russia is open to constructive work on the energy dialogue with the EU, and Russia "hope[s] that [its] European colleagues adopt norms and rules for mutual respect", but also by Khristenko (2004), according to whom the energy cooperation of Russia and the EU needs "special regulative norms" and "further approximation of energy strategies and energy systems" (Khristenko 2005c, 2006a). In order to achieve this aim, Russia and the EU are going to continue working on establishing "a mechanism for mutual information and notification in the energy sector" (Putin 2007a). In order to create a tool for the exchange of information on potential problem situations and ways of solving them, including the use of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, Russia and the EU "agreed to continue work on the establishment of a mechanism of early warnings for [the] supply and demand of energy coming from Russia to the EU" (Putin 2007c, but also Nabiullina 2009a, b, c; Gryzlov 2007).

Besides that, in Russia's integration discourse, what is evident is a rational approach to its own behaviour and actions; Russia, as a "rational actor" in the energy relations with the European Union, promotes the rational use of EU standards and values in order to achieve economic benefits; for example, it believes that in 2020 ". . . [the] energy and economic rapprochement with the European Union, based on EU norms[,] will be subject to a long-term solution of the socio-economic and energy development [of the] Russian Federation" (Ministry ekonomičeskovo razvitija Rossijskoj Federations 2008a, p. 25)

The integration energy discourse of Russia thus explicitly confirms the effect of rules, norms, and values on the foreign identity of the Russian Federation, which, as a "normative-rational actor", promotes towards the European Union the normative instruments in the form of economic norms and values; on the one hand, this way, it tries to make it so that the two actors would approach each other, and on the other

hand, the Russian Federation rationally accepts the EU values, rules, and norms in anticipation of its own positive benefits in terms of economy and energy. The position of the Russian Federation is clearly explained by Lavrov (2006a, b), according to whom it is very important that the European Union, as a participant of the St. Petersburg Summit, "adopted norms and values for energy cooperation", which, together with the content of the new treaty, "based on the principles of equality and mutual access [to] energy", become "an instrument of integration in terms of the actual proximity of the Russian Federation and the European Union in energy relations" (Lavrov 2009a), although according to Nabiullina (2009b, c), respecting "the EU norms in these relationships" as well helps "to achieve real progress in the modernization of the Russian energy sector" (but also Gref 2005a, b).

At the same time, in the context of this identity, Russia, in its energy relations with the EU, prefers normative-economic interests with the strategic objective of establishing a mutually beneficial, balanced collaboration. The character of the energy relations and the importance of the energy cooperation and partnership between Russia and the European Union from a utilitarian perspective are best explained by Medvedev (2009a): "Energy is something that binds together the RF and the EU countries. It is our common business and it is something that guarantees a comfortable life for millions of Europeans. Energy is therefore not a problem but an advantage". This is confirmed also by Lavrov: "Russia and the EU [do not have] an acceptable alternative . . . it is necessary to build a truly strategic—equal and mutually beneficial—partnership with the EU in the field of energy" (Lavrov 2007b).

5.2 The Liberalisation Discourse of Russia in 2004–2009

5.2.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Liberalisation Discourse

The next discourse that the author analysed on the basis of an examination of relevant Russian documents and speeches of political leaders of the Russian Federation is the liberalisation discourse. In the Russian liberalisation discourse, there are a few differences from but also many similarities with the integration discourse in Russia.

On the one hand, both of the Russian discourses differ mainly in terms of their primary focus. While for Russia's integration discourse the mutual integration of the European Union and the Russian Federation in their energy relations is important, the liberalisation discourse of the Russian Federation pays considerable attention to attempts of Russian energy entities, such as the oil companies Lukoil and Rosneft

and the state-owned gas company Gazprom,[1] to consolidate and strengthen their positions on the EU internal energy market.

On the other hand, the Russian integration and liberalisation discourses agree—with certain exceptions—on a positive perception of both actors, i.e. the EU and Russia, as natural trading partners whose cooperation is guided by economic interests and convenience. At the same time, the positions of both players are rather symmetrical in Russia's liberalisation discourse. For example, in an interview, it was suggested by Medvedev (2008) that ". . . Europe is our biggest customer for gas and oil supplies. It is our biggest market, and we will continue to develop our supplies to this market". At the same time, Putin (2006d) also outlined the conditions under which such a cooperation could function effectively: "All of Europe needs our energy resources. And we need to remove all fears, all anxieties [,] and establish stability, reliability and predictability. Is it possible to do this within a free trade zone? It is possible" (but also see Nabiullina 2009a, d; Gref 2005b).

Similarly, Russia's liberalisation and integration discourses agree on the division of the access of Russian entities to the energy markets of the member states, like when the interest of Russian companies is "to enter . . . the [German] energy market" (Putin 2006j, 2008a, b), and the "[i]nterest of the Russian investors in the European market continues to grow in recent years . . ." (Lavrov 2007a). Putin (2007c) advocated the presence of Russian companies in the energy market of the EU by increasing the security of energy supplies from the Russian Federation, and together Russian energy companies "have contributed significantly to the stabilization of the European energy market" (but also see Lavrov 2006a, b; Gref 2005b). In other words, the RF's fundamental objective is to preserve and increase the share of Russian energy supplies in Europe, as exports to the markets of the member states/EU are considered a major source of revenue for Russian companies, especially Gazprom, and thus the main financial source for the Russian state budget.

In response to the criticism of the European Commission that is being voiced in the liberalisation discourse of the European Union, claiming that Russia should liberalise and open its energy market to European investors and approximate its domestic prices for gas to world prices, Putin (2009b) has repeatedly said, "I know that our energy market is much more open than markets in the world's other big energy producers". Similarly, he also said, ". . . our energy production and transportation sector is considerably more liberal than [those] in many other energy producing countries" (Putin 2007c, d; Shmatko 2008, 2009d). Putin (2009c) also promised to gradually raise gas prices for domestic consumers when he said, "We plan to introduce European prices for our domestic customers in 2011–2012 . . ." (also see Medvedev 2009b). The increase of domestic prices for natural gas was also

[1]Gazprom—a Russian gas company—holds a privileged position among the Russian energy companies. Since 2006, it has had a de jure monopoly on the exports of Russian natural gas, and it exports gas virtually exclusively to Europe. The export of gas to the member states of the EU is Gazprom's principal source of revenues—representing some 60% of its revenues and some 20% of the Russian national budget. Gazprom also contributes about 10% to the Russian GDP (Proedrou 2010, p. 87).

confirmed by Khristenko (2007c), who stressed that "the Russian government in November [of] last year endorsed the need to focus on achieving equal profitability of domestic sales of natural gas, which means that the price of natural gas for domestic customers would should gradually approach … prices paid by European consumers …".

At the same time, Putin (2007c) has repeatedly stated that foreign European companies participate in all major Russian energy projects: "According to different estimates, up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in the Russian Federation is done by foreign capital. Try, try to find me a similar example where Russian business participates extensively in key economic sectors in western countries. Such examples do not exist!" Speaking about the openness of Russia to European investment, Putin (2006g) tried to present some examples of European companies investing in Russian projects by stating that "European companies are also participating in projects based on production sharing agreements, namely Sakhalin-2, Khariaga, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium …" (but also Khristenko 2004, 2007b, c).

According to both the Russian liberalisation discourse and the Russian integration discourse, the efforts of some European countries to prevent Russian companies such as Gazprom from entering their energy markets are one of the main factors that negatively affect the energy cooperation between the European Union and Russia. As an example, Putin (2006a) has several times mentioned the case of the negative reception Gazprom received when it wanted to buy a company in the UK: "Gazprom announced that it wanted to buy one of their companies, [and] everyone got excited: 'The Russians are coming! Guards!' …" (but also Khristenko 2004, 2006b, 2007d, e). The EU-Russia energy relations are also negatively influenced both by "the West's intention to gain access to Russian energy resources while not forgoing anything in return" (Lavrov 2006a, b, 2009b, c, but also Gryzlov 2007; Zubkov 2008) and by US policies: "We know how, say, our American partners conduct a dialogue in Europe: they go to certain countries and urge them not to take our raw materials … This is already a political matter" (Medvedev 2009c). According to Putin (2008b), the question is why Americans are so afraid of a "European meat, from which Gazprom carves … Maybe because they want it for themselves; …".

Another controversial issue in the liberalisation discourse of the RF is the Energy Charter Treaty, whose content reaches even into the discourse of integration. The reasons why Russia steadily refuses to ratify the present form of the ECT and its Transit Protocol have been summed up by Putin (2006b) repeatedly, and they are as follows: "first, our partners want to liberalize energy transport in Europe … This would lead to massive speculation which would not at all benefit the final consumers in Europe. Second, there is still an issue on which we have not reached an agreement with our European partners. This issue concerns creating equal conditions for supplying nuclear fuel to the market". According to Putin (2006a), the Energy Charter Treaty and its Transit Protocol refer to granting access to infrastructure for extracting and transporting gas: "And so we ask our partners: 'Very well, we shall give you access to this infrastructure and where will you allow us access? Where are these deposits? Where are the huge gas pipelines and infrastructure like [those] that we have?' Our partners do not have such infrastructure. For that reason signing and

ratifying the additional protocols with the Russian party is a unilateral decision, and we shall not accept unilateral decisions" (Khristenko 2006a; Shmatko 2009b; Chizhov 2006, 2007).[2]

In response to these alleged shortcomings of the Energy Charter Treaty and its Transit Protocol, and in order to amend the content of the ECT or completely replace it, Medvedev (2009a, b, c) suggested a new legal foundation for international energy cooperation[3] that "[would reflect] the interests of suppliers, purchasers, and transit nations" (but also Lavrov 2009a, b). Medvedev (2009a, d) also suggested negotiations on this new document: "We would like to start discussing these documents with the EU and our other partners, as soon as possible, and hope they will respond positively to our ideas". Simultaneously, he claimed that "it seemed to [him] that [Russia's] European colleagues show[ed] [an] interest in these ideas" and "did not reject out of hand the Russian Federation's suggestions" (Medvedev 2009a, e).

5.2.2 *The Impact of the Norms of the Liberalisation Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the RF in Its Relations to the EU*

Like in the integration discourse of the RF, in the Russian liberalisation discourse, an influence of rationality and normativity on the Russian identity is present. On the one hand, the Russian Federation, as a "rational actor", uses in its energy relations rationally economic norms and values to make changes in the behaviour of the EU, which should bring both parties benefits; in connection with this, Medvedev (2009a, b) said, "I remind again our European partners [of] a new energy initiative of Russia, which [should] facilitate reciprocal access to our energy markets and ... create a high-quality basis for international energy cooperation". On the other hand, under the influence of these norms and values, Russia, as a "normative actor" in relation to the European Union, is trying to defend its actions as follows: "we, unlike other states[,] follow market rules" (Lavrov 2007a, b) or "we build our relationships with all our Western partners under long-term contracts", but "Gazprom [does not

[2]The main obstacles for the Russian ratification of the ECT were the conditions relating to energy transit. Free transit through the territory of Russia would not be able to generate revenue from transit in the same volume as the transit through European countries as a result of the significantly lower tariffs for pumping gas to Russia, which would thus lose the most attractive markets and, as a result, reduce its export prices. Russia unilaterally decided to terminate the temporary status and officially announced its intention to withdraw from signing the former ECT in October 2009.

[3]During the EU-Russia summit in Khabarovsk in May 2009, President Medvedev presented his proposal for a "New Legal Framework for Energy Cooperation", which deems it inevitable to create a new international and universally applied treaty that would include—unlike the ECT—all major producers, consumers, and transit states on the energy market and cover all important aspects of the global energy cooperation.

have] a monopoly on the European gas market and does not determine [the] price. The price of gas is determined by the market" (Putin 2009a).

In the Russian liberalisation discourse, what is apparent is the influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the RF, which, as a "rational-normative actor", used the rationally normative instrument of liberal market norms in an attempt to justify its actions, draw attention to the application of non-market barriers from the EU and convince the EU about the need to remove these barriers and ensure its greater openness to Russian companies and equal access for Russian companies to European energy markets. It should bring Russia maximum profits and enhance its energy cooperation with the EU. This approach was explicitly expressed by Putin (2006a): "If people want us to create the conditions that will allow foreign firms access to the Russian market then it is also our right to expect a nondiscriminatory attitude from the governments of interested states when Russian companies plan to enter European markets". In this context, the very clear question of a *quid pro quo* often arises: "If they want something from us ..., then we want to know what we would get in return" (Putin 2006b, f). What the Russian leaders mean by this is that the conditions for entering the EU internal energy market for Russian companies should be improved in return for Russia's "openness" (Putin 2006c, g; Fradkov 2006a).

Instead, however, "Russian companies face barriers in entering ... the energy market of the EU in the form of ECT restrictive rules" (Putin 2006a, 2008a, b). Putin argued against these rules by saying, "we require the establishment of common and transparent rules and conditions for cooperation in Europe and adapting to the transition to market principles of cooperation" (Putin 2007a, but also Chizhov 2006, 2007). At the same time, according to Khristenko (2006a, b), this will contribute to improving the energy cooperation definition of "mutual access to energy markets" and determining "market-based mechanisms for price fixing" (Khristenko 2006c, d), which are "very important [for creating] uniform rules as on the energy market, so in [the] framework of the European economy as a whole ..." (Putin 2006a, b).

In its rational-normative identity, the Russian Federation, in its energy relations with the EU, emphasises the rational-liberalisation interests with the strategic objective to strengthen the presence of Russian energy companies in the internal gas market of the EU and improve the reciprocal energy trade. This was also confirmed by Putin, according to whom strengthening the presence of Russian companies in the EU internal energy market contributes primarily "to increas[ing] the security of energy supplies from the RF", while Russian energy companies "have contributed significantly to the stabilization of the European energy market" and help "to improve our energy trade with the EU" (Putin 2007c, but also Lavrov 2006a, b).

5.3 The Diversification Discourse of Russia in 2004–2009

5.3.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Diversification Discourse

The third identified and analysed Russian discourse in this section is the diversification discourse. On the one hand, the diversification discourse differs from the two previous discourses primarily by being focused on the EU's energy security, which remains "a priority of our bilateral cooperation" and which "Russia has an interest in ensuring" (Putin 2006i). On the other hand, the Russian diversification discourse agrees with the integration discourse on the credibility of Russia as a stable and reliable supplier of oil and gas. Like the Russian integration discourse, the diversification discourse presents Russia as the main energy supplier in relation to the EU, as "Russia is one of the largest suppliers of energy resources to European markets" (Putin 2006e, h, but also Shmatko 2009a, b; Lavrov 2005), and also as a reliable partner. In this context, Putin (2006f) said, "I think that Russia has always been a reliable energy supplier for its European partners", and he also said that it contributes to the energy security of the EU (also Medvedev 2009c, e; Gryzlov 2007, 2009b).

This statement was then repeated several times by Putin (2006g): "[Over] more than 40 years, Russia has consistently fulfilled its obligations to the European partners in full on the day and minute. Name me one case where Russia failed to deliver the promised supplies to Europe [or] to its European partners", or "Russia has always been and will be a reliable partner for our European colleagues" (see Lavrov 2007a). In such statements of the Russian policymakers, what is clear is that an important role for their claims is played by references to the events of the recent past, which are also present in other statements in the diversification discourse and which serve as supporting arguments. To secure the fulfilment of its obligations, Russia plans to increase its drilling and production of oil and gas and its exports to Europe, because "the Russian Federation has enough gas to ensure supplies to Europe in the next 50 or even 100 years" (Shmatko 2009a).

The Russian diversification discourse believes that the main aims of the Russian diversification efforts are to construct new transport routes that would bring more oil and natural gas to Europe and to strengthen the presence of Russian energy companies on the EU internal energy market. Thus the Russian diversification discourse agrees with the liberalisation discourse in terms of understanding the importance of ensuring the access of the RF to the European electricity and gas market. The importance of diversification in the form of building new pipelines is clearly pointed out by Khristenko (2007d): "The implementation of these projects allows [us] to solve the most important task for the EU—to diversify the routes for energy supplies, and [the most important task] for Russia—to diversify the directions of sales".

The major diversification projects of the Russian diversification discourse are mainly the South Stream and Nord Stream pipelines. On the one hand, for example, Putin (2006b, 2009c) expressed some surprise within the diversification discourse at the negative reaction of some member states to the upcoming pipelines: ". . . the fight

against [the] North Stream pipeline is a fight against German interests and the German economy", but already in the Cold War era, some states "tried to prevent [the] construction of [the] gas pipeline between Germany and the USSR. And in this regard, nothing has changed. [The only change is] that [the] RF is not [the] so-called Evil Empire" (but also Chizhov 2007, 2008). In this case, it is again important to make links with the past that has underlined the rhetoric of some political representatives of the member states which behave and act just like they did during the Cold War. The attempts of some countries to prevent the realisation of Russian energy projects bring the European Union and the RF to the positions of two rivals in their energy relations, which make the Russian diversification discourse fundamentally different from the previous two energy discourses of the Russian Federation.

Putin (2006b) and Lavrov (2006b) have repeatedly tried to convince European states that "[Russia does] not want to eliminate any pressure from the piping system . . . [e]verything remains as it was" but also that there is "no reduction in the volume of gas [travelling] through existing pipelines . . .". Conversely, both of the diversification projects would increase the energy security of the EU. This means that the main Russian argument for supporting the construction of new Russian pipelines is that this would ensure the energy security of the EU, and so we hear utterances from the Russian leaders like "the South Stream project opens up new prospects for cooperation to strengthen European energy security" or "I am confident that Nord Stream is one such example, [as it] is of strategic importance not only for Russia and Germany, but for Europe as a whole. Its successful implementation will reinforce energy security all throughout the continent" (Medvedev 2009a, but also Putin 2008b; Chizhov 2009a, b; Lavrov 2007a).

According to Putin (2005a, b, 2008c), Europe needs both of these projects because "we know about the prospects for gas extraction in traditionally gas-rich countries of Europe such as Great Britain and Norway. Extraction there is falling" (Chizhov 2008). Therefore "Europe sees as positive the construction of any new infrastructure, given the conditions of the growing gas demand" (Khristenko 2007d). Finally, another reason why the EU needs new Russian diversification projects (in the Russian view) is the risk of a disruption of energy supplies and unreliable transit countries: "we understand that diversification is one way of decreasing risks on the part of our partners" (Khristenko 2006d, but also Putin 2009d), and "diversifying supplies will greatly reduce Europe's dependence on the whims of any country's political regime" (Medvedev, 2009f, g, but also Nabiullina 2009b).

According to most Russian political leaders, Ukraine is an especial example of a country with a "whimsical" political regime that bears the primary responsibility for the recent disruption of energy supplies and is the cause of the past energy crises in 2006 and 2009 (see Medvedev 2009a, b; Lavrov 2007a, Putin 2009a, b, c; Gryzlov 2009a, b; Shmatko 2009a, b), while according to Putin (2009d), Russia, as well as the EU, is "a victim of domestic political problems of Ukraine". As possible causes of the disputes with Ukraine, Putin sees both the collapse of the USSR, as "the Soviet Union and then Russia [originally] never stopped [its] gas supplies[,] and the closure of supply emerged [only] after the collapse of the Soviet Union" (Putin 2009c), and

the effort of Ukraine "to cause us to reduce prices for gas, which [it] buys from us" (Putin 2009b).

In this context, Medvedev (2009e, h) and also Putin (2006a, b) have repeatedly pointed out the inefficiency of the ECT when "everybody thinks highly of the Energy Charter to which Ukraine is a party along with some other countries. Well, was the Energy Charter in any way helpful in the much discussed gas conflict earlier this year? Absolutely not". The diversification discourse of the Russian Federation shows that in the statements and speeches of many Russian policymakers and political representatives, what is present is a very strong argumentation in an effort to convince the EU about the importance and reliability of the RF compared to other suppliers and transit countries. At the same time, this argumentation is supported by the remembrance of recent history, which is to emphasise the importance of the USSR and show the problem of its collapse in connection with the background of energy security.

In connection with the European Union's concerns and attempts to reduce its energy dependence on Russia, Putin (2006a) indirectly suggested the possibility of a partial reversal of the flow of Russian oil and gas from Europe to the east. He gave the following reason for it: "we are always hearing about excessive dependence on Russia and about how steps should be taken to limit Russia's access to the European energy market. What do you expect us to do . . .? We start to look for other markets. This does not mean that we plan to reduce our cooperation with Europe, even though Europe is the natural and most appropriate partner for us . . .". According to Lavrov (2009b), China is an example of an alternative market for Russian natural gas since "there are good opportunities for building [a] cooperation with China by means of cooperation development in [the] gas sphere". But if Russia takes this step, Europe will not receive the irreplaceable natural resources "that she could have received" (Putin 2006b, c).

Russia's future needs to diversify its transport routes and find new energy markets in order to reduce its dependence on the European energy market is openly expressed in the Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2030. Altogether, the share of the European energy markets in the total volume of Russian energy exports is expected to be steadily declining all the way to 2030 "due to export diversification to Eastern energy markets (China, Japan, [the] Republic of Korea, [and] other countries of the Asia-Pacific region) . . . This will make it possible to reduce the dependency of the Russian energy sector on export of energy resources to Europe" (Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2009, p. 23).

5.3.2 *The Impact of the Norms of the Diversification Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the RF in Its Relations to the EU*

And finally, in the context of the Russian diversification energy discourse, a normative influence on and a security approach to the foreign identity of Russia are also present. On the one hand, the RF, under the influence of security norms and values, acts in its relations to the EU as a "security actor", which emphasises the importance of Russian energy supplies for the energy security of the EU when "Russia wants to secure [an] uninterrupted supply of energy resources to Europe" (Lavrov 2008a, b). On the other hand, under the influence of normativity, the RF, as a "normative actor", uses security and economic norms and values in the process of *desecuritisation* in an effort to defuse the criticism of the EU due to the Russian negotiations on Ukraine during the energy crisis; according to Medvedev (2009g): "first, we did not cut supplies . . . We had no legal basis for supplying gas; therefore, we had to make tough decisions, which we did not want to make . . .", because during the cut-off of the gas supplies to Europe, "Gazprom . . . has lost a total amount of 800 million dollars . . ." (Putin 2009b).

In other words, the RF, in its relations with the EU, seeks to *desecuritise* energy issues, which rests on several factors. Firstly, it rests on the refusal of both an "overdependence of the EU on Russian energy resources" (Putin 2005b) and any obstruction by the EU in the implementation of Russian projects as unfounded: e.g. "I want to say that [the] rumors and suspicions of our European partners regarding [their alleged] excessive dependence on Russian energy resources and projects are extremely overvalued" (Putin 2006b). Secondly, it rests on a positive attitude and the opinion that Russia has nothing against EU diversification projects such as the Nabucco pipeline because "[Russia is] not afraid of any other alternative routes such as NABUKKO [sic] and all the others. If natural resources exist [somewhere], well, then start [from] there and let there be additional routes, additional deliveries" (Putin 2005c, 2006b; Medvedev 2009e, h; Khristenko 2006c). Khristenko (2006c) even admitted to the possibility of the participation of Russia in the Nabucco project: "Russia is ready to assess its participation in similar projects". Thirdly, the *desecuritisation* rests on a dismissal of accusations of the unreliability of Russia as the main supplier of energy resources to Europe: "Fears that have sometimes been voiced about the reliability of energy supplies from Russia to Europe . . . have no foundation beneath them" (Lavrov 2006b).

Fourthly, it rests on accusations of Ukraine being an unreliable transit country: "The problem was that Ukraine should pay a fair price for our gas and fulfill its obligation to ensure [a] secure transport of natural gas to the West . . ." (Shmatko 2009a); therefore, "the European Union has to make clear that it was Ukraine and not Russia who violated the Energy Charter" (Shmatko 2009b). And finally, it rests on emphasising the need for implementing new diversification projects that would reduce the dependence on unreliable transit countries. This is confirmed by Lavrov (2006c), according to whom the diversification of routes for energy supplies from Russia is to replace these unreliable countries with better transit countries, and on the

other hand, it is "to strengthen the stability of energy supplies to Europe and thus also improve its energy security" (but also Putin 2008a).

As part of its security-normative identity, the RF, in its energy relations with the EU, pursues its security-diversification interests with an aim to increase the Russian share of the European energy market and the diversification of transport routes. This was confirmed by Putin (2007e, f), according to whom "[Russia is] interested in the direct access to the major European customers in the energy market, which is absolutely in line with [Russia's] economic and security interests", but also by Khristenko (2006a), who said, "[Russia is] not interested in monopolization of power in Europe. The policy aims to ensure [the] energy security of Russian energy suppliers, which corresponds to our strategic interests . . .".

5.4 A Comparison of the Three Discourses of Russia in 2004–2009

Table 5.1 shows the main themes of the Russian integration, liberalisation and diversification energy discourses in 2004–2009. The basic themes clearly confirm the main features of all three Russian energy discourses. For example, while in the

Table 5.1 The main themes of the three energy discourses of the RF in 2004–2009

Integration discourse	Liberalisation discourse	Diversification discourse
– Emphasis on integration in terms of mutual, symmetrical, closer Russia-EU energy relations – The Russian Federation as an equal and main trading partner of the EU – Focusing on bilateral energy cooperation between Russia and the member states – Positive perception of energy cooperation with the EU – Emphasis on the institutional and legislative framework for EU-RF energy relations – Focusing on the economic benefits of energy relations between the EU and the Russian Federation – Positive assessment of the energy interdependence between the RF and the EU	– Emphasis on consolidating and strengthening the position of Russian companies in the internal energy market in the EU – The EU and Russia as natural trading partners – Positive perception of both actors – Highlighting the successful process of liberalisation of the Russian energy market – The openness of the Russian energy market to foreign investors in Russia requires the same approach from the EU – Negative review of the ECT and the Transit Protocol – The proposal to create a new agreement for energy cooperation	– The RF as a major energy supplier for the EU and a reliable partner – Rejection of the idea that Russia is unreliable in its relations with the EU – Rejection of the idea that the EU is excessively dependent on Russia – A focus on the construction of new/alternative transit routes – The conviction of the importance of the new Russian pipelines but also of pipelines to secure and strengthen the EU's energy security – Russia's disclaimer for the energy crisis with Ukraine – The possibility of a partial reversal of the flow of Russian oil and gas supplies from Europe to the east

Source: Compiled by the author and Kratochvíl and Tichý (2013, p. 399)

Table 5.2 Overlaps and differences between the three Russian energy discourses in 2004–2009

Criteria	Integration discourse	Liberalisation discourse	Diversification discourse
Overlaps	– With the liberalisation discourse, it shares a positive perception of the energy cooperation with the European Union as a main business partner and focuses on the economic benefits of the EU-Russia energy relations	– Like the integration discourse, it favours conditions under which the energy cooperation/relations between the EU and the RF could effectively function – With the integration discourse, it agrees on the division of access of Russian companies to the energy markets of the member states and the EU as a whole	– It overlaps with the integration discourse by presenting Russia as a main partner. – With the liberalisation discourse, it shares efforts to strengthen the presence of Russian energy companies on the European Union's internal energy market
Differences	– Unlike the liberalisation discourse, the integration discourse emphasises the importance of integration between the EU and the RF energy relations – Unlike in the liberalisation discourse, the positions of both players are rather asymmetrical in the integration discourse	– Unlike the integration discourse, the liberalisation discourse stresses the need to strengthen the presence of Russian energy companies in the internal energy market of the EU – Unlike in the integration discourse, the positions of both players are rather symmetrical in the liberalisation discourse	– Unlike the integration and liberalisation discourse, the diversification discourse mainly focuses on the EU energy security – Unlike in the liberalisation and integration discourse, Russia's positive perceptions of the EU are not predominant in the diversification discourse

Source: Compiled by the author and Kratochvíl and Tichý (2013, p. 399)

Russian integration and liberalisation discourse, especially issues associated mainly with the economic aspects of the energy cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union play a key role, in the case of the diversification discourse, the main emphasis is particularly on the political and security issues of the RF energy relations with the EU.

The previous table, Table 5.1, is then immediately linked with Table 5.2, which deals with and clearly shows the overlaps and differences between the liberalisation, integration, and diversification energy discourses of Russia. It applies the above characteristics to each of the discourses, according to which the Russian integration and liberalisation discourse are the closest to each other and often overlap, while the Russian diversification discourse highly differs from the two other energy discourses, despite certain similarities between it and them.

The last table, Table 5.3, gives an overview of the main topics, the EU's perception of the Russian Federation, and the influence of values and norms on Russia's identity and energy interests in its relations with the EU in the three Russian energy discourses in the years 2004–2009. While in the case of the Russian integration and liberalisation energy discourse there is a particularly positive perception of the EU and a significant

Table 5.3 The perception of the EU and the impact of energy relation norms and values on the identity and interests of the RF in each of the three discourses in 2004–2009

Discourse of	Perception of the EU from the RF	Relationship of norms and values in the conduct of the RF in its energy relations with the European Union	Influence of norms and values on the foreign-policy identity of the RF and its interests
Integration	The European Union as a reliable energy and economic partner	The RF, in relation to the EU, promotes economic norms and values in an effort to bring their positions closer to each other in the energy relations on the one hand, and on the other hand, the RF partially accepts the values and norms of the EU in anticipation of its own positive benefits in terms of economy and energy	There is an important influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the Russian Federation, which, as a "normative-rational actor" in its relations with the European Union, prefers normative economic interests in order to ensure that both sides benefit and also prefers an easygoing symmetric cooperation in the field of energy
Liberalisation	The European Union as a key trade and energy partner	The RF, in its relations with the EU, uses market-liberal norms and values in an attempt to justify its actions, convince others of the need to eliminate non-market obstacles and barriers from the EU, and ensure a greater openness to and an equal access for Russian companies in the EU energy markets, which would bring the RF maximum profits and enhance its energy cooperation with the EU	There is an effect of norms and values on the international identity of the Russian Federation, which, as a "rational-normative actor" in its relations with the European Union, promotes primarily rational-liberalisation interests in an effort to strengthen the presence of Russian energy companies in the internal gas market of the European Union and improve its energy trade
Diversification	The European Union as an energy and trade partner but also partly a rival	In its energy relations with the EU, the RF tries to desecuritise the issue of energy security when it uses the security-economic norms and values as a defensive tool in order to convince the EU about its reliability and the significance of Russian diversification projects for EU energy security	There is an influence of norms and values on the international identity of the RF, which, as a "security-normative actor" in its relations with the European Union, defends the interests of security-diversification in an attempt to secure its access to the European energy market and diversify its transport routes

Source: Compiled by the author and Tichý and Kratochvíl (2014, p. 25)

impact of values and norms on the foreign identity of the RF, which is used when forming its energy interests in regard to the EU, in the Russian diversification discourse, the positive perception of the EU is partly undermined by the mutual rivalry between the two actors, but in this case as well, there is a present influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the RF, which in its context promotes its energy interests in relation to the European Union.

5.5 The Integration Discourse of Russia in 2010–2014

5.5.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Integration Discourse

The Russian integration discourse in the years 2010–2014 adopts the structure and all of the main themes and content of the previous RF discourse from the years 2004–2009. That means that the main attention is given to a positive and symmetrical energy cooperation based on an institutional and legislative framework of RF–EU interactions, which will provide both actors with economic benefits.

However, there are several slight differences in the Russian integration discourse in 2010–2014 compared to the previous period. First, the discourse makes much greater note of the divergent energy interests of the Russian Federation and the European Union and the need to respect them in mutual relations. Second, in the process of mutual convergence, the discourse newly focuses on the question of modernising the EU and Russian Federation energy sectors as a matter of integration and cooperation within the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation. Third, at the end of the analysed period, the continued political instability in Ukraine caused a slight weakening of the dominant position of integration discourse together with a partial softening of the intensity of the previous emphasis on the existence of a concept of energy interdependence between Russia and the EU.

Contrarily, both Russian integration discourses agree on the importance of Russia's energy cooperation/interaction with individual member states and their companies on a bilateral level. Russia's main partners in the European Union are France, as "our bilateral cooperation has always been a positive factor in European … affairs" (Putin 2011a, 2012a, 2013a, but also Chizhov 2013a, 2011a), and Germany, which "is becoming an important centre for the distribution of Russian energy sources into the rest of Europe" (Putin 2012a, but also Shmatko 2010a; Medvedev 2010a, 2011a, 2012), but also "Russian-Italian energy cooperation contributes to the strengthening of energy relations between Moscow and Brussels".

Besides bilateral energy relations, the RF integration discourse also advocates for the cooperation of Russian energy firms with European ones, which are important actors in the implementation of Russian energy projects. This was repeatedly confirmed by Putin (2011b, 2012b), who claimed that "the Nord Stream project … has now become a pan-European project, that involves Russian, German, Dutch

and French companies" (Khristenko 2010a; Lavrov 2013a). Similarly, according to Putin (2014a, b), "Austrian oil and gas company OMV has been working fruitfully with Gazprom … and has without question made a strategically correct choice in favour of active participation in building the South Stream gas pipeline" (but also Medvedev 2014a), which is also participated in by Italian, French, and German companies (Putin 2014a; Khristenko 2010b; Naryshkin 2014).

A major role in Russian energy relations in the integration discourse is retained by the EU, which "is a key energy partner of our country" (Chizhov 2012a; Putin 2014b; Lavrov 2013b), which receives "90% of all export of Russian oil, 70% of Russian gas, and 50% of Russian coal" (Chizhov 2013b; Shmatko 2010b; Gryzlov 2010a) and "for Russia, developing further cooperation with the European Union is an absolute and long-term priority" (Medvedev 2013a; Lavrov 2012a; Prime Minister 2013). Russian integration discourse sees importance in the fact that the Russian Federation is just as necessary to the European Union, when, for example, "Russia supplies a considerable part of the European consumption in terms of gas, oil, coal and uranium" (Shmatko 2010a, 2011a; Chizhov 2013c; Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013, p. 6), while "34% of the total EU imports of gas …, more than 30% of imports of oil …, 23% of oil products …, 24% of coal …, 30% of nuclear fuel and materials … are of Russian origin" (Chizhov 2011b, 2014a; Nabiullina 2011a, b). Novak (2014a) then presumes that "Russia will continue to be the main energy partner and supplier of the EU in the future" (see also Belousov 2012; Ulyukaev 2013a, b).

The acknowledgement of the importance of the mutual position of both actors strengthens their energy cooperation, which is perceived in a positive light when, for instance, "Russia and the European Union are extremely important and well-established partners in the gas field. They share almost 40 years of common history and tradition, a unique experience of mutually beneficial cooperation that successfully withstood the frosty winds of the Cold War" (Chizhov 2011b), with that the energy cooperation between the RF and the European Union "was, still is and—I'm convinced—will continue to be developing on a long term basis and to the benefit of both Parties" (Chizhov 2014a). The reasons for this are clear, according to Lavrov, as "it is necessary to do everything possible to take Russia-EU cooperation to a new level and to develop mutually beneficial and equal dialogue" (Lavrov 2011a), which is "facilitated by such factors as geographic proximity, long history of political, economic and cultural ties" (Nabiullina 2011a).

Apart from that, Chizhov (2012a) notes that further development of energy cooperation requires acknowledgement that "energy cooperation … is a two-way street" because "naturally, the interests of the European Union as consumer and of Russia as supplier are far from being identical on all parameters", and yet the two actors are joined by a common interest, which is "creating favourable conditions for companies operating in the market [… and] intergovernmental energy cooperation" (Chizhov 2012a; Putin 2014a). By accepting the divergence of EU and RF energy interests, the 2010–2014 Russian integration discourse differs from the previous period, which hardly mentioned the issue. At the same time, the integration discourse takes the nurturing of energy relations further, and, according to Manturov (2013a), "the EU and Russia are not in a mere consumer-supplier relationship, they are

partners" (President of Russia 2012), who are "well disposed toward joint work to [. . .] build up productive international partnerships" (Lavrov 2011a; Putin 2014a) in the process of mutual and symmetrical convergence, based on "the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and trust . . ." (Shmatko 2010a, 2010c; Lavrov 2011a; Manturov 2014a, b), which emphasises the symmetry with regard to both benefits and convergence of the RF and the EU.

The prerequisite for the successful functioning of the strategic energy partnership between the RF and the EU is the existence of a new, legally binding agreement that would "replace the present, outdated Partnership and Cooperation Agreement" (Putin 2013a; Lavrov 2011b; Naryshkin 2012). Putin (2014c, d) declared that "we are urging the EU and European countries to work consistently towards a new basic partnership and cooperation agreement between Russia and the EU" that "should include a large and maximally concrete chapter on trade and economic relations" (but also Ulyukaev 2014a; Lavrov 2014a; Chizhov 2011c). Putin (2012c) also stressed that "results in the energy sector convincingly demonstrate what we can achieve when we take a pragmatic and business-like approach to cooperation, without ideological and other stereotypes", and therefore "this logic should be the basis for the new basic agreement between Russia and the Europena Union" and "we have a good opportunity now to cement in this agreement our strategic goals and outline our main long-term cooperation areas" (but also Lavrov 2014b).

Besides the legislative framework, the Russian integration discourse endeavours to reinforce the RF–EU strategic cooperation and partnership by stressing the existence of an institutional framework. This takes the form of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, which "is an important project of mutual convergence and an effective tool for energy cooperation" but also an opportunity to ensure permanent mechanisms of rapid response to co-monitor and neutralise crises, make common decisions and implement them" (Lavrov 2011a), while respecting the fact that "the energy policies of Russia and the EU are different and independent, but there are areas in which they agree and where beneficial synergies may be formed" (Novak 2013a, but also Lavrov 2014c).

Energy cooperation is newly also implemented via the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation, which "builds on results achieved so far in the context of the four Russia-European Union Common Spaces" (Chizhov 2011d) and where "under the sectoral dialogues our sides will gradually be bringing together technical regulations, eliminating trade barriers and expanding opportunities for cooperation" (Lavrov 2012b; see also Chizhov 2011c, d), wherefore "we acknowledge that mutual energy integration with the EU can help support policies focused on the modernisation of the Russian energy sector" (Chizhov 2011b; Medvedev 2011a, b; Nabiullina 2011b). The EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation is the central element of "the energy convergence between the RF and the EU" (Chizhov 2011a, d), though Chizhov (2011d) notes that "modernisation is not just a one-sided process of adaptation, the energy sector in the European Union needs modernisation just as much" (Shmatko 2010d; Lavrov 2012b; Putin 2012d, e).

Energy dialogue as a mechanism for implementing the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation in the energy sector is, on the one hand, based on the assumption of

the existence of mutual dependence as a qualitative attribute of the energy cooperation between Russian and the EU, where "both Parties are in need of each other and consequently both Parties are interested in preserving the level and quality of energy cooperation" (Chizhov 2014a; see also Medvedev 2010b; Shmatko 2010b). On the other hand, according to Lavrov (2014d) and Putin (2014e), due to the crisis in Ukraine, relations between Russia and the EU were "in a far-from-favourable environment", which was reflected in the stagnating demand for Russian oil in Europe and a reduction of oil export to the European market but also by "the crisis in relations with European gas consumers" in the form of "the reduction of the demand and import of gas from Russia to member states and the increase in competitiveness in the internal EU market" (Ministerstvo energetiky Rossijskoj Federacii 2014; Chizhov 2012b), which can lead to the partial reduction of interdependence.

5.5.2 *The Impact of the Norms of the Integration Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the RF in Its Relations to the EU*

As in the case of the previous RF integration discourse, the discourse in the years 2010–2014 also enters into energy relations with the EU under the influence of normativity, when as a "normative actor" it promotes values and rules that the EU should gradually accept in the process of mutual integration. This was confirmed by Putin (2012f), who said that "the biggest problem at the moment is that we still have not concluded a new basic agreement" that would address energy issues, and so "I have asked my European colleagues working on the energy chapter in the new agreement to harmonize the legislative bases of our energy policies, to protect the principles of equality and free market values while implementing the principles of modernisation" (Putin 2012e; Lavrov 2014b) "to bring our legal basis in line with the dynamically evolving Russia-EU relationship, pinpoint areas of strategic interest and generally take cooperation to a higher level" (Chizhov 2014b).

Apart from that, Russian integration discourse is also imbued with a rational approach to actions and behaviour of Russia, which as a "rational actor" in energy relations with the EU uses norms, rules, and values in an effort to obtain economic advantages, when "in the process of modernizing and integrating our economies we have harmonized rules and norms" (Khristenko 2010a; Putin 2012e) to "develop a mutually beneficial energy partnership with the aim of creating a common European energy sector, ensuring strict compliance with existing bilateral and multilateral contractual obligations" (President of Russia 2012; Ulyukaev 2013b).

The Russian integration discourse also explicitly confirms the impact of rules, norms, and values on the external identity of the Russian Federation, which as a "normative-rational actor" on the one hand promotes normative-economic mechanisms towards the EU in the effort to bring their positions in energy relations closer to each other and, on the other hand, the RF partly accepts the values, rules, and

norms of the EU in expectation of positive benefits with regard to economy and energy while asking that divergent interests be respected. Russia's position was clearly explained by Medvedev (2010a), who stressed that "I suggested implementing EU norms in Russia. That is what we did, and now, we can use EU norms for the purposes of technical regulations. This, too, is an element of the Partnership for Modernization", while "both sides are engaged in substantial dialogue [. . .] in the area of promoting a low-carbon and resource efficient economy. . ." (Chizhov 2011c, d, 2012c), which will "support the modernization of Russian economy, which is based primarily on the export of energy resources" (Medvedev 2010c, 2011b; Putin 2013b).

In the context of this identity, Russia prefers normative-economic interests in energy relations with the EU with the strategic aim of ensuring mutually beneficial and symmetrical cooperation in the energy sector when, according to Chizhov (2014a), "energy cooperation allows Russian state treasury to replenish its financial resources and the EU—to have predictable and stable access to energy which is a prerequisite for economic development" (Nabiullina 2011b). In other words, "cooperation in the energy sphere is indispensable for economic development of both Parties, for preserving and increasing employment, maintaining and improving the well-being of people in Russia and EU countries" (Chizhov 2014a; see also Lavrov 2014b; Novak 2013a). Nonetheless, "Russia and the EU should bear in mind that energy cooperation in the gas sector is a two-way street, and ignoring the interests of one's partner can do significant and—more importantly—unjustified harm to the partnership as a whole" (Chizhov 2012a; Ulyukaev 2013a, 2014b).

5.6 The Liberalisation Discourse of Russia in 2010–2014

5.6.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Liberalisation Discourse

The energy liberalisation discourse of the RF in the period of 2010–2014 also continues most of the themes and content of the preceding discourse. This means that the Russian liberalisation discourse mainly emphasises the economic perspective of RF–EU energy cooperation (bilateral and multilateral) and the efforts of Russian energy companies to strengthen their presence in the internal energy market of the EU while also defending Russia's behaviour as correct and criticising some of the EU's actions as misguided.

On the other hand, compared to the years 2004–2009, the RF liberalisation discourse in 2010–2014 introduces several shifts. First, the discourse takes much greater note of the importance of Russia's accession to the WTO and the latter's positive influence on the Russian economy and energy relations with the EU. Second, the liberalisation discourse newly discusses the issue of Russian dependence on the export of energy resources and the need to modernise the

Russian economy and energy sector, meaning innovations and liberalisation. And third, whereas the previous period gave considerable focus to the RF's objections to the Energy Charter Treaty and its refusal to ratify the document, the 2010–2014 discourse newly criticises the EU's Third Energy Package instead, claiming it to be discriminatory.

On the other hand, the Russian liberalisation discourse in the years 2010–2014 continues the previous discourse's positive appreciation of the largely symmetrical character of RF–EU energy relations, which provides a framework for bilateral and multilateral cooperation that accentuates both the importance of the Russian market for the EU and individual member states and the significance of the internal energy market of the EU and member states for Russia and its energy companies. The key member state energy markets are Germany, which is the destination of "a large quantity of Russian gas" (Putin 2012c) and thus "it is in the interest of both our countries to continue our efforts" (Putin 2011b); Italy, which "is Russia's fourth largest trading partner, and bilateral trade is growing" (Putin 2013b); and France, which "offers opportunities to Russian [energy] companies" (Putin 2011a) but also European "companies and enterprises interested in entering the Russian market" (Putin 2012b; Nabiullina 2011b).

Aside from that, Russia has vital need of the EU energy market. This was confirmed, among others, by Nabiullina (2010a, 2011a), who noted that "EU countries will remain the principal trade partners of Russia and ... tapping of the European markets will be strong incentives to increase competitiveness of domestic producers", and by Shmatko (2010d), who clearly stressed that "Historically, Europe has been our principal export market. According to forecasts, its ... dependence on imports [will] increase". At the same time, "I believe there is enough understanding here of the importance of energy resources ... and of the necessity not only to develop a common energy policy and overcome fragmentation of energy markets" (Chizhov 2013c). Chizhov (2011b) claims that the joint goal of the EU and Russia is to "envisage joint steps to increase transparency, stability and predictability of energy markets, improvement of investment climate in the energy sector, promoting energy efficiency and energy savings ...".

The fulfilment of these goals and the acquirement of a better starting position for improved access of Russian entities to the internal market of the EU, according to the Russian liberalisation discourse, should be achieved via Russia's accession to the WTO, the importance of which was pragmatically assessed by Lavrov (2012b) when he said that "Russia's entry in the WTO has created conditions for the transition of trade and economic cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Union on a new level". This was also confirmed by Medvedev (2011c, d) and Nabiullina (2011a), with that "WTO accession is a significant factor [... that] meets both our national interests and the objectives of stabilising the international trading system", and so "accession to the WTO provides an opportunity for us to actively participate in forming of a global integration picture".

Contrarily, a lack of investments in individual areas of the Russian economy "is a system-wide problem" that will require, for instance, "oil companies [to] invest... in modernizing" (Shmatko 2011b, 2012), as failing to do so would negatively affect the

growth of the Russian economy, including the energy sector and relations with the EU. The second issue to hamper Russian competitiveness compared to the EU is Russia's strong orientation on the export of energy resources, when, for example, "we must work to improve the structure of our exports and stop focusing on hydrocarbons. That's our major problem, we just have to adjust our economy" (Medvedev 2013b), while "Europe accounts for over 70% of our oil exports and almost all of our pipeline gas" (Putin 2014e, f) and "the Russian budget is based on a calculation of $96 per barrel" (Putin 2014g). It is thus in the interest of Russia to reduce its dependence, wherefore "we must restructure exports" (Medvedev 2013b).

An important instrument of Russia's changed approach to the process of liberalising energy relations with the EU in the Russian liberalisation discourse is the reform and modernisation of the Russian economy and energy sector/market in the sense of innovations and greater openness, transparency, and competitiveness with the aim to increase its efficiency. This was very clearly confirmed by Putin (2013c) and Medvedev (2010d, 2011e, 2013c), who said that "we see that leading European countries carry out structural reforms to raise the competitiveness of their economies" and "we are all jointly searching for new approaches to reform [. . . by] modernizing our economy, primarily upgrading our industries and promoting innovative economy", with that "comprehensive modernisation of the country, diversification of the economy and its transition to an innovative, high-tech model of development is a key challenge" (Chizhov 2011c; Lavrov 2010a), and "the modernization policy is the top development priority for our country" (Medvedev 2011f; Khristenko 2010c).

Modernisation can also help "overcome the Russian economy's dependence on the export of energy resources" and gain "access to new technologies, creating more efficient and less energy intensive economy" (Medvedev 2010e, 2010f); thus it "is absolutely a mutually beneficial issue" (Medvedev 2011c), and "I would like to thank the EU leadership for its close attention to this idea [of modernisation]" (Medvedev 2010f, 2011e, f, g). Nonetheless, different opinions exist regarding the process of modernisation, and "our positions are naturally at odds on some issues" (Chizhov 2011c, d); with that modernisation "is by no means a one-way street, Russia itself having a lot to offer to its partners" (Chizhov 2011c).

At the same time and similarly to the previous Russian liberalisation discourse, Putin (2012f) rejected EU criticism of insufficient liberalisation of the Russian energy sector, when, for example, "Russia's energy market has already been liberalized to a large extent and a quarter of it is in the hands of foreign investors" (see also Gryzlov 2010b; Chizhov 2013d; Lavrov 2010b). Likewise, Belousov (2013a) refuted the European Commission's claim that "we do not have market prices for gas" because "our domestic prices for gas are around $100 for 1000 m^3 and are slowly rising. That is the same price as they have in the USA".

Contrarily, in this context Chizhov (2014b) accused the EU both of monopolising the market with "a single subject as the executive organ of the EU proposed by Prime Minister Tusk" and of creating and promoting non-market principles and rules in relation to the RF and its energy company, which negate the process of liberalisation in RF–EU energy relations. Whereas the original subject of differing opinions was the ET, which "lacked a transitive protocol and did not cover investments and trade

with nuclear material" but has "ceased to be seen as an important issue" (Chizhov 2010a, b, 2013e), a new problem arose in the form of the so-called Third Energy Package. According to Lavrov (2013c), the packages violates "the philosophy of EU energy policy, which concentrates on the liberalisation of the energy market" and also "directly affects the plans of development of energy cooperation between Russia and EU countries" (but also Chizhov 2014b, c, d, e; Ulyukaev 2014b).

The main objections voiced by Russian political representatives regarding the Third Energy Package can be summarised in three points. First, "one of the last vestiges of obsolete 'zero-sum' thinking relates to the spillover effect of EU attempts to impose its policy on third countries . . . A prime example is the so-called EU Third Energy Package that under the euphemistic name of 'unbundling' requires separation of energy production, transportation and sales in EU markets . . . through forcible expropriation of assets. This piece of legislation not only runs counter to the provisions of the 1994 Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement as well as several bilateral arrangements. In our view, it undermines long-term EU energy security, competitive advantages of regional energy markets, and above all, the interests of European consumers" (Chizhov 2012d, e). Second, it "creates a threat to earlier Russian investment in the energy sector of the EU member states and will greatly hamper such investment in the future" (Lavrov 2010a; Putin 2010a). Third, its "aggressive and retrospective implementation already affects the interests of Russian companies" (Lavrov 2011a, b) and is discriminatory because "the adoption of the relevant gas directive seriously restricts traditional gas suppliers, who have invested in the European gas sector's development over several decades, in their activity on the EU market" (Putin 2013d, e).

Another area of conflict connected to the Third Energy Package is the antimonopoly investigation of Gazprom by the European Commission, which Shmatko (2011b) terms "unacceptable and unjustified" (Novak 2014b) because if "the EU doesn't yet have a single energy market . . . Gazprom . . . cannot fragmentise something that is not yet in existence" (Chizhov 2013b). Putin claims that there are a number of reasons why the EC accused Gazprom in the matter, but "the main [reason] is the economic crisis in the eurozone . . . United Europe wants to preserve its political influence but it wants us to pay for it. This is not constructive" (Putin 2012g; Novak 2013b, c). However, the Russian Federation does not plan to "take steps" against the EU as "our [energy] relations are very constructive, very positive" (Putin 2012g; Novak 2013d; Shmatko 2011c).

5.6.2 The Impact of the Norms of the Liberalisation Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the RF in Its Relations to the EU

As in the case of the previous RF liberalisation discourse, the discourse in the years 2010–2014 also evinces the impact of normativity and rationality on Russian identity. On the one hand, the RF acts as a "rational actor" in energy relations

when it makes rational use of economic norms, rules, and values to bring about changes in EU behaviour, which should benefit both parties; thus "we have clearly indicated that the measures of the Third Energy Package endanger the process of modernising the energy sectors of Russia and the EU, which is our joint project" (Medvedev 2013a, d), and "the EU should consider changing its energy package" (Lavrov 2011a), which would be beneficial. On the other hand, under the influence of these norms, values, and rules, Russia as a "normative actor" strives to justify its approach to the EU by claiming that "in the gas sector . . . nothing is more sustainable than long-term contracts that are tied to the market price for oil. This is an absolutely fair pricing system. What can be more liberal than the market price for oil, which is traded on the exchange?" (Putin 2014h). Also, "modern Russia never committed to . . . regulate the economies of [EU] countries through the use of non-market measures" (Putin 2012g, h; Nabiullina 2010b).

The Russian liberalisation discourse evinces the influence of norms and values on the external identity of the RF, which as a "rational-normative actor" rationally uses tools in the form of liberal-market norms, rules, and values to defend its actions, to firmly and critically point out the implementation of non-market obstacles by the EU and convince the latter of the need to remove these barriers and ensure greater accessibility and equal approach of Russian companies to European energy markets. This should then provide Russia with maximum benefits and reinforce its energy cooperation with the EU, when "the creation of a European system of connected gas pipelines and further liberalization of the market must be considered" as "an increased number of gas retailers will only lead to an increase in the prices of gas and a large number of infrastructure projects will be stopped". As a solution, "we have offered the European Commission an intergovernmental agreement that would exempt large Russian gas infrastructure projects from the norms of the Third Energy Package" (Shmatko 2011b, c; Putin 2012i; Lavrov 2014d).

At the same time, Russia criticises the Third Energy Package, which "undermines long-term energy security, competitive advantages of regional energy markets, and especially the interests of European consumers" (Putin 2014h), and "any attempts to use the Third Energy Package retrospectively are contrary to the norms of international law and practices, which have always existed in relations between civilised states" (Lavrov 2014c). Therefore, Russia "reserves the right to explain to our partners our concerns" (Chizhov 2013a; Putin 2012b). Although the Third Energy Package declares the "aim of liberalising EU energy market, . . . some provisions of the Package have brought results opposite to those expected. The Package has been hindering investments in construction of new infrastructure" (Chizhov 2013a) and "worsens investment conditions for Gazprom and other Russian companies on the European energy market" (Belousov 2013b), and yet both the EU and Russia need investments that are "absolutely essential for us to be able to modernize our [economies]" (Medvedev 2010c). Consequently, "mechanical application of the provisions of the Third Energy Package puts a serious question mark over the plans to modernize energy systems and develop infrastructure" (Putin 2010a; Chizhov 2013a).

In the framework of its rational-normative identity, the RF emphasised rational-liberalisation interests in energy relations with the EU with the strategic goal of bolstering the presence of Russian energy companies in the internal gas market in the EU and improving mutual energy trade. This was confirmed by Medvedev (2013e), as "the gas market works on the principle of 'take or pay', and long-term contracts are the foundation of our gas cooperation with the EU", which is "an important factor for our European consumers [as] they can be certain that this volume will definitely be delivered according to those rules of setting the price. This creates certainty in European energy security" (Putin 2014h; Belousov 2013b; Ulyukaev 2013b; Novak 2014b).

5.7 The Diversification Discourse of Russia in 2010–2014

5.7.1 The Main Themes and Contents of the Diversification Discourse

Finally, the third RF discourse in the years 2010–2014, that is, energy diversification, adopts all of the main themes, content, and characteristic features of the discourse of 2004–2009. As in the case of the previous period, the diversification discourse places the greatest emphasis on the importance of Russia as a primary and reliable supplier whose diversification projects contribute the EU energy security, which is threatened by unreliable Ukraine; however, the EU does not always see these new Russian pipelines in a positive light due to worries of increased dependency, and so the RF must also diversify towards the east.

On the other hand, the 2010–2014 diversification discourse evinces several changes compared to Russia's 2004–2009 discourse. First, influenced by the lasting instability of Ukraine and deteriorating relations with the EU, the RF diversification discourse gained much great prominence and importance towards the end of the second period, which takes much greater note of the EU's measures for strengthening energy security and reducing dependency. Second, in reaction to the EU's efforts to reduce the volume of Russian gas and oil exports, the RF's diversification discourse pays more attention to the necessity of helping Russian firms break through into Asian markets and build strategic partnerships with new consumers.

However, both diversification discourses maintain that "the European Union is the number one investor into the Russian economy" (Chizhov 2013f), while "Russia supplies more than 20% of EU gas consumption and 40% of imported gas" and "has retained its role safeguarding European energy security, providing about a third of total EU imports of oil and natural gas" (Chizhov 2011b, 2013f; Shmatko 2010b, d). The RF's importance for the EU was succinctly described by Novak (2014c), who declared that "without Russian energy resources, European economy would not be able to function" and "in the interest of ensuring energy security, we are prepared to

compete with potential producers to supply energy to the EU, but as yet no one can offer an alternative to the RF".

Besides that, both diversification discourses show Russia as a stable and reliable partner for supplying oil and gas to the EU, as "during the 'Cold War', and during the period of radical changes in Europe in the 90s of the last century, we always follow all the obligations to our partners" (Lavrov 2012b) or "our country has been exporting energy resources to Europe for more than 45 years now and has always met its obligations on time and in full" (Putin 2014a) and "the Soviet Union never—I want to stress this—never cut off supplies to Europe. And the RF is doing the same" (Putin 2014i; Medvedev 2010e). At the same time, Lavrov (2014d, e, f) clearly emphasised that "we are ready to continue to build up cooperation [with the EU]", and Russia will continue to be "a reliable partner to ensure European energy security" (Novak 2014a).

The Russian Federation, or its energy companies, boosts European Union energy security especially "by investing significant financial resources in maintenance of existent pipelines and construction of new ones in order to diversify routes of supply of natural gas [to Europe]" (Chizhov 2013c; see also Lavrov 2011c, 2014d). The new oil pipelines include the "Baltic Pipeline System" (BPS 1 and BPS 2), which is designed as "an alternative route for oil supplies to Europe" (Novak 2013d, e, but also Putin 2013b), or the re-proposed and abandoned Burgas-Alexandroupoli oil pipeline project, where "we believe that work on the oil pipeline between Russia, Bulgaria, and Greece will be renewed" (Novak 2014b).

Alternative energy transit routes for gas mainly comprise Nord Stream, which "has truly become international, pan-European … gas will now be flowing through this transit corridor not only to Germany but other European nations as well", and "we are also now getting requests from Scandinavian nations and Great Britain" (Putin 2012j; Medvedev 2011d; Gryzlov 2011). Nord Stream thus, according to Medvedev (2010g, 2011b, d), "will create additional opportunities for delivering gas supplies to our European partners" and "marks a new stage in strengthening the relations between Russia and the EU". The second project was to be South Stream, which "is being developed by … Gazprom and its partners in Germany, France and Italy" (Lavrov 2011d). The South Stream pipeline was to be "a strategically important project" for the EU (Medvedev 2013f; Putin 2010b), proposed "to diversify routes of supply of gas to Southern and South-Eastern Europe" (Chizhov 2013a) to "reduce transit risks" and provide "guaranteed long-term gas supplies" (Lavrov 2014g).

In connection with the realisation of these two Russian diversification projects, Lavrov tried to repeatedly persuade European countries that "the Nord Stream pipeline will not increase the EU's energy dependency, that's absurd" (Lavrov 2010b, 2011a) and likewise "South Stream and Nabucco may be considered as mutually supplementary projects" (Chizhov 2011a). On the contrary, both projects play a role "in ensuring the energy security of the EU" (Chizhov 2011a, 2014b). At the same time, the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines "will make a weighty contribution to the complex energy security of Europe, contributing to the diversification of gas supply routes, which will allow to reduce transit risks" (Lavrov 2014f, g; Shmatko 2010c; Chizhov 2012e; Putin 2014j; Novak 2013e, f).

Both RF diversification discourses then concur that the main risk for energy transit routes is Ukraine, as "in 2008, a crisis occurred because Ukraine practically blocked transit. But Russia was not responsible for this" (Putin 2014h). And "illegitimate … and unfair requirements from Ukraine, a demand for an unbelievable price cut for the Ukrainian supplies, resulted in Ukraine's refusal to transit Russian gas to Europe" (Putin 2014i). "But when Ukrainian partners refused to transit our gas and just stole it from the transit pipeline, what were we supposed to do? Stop delivering gas to Ukraine. You have to pay for what you get" (Putin 2014i, h; Lavrov 2014d; Medvedev 2013g).

The same "self-exonerating" rhetoric is present in the Russian diversification discourse in the case of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine from 2014, when "the crisis in Ukraine is still unfolding" (Putin 2014h, i) because "as you may know, last year, to help Ukraine pay the debt it accrued … to normalize the situation we [lent them] $3 billion" and "we gave them a discount of $100 per 1000 m^3 at some point as a payment for our fleet's base in Crimea", but "the result is that the debt for the previous year was not paid out" (Putin 2014h, i), so "we were forced to interrupt gas supplies to Ukraine" (Putin 2014j), but "we are worried that Ukraine might take gas destined to Europe" (Novak 2014c). Nonetheless, "it is in Russia's national interests to help Ukraine to find a way out of the political and economic crisis" (Putin 2014k); unlike "our partners in Europe [who] recognize the legitimacy of today's authorities in Kiev, but are not doing anything to support Ukraine—not a single dollar, not a single euro" (Putin 2014l), "there are only promises that are not backed up by any real actions" (Putin 2014m). Contrarily, according to Putin, it is clear that "the EU is using Ukraine's economy as a source of raw foodstuffs, metal and mineral resources", whereas "the Russian Federation … continues to provide economic support and still subsidizes Ukraine's economy with hundreds of millions and billions of dollars" (Putin 2014l, m; Lavrov 2014e; Naryshkin 2014).

Apart from that, the Russian diversification discourse newly takes much greater note of the EU's measures in reaction to the crisis in Ukraine in the effort to "diversify gas supplies and reduce its so-called dependence on Russia" (Novak 2014d). First, "the actual alternative to such 'diversification' is replacing cheap Russian gas with expensive American gas" (Novak 2014c, d). That was further emphasised by Medvedev (2014b), who claimed that "the price of LNG to be supplied from the United States of America will be 40% more expensive than the Russian pipeline gas", but "I can hardly imagine an American gas company choosing to supply gas to Europe, where the Asian market would pay 50% as much" (Chizhov 2014f). Second is "the proposal of such non-market measures, which are reminiscent of the Soviet era. For instance, Poland has currently launched an initiative of the so-called Energy Union to create a unified European institution for the centralized purchase of oil and gas in the EU" (Novak 2014d, but also Putin 2014e).

Third, "in an attempt to damage the energy partnership between Russia and the EU, some member states headed by the European Commission are blocking the South Stream project" (Lavrov 2010b, 2011a). At the same time, "just recently, we have heard from Brussels that the negotiations on the South Stream will be frozen until Russia recognises the Kiev authorities. What do you think, is this constructive? … Brussels is guided by the wish to punish and take revenge, rather than a natural

aspiration to ensure the legal and natural economic and other interests of its member states" (Lavrov 2014f). And finally, fourth is "punishing Russia by sanctions, which I do not see as economic, but rather as politically motivated . . . and will not benefit the EU in any way" (Novak 2014e) because they are "an unlawful and hostile act against Russia, and a step that will definitely damage . . . Russia-EU relations" (Putin 2014n). Also, "sanctions against the Russian gas sector are unrealistic. We have a number of countries that satisfy 100% of their gas consumption through supplies from our country. . . . Banning the import of Russian gas into these countries would have a catastrophic effect on their citizens and industry"; therefore, "we are very sceptical about the EU's plans to reduce their energy dependency on Russia" (Novak 2014f).

The RF's response to the EU's efforts to reduce its dependency on Russian gas and oil, similarly to the previous Russian diversification discourse, is based on the Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2035 (2014), which declares the need "to focus on the diversification of export, to bolster Russian presence on the energy markets of the Asia-Pacific region". While "there is no doubt that the current situation in our relations with the European Union is affecting the scale and rates of Russia's cooperation in other geographical areas. We are actively promoting a strategic partnership with China" (Lavrov 2014d; Medvedev 2014b, c), and "once we begin executing our contract with China, that country will become an equal consumer of Russian gas, just like Germany [. . . yet potentially] China will become our largest gas partner" (Putin 2014i). At the same time, Russia also intends to develop energy relations "with countries in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East" (Lavrov 2014d; Novak 2014g; Manturov 2013b).

5.7.2 The Impact of the Norms of the Diversification Discourse on the Identity and Interests of the RF in Its Relations to the EU

As in the years 2004–2009, the RF diversification discourse in 2010–2014 is marked by the influence of a normative and security-oriented approach to Russian external identity. On the one hand, security norms, rules, and values cause Russia to behave as a "security actor" towards the EU, emphasising the importance of Russia and its energy supplies for EU security, when, for example, "we are in favour of contributing to the EU's energy security by diversifying energy transport routes" (Lavrov 2014d, g). On the other hand, influenced by normativity, the RF applies security and economic norms and values as a "normative actor" in the process of desecuritisation in the endeavour to soften EU criticism of Russian interventions in Ukraine, where "Russia is interested in supplies to reliable customers who will pay the agreed price . . . But when Ukrainian partners refused to transit our gas and just stole it from the transit pipeline [. . . we had to] stop delivering gas to Ukraine" (Putin 2014i; Medvedev 2014c; Novak 2014h).

The RF's identity as a "security-normative actor" in the diversification discourse is formed with the help of security and economic norms, rules, and values, which it uses as normative-defensive tools in energy relations with the EU with the strategic goal of convincing the EU of Russia's reliability and the importance of its diversification projects for reinforcing EU energy security while also striving to show that EU measures against the RF are unnecessary and damaging to their mutual energy relations. In the context of these facts, the Russian diversification discourse further desecuritises the energy issue, claiming it is not a security problem in relations with the EU, and with that this process of desecuritisation is based on several factors:

First, denying that the EU is overly energy dependent on Russia, when "some Western politicians make insistent calls to artificially reduce Russia's share in European energy supplies and see EU dependence on Russian gas as a threat. I do not think that there is anything to fear in this respect because this dependence is always reciprocal" (Putin 2014a).

Second, repeatedly stressing that "Russia has never used energy for political aims" (Chizhov 2014c) because "using energy as a geopolitical tool increases instability and damages the investment climate" (Novak 2014d).

Third, emphasising that "Russia was and is a reliable supplier of energy to the European Union" (Novak 2014b), and "we expect that the consumers and the transit countries have the same responsible approach … we are seriously concerned over the statements made by some Ukrainian radicals who are threatening the transit of our gas to Europe" (Putin 2014e).

Fourth, the process of desecuritisation is supported by denying the European Commission's request "that intergovernmental agreements between Russia and countries which are parties to the South Stream project … should be revised to make them comply with the provisions of the EU's Third Energy Package" (Lavrov 2014e), while "Russia is ready to contribute to ensuring energy security of our European partners through implementation of new projects, including the construction of South Stream" (Chizhov 2012a; Lavrov 2014f).

Fifth, refusing investigations of Gazprom by the EC and sanctions that "demonstrate nothing less than a serious lack of wisdom and diplomatic skill on the part of our American and European partners" (Chizhov 2014d) because "sanctions … are not very effective and almost never produce the hoped-for results, even when used against small countries, let alone against a country like Russia" (Putin 2014o).

In the framework of its security-normative identity, the RF advocates its security-diversification interests in energy relations with the EU with the strategic aim of increasing its share of the EU energy market and diversifying its transit routes. This was confirmed by Chizhov (2012a), who said that "I would like to stress that in the long run South Stream and gas pipelines implemented in the framework of the EU Southern Gas Corridor will not be competitors". On the contrary, these projects "will complement each other—all available estimates … suggest that gas demand in the EU will only grow, so there should be enough room for all projects in the market", and Russia is prepared to "make a weighty contribution to the complex energy security of Europe, contributing to the diversification of gas supply routes" (Lavrov 2014g, h; Chizhov 2012a).

5.8 A Comparison of the RF Discourses in 2010–2014 and 2004–2009

Table 5.4 provides an overview of the main themes of Russian energy discourses of integration, liberalisation, and diversification in the years 2010–2014, which again clearly confirm the main features of all three Russian energy discourses. Compared to Table 5.1, which summarised the main themes of the three RF discourses in 2004–2009, Table 5.4 contains two fundamental differences. First, Table 5.4 shows the overall increase in the number of themes in all three RF energy discourses, which attests to the greater diversity and richness of the integration, liberalisation, and diversification discourses of the RF in the years 2010–2014. Second, the majority of the energy themes from this period were continued from Table 5.1 and supplemented with two or three new themes, which appeared in the analysed Russian documents, speeches, public statements, and discussions of political representatives of the RF.

Table 5.4 is closely connected to Table 5.5, which charts the overlaps and differences between the energy discourses of liberalisation, integration, and diversification in the years 2004–2009 and 2010–2014. Table 5.5 clearly shows that all three 2010–2014 RF discourses mostly match the content of the previous three discourses from 2004 to 2009 and diverge only in certain aspects.

Table 5.4 The main themes of the three energy discourses of the RF in 2010–2014

Integration discourse	Liberalisation discourse	Diversification discourse
– Focus on bilateral energy cooperation of Russia with member states – Russia as an equal, main trade partner with the EU – Positive view of energy cooperation with the EU, which can have different energy interests than Russia – Focus on economic benefits of RF–EU energy relations – Emphasis on the institutional and legislative framework of RF–EU energy interactions – Emphasis on integration in the sense of mutual and symmetrical convergence in the process of modernising the EU and RF energy sectors within the Partnership for Modernisation – Emphasis of the importance of mutual energy dependence between the RF and the EU, which can be harmed by the Ukrainian crisis	– Emphasis on the consolidation and increased presence of Russian companies in the internal energy market of the EU and member states – Positive view of RF–EU energy cooperation as between natural business partners – Importance of Russia's accession to the WTO for the improvement of its economy – Need to modernise the Russian economy and energy sector in the sense of innovations and greater openness and competitiveness with the aim of increasing its effectiveness – Emphasis of the successful process of liberalisation in the Russian energy market – Negative assessment of the ECT and Transit Protocol – Critical approach to the Third Energy Package and investigations into Gazprom by the European Commission	– View of the RF as a reliable partner and key supplier of oil and natural gas to EU countries – Focus on the construction of new/alternative transit routes – Conviction of the importance of new Russian gas and oil pipelines to improve EU energy security – Refusal of responsibility for the Russian energy crisis with Ukraine – Refusal of measures taken by the EU to reduce its energy dependence on Russia – Option of partly turning the flow of Russian oil and gas from Europe to the east – Expansion of presence of Russian companies to new market and building of strategic partnerships with new or current consumers

Source: compiled by the author according to Kratochvíl and Tichý (2013, p. 399)

Finally, Table 5.6 is devoted to the results of the various discussed questions in each of the energy discourses of the Russian Federation in the years 2010–2014, such as the perception of the EU by the RF; the influence of norms, rules, and values in energy relations with the EU on the identity of Russia; and its influence on

Table 5.5 Overlaps and differences between the 2004–2009 and 2010–2014 versions of the three RF energy discourses

Criteria	Integration discourse	Liberalisation discourse	Diversification discourse
Differences	– The first integration discourse differs from the second in its emphasis on the mostly complementary character of the energy interactions and its excessive advocacy of the importance of mutual dependency – The second integration discourse differs from the first in its greater focus on the divergent energy interests of the RF and the EU and the need to respect them in their interactions, newly also in its emphasis on the modernisation of the EU and RF energy sectors as an area of integration, and in its recognition of the possible weakening of the mutual energy dependency due to the Ukrainian crisis	– The first liberalisation discourse mainly differs from the second in its sidelining of the question of the Russian economy's dependence on energy exports and in its vehement refusal to ratify the ECT – The second liberalisation discourse mainly differs from the first in its emphasis on the importance of Russia's accession to the WTO, its greater demand for the modernisation of the Russian economy and energy sector in the sense of innovation and liberalisation, and newly in its criticism of the so-called third liberalisation package (the Third Energy Package)	– The first diversification discourse mainly differs from the second in its repeated emphasis of the need to construct the alternative gas pipeline Nord Stream – The second diversification discourse mainly differs from the first in its reaction to and refusal of the EU measures to improve its energy security and reduce its dependency and in its greater focus on the need to expand the presence of Russian firms into the Asian market and build strategic partnerships with new consumers
Overlaps	– Both discourses focus on the bilateral energy cooperation of the RF with EU member states and the importance of Russia for the European Union – Both discourses highlight the positive importance of the energy cooperation, which brings mutual benefits and advantages to both actors – Both discourses stress the need for a legislative and institutional framework of mutual energy relations based on interdependence	– Both discourses agree on the positive framework of the mutually beneficial RF–EU energy cooperation based on free-market principles – Both discourses focus on the efforts of Russian companies to improve their presence in the energy markets of the EU and its member states – Both discourses defend the RF's correct behaviour while criticising the EU's wrong behaviour	– Both discourses place a matching importance on the RF as a reliable main supplier to the EU – Both discourses note the need to construct new transit routes due to Ukraine's unreliability – Both discourses agree on Russia's need to diversify its transit routes towards the east

Source: Compiled by the author

Table 5.6 The perception of the EU and the impact of energy relation norms and values on the identity and interests of the RF in each of the three discourses in 2010–2014

Type of discourse	Perception of the EU by the RF	Impact of norms and values on RF negotiations in energy relations with the EU	Impact of norms and values on the foreign-policy identity and interests of the RF
Integration	The EU as a strategically important, reliable energy consumer and the RF's main economic partner with partly different interests	On the one hand, the RF promotes economic norms and values in its energy relations with the EU in the effort to bring about a mutual convergence of their positions in their energy relations, while, on the other, Russia partly accepts the values and norms of the EU in expectation of the ensuing benefits related to the economy and energy while demanding respect for the divergent interests of the EU and the RF	A strong influence of norms and values on the external identity of the RF, which—as a "normative-rational actor"—prefers normative-economic interests vis-à-vis the EU in the effort to ensure a mutually beneficial and symmetrical energy cooperation for both parties
Liberalisation	The EU as a key business and energy partner that naturally has different interests and attitudes in some areas than the RF	The RF employs liberal-market norms and values in relation to the EU with the intention of defending its behaviour, criticising the implementation of non-market obstacles by the EU, and convincing the latter of the need to ensure equal access of Russian firms to EU energy markets, which should bring a profit to the RF and strengthen its energy cooperation with the EU	Norms and values shape the external identity of the RF, which—as a "rational-normative actor"—stresses its rational-liberalisation interests vis-à-vis the EU with the aim to expand the presence of Russian companies in the EU's internal gas market and improve its energy trade with the EU
Diversification	The EU as a business and energy partner but also partly as a rival with significantly different interests and expectations	The RF desecuritises its energy relations with the EU when it employs security-economic norms and values as defensive tools to convince the EU of Russia's reliability and the importance of its diversification projects for improving energy security while also	The influence of norms and values on the external identity of the RF, which—as a "security-normative actor"—advocates its diversification and security interests vis-à-vis the EU in the effort to increase its share of the European energy

(continued)

Table 5.6 (continued)

Type of discourse	Perception of the EU by the RF	Impact of norms and values on RF negotiations in energy relations with the EU	Impact of norms and values on the foreign-policy identity and interests of the RF
		persuading the EU of the needlessness of taking measures against the RF, as such measures are harmful to their energy interaction	market and diversify its transit routes

Source: Compiled by the author according to Tichý and Kratochvíl (2014, p. 25)

Russian interests. Table 5.6 corroborates Tables 5.4 and 5.5 to confirm that the discussed questions in all three RF energy discourses in the years 2010–2014 largely match the results of the RF discourses of integration, liberalisation, and diversification in the previous period of 2004–2009.

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Chapter 6
The Comparison of the Three Energy Discourses of the European Union and the Russian Federation in 2004–2014

6.1 The Comparison of the Content and Main Themes of the Three Discourses of the EU and Russia

The energy discourse of both the EU and the RF is characterised by a number of shared features and several divergent attributes. On the one hand, both energy discourses share a similar content structure and argumentation method, used by political representatives of the RF and the EU with the aim of convincing the other party of the correctness of their own actions and the necessity of changing the behaviour of their counterpart. On the other hand, whereas the Russian energy discourse applies an argumentation technique that is much more diverse, open, and direct, the argumentation technique of the EU energy discourse is—bar some exceptions—bound by diplomatic style and correctness. This is notable in all three EU and RF discourses, which are compared hereafter.

6.1.1 The Comparison of the Content and Main Themes of the Integration Discourses of the EU and the RF

Both integration energy discourses in the years 2004–2014 bear two identical traits. First, both the EU and the Russian integration discourses are clearly dominant over the other EU and RF energy discourses, although a slight weakening of this dominant position can be seen for both actors at the end of the analysed period as a consequence of the military instability and political crisis in Ukraine. Second, both the EU and the RF integration discourses are notable for the minimal amount of changes they incurred between the two analysed periods of 2004–2009 and 2010–2014. At the same time, the EU and Russian integration discourses are, bar a few exceptions, largely congruent in terms of content and main themes.

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Both the EU and the RF integration discourses in the years 2004–2014 concur in their positive perception of EU-RF energy cooperation and the significance they place in it, when, for example, Piebalgs (2008) clearly emphasises the importance of "close ties" in energy relations with Russia. This was further elaborated by Buzek (2010a), who notes that "Russia and the EU need to cooperate more" and "our relationship can and should make us stronger and should not be seen as a threat, but rather as an opportunity". Similarly in the Russian integration discourse, Putin (2006a) repeatedly emphasises that "Russia has been [an energy partner to Europe] for over 40 years", while energy cooperation "was, still is and—I'm convinced—will continue to be developing on a long term basis and to the benefit of both Parties" (Chizhov 2014a).

Besides cooperation with the EU as a whole, the Russian integration discourse also stresses the importance of bilateral energy cooperation, especially with Germany, where "energy is traditionally among our strongest areas of cooperation", and France, as "our bilateral cooperation has always been a positive factor in European . . . affairs" (Putin 2011a, b). Contrarily for the EU, which did not pay much attention to the matter in its integration discourse in 2004–2009, bilateral relations of member states with the RF are seen in a mostly negative light in the years 2010–2014: "the EU as the EU as 27 is much more capable of having the influence that we would wish to see in Russia than individual Member States would be" (Ashton 2010), and "if we have 28 different positions, Putin's strategy of 'divide et impera' can be much more successful with regard to the EU" (Oettinger 2014a). Russia, on the other hand, sees "how difficult it is for EU countries to make such decisions. Each of the 27 countries has its own opinion, but the EU needs consensus" (Putin 2011c).

Nonetheless, the core of the integration discourses of both the EU and the RF is the acknowledgement of the mutual importance of the two actors in energy interactions, as Rehn (2008) notes: "Russia is and will remain the EU's main energy partner far into the future". Oettinger (2011) puts it in even stronger language when he stresses that the RF is no mere producer and exporter of oil, gas, coal, uranium, and electricity with no closer relation to the EU but rather that it is "the indispensable partner for European energy security". Similarly in the Russian integration discourse, Lavrov (2007a) emphasises that "the European Union is our major economic and political partner" and "in the foreseeable future, the EU will continue to be Russia's most important partner in the production, transportation, and sales of energy resources" (Chizhov 2011a).

This mutual importance of the EU and Russia is further stressed in both integration discourses with the frequent use of the word "partnership" to depict the relationship between both actors, and it is also linked with advantages and benefits acquired by the EU and Russia, as "the EU and the RF should see the mutual long-term benefits of the new energy partnership" (European Commission 2006a, p. 3), which "has a huge potential for cooperation with gains for both sides" (Barroso 2012). Likewise Putin (2006b) states that "Russia and the EU are natural energy partners", while Lavrov (2014a) notes that "there is no reasonable alternative why not to continue in the mutually beneficial and fair energy cooperation between Russia and the EU".

A further strengthening of energy relations in the process of a growing partnership between the EU and Russia should be brought about by mutual recognition of the naturally divergent interests of Russia and the EU, which neither of the two actors' discourses focused on in the first analysed period, when both integration discourses mainly emphasised the complementary character of mutual relations, as "[there exist a] community of interest and the prospects for heightened cooperation . . . in the energy field between Russia and the EU" (Piebalgs 2006) or the EU is "our main partner" with which "we have identical interests" (Lavrov 2008). Contrarily, in the second period, both integration discourses clearly emphasise the need to respect different interests, as the EU and the RF have "different interests which cannot always be brought to a common denominator" (Oettinger 2010a) or the "naturally, the interests of the European Union . . . and of Russia . . . are far from being identical on all parameters" (Chizhov 2012).

Although the previous paragraphs confirmed the presence of symmetry of benefits in both integration discourses, the EU and RF integration discourses differ considerably in the question of integration in the sense of adaptation and convergence. Whereas the EU integration discourse prefers unilateral integration, that is, the asymmetrical adaptation of Russia to the EU in energy relations, where "Russia cannot avoid economic realities and their impact on foreign policy" and "legally binding provisions on energy interdependence must be developed" (Rehn 2008), this rhetoric is later softened by the EU in favour of mutual integration in the sense of the bilateral convergence of the EU and Russia, where "both sides underline their commitment to see their mutual energy relations as a priority" (Oettinger 2010b). The Russian integration discourse refuses unilateral integration because "what is important to us is dialogue, not dictate" (Shmatko 2009), and it emphasises the need for the symmetrical integration of both actors in the process of mutual convergence, who have "the joint aim of creating a partnership in the energy sector" based on "the principles of equality, mutual benefit, and trust" (Shmatko 2010).

Contrarily, both integration discourses agree on the necessity to create a new legally binding agreement as a prerequisite to the successful functioning of the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia in the energy sector, with that the main legal instrument regulating their energy relations should be a revision of the PCA, where "essential efforts must be geared towards the promotion of compatible regulatory frameworks and the proper enforcement of rules" (Rehn 2004), with that negotiations of a new agreement for energy "need to address crucial topics like access to energy resources, . . . reciprocity, crisis prevention and cooperation" (European Commission 2011, p. 8). The Russian integration discourse uses a very similar argumentation when it emphasises that the RF and the EU should speed up negotiations "for early conclusion of a new Strategic Partnership Framework Agreement, which we regard as a vehicle for deepening our partner relations, above all in areas such as energy security" (Lavrov 2009a) and that "we have a good opportunity now to cement in this agreement our strategic goals and outline our main long-term cooperation areas" (Putin 2012a).

Besides a legal framework, in an effort to reinforce the cooperation and partnership of the EU and the RF, both integration discourses concurrently stipulate the

need for an institutional framework, which is primarily seen in the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, which provides "a common understanding of our mutual energy priorities and lay the practical foundations for an enhanced energy relationship" (Piebalgs 2006) and within which a considerable joint success was achieved, "including the Early Warning Mechanism, the EU-Russia roadmap until 2050, the energy-related aspects of the Partnership for Modernisation" (Council of the European Union 2011, p. 4). The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue is also shown in a positive light by Putin (2006c), as its framework allows both parties "to identify common approaches. We would very much like for cooperation in this field to be not only mutually beneficial, but also based on common approaches and principles, on uniform principles" while respecting the fact that "the energy policies of the EU and Russia are different and independent of each other, but there are areas in which they agree" (Novak 2013).

Both integration discourses newly note that energy cooperation is also maintained on the institutional level through the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation, which represents "a framework to promote concrete energy projects between the EU and the RF" (Oettinger 2010b) and consists of both the process of gradual convergence with the RF through the modernisation of its energy sector and also "modernisation, which is important to the EU" as it "can help in the mutual convergence of the Russian and EU energy sector" (Oettinger 2012). Similarly in the Russian integration discourse, according to Chizhov (2011b), "we recognise that mutual energy integration with the EU may contribute to the support of policies aimed at modernising the Russian energy sector in the framework of the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation", but "it would be naïve to sit idle waiting for a possibility to blindly import modernisation recipes from abroad. In our view, the 'Partnership for Modernisation' ... cannot replace own efforts either by Russia, or the European Union" (Chizhov 2011c).

Last but not least, both integration discourses agree on the importance of interdependence between the EU and Russia, where the EU needs Russian energy supplies and the RF needs the EU market and demand. This was confirmed, among others, by Ferrero-Waldner (2009, p. 2) who noted that "there is a clear interdependence". Valenzuela (2012) even suggested that this interdependence will remain unchanged for a long time because "we cannot say we do not want Russian gas. In the same way, Russia cannot say it will stop selling us gas. It cannot find an alternative buyer from one day to the next. That is not realistic". Similarly, in the Russian integration discourse, the importance of interdependence was mentioned by Lavrov (2007a), who claimed that "our interdependence shows itself most vividly in the energy sector", while at the same time, it ensures "significant budget income for the RF and, on the other hand, guarantee[s] the EU supply of energy resources needed for sustainable development of its economy" (Chizhov 2012).

Table 6.1 provides a comparison of the common and divergent features of the EU and Russian integration discourses in the years 2004–2014. Table 6.1 also highlights the similarities and differences in the perception of the Russian Federation by the European Union and vice versa in their respective integration discourses.

Table 6.1 The comparison of the common and divergent features of the integration discourses of the EU and Russia and their mutual perception in 2004–2014

Area of analysis	EU integration discourse in 2004–2014	Russian integration discourse in 2004–2014
Overlaps	– Both integration discourses concur on the importance of the energy cooperation, which brings economic benefits – Both discourses share a positive perception of interdependence	– Both integration discourses agree on the need to strengthen their strategic energy partnership – Both discourses agree on the importance of a legislative and institutional framework for energy relations
Differences	– The EU integration discourse differs from the Russian one in its emphasis on unilateral energy integration, that is, the asymmetrical adaptation of the RF to the EU, which it later modifies into the process of mutual convergence	– The Russian integration discourse differs from the European Union one in its emphasis of the need for mutual integration, that is, the mutual convergence of the EU and the Russian Federation, and in its defence of bilateral energy relations with EU member states
Perception of the EU by Russia and perception of Russia by the EU	– The RF is seen as a strategically important partner and a major energy supplier with partly divergent interests	– The EU is seen as a strategically important and reliable energy customer and a core economic partner with partly divergent interests

Source: Compiled by the author

6.1.2 The Comparison of the Content and Main Themes of the Liberalisation Discourses of the EU and Russia

The liberalisation energy discourses of the EU and Russia in the period from 2004 to 2014 have several characteristic features. On the one hand, both liberalisation discourses are, bar some slight differences, very closely aligned with their integration energy discourses. At the same time, the EU and Russian liberalisation discourses evince few changes between the two analysed periods. On the other hand, although both discourses for the most part share their content and main themes, they differ in the way they approach them.

First, both liberalisation discourses differ in their primary focus. In the case of the EU discourse, the central idea is the conviction that the creation of a fully functioning and interconnected inner energy market with the simultaneous expansion of the norms of a liberalised energy market beyond the borders of the EU will help ensure secure energy supplies, increase predictability, and improve energy relations. This was confirmed by Piebalgs (2007a): "The continued liberalisation of the energy market of the EU and the development of a common EU external energy policy have also impacted the bilateral cooperation of the EU and the RF", and "the reality is that in an open, interconnected and competitive EU energy market, Russian energy supplies will continue to play a crucial role. A fully liberalized EU energy market

will also mean more opportunities for a much greater number of Russian suppliers" (Barroso 2013a).

The Russian liberalisation discourse places considerable emphasis on the efforts of Russian energy subjects to strengthen their position on the European energy market. Apart from that, the Russian discourse distinguishes between the access of Russian entities to the energy markets of individual member states, where "it is in the interest of Russian companies to enter the energy market of Italy or Germany" (Putin 2008), and their access to the EU energy market, where "the European energy market is a key and crucial factor that ensures the growth of the Russian economy" (Nabiullina 2011).

Conversely, the EU and Russian liberalisation discourses share a positive perception of the mostly symmetrical nature of EU-RF energy relations and of the economic advantages of mutual energy cooperation, where, for instance, "Russia is the most important supplier of energy products to the EU" (European Commission 2008, p. 7) and "the inner energy market of the EU—the largest in the world—offers major business opportunities to Russian firms" (Barroso 2013b). The Russian liberalisation discourse puts it similarly via Medvedev (2008): "Europe is our greatest customer for gas and oil. It is our biggest market", "and forecasts show that it's dependence on import will increase ... That is why our basic goal in this market is to maintain and increase the share of Russian gas in Europe" (Shmatko 2011a), which "will help strengthen our mutual energy cooperation with the EU" (Putin 2006c) and "bring both parties mutually beneficial economic advantages" (Novak 2012).

This mutually beneficial energy cooperation is to be founded on two premises: first, on market conditions that are agreed upon by both EU and Russian liberalisation discourses, where "what we need is reciprocity ... and truly equal conditions concerning access to the energy market ... to increase stability and predictability in our energy relations" (Ferrero-Waldner 2006), and so this cooperation should be "based on market principles" (Ashton 2012). Putin (2006d) speaks in a very similar vein: "The whole of Europe needs our energy resources. And we must dispel all fears and create stability, reliability, and predictability" because the common goal of the EU and Russia is to "envisage joint steps to increase transparency, stability and predictability of energy markets, improvement of investment climate in the energy sector" (Chizhov 2011b). Second, on a legally binding agreement "that will include a strong energy component and must become a priority for the EU" (Pöttering 2008), but also for Russia as it will be "beneficial both for our political cooperation ... and for our business and investment relations" (Ashton 2012). However, the Russian liberalisation discourse leaves this issue practically unmentioned.

Likewise, both liberalisation discourses differ in how they think the energy market should function and how it should be accessed, as EU firms "can invest in supplier assets in Russia, but they do not have the right to independently access Russian transport infrastructure" (Rehn 2006), and yet "the gradual removal of obstacles to entry into the Russian gas industry would be an important step in the process of building mutual trust and strengthening energy cooperation" (Oettinger

2012). But according to Putin (2006a, 2012b), the actual situation is that "there are a huge number of partners working in Russia's energy sector" and "a quarter of the Russian energy market is in the hands of foreign investors".

Finally, both discourses differ in the question of what degree of liberalisation has been attained. Whereas the EU discourse emphasises the need for (further) liberalisation of the Russian energy market and sector, where "the liberalization of the energy market in Russia in accordance with its internal goals can ensure stability and predictability of demand for Russian gas and clarify the condition under which Russian companies could invest into processing and distribution in the EU" (European Commission 2008, p. 9), so "we need Russia to further liberalize its energy market" (Barroso 2013a); but the Russian discourse refuses such "criticism" from the European Commission, and Putin (2007a) repeatedly stressed that "our production and transport of energy resources is decidedly more liberalized than in many other producer countries", while Belousov (2013) confirmed that "our domestic prices for gas are about 100 dollars for 1000 m^3 and are slowly rising. That is the same price as they have in the USA".

Nonetheless, the two liberalisation energy discourses concur both on the basic framework of the liberalisation process in EU-RF energy relations, which newly focused on Russia's accession to the WTO, which "has enjoyed strong, long-term support from the EU" (Barroso 2013c) because "this step can help us create a much more reliable legal environment, not just with regard to energy" (Van Rompuy 2011). Similarly, the WTO "will support the growth of our economy and the diversification of our companies' access to the European market and will improve investments" (Medvedev 2011a), which is why "the Russian accession to the WTO is ... a good factor to help change our investment climate" (Medvedev 2011b).

At the same time, the EU and RF liberalisation discourses agree on the necessary measures or tools for the liberalisation of energy cooperation, namely, the process of modernisation in the sense of ensuring innovations, transparency, and competitiveness to achieve efficiency in the energy sector and a fully open market, where "both the Russian and the EU energy sector face the challenge to modernise" (Oettinger 2010b), which together with "improving the investment and business climate and strengthening mutual access to energy markets" (Füle 2010) is "one of the greatest challenges" (Van Rompuy 2011). Modernisation can then help the RF gain access both to "energy markets in the EU and to new technologies in energy and transport while also enabling a more efficient and less energy-demanding economy" (Medvedev 2010a), and so "it is an utterly advantageous issue for us" (Medvedev 2011b) and "I would like to thank our European partners for their help with modernisation" (Medvedev 2010a).

A disputed issue in the EU liberalisation discourse is the question of "insufficient investments into the energy sector ... low energy efficiency in Russia, those are all potential risks for the future insurance of energy supplies both in the Russian Federation itself and for European consumer countries" (Franko 2007), and if the RF does not implement the reform and modernisation of its energy market and sector, it could have serious problems due to "the strong dependence of the Russian economy on the export of energy resources to the EU" (De Gucht 2012). A disputed

issue in the Russian liberalisation discourse is the matter of US policy, where "we know what our American partners say of the energy dialogue of Russia in Europe: they come into certain countries and appeal on them not to buy our resources" (Putin 2008) and later also "the significant dependence of the Russian economy on the export of energy resources" (Medvedev 2013).

Another problematic topic of divergent approaches is the ECT. Whereas the EU discourse is convinced that the ECT, as a legal framework upon which "a real energy partnership with Russia must be built" (Ferrero-Waldner 2008), should become "the foundation for energy relations between the EU and Russia" (Buzek 2010b), contrarily, in the Russian discourse, Putin (2006e) clearly refused to ratify the ECT and especially its Transit Protocol because "our partners want to liberalize energy transit in Europe, which means it will be possible to buy or rent every section of the transit network. That would lead to massive speculations, which will not benefit the end consumers in Europe", and, second, the ECT has ceased to be "an important topic at the present time" (Chizhov 2010).

Another, more recent disputed issue on which both liberalisation discourses diverge is the so-called Third Energy Package. Whereas the EU discourse has a positive perception of the Third Energy Package as an instrument that "regulated the EU market with the aim of creating a competitive, open, and interconnected European market for electricity and gas" (Van Rompuy 2012) and "is fully compatible with the rules, values, and norms of the WTO" and "is indiscriminate" (Barroso 2011) because "the applicable rules are the same for everyone—for European firms just as much as Russian and American companies" (Valenzuela 2011), the Russian discourse sees the Third Energy Package in a negative light, as a contradiction to "the philosophy of the EU energy policy, which is focused on the liberalization of the energy market" (Lavrov 2014b), mainly because "the aggressive and retrospective application of the Third Energy Package aggravates the climate for business and investment in the EU" (Lavrov 2013) and "presents a threat to previous Russian investments in the energy sector of member states of the EU and impedes investments in the future" (Lavrov 2010).

Table 6.2 provides a comparison of the common and divergent features of the EU and Russian liberalisation discourses in the years 2004–2014. Table 6.2 also highlights the similarities and differences in the perception of the Russian Federation by the European Union and vice versa in their respective liberalisation discourses.

6.1.3 The Comparison of the Content and Main Themes of the Diversification Discourses of the EU and Russia

The third discourse of the EU and Russia, that is, energy diversification, in the years 2004–2014 has several characteristic features. First, whereas the EU diversification discourse is fundamentally different from the other two EU discourses, the Russian diversification discourse has a number of aspects in common with the other two

Table 6.2 The comparison of common and divergent features of the liberalisation discourses of the EU and Russia and their mutual perception in 2004–2014

Area of analysis	EU liberalisation discourse in 2004–2014	Russian liberalisation discourse in 2004–2014
Overlaps	– Both discourses concur on the positive perception of the mostly symmetrical character of the EU-RF energy relations and on the economic benefits of the bilateral energy cooperation based on liberalisation and market principles	– Both discourses agree on the importance of Russia's accession to the WTO and the need for a bilateral modernisation in the sense of achieving innovations and competitiveness in both economies simultaneously while ensuring an efficient energy sector and maximum access to energy markets for both actors
Differences	– The EU liberalisation discourse differs from the Russian one in its emphasis on the creation of a fully functional, liberalised and interconnected inner energy market in the EU, its requirement of a legal framework for the energy cooperation and the liberalisation of the Russian energy sector, and its promotion of the ECT and the Third Energy Package	– The Russian liberalisation discourse differs from the EU one in its focus on strengthening the presence of Russian firms in the energy markets of the EU and its member states, its refraining from any discussion of a legal framework for the energy cooperation, its refusing of EC objections regarding the insufficient liberalisation of the energy sector and its criticising of the ECT and the Third Energy Package
Perception of the EU by Russia and perception of Russia by the EU	Russia as a reliable business and energy partner that naturally may have other preferences than the EU	The EU as a key business and energy partner that naturally has other interests and opinions on certain issues

Source: Compiled by the author

Russian discourses. Second, the EU and the Russian diversification discourses both underwent only a minimum of changes in the two periods of 2004–2009 and 2010–2014, amounting merely in a shift in focus in certain themes in either discourse, and a rise in importance at the end of the analysed period. Third, both discourses are highly divergent, mainly in the attitudes of the EU and Russia to energy security issues.

The differences are notable in several aspects. First, both diversification discourses have a different perception of energy security and of Russia's role in providing it. On the one hand, the EU discourse is represented by rhetoric about the energy vulnerability of the EU combined with the need to implement a common energy strategy and provide solidarity, where, for instance, "the gas crisis demonstrated the vulnerability of EU gas security" (Piebalgs 2009), and so "I think it is time for the Union to have a real, common energy policy" (Pöttering 2009a) based on "energy solidarity as one of the principles of the EU" (Pöttering 2009b). At the same time, it is characterised by a strong demand for EU energy security. Thus,

Piebalgs (2009) declared that "the threat of gas supply interruptions was one of the main reasons for the EU's increased interest in energy security".

Last but not least, the EU discourse differs in its opinion on how energy security should be ensured. One example may be the construction of the Russian gas pipeline South Stream, which the EU "does not condemn" (Valenzuela 2012) but of which it emphasises that "South Stream . . . is not our top priority" (Oettinger 2011) because "it does not mean more gas from Russia but a greater volume of transport via a gas line that does not go through Ukraine" (Oettinger 2014b). The EU does not consider "South Stream advantageous from the perspective of increased energy security" (Oettinger 2014b) in the sense of transit route diversification.

On the other hand, the Russian diversification discourse is characterised by its emphasis both on the importance of the RF as "one of the largest suppliers of energy resources to Europe" (Putin 2006b) and on the importance of EU energy security, where "energy security remains a priority of our bilateral cooperation with the EU" (Putin 2006f). Russia's importance to the EU was probably most aptly described by Novak (2014a), who said that "Russia is rich in mineral resources, and Europe—is not. And without Russian energy resource, the European economy will not be able to function".

The Russian discourse is also characterised by its focus on the creation of new transit routes, which will bring more oil and gas to Europe and provide more opportunities for Russian energy companies to access the energy market of the EU, where Khristenko (2007) claimed that "the realisation of these projects allows us to solve the greatest task for the EU—the diversification of transit routes for energy supplies, and for the RF—the diversification of routes of sale", which is why "we invest significant funds into the construction of new oil and gas pipelines" (Chizhov 2013). The main argument in support of the construction of new Russian oil and gas lines is its alleged impact in ensuring EU energy security, where "the aim of South Stream is to significantly increase energy security . . . throughout the whole European continent" (Medvedev 2009a). Similarly, Nord Stream "creates further opportunities for gas supplies to Europe" (Medvedev 2010b).

Furthermore, the EU diversification discourse differs from its Russian counterpart in the question of Russia's reliability as a supplier of energy to the EU in connection with its role in energy crises, especially with Ukraine. In light of these facts, the EU diversification discourse further securitises the energy issue, where, for example, Borrell Fontelles (2006) repeatedly stressed that "the Russia-Ukraine crisis in natural gas supply showed how greatly energy dependent we are, and Europe has realised its vulnerability in the field of energy", while Oettinger (2014c) clearly noted that "the question of energy security has again become a policy and security priority of the EU as a consequence of the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine". Likewise, when asked whether the gas crisis undermined the credibility of both countries, Piebalgs (2009) replied: "I would say that the trust is broken because we can be cut off at any moment". Barroso went even further by stating that "the Russian Federation must choose if it wants to be a strategic energy partner or rival". If it "chooses the second option, rivalry, then we would all have to take collective political, economic and security measures" (Barroso 2014a).

In contrast, the Russian diversification discourse desecuritises the energy issue both when it refuses EU claims of its unreliability because "for more than 40 years, Russia has diligently fulfilled its obligations to its European partners in the full, to the day and to the minute" (Putin 2006g) and will continue to "be a reliable partner in ensuring European energy security" (Novak 2014b). At the same time, Russia refuses responsibility for stopping gas supplies to the EU in connection with the energy crisis with Ukraine because "as you may know ... Ukraine stopped paying for the gas it used in July 2013 ... To normalise the situation, we lent Ukraine three billion dollars and reduced the price in the first quarter of 2014 by 100 dollars per 1000 m^3 as a payment for our fleet's base in Crimea. The result is that the debt for the previous year was not paid out" (Putin 2014a), and so "we stopped gas supplies to Ukraine" (Putin 2014b). Furthermore, the fact that "our European partners unilaterally withdrew from the common effort to solve the Ukrainian crisis ... does not give Russia any alternative" (Putin 2014c).

A third aspect of the divergence between the EU and Russian diversification discourses is the requirement of reducing energy dependence on Russia and the implementation of the corresponding measures, especially in the form of diversification. The EU diversification discourse emphasises that "the dependence of the EU on Russia will remain high and may be a source of concern" (European Commission 2008, p. 7), and so "Russia [...] must not be the only partner of the EU. That is why the EU began to develop energy agreements with several of our partners" (Barroso 2006) with the goal of "reducing energy dependence on Russia", and this "dependence, which is a priority for the EU, must be reduced as quickly as possible" (Füle 2014), for "the situation in Ukraine and the tension with Russia may have a very negative impact on EU energy security" (Barroso 2014b).

To reduce the EU's energy dependence on Russia, the Union's diversification discourse stresses the need to acquire new alternative suppliers of gas, as "Although it is true that Russia has the greatest supplies of gas in the world, the greatest supplies of natural gas for the Nabucco pipeline are in the countries of the Middle East and the region around the Caspian Sea" (Piebalgs 2007b), but at the same time, "we are developing new initiatives with alternative suppliers in the region of Central Asia, North Africa, and South America" (European Council 2007). At the same time, the EU strongly supports "the Southern Corridor [which] is aimed at diversifying routes, sources and counterparties", and "we need to diversify to make sure that the risk of total gas cut-offs is avoided" (Oettinger 2011). Finally, according to Oettinger (2014a), the EU needs to "better use its own resources, including shale gas" and to develop "energy cooperation with the USA in the supply of natural gas".

Contrarily, the Russian diversification discourse regards the negative reactions of some countries to its implementation of diversification projects as unsubstantiated, as "even in the past, certain countries tried to prevent the construction of a gas line between Germany and the USSR. And nothing has changed in this respect. Only that the RF is not an 'evil empire'" (Putin 2006h). Putin (2006h) and Lavrov (2006a) repeatedly endeavoured to convince European countries that "we do not want to remove pressure from the pipeline ... Everything will stay the way it was". At the same time, "our diversification projects will not increase the EU's gas dependency

on Russia" but contrarily "decrease Europe's dependence on the vagaries of unstable countries" (Medvedev 2009b).

Besides that, the Russian discourse takes note of the set of measures that the EU has adopted in an effort to diversify its suppliers and transit routes and thus decrease its energy dependence, which the RF considers expensive and impracticable in the short term, as "the realistic alternative to such 'diversification' is the substitution of cheap Russian gas with expensive American gas" (Novak 2014a), but "I can hardly imagine the situation in which American companies would decide to supply gas to Europe when they can get 50% more in the Asian market" (Chizhov 2014b), and so "we are very sceptical to the EU's plans to reduce its energy dependence on Russia" (Novak 2014c). Such a thing "can only be achieved after a long a time" (Novak 2014d).

In connection with the EU's worries and attempts at reducing its energy dependence, Putin (2006f) indirectly intimated the possibility of the partial rerouting of the flow of Russian oil and gas from Europe to the east. Because if "I keep hearing of the undue dependence on Russia ... What do you think we will do. We will begin to search for other markets". One alternative is China, which provides "a good opportunity to build cooperation in the area of natural gas" (Lavrov 2009b), with that "when the Power of Siberia gas line is complete", China will "be our largest energy partner in the near future" (Putin 2014a). Apart from that, "we also want to build energy relations with the countries of Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East" (Lavrov 2014c).

Table 6.3 provides a comparison of the common and divergent features of the EU and Russian diversification discourses in the years 2004–2014. Table 6.3 also highlights the similarities and differences in the perception of the Russian Federation by the European Union and vice versa in their respective diversification discourses.

6.2 The Comparison of the Identities and Interests of the EU and Russia in the Context of Energy Discourse

The second part of this chapter provides a comparison of the identities and interests of the EU and the RF, which share several common features while also differing in notable ways. On the one hand, both actors evince the influence of norms, ideas, values, and rules on their identity in the context of the energy discourse. At the same time, both the EU and Russia seek to achieve either normative or strategic goals within their energy policies, which both actors perceive differently. On the other hand, whereas the EU, as a "normative-rational actor", securitises energy as a security issue in relation to Russia, the Russian Federation, as a "normative-rational actor", attempts to desecuritise energy interactions with the EU and claim they are not a security problem. Apart from that, the identities of Russia and the EU are also noticeably different in their perception of the relation between Self and Other. While the EU energy discourse regards its external identity of Self as a European "normative-rational actor" in conformity with the Russian Other/Self as a European actor, as

Table 6.3 The comparison of the common and divergent features of the diversification discourses of the EU and Russia and their mutual perception in 2004–2014

Area of analysis	EU diversification discourse in 2004–2014	Russian diversification discourse in 2004–2014
Overlaps	– Both discourses agree on the prioritisation of security issues over economic interests	– Both discourses share a common perception of energy as a strategic instrument of foreign policy
Differences	– The securitisation process of the EU discourse differs from the Russian discourse in its rhetoric of EU energy vulnerability accompanied by the need to implement a common energy strategy and EU solidarity together with the demand to ensure the Union's energy security in a different way than Russia proposes, its pointing out of Russia's unreliability as a main energy supplier to the EU due to its active participation in energy crises, and its emphasising of the reduction of the EU's energy dependence on Russia and the implementation of necessary measures to achieve this aim, mainly in the form of diversification	– The desecuritisation process of the RF discourse differs from the EU discourse in its emphasis on the important role of Russia, as the main supplier, in ensuring the energy security of the EU by constructing new transit routes, its refusing of EU objections regarding the Russian unreliability and responsibility for interrupting gas supplies to Europe in connection with energy crises, and its describing as unsubstantiated the set of measures adopted by the EU in the effort to diversify suppliers and transit routes and thus reduce its energy dependence
Perception of the EU by Russia and perception of Russia by the EU	Russia as a rival and an unreliable supplier that can use energy as an instrument of political blackmail	The EU as an energy and business partner but partly also as a rival with significantly divergent interests and attitudes

Source: Compiled by the author

a "security actor", it delimits its identity of Self in relation to the RF as a (non-)European second actor (Other) that endangers the energy security of the EU (Self). In contrast, the RF energy discourse regards its external identity of Self as a European "normative-rational actor" in conformity with the EU Self/Other and likewise endeavours to join its identity of Self with the European Other when it acts as a European "security actor" that stabilises the energy security of the EU (Other).

In the same way, shared and divergent features can be identified with regard to EU and Russian interests. On the one hand, both energy discourses show a connection and co-influence between their identity and their interests. On the other hand, the EU as a consumer and Russia as a producer have largely different energy interests.

6.2.1 *The Comparison of the Identities and Interests of the EU and Russia in Their Integration Discourses*

The EU integration discourse in 2004–2014 is characterised by a strong presence of norms, rules, and values in the EU's approach to Russia, exemplified by "commitments to ... transparent, equitable, stable and effective legal and regulatory frameworks" (Piebalgs 2006), "assuming that they the basic values upon which the Union is founded will be shared and promoted" (European Parliament 2012). At the same time, the integration discourse evinces a strong influence of norms and values on the external identity of the EU, which—as a "normative actor"—constructs its Self in relation to Russia as a temporally different Other when it promotes its own mostly economic norms, values and rules, which the RF should gradually adopt. This was confirmed by Mendelson (2008), who said that Russia should gradually accept "the EU's norms and rules, but also its legal model and acquis"; furthermore, the RF should "respect international norms and values" (Barroso 2014c) in the energy sector.

Its identity as a "normative actor" formed by intersubjectivity then predetermines the EU's interests, which underwent a certain transformation. Whereas in the years 2004–2009 the EU promoted the need for the unilateral integration of the RF, which is needed "to ensure a secure and attractive investment climate" (Piebalgs 2006) and to "strive to achieve a greater degree of connection and integration with the EU" (Mendelson 2007), during the tenure of the second Barroso Commission, this interest morphed into one of the integrations in the sense of mutual convergence with the RF "on the basis of common values, mutual interest, mutual benefit and mutual respect" (Barroso 2012) because "predicability is a key to good economic, energy relations" (Füle 2010). In other words, through normative instruments, the EU integration discourse prefers mostly normative-integrative interests in energy interactions with Russia with the normative aim of ensuring integration and mutual convergence and improving stability and predictability in energy cooperation, which will bring benefits while acknowledging the different interests of the EU and Russia.

Similarly, while the Russian integration discourses in 2004–2014 show the presence of economic norms, values, and rules in the normative behaviour of the RF, which "hopes that our European colleagues will support and adopt the norms and rules of equal rights and mutual respect" (Putin 2007b), on the other hand, Russia also makes rational use of some EU norms, rules, and values "in the process of the modernisation and integration of our economies", as "we have harmonised our rules and norms ... to be able to develop a mutually beneficial partnership in energy" (President of Russia 2012). In other words, the Russian integration discourse places importance on the influence these norms, values, and rules have on the external identity of the RF, which—as a "normative-rational actor"—constructs its temporal Self in conformity with a similar EU Self when it demands that "the EU, as a participant of the Petersburg summit, adopts its rules, norms, and values for energy cooperation" (Lavrov 2006a), which together with the need for "modernisation of the economy and the energy sector is a very strong argument for the RF to pursue deeper integration with the EU" (Putin 2011b).

Table 6.4 The comparison of the identities and interests of the EU and Russia in their integration discourses in 2004–2014

Discourse	Impact of norms and values on the external identity of the Self/Other	The relation between identity and interests, goals, and instruments in energy interactions
EU integration discourse in the years 2004–2014	A strong impact of norms and values on the external identity of the EU, which as a "normative actor" constructs its Self in relation to Russia as a temporally different Other when it promotes its own (mainly economic) norms, values and rules, which the Russian Federation should gradually adapt to	In the context of its intersubjective identity, the EU uses normative instruments to promote mostly normative-integrative interests in its energy relations with the RF with the strategic goals of ensuring the integration and convergence of Russia and the EU and improving the stability and predictability in the mutual energy cooperation, which will bring both parties' benefits while their divergent interests will be recognised
Russian integration discourse in the years 2004–2014	An important impact of norms and values on the external identity of Russia, which as a "normative-rational actor" constructs its temporal Self in conformity with a similar EU Self when it promotes its own economic norms and values towards the EU while simultaneously (partly rationally) accepting the values and norms of the EU	In the context of its intersubjective identity, in its energy relations with the EU, the RF prefers to pursue its normative-economic interests via normative instruments with the strategic goal of converging RF and EU positions in expectation of its own advantages while simultaneously ensuring a mutually beneficial and symmetrical cooperation in the energy interaction while respecting the divergent interests of Russia and the EU

Source: Compiled by the author

This intersubjective identity forms the RF's preferences, which uses normative instruments in energy relations with the EU to achieve mostly normative-economical interests with the strategic goal of converging the positions of Russia and the EU in expectation of gains for itself while also securing mutually beneficial and symmetrical cooperation in energy interactions while respecting the different interests of Russia and the EU. This was confirmed by Lavrov (2007b), among others, who declared that "Russia and the EU have no acceptable alternative ... and all existing differences can be solved through dialogue ... This all suggests that it is necessary to build a truly strategic—equal and mutually beneficial—partnership with the EU in the field of energy", which within the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernisation "allows Russian state treasury to replenish its financial resources and the EU—to have predictable and stable access to energy which is a prerequisite for economic development" (Chizhov 2014b).

Table 6.4 provides a comparison of the identities of the EU and Russia in their integration discourses; attention is given to the impact of norms and values on their external identity. Table 6.4 also shows the relation of identity to the shared and

divergent interests of the EU and Russia and their goals and the instruments they use in energy interactions.

6.2.2 *The Comparison of the Identities and Interests of the EU and Russia in Their Liberalisation Discourses*

The liberalisation energy discourse of the EU in the period from 2004 to 2014 is characterised by the influence of rationality, where the EU "wants the same fair approach in mutual relations regarding energy" (European Commission 2006b, p. 4), which will bring it benefits. On the other hand, the EU's actions are impacted by norms, values, and rules, as it wants to "bind the Russian Federation with the international rules and norms of the WTO" (Füle 2010). In other words, norms, rules, and values influence the external identity of the EU, which—as a "rational-normative actor"—forms its temporal Self in conformity with a similar Russian Self when it uses rational liberal-market norms and values in relation to Russia, which should accept them as the EU has "the aim to create truly equal conditions regarding transparency, the ban of discrimination . . ." (European Commission 2008: 7) and the RF should "accept the values and principles of a liberalised market" and "ensure easier access to European firms to its energy market" (Ušackas 2014).

Influenced by this intersubjective identity, the EU in energy interactions with Russia uses normative instruments to advance rational-liberalisation interests with the strategic goal of improving its access to the Russian energy market, ensuring greater liberalisation and modernisation of the energy market and sector in Russia. This should help strengthen energy cooperation, improve economic competition and the openness of mutual trade, and bring both parties maximal benefits, where "our interest should be to achieve . . . the liberalization of the Russian energy sector, an open market, and fair access to Russian transport networks" (Ferrero-Waldner 2006), and so the EU will "support market reforms and help improve the investment climate", while "the Russian Federation can optimise socio-economic benefits from its energy exports" (European Commission 2011, p. 8); thus, "Russia must reflect this development and adapt its attitudes to be . . . more competitive with regard to prices" (Oettinger 2013), which will help "increase the efficiency of our energy relations" (Ferrero-Waldner 2007).

Similarly, the Russian liberalisation discourse in 2004–2014 is influenced by rationality, as the RF uses norms, values, and rules to "remind our European partners of Russia's new energy initiative, which will also simplify mutual access to our energy markets" (Medvedev 2009b), while on the other hand, it is impacted by normative instruments, that is, norms, values, and rules, so that Russia "has no intention of using non-market measures against EU member states" (Putin 2012c). In other words, norms, ideas, and values affect the external identity of the RF, which—as a "rational-normative actor"—forms its Self in relation to the temporally divergent EU Other when it makes rational use of market-liberal norms and values towards the EU, which should accept them, as "if people want us to create conditions that will give foreign

firms access to the Russian market, then it is also our right to expect an indiscriminate approach from the governments of the involved states" (Putin 2006f), and so "we offered the European Commission an intergovernmental agreement that will free the large infrastructure projects of Russian gas to the EU from the norms of the Third Energy Package" (Shmatko 2011b).

Influenced by this external identity, which is formed by intersubjectivity, the RF uses normative instruments in energy interactions with the EU to prefer rational-liberalisation interests with the strategic goal of justifying its actions, criticising the implementation of nonmarket obstacles by the EU, and ensuring greater accessibility, which should provide both parties with benefits and should strengthen the position of Russian firms on the internal market and improve energy cooperation and trade with the EU, as "unlike other states, we respect market principles" (Lavrov 2007a) and "we build energy relations with all our western partners" (Putin 2009), but the EU and its Third Energy Package "worsen the investment conditions of Russian subjects on the European energy market" (Belousov 2013), and yet both the EU and Russia need "investment, which are indispensable for the modernisation of our economies" (Medvedev 2010c). It is therefore necessary to "ensure the indiscriminate presence of Russian companies on the internal energy market of the EU, which ... will strengthen our mutual energy trade" (Putin 2014d).

Table 6.5 provides a comparison of the identities of the EU and Russia in their liberalisation discourses; attention is given to the impact of norms and values on their external identity. Table 6.5 also shows the relation of identity to the shared and divergent interests of the EU and Russia and their goals and the instruments they use in energy interactions.

6.2.3 The Comparison of the Identities and Interests of the EU and Russia in Their Diversification Discourses

Under the influence of security risks and threats, the EU diversification discourse in 2004–2014 strongly securitises energy relations with the RF as a security issue in several ways: first, by shifting the perception of Russia, where "conflicts with transit countries ... raise concern about future supplies from Russia" (European Commission 2008, p. 7), and by condemning Russia for "using energy as an instrument of pressure" (European Parliament 2014a); second, by emphasising that "the Ukrainian crisis was a strong reminder of our energy vulnerability in relation to our import dependence on the Russian Federation" (European Commission 2014) and "the primary goal ... is to prevent energy dependence on the Russian Federation" (Mendelson 2007); third, by repeatedly voicing concerns that "Russia might put pressure on member states and test their endurance" (European Parliament 2014b); fourth, by repeatedly stressing that "we do not want to diversify only because we worried about the RF but also because diversification is good in general" (Piebalgs 2009); and, fifth, by adopting measures against the RF in the form of "launching

Table 6.5 The comparison of the identities and interests of the EU and Russia in their liberalisation discourses in 2004–2014

Discourse	Impact of norms and values on the external identity of the Self/Other	The relation between identity and interests, goals, and instruments in energy interactions
EU liberalisation discourse in the years 2004–2014	An impact of norms and values on the external identity of the EU, which as a "rational-normative actor" forms its temporal Self in conformity with a similar Russian Self when it makes rational use of liberal-market norms and values in relation to Russia, which should accept them	Influenced by its intersubjective identity, the EU uses normative instruments to promote rational-liberalisation interests in its energy relations with the RF with the strategic goal of improving its access to the Russian energy market and ensuring a greater liberalisation and modernisation of the energy market and sector in the RF, which should help strengthen the energy cooperation, improve the economic competition and the accessibility of the mutual trade and bring both parties maximal benefits
Russian liberalisation discourse in the years 2004–2014	An impact of norms and values on the external identity of Russia, which as a "rational-normative actor" forms its temporal Self in relation to the divergent EU Other when it makes rational use of market-liberal norms and values in relation to the EU, which should accept them	Influenced by its intersubjective identity, the RF uses normative instruments to promote rational-liberalisation interests in its energy relations with the EU with the strategic goal of justifying its actions, criticising the implementation of nonmarket obstacles by the EU, and ensuring greater accessibility, which should provide both parties with benefits, strengthen the position of Russian firms on the internal market and improve the energy cooperation and trade with the EU

Source: Compiled by the author

anti-trust procedures against Gazprom" (Oettinger 2013) and placing "sanctions on ... the energy sector in Russia" (European Parliament 2014b). On the other hand, the diversification discourse is also influenced by the EU's rational approach to negotiations, as "we should invest financial means into building up our internal market" (Piebalgs 2007b) because "it is the most attractive market for export from Russia, whose budget is strongly dependent on income from energy exports to the EU" (Oettinger 2013). The EU's identity as a "security-rational actor" in its diversification discourse is formed via security norms, rules, and values, which makes rational use in the process of securitising energy relations with Russia, which should accept these security norms, rules, and values. At the same time, as a "security-rational actor", the EU delimits its spatial external identity of Self in contrast to Russia as the (non-)European Other that threatens the energy security of the EU.

This intersubjective identity determines the security-diversification interests that the EU advances in energy relations with the RF via normative-offensive instruments with the strategic goal of eliminating potential threats; diversifying transit routes, sources, and suppliers; reducing its energy dependence on Russia; improving its negotiating power; and strengthening energy security. This was confirmed by Piebalgs (2009), who said that "if we are to avoid future risks of interrupted gas supplies", as it was in the past, "we need a unified energy strategy based on solidarity between member states" and security norms "regulating mutual relations" and supporting specific measures, such as diversification, as "a greater diversification of gas supplies" is very important and will "strengthen the negotiating power and security of the EU and reduce its dependence on Russia", but there is "a mutual dependence ... and the payment of gas with European money is just as important to the Russians because it is a key component of their national budget" (Oettinger 2014b).

Similarly, the Russian diversification discourse in 2004–2014 is influenced by security norms, rules, and values, where "Russia wants safe and uninterrupted supplies of energy resources to Europe" (Lavrov 2008). On the other hand, the impact of normativity leads the RF to apply economic norms and values, as "when Ukraine did not pay, we had to stop the gas" (Putin 2014a). Russia's identity as a "security-normative actor" in its diversification discourse is framed by security and economic norms and values, which it uses in the process of desecuritising energy relations with the EU, which should respect them. Apart from that, Russia endeavours to join its external spatial identity of Self with the European spatial Other when it presents itself as a European "security-normative actor" that stabilises the energy security of the EU in the process of desecuritisation, which is based on several factors: first, the refusal of "the excessive dependence of the EU on Russian energy resources" (Putin 2005), but "we are not afraid of other alternative routes" (Putin 2006h); second, the repeated emphasis that "Russia never used energy for political means" (Chizhov 2014c) because that "damages the investment climate in the energy sector" (Novak 2014e); third, the denial of unreliability, where "the concerns voiced regarding the reliability of energy supplies from Russia to Europe are not based on the truth" (Lavrov 2006b) and, conversely, the accusation of Ukraine as "an unreliable partner" (Putin 2014e); fourth, the emphasis of the need to "diversify routes of energy supplies from Russia", which are to replace the unreliable ones and "improve the stability of energy supplies to Europe" (Lavrov 2006a), and the refusal of "unacceptable obstacles to the construction of South Stream" (Lavrov 2014d); and, fifth, the refusal of "the investigation of Gazprom by the European Commission" and of sanctions, which "are only proof of a lack diplomatic ability by our American and European partners" (Chizhov 2014d).

At the same time, this intersubjective identity determines the security-diversification interests of the RF in energy relations with the EU, which lead it to use normative-defensive instruments with the strategic goal of convincing its counterpart of Russia's reliability and of the importance of its diversification projects in strengthening EU energy security, increasing the share of Russian firms on the European energy market, diversifying its transit routes, and persuading the EU of the pointlessness of its measures against Russia, which damage their mutual energy relations. This was claimed by Putin (2007c), who said that "it is in our interest to

Table 6.6 The comparison of the identities and interests of the EU and Russia in their diversification discourses in 2004–2014

Discourse	Impact of norms and values on the external identity of the Self/Other	The relation between identity and interests, goals, and instruments in energy interactions
EU diversification discourse in the years 2004–2014	An impact of norms and values on the external identity of the EU, which as a "security-rational actor" uses security norms and values to securitise energy issues in relation to the RF, which should accept the norms and values. At the same time, the EU delimits its external spatial identity of the Self in contrast to Russia as the (non-)European Other that threatens the energy security of the EU	Influenced by its identity, formed by intersubjectivity, the EU uses normative-offensive instruments to promote security-diversification interests in its energy interactions with the Russian Federation with the strategic goal of eliminating potential threats; diversifying transit routes, sources, and suppliers; reducing its energy dependence on Russia; improving its negotiating power; and strengthening its energy security
Russian diversification discourse in the years 2004–2014	An impact of norms and values on the external identity of the RF, which as a "security-normative actor" uses security and economic norms and values to desecuritise its energy relations with the EU, which should respect the norms and values. At the same time, the RF strives to join its external spatial identity of the Self with the European spatial Other when it presents itself as a European "security-normative actor" that stabilises the energy security of the EU	Influenced by its identity, formed by intersubjectivity, the RF uses normative-defensive instruments to promote security-diversification interests in its energy interactions with the EU with the strategic goal of convincing its counterpart of Russia's reliability and of the importance of its diversification projects in strengthening EU energy security, increasing the share of Russian firms on the European energy market, diversifying its transit routes, and persuading the EU of the pointlessness of its measures against Russia, which damage their mutual energy relations

Source: Compiled by the author

ensure direct access to the main European customers in the energy market, which is completely in line with our economic and security interests", and "I would like to stress that in the long run South Stream and gas pipelines implemented in the framework of the EU Southern Gas Corridor will not be competitors" (Chizhov 2012). At the same time, "we are not interested in monopolising the energy sector in Europe. Our policies are directed towards ensuring the energy security of Russian energy suppliers" (Khristenko 2006), and "Russia is ready to help strength the energy security of our European partners through the diversification of gas transit routes to European countries" (Lavrov 2014e).

Table 6.6 provides a comparison of the identities of the EU and Russia in their diversification discourses; attention is given to the impact of norms and values on

their external identity. Table 6.6 also shows the relation of identity to the shared and divergent interests of the EU and Russia and their goals and the instruments they use in energy interactions.

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Chapter 7
The EU-Russia Energy Relations in Captivity of Discourse

7.1 The Influence of the Nondiscursive Structure on Energy Discourse and the Aim of the Monograph

The topic of energy policy and security represents one of the most frequently discussed issues of the relations between the European Union and its biggest eastern neighbour, the Russian Federation. On the one hand, the theme of energy is a key factor in strengthening the formal and informal relations between the European Union and Russia. Already in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union began delivering energy supplies (oil and natural gas) to Western Europe on the basis of long-term contracts. At the same time, this is evinced by the fact that until the Partnership Cooperation Agreement's signature and the holding of the EU-Russia summit in 2003, which set out the direction for a strategic partnership on the basis of the so-called four common spaces, talks between EU and Russian political leaders were largely limited to the energy dialogue (see more Kuchyňková 2010; Godzimirski 2016).

On the other hand, the issue of fluent and secure oil and gas supplies causes tensions between the European Union and Russia and contributes to the deterioration of their mutual relations (Petrovic et al. 2009, p. 91). In particular, a series of energy crises in the relations between the EU, Russia and the transit countries, which took place in 2006, 2007 and 2009, have significantly contributed to the politicisation and, indeed, the securitisation of the energy problematique. Although Russia might have been perceived as a relatively stable supplier of energy resources to the EU at the turn of the century, today, in some EU quarters, the discussions about the need of diversification are centred on the allegedly too strong energy dependence of the EU on Russia (Kratochvíl and Tichý 2013, p. 391). This is currently seen in the example of the on-going political and military crisis in Ukraine that has led to a significant deterioration of the EU's relations with the Russian Federation and has caused concern among EU member states about their own energy security in relation to ensuring uninterrupted and stable supplies of Russian oil and gas that travel across the Ukrainian territory to Europe (for more on this, see De Micco 2014; Szulecki and Westphal 2018).

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These positive and negative events of the EU-Russia energy relations have a significant impact on the decision-making and behaviour of the EU and RF political representatives and thus also on the nature and content of the energy discourse between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Therefore, besides the primary focus of this monograph on the discursive (ideational) framework of the EU energy relations with the Russian Federation, which gives meaning to the material resources and institutional structures and influences our actions and thinking, the significance of the institutional and material (nondiscursive) level of the EU-Russia energy relations cannot be overlooked when examining the issue.

On the one hand, this institutional and material structure affects the content and character of the energy discourses of both actors, and, on the other hand, the EU and Russia are active in their discourses in regard to this extra-discursive structure of the energy relations when determining its content and character while creating the initial framework in the process of exploring the interaction between discursive and extra-discursive reality. At the same time, the discourse, through which meaning is put into reality, interferes with the nondiscursive structure. In other words, there is a marked influence of both energy discourses on nondiscursive reality; that is, the statements and speeches of selected EU and RF political leaders determine the reality between the two actors.

In this context, the main goal of the monograph was to define and categorise the main approaches of the EU energy discourse in relation to the Russian Federation and vice versa and compare and interpret the contents and the basic themes of the EU and Russian discourses on their mutual energy relations in 2004–2014. The main research question of this monograph was:

> What basic discursive complexes related to the energy relations of the EU towards Russia and vice versa can be identified, and are there any overlaps or different features in these individual energy discourses of the EU and the RF?

By fulfilling the main goal and answering the research question, the presented monograph contributed to our understanding of the importance of the discursive-ideational framework of the EU-RF energy relations—in particular, its main themes and the content and perceptions of Russia by the EU and vice versa in both energy discourses in the context of extra-discursive reality. At the same time, by fulfilling the goal by answering the given research question, this monograph provided several findings related to other important topics of the EU and Russian energy discourses, such as the actors' identities, interests, intersubjectivity, norms and values, that the extra-discursive approach theory either ignores or regards as fixed and unchangeable facts.

7.2 Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to Energy Discourse

The complexity of the issue of discourse in the energy relations between the European Union and Russia highlights in the first stage of the theoretical level of the work the need to construct a wider theoretical approach. The constructivist-

discourse framework was created for this purpose. This framework is based on a theoretical pluralism that allows one to combine discourse and the main findings of conventional and critical constructivism. These two constructivist approaches, which create a comprehensive framework of constructivism, complement each other on a number of issues, such as (1) the importance of ideas and norms in relation to an actor's behaviour, (2) the relationship of foreign and security policy and action and identity, (3) interests and preferences and (4) the influence of the intersubjectivity of discourse and its relation to the structure–actor debate. In other words, both constructivist approaches complement the issue of the influence of ideas and norms, but also the rationality of an actor's behaviour and his foreign-security identity, negotiation and interests designed in a discourse that can serve as an actor and a structure in the process of intersubjectivity.

In the second phase, the monograph dealt with the relationship between the constructivist and discourse framework, composed of the broader conception of constructivism associated with discourse, and the basic theoretical concepts used in this work, which are primarily energy discourse, ideas, norms and values, identity, interests and intersubjectivity. The resulting interaction yields several important conclusions, according to which in the energy discourse form ideas, which subsequently define norms, rules and values. At the same time, values, rules and norms influence behaviour and shape the foreign and security identities of actors that determine the actors' interests, which are constructed by political discourse and based on the influence of intersubjectivity. At the same time, this interaction created a coherent theoretical framework with a number of important sources, with the help of which the author explored discursive complexes at the energy discourse level of the European Union and the Russian Federation.

At the methodological level, the monograph is based on discourse analysis, which is most often associated with either the linguistic structure of the message or the text, or the rhetorical or argumentative organisation of text and expression. Discourse analysis then stems both from a constructivist ontology which presupposes that reality is socially constructed via discourses and from a constructivist epistemology based on the presumption that the discourse produces meanings and forms reality in ways that may be postulated with the help of interpretive methods. Discourse analysis, which is compatible with the constructivist-discursive framework, is not considered in the work as a specific method but as based on methodological pluralism; namely, it is considered to be an umbrella methodology in which different theoretical approaches and methods of data analysis can be combined. In particular, a thematic analysis was used to examine the existence of the main themes and the content of discourse approaches within the energy discourses of the European Union and the Russian Federation.

Other methods used in this monograph are case study and comparisons, namely, a comparative method. Both methods were used simultaneously. The comparative method was used to compare the EU and RF discursive complexes at the level of individual case studies, both thematic and temporal, but also to compare case studies of comprehensive energy discourses between the EU and Russia in 2004–2014.

7.3 The Criteria for the Selection of Documents and the Three Energy Discourses

On the practical level, in the beginning, the documents to be used in the study were selected and the criteria for their classification were established. First, it was determined what corpus of documents should be examined and which key criteria should be used in the examination, and then only a narrowly timed and thematic analysis was chosen as the method. On this basis, only the speeches, interviews, press releases and documents of selected political representatives and EU institutions and political representatives and ministries of the Russian Federation where the words "EU" and "European" or "Russia" and "Russian" were used in connection with the word "energy" in the time frame of 2004–2014 were chosen for the study. Overall, 1053 text and speech documents were gathered, of which 492 documents belong to the side of the European Union and 561 to the side of the Russian Federation.

A preliminary analysis of these documents and speeches subsequently revealed that both the European Union and Russia have three major discursive complexes: (1) the integration discourse, (2) the liberalisation discourse and (3) the diversification discourse. In all three cases, the main themes and their content and the views and attitude of the EU in relation to the RF and vice versa were examined. At the same time, the focus was on the common but also the different features and the development of these three discourses. Last but not least, within these three discourses, we followed the relationship of norms, rules and ideational values to the EU or Russian position, and the two actors' behaviour in external energy relations, and thus also their influence in shaping the identities, interests, goals and tools that both actors use to fulfil them.

7.4 EU Energy Discourses

The predominant energy discourse in the EU is the integration discourse. This discourse stresses the mutual benefits that go hand in hand with the energy cooperation of the EU and Russia, which is based on a strong interdependence between the two actors. Unlike the liberalisation discourse, the integration discourse emphasises the specific link between the EU and the RF, i.e. they are not mere business partners, but there is a special bond between them that reflects the need for specific institutions that regulate their energy policy. The integration discourse of the EU is characterised by only minimal changes in 2004–2009 and 2010–2014, although a partial reassessment of the complementary nature of the energy relations has been made, and the importance of the two-way approach in the sense of mutual integration has been more emphasised. In the integration discourse, there is a strong influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the EU, which as a "normative actor" constructs its Self in relation to the RF as a temporally different Other when it

enforces its own economic norms and values which Russia should adopt. At the same time, in the context of this identity, the European Union pursues with a normative aim and through tools its normative-integration interests in relations to the Russian Federation.

The integration discourse in many ways closely resembles the liberalisation discourse. Both discourses emphasise the economic and market-related factors and aspects of the relationship and the importance of the European Union for Russia and vice versa in market conditions. Both discourses also agree on the mutual benefits that this cooperation entails, and they are also in accord as to the benefits of a new treaty and the EU and Russia's mutual access to each other's energy markets. Similarly to the integration discourse, the liberalisation discourse has undergone only a minimal change between the two stages (2004–2009 and 2010–2014), with the exception of its greater emphasis on the reform and modernisation of the Russian energy sector in the second stage, and the new need to address the negative attitude of the Russian Federation towards the so-called third liberalisation package. In the liberalisation discourse, the norms and values influence the EU's foreign identity. The EU, as a "rational normative actor", forms its Self in accordance with the time-like Russian Self when it makes use of market-liberal norms and values that Russia should accept. At the same time, under the influence of this identity, the European Union pursues its rational-liberalisation interests in its energy interaction with the RF with a strategic goal and through normative instruments.

The third discourse is the diversification discourse, which is the most specific one and which rose to prominence particularly during the energy crisis. The diversification discourse—sometimes also termed the "securitisation discourse"—is characterised by its focus on the political aspects and the security implications of the energy relations between the EU and Russia, which is considered as a rival. Thereby the diversification discourse sets itself apart from the two preceding discourses. Although the diversification discourse underwent only a minimal change between the two stages, under the influence of the persistent instability in Ukraine, there was a deterioration of relations with the RF, and the EU emphasised to a greater extent the need to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. In the diversification discourse, norms and values apply to the EU's external identity. The EU, as a "security-rational actor", defines its spatial identity Self to the RF as a (non-)European Other and uses security norms and values in the process of securitisation of energy issues in its relations with the RF, which should respect them. At the same time, under the influence of this identity, the EU promotes mainly its security-diversification interests in its energy interaction with the RF. It does so with a strategic goal and through normative-offensive tools. Table 7.1 summarises some typical wordings and sentences of the three EU energy discourses.

Table 7.2 summarises the content of all three energy discourses of the European Union in 2004–2014. Table 7.2 shows the main topics and perceptions of Russia from the side of the EU in the integration, liberalisation and diversification of energy discourse. At the same time, Table 7.2 shows the importance of norms and values for the identity of the EU and its interests towards Russia.

Table 7.1 An overview of phrases and sentences of the EU energy discourses

Type of discourse	Characteristic phrases	An example of a representative sentence of the discourse
Integration	Energy integration, gradual integration, intensive energy cooperation, mutually beneficial and long-term cooperation, energy partnership, strategic partnership, closer energy relations, energy interdependence, strong interdependence, the need for a new Partnership Cooperation Agreement based on common norms and values	"In our energy relations, the Russian Federation is the major supplier and strategic partner with whom we want to deepen an energy cooperation based on mutual trust, interdependence, a new PCA and common values and norms that the RF should adopt in the process of gradual convergence and integration, which will bring both sides benefits"
Liberalisation	Mutual access to the gas markets, a liberalised and interconnected energy market, based on market rules, adherence to and extension of market rules, the necessary investment, mutual transparency, the need for reform and modernisation of the energy sector, accession to the ECT, the importance of the third liberalisation package	"The RF as an important energy and trade partner should liberalise its energy market and reform/modernise the energy sector with the greatest possible openness, enhancing access to energy markets and improving investment and cooperation, which should be based on market principles, transparency and the rules liberalisation package"
Diversification	Ensuring energy security; enhancing energy security, the need for diversification, the diversification of transport routes, resources and suppliers, an unreliable Russia using energy resources, the need for alternative routes, cooperation with third countries, the need to link energy infrastructure, the Southern Gas Corridor	"As a result of previous energy crises and the use of energy as a policy instrument, the Russian Federation cannot remain the only energy supplier for the EU, which has to diversify energy sources and suppliers and build alternative energy routes, thereby reducing energy dependence on the RF and enhancing energy security"

Source: Compiled by the author

7.5 Russian Energy Discourses

As in the EU, the integration discourse clearly dominates in Russia as well. The integration discourse emphasises the need for a deeper integration of both sides but claims that both the EU and Russia should recognise that there is no unilateral asymmetry between them but rather an interdependence. In this respect, it differs from the liberalisation discourse. Contrary to the liberalisation discourse, it has a positive perception of the energy cooperation (both bilateral and multilateral) with the EU and focuses on the economic benefits and other benefits of the energy relations. The integration discourse sees the need for building a strategic energy partnership based on a solid legal foundation. The Russian integration discourse is characterised by only a minimal change between 2004–2009 and 2010–2014, although there have been several minor changes in the second period which concern

Table 7.2 A summary of the three energy discourses of the EU in 2004–2014

Concepts	Types of energy discourses		
	Integration	Liberalisation	Diversification
Main themes	Energy cooperation, energy relations and partnerships, energy integration, the legislative and institutional framework, energy interdependence	Access to markets, reform and modernisation of the energy sector, ECT, liberalisation of the energy market, the third liberalisation package	Energy security, diversification of resources and suppliers, energy crisis, security threats and risks, alternative transport routes
Perceptions of the RF by the EU	Russia as a strategically important partner and a major energy supplier with partly different interests	Russia as a reliable business and energy partner that can and does naturally have different preferences than the EU	Russia as a rival and an unreliable supplier that can use the energy sector as a political means of blackmail
Importance of norms and values	The EU promotes economic norms and values, which Russia should adopt; a strong influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the EU	The EU employs market–liberal and economic norms and values, which Russia should accept; the influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the European Union	The EU in the securitisation process applies security norms and values, which the RF should respect; the influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the EU
The foreign identity Self/Other	The EU as a "normative actor" construes its Self in relation to the Russian Federation as a temporally different Other	The EU as a "normative-rational actor" forms its Self in accordance with the time-like Russian Self	The EU as a "security-rational actor" defines its spatial identity Self in relation to the RF as a (non-)European Other
Interests, goals and tools	In the context of this identity, the European Union pursues its normative-integration interests in relations to the Russian Federation with a normative aim and through tools	Under the influence of this identity, the EU pursues its rational-liberalisation interests in its energy interaction with the RF with a strategic goal and through normative instruments	Under the influence of this identity, the EU promotes mainly its security-diversification interests in its energy interaction with the RF with a strategic goal and through normative-offensive tools

Source: Compiled by the author

a greater emphasis on respecting the different energy interests of the EU and Russia and the issues of modernising the EU and RF energy sector as an area of integration and cooperation. Also in the Russian integration discourse, there is a strong influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the RF, which, as a "normative-rational actor", constructs its Self in accordance with the time-like Self of the EU when it promotes its own economic norms in its relations to the EU while adopting EU norms and values. In the context of this identity, the RF pursues mostly normative and economic interests in its relations to the EU with strategic goals and through normative instruments.

The integration discourse of the RF is linked with its liberalisation discourse. Both energy discourses support the conditions in which the EU-RF energy cooperation and relations can work effectively and agree on the division of the access of Russian entities to the energy markets of the Member States and the EU. Similarly as the integration discourse, the liberalisation discourse has undergone only a minimal change between the two stages, with the exceptions of focusing on the entry of the RF into the WTO, highlighting the need to modernise the Russian economy and the energy sector in terms of their innovation and liberalisation and the strong criticising of the Union's third liberalisation package in the second stage. In the liberalisation discourse, norms and values influence the foreign identity of the RF, which, as a "rational normative actor", forms its Self in relation to the time-different EU Other when it uses the market-liberal norms and values, which the EU should respect. At the same time, under the influence of this identity, the Russian Federation pursues mainly its rational-liberalisation interests in its energy interaction with the European Union with a strategic goal and through normative instruments.

Russia's third separate discourse is the diversification discourse, which coincides with the integration discourse in the presentation of the RF as the main partner for the EU and shares with the liberalisation discourse efforts to strengthen the presence of Russian energy companies in the internal energy market in the European Union. The diversification discourse differs from both of the other discourses with a focus on the EU's energy security. Although there has been only a minimal change between the two stages in 2004–2009 and 2010–2014, under the influence of the persistent instability in Ukraine, Russia's relationship with the EU has deteriorated, and Russia pays much more attention to EU measures to strengthen energy security and reduce its energy dependence on the RF. In the diversification discourse, norms and values prevail in the foreign identity of the Russian Federation, which, as a "security-normative actor", attempts to connect its spatial identity Self with the European spatial Other and uses security and economic norms and values in the process of de-securitisation of its energy relations with the EU, which should accept them. At the same time, under the influence of this identity, the RF pursues mainly security-diversification interests in its energy interaction with the European Union with a strategic goal and through normative-defensive tools. Table 7.3 summarises some typical wordings and sentences of all three Russian energy discourses.

Table 7.4 summarises the content of all three energy discourses of the Russian Federation in 2004–2014. Table 7.4 also shows main topics and views of the European Union by the Russian Federation in the integration, liberalisation and diversification energy discourse. At the same time, Table 7.4 shows the importance of norms and values for the foreign identity of Russia and its interests towards the European Union in all three of the energy discourses.

Table 7.3 An overview of phrases and sentences of the Russian energy discourses

Type of discourse	Characteristic phrases	An example of a representative sentence of the discourse
Integration	Gradual energy integration, mutual integration, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, strengthening the energy cooperation, energy partnership, natural partnership, replacement by an existing new agreement, a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement incorporating a specific energy chapter, sustained interdependence, combining energy interdependence	"In our energy relations, the EU is a key customer and a natural partner with whom we want to strengthen a cooperation based on interdependence, a mutually beneficial and just legal basis in the form of a new agreement, and common approaches and shared principles that the EU and RF have in the process of bringing each other together and integrating gradually"
Liberalisation	Access to the markets of the Member States and the EU, the liberalisation of the market, based on market rules, adherence to market rules, the need for foreign investment, mutual transparency, the need for reform and modernisation, the reform and modernisation of the energy sector, the rejection of the ECT and the illegality of the third liberalisation package	"The European Union as our most important energy consumer and business partner in the process of modernising the Russian energy sector should abandon the application of the rules of the third liberalisation package, which runs counter to market principles and liberalisation, damages the mutual energy cooperation and prevents Russian entities from accessing the EU energy markets"
Diversification	Ensuring and strengthening the EU's energy security, the need for diversification, the diversification of transport routes and customers, a reliable Russia not using energy resources as a political tool, the need for alternative routes (Nord Stream and South Stream), removal of transit countries, the unreliable Ukraine, access to Asian energy markets	"The Russian Federation does not use energy as a political instrument but instead reinforces the energy security of the European Union by diversifying unreliable transit countries and building alternative transport routes that do not increase the EU energy dependence, but if the EU does not stop with its hostile rhetoric, Russia will be forced to look for alternative customers in Asian markets"

Source: Compiled by the author

7.6 The Comparison of EU and Russian Energy Discourses

On the one hand, both energy discourses, i.e. those of the European Union and the Russian Federation, coincide in the sense of having similar content structures and similar argumentation methods of political representatives with the aim to persuade and influence the behaviour of the other actor. On the other hand, while the energy discourse of the RF uses far greater speech diversity and straightness in its argumentation technology, the EU energy discourse is rather tied down in its argumentation technique by diplomatic speech and correctness. At the same time, in the case of both the EU and Russia, the influence of norms, ideas, values and rules on the

Table 7.4 A summary of the three energy discourses of the RF in 2004–2014

	Types of energy discourses		
Concepts	Integration	Integration	Integration
Main themes	Energy cooperation, energy relations and partnerships, the rejection of unilateral energy integration, the legislative and institutional framework, energy interdependence	Mutual access to energy markets, reform and modernisation of the energy sector, market liberalisation, the rejection of the ECT and the third liberalisation package	Energy security, diversification of transport routes and customers, Russia rejecting its alleged responsibility for the energy crisis, alternative energy markets
Perceptions of the EU by the RF	The EU as a strategically important, reliable energy consumer and Russia's main economic partner with partly different interests	The EU as a key business and energy partner that naturally has different interests and attitudes in some areas than the RF	The EU as a business and energy partner but also partly a rival with significantly different interests and expectations
Importance of norms and values	The Russian Federation promotes economic norms and values in relation to the EU, which should adopt them, and at the same time, Russia partly accepts the EU; a strong influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the RF	The Russian Federation employs market–liberal norms and values in relation to the European Union, which should respect them; the influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the Russian Federation	The RF uses security and economic norms and values in the process of de-securitisation of its energy relations with the EU, which should accept them; influence of norms and values on the foreign identity of the RF
The foreign identity Self/Other	The Russian Federation as a "normative-rational actor" constructs its Self in accordance with the time-like Self of the European Union	The Russian Federation as a "rational normative actor" forms its Self in relation to the time-different EU Other	The RF as a "security-normative actor" attempts to connect its spatial identity Self with the European spatial Other
Interests, goals and tools	In the context of this identity, the Russian Federation pursues mostly normative and economic interests in relations to the European Union with strategic goals and through normative instruments	Under the influence of this identity, the RF pursues mainly rational-liberalisation interests in its energy interaction with the EU with a strategic goal and through normative instruments	Under the influence of this identity, the RF pursues mainly security-diversification interests in its energy interaction with the EU with a strategic goal and through normative-defensive tools

Source: Compiled by the author

creation of their identities in the context of the energy discourse is evident. In addition, both the EU and the RF, when pursuing their foreign identity, pursue both normative and strategic goals and use both normative and strategic tools. On the other hand, while the European Union, as a "normative-rational actor", securitises the energy issue in its relations with Russia, the Russian Federation, as a "normative-

Table 7.5 EU and Russian policy-makers on EU-Russian energy relations in 2004-2009

Positions of the political representatives		The three energy discourses		
		Integration discourse	Liberalisation discourse	Diversification discourse
Shared positions of the political representations of the	European Union	"Our interdependence allows for a win–win situation to be created . . ." (Ferrero-Waldner 2008)	"The Russian Federation is the EU's most important single supplier of energy products. The EU is the most important market for Russia [n] energy export [s] . . ." (European Commission 2008)	"The Russian Federation [is] the most promising alternative to the Middle East as [an] energy supplier to Europe" (European Commission 2004)
	Russian Federation	"Undoubtedly Russia and the EU are natural partners in this area. Our interdependence only strengthens energy security on the European continent" (Putin 2006a)	"Europe is our biggest customer for gas and oil supplies. It is our biggest market, and we will continue to develop our supplies to this market . . ." (Medvedev 2008)	"These projects allow [us] to solve the most important task for the EU–to diversify the routes for energy supplies" (Khristenko 2007)
Divergent positions of the political representations of the	European Union	". . . [the] acquis, which Russia should gradually accept, should become the foundations of our good energy relations" (Mendelson 2008)	"Negotiations could in this way facilitate the reform and liberalization of the energy market in Russia [and] provide stability . . ." (European Commission 2008)	". . . if we are to avoid another risk of gas supply cuts" [the EU needs] "a greater diversification of gas supply" (Piebalgs 2007)
	Russian Federation	"What is important for us is dialogue, not a diktat" (Shmatko 2009)	"I know that our energy market is much more open than markets in the world's other big energy producers" (Putin 2009)	"The rumors that Europe could lose its independence in the energy sector are highly exaggerated" (Putin 2006b)

Source: Compiled by the author according to Kratochvíl and Tichý (2013, p. 404)

rational actor", seeks to de-securitise its energy interactions with the EU. Table 7.5 presents an overview of several selected quotations of EU and Russian policy-makers (expressing both points of agreement and points of disagreement between them) which we consider as the most typical examples of the three energy discourses of the EU and Russia in 2004–2009.

Table 7.6 presents an analogous overview of quotations of EU and Russian policy-makers for the period of 2010–2014. On the one hand, Table 7.6 confirms

Table 7.6 EU and Russian policy-makers on EU-Russian energy relations in 2010–2014

Positions of the political representatives		Three energy discourses		
		Integration discourse	Liberalisation discourse	Integration discourse
Shared positions of the political representations of the	European Union	The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, "as an implement of the mutual convergence of our legislation and standards in the field of energy . . ." (Oettinger 2010a)	". . . the EU energy market—the largest in the world—offers major trade opportunities for Russian companies, and Russia . . ." (Barroso 2013)	". . . the EU does not condemn South Stream" (Valenzuela 2012), "nor does [it] block it" (Oettinger 2010b)
	Russian Federation	The EU-Russia Energy Dialogue "is an important project of mutual convergence and an effective tool for energy cooperation . . ." (Lavrov 2011)	"the European [energy] markets will be strong incentives to increase [the] competitiveness of domestic producers" (Nabiullina 2011)	The South Stream pipeline was to be "a strategically important project" for the EU" (Medvedev 2013), and was proposed "to diversify routes of [supplies] of gas [going] to Southern and South-Eastern Europe" (Chizhov 2013)
Divergent positions of the political representations of the	European Union	". . . if we maintain 28 different positions, Putin's strategy of 'divide et impera' can be much more successful towards the EU" (Oettinger 2014)	". . . the third liberalization package is fully compatible with the rules and norms of the World Trade Organization" and "is non-discriminatory" (Barroso 2011)	". . . focus on how to reduce [the] energy dependence on Russia and how to hasten the reduction of this dependence, which is a priority for the EU" (Füle 2014)
	Russian Federation	"The EU has 27 different views", but "we need the European Union to reach a consensus and speak with us a common language" (Putin 2011)	The EU Third Energy Package ". . . not only runs counter to the provisions of the 1994 Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement as well as several bilateral arrangements . . ." (Chizhov 2012)	". . .we are very sceptical about the EU's plans to reduce their energy dependency on Russia" (Novak 2014)

Source: Compiled by the author

the minor changes in the EU and Russian discourses that took place in the period 2010–2014 and, like the previous table, it also confirms the similarity of rhetoric between the EU and Russian political leaders in regard to some topics or issues. On the other hand, Table 7.6 highlights much more the different rhetoric of the political representatives of the EU and Russia in regard to questions and issues that the actors had different opinions on and different attitudes towards.

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