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The Pipeline that kicked EU's nest

The story of EU's Energy Security and the Securitisation of
the Nord Stream 2 project

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Abstract

This thesis is about EU energy security in relation to Russia and its proposed Nord Stream 2 project. In this thesis the Copenhagen School theory on securitisation is applied with the help of a combination of content analysis and discourse analysis as methods, which will together with the theory become the framework of this study. While the focal point will fall on EU's Parliament and how the project Nord Stream 2 is securitised within this EU structure, where the project itself will serve as an exhibitory example of the energy security relationship between EU and Russia. The main findings that are made in this thesis are that the securitising actors in the debate are the countries not the political parties and that Russia, not Nord Stream 2 is the true object of securitisation. In addition to that it was established that there is little unity amongst the EU member states, which is supported by the finding in previous academic studies that have been conducted within the field.

The key words for this thesis are: security, securitisation, energy security, supranational-state, state interests, EU, European Parliament, Nord Stream 2.

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Chapter 1: The Background for the Thesis

The overall theme of the thesis pertains to the EU's energy security and the relationship between the EU and Russia. This relationship, within its energy security format, will be exhibited with the illustrative case of Nord Stream 2. Nord Stream 2 is a gas supply project that will cross the Baltic Seabed from Kotka in Finland to Mukran in Germany and is an extension of an existing project called Nord Stream (see Appendix I for illustration). This project offers an additional pipeline, circumventing the traditional transit countries, and a direct line to European Unions's (EU's) greatest industrial power, Germany (The Guardian, 2010), the same country that has been the primary advocate in the EU for both projects (Gorkov, 2016).

Running from Russia to Germany, the pipelines pass through the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Finland, Sweden and Denmark (Gotkowska and Szymański, 2016). As seen in Appendix I, it is the entire region surrounding the Baltic Sea that will be affected by the Nord Stream 2 project. The Baltic countries might be affected ecologically if the pipeline ruptures, hence they view the pipeline as a security threat, independently from Russia (Šefčovič, 2016). The security threat here is in the risk posed to the ecological habitats of species in, and around, the Baltic Sea. These species, which the region nourishes on, risk to be wiped out if the pipeline bursts or leaks. Poland also views this pipeline as a threat because it could diminish the value of its transit revenues, or possibly lose the transit revenues all together from the Russian gas pipeline that runs through it to Germany (Loskot-Strachota, 2015). The Baltic countries, Poland and Sweden all view increased Russian presence in the Baltic Sea as a threat to their national security (Granholm et. al, 2007). Denmark on the other hand, has not made any concrete statements and Finland has stated that this project is purely commercial and therefore sees no need in politicising it (Gotkowska and Szymański, 2016). EU countries in the region surrounding the Baltic Sea are, however, not alone in expressing their opinion on the new project. Just as the EU members of the Baltic Sea region, other EU members have varying opinions concerning the project, which have led to a rift within the EU (European Parliament News, 2016). The expressed concern usually regards the country that is considered the main victim of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, Ukraine. The reason for this is that Ukraine serves as the main transit country, where that pipeline carries 39% of the gas from Russia to Europe. Here, the concern is that Ukraine becomes more exposed to Russia (See Alp Kocak et. al., 2016), meaning that if the second Nord Stream pipeline is built, Ukraine

loses importance as a transit country. This is due to the recent conflict between Russia and Ukraine, regarding the annexation of Crimea and Russian military involvement in Eastern Ukraine (Alp Kocak et. al., 2016) (See AsKEP, 2015).

Nonetheless, the Nord Stream 1 project had also caused political unsettlement within the greater part of the EU. According to Beckman, the Nord Stream 1 project was only approved after EU didn't get energy supplies for two weeks due to a transit country's dispute over transit tariffs with Russia in 2009 (see Beckman, 2016). Beckman points out that a similar occurrence had happened in the past (in 2006, see chapter 1.1) and threatened to happen in the future, which the EU realised (Beckman, 2016). The EU attempted to mitigate the EU's energy security vulnerability by allowing the construction of Nord Stream 1, which avoided transit countries and secured the energy supply to Europe without disruption (Beckman, 2016). Concluding that the greater part of the Union is, more or less, directly affected by this project and this is where the concerns regarding Nord Stream 2 started. Hence the solution of a pipeline without transit countries that was supposed to rid Europe of energy insecurity opened a new feeling of insecurity within Europe. A feeling that related to the fear that the EU might fall under Russia's control due to a heavy dependency on Russian energy supply (Wiklund, 2016); see chapter 1.1). Fearing that in consequence it will render the EU unable to hinder Russian expansionism such as the case with Ukraine (Wiklund, 2016). This fear was also expressed by the countries surrounding the Baltic Sea that were opposed to the Nord Stream 2 project. This fear is one of the main reasons why many EU member states are against expansion of the Nord Stream project. Another related reason is that Russia might cut off its energy supply and use it as leverage to manipulate the EU as it has done with Central Asian countries (Smith, 2006).

What piqued the interest in Nord Stream 2 is that the EU, the main actor in this thesis, embodies so many actors within itself with their own motives and positions on the project. Yet, the EU remains a sole actor in its own right, thus being a paradox of itself. This paradox entails the individualism of state interests and the process of making it the common interest of the EU, as well as the political battle of which states' opinion will eventually become the opinion of the EU in its entirety. These are the reasons for why the issue had awoken interest, and summed up, they form the question of how Nord Stream 2 is framed as a security issue by some countries, while others view it as a purely economic endeavour. Regardless of how this process occurs, the result is a rift within the EU because of the paradox it creates with regards

to how it is structured (see chapter 1.1). Because, there must be unity when voting upon issues in the European Parliament and Council as it has been before, for the EU to create a policy and act as a united front when acting upon its various policies (Mühlböck, 2013; see chapter 1.2 for more information). This is in consequence of the process of European unification, or Europeanisation, which was designed to bring the states together to form a super-state that is similar to a federation but with more independent states within, thus creating the supranational organisation that is the EU (Richardson, 2012; see chapter 1.1 for more information). Hence, when members cannot reach unanimity, they themselves enable Russian actions like in Ukraine when they cannot reach unanimity which results in inaction. Ergo, the EU can be seen as a supranational state with internal conflict of national interest between the “federations”/ member states (Smith, 1992). Thus, the paradox of nation state versus supranational-state will be at the heart of this thesis. Though, in order to better grasp this debate and the issue of energy security within EU, one must look at it from the academic point view, which has been studied in various ways and angles by scholars. This point of view will be shown and discussed in the critical review part-chapter. Though, before that, a part-chapter about the main actor, the EU, and its internal workings will follow this chapter in order to shed some more light on the mechanics behind the paradoxical main actor which will be in the centre of this thesis.

1.1: A Short Introduction to the European Union as an Actor

“The European Union is a unique economic and political union between 28 member states that together cover much of the continent” (Europa.eu). The European Union (EU) encompasses elements of intergovernmentalism and supranationalism which can be clearly seen in its decision-making structure, which is treaty based (see chapter 1.2). The EU’s structure is vast and complex, with multiple institutions and agencies with a wide range of functions. The EU bodies which will be brought up and briefly explained are the main institutions that are a part of the decision-making process of this organisation, and within the limits of Energy Policy making.

One of EU’s main institutions is the European Council, where all the heads of the member states and the presidents of the council and commission gather to discuss issues of various range, which will eventually result in the general political direction for the EU. The European Council does not adopt laws, but the Council of the EU does, in accordance with the guidelines provided by the European Council. The institution that is the Council of the EU is

where national ministers from all member states convene to adopt laws and coordinate policies. The European Parliament, however, has co-decision position along with the Council and an “over-watching” position in relation to the Commission, and has an internal committee system with 20 committees with different Members of European Parliament (MEP’s) specialising in a variety of topics (McElroy, 2006). The main committee of MEP’s regarding the energy sector is the Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) in the European Parliament, which sought to shape EU’s energy policy agenda prior to the resulting legislative initiatives ((Green paper, 2006, Third Gas and Electricity Market, 2007, Energy and Climate Change, 2009, EURACTIV, 2012). This resulted in the EU’s current day Energy Policy (See Mahmoudi, 2000) Piebalgs, 2009)(Braun, 2011) and Biesenbender, 2015)). These initiatives/ legislative packages were made in co-decision with the Council and help from the Commission (Biesenbender, 2015). The co-decision process was a tool to contain radical members and is done in the spirit of “togetherness”, though political groups/ parties contest proposals (Ripoll Servent, 2010). These political parties consist of MEP’s who come to the parliament and then enter in a coalition with other members that represent parties that are similar to their own “home” state. Though, this system is a direct reflection of the supranational part of the EU, and the ideology of Europe integration, since the party system eliminates the states, since within a party there can be multiple nationalities. The European Parliament itself has 20 specialised standing committees made up of the MEP’s, with different fields of focus where 25 to 73 full members (EuropaParl.EU). The European Commission is answerable to the European Parliament, and it “promotes the general interest of the EU by proposing and enforcing legislation as well as by implementing policies and the EU budget” (Europa.eu).

These constitute the main decision making bodies of the EU, although for the purposes of this thesis, there is also the policy-specific Directorate-General for Energy, a department within the European Commission. According to the European Commission, “the Directorate-General for Energy is responsible for developing, and implementing a European energy policy under the political guidance of the European Commission Vice-President for Energy Union, Maroš Šefčovič and Climate Action and Energy Commissioner, Miguel Arias Cañete” (European Commission, 2017). The task that relates to this thesis problem area is “contributing to setting up an energy market providing citizens and business with affordable energy, competitive prices and technologically advanced energy services” (European Commission, 2017). But the task is also to “enhance the conditions for safe and secure energy supply in a spirit of solidarity between EU countries ensuring a high degree of protection for European citizens” (European Commission, 2017).

Since the rise of the Energy agenda in the 90's, these abovementioned bodies have worked together and developed several important energy and environmental policies, which were spearheaded by the three bodies who are responsible for EU's energy Policy; the Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament. However, what made the Energy Policy question into an Energy Security question was the gas dispute between Russia and the Ukraine that had flared up about a decade ago. The dispute climaxed in the crisis of January 2006 and subsequent gas shortages served as an influence on the initiative making process. The reason why this dispute was of greater importance is the fact that EU has a dependency on Russian gas (40 % share of total gas imports in 2006) (see Finon and Locatelli 2008; Stern 2006). While the influences from this dispute is that it served as a wake-up call for the EU, and demonstrated the need for a common energy policy but also a future policy strategy. This event also put energy policy on top of the EU agenda where issues such as energy networks, energy security, and external energy relations became central in the debate. This led to the document "An energy policy for Europe" that was published by the Commission in 2007 (See Behrens & Egenhofer, 2007). The document summarised the current energy situation in the EU and designated ways for how future strategic energy policy making can develop.

This concludes the overview of the complex bureaucratic web of agenda shaping procedures. As one can see above, the EU has all the institutions and legislative power as that of a state. Yet, it is important to remember that the member states still retain their individual legislations etc., which creates a clash between the united community and the individualistic state. The case of Nord Stream 2 is a clear example of such a clash, since contradictory state interests disables the EU to form a policy regarding Russia and the energy supply project. This section was the purely mechanical side of the EU in a very condensed version, while the next chapter will show Energy Policy in EU and Europe overall from a scholarly view.

1.2: Critical Literature Review

As it has been depicted in the previous part-chapters, European energy security can be described as a multifaceted problem area that exists in various dimensions. This in turn enables numerous openings into different IR theories. Since the area concerns security in relation to energy and the obvious connection between realism and security, realism should be the predominant medium used to understand this problem. But it is not. The seemingly most prevalent theoretical linkages made to understand the EU's energy security problem are liberalism and constructivism, which could be explained by the fact that this problem does not

only concern energy security. The problem concerns energy security in relation to Russia, hence the explanation for the use of liberalism and constructivism could be their focus on relationships between states and institutions, which are central to this problem. Yet, to understand the problem, one must still start with realism because of the all-encompassing nature of energy security.

Thus, this critical review will start with an approach of the theory of realism, then liberalism and finally constructivism with relevant studies with branching out to terms such as securitisation and the subject of geopolitics. The conclusion will contain a summarising discussion that will contain the knowledge which was drawn from this literature overview.

1.2.1: Realism and State Interests

The realist approach to energy relationship between Russia and EU is mostly focused on the different state interests and attitudes towards Russia within the EU, which are framed out of whether Nord Stream 2 is a security threat to the state or not. Or, as preferentially stated by realism, each country pursues the interest of self-help which entails insuring the country's wellbeing and survival, and is the basis of state interest formation (Dunne and Schmidt, 2014). This can be seen in the study done by Le Coq and Paltseva (2012), in which they explain how the EU's lack of a united approach to dealing with Russia is the biproduct of each state pursuing their own interest, instead of having a united policy (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012). Furthermore, this study shows that even though each state is pursuing their own interest, the EU members still find likeminded states which then form groupings within the EU based on their stance on how to handle Russia (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012). Even though this approach was good for explaining the division within the EU, there was no suggestion made to how to salvage this issue. This study failed to determine, and did not attempt to analyse whether Russia is a threat to EU's energy security or not, nor did it attempt to identify how and why Nord Stream 2 was a threat.

1.2.2: Liberalism and Neoliberalism's "Soft Power"

The search for alignment with likeminded states is closely linked to Immanuel Kant's idea that states with similar governing style are more prone to cooperate (Dunne, 2014). The other connections that are made with the theory of liberalism to the problem area are to economics, interdependence and institutionalism. Interdependence is the interconnectedness that reflects globalisation, while institutionalism is the need of the establishing institutions that would

manage and regulate the collaboration between states (Dunne, 2014). Such collaboration is based on interdependence between the EU and Russia and the democratic values that bond the EU members together. These values are what dictate EU's free market which clashes with Russia's centralised market values.

The study conducted by Paillard regarding this matter suggests that a division in mercantile interests amongst the EU members is enough to dismantle the "unification" of the members (Paillard, 2010). A division disables a united strategic solution from the supranational state and thus enables individual states to pursue their own state interests with little regard to its neighbour's opinion (Paillard, 2010). Pillard underscores that there is no "one" country to blame, but suggests that Germany is a major culprit due to its dependence on Russian gas and active lobbying of new Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) pipe construction from Russia (Paillard, 2010). Though, Pillard points out that Russia is more dependent on its exports to Europe than vice versa, while suggesting that Russia is only "winning" from the division within the EU because it enables it to pursue its interest in expanding its exports as well as its interest in Ukraine (Paillard, 2010). Dusseault adds to Pillard's conclusions by implicating that when energy projects like Nord Stream etc. are conducted, Russia does not only gain access to European energy market but also to the overall markets of the transit countries, since the project will offer jobs to the people in the transit countries (Dusseault, 2010). This in turn could prompt further cooperation between Russia and the transit countries in other spheres (Dusseault, 2010). Dusseault also concluded that Russia has a higher dependency on EU's import than the EU does, as well as Russia has proven to be overall a reliant supplier and would not risk the income from export to EU over political disputes (Dusseault, 2010).

What both Pillard and Dusseault were missing in their studies was the understanding of why and how Russia was framed as a villain, which is why there was no clear answer to why integration with the Russian market was to be feared if they are, in fact, in a dependent position.

The neo-liberalist Joseph Nye's term "soft power" is most frequently used as a term within liberalism to enable analysis within this problem area. The term can be described as a power of influence that can only be exercised once the influencers "might" has been recognised by the ones influenced (Nye 2004). The influencer must, in order to have its power recognised, attract countries to act as it wants with its economic benefits etc., which enables a power to influence (Nye, 2008, 2009, 2011). However, one cannot predict the effects of cultural and historical influences that comes with soft power, hence in an attempt to attract countries to act

as one wants, one can sway them to do the opposite (Nye, 2008). Though, Nye considers that the leverage of influence can be a better determinant than material power (Nye, 2011). How to use the leverage, or if it can be used at all has been explored in the studies made by Banciu, Goldthau and Sitter (Banciu, 2016; Goldthau and Sitter 2015). Goldthau and Sitter believe that if Russia and EU would become more interdependent and Russian dependence on energy exports to EU would increase, it still would not be enough soft power for the EU to control Russia with regards to Ukraine and the ongoing crisis there (Goldthau and Sitter 2015). Banciu on the other hand was more focused on Russian attempts of soft power in regard to Bulgaria and South Stream, and how Russia retracted the project when Bulgaria did not announce their opinion on the project (Banciu, 2016). This study emphasized that South Stream was a soft power project, as well as stating that Nord Stream 2 is also a political project, basing this conclusion on the fact that both pipelines would not be constructed out of dire need for more gas exports or imports. Furthermore, Banciu states that Nord Stream 2 is geared towards Germany, to make it more dependent on Russian energy. There was also an emphasis on how soft power is used to strengthen of state power, meaning that Russia is seeking to regain its legitimacy, in the battle of credibility that is today's political arena (Banciu, 2016). Hinting that the Russian legitimacy battle is waged to counteract the backlash from the Ukrainian crisis (Banciu, 2016). Both studies state that soft power within EU's and Russia's energy security relationship is only considered as a zero-sum game within a plus-sum theory, where one will have more leverage over the other. However, none of the previous mentioned studies consider that soft power is enough for the EU to stop Russian expansionism in Ukraine nor that it could lead to interdependence between the two parties. Though more solid arguments for why Russia is feared were provided by both studies, but the conclusions remained ambiguous since these arguments were not focused upon why Russia was feared.

1.2.3: Constructivism and Its Adjoining Elements

Constructivism is the theory that aims to combine the approaches of realism and liberalism, but also adds a focus on the identities of the actors and the cultures and structures, such as international organisation etc., surrounding them (Wendt, 1999). Wendt states that "[a]n institution is a relatively stable set or "structure" of identities and interests/.../ [while also adding that], institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the world works" (Wendt, 1992:399). This view completely correlates

to EU and its “essence”, where a collective identity is made by states and adopted by states. This view in this state could be considered as purely adherent to Liberalism, however, Wendt continues his definition of an institution by adding that Self-Help is an institution. He continues the definition: “Self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity-formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or "security" of the self” (Wendt, 1992: 399). Self-help, and security being a core part of the realist theory as well as anarchy, adds to and reaffirms Wendt’s inclination to unify the two schools. Wendt also furthers the thought by adding identity which explains the diversification within discourses about security. The explanation being that the concept of security “differs in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other” (Wendt, 1992: 399). Additionally, the theory analyses how history of a region, political situation as well as the effects of globalisation shapes the present-day EU and the power relations within it (Buzan, 2004, 2010).

Constructivism as used in relation to this problem area, focuses on the discourse and the identity as well as perceived identity both within the EU and with regards to Russia. Aalto et al. lay focus on Russia as an actor in relation to the structure of the EU and the international energy market and explains why energy superpower is a commonly used when speaking about Russia (Aalto et al., 2014). This study explains that the term ‘energy superpower’ is used to feed into the fear discussion in regard to Soviet Union that was inherited by Russia. Though it is suggested that Nord Stream is what caused the rift within the EU, previously mentioned research states that the rift already existed, and had an inconclusive answer to if Russian energy ambitions are purely commercial or if they truly want to gain soft power and leverage over EU. In contrast, Bozhilova and Hashimoto simply state that there is a rift between EU members and provides nuanced groupings based on whether they are for or against Russia (Bozhilova and Hashimoto 2010). Furthermore, they suggest that the rift is divided into old and new EU members where the old who are pro Nord Stream have no regard for the newer members, thus putting the two parties national interest against each other in an over-gripping economical context that affects the entire EU (Bozhilova and Hashimoto 2010). This study implies that the EU is too weak as an actor and institution in order to unify all member states over the matter of Russia, as well as it has done the same neglect as previous actors, which explains the inconclusiveness (Bozhilova and Hashimoto 2010). Bozhilova and Hashimoto also suggest that both the EU and Russia have similar neighbourhood policies, which explains

EU's fear of Russia gaining influence over their own spheres of interests (Bozhilova and Hashimoto 2010). Though, this is done without suggesting how EU could unify and create a policy regarding Russia, or how EU and Russia could make bilateral agreement when their soft power spheres of interest keep colliding.

The study conducted by Smith-Stegen makes up for the lacking discourse in the previous constructivist studies by narrowly focusing on how the EU's and Russia's energy relationship got politicised from a simple gas transaction. This provided the insight to the security dangers to EU's energy supply and how Russia can pose more than a security threat to EU, if EU will become more dependent on Russian energy (Smith-Stegen, 2011). Politicisation is a part of the act of securitisation, which is done by authorities to make an issue urgent in order to justify actions to "remove" the problem (McDonald, 2008, see more chapter 2.1). Yet, all these studies failed to take into account why Russia is securitised and not the transit countries, which could be equally as damaging to EU as the supply country itself.

A more thorough study than the previous ones had used Montgomery's geopolitical approach to global energy trade (Montgomery, 2010), where geopolitics is a study of socio-spatial borders, that brings in historic, social, economic and political elements to physical borders (Van Houtum, 2005). This study was conducted by Stefanova, though this branch (geopolitics) is not an official part of constructivism it added to the discourse above. Stefanova managed to add to the discourse by showing how our discourses are coloured by who borders are shared with and who has natural resources (Stefanova, 2012). In Stefanova's study, it is concluded that Russia, if chosen as the energy security option, can cause political insecurity within the EU (Stefanova, 2012). Though, at the same time it states how alternative suppliers, that are slightly less geographically convenient than Russia, such as Middle East etc., can cause political security but energy insecurity for the EU (Stefanova, 2012). The reason why the study was more thorough was because Stefanova focused on how Russia is securitised and why, without really using the term, which offsets the study and results in unclear conclusions.

1.2.4: Conclusive Discourse

The overall discussion regarding the problem area of EU's energy security and the energy relationship between EU and Russia has, as shown above, proven to be of a complex nature with different viewpoints and factors. Where the consensus is that there is no unanimity amongst the EU members in regard to Russia. This in turn causes a rift within the EU, or

possibly expands an already existing crevasse, this hinders a common action plan to be devised in relation to Russia and how to ensure EU's energy supply. Additionally, this also hinders the EU to form a plan for its energy strategy and how it will attain its goal by 2050 (see Loskot-Strachota, 2015). Therefore, there are a variety of theoretical approaches used to analyse the issue from different angles. The study that used realism as an approach focused purely on the state interest of the EU members and grouped them in accordance on their stance on Russia in regard to the Nord Stream 2 energy project. However, the theoretical approach which proved to be most useful is securitisation, and the reason for this is that they identified why Russia was feared. The reason for the usefulness was because those studies who identified why their actors feared Russia, they produced concrete answers to their research questions.

However, it was made apparent that none of the studies above made clear that they understood why Russia was feared by the actors of focus, which is what this study will aim to explain with the help of Nord Stream 2 serving as an example. Though this will be further discussed in the following part chapter.

1.3: The Essence of the Thesis

The problem in focus in this study is the EU's Energy Security, and how it views the proposed pipeline project Nord Stream 2. Hence, there will not be an evaluation of Russia as a partner or whether not Nord Stream 2 is a suitable project for the EU. The focus will be entirely on what MEP's opinions are. In this part chapter, the aim, purpose, research question as well an expiration of the further outline of the thesis, will be elaborated upon in pursuance of understanding the essence of this thesis.

1.3.1: The Aim of this Thesis

The problem that this essay will study entails a divide in opinions on whether Russia and its second Nord Stream project poses a threat to the EU. Since the answer to this is a matter of opinion, finding out if it is truly a security issue or not will prove impossible within the format of a bachelor thesis. This thesis will instead focus on how Nord Stream 2 is framed as a security threat in order to move it from the political discourse to the security discourse in a European Parliamentary debate. The reason why securitisation of Nord Stream 2 was chosen as the point of focus for this study was because the conclusions reached in the critical literature overview chapter. There, it was made obvious that the reason for the ambiguous

conclusions, from the point of view of this thesis, was because scholars did not try to isolate the factors for why a project or Russia was perceived as a threat. It was also in the Overview chapter where it was made evident that the theories of constructivism and securitisation were the ones that had a more accurate conclusion, where the theoretical framework was most apt to handle the aim of this study. The aim being, finding out how and possibly why MEP's view Russia and/or Nord Stream 2 as a threat. How this will be achieved will be elaborated upon in the methodology chapter, however, the ultimate aim of this study is to provide a concrete answer for the IR field, in order to concretise future studies. This will be achieved by fulfilling the rudimentary aim of this study: understanding how MEP's securitise Nord Stream 2, which is the aim that this study wishes to fulfil. This aim, together with the theory of securitisation, resulted in the following research question and operational questions.

1.3.2: The Research Question

Based on the aim and problem formulation presented above the following research question is stated:

How can a securitisation process be detected within a debate held May 9th in the European Parliament on the issue of Nord Stream 2?

In order to narrow down the study of the debate held the 9th of May, the theoretical framework of securitisation developed by the Copenhagen school will be applied. However, in order to answer the general research question, the following operational questions will be used:

1. Who/What is/are the securitising Actor/s?
2. How was the issue (referent object) securitised and is there a speech act?
3. If any, what extraordinary measures are suggested? (see chapter 2.2 for how they came to be).

When answering the first operational question another question will be answered at the same time that will be classified as a sub operational question to operational question 1. The sub operational question being: How well is the EU integrated. Is the supranational state stronger than the individual state interest?

These questions will be answered in the data analysis and reaffirmed in conclusion. Though the outline of this thesis will be discussed in the later part of this chapter but first the purpose of the time and research question will be discussed in the subsequent part.

1.3.3: Purpose of This Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to identify how a body of the EU securitises and energy question. In addition to that, to find out if the securitisation is more tied to country of origin or the party which the MEP is representing. The reason why this is of importance is because similar studies have only been executed on the area of border security, however, energy security has not been studied through the lens of securitisation. The differences between the two area is the bodies who are responsible for them within the EU, therefore this study could be seen as original. The relevance of this study to the discipline of International Relations is the fact that the EU is, more or less, a supranational state with a complex web of sovereign states and inter-state relations. Where the contribution to the discipline would be to see if ones' nation state of origin outweighs one political party when it comes to discursively framing an issue. The imperative in this being to find if the identity states is stronger than the European "universal" identity. While the contribution to the area of research would be to answer the question if individual state interests are more important than the "union's" interests when it comes to energy security.

1.3.4: The Outline of the Thesis

In the quest to fulfil the purpose of this thesis and answer the research question, the EU and its bodies as well as its Energy policy development etc., has been brought forth in this background chapter for the sake of building a foundation, which this thesis will hold as presumed knowledge when analysing the data. Later the theory of the Copenhagen School along with the methods that will be used in this thesis will serve as the methodology chapter. Where the above mentioned will be put to practise and then discussed in the Data Analysis chapter. Then this thesis will end with a conclusive chapter that will briefly summarise all the content in the thesis and discuss the strengths and limitations of this thesis. The last chapter will end with the answer to the research question.

Chapter 2: Methodology

In this chapter, the theory of securitisation and its strengths and weaknesses will be discussed along with the methods that will be used. The securitisation theory is presented as it will be utilised in this thesis. The chapter will end with an explanation of how the combination of the

methods and theory will united in a framework/methodology will be used in order to conduct the analysis.

2.1: The Theory of Securitisation

The Copenhagen School is represented by the writings of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde and others. The School views security as a concept of social construction, hence the use of a constructivist approach. When the School works with the concept of security it uses the constructivist approach of discourse analysis, however, the term “security” still adheres to the realist stance. Hence, “the securitisation model that is offered could be seen as a synthesis of realism and constructivism” (Emmers, 2016:172). Due to its mainly constructivist origin, the securitisation theory does not attempt to determine if an issue is truly a security threat or not. Instead it focuses on analysing how the discourses surrounding the issue makes the issue into a threat (Elbe, 2010). Wæver defined securitisation as a discursive process where an actor declares an issue as an eminent threat (Wæver, 1995). Since the Copenhagen School holds that security must be articulated as an existential threat (Buzan et al, 1998).

“This significant criterion enables the Copenhagen School to link a broadly defined security concept to the question of survival and thus to the reasoning found within a traditional approach to security studies. This avoids a broad and loose conceptualisation of security that could too easily become meaningless” (Emmers, 2016:171).

Furthermore, the Copenhagen School’s securitisation model has expanded the concept of security and identified five categories of security: military, societal, environmental, economic and political. “The dynamics of security within each category are determined securitising actors and referent object” (Emmers, 2016:169). The securitising actors are defined as actors who securitise issues by declaring them as existential threats, while the referent object is the issue which is securitised. The actors must be in a position of legitimate authority to be able to securitise an issue, a position like: a political leader, or in a bureaucracy, government, etc. and even a non-state actor (Buzan et al, 1998). The threats can be of any nature, hence the Copenhagen School claims that any issue/referent object can be either non-politicised, politicised, or securitised. The Copenhagen School means that an issue can end up in any category, but it is the securitising actor that determines which category (Buzan et al, 1998).

The securitisation theory “examines how a specific matter becomes removed from the political process to the security agenda” (Emmers, 2016:168). The examination of securitisation is a two-stage process. An issue can be defined as non-politicised when a potential state action regarding the matter is not discussed in a public debate. The issue only becomes politicised when it is a part of public policy, which requires a governmental decision, allocation of resources and possibly some other form of communal governance. Like for example Nord Stream 2 is discussed in a public debate in an intricate political system (see chapter 3), hence in accordance to the Copenhagen School, Nord Stream 2 can be considered as politicised.

The act of securitisation is in its entirety, an acceptance of the “existential threat” classification of a phenomena or persons etc., where the classification requires emergency measures. “The Copenhagen School relies on a two-stage process of securitisation to explain how and when an issue is to be perceived and acted upon as an existential threat to security” (Emmers, 2016:170).

Stage one concerns how the referent object (the issue) is portrayed by state (and non-state actors). This stage is mainly concerned with the power of influence, which is directly related to the authority and legitimacy the actor has. The more authority/legitimacy an actor has, the greater the power of influence. This is all a part of speech act that defines the first stage of the process, which the Copenhagen School believes is the starting point of the securitisation process, however, influence and skilful use of language is not enough for an issue to become securitised. The establishment of a threat needs to be conceptual to have salience enough to produce a substantial political effect (Buzan et al, 1998). Although, the School believes that the speech act alone can make an issue a security question, even if it does not represent an existential threat in material terms.

Stage two, which is crucial to the securitisation process, can only be deemed successful if the securitising actor has managed to convince its “target audience” to whom the speech act was directed to (i.e. politicians, citizens, military etc.) (Buzan et al, 1998). Thus, “a securitising actor uses language to articulate a problem in security terms and to persuade a relevant audience of its immediate danger” (Emmers, 2016:171). Yet, even though the School holds that “a successful act of securitisation provides securitising actor with the special right to use exceptional means. It indicates, however, that the success of the process does not depend on such actions” (Emmers, 2016:172). Here, extraordinary measures are loosely defined as “go[ing] beyond rules ordinarily abided by and there are therefore located outside

the usual bounds of political procedures and practices” (Emmers, 2016:172). Therefore, one can derive that securitisation can still occur even if the actions to ward off the threat are within the “ordinary” political procedure, and the “adoption of extraordinary means is not a requirement” (Emmers, 2016:172). Since Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998:25) clearly state that they “do not push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted” (Buzan et. al, 1998:25). This relates to the issue that the model includes non-state actors (like Green peace etc.) as securitising actors, and such actors do not have any specific “ordinary” political procedures, although they do affect state-actors into political actions that can perform political procedures. Ergo, the Copenhagen School also holds that a “transforming an issue into a security question requires only the audience’s acknowledgement that this indeed a threat” (Emmers, 2016:173). This constitutes the securitisation model that is offered by the Copenhagen School.

2.2: The Strengths and Limitations of the Copenhagen School’s Securitisation Model in Relation to This Thesis

The Copenhagen School’s securitisation model provides a framework which enables identification of who securitises an issue and how. The core lies in societal security rather than individual state security, which once again shows its adherence to the constructivist theory. These are the main strengths with this specific model. Though this theory has also been critiqued, where one principal critique was that the securitisation theory is state-centric (McDonald, 2008). This argument can be countered with Wæver’s reasoning about the theory, where he holds that securitisation can go beyond the normative way of thinking, which ties all security to the state (Wæver: 1995: 47). However, with the example of the EU or the UN, it is clear that security can also be tied to an international organisation. Another limitation that is brought up is that the securitisation theory derives from “Western”, i.e European experiences such as the EU with liberal borderless markets, and the construction of a collective European identity, which make it hard to implement this theory outside an “environment” that is similar to the EU (McDonald, 2008). In this thesis, however, this will not serve as an issue due to the fact that the EU is the object of study.

As mentioned above, the actor that this thesis will focus upon is the European Union, which has been the focus actor of other securitisation theory studies. Though EU Energy security has not been subject to securitisation scholars, border security is the most prevalent

subject used within securitisation with regards to the EU, like for example, in an article by Léonard, where the EU's border agency FRONTEX and its actions were assessed through securitisation theory (Léonard, 2010). Viewing mainly its tasks, actions and ties to the member states in order to be able to "examine[] the extent to and the specific ways in which this Agency contributes to the ongoing securitisation of asylum and migration in the EU"(Léonard, 2010, 238). Another article about the same agency, had, on the other hand, a focus on its origins, and how immigration was securitised in order to create FRONTEX, as well as how the agency itself and its actions were securitised (Neal, 2009).

The issue of migration has also been studied by securitisation theorists that used OSCE documents from the organisation and reports from EU bodies like the European Parliament as material, thus maintain the EU as the main actor. (Sasse, 2005). A correlation between European integration and securitisation of migration (Huysmans, 2000) has also been pointed out, supported by reports from the European Parliament amongst other material. Additionally, the book "Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU" included the abovementioned materials as well as conferences on migrations such as Maastricht and Amsterdam (Van Munster, 2009). While another study focused on how migration was politicised in the first place using similar material as above (Buonfino, 2004).

Though the European Parliament has been used for material in the past, none have used a "live" debate as data before within the area of EU's energy security, nor has there been any previous links between EU's energy security and securitisation before. Thus, this thesis is the first to use the theory and the framework it provides. The toolbox within the framework for handling material, where the toolbox contains questions that need to be answered. These questions are: 1. Who/What is the securitising Actor? 2. Who/What is the referent object? 3. What "power" does the securitising actor have and who is the audience? 4. How was the issue (referent object) securitised and is there a speech act? 5. If any, what extraordinary measures are suggested?

This Toolbox, for this thesis, is the main strength of this theory, since it delimited the scope further and provides a method in itself. However, from the material that this thesis is using, it is already made clear that the referent object is Nord Stream 2 due to the fact that this thesis has chosen the issue as an example of energy security securitisation. What concerns the power of the securitisation actor, is that nobody that participated in the debate had more power than the other since they were speaking on equal terms. Additionally, they themselves were also the targeted audience, hence question 3 is also not necessary in the context of this

thesis. This leaves only three questions for the thesis to answer: 1. Who/What is the securitising Actor? 2. How was the issue (referent object) securitised and is there a speech act? 3. If any, what extraordinary measures are suggested?

However, it was not clear if the literature above used any other method, but it has been chosen to solidify the securitisation framework with additional methods such as Textual- and Context analysis, which will be performed within the delimited frame of Nord Stream 2. This will be elaborated upon in the next part of this chapter.

2.3: The Two Methods of Analysis that Will Be Used with the Theory

As previously mentioned, this thesis will use two methods, both content analysis and discourse analysis. These two methods will be used to operationalise the questions which were provided by the securitisation theory, which will then be applied to the empirical material: the debate that was held by European Parliamentary Members on Monday, 9 May 2016 in Strasbourg, where the issue of Nord Stream 2 was discussed.

Though, first some common denominators will be brought up within textual analysis, in order to get a general overview of textual and discursive methods. Firstly, “the production of the text puts the focus on producers, authors, speakers, writers; the reception of the text puts the focus on interpretation, interpreters, readers, listeners” (Fairclough, 2003:10). Secondly, one must take into account the:

“institutional position, interests, values, intentions, desires etc. of producers; the relations between elements at different levels in texts; and the institutional positions, knowledge, purposes, values etc. of receivers. It is very difficult to be precise about the processes involved in meaning-making for the obvious reason that they are mainly going on in people’s heads, and there are no direct ways of accessing them” (Fairclough, 2003:10-11).

Content Analysis involves the systematic analysis of textual information and can be either qualitative or quantitative. This is an approach used when one “move[s] from spoken dialogue to, for instance, published texts, the problems are compounded because we no longer have the ongoing negotiation of meaning within dialogue, which at least gives us some evidence of how things are being intended and interpreted” (Fairclough, 2003:11). The qualitative content

analysis focuses purely on the text and its latent content, while the quantitative focuses on repetition of words from the same category (i.e. polite, negative, or threatening etc.). Furthermore, the content analysis approach can also sort the different types of words into different contexts, since the meaning of this word depends completely on the context in which the speaker utters it and from which context the speaker comes from (i.e. a speaker from transit country will have a different view on the situation in Ukraine than a speaker coming from a non-transit country). The content analysis approach holds that that it is possible to reveal the meanings, motives and purposes that are hidden in between the lines. This is done by taking a sample of a similar document or other type of material and focus on keywords to disclose the common theme within them. In other words, one can call this approach:

“intertextuality [which means] how texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualise and dialogue with other texts. It is also partly a matter of the assumptions and presuppositions people make when they speak or write. What is ‘said’ in a text is always said against the background of what is ‘unsaid’ – what is made explicit is always grounded in what is left implicit. In a sense, making assumptions is one way of being intertextual – linking this text to an ill-defined penumbra of other texts, what has been said or written or at least thought elsewhere” (Fairclough, 2003:17).

The material used within this methodical approach is exclusively textual, ranging from official documents to personal diaries. While the criticism of this method is researcher bias, it is still the most objective way to process text into data, due to the fact that no better option was found for this specific study. This is the reason why this method was chosen for this thesis, and it was chosen for its ability to turn words and sentences into numbers and cold data, rather than being interpretive like other textual analyses.

Discourse Analysis or Context Analysis, is an interpretive and constructivist approach to understanding political phenomena. This approach assumes that an actor’s actions spring out of context such as, but not limited to, beliefs and values. Ideology, just as class, shows differences between cultures, people etc., is still present in today’s discourse hence it could be considered relevant, though in both cases the relevance of the two categories depend purely on the context (Fairclough, 2010). For example, in a European Parliamentary debate the hidden precedence of culture will be present in their arguments. This will be seen through the focus on past historical events, such as whether the country was part of Soviet Union or not.

Such historical events do shape a country's culture and therefore the view on the country which "represents" the "new Soviet Union threat", which is Russia (see chapter 1.2).

Therefore, this thesis will use the context analysis in order to focus more on the historical and cultural context for a word, while content analysis will be used to look at words and determine their nature based on the content of the overall sentence or discourse. Though, this approach that involves using the two methods holds that one must understand the intent and reasoning behind actor's actions. When using these methods one interprets the discourse and social construction surrounding the actor and problem area. When it comes to discourse analysis, one can also use it to assess the "goal" of the discourse, or rather, uncover the motive behind the discourse, which is how these theories will be used within the frames of this thesis. The method for uncovering the "goal" of a discourse is looking at the context of the discourse and the actor background to uncover the actor's position, which in turn would uncover the motive behind the actor's discourse in that debate, interview or etc. The material used within the method can range from official documents to TV-programmes, since the aim is not to interpret the content of the material but to divulge the broad context within which it was produced.

The Discourse Analysis approach has been:

"criticised for its lack of concern with explanation – with how discursive practises are socially shaped, or their effects /.../ [but also for] 'background knowledge' as an obfuscation of ideological processes in discourse, the preoccupation with 'goals' as based upon an untenable theory of subject, and the neglect of relations of power manifestation" in conversations (Fairclough, 2010: 26).

Despite the criticism, this method is still chosen because of the framework provided by the securitisation model which amends for the criticism. Additionally, the discourse analysis approach has been criticised for being researcher biased. However, one could argue that there is a danger regardless of method. To increase validity, content analysis will serve as a foundation for the discourse analysis. This can be done since the content will clearly show which themes are present in the discourse, while the discourse analysis will complete the information by providing the context for the perception of the themes, which will be analysed by the securitisation model framework.

This thesis has made a conscious decision to use **Discourse Analysis** and not to use the less biased and more rounded *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA) due to its large focus on the actor who conducts the discourse, while this thesis has multiple discourse conductors within one actor, hence the CDA approach would not prove helpful in fulfilling the purpose of this thesis. Furthermore, all the stages which Fairclough suggests "1. Focus upon social wrong, in its semiotic aspect 2. Identify obstacles to addressing the social wrong 3. Consider whether the social order needs the social wrong 4. Identify possible ways past the obstacles" (see Fairclough 2010: 226). All these categories do not fit into the context of this thesis simply because a social wrong is not investigated, however Fairclough's structure of how to analyse a problem will be adopted by this thesis when using the previously mentioned methods. Meaning that instead of using the Fairclough's stages, this thesis will use the operational questions that were derived from the securitisation theory (See previous part chapter). Namely: 1. Who/What is the securitising Actor? 2. How was the issue (referent object) securitised and is there a speech act? 3. If any, what extraordinary measures are suggested? Additionally, Fairclough's structure of working with his "stages" where he analyses them and discusses them separately from each other and forms his data analysis into multiple mini data analysis, where each one build on the previous analysis (see Fairclough: 2010).

All these parts which have been mentioned in this chapter up until now will be referred to as *Critical Securitisation Analysis* and it is this framework that will be the way in which the data analysis chapter will be structure and executed in. Howbeit, this will be elaborated upon slightly more in the subsequent part.

2.4: Methodology Design and How It Will Be Used in Practice in this Thesis

The Critical Securitisation Analysis consists of the previously mentioned operational questions: 1. Who/What is the securitising Actor? 2. How was the issue (referent object) securitised and is there a speech act? 3. If any, what extraordinary measures are suggested?, will be the stages of this thesis. The method used for the first stage of the data analysis will be discourse analysis combined with quantitative content analysis. This will be done since in this part, the "origin" of the speakers (both country and EU party) will be put into a table and their opinions as representatives of (country or party) will be grouped together and displayed as numbers (see Table 1a and Table 1b for more information).

The methods used for stage two of this is qualitative content analysis combined with discourse analysis. Where the discourses will be brought forth from the data and be represented in words within a table (see Table 2), which will be analysed through context analysis.

In the method for stage three qualitative will connect the overall content of the discourse and show how it evolved from the start to the end of the debate. Then the findings will be briefly summarised in the end of the Data Analysis chapter. Though in this chapter the proceedings of data collecting and processing will be discussed, this information will be elaborated on in this next part of the chapter.

2.5: Data Collecting and Processing Procedure

The material from which the data will be collected is a European Parliamentary debate amongst MEP's, which was held on Monday, 9 May 2016 in Strasbourg. The only aspect of the debate that will be used for the data collecting is the debate transcript (see Appendix II). The legal decisions on how they will delegate the question within the EU structure will not be discussed, since legal analysis is not a part of this methodology, nor is it necessary to achieve the goal of answering the research question of this thesis (see chapter 1.1). Hence, the data will be strictly derived from the debate transcript and the additional written comments which were attached to the transcript. Additionally, to that, it is of importance to say that the "visual" debate where one could see and hear the debate was not used due to the language barrier and equipment difficulties where the visual was not transmitting. Therefore, it was deemed unnecessary to incorporate such material into the framework as it wasn't imperative to achieving the goal of this thesis. The debate which is held in the European Parliament is written down in the original language of the speaker, and due to lack of language skills, the only language that could be translated without help was Swedish (and English of course). Therefore, the translation was carried out through "google translate" on all languages (except English of course). Swedish was also translated in "google translate" as a control, since it was the only language where one could see if the context was correctly translated. Since the experiment with the Swedish translation was a success and the translation from Swedish to English was deemed sufficient enough, the decision was made to proceed with the study. All the languages which required translation were translated in the same translation "engine". It is important to point out that it is recognised that the translation may differ in exact wording, hence overall topics of discourses will be extracted from the securitising actor(s).

Additionally, it is also recognised that the translation quality may differ from language to language, though it was deemed too small of a risk to not execute the translation. The discourses that will be extracted from the debate will be represented by singular words, or sentences. Only the discourses that are prevalent in the debate that are conducted by selected securitising actors, will be represented in the table as words or sentences (see Table 2). This data that will consist singular words and sentences, and will be considered as securitisation “trigger words/ sentences”, which represent the different themes of discourse in the debate in relation to the Nord Stream 2 project. This data will then be discussed, by putting the words and sentences into a context which would explain why they are securitising. This data will also to some extent be compared to the non-securitising discourse to show the difference in the topics that are brought out.

The previously mentioned transcript of the debate, not only lacked the English translation of what was spoken but also the country of origin as well as party membership of the speakers. Hence, this information was added to the transcript in Appendix II, where the information was found at the MEP’s search at the European parliament site (European Parliament, 2017). To find each member, their names were inserted into the site, from which the information was retrieved. Additionally, the Commissioner, who opened and closed the debate with as speech is not taken into the data since he is not a MEP. This is done to further narrow down the data, since the commissioners’ speeches are long. Another important point of information is that in-between the time of the debate and present-day, Czech Republic has changed its name to Czechia, though Czech Republic will be the name that will be primarily used in this thesis since it is the name that was used in the debate, though sometimes Czechia will be written in parenthesis as a reminder of this fact (See for more information Tait, 2016).

This concludes the rundown of the mechanical proceedings of this thesis which will now be seen in action in this following chapter.

Chapter 3: Data Analysis

This chapter’s main objective is to uncover how the Nord Stream 2 project is securitised during the European Parliamentary debates that took place on Monday, 9 May 2016 in Strasbourg between MEP’s (see full google translated transcript of the debate in Appendix II, (European Parliament,2016)). All the data in the tables and examples will be taken from this debate, however, before the uncovering of how the Nord Stream 2 project was securitised, it will be underscored how the project was politicised in the first place.

Politicisation as seen in chapter 2.1, is the stage before securitisation. In the case which is brought forth in this thesis, the EU's structure alone which has brought the project up for debate, is in itself a politicisation process. Hence the debate, which will serve as the main source of all data, is in itself a confirmation that the project is already politicised (see chapter 1.1 and 2.1). Due to the fact that politicisation of the project has taken place upon it reaching the committee which holds the debate, one can continue with uncovering the securitisation process of this debate. Prior to this it is important to know that a committee consists of between 25 and 73 MEP's, sometimes more, excluding the president (chair) and secretariat etc." (European Parliament, 2017a). The members are grouped together based on political party adherence not nationality, where a fourth of the party must be represented by one spokesperson per debate as a minimum.

It was deemed unnecessary to collect statistics on nationality and political party presence corresponding to the overall party. Given that this information would be irrelevant for realising the goal of this thesis, which is to answer the research question, it will not be discussed in this thesis.

This chapter will consist of three parts with a discussion adherent to each part separately, and the summary of all the parts will be in the overall conclusion. The three parts are: 1. Who/What is the securitising Actor? (How well is the EU integrated. Is the supranational state stronger than the individual state interest? (see chapter 1.4)) 2. How was the issue (referent object) securitised and is there a speech act? 3. If any, what extraordinary measures are suggested? The discussion part in each section will contain an answer to the subsequent question.

3.1: Who is the Securitising Actor in the Parliamentary debate?

How well is the EU integrated - is the supranational state stronger than individual state interests?

In this part, the data has been taken from the material in Appendix II, and through the method of textual analysis, it has been transferred into quantitative data. This quantitative data has been processed through colour coding within two tables. One table containing groupings of MEP's opinions based on their country of origin, and the second contains groupings of MEP's opinions based on their party. These two tables will be followed with a subsequent discussion concerning the information derived from the tables below.

Table 1a

In this table below it is evident how many participants were from which country, and how they positioned themselves in relation to the topic at hand. Meaning whether they were “against”, “in favour of” or “no position on” in relation to allowing the construction of Nord Stream 2. The colour “yellow” indicates that participants from the same country were not categorical in their positioning towards Nord Stream 2 as their fellow nationals. Green indicates that there are participants from the same country that are categorically divided in regard to Nord Stream 2. White means that all participants from the same country are unanimous on their position in the matter of Nord Stream 2.

Country	Different (active) representatives	How many were AGAINST NordStream 2	How many were IN FAVOUR OF NordStream 2	How many were NO POSITION ON NordStream 2
Poland	10	10		
Hungary	4	2		2
Spain	3	3		
Italy	3	3		
Denmark	3	3		
Sweden	3	3		
Czech Republic (Czechia)	2	1	1	
Lithuania	2	2		
Estonia	2	2		
Greece	2	1		1
Romania	2	2		
Finland	1	1		
Croatia	1	1		
Slovenia	1			1
Slovakia	1	1		
Cyprus	1			1
Austria	1		1	
Germany	1	1		
Belgium	1		1	
Latvia	1	1		
Bulgaria	1	1		
Total Number of	46	38	3	5

Table 1b

In this table one can see how many members of a party participated in the debate and how many within the party positioned themselves as “against”, “in favour of” or “position unclear” in regard to allowing the construction of Nord Stream 2. The colour “yellow” indicates that

same members were not categorical in their positioning towards Nord Stream 2 as their fellow party members. Green indicates that there are members that are categorically un-unanimous in regard to Nord Stream 2. White means that all members are unanimous on their position in the matter of Nord Stream 2. The non-attached members are “white” since they do not belong to any party and therefore all have individual opinions and but default cannot be inconsistent with each other.

Party names	Number of representative s	How many were AGAINST NordStream 2	How many were IN FAVOUR OF NordStream 2	How many were NO POSITION ON NordStream 2
Group of the European People's Party	18	18		
Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament	5	3		2
European Conservatives and Reformists Group	6	4	1	1
Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe	6	5		1
Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left	3	1	1	1
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance	3	3		
Europe of Nations and Freedom Group	2	1	1	
Non-attached Members	3	2		1

Discussion of the data above:

Rendering the results from the two tables above, one can deduce that in the case of Nord Stream 2, it is the countries that are the securitising actors within a European Parliamentary debate. This deduction is reached due to the fact there are less dissonant opinions among fellow nationals than fellow party members if one pays special attention to the amounts of green stripes present in the two tables. The same goes for the amounts of yellow stripes present in both tables.

It is recognised, however, that there are countries with only one representative that prevents dissonance within respective country. The counter argument is that if one looks at the tables, one can see that on balance, there are not as many parties as there are nationalities. Therefore, the deduction that countries are the securitising actors in the European Parliament, is considered on balance a just deduction. The deduction is further supported by the participants/speakers referring to their own countries when discussing Nord Stream 2 project. The most prominent examples of such speakers are Czesak, Korwin-Mikke, Synadinos, though there are a couple of more incidents of such occurrences (see Appendix II). Another supporting argument for the previously mentioned deduction is that the party that had most representatives (Group of the European People's Party), a third of that party consisted of polish representatives. Meaning that six out of ten polish representatives that were participating in the debate, were in that party. This number could be a possible reason for the 100% consistencies of the party's opinions, since all the polish representatives were of the same opinion too (see table 1 and 2). This is a deduction that is made in this thesis and considered a fact, based on the data above, that the reason why the largest party had a unanimous position towards Nord Stream 2 was because the polish representatives in the party constituted a majority. Thus, increasing the chances of reaching 100% unanimity within the party. This in turn adds further support the statement that countries are the real securitising actors of the Nord Stream 2 project in the European Parliamentary debate. Ergo, answering the question that individual state interest is stronger than the supranational union. The data that has been used in this part chapter will be used and elaborated upon in the next part of the analysis.

3.2: How Was the Referent Object Nord Stream 2 Securitised — Is There a Speech Act?

To answer this part chapters' question, one must move forward from the quantitative data, while still baring it in mind, to qualitative data. Another table is constructed where words and sentences that represent the recurring and main themes of the discussions with the three positions: against-, in favour-, and no position on the issue of Nord Stream 2. These three categories are the same as table 1a and 1b. In this table, Poland, which is the country with most representatives amongst the securitising actors that are also united in their position on Nord Stream 2, will have a separate box with the prevalent discourses they have brought up. The previously mentioned words or short sentences will represent the Polish discourse on the topic (see chapter 2.5) and then compared with the next three countries who have a unified "against" position on Nord Stream 2. These are Spain, Italy, and Denmark who each have three representatives and will together amount to approximately the same number as the polish representatives. In the same table the discourse representation of all who were "in favour" of or "no position on" the matter of Nord Stream 2 will be shown in the table below in order to determine if there is a speech act or not. Afterwards some context will be brought up to some of the words that represented the discourses and other issues that have been brought up in the debate.

Table 2

In this table one can see the discourses of the securitising actors from Poland, Spain, Italy and Denmark, from the categories in table 1a. The securitising speech acts of these actors reflects the prevalent speech acts that exist in all those speeches that were against Nord Stream 2. The examples of such speech acts are: "Russia uses gas as a political weapon to accomplish its neo-imperial goals"(by Zdzisław Krasnodębski); "[T]his project destroys unity and European solidarity, undermines trust and creates tension between countries /.../ and threatens the security of several Central European countries"(by Jerry Buzek); "It will increase the dominance of Gazprom where it is dominant, it will strengthen its monopoly, and it is a part of Russian policy versus Europe" (by Gunnar Hökmark); "Nord Stream 2 is both unnecessary, unwanted and dangerous"(by Jeppe Kofod); "[T]he high degree of dependence on Russian energy is a problem for Europe. In particular, the risk have increased after Putin's Russia has taken a weapon of foreign policy and energy into power politics"(by Henna Virkkunen; see Appendix II for more examples).

The principle for extracting this information from Appendix II, as described in chapter 2.5, was by compiling all the statements from the previously mentioned representatives and extracting repetitive themes and remaking them into singular words and short sentences which encompass and properly represents the meaning of the “theme”. Both content and context analysis was needed for this procedure, however the procedure is self-explanatory, but if curious, one could look at Table 1a and the corresponding parts in Appendix II.

The Positions of the securitising actors	The discourse topics in the form of ”securitizing trigger words and sentences”.
Polish representatives (see table 1a)	Ukraine; Contradicts EU principles, Economically unjustified, Environmental- and EU Law, dependence on Russia, Russian-threat, Germany being more privileged than other member states, Russian-monopoly, division of unity, negative effects, Russian weapon, Poland, no diversification.
Against Nord Stream 2	the project is unneeded, unwanted and dangerous, Putin’s Russia, Russian monopoly, threat, unjustified, Ukraine, Central Europe, Eastern Europe, dividing EU, disintegrating the Union.
In favour of Nord Stream 2	guaranteed gas supply, ulterior motives of transit countries.
No position on Nord Stream 2	South Stream, bureaucracy, EU’s lack of strategy, ulterior motives of Members states, Germany being more privileged than other member states, questioning the legitimacy of EU.

Explanation of Table 2:

Though most of these people were not represented in the table below, these speech acts clearly show that Nord Stream 2 was securitised during the debate. Similar speech acts were selected from all the participants of from the countries Poland, Spain, Italy and Denmark, which were amongst the securitising actors of this debate. These countries represent the securitising side of the discourse, where the repetitive topics brought up in the representatives speeches are the ones that are represented in “the discourse topics” column. The topics

correspond to which position (or country) and the column contains the trigger words and sentences which the representatives of the “position” used.

The reason why three additional countries were chosen was done in order to represent the securitising speech acts of other securitising actors in a number that was approximately similar to the numbers of the Polish representatives. The reason why these three specific actors were chosen was because all these chosen countries’ nationals were unanimous and because of the order in which they were written up in Table 1a. (See Appendix II for verification of the information in this table)

Discussion on the table above:

The information that is found in the table above corresponds with the information found in the Critical Literature Review and the introduction to the Background chapter (see chapter 1 and 1.2), specifically that there is a divide within the EU and this is clearly seen in the topics. Starting from the bottom with the “No position” themes, one can find a clear example of the link between the information found in chapter 1.3 and the information in Table 2 is the “ulterior motives of member states” discourse, which was a not directly outspoken, though could be easily discerned between the lines with the help of context of the actor who spoke it. An illustrative example is the sentence “gas transit means for some countries an interesting source of significant assets, understand, respect to Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic” (see Appendix II, Jaromír Kohlíček). Though it is not spoken, what can be found between the lines is that it is hinted that since all these countries are transit countries, they are all against Nord Stream 2 in order not to lose their revenue. Therefore, the speaker is hinting that the transit countries have a hidden reason for why Ukraine’s fellow transit countries are so concerned for Ukraine (see chapter 2.3). However, the interesting part is that the speaker itself is from the Czech Republic (Czechia), one of the countries that were called out, which could then indicate that this person understands the importance of the revenue for his country and therefore can draw a conclusion that it is similar for the other countries. Thus, making the speakers background the guide to reading in between the lines of his statements. To reaffirm this, another example will be given. The statement, “the construction of the South Stream would have provided alternative routes to bypass Ukraine more European, Central European countries, but what was said of the objections: those based on competition, bureaucratic, liberal principles, and eventually became the result of this failure puffing” (see Appendix II, Zoltán Balczó). Again, one must take to looking between the lines in order to understand that

it is hinted that there was a good project, but that it was ignored due to personal interests and that is why we need to deal with this lesser alternative. Again, to reach these conclusions one must look at the country of origin of the speaker, which is Hungary. This information was helpful due to the fact that Hungary was one of the main countries that would benefit from the South Stream project, which is the reason for the speakers' utterance. If to take another theme like the discussion of the mistrust of Germany, and the statements like "all member states and not only Germany, have the same opportunities to carry out the construction of energy infrastructure, at least legally" (see Appendix II, Notis Marias). Where the origin of this statement comes from the fact that the speaker is Greek, which gives the context of Greek debt to Germany, which could explain the mistrust expressed in this statement. Another illustrative statement within the theme of the questioning of the union itself, the "European Union have not yet solved important issues of energy security" (see Appendix II, Neoklis Silikiotis). Since this speaker is from Cyprus, this statement clearly originates from the part of the Cypriots that have expressed a disappointment in EU which was caused by the economic crisis that strained the already difficult relationship between Cyprus and EU (See EuroActive, 2015). There are many more examples, however, the objective is to find out if Nord Stream 2 is securitised.

Looking at the against section, there are obvious securitising words that bear a negative and threatening nature such as: threat, weapon and danger, hence it is clear that Nord Stream 2 is securitised. There is also a speech act within this securitisation, since speech acts involve use of words of threatening nature which is seen in the table above. It can also be seen clearly in a statement by the Swedish representative that stated, "I think it must be remembered that Russia the last thirty, forty years have been using energy as a political weapon" (see Peter Eriksson, Appendix II). It is clearly seen in this statement, from a country that is not included in the table, clearly reflects the securitising tone of those included. This securitisation will be further investigated in the next part in order to reaffirm and prove the finding.

Context Analysis:

In this part of the analysis the context of five discourse topics out of the "against" position will be analysed, which will be offset by an "in favour" position for the sake of illustrating how these two discourses interacted within the debate. This will be done in order to establish if these discourses are of securitising nature.

First the discourse of "dependence on Russia", that is Russian gas, is highly knitted with

the discourse “Russian weapon” (for more information see discussion in chapter 1.3 and Smith-Stegen, 2011) since all the gas that is transported from Russia is owned by one company. This company, Gazprom, has a monopoly in the Russian gas market, (this also ties to the “Russian-monopoly” discourse and theme) where the company is closely connected with the government, which, for example, is notable in the discourses of Zanonato, Krasnodębski, Helveg Petersen, Eriksson, Hökmark, Kofod, (see Appendix II). This allows the Russian government to use gas as a political tool since the country is a major gas exporter. The way in which Russia can use gas as a political tool is that it can manipulate those countries that are dependent on Russian gas to adhere to Russian interests, hence the use of the word weapon by the MEP’s. This is also the reason why the EU is very afraid of falling dependent on Russian gas, because then, according to the MEP’s, the EU could not counteract and/or condemn Russian actions like those in Ukraine (ex. Annexation of Crimea; see statements by Eriksson, Virkkunen etc.). Hence, one can positively state that these discourses indicate a threat. Here, Russia is clearly framed as the “enemy” within this discourse, while the Nord Stream 2 project is a threat from which the EU needs then to protect itself from, which is a part of securitisation act. Russian monopoly was also widely used as a securitising “trigger-word” by securitising actors other than those from Poland. But, if to look at the actors that come from Poland, they express that Russia uses gas as a weapon. This conduct could find its roots in the Polish cultural and historical past from when Poland was previously a part of the Soviet Union as a satellite state. Hence the context for this discourse spring from both a cultural and historical context that entails fear and mistrust towards Soviet Union which was then switched over to Russia (see chapter 1.2). Furthermore, Poland was more or less annexed by Soviet Union with the Warsaw Pact, hence when Crimea was annexed by Russia it reminded the Polish of that instead and caused fear for it happening again to their country. This fear is amplified by sharing a border with Russia, which makes them geo-strategically comfortable to overtake, just as Ukraine is. All this can be seen clearly in their fearful and negative discourse about Nord Stream 2 and Russia, as well as the previously mentioned pragmatic undertone for why Poland as a transit country is against the Nord Stream 2 project.

The positive position on the issue of the Nord Stream project, does also point a finger on the underlying pragmatism of some of the representatives which are, as Poland, transit countries that have money to lose if the Nord Stream 2 project was built. The “champions” of this position had few representatives and therefore were easily overpowered by the opposition. Though the way in which they spoke about the project was that it was

economically sound and the best option to avoid a similar crisis like in 2006 (see chapter 1.1). Thus, they used a tone of “reason” and tried to position it as a lesser evil than to remain without electricity (paraphrasing). This tone served as a contrast to the cynical and fearful tone of those with the position of “against” had in writing. Though, as mentioned before, the latter overpowered the “positive” position easily, which is seen in the “against” position discourse themes of Spain, Italy and Denmark.

The fourth discourse theme, held by the “against” group of Spain, Italy and Denmark, concerns “Ukraine, Central Europe, Eastern Europe”. This theme again goes back to the time when Russia and the Eastern and Central parts of Europe along with Ukraine were a part, or under the influence of the Soviet Union. Where Russia, as it was discussed in chapter 1.2, took over the mantle when the Union collapsed and is seen to seek to regain its “lost lands” i.e. Ukraine, Central Europe, Eastern Europe (for more information see chapter 1.2). Unlike Poland, the countries Spain, Italy and Denmark were never a part of Soviet Union, however, they lived under the Cold War rhetoric which partly exists today in the form of fear of Russian Expansion towards the West. The annexation of Crimea confirmed the fears of the EU member states, which amplified the discourse of the “Russian threat” even more, as seen by the statement: “the kremlin is part of a deal which is splitting the European Union apart” (see Pavel Telička, Appendix II). This fear originates from the notion of Russia is trying to rebuild the Soviet Union, which is where the discourse of “Putin’s Russia” comes in. In the eyes of the EU member states, it is under president Vladimir Putin’s rule that Russia has reverted to its Soviet foreign policy tendencies, which has played one the European countries’ fears. Vladimir Putin himself is positioned as a figure of threatening nature due to his actions on the political arena. This can be clearly seen in the statements by Bendtsen “Europe must become less dependent on gas from Putin’s Russia”, and in the statement by Kofod “[Nord Stream 2] will only strengthen Mr Putin’s energy hold on Europe”. The actions of the Russian President which caused such reaction is the expansionist tendencies that were made apparent for the EU member states on the example of Ukraine, which made him be seen as a figure from which they must defend themselves. Hence, once again, proving that Nord Stream 2 is securitised by speech acts that are hidden in both context and between the lines. The speech acts entailing the fearful and threatening nature of the discourse conducted by the securitising actors have when speaking about the Nord Stream 2 project. An example existing outside the participants in the table, is provided by Krišjānis Kariņš, and states that Nord Stream 2 is a drug and Europe is a “drug addict [injects its] vein with twice the dose. It is life-

threatening. It is dangerous” (see Appendix II). This statement clearly depicts how Nord Stream is securitised, yet it can be argued that Nord Stream 2 is only securitised by default since the true referent object is the Russian government, based on the themes found in Table 2. Yet, this begs the question if there are any extraordinary measures taken? This will be the topic of discussion of the last part of this chapter.

3.3: If Any, What Extraordinary Measures are Suggested?

Before answering this last question, one needs to look at the structure of the debate, or rather, the evolution of the discussion between the MEP's.

The discussion initiated by a Polish speaker contained a harsh and securitising tone towards the Nord Stream 2 project. Though the harsh and securitising tone which hardened in the duration of the first part of the debate was countered by an even harsher tone of criticism towards the European Union itself. This criticism came from the representatives who did not take a concrete position (No Position, see tables above) on the question of accepting the Nord Stream 2 project. Where the last “live” comment on the matter was a criticism towards the union itself rather than focusing on the topic of Nord Stream 2. This trend can be detected in the Tables 1a and 2 above, yet, as seen in these tables, the discussion was slightly diluted by voices that were in favour of the project.

Nonetheless, as seen in the previously mentioned tables, the dominating discussions were about mistrust towards the EU and about the potential threat Nord Stream 2 (and Russia) pose to the EU as a whole, and to some individual countries (see Table 1 and 3). The latter being the most prevalent one as seen in Table 1a and is confirmed by the fact that the last comment on the debate in writing was also against the Nord Stream 2 project. These comments were attached to the debate “in writing” by those MEP's that could not participate “live” (see Appendix II). All the comments which were attached after the debate had ended showed a clear position of being against the construction of the Nord Stream 2 project.

It is a sheer fact that has been observed in this debate, and that fact is that there was no unity amongst the MEP's, at least not enough to form a policy or common consensus of how to move forward with the issue at hand. This has been stated in both chapter 1.2 and in the texts above like the camp that were against the project. This served as the main reason why no concrete and assertive measure was suggested during this debate. Furthermore, it is clear that

this is not the first time that the topic has been discussed since the President of the Energy Sector in the Commission was asked to be present and open and conclude the debate, however, as discussed in the methodology part of the thesis, his statements were not analysed since he is not a member of the Parliament, yet his presence is noted since it clearly shows that this issue is taking political priority amongst the EU member states, which are the securitising actors within the EU; on the issue of Nord Stream 2 at least. Furthermore, MEP Edward Czesak said:

“A few weeks ago, during a debate in the European Parliament, Šefčovič suggested signing an international agreement between Germany and Russia regulating the legal status of Nord Stream 2. How does the German government deal with this proposal? What arguments does the European Commission use to convince Germany of such a solution? Does the Nord Stream thread appear in talks with partners outside the European Union, such as the United States? What is the position of our key US partners on this matter and will it be taken into account by the European Commission?” (see Appendix II, Edward Czesak and chapter 1.2)

This entire paragraph above shows the politicisation of the project as well as the call of external actors such as the US, which could be seen as an extraordinary measure since this is an actor outside of EU's control and political system. In addition to this, it is important to state that the US is believed to be a deterrence “weapon” for Russia, where the notion has its roots from the Cold War rhetoric, which as previously mentioned, still exists in the EU. Other measures are more or less within the EU's system due to the fact that it is political procedure to delegate measure taking to individual state and then having those states coming back through the commission again and restarting the cycle which will result in another debate (see EU chapters).

Since, according to the Copenhagen School, there is no official need for an extraordinary measure to take place for an issue to become securitised (See 2.1 chapter), ordinary legislative actions without military involvement do count as measures of securitisation, thus completing the securitisation process. The Copenhagen School argued that as long as there is a clear speech act involved, and an issue that can become securitised, where the process is made at a high authority level, the issue can be deemed as successfully securitised. This debate is evidently taking place at relatively high EU governmental level, and also visibly fulfils the remaining requirements, therefore, one can deem the Nord Stream 2 project as successfully securitised already. What concerns the “convincing of the audience” part of the securitisation

process, one needs to take into account the European system. It is a system with many securitising actors with a wide range of individual state interests, hence it would be very extraordinary if every single one of the audience was convinced, which is not a requirement of the Copenhagen School. In this thesis the requirement is the vast majority, which is undoubtedly met by the opposed position, hence the Nord Stream 2 project is fully securitised. Yet, there may be a question if any convincing occurred at all during the debate or if everybody simply remained with their initial opinions. Regardless of that, the majority of the speakers still conducted a securitising discourse, hence the conclusion that the Nord Stream 2 project was fully securitised during this debate.

Nonetheless, as stated before, the US was invoked as a potential measure, and a suggestion to involve an external actor, that is known to be the military hegemony of the world, is in itself an extraordinary measure. Hence, this thesis considers the call on an external actor, which is not under the legislative control of the EU or a part of EU, to be an extraordinary measure. This then concludes that there is one such extraordinary measure, though not military, but with military potential. Ergo, the securitisation process of the Nord Stream 2 project has been completed.

3.4 Summarising the Findings Made in the Data Analysis

One of the main findings that have been made in this data analysis is the identification of countries as the securitising actors of the European Parliament debate on the issue of the Nord Stream 2 project. This find is of grave importance since it proves that the European Integration Process is failing and that despite the efforts of the EU, state interest come before the interests of the European Union in its entirety. This also serves as an explanation for why no concrete measures are taken in regard to Russia and the mentioned above “threat” Russia poses to the European Energy Market. Since, as mentioned in the introduction of chapter 1, unity is important in making a decision within the structure of the EU, and when it fails the result is what is seen above, mistrust towards the structure itself.

The confirmation of the information in chapter 1.2 and the introduction of chapter 1, where it was stated that there is no unity amongst the EU member states when it comes to Russia, is another important finding. It is important because it means that this study correlates to the previous academic work, and therefore reaffirms the new finds such as the true securitising actors of the European Parliament on this specific issue at least. Furthermore, it is important

because this shows that the discourse that exist in media is reflected in the debate, which could be of use for future studies. However, what is of main importance for future academic studies is that one can safely assume that if countries are the securitising actors in this occurrence, then the possibility is very high that this is happening in other instances as well. Though that is a find left for future studies to prove.

The additional contribution which this thesis has made is to confirm that the true referent object is Russia itself, despite the fact that it was meant to be a discussion about an energy project proposition, strictly. This find builds upon what has been said in chapter 1.2, which is that there is a cultural discourse that can be considered to be linked with politics and to some extent ideology, which exists in Europe. In this thesis this discourse has been likened to the Cold War rhetoric, which is suspected to be the origin of the discourse for the Western European countries. This can also be clearly seen in Eastern Europeans have a culture of fear towards Russia due to their Soviet past. Yet, the catalyst of fear for both sides is the unravelling situation in Ukraine, which has heightened the levels of fear in the EU member states. This catalyst is believed to be the main reason why the discourse of the “against” position is the way it is in this debate. This belief is supported by how many times Ukraine has been mentioned in the debate by the side that is against the Nord Stream 2 project, and how many times Ukraine was not at all mentioned by those who were in favour of the Nord Stream 2 project. Thus, proving that Ukraine is the catalyst and this find will help future studies develop further into the subject.

Chapter 4: Conclusion and Evaluation of the Thesis and the Resulting Answer to the Research Question

The key theme in this thesis is about the EU energy security in relation to Russia and its proposed project Nord Stream 2. The EU is the main actor in the analysis, which was the reason why one of EU’s decision-making bodies were analysed in this thesis. This is the reason why chapter 1.1 included how energy security works and got developed within the EU was brought up in this thesis as background information. Along with this, a general context for the project was provided in the first part of chapter one. Nonetheless, it was the critical literature review (chapter 1.2) which clarified why the aim of the thesis is to see how Nord Stream 2 is securitised, as well as the guidelines or the relevance and purpose of this thesis for

the IR field and the energy security field (see chapter 1.4). The chapter 1.2 also provided a hint to which theoretical tools one needs to use when conducting a similar study. Although in this chapter, the method was undetectable due to lack of ascription to methods by the scholars in the field, hence it had to be engineered from scratch into the Critical Securitisation Analysis which has been used in this study.

However, in being one of a kind, this study does have its shortcomings. Due to lack of language skills, one could not make a more precision data analysis of the words used.

In order to elaborate on the present work that has been presented in this thesis, the following could be suggested: an expansion would be necessary on both context analysis where one looks at the actors' backgrounds and data analysis where one ties singular words to context of the discourse and then speaker. What would be done as well, is getting proper official translation of what the speakers say during the debate in order to get more precise data.

Yet, this thesis did try to mend its shortcomings by focusing on abstract themes that were present in the debate rather than concrete words, and analyse the content of overall discourse that still provided an answer to the operational questions. Due to this fact, this framework of Critical Securitisation Analysis based on the Copenhagen School allowed to see how and issue like Nord Stream 2 can be securitised within the European Parliament.

Another possible way to build upon this thesis is to expand the horizon by adding to this data the statistics over how the parties are usually formed in the committees to find out if it is a mere coincidence that there were so many polish representatives and so few German or not. Unfortunately, this could not be done within the format of this thesis due to lack of space within the frame of a bachelor thesis.

If to return to the answering the research question, which goes as follows: How can a securitisation process be detected within a debate in the European Parliament on the issue of Nord Stream 2? This questions answer is in this this thesis and one can find it by looking at the framework which the Copenhagen School provided, which is the three operational questions that got answered in this thesis: 1. Who/What is/are the securitising Actor/s?, which the conclusion of the first part of the analysis (ch.3.1) was that the countries were the securitising actors. 2. How was the issue (referent object) securitised and is there a speech act? Through Cold War rhetoric, and negatively linking the project (Russia) with words of danger and national culture (i.e. Eastern European culture of fear towards Russia). In addition

to that the events in Ukraine were central in the discourses of those who were against the Nord Stream 2 project, meaning that it's a showcase of Russia reverting back to its expansionistic Soviet past. 3. If any, what extraordinary measures are suggested? The answer to this was to involve a country outside the Union's legislation that is a known military power, namely the US, which is an apparent part of the Cold War rhetoric.

Yet, using these questions alone, one could not have reached the answer so easily. This can be clearly seen in the Data Analysis chapter, and how it was done was carefully planned as seen in chapter in chapter 2, in its entirety. Hence the answer is: The way a securitisation process can be detected within a debate held May 9th in the European Parliament on the issue of Nord Stream 2, is by using the methodology of Critical Securitisation Analysis.

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
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Appendix I

Picture 1: In the picture one can see a map with the pipelines that work, proposed, under development and have been canceled, in Europe. Nord Stream 1 is number 1, Nord Stream 2 is number 9 and South Stream is number 14 .



The credit for the picture goes to southfront.org.

Appendix II

Debates: Monday, 9 May 2016 - Strasbourg, (European Parliament ,2016)

This is the google translated version which has not been alter except the country of origin and party which the speaker (writer) belongs to has been added next to their name (European Parliament ,2017).

President – Another point of the agenda is the Commission statement on the impact of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline on the Central and Eastern Europe gas market **(2016/2703(RSP))**.

Miguel Arias Cañete, *Member of the Commission*. – Mr President, it is my pleasure to be here to address with honourable Members the issue of the Nord Stream 2 project and the impact it may have on central and eastern European Member States. Nord Stream 2 is a subject of huge concern for many Members in this House, but also for Member States and in particular for the central and eastern European Member States, as was reflected in the letter of nine prime ministers and leaders addressed to President Juncker on 17 March.

The concerns are of various natures, be they legal, geopolitical or economic. As regards the legal aspect, let me reiterate what we stated in this House some weeks ago. If built, Nord Stream 2 will have to fully comply, just like any other infrastructure project, with applicable European Union law, including on energy and environment.

The construction of such an important infrastructure project as Nord Stream 2 cannot happen in a legal void. This would also run counter to the interests of economic operators in having legal certainty. Nor can it be exclusively operated only according to Russian law. Against the background of colliding legal regimes, Nord Stream 2, if built, has to be operated under a legal framework which also takes due account of the key principles of our energy market rules.

While respect for these legal principles is in our view a necessary precondition, we also recognise that for the central and eastern European Member States the issues of the impact on the security of supply of the region and on the central and eastern European gas market are of particular importance. Let me remind you that most of the central and eastern European gas market remains highly dependent on a dominant gas supplier, namely Gazprom, as well as on a limited number of transport corridors.

In the last few years, the Commission's most important objective with regard to the central and eastern European Member States has been to foster progress in making the gas market

more secure, competitive and diversified, thanks to the European Union's internal energy market infrastructure, development and competition enforcement. In this context, let me mention the Commission's energy security strategy of May 2014, supported by European Union Member States and this Parliament, and the security of supply package originally proposed, with legislative proposals aimed at improving the security of supply of the European Union and in particular the more vulnerable regions.

Regarding infrastructure development, the Commission has provided strong support to the central and eastern European Member States in terms of improving their connectivity across markets through regional groupings such as BEMIP and CESEC, improving access to LNG through building of new LNG terminals in Lithuania and Poland, while another important terminal is planned in Croatia, and promoting the development of liquid gas HAPs not only in the Mediterranean, but also in Bulgaria.

We will continue our efforts together with Member States to ensure that other key diversification projects are also completed in the coming years. Nord Stream 2 will, due to its route, alter the landscape of the European Union's gas markets, and we will have to carefully assess its impact on our own priorities in terms of security of supply, diversification and creation of competitive gas markets, including in central and eastern Europe.

Clearly, Nord Stream 2 will not give access to a new source of supply or of a supplier and further increase excess capacity from Russia to the European Union. As regards transit rules, Nord Stream 2 could lead to gas transportation corridors being decreased from three to at least two – abandoning the route through Ukraine – and the German route via Poland could also be in danger. Such a reduction of routes would not improve security of supply.

Regarding the market impact of the Nord Stream 2 project, we are carefully analysing what impact it can have on competition on our gas markets, including in central and eastern Europe. We have made a lot of progress in implementing the Third Energy Package across Europe and we have to make sure that no market operator is able to leverage its dominant position to the detriment of consumers.

Let me say at the end of my statement a few words on Ukraine. Despite economic and political challenges, Ukraine continues to be a reliable gas partner and transit country. It is in the interests of all parties, including and notably the central and eastern European countries, that Ukraine remains a significant gas transit corridor. The successful implementation of the gas winter package, with the constructive engagement of both Russia and Ukraine and facilitated by the Commission, has helped to secure domestic consumption in Ukraine and contributed to a smooth transit in supply of Russian gas to the European Union. The

Commission stands ready to continue this successfully proven format and to enlarge the trilateral talks to the negotiation of a new transit contract with Russia and Ukraine as the current one comes to an end in 2019.

Jerzy Buzek, Poland, Group of the European People's Party - Mr President! Thank you, Commissioner, for a very important statement. Today we have May 9, the Day of Europe, so the feast of unity, understanding and cooperation. It is good to talk about Nord Stream II. There can be no doubt - it results from all the discussions - that this project destroys unity and European solidarity, undermines trust and creates tension between countries. Political objections to this project also create business investment uncertainty. As rapporteur for the Gas Supply Regulation, I emphasize, like the Commissioner, that Nord Stream II strengthens the monopoly position of one supplier, contradicts the principle of supply diversification and threatens the security of several Central European countries. As such, it affects the entire Union, not just a few countries. There are environmental concerns, including reservations about the development of maritime economy in the Baltic Sea and commitments towards Ukraine. This project should therefore not receive any support from the European Union and should be subject to EU law without exception. In this context, I would like to ask the Commissioner and the European Commission whether, in line with the conclusions of the December 2015 European Council, the Commission formally notified the German authorities of the application of the third energy package to Nord Stream II?

Flavio Zanonato, Italy, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament - Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I state that I support the creation of energy infrastructure as the external supply enhancement and identification of expansive energy equipment solutions to better adapt the offer and costs in Europe. No doubt we need more tools, more infrastructure to respond more flexibly to market developments and energy consumption. But it seems clear - and I share the things we have heard from President Buzek - that the proposed doubling of the Nord Stream gas pipeline does not go in this direction and is a step backwards compared to the ambitions of the energy policy coordination that the European Commission drew just a few months ago, in February 2015, in its communication energy Union, and that this was amended by Parliament and signed by the December 15 resolution. What are the elements? First Nord Stream increases energy dependence from one source, ie from Russian giant Gazprom, and creates the conditions for the exercise of a dominant market

position. At this time it is not necessary to double the Nord Stream, Nord Stream as the current one exercises below its capacity. In addition to Nord Stream 2 is almost exclusively involve actors from a single Member State. In other words it is a project for the use and consumption of only a few national interests and not the interests of the EU. Finally, it is a weak point in the definition of future European energy architecture because it is a precedent according to which a Member State has its hands completely free in deciding the energy strategy which instead must involve all European countries.

Therefore they are not ideological reasons for which they and we are against, but reasons related to a specific policy that Europe has adopted.

Zdzisław Krasnodębski, Poland, European Conservatives and Reformists Group - Mr President! The Nord Stream project is a test for the European Union. Its realization, if indeed it would have come to her, would show that all these beautiful words about Europe expressed in this room have little in common with reality, when the powerful but specific political and economic interests of some states and companies are at stake. Who can believe in assuring the Nord Stream consortium that this project is purely commercial rather than political, since we know well that Russia uses gas as a political weapon to accomplish its neo-imperial goals, as we know that the capacity of existing gas pipelines Transmission of gas from Russia to the EU today far exceeds the Union's demand for Russian gas. This project would deepen the dependence of the EU countries on Russia, and already more than a third of the gas imported from the EU comes from that country. Five Member States depend on Russia as the only external supplier of all imported gas. This investment would further deepen the division between East and West Europe, and would also allow Russia to easily bypass Ukraine as a transit country to the European Union, depriving Ukraine of about two billion dollars in transit revenue a year, which would perhaps destabilise Ukraine. And yet so many words have been devoted to the democratic and economic development of this country.

The Commission acknowledges that the Nord Stram 2 project is economically unjustified and that it is contrary to the Union's energy objectives such as increasing security of supply or diversification. So how does the Commission intend to counteract these potential negative effects? It is also evident that a gas pipeline passing through territories subject to EU law should also be subject to this law in sub-sea areas. Will the Commission - I repeat the question of the Prime Minister Professor Buzek - has formally asked the German authorities to apply the third energy package to Nord Stream 2?

Morten Helveg Petersen, Denmark, Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – Mr President, by the end of this year we will have laid down the tracks for the European energy union. These are exciting and ambitious times as the energy union is one of the biggest and most important projects in the history of the European Union. We have to deliver. Why is it that we are creating this energy union? To create a well—functioning energy market, to attract capital, to create growth and jobs, to push the sustainable transition agenda much further – and, not least, to be less dependent on Russian gas and supplies from Mr Putin.

This leads me to the obvious question: where does Nord Stream 2 fit into this context? To me the simple answer is that it does not fit at all. I am fully aware of the fact that we will be dependent, to some degree, on Russian gas in years to come, but bear in mind that Nord Stream 1 is operating at around only half of its capacity today. Therefore I find it very hard to identify any economic, environmental or political arguments for Nord Stream 2. I find it very hard to see any positive perspectives for anyone other than Mr Putin in this.

So far, I do not think that either we, the European Parliament, or the Member States have taken Nord Stream 2 and the perspectives of this project seriously enough. More than anything, we need to conduct a firm geopolitical study on North Stream 2 and the implications of the project. We need the Commission to step up its efforts, ensuring that Nord Stream 2 complies with all our laws and intentions. If not, we risk putting the entire energy union in jeopardy, and that would be a total disaster.

Neoklis Silikiotis, Cyprus, Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left

- Dear colleagues, constantly discussing the issue of the Northern Pipeline II, and we hear expressed repeatedly the same concerns. In reality, however, is not only the problem-east pipeline, but it comes as a response to the inability of the Union itself to achieve energy efficiency and power while enhancing energy security.

The problem for us is that the European Union has not yet managed to achieve the goal of diversification of sources and supply routes. The problem is that not yet effective steps taken to lift the energy isolation in which are doomed many countries and regions of the Union, especially in the South, not the North. The problem is that there still could face serious problems in energy supply and energy poverty afflicting a large proportion of citizens.

What is needed is to directly exploit domestic energy resources of the Union, to stop ignoring the role of the deposits discovered in Cyprus, which is a Member State, and the deposits in the

region of the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa. It also requires the European Union to directly support energy investments in the Eastern Mediterranean, to promote the creation of a Mediterranean gas hub by pipeline and the development of LNG production. Equally important for us is to develop a comprehensive strategy for the development of renewable energy sources, while ensuring reasonable prices for consumers.

The speaker agrees to answer a question with a "blue card" (Article 162 paragraph 8 of the Rules)

Tibor Szanyi, Hungary, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament: Blue card question. - Clean Representative Lord! Although I agree with you, he said energy union affairs of, and exploited or exploited opportunities, but I feel that with a lot of good words maybe it should aim here is more to the issue of the energy mix design is not to be limited to member state competence, but should be it is a coordination, because it is a bit undraw the whole field, despite all good intentions. What do you think about you?

Neoklis Silikiotis, Cyprus, Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left: answer "blue card". - Exactly, dear Colleague, what I noted too is that because the European Union have not yet solved important issues of energy security, create new infrastructure and one of these is the Northern Pipeline II. I want to focus more attention on the fact that the European Union must turn to domestic sources of energy but at the same time to further develop renewable energy sources.

Peter Eriksson, Sweden, Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance - Mr President, I intend to take up the visions, not least, the Commission has put forward in its efforts to lift energy Union as one of the major tasks of this legislature; To get a proper change, we increasingly can create common energy markets in Europe, to increase self-sufficiency and the production of energy, to get a closer towards climate objectives because we are spending more on their energy, renewable energy, instead of the large dependence on imports as Europe to the wider world, and not least just from Russia which we are now discussing. I think that these visions are very important. It provides a basis for strengthening Europe as part of the world and strengthen our competitiveness, and also create very many jobs in the future, but also for long-term gain lower energy prices.

The problem with this investment we are talking [...], it is that this will go against almost any point in the vision that we're talking about energy union. When you look at it from that point on it becomes the absurd to make efforts, that one day to talk about that we should do something together, create sustainable development with less carbon emissions, and also less vulnerability, but the next day we do the opposite .

I think the Commission needs to be even stronger, but I still thank Mr Arias Cañete for his words to the laws and rules that we have decided this, they have to actually apply for this project. Therefore, I also want to continue the rolling pin sent around here in terms of the third energy package Buzek, chairman of the Industry and Energy Committee, that if we in Europe really want to follow the rules we have set up in the third energy package, then it is unreasonable , impossible to be so that they can be compatible with this package, because Nord Stream 2 means a supplier who has complete control over the entire infrastructure. I think it must be remembered that Russia in the last thirty, forty years have been using energy as a political weapon more than any other country, and it is Gazprom's main player in the game.

Barbara Kappel, Austria, Europe of Nations and Freedom Group- Mister President!

Commissioner Cañete! We have heard from the previous speakers many important points, also very critical points, why this project Nord Stream 2 is not to be realized, and these points are to be taken seriously! This goes from a lack of diversification to the point where the European Union is not supposed to support this project. Let me, however, consider some of the points which one should perhaps take seriously.

The first point: Let us look at the consortium that carries this great project. This is a consortium of European dimensions. This is not just the Gazprom but two German companies, Uniper and BASF Wintershall Holding, which is Shell, which is ANGI and that is the Austrian OMV - is a quite respectable group.

Second topic European security of supply: With the help of Nord Stream 2, the capacity of the two existing strings could be doubled by 55 to a total of 110 billion cubic meters of gas. 52 million households in Europe could be supplied with gas and one third of European gas requirements could be ensured. It is up to us, ladies and gentlemen, if we are talking about diversification, to expand the south-east corridor in the south-eastern Mediterranean - a previous speaker has already mentioned - and to ensure more diversification.

Infrastructure expenditure: Commissioner Cañete said recently that Europe has an investment envelope of 200 billion euros in the energy sector. Nord Stream 2 would invest 9 billion euros

in investment in a construction phase and a further 7 billion in the expansion of additional line capacities and additional routes. In addition, additional investment for equipment investments: the Austrian company Voestalpine alone has been awarded the contract to supply 300,000 tonnes of high-strength tube sheets for this pipeline, at times when we are discussing all the problems in the steel industry.

My home country Austria supports this project not only because the OMV is represented, the node Baumgarten is essential and the Voest can make an important contribution. However, the above concerns are being addressed, namely Ukraine as a gas transit country and the modernisation of the Ukrainian gas pipeline infrastructure, as well as the compatibility of Nord Stream 2 with EU law, in particular the question of the territorial application of the third energy market package.

Zoltán Balczó, Hungary, Non-attached Members – President! As the Commission relates to the Nord Stream pipeline 2, compared to South Stream, a typical case of double standards. The construction of the South Stream would have provided alternative routes to bypass Ukraine more European, Central European countries, but what was said of the objections: those based on competition, bureaucratic, liberal principles, and eventually became the result of this failure puffing. Cañete Commissioner me to my written question he replied that the South Stream is a problem that you had diversified its route. 2 and Nord Stream? Neither source is not diversified, no path. So why take it? Obviously, the big difference between what we say and joint action of the four Visegrad Prime Minister Angela Merkel. It has decided on this basis. What we were not allowed these countries, it is possible to Germany.

Gunnar Hökmark, Sweden, Group of the European People's Party – Mr President, my thanks to the Commissioner. Everyone tends to love rules and competition until we need to practise them. Then it gets tough, because it involves a lot of difficult issues. But I think it is quite clear that Nord Stream 2 has no real commercial logic on its own.

It is not compatible with the principle and rules of unbundling, with the Third Energy Package. It is not – and I cannot see how it could be – compatible with the aims and the rules of the energy union. It will increase the dominance of Gazprom where it is dominant, it will strengthen its monopoly, and it is a part of Russian policy versus Europe.

Commissioner, it is a difficult thing to deal with, but do you think it will make Europe more or less dependent on Russian gas?

Jeppe Kofod, Denmark, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament – Mr President, Nord Stream 2 is both unnecessary, unwanted and dangerous: unnecessary because current capacity is nowhere near fully utilised; unwanted because we know that our central and eastern European Member States are worried about this plan for good reason; dangerous even, because it will only strengthen Mr Putin's energy hold on Europe. Nord Stream 2 will bypass the Baltic States and allow Russia to completely deny Ukraine vital gas deliveries.

The energy union should strengthen Europe, strengthen renewables, strengthen European cooperation on energy and lead us forward in a carbon-free future. Nord Stream 2 is the exact opposite of all of this. It divides Europe into two: those who will have and those who will not have access to Russian gas. I say that Europe in its entirety should say 'No' to becoming even more dependent on Russian gas and that is why the Commission must state clearly to Russia, to Germany, to Denmark and to all others that Nord Stream 2 is an unwanted, unneeded and unsafe project that belongs not at the bottom of the Baltic Sea but at the bottom of a wastepaper basket, clearly stamped 'rejected'.

Hans-Olaf Henkel, Germany, European Conservatives and Reformists Group – Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen! There was a lot of talk about what is going on against the Nord Stream 2 project, and a lot of what speaks for it. But I would like to draw attention to something else: The German federal government thinks that the Nord Stream 2 project is the decision between private companies and the policy should be there. Since they are part of the government in Germany, I ask the SPD members in this House. Firstly: Her former Chancellor Schröder, shortly before the Bundestag elections in 2005, had graduated with Gazprom. Was this not a political interference?

Second: Shortly after the lost election, Schröder was appointed by Putin as Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Gazprom. My question: Would not you consider this as an act of passive and active bribery?

And thirdly, for Putin, Putin is still a democrat, and I ask the Social Democrats in this House: Do you think that his mandate at Gazprom 1 could have something to do with it?

Nord Stream 2 was a wrong decision, politically motivated. Here we have the chance to correct a wrong decision politically. We will not agree to Nord Stream 2.

Pavel Telička, Czech Republic (Czechia), Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – Mr President, the Commission has made a number of important

innovations in the direction of the European energy union. I think that this House backs this initiative, at least in its majority.

Yet we have a project whose implications you have described, and I do appreciate that many of those that you have described were in fact of a negative nature. There are clearly down sides; the Commission acknowledges that. In other words, we have a project which is clearly not heading in the direction of the energy union, but which – even worse – is splitting the European Union apart. So we are already fragmenting the unity that we need in order to be able to back the energy union before we have even started to dwell on concrete legislative proposals. For me, this is further confirmation that, apart from all the economic arguments – or the lack thereof, as has been mentioned by my colleagues – this is welcome news to the Kremlin, because the Kremlin is part of a deal which is splitting the European Union apart. The implications are very concrete. You have mentioned the downsides, and you were more explicit than ever before, but from here on we need to embark on a clear-cut strong position. What will happen when Nord Stream 3, or any other project, comes around?

I will stop here – and I apologise as I have to leave for another meeting, which I am late for – but I am sure that my colleagues will take care of this and that the Commission will reply to a number of the questions which we jointly share.

Jaromír Kohlíček, Czech Republic (Czechia), Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left – Mr President, the Nord Stream 2 is a practical example of how the European Union is often at odds with its earlier plans. A few years ago he broke the gas crisis coincided with EU politicians that the safe gas supply is one of the common priorities of the Union. Today is obviously different.

Nord Stream 2 may be considered from three angles. The first is to provide a sufficient amount of gas for the EU. The second is a political decision, whether at the inlet gas to the European Union may be significantly represented only one Member State. The third aspect is the economic aspect. Gas transit means for some countries an interesting source of significant assets, understand, respect to Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Czech Republic. Personally, I prefer the safe provision of sufficient quantities of gas, and therefore I see no reason why this intention in any way to question.

Finally, I would like to add that only through a strange backstage machinations has not yet built a pipeline supplying natural gas directly to the Balkans. Now in this case it would be appropriate to discuss strengthening the security of EU natural gas.

Krišjānis Kariņš, Latvia, Group of the European People's Party – Mr President, colleagues! There are complex cases, and there are very simple things. Nord Stream II pipeline expansion issue, in my opinion, is of quite simple things. The Council on drugs and drug addiction. We all know that drug dependence is a very dangerous and have to get rid of it. As with all drugs, the European Union is dependent on imported gas. We already have almost 70% of the imports with a tendency to further increase. Who is our biggest gas supplier? This is a Russian export monopoly Gazprom.

At present, the idea of a number of European companies, together with Russia's Gazprom to double the so-called Nord Stream gas pipeline - Nord Stream II - in this way. What does it do? This is because drug addict durties vein with twice the dose. It is life-threatening. It is dangerous for Europe. We can not go this way. Fortunately, as sometimes the drug is a drug and medicine, we have taken the course, which the Commission has proposed, and we have supported - the so-called energy union. Energy union principles show us loud and clear that we must reduce its import dependence, we need to diversify their sources of energy and we can not allow any kind of monopolistic European market. Create the single market. Nord Stream II project goes against all as a dangerous drug. Commissioner, I invite you to keep your courage and do everything to prevent this project! Thank you for your attention!

José Blanco López, Spain, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament – Mr President, alternative ways must be offered to enable Europe to have new supplies at a better price, with the launch of new infrastructures forming part of the energy corridors. In a context of energy interdependence as the current one, the lack of a long-term strategic vision favours the uncertainty in the markets. The southern corridor, with potential to cover up to 20% of the European Union's gas needs, must therefore be a priority. The European Union must diversify its sources of gas supply so that all regions have access to at least two different sources of supply. In this way, we will move forward in consolidating the Union's energy security, guaranteeing a supply and ensuring stable long-term energy transit.

Anneleen Van Bossuyt, Belgium, European Conservatives and Reformists Group – Today I want to make a plea for a critical but realistic view of the Nord Stream 2 project. Gas will be an important fuel in the transition to more green and more sustainable energy sources. Gas is less polluting than, for example, coal or brown coal, and it is also complementary to renewable energy in order to compensate for the low moments. Gas is also often used for

heating in households and businesses. There is in other words a growing demand for gas and Nord Stream 2 can absorb much of that need.

However, this should certainly not be an excuse for some major energy players to abuse their market position. It is also very important in the context of the Energy Union permanently searching for alternative sources of different origins. I call on the Commission on monitoring that competition rules are respected within the framework of this project. In addition, should also encourage Member States to diversify their energy suppliers.

Xabier Benito Ziluaga, Spain, Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left – Mr President, the worst part of this debate is that we are not talking about access to energy, nor about climate change, but about pure and hard geostrategy, conflicts over access to fossil fuels.

Energy agreements with third countries directly determine the type of relationship we want to build with them. In this case, the German government, guided by the low price of Russian gas, prefers to pass over the interests of the Eastern countries.

This project is an economic and environmental aberration. The different studies show a continued drop in gas demand. The European Court of Auditors itself acknowledged that the Commission's projected gas demand is persistently overestimated, which means that it is not necessary at all to increase the gas supply capacity at present.

However, there are German companies that invest in this project, a consequence of leaving the energy future in the hands of the market. The 'no' to this project without economic or climatic justification is fundamental, as well as the intervention of the Commission to stop it.

Janusz Lewandowski, Poland, Group of the European People's Party – Mr President!

Commissioner! I hope that this debate will have practical relevance, that is, it will affect the European Commission's strategy and reach out to the companies participating in this project.

Today's European Union is struggling with a lot of troubles, needs united and non-disintegrating projects, needs demonstrations such as those taking place on the streets of Warsaw last Saturday. The Nord Stream 2 project, on the other hand, is a disintegration factor. The more a person implements economic issues, the more he realizes that this is not a commercial project. The more we look at geopolitical determinants or the sense of energy union, the more we see the contradiction between the principles of diversification and independence from a monopolistic supplier and the Nord Stream 2 project. Therefore, without

furthering this debate, I hope that the European Commission will free us from this problem. They could tackle other challenges that are lacking in the European Union.

Notis Marias, Greece, European Conservatives and Reformists Group - Mr President, doubling the capacity of the North Stream pipeline, the North Stream II project will allow increasing imports of cheap Russian gas in the European market and that economically is something positive. Unfortunately, the current rules of gas to Europe will not allow the full exploitation of this capacity for reasons 'supposedly' competition. The rule on the compulsory third party access makes it almost useless 50% of the capacity of the North Stream I, like just now and the North Stream II. As one can understand, these restrictions endanger the economic viability of costly pipeline projects, particularly in times low price as the current one. At the same time, the Commission should ensure that all Member States and not only Germany, have the same opportunities to carry out the construction of energy infrastructure, at least legally. He must not judge the pipeline projects with double standard. Obsessive policies imposed by the Commission under the third energy package already cost the cancellation of the South Stream in 2014. In contrast, the North Stream I received, notably because of Germany, exceptions allowed for completion. We wish not to create obstacles in the future by the Commission in what concerns the TAP pipeline, the ITGI pipeline and other projects that may be developed in the Balkans. It is now imperative to establish in Greece an energy hub that offers security and growth prospects throughout southeastern Europe.

Marian-Jean Marinescu, Romania, Group of the European People's Party – Mr President, Europe talks about energy and energy security union. There is much talk, not implement the same. The best example is the Connecting Europe Facility: energy funds were reduced by over 50%. Energy security without resources security there. Resource security can not be achieved without diversification. Nord Stream does not fall within any safety rule or source, which proved unpredictable politicized and generating benchmarks, nor as a rule the market, causing a dangerous dependence on a single source. Gazprom is apparent attempt to increase Europe's dependence on Russian gas, South Stream, Turkish Stream, Nord Stream. Europe is incomprehensible passivity in relation to attempts to diversify the Southern Corridor. Requires the active involvement, financial policy gas supply to the European Union in the southeast of existing or new sources: Azerbaijan, Iran, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean. Involvement on the ground, not only in debates.

Edward Czesak, Poland, European Conservatives and Reformists Group – Mr

President! Commissioner! Everyone here, representing both the European Parliament and the European Commission, is aware that this project is a project not only economic but primarily political striking the energy security of many European Union countries, including Poland. According to the latest forecasts, in the coming years there is no significant increase in the demand for natural gas in the European Union as a whole - in this case the development of the Russian transmission infrastructure is certainly not economically justified. This is confirmed by the fact that the cost of building new strands is estimated at around EUR 10 billion, while the estimated cost of modernizing the transmission infrastructure in Ukraine is half lower. In addition, Nord Stream 2 prevents the development of the port of Swinoujście, which is already very often mentioned and what is at present a political issue. Negative arguments or conclusions have already been presented several times in meetings and debates in Parliament and the Commission. Still, questions remain, including how the Commission intends to support projects that bring about real diversification or eliminate bottlenecks within the European Union? Because these are the real needs for energy infrastructure in the European Union, as opposed to Russia's additional transmission capacity.

A few weeks ago, during a debate in the European Parliament, Šefčovič suggested signing an international agreement between Germany and Russia regulating the legal status of Nord Stream 2. How does the German government deal with this proposal? What arguments does the European Commission use to convince Germany of such a solution? Does the Nord Stream thread appear in talks with partners outside the European Union, such as the United States? What is the position of our key US partners on this matter and will it be taken into account by the European Commission?

Bendt Bendtsen, Denmark, Group of the European People's Party –Mr President. Europe must become less dependent on gas from Putin's Russia. Unfortunately prefer the so-called North Stream 2 project in the opposite direction. The project is bad for Europe, and as I fully agree with my colleague Buzek, who in his speech said that under no circumstances must have EU funds in grants.

Is the project at all in line with the target for energy union? I doubt very much! We should also look at the so-called IGA agreements like that to happen at the Council now June 6th. This project Nord Stream, how does that work with IGA agreements? We should make us less dependent on foreign energy.

This is a question for me also on security of supply, but it is also a matter of security. We must put more emphasis on other energy sources, for example. sun and wind, while we have to use the energy we have in Europe more effectively. Energy efficiency and renewable energy is better than handing money in Putin's treasury.

Zbigniew Kuźmiuk, Poland, European Conservatives and Reformists Group – Mr President! Commissioner! Commissioner! This information has already fallen on this room, but I will remind them to order it. The existing gas infrastructure allows the transfer of 250 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia to Russia, while the Union's gas imports from Russia in 2014 amounted to about 120 billion cubic meters, which accounted for less than 50% of the transmission capacity.

Secondly, the level of use of the existing LNG-liquefied gas infrastructure was only 25% in the EU in 2014. This means that as much as 75% of this infrastructure is unused, which in absolute figures gives 150 billion cubic meters of gas, which is clearly more than the Union imports from Russia.

Thirdly, when the first two Nord Stream filings were put into service, the use of gas pipelines running through Ukraine in 2014 dropped sharply from 58% to 28%, while the use of the first two Nord Stream filaments increased from 36% to 60% The main goal of Nord Stream 2 will be to increase Russian transmission capacity and thus eliminate Ukraine's gas transmission completely and impede or even cut off Russian gas for Slovakia and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. So at the end of the question, do you think the Commission should not be more firm in relation to this project?

(The speaker agreed to answer the question raised by raising a blue card (Rule 162 (8)).

IN THE CHAIR: ANNELI JÄÄTTEENMÄKI

deputy speaker

Janusz Korwin-Mikke, Poland, Non-attached Members, *Question raised by raising a blue card.* - Nord Stream 2 is a political project and I would like to point out that Professor Kuźmiuk said that Ukraine gets two billion dollars a year from this cost of ten billion dollars, but Poland and Slovakia also take money. Paying Ukraine two billion a year maybe it has some economic justification, right? On the other hand, I am surprised that nobody says -

although this is an important question - about the country most threatened by Nord Stream 2, about Belarus.

Zbigniew Kuźmiuk, Poland, European Conservatives and Reformists Group, *Answer the question raised by raising a blue card.* - There is no doubt that transit countries, when they charge for gas, earn that money, but if we are in one body of the European Union, then European solidarity should be based on the fact that Member States' interests are primarily taken into account. I remind you that Ukraine is an associated country, so we should, in the pursuit of European solidarity, look after these interests. Nord Stream 2 clearly expresses these interests and it should be our intention to oppose this investment.

Henna Virkkunen, Finland, Group of the European People's Party – Mr President, the high degree of dependence on Russian energy is a problem for Europe. In particular, the risks have increased after Putin's Russia has taken a weapon of foreign policy and energy into power politics. We know that more than a third of Europe's energy comes from Russia, and most of addition is specifically natural gas, which accounts for up to about 40 percent. All those targets that are now being made to promote the Union's energy - to increase self-sufficiency, improvement of the market, the diversification of energy sources and the networking of European countries to each other even better - are all important and worthwhile objectives. But Nord Stream 2 is not in line with these objectives. It is contrary to the Union's energy objectives. Here is used in more than 20 speeches on the subject, from all political groups, and no one has said that this would be a good project and should be supported. Nord Stream 2 is not worthy of European Union support.

Massimiliano Salini, Italy, Group of the European People's Party – Madam President, ladies and gentlemen, Commissioner, I will not repeat things that you know very well. Data relating to this project have long been in their possession and has also commented in a very explicit way.

Everyone in Europe and the world has a bit of familiarity with energy and the European Union's issues, and smiles at the evolution of this project, so that if we were to sit at a table and try to create an example of school Is able to contradict all of the objectives of the European Union in the energy field at a time, we would not find such an example as this. Then the first issue is: we honor the European Union and we do not prove to be so contradictory. Secondly, let us consider that if a project like this was to be realized, there

would be a whole slice of Europe that could not take advantage of the gas that will come to Europe from Russia through this pipeline because there are not enough connections. So it's stupid from a political point of view and it's stupid from the economic point of view, so give us a hand to not cover ourselves with ridicule and also block this project with us.

Adam Szejnfeld, Poland, Group of the European People's Party –Madam President, For lack of time I will skip here economic thread - it was already mentioned, we do not deal with economic justification. I will also overlook the issue of legality and compatibility of this project with European Union law, international law, environmental law, etc. - because even if investors comply with the required provisions, it is still a bad project anyway because it is in line with the idea and the most important principles The European Union, including the energy union. This is a project that is in the security of supply. This is a project that violates the principle of diversification, including the principle of diversification of sources, suppliers and supply routes. This is a project that violates the principle of competitiveness. And finally, most importantly, it is a project that violates the principle of solidarity and trust. And what do we need today in the difficult times of the European Union more than just solidarity and mutual trust?

speeches granted on request

Krzysztof Hetman, Poland, Group of the European People's Party – Madam President, Commissioner! Today's debate clearly shows how the controversial and complex project is Nord Stream 2. It is definitely not only outside of Central and Eastern Europe, but also outside of purely energy issues. I think we can be tempted to say that it focuses on the lens in what condition the European Union is currently. He will show whether we are able to work together for the interests of Europe as a whole, to show how resistant we are to the influence of external factors, including the "divide and rule" strategy, will ultimately show how seriously we treat the rules we have adopted in the first place. That is why I am very much in favor of the European Commission to thoroughly examine this project in terms of its compliance with the objectives of the Energy Union as well as with European law within its competence. I am convinced that if this analysis is reliable, the result will be unambiguous for Nord Stream 2 - negative.

Tunne Kelam, Estonia, Group of the European People's Party – Madam President, we should first of all have in mind the context. Russia is not a normal partner any more. Its strategic aim is to weaken the EU – to split and discredit it. Gazprom has been, and is still, the main tool of Russian foreign policy. At a time of Russia's increasing provocations, the Kremlin tries to demonstrate that the EU still needs it; that we can be further disorientated, that they can make fun of our energy union, and that they can weaken and economically isolate Ukraine. In this new situation, I am afraid there is no room for pretending that we can conduct two parallel policies – one of Russian sanctions, and another pretending that this is private business. Nord Stream 2 is a politically motivated project. We cannot hide our heads in the sand. It has to be countered by strong and clear political means.

Jasenko Selimovic, Sweden, Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – Madam President, My belief is that Nord Stream 2 is not consistent with the Union's energy goals, not with our climate ambitions, nor with the EU's goal of diversifying energy producers. So the question is why we allow this pipeline is built. The simple answer is that the EU member countries do not trust each other when it comes to energy supply, and the lack of this trust we allow Russia to play off member states against each other. But the fact is that if the expansion of the Nord Stream becomes of it will reduce security of supply in particular in Central and Eastern Europe. It will give more strength to Russia using energy squeeze out individual countries. It will increase Gazprom and Russia's dominant position, reducing the diversity of suppliers, putting Ukraine and neighboring countries in a difficult situation, and destroy the climate ambitions. Is it not better to try to make an effort to build trust between our countries than to allow this project to proceed? At a time when security in our region, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe is worse than for many years, it is foolhardy to go ahead with the plans for the Nord Stream 2. I only say: Stop the plans on the Nord Stream 2 as soon as possible.

Ivana Maletić, Croatia, Group of the European People's Party – Madam President, I am glad that we have this evening gave a great and harmonious not project Nord Stream 2, because our goal is to help diversify supply routes from Russia than to diversify energy sources in Europe and reduce dependence on imports. Energy dependence is very easily transformed into economic, social and economic in Europe so we want to do leader and driver of development, the project Nord Stream 2 push in the other direction.

Another thing I would like to highlight: the European Commission has identified 195 key energy infrastructure projects. These are projects which will contribute to meeting the strategic objectives of energy Union, and this project Nord Stream 2 is questioning the value and implementation and these energy projects whose preparation we have got funding from the CEF. That means we do not want.

Eleftherios Synadinos, Greece, Non-attached Members - Madam President, it is necessary but useless to remind that the Union's unity is threatened because of Germany and will soon collapse, not only because of possible brexit, illegal immigrants, austerity policies and the strangulation of Greece, that is policies which impose Germany. Will collapse because it is now clear that more and more countries openly resisting the policies that most cases levied extortionate: the North Stream II interested exclusively in Germany, which is indifferent to the reactions of other countries, such as Poland and Italy. Germany follows two measures policy of double standards, prohibiting other countries have privileged economic relations with Russia, while the same maximum benefit from them, against moral and political rules. Germany played a great role in the silence and tolerance of the Ukrainian crisis, dragging and other Member States. Now even using as an excuse the Ukrainian crisis to impose validation agreement with Gazprom. At the same time, prevents the construction of the South Stream, which would transport Russian gas via Greece, Bulgaria and Italy. I'm not a prophet to guess when to break the Union, but I think the split is inevitable but will tolerate the insatiable thirst for Germany's political and economic domination.

András Gyürk, Hungary, Group of the European People's Party –Madame President for the Central and Eastern European countries, the expansion of the Nord Stream does not constitute diversification nor the improvement of their competitiveness. In fact, it goes further than that, if implemented the project on the pipeline points of contact, which we have built joint effort to better connect the fragmented Central and Eastern Europe, the more liquid the Western European gas market, Russia's gas will be imported. It is doubtful whether it will remain in the capacity points of contact for alternative supplies.

This step will be to set the diversification objective. Are not expected to be economically well in the Central and Eastern European countries, as the number of cross-country transportation significantly more costly the price of energy. I request that the European Commission pursue and implement EU legislation, especially the Third Energy Package enforcement of EU energy objectives. It is the interest of European citizens.

Ivo Vajgl, Slovenia, Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe – I'll probably say something dissonant in this debate. Nordstream 1 was initiated at a time when the relations between Europe and Russia are good and promising. In such atmosphere, he was born the project Southern stream from which it was abandoned.

I think it should be the Commission and those who will lead project funded energy union, trust that they will be able to keep a balance between rationom, including economic reasons, environmental reasons between on the one hand and geo-strategic reasons, on the other hand. I think that is too tempting to the Energy Perspectives of Europe discussed only under the influence of geostrategije. I think that we are smart enough to know how to keep accounts on other elements.

(Speeches granted on request to an end)

Miguel Arias Cañete, Member of the Commission. – Madam President, I would like to thank all the honourable Members for their contributions to this debate that have enlightened the views of the Commission on this very difficult issue.

Let me say from the very beginning that I heard some honourable Members stressing that we were discussing gas too much and we should concentrate on other sources of energy. It is clear that after the Paris agreement on climate change, we are on a path of decarbonising our economies and developing renewables and energy efficiency, but it is also clear that it will take some time. In the meanwhile the cleanest fossil fuel is gas and we have to ensure security of supply for the 28 Member States of the European Union – not for a single Member State but for the 28 Member States of the European Union.

That is why the Commission is implementing a security of supply policy, trying to diversify sources, suppliers and routes. That is why we have come along with an LNG gas strategy on one side and that is why we are developing interconnectors in central and south-eastern Europe, that is why we have implemented reverse flows and that is why the Commission is supporting the Southern Corridor, which is another alternative source of supply. So the Commission will keep on applying these policies which are the ones needed to assure security supply all over the European Union.

There were two specific clear questions. One was by Mr Hökmark who asked whether this project would make us more or less dependent on Russian gas. The answer is very clear, and you know it already, because we speak of about 100 bcm going through a single corridor.

That would mean 26% of all European Union gas consumption and 80% of Russian gas imports on a single route. The answer is very clear. Due to the size, the route and the strategic character, it would probably change the architecture of today's European gas market and further increase the dominance of Gazprom in the western European gas market.

The European Union has made a lot of progress in opening up and integrating energy markets. That is why the European Union should therefore make sure that no market operator is able to leverage its dominant position to the detriment of competitors and consumers. So it is clear that this may change. It is also clear that we have to review those changes and apply European laws. European laws must be applied in all aspects.

I come back to Mr Buzek's questions. He asked whether we were in contact with the German authorities. I can say that, following the mandate of the European Council, we have made contact with the German authorities on all levels and my services are in contact with the German regulators to have a complete picture of all the facts needed to assess the project. This is a complex project – it has an onshore part which touches the waters of five different Member States – and is difficult to evaluate.

But what I can say is that in the Commission we are convinced that European Union law needs to be applied, including the principles of energy law, which also need to be applied in the case of the offshore part. We will continue our discussions with the German authorities on what this entails in practice.

But beyond the application of the legal framework this project has very clear geopolitical consequences and all the Members who have intervened have pointed out those consequences. Thus this also needs to be discussed at a political level and that is why both Vice—President Šefčovič and I have explained exactly the same political concerns to the German Government on several occasions.

What I can say in conclusion is that we all agree that energy produced in the European Union must be fully aligned with European Union core policy objectives, including energy security. We cannot look in an isolated way at infrastructure projects. We have to find comprehensive and well—balanced solutions which benefit all Member States alike, as well as our neighbours. So the Commission will take very seriously the remarks of the honourable Members. We will continue monitoring this process and applying European Union legislation. There was another question at the end on whether we have the opinion of the United States. We have the opinion, we hear the honourable Members, but I must say that just last Wednesday we had the Energy Council with the United States and we also discussed this

topic, because it is a problem of geopolitical importance and is worth discussing in our bilateral relations with the United States.

President. – The debate is closed.

Written statements (Rule 162)

Petras Auštrevičius, Lithuania, Group of the European People's Party, *in writing.* – The energy union's aim is providing mutual benefits: to secure energy for consumers at affordable prices, create competitive market opportunities for suppliers and strengthen EU members' solidarity. One of the Union's key goals was achieving greater energy diversification by finding alternative sources. Nord Stream 2 represents neither source nor supply diversification. It duplicates the existing Nord Stream 1 pipeline and can become a Russian political weapon.

In order to stay resilient, the EU needs more cooperativeness and interconnection. This killer-project's aim is opening up old divisions by destroying recently installed interconnectors in central Europe and by creating winners that will be directly supplied by Nord Stream 2 and losers bypassed by it. Ukraine's European future would also be put at risk as Nord Stream 2 would create the conditions to cut off the gas currently transited through it.

Developing alternative energy sources infrastructure, boosting EU energy production and building new pipelines and interconnections compose an investment plan towards a common and secure energy future. Energy security is a key pillar of the EU's energy union strategy and I believe Nord Stream 2 would eliminate any prospect of achieving a competitive and resilient internal EU gas market, free from political manipulation.

Nicola Caputo, Italy, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, *in writing.* - The Nord Stream 2 project, run by the Russian gas company Gazprom, goes against the objectives of the Union energy and undermines solidarity among Member States. At the moment this project is not needed given that Nord Stream 1 working at below capacity. With Nord Stream 2, the Russian giant Gazprom would virtually full control of an important part of the distribution system and storage of gas in Central Europe, coming into possession of deposits quotas in the North Sea and bypassing or cutting out not only the 'Ukraine but other countries of central and Eastern Europe. There are also legal and environmental concerns. The project, in fact, are not economically justified, and would have negative consequences for the marine environment of the Baltic Sea. Nord Stream

2, furthermore, operates only on the basis of the laws of Russia and does not comply with European standards in energy and environmental terms. I therefore ask the Commission to put an end to the Nord Stream 2 project in the shortest possible time and focus on South Stream that represents the true long-term solution to ensure energy supplies to European citizens.

Benedek Jávor, Hungary, Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance, *in writing*. - The common climate and energy policy goals, the objectives of COP21 and the principle of diversification of energy supply also questions the need for the Nord Stream 2. The project is also of concern because of their impact on both energy security and diversification of energy supply.

In addition to the policy concerns like to draw your attention to an obvious double standards: in 2014, the European Commission argued that constitutes an abuse of the Central and conduct business on Eastern European gas market, with a dominant market position by Gazprom, and in violation of EU antitrust rules. At the same time referring to the third energy package it had stopped the construction of the South Stream as well. This position was consistent with both energy policy and security policy perspective.

But now that Germany wants to build a pipeline, Gazprom suddenly seems a reliable market player, in fact, considered to be in line with the third energy package, even with reference to specific rules for the subsea pipelines, the Commission of the planned gas pipeline.

Strictly legally this stops your location, however, we need to see that Allow impact on gas market in Central and Eastern Europe project will be a fundamental impact on bringing Union relations in the region, since it is the Member States - will appreciate the double yardstick - not without reason.

countries of the region, which already are line conflicts with the EU, this will have consequences for the whole of the judgment of the European integration.

Carolina Punset, Spain, Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, *in writing*. - Beyond the undeniable negative effects, for the marine ecosystems will have the construction of a new gas pipeline in the Baltic to rejoin Russia and Germany, and beyond the geopolitical circumstances of Ukraine, this facility is not necessary at all: No Improves security of supply, since there are several gas pipelines that fulfill this function; It would give a dominant position to a single supplying company, and to a single Member State. In addition, it would increase the already high capacity of transport of Russia without justification. At present only about 50% of Russia's transport capacity is used and available capacity far exceeds EU needs. It would jeopardize routes across Romania and Bulgaria, adversely

affecting diversification of supply to the EU. All this creates serious doubts about the compatibility of the project with the internal energy market, in particular with the third energy package. Natural gas can be a backup fuel, in the transition to a new energy model based on the use of renewable, but in no case should be a substitute fuel. Increasing supply capacity would delay the entry of clean energy into Europe.

Laurențiu Rebeca, Romania, Europe of Nations and Freedom Group, *in writing*. - I believe that Nord Stream 2 should be analysed from three points of view. In terms of legality and compliance with European legislation, namely the strategy of energy security of the EU adopted in May 2014, it is necessary to ensure that EU law is respected and applied in all segments Nord Stream 2 and that is against the objectives energy union. In the business case and increase delivery capacity, Nord Stream 2 discouraging states from Central and Eastern Europe. If some of the major consumers of Western Europe have certain financial benefits, this should not affect the interests and level of development of energy and transit capacity from the East. At principles and values, as long as the European Union maintains economic sanctions against Russia seeking to gain energy independence, Nord Stream 2 must contribute to the objective of diversification, not dependence on one supplier.

Dariusz Rosati, Poland, Group of the European People's Party, *in writing*. – Interestingly, on Europe Day, while celebrating the European continent's unity, we are confronted with a project that divides Europe. Contrary to some opinions, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is not a commercial venture – it is a purely political project hampering mutual trust in Europe and weakening our energy security.

Firstly, with the existing pipeline only being used up to about 70% of its capacity, building of a new leg is economically unjustified. Secondly, it might have an economic justification only if Russia decided to stop the transit through Ukraine, thus using gas supplies as a tool of political pressure. We all know that Gazprom is not a typical business company – it is a foreign policy instrument of the Russian Government.

Moreover, Nord Stream 2 would violate the key principle of the energy union – diversifying sources of energy. In 2013, 39% of all natural gas imports to the EU were from Russia, with several countries being fully dependent on imports from Russia. The debate on Nord Stream 2 shows that some Member States only pay lip service to values such as solidarity and security. This must change if we want to show European citizens that the EU is still a legitimate project.

Algirdas Saudargas, Lithuania, Group of the European People's Party, *in writing*. - has carried out dozens of studies on the need to diversify suppliers of energy resources for its own security. The implementation of the Third Energy Package has fundamentally changed the situation in Lithuania - a few years ago we were 100 per cent. dependent on Gazprom's gas, and today we talk about the real plans to completely abandon them. The ability to choose, and not to take more aggressive foreign policy of the Russian performing conditions, the Central and Eastern European aspirational. The European Commission, in order Energetic union, took the right steps. However, the plan to build the Nord Stream 2 "completely contrary to the purpose. Of course, the EU's largest economy seeks to maximize its efficiency, and states that the agreement will allow it to do so. However, the Bundestag recently užvirusios discussion, as far as the "commercial" named project cost to Germany, which will have to adapt to a new domestic gas network traffic raises serious doubts. Preliminary paskaičiavimimais it is about 500 million. euros. Obviously, the project will cost a lot of other countries - for Europe even more dependent on Russian gas will pay a huge sum. So about the Nord Stream 2 "damage can talk not only geopolitical or energy security, but also economically efficient. All the more, soon atsiversianti possibility of importing gas from the United States can radically change the European gas market. Trade with the strategic partner, not an aggressive neighbor, should be the direction in which we are going.

Czesław Adam Siekierski, Poland, Group of the European People's Party, *in writing*.

There is no doubt that the planned construction of Nord Stream 2 is about energy security, but also on the vital interests of Central and Eastern Europe.

Firstly, after the second pipeline of the Nord Stream gas pipeline has been built, these countries may be cut off from Russian gas at any time, for political reasons, from which they continue to be heavily dependent. Russia will be able to transmit gas seamlessly to its strategic market, ie west of Europe, bypassing Ukraine.

Secondly, if this controversial investment is made, the state of the region may lose billions of euros in gas transit fees for existing pipelines.

Thirdly, the continent's dependence on Russian gas will increase, and soon after the adoption of the so- Energy union, which assumes the diversification of energy sources in Europe.

It is therefore clear that Nord Stream 2 is in conflict with the EU's energy policy and that it has a dubious economic justification, given that its first line is used only in half. The priority of the EU should first be to develop inter-connector between countries to increase the

efficiency of the system and its resilience to possible restrictions on supplies to certain countries.

Ivan Štefanec, Slovakia, Group of the European People's Party, *in writing*. - Nord Stream 2 is a purely political project that is dangerous not only for Slovakia, but also for the whole EU. This project goes against the fundamental principle of EU energy based on diversification of sources and suppliers. Better energy prices can only achieve their wider range, rather than strengthening Russian national giant.

Indrek Tarand, Estonia, Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance, *in writing*. – I agree with what my honourable colleague Mr Kelam said on the matter, and I would like to add that reliance on Russia's gas supply is extremely short-sighted because it is not sustainable in the long term. Primarily since Russia is not a reliable partner, but also because Russia's supplies are limited. I believe that Gazprom is bluffing and the alleged abundance of gas in Siberia is greatly exaggerated.

It would be hypocritical and contradictory on our part to condemn the war in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea on one hand while on the other we further increase our own dependence on Russia in the field of energy. Russia has on several occasions tried to strangle Ukraine, earlier by cutting off supply in a critical moment and now by planning to bypass Ukraine entirely in order to further destabilise them economically. Russia wields energy as a weapon without hesitation, which is why we should oppose doubling Nord Stream's capacity, both out of solidarity for Ukraine but also to avoid ending up in a similarly precarious situation. To achieve this we need strong political means, but while we pinpoint those we should at the very least keep the current sanctions.

Vladimir Urutchev, Bulgaria, Group of the European People's Party, *in writing*. - Dear colleagues, today united Europe is torn by dividing lines between Member States, emerging in the way of solving old and emerging crises. Nord Stream 2 project, outlining the new dividing line. This time the division is right on one of the most important EU initiatives for new impetus for unity, namely the establishment of a European energy alliance in which the path of solidarity and confidence between the parties to achieve security and diversification of energy supply and competitive prices of a common energy market. I recall now abandoned, but priority supported by the entire EU project Nabucco, whose fate was decided by the selection of another decision by the interested private companies. Is it possible today gas map

of Europe once again be redrawn by a consortium of European energy companies and Gazprom participating in the Nord Stream? Repeatedly declared EU priorities for the development of the southern gas corridor again they will be left behind? Can the government do anything? Perhaps such questions would have if open and accessible was presented to the public information on why and whom need this project. It is time for true openness in the European energy to trigger the mechanism of solidarity and trust.