
XEnsemble-1.0 Code Package

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Red: code file

Yellow: saved data/model

White: flow component of the defense-prediction portal

arguments

- This code is built on top of Feature Squeezing[1].
- We consider the following arguments:
 - Dataset_name: dataset for the experiment, now support MNIST, CIFAR-10, ImageNet, LFW
 - Model_name: target model in use
 - Attacks: attack faced by the prediction system adversarial example or OOD input
 - Input_verifier: input denoising method used for the input verifier
 - Output_verifier: models used for the output verifier

[1] Xu, Weilin, David Evans, and Yanjun Qi. "Feature squeezing: Detecting adversarial examples in deep neural networks." *arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.01155* (2017).

Dataset_name, model_name and output_verifier

dataset_name	model_name or output_verifier		
	CNN1, CNN1_30, CNN1_40, CNN1_half,		
	CNN1_double, CNN2, CNN2_30, CNN2_40,		
MNIST	CNN2_half, CNN2_double		
	densenet, CNN1, CNN2, resnet-20, resnet-32,		
CIFAR-10	resnet-44, resnet-56, resnet-110		
	mobilenet, VGG-16, VGG-19, resnet-50,		
ImageNet	Inceptionv3		
LFW	CNN1, CNN2		

- Red: default model, if do not use output verifier, this model will be used for prediction. Also, adversarial attacks are generated on those models.
- Output_verifier choose multiple models from the list.

Description of the models

models	description	source	framework	comments
CNN1	a 7-layer CNN	[1]	Keras(Tensorflow)	_half: #feature maps are reduced to half
CNINIO	a E lavor CNN	[2]	Keras(Tensorflow)	_double: #feature maps are doubled
CNN2	a 5-layer CNN			_30/40: training epochs
ResNet	a ResNet model	[3]	Keras(Tensorflow)	-20/32/44/56/110: # resnet layers
Densenet	a Densenet model	[4]	Keras(Tensorflow)	40 layer, loaded a pretrained model
Mobilenet	a Mobilenet model	[5]	Keras(Tensorflow)	loaded a pretrained model
VGG	a VGG model	[6]	Keras(Tensorflow)	16 or 19 layer, loaded a pretrained model
InceptionV3	an InceptionV4 model	[6]	Keras(Tensorflow)	loaded a pretrained model

- [1] https://github.com/carlini/nn_robust_attacks/blob/master/train_models.py
- [2] https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/blob/master/cleverhans/utils_keras.py
- [3] https://github.com/keras-team/keras/blob/master/examples/cifar10_resnet.py
- [4] https://github.com/titu1994/DenseNet/blob/master/densenet.py
- [5] https://github.com/titu1994/MobileNetworks/blob/master/mobilenets.py
- [6] https://github.com/fchollet/deep-learning-models

Attacks

Attacks type	Attack algorithm
untargeted	fgsm, bim, deepfool, pgd
Targeted (next class, most-likely and least-likely class)	FGSM, BIM, CW_i, CW_2, CW_0, JSMA

- Note: the attack input here need to be consistent with the attack_portal as the file is saved in the name of attack method, attack target model, and attack parameters.
- We use the attack format as provided by Feature Squeezing(EvadeML), and we can only load one attack at a time.
- Feel free to try the attack setting in Feature Squeezing and other attack parameters.

MNIST attack Parameter setting

```
fqsm?eps=0.3;bim?eps=0.3&eps iter=0.06;deepfool?overshoot=10;pqdli?eps=0.3;
fgsm?eps=0.3&targeted=most;fgsm?eps=0.3&targeted=next;fgsm?eps=0.3&targeted=ll;
bim?eps=0.3&eps_iter=0.06&targeted=most;
bim?eps=0.3&eps_iter=0.06&targeted=next;
bim?eps=0.3&eps_iter=0.06&targeted=ll;
carlinili?targeted=most&batch size=1&max iterations=1000&confidence=10;
carlinili?targeted=next&batch_size=1&max_iterations=1000&confidence=10;
carlinili?targeted=ll&batch_size=1&max_iterations=1000&confidence=10;
carlinil2?targeted=most&batch_size=100&max_iterations=1000&confidence=10;
carlinil2?targeted=next&batch size=100&max iterations=1000&confidence=10;
carlinil2?targeted=ll&batch_size=100&max_iterations=1000&confidence=10;
carlinil0?targeted=most&batch_size=1&max_iterations=1000&confidence=10;
carlinil0?targeted=next&batch size=1&max iterations=1000&confidence=10;
carlinil0?targeted=ll&batch_size=1&max_iterations=1000&confidence=10;
jsma?targeted=most;
jsma?targeted=next;
jsma?targeted=ll;
```

Input_verifier:

- A variety choice of input denoising method is available.
- Takes input verifier one by one with a separator ";".
- As provided by feature squeezing, added rotation.

```
inverifier list = ['none',
                  'bit depth random',
                  'bit depth',
                  'binary filter',
                  'binary_random_filter',
                  'adaptive binarize',
                  'otsu binarize',
                  'median filter',
                  'median_random_filter',
                  'median_random_size_filter',
                  'non_local_means_bw',
                  'non_local_means_color',
                  'adaptive bilateral filter',
                  'bilateral filter',
                  'magnet mnist',
                  'magnet cifarl0',
                  'rotation'
```

XEnsemble Research

- [1] Wenqi Wei, Ling Liu, Margaret Loper, Stacey Truex, Lei Yu, Mehmet Emre Gursoy, and Yanzhao Wu. "Adversarial examples in deep learning: Characterization and divergence." arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.00051 (2018).
- [2] Ling Liu, Wenqi Wei, Ka-Ho Chow, Margaret Loper, Mehmet Emre Gursoy, Stacey Truex, and Yanzhao Wu, "Deep Neural Network Ensembles against Deception: Ensemble Diversity, Accuracy and Robustness." In the 16th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Smart Systems (MASS), IEEE, 2019.
- [3] Wenqi Wei, Ling Liu, Margaret Loper, Ka Ho Chow, Emre Gursoy, Stacey Truex, Yanzhao Wu. "Cross-layer Strategic Ensemble Defense against Adversarial Examples." In International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), 2020.
- [4] Wenqi Wei, Ling Liu, Margaret Loper, Mehmet Emre Gursoy, Stacey Truex, Lei Yu, and Yanzhao Wu, "Demystifying Adversarial Examples and Their Adverse Effect on Deep Learning", under the submission of IEEE Transaction on Dependable and Secure Computing.
- [5] Wenqi Wei, and Ling Liu, "Robust Deep Learning Ensemble against Deception", under the submission of IEEE Transaction on Dependable and Secure Computing.