

# **Supplementary Materials for Forced Displacement and Asylum Policy in the Developing World**

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Table A.1: National Laws and Policies on Forced Migration

Country	Law	Year
Afghanistan	Law on the Travel and Stay of Foreigners in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	2015-2017
Algeria	Décret no. 1963-274, du 1963 fixant les modalités d'application de la Convention de Genève du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des Réfugiés	1963-2017
Angola	Law No. 8/90 of May 26	1990-2017
Armenia	The Law of the Republic of Armenia on Refugees The Law of the Republic of Armenia on Refugees and Asylum	1999-2008 2009-2017
Azerbaijan	Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan On the Status of Refugees and Forced Migrants	1992-1999
	Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan On Legal Status of Aliens and Stateless Persons	1996-2013
	Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan 'On Status of Refugees and Forcibly Displaced (Persons Displaced Within the Country) Persons' Law 'On Social Protection of Internally Displaced Persons and Persons Equated to Them'?	1999-2017
	Decree Regarding the Approval of the 'State Program for the Improvement of living standards and generation of employment for refugees and IDPs'?	1999-2017
	Migration Code of the Azerbaijani Republic	2004-2017
Bahrain	Aliens (Immigration and Residence) Act, 1965	2013-2017
Bangladesh	Foreigners Act of 1946 Foreigners Order of 1951	1965-2017 1971-2017
Benin	Décret No. 1984-303 du 1984, portant sur la création, composition, attributions et fonctionnement de la Commission nationale chargée des réfugiés Décret No. 97-647 du 31 décembre 1997 portant sur création, composition, attributions et fonctionnement de la Commission nationale chargée des réfugiés (CNR)	1975-2017 1984-1997 1997-2017
Bhutan	The Immigration Act of the Kingdom of Bhutan	2007-2017
Botswana	Immigration Act of 1966 Refugees (Recognition and Control) Act of 1968 Refugees (Recognition and Control) Regulations of 1968 Refugees (Recognition and Control) Order Immigration Act of 2011 Immigration Regulations of 2011	1966-2011 1968-2017 1968-2017 1993-2017 2010-2017 2011-2017
Burkina Faso	Kiti No. AN V-360/FP/REX de 1988, relatif à la Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés Zatu n° AN V-0028/FP/PRES du 3 août 1988, portant statut des réfugiés Décret No. 1994-055/PRES/REX de 1997, portant application du statut des réfugiés	1988-2008 1988-2008 1994-2008
	La loi n° 042-2008/AN du 23 octobre 2008 portant statut des réfugiés au Burkina Faso	2008-2017
	Decret No. 2011-118 PRES/PM/MAEGR portant attributions, composition, organisation, et fonctionnement de la Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés (CONAREF) Decret No. 2011-119 PRES/PM/MAEGR relatif aux modalités d'application de la loi portant statut des réfugiés au Burkina Faso	2011-2017 2011-2017
Burundi	Décret-Loi n°1/007 du 20 mars 1989 portant l'accès, du s'agissant, de l'établissement des étrangers sur le territoire du Burundi et de leur accloignement Loi W 1/32 Du 13 Novembre 2008 Sur L'Asile Et La Protection Des Refugis Au Burundi	1989-2008 2008-2017
Cameroon	Loi no 74/21 du 5 décembre 1974 portant répression de l'immigration clandestine Loi n° 1990/043 du 19 décembre 1990, Conditions d'entrée, de séjour et de sortie du territoire camerounais Loi No. 1997/012 du 1997, Fixant les conditions d'entrée, de séjour et de sortie des étrangers au Cameroun Loi n°2005/006 du 27 juillet 2005 Portant statut des réfugiés au Cameroun	1974-1990 1990-1997 1997-2017 2005-2017 2011-2017
Central African Republic	Décret No. 1968/279 du 1968 fixant les conditions de délivrance de cartes d'identité et titres de voyages aux réfugiés en République Centrafricaine Décret No. 1983/278 du 1983, portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés en République Centrafricaine Décret No. 07/019 du 28 Décembre 2007, portant Statut des Refugies en Republique Centrafricaine	1968-1981 1983-1990 2007-2017
	Decret No. 09/001 du 6 Janvier 2009, portant organisation et fonctionnement des organes de mise en œuvre de la politique nationale relative aux réfugiés	2009-2017

Table A.1, continued: National Laws and Policies on Forced Migration

Country	Law	Years
Chad	Décret portant création, organisation et attributions de la Commission Nationale d'Accueil, de Réinsertion	2011-2017
Comoros	Loi n° 88-025 du 29 décembre 1988 portant modification de la loi n° 82-026 relative aux conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers aux Comores	1988-2017
Côte D'Ivoire	Loi No. 90-437 du 29 mai 1990 relative à l'entrée au séjour des étrangers en Côte d'Ivoire	1990-2017
Cyprus	Aliens and Immigration Law, Cap. 105 Aliens and Immigration Regulations The Refugee Regulations of 2002	1952-2017 1972-2017 2000-2017 2002-2017
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Ordonnance 87-281 portant mesures d'exécution de l'ordonnance loi 83-033 du 12 septembre 1983 relative à la police des étrangers. Law no. 021/2002 portant statut des réfugiés en République Démocratique du Congo?	1987-2017 2002-2017
Djibouti	Ordonnance No. 77053 PR/AE portant statut des réfugiés sur le sol de la République de Djibouti Décret No. 77-054 PR/AE du 1977 portant création de la commission nationale d'éligibilité au statut des réfugiés Décret No. 2001-0101 PR/MI portant création d'un Comité National d'Assistance aux réfugiés et aux sinistrés Décret N° 159 AN/16/74ème L portant statut des réfugiés en République de Djibouti.	1977-2017 1977-2001 1978-2017 2001-2017 2017
Egypt	DAOrcret N° 2017-409 PR/MI fixant les règles de procédure, les modalités d'organisation et de fonctionnement des organes chargés de la gestion du statut des réfugiés DAOrcret N° 2017-410 PR/MI fixant les modalités d'exercice des droits fondamentaux des réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile en République de Djibouti	2017
Eritrea	Presidential Decree No. 89 of 1960 on the Residency and Entry of Foreigners Presidential Decree No. 331-1980 Law 88/2005 on Entry, Residence and Exit of Foreigners	1960-2005 1980-2017 2005-2017
Ethiopia	Proclamation regulating the Issuance of Travel Documents and Visas, and Registration of Foreigners in Ethiopia, No. 271 of 1969 Issuance of Travel Documents and Visas Regulations 1971 Immigration Proclamation No. 354/2003 Refugee Proclamation No. 409/2004	1969-2003 1971-2003 2003-2017 2004-2017
Gabon	Ordonnance No. 64/1976 du 1976, créant une Délegation générale aux réfugiés Loi no 5/98 du 5 mars 1998 portant statut des réfugiés en République gabonaise DAOrcret no 00064/PR/MAEFC portant attributions, organisation et fonctionnement de la Sous-Commission d'Éligibilité DAOrcret no 00064/PR/MAEFC portant attributions, organisation et fonctionnement du Bureau de Recours de la Commission Nationale pour les Réfugiés Arrête No 1145 PM/MAEFC Instituant la carte d'identité de réfugié et fixant ses modalités de délivrance et de renouvellement Act No. 2 of 1965 Refugee Act, 2008	1976-1998 1998-2017 2000-2017 2000-2017 2004-2017 1965-2017 2008-2017
Georgia	Law of Georgia on Refugees Law of Georgia on Refugee and Humanitarian Status Law of Georgia on International Protection	1998-2011 2011-2017 2017
Ghana	Aliens Act, 1963 (Act 160) Refugee Law, 1992	1963-1992 1992-2017
Guinea	Ordonnance no 054/PRG/SG/87 du 22 juillet 1987 portant conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers en République de Guinée Loi No. L/9194/019/CTRN du 1994 portant sur les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers en République de Guinée Loi L/2000/012/AN Adoptant Et Pronlguant le Statut Des Refugies En Republique De Guinée	1987-1994 1994-2017 2000-2017
Guinea Bissau	Lei No. 6/2008 de 2008, Aprovado o Estatuto do Refugiado	2008-2017
India	The Foreigners Act of 1946 The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act of 1983	1951-2017 1983-2017

Table A.1, continued: National Laws and Policies on Forced Migration, continued

Country	Law	Years
Iran	Regulations Relating to Refugees The Refugee Law No. 1/4/1959 The Political Refugee Act No. 51 Law 21 of 2010	1963-2017 1959-1971 1971-2003 2010-2017
Israel	Law No. 5712-1952 Prevention of Infiltration (Offenses and Jurisdiction) Law	1952-2017 1954-2017
Jordan	Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners' Affairs	1973-2017
Kazakhstan	Decree of 19 June 1995 on Legal Status of Foreigners Presidential Decree On Granting of political asylum, as of 15 July 1996 Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 13 December 1997, No. 204-1 on Population Migration The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan On Refugees Law No. 477-NV of 22 July 2011 on Migration Government Decree No. 148 of 21 January 2012	1995-2017 1996-2009 1997-2002 2009-2017 2011-2017 2012-2017
Kenya	Kenya Immigration Act Aliens Restriction Act The Refugee Act, 2006 The Refugees Act Regulations The Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act No. 12 of 2011 The Refugees Bill, 2016	1967-2010 1974-2010 2006-2017 2009-2017 2011-2017 2017
Kuwait	Anmir Decree No. 17 of 1959 issuing the Aliens Residence Law	1954-2017
Kyrgyzstan	Act of 14 December 1993 on the order for residence of aliens in the Kyrgyz Republic. Resolution of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic No. 340 of 1996 The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Refugees Regulations of 2003 Governing the Work with Refugees in the Kyrgyz Republic	1993-2002 1996-2002 2002-2017 2003-2017
Lebanon	Law Regulating the Entry of Foreign Nationals Into, Their Residence in and Their Departure From Lebanon	1962-2017
Lesotho	Aliens Control Act of 1966 The Refugee Act of 1983	1966-2017 1983-2017
Liberia	Aliens and Nationality Law	1973-2017
Libya	Law No. (17) of 1962 on the entry, residence, and exit of foreigners in Libya Law No. (6) of 1987 on organising the entry, residence, and exit of foreigners in Libya Law n°19 of 2010 related to the combatting of irregular migration	1962-1987 1987-2017 2010-2017
Madagascar	Décret No. 1962-001 du 1962 portant création d'un bureau des réfugiés et apatrides au Ministère de l'Intérieur (Direction de la Sécurité Nationale)	1962-2017 1962-2017
Malawi	Loi No. 1962-006 fixant l'organisation et le fonctionnement de l'immigration Immigration Act of 1964	1964-2017 1964-2017
Maldives	Immigration Regulations of 1968 Refugee Act, 1989 Refugee Regulations, 1990	1984-2017 1990-2017 2007-2017
Mali	The Maldives Immigration Act	1998-2017
Mauritania	Decret No. 64/169 du 12 /12/64 Portant régime de l'immigration en République Islamique de Mauritanie Décret n° 2005-422 du 3 mars 2005 fixant les modalités d'application en République islamique de Mauritanie des conventions internationales relatives aux réfugiés	1964-2017 2005-2017
Mauritius	Immigration Act 13 of 1970	1970-2017
Morocco	Decret No. 2-57-1256 du 2 safar 1377 (29 août 1957) fixant les modalités d'application de la loi n° 02/03 relative à l'entrée et au séjour des étrangers au Royaume du Maroc, à l'immigration et l'émigration irrégulières Dahir n° 1-03-196 du 16 ramadan 1424 (11 novembre 2003) portant promulgation de la loi n° 02/03 relative à l'entrée et au séjour des étrangers au Royaume du Maroc, à l'immigration et l'émigration irrégulières	1957-2017 1991-2017 2003-2017
Mozambique	Decree 33/2007 on the Regulation on the determination of refugee status	2007-2017
Namibia	Immigration Control Act Namibia Refugees (Recognition and Control) Act of 1999	1993-2017 1999-2017

Table A.1, continued: National Laws and Policies on Forced Migration, continued

Country	Law	Years
Nepal	Foreigners Act The Immigration Act , 2049 Immigration Rules, 1994 Immigration Procedure, 2008	1958-1992 1992-2017 1994-2017 2008-2017
Niger	Ordinance n° 81-40 of 29 October 1981 related to the entry and stay of foreign nationals in Niger Décret n° 87/076/PCMS/MI/MAE/C du 10 juin 1987 réglementant les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers au Niger Décret No. 98-382 PRN/MI/AT du 19/08 déterminant les modalités d'application de la Loi No. 97-016 du 19/07 portant statut des réfugiés Loi No. 142/MI/SP/D.AR/DEC-R accordant le bénéfice du statut de réfugié prima facie au Niger, aux Maliens victimes du conflit armé du nord Mali Loi No. 806/MI/SP/D/AC/R/DEC-R du 04 Dec 2013 accordant bénéfice du statut temporaire de réfugiés à des ressortissants du Nord-Est du Nigeria	1981-1987 1987-2017 1997-2017 1998-2017 2012-2017 2013-2017
Nigeria	Immigration (Control of Aliens) Act (L.N. 94 of 1963) (Chapter 171) Immigration (Control of Aliens) Regulations National Commission for Refugees Establishment, Etc.) Act Immigration Act, 2015	1963-2015 1963-2015 1984-2017 2015-2017
Oman	Decision No. 63 of 1996 Issuing the Implementing Regulations of the Foreign Residency Law No. 16 of 1995	1996-2017 1995-2017
Pakistan	Foreigners Act of 1946 Foreigners Order of 1951	1951-2017 1951-2017
Puntland	Puntland Refugee Protection Act	2017
Qatar	Law No. 3 of 1963 Regulating the Entry and Residence of Aliens in Qatar Law No. 4/2009 Regulating Expatriates? Entry, Exit, Residence and Sponsorship Law No. 21/2015 Regulating the Entry, Exit, and Residence of Expatriates	1963-2009 2009-2016 2016-2017
Republic of the Congo	Ordinance No. 15-72 du 10 avril 1972 modifiant la loi No. 36-60 du 10 avril 1972, réglementant l'admission des étrangers dans la République Populaire du Congo Loi 23-96 du 6 Juin 1996 fixant les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers sur le Territoire de la République Populaire du Congo Décret No. 22/131/D du 31 Décembre 1999 portant création, attributions, organisation et fonctionnement du comité national d'assistance aux réfugiés Arrêté No. 804/0 du 28 Décembre 2001 portant création, attributions,organisation et fonctionnement de la commission des recours des réfugiés Loi n° 29-2017 du 7 aoÅt 2017 modifiant et complAçant certaines dispositions de la loi n° 23-96 du 6 juin 1996 fixant les conditions d'entrAçé, de sAçjour et de sortie des AÇtrangers en RAÇpublique du Congo	1960-1972 1972-1996 1996-2017 2000-2017 2001-2017 2001-2017
Rwanda	Loi du 15 octobre 1963 relative à l'immatriculation des étrangers Loi du 1963 portant sur la police de l'immigration et les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers dans la République rwandaise Law No. 17/99 of 1999 on Immigration and Emigration Law No. 34/2001 of 05/07/2001 Relating to Refugees Law No. 29/2006. of 20/07/2006 Modifying and Complimenting Law No. 34/2001 of 05/07/2001 Relating to Refugees Law No. 04/2011 or 21/03/2011 on Immigration and Emigration in Rwanda Law No. 13ter/2014 of 21/05/2014 Relating to Refugees	1963-1999 1963-1999 1999-2011 2001-2014 2006-2014 2011-2017 2014-2017
Saudi Arabia	The Residence Regulations	1952-2017
Senegal	Loi No. 68-27 du 19/08 portant statut des réfugiés Décret relatif A la Commission des Réfugiés The Non-Citizens (Registration, Immigration and Emigration) Act, 1965 The Refugees Protection Act, 2007	1968-2017 1976-2003 2003-2017
Somalia	Presidential Decree Law No. 47 of 15 July 1979 Presidential Decree No. 25 of 1984, on Determination of Refugee Status	1979-1984 1984-1991
Seychelles	Law of Seychelles Chapter 93 Immigration Decree	1975-2017
Sierra Leone	The Non-Citizens (Registration, Immigration and Emigration) Act, 1965 The Refugees Protection Act, 2007	1965-1980 2007-2017
Somaliland	Law No. 72 of 27 November 1995 Aliens Act 1 of 1937 Aliens Control Act, No. 96 of 1991 Regulations to the Aliens Control Act Refugee Act, 1998 Regulations to the South African Refugees Act	1991-2017 1995-2017 1951-1991 1991-2002 1996-2002 1998-2017 2006-2017
South Africa		

Table A.1, continued: National Laws and Policies on Forced Migration, continued

Country	Law	Years
South Sudan	Act No. 20 of 2012 Refugee Status Eligibility Regulations	2012-2017 2017
Sri Lanka	Immigrants and Emigrants Act	1951-2017
Sudan	The Regulation of Asylum Act No. 45 of 1974 The Asylum Regulation Act, 2014	1974-2014 2014-2017
Swaziland	King's Order-in-Council No. 5 of 1978	1978-2017
Syria	Legislative Decree No. 29 of 15 January 1970 - The Entry and Exit of Aliens to and from the Syrian Arab Republic and Their Residence Therein Entry, Exit, and Residence in Syria Act of 2014	1970-2014 2014-2017
Tajikistan	Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Refugees of 1994 Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Refugees of 2002	1994-2002 2002-2017
Tanzania	War Refugees (Control and Expulsion) Ordinance Refugees (Control) Act The Refugees Act, 1998	1951-1965 1966-1998 1998-2017
Togo	Loi no. 1987-12 relative à la police des étrangers Loi No. 2000-019 Portant Statut des Réfugiés au Togo	1987-2017 2000-2017
Tunisia	Loi n° 1968-0007 du 8 mars 1968, relative à la condition des étrangers en Tunisie Décret No. 1968-198 du 1968, réglementant les conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers en Tunisie	1968-2017 1968-2017
A.	Law on Settlement Settlement Law Law on Foreigners and International Protection Temporary Protection Regulation	1951-2006 2006-2017 2013-2017 2014-2017
Turkey	Law of Turkmenistan on Refugees of 1997 Law of Turkmenistan on Refugees of 2012	1997-2011 2012-2017
Turkmenistan	Control of Refugees from the Sudan Ordinance Control of Alien Refugees Act, Cap. 64 of 1960 "The Refugees Act, 2006 The Refugees Regulations, 2010	1955-1960 1960-2006 2006-2017 2010-2017
Uganda	Federal Law No. 6 for 1973 Concerning Immigration and Residence Federal Law No (13) for 1996 Concerning "Aliens Entry and Residence" Regulations on Entry to and Exit From the Republic of Uzbekistan for Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons Rules on Residence for Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons Regulation on the Procedure for Granting Political Asylum in the Republic of Uzbekistan	1973-1996 1996-2017 1996-2017 1996-2017 2017
United Arab Emirates	1984 Ministerial Resolution No 10	1984-1990
Yemen	1984 Ministerial Resolution No 10 Law on the Entry and Residence of Aliens	1990 1991-2017
Uzbekistan	Refugees (Control) Act, 1970 Refugees (Control) (Declaration of Refugees) (No. 2) Order 1971 The Refugees Act, 2017	1970-2017 1971-2017 2017
Zambia	Chapter 4:03 Refugees Act Regulations of 1985 on Refugees	1983-2017 1985-2017
Zimbabwe		

## Section A.2: DWRAP Codebook

The dataset is divided into five policy fields: access, services, livelihoods, movement, and participation. Each policy field is sub-divided into a number of policy strands, which reflect the most important facets of the policy texts we are coding. We code 68 variables, 14 of which are descriptive and 54 of which are coded within the 14 policy strands and 5 policy fields we outline. Only the 54 policy-relevant variables are included in our index.

- ***country***: Country name.
- ***ccode***: Country code from the Correlates of War.
- ***region***: Indicator of subregion from the United Nations geoscheme. Code 1 for Northern Africa; 2 for Western Africa; 3 for Middle Africa; 4 for Eastern Africa; 5 for Southern Africa; 6 for Western Asia; 7 for Central Asia; 8 for Southern Asia.
- ***pol\_name***: Formal or official name of a law or policy.
- ***other\_name***: Informal or unofficial name or abbreviation of a law or policy. For example, the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa is often referred to as the Kampala Convention. In this case, *other\_name* would be the Kampala Convention.
- ***year***: Year that a law or policy text was passed or adopted by the relevant parties.
- ***level***: Indicator for the level of a law or policy. Code 1 for binding international laws, treaties, and agreements, including those that are not yet in force, but which will become binding once the conditions for entry into force are met; 2 for regional laws, treaties, and agreements, such as those entered by regional international organizations; and 3 for domestic laws, such as national constitutions and laws passed by national legislative bodies that apply to the entirety of the national territory.
- ***intl***: Dichotomous indicator capturing whether a law or policy is international or domestic. Code 0 if *level* is 3; 1 if *level* is 1 or 2.
- ***colony***: Dichotomous indicator for whether the relevant law or policy was passed by the colonial or protectorate government of a state. Code 0 for no; 1 for yes. All 0s indicate that the country in question passed the law as an independent state.
- ***asylee***: Dichotomous indicator capturing whether a law or policy pertains to asylum-seekers. Code 0 for no; 1 if yes.
- ***refugee***: Dichotomous indicator capturing whether a law or policy pertains to refugees. Code 0 for no; 1 if yes.
- ***stless***: Dichotomous indicator capturing whether a law or policy pertains to stateless persons. Code 0 for no; 1 if yes.

# Access

## Status

- ***accept***: Does the law or policy annunciate a process for granting subsidiary or humanitarian protection, or relate to such a process already defined? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes.
- ***refoul***: Is there an explicitly stated right to non-refoulement? Code 0 if no, there is an explicitly stated provision *for* refoulement; 1 if the law/policy is ambiguous on refoulement, and lacks either a stated provision for refoulement or an explicit right to non-refoulement; 2 if there an explicit right to non-refoulement.
- ***excl***: Does the relevant country reserve the right to *deny* status to certain individuals? Code 0 if yes, to any individual; 1 if yes, to individuals who fit exclusionary categories beyond those outlined in the 1951 Convention (i.e. beyond status as a war criminal, perpetrator of serious non-political crimes, or for submitting fraudulent claims); 2 if no, individuals may only be denied status for reasons outlined in the 1951 Convention; 3 if no, individuals may not be denied status for any reason.
- ***cease***: Does the relevant country reserve the right to *cease* status recognition for certain individuals? Code 0 if yes, to any individual; 1 if yes, to individuals who fit cessation categories beyond those outlined in the 1951 Convention (i.e. beyond status as a war criminal, perpetrator of serious non-political crimes, if causal conditions cease, or for submitting fraudulent claims); 2 if no, individuals may only have their status ceased for reasons outlined in the 1951 Convention; 3 if no, individuals may not have their status ceased for any reason.
- ***pend\_rem***: Does the law or policy guarantee the right to remain while determination of status is pending? Code 0 if no, there is no guaranteed right to remain while status is pending; 1 if yes, there is a right to remain subject to conditions on applicants' behavior and movement; 2 if yes, there is an unconditional right to remain while status determination is pending.
- ***perm\_rem***: Does the law or policy guarantee status recognized individuals the right to remain? Code 0 if no, there is no guaranteed right to remain; 1 if yes, provided other specified conditions for cessation are not met; 2 if yes, unconditionally.

## Control

- ***unlaw\_ent***: Does the law or policy contain a provision exempting individuals from prosecution for unlawful entry? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, but subject to other entry restrictions (like limits on where individuals may enter); 2 if yes, and without additional limits on entry.
- ***monitor***: Does the law or policy contain a provision obliging individuals to check-in with government officers? Code 0 if yes, with local *and* national government officials, or with any officials more frequently than annually; 1 if yes, with local *or* national government officials, or with any officials less frequently than annually; 2 if no.

## Family

- ***status\_fam***: Does the law or policy contain a provision extending status to the family members of recognized individuals? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes.
- ***famre***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing efforts to reunite separated families? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, to reunite immediate family members, including parents, spouses, and/or minor children; 2 if yes, to reunite immediate and extended family members including parents, spouses, children, and others.
- ***pers\_stat***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing individuals recognition of their previously acquired personal status and marriage rights? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes.

## Recourse

- ***court***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing court access? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, generally; 2 if yes, with legal assistance provided.
- ***reason***: Does the applicant have a right to a reasoned response in case of a negative status decision? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, a right to reasoned decision; 2 if yes, a right to reasoned decision *and* additional means of legal recourse.
- ***appeal***: Does the applicant have a right to legal redress in case of a negative status decision? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, a right to appeal; 2 if yes, a right to appeal and to representation before an independent administrative authority or a court.

## Services

### Education

- ***elem\_educ***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing access to primary and/or pre-primary education? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, only for recognized individuals; 2 if yes, for all individuals.
- ***high\_educ***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing access to secondary and/or post-secondary education? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, access to secondary education; 2 if yes, access to secondary and post-secondary education.
- ***aff\_act***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing affirmative action admission to educational institutions? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes.
- ***relg\_educ***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing the right to religious education? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, only for recognized individuals; 2 if yes, for all individuals.
- ***lang\_train***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing access to language training? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, only for recognized individuals; 2 if yes, for all individuals.
- ***voc\_train***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing access to vocational training? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, only for recognized individuals; 2 if yes, for all individuals.

## Aid

- **aid:** Does the law or policy contain a provision for aid or humanitarian assistance to individuals? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, conditional on residence in designated areas; 2 if yes, unconditionally.
- **aid\_type:** What types of aid are provided? Code 0 if no aid is provided; 1 if food, drinking water, and/or shelter/building materials are provided; 2 if materials are provided *in addition* to food, water, and/or shelter.
- **soc\_sec:** Does the country extend social security—“legal provisions in respect of employment injury, occupational diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, unemployment, family responsibilities,” etc.—to individuals? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, conditional on employment or residence in designated areas; 2 if yes, unconditionally.

## Health

- **health:** Does the law or policy provide a right to health care and/or medical access? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, conditional on specified requirements (e.g. employment or residence in certain areas) ; 2 if yes, unconditionally.
- **health\_cost:** How much does health care cost? Code 0 if health access is not provided, or if individuals are charged a non-zero fee greater than that paid by legal aliens; 1 if individuals are charged a non-zero fee on par with that paid by nationals and/or other aliens; 2 if health care is free of charge.
- **health\_app:** Are there categories of applicants that are to receive special, favorable treatment or consideration for health-related reasons (e.g. the elderly, disabled, pregnant women, or HIV/AIDS-positive individuals)? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, one category of health-related applicants receive consideration; 2 if yes, two or more categories of health-related applicants receive consideration.
- **health\_rest:** Can applicants be denied entry on the grounds that they have communicable diseases or pose other health concerns? Code 0 if yes, applicants must pass a formal health examination in order to gain entry or status; 1 if yes, applicants are screened visually or asked about their medical history, but a formal health screen is not required; 2 if no, applicants face no specified medical barriers to entry.

## Livelihoods

### Property

- **asset:** Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing the right to transfer movable property into and out of the country? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, subject to some restrictions on the type of property; 2 if yes, without restrictions.
- **asset\_take:** Does the law or policy contain a provision allowing the government to seize property with which individuals enter the country? Code 0 if yes, any property may be seized, or *at least* two of the following—animals, vehicles, and

arms/ammunition—may be seized; 1 if yes, one of the following—animals, vehicles, and arms/ammunition—may be seized; 2 if no, property may not be seized.

- ***asset\_comp***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing compensation for seized property? Code 0 if no, there is no compensation guaranteed for any seized property; 1 if yes, compensation is guaranteed for some *but not all* categories of seized property; 2 if yes, compensation is guaranteed for *all* seized property, or if property may not be seized in the first place.
- ***move\_prop***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing the right to own and acquire movable property in the host country? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes.
- ***immv\_prop***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing the right to own and acquire immovable property in the host country? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, land *or* fixed buildings; 2 if yes, land *and* fixed buildings.
- ***intel\_prop***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing individuals' rights to intellectual property? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes.
- ***lease***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing individuals the right to lease and/or sublease immovable property in the host country? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, land *or* fixed buildings; 2 if yes, land *and* fixed buildings.

## Land

- ***land***: Does the law or policy contain a provision granting a plot of land for cultivation, grazing, and/or shelter construction? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, for a limited duration of time and/or subject to conditions on use; 2 if yes, without conditions.
- ***land\_let***: Are individuals allowed to let and/or sublet granted land? Code 0 if no, or if individuals are not granted land; 1 if yes, subject to condition and/or government permission; 2 if yes, without conditions.

## Employment

- ***employ***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing the right to work? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, only for recognized individuals; 2 if yes, for all individuals.
- ***emp\_self***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing the right to self-employment and/or to start a business? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, only for recognized individuals; 2 if yes, for all individuals.
- ***emp\_prof***: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing the right to work in professional fields provided an individual holds the requisite training or certification? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, only for recognized individuals; 2 if yes, for all individuals.
- ***emp\_permit***: Does the law or policy oblige individuals to hold a work permit? Code 0 if yes, and permits cost a fee; 1 if yes, but permits are free; 2 if no, work permits are not required.

- *emp\_rest*: Does the law or policy place additional restrictions on individuals in terms of work, including restrictions on which industries they may work in, or where they may work? Code 0 if yes, at least two work restrictions are in place, in addition to any work permit requirement; 1 if yes, at least one work restriction is in place, in addition to any work permit requirement; 2 if no work restrictions are in place, in addition to any work permit requirement.
- *tax*: Does the law or policy contain a provision obliging individuals to pay taxes? Code 0 if yes, generally or unconditionally; 1 if yes, provided the individual is employed or otherwise has income; 2 if no, individuals are not taxed.

## Movement

### Settlement

- *move*: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing the right to free movement within the host country? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, only for recognized individuals; 2 if yes, for all individuals.
- *move\_cond*: Does the law or policy condition the right to free movement? Code 0 if yes, there is no provision for free movement, or if movement is conditional on government permission *and* at least one other restriction (e.g. national security or health); 1 if yes, conditional on government permission or one other restriction; 2 if no, free movement is unconditional.
- *camp*: Does the law or policy contain a provision for the establishment of transit centers, settlements, or camps? Code 0 if yes, and residence in designated areas is required; 1 if yes, but individuals can live outside designated areas with government permission; 2 if no, designated residence areas are not specified.

### Documents

- *docs*: Does the law or policy guarantee an individual travel and identification documents? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, only for recognized individuals; 2 if yes, for all individuals.
- *docs\_pay*: Do travel and identity documents cost a fee? Code 0 if documents are not provided, or if individuals are charged a non-zero fee greater than that paid by legal aliens; 1 if individuals are charged a non-zero fee on par with that paid by legal aliens; 2 if individuals are charged a non-zero fee on par with that paid by nationals; 3 if documents are free of charge.

## Citizenship and Participation

### Citizenship

- *citizen*: Does the law or policy provide a path to citizenship? Code 0 if no; 1 if no, but a path to permanent residence is provided; 2 if yes.


- *cit\_year*: How many years must an individual reside in the host country in order to be eligible for citizenship? Code 0 if there is no path to citizenship, or if an individual must reside in a country for 30 years or more in order to become eligible for citizenship; 1 if an individual must reside in a country for 15 to 29 years in order to become eligible for citizenship; 2 if an individual must reside in a country for less than 15 years to become eligible for citizenship.
- *cit\_marr*: Can an individual achieve citizenship through marriage to a national? Code 0 if there is no path to citizenship, or if there is no path to citizenship through marriage; 1 if only a non-citizen female may become a citizen by marriage to a male national; 2 if non-citizens of any gender may become citizens by marriage to any national.
- *cit\_birth*: Are the children of non-citizen individuals born in a host country eligible for citizenship? Code 0 if there is no path to citizenship, or if children of non-citizens born in a host country are not eligible for citizenship; 1 if only children born to mixed, non-citizens-national couples are eligible for citizenship; 2 if all children of non-citizens born in a host country may be eligible for citizenship.
- *cit\_unacc*: Are unaccompanied minors in a host country eligible for citizenship? Code 0 if there is no path to citizenship, or if unaccompanied minors are not eligible for citizenship; 1 if unaccompanied minors must be adopted by nationals in order to be eligible for citizenship; 2 if all unaccompanied minors in a host country are eligible for citizenship.

## Political Rights


- *pol\_part*: Does the law or policy contain a provision allowing individuals to participate (vote or run) in host country political processes? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes, individuals may participate in special bodies for asylum-seeker/refugee representation; 2 if yes, individuals may participate in ordinary local, state, and/or national political processes.
- *assoc*: Does the law or policy contain a provision guaranteeing individuals the right to associate? Code 0 if no; 1 if yes generally, or only in labor unions and non-political organizations; 2 if yes, in political and non-political organizations.

## Figure A.3: Correlation Matrices

In order to build confidence in our coding and aggregation schema we present correlograms demonstrating that sub-components of the full policy index and each field index are highly correlated. The strong, observed associations between policy provisions and the strands and fields into which we group them lend confidence in the construct validity of our index, and the sensibility of the groupings outlined in Table 2.




Full Policy Index and Constituent Policy Fields



Access Field Index and Constituent Policy Strands

ServicesIndex 0.82 0.82 0.82




Services Field Index and Constituent Policy Strands

LivelihoodsIndex 0.75 0.75 0.75




Livelihoods Field Index and Constituent Policy Strands

MovementIndex 0.85 0.85



Movement Field Index and Constituent Policy Strands

ParticipationIndex 0.80 0.80



Participation Field Index and Constituent Policy Strands

## Table A.4: Principal Component Analyses

We use inverse-covariance weighted summary indices (Anderson, 2008) to collapse our variables into policy strands, fields, and an overall policy score. We take this approach because there are strong a priori theoretical reasons to expect certain policy dimensions to emerge. Our coding scheme was built around existing indices like MIPEX and IMPIC, which have demonstrated that the policy strands and fields we code emerge in migration laws. Nevertheless, an alternate aggregation strategy, principal component analysis (PCA), gives a substantively similar decomposition of the variables. Specifically, PCA collapses the 54 variables we code to 13 factors that correspond to our 14 policy strands. Our education and political rights strands are collapsed into a single factor in the PCA. Our policy strands are highly correlated with the 13 factors identified in the PCA.

Table A.4: Factors Based on Principal Component Analyses

	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative	Corresponding Policy Strand(s)
Factor 1	17.96364	13.10685	0.3327	0.3327	Control
Factor 2	4.85679	2.00838	0.0899	0.4226	Status
Factor 3	2.84841	0.15729	0.0527	0.4753	Health, Aid
Factor 4	2.69112	0.51823	0.0498	0.5252	Citizenship
Factor 5	2.17289	0.13516	0.0402	0.5654	Employment
Factor 6	2.03773	0.40787	0.0377	0.6032	Property
Factor 7	1.62985	0.11328	0.0302	0.6333	Land
Factor 8	1.51658	0.04877	0.0281	0.6614	Property
Factor 9	1.46780	0.19803	0.0272	0.6886	Settlement
Factor 10	1.26978	0.09331	0.0235	0.7121	Recourse
Factor 11	1.17646	0.11384	0.0218	0.7339	Family
Factor 12	1.06263	0.02843	0.0197	0.7536	Education, Pol. Rights
Factor 13	1.03419	0.18051	0.0192	0.7727	Documents


LR Test:  $\text{Chi}^2(1431) = 370000$  Prob> $\text{Chi}^2 = 0.0000$

## Section A.5: Universal Periodic Review Excerpts


The following passages are excerpted from UNHCR submissions to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), and demonstrate the usefulness of these reports for mapping the national policy space on forced migration.

- “The Republic of Angola is a signatory to the **1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees** (ratified on 31 January 1976, with reservations), the **1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees** (acceded on 23 June 1981) and the **1969 OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa** (acceded to on 30 April 1981). ... Article 29 of the Foreigners Act (**Lei sobre o Regime Juridico dos Estrangeiros na Republica de Angola**) provides safeguards against the expulsion of refugees to countries where they may be persecuted for political, racial or religious reasons, or where their lives may be in danger. The same article guarantees refugees ‘the most favourable treatment under the law or international agreements to which Angola is party’. Despite these protections, refugees and asylum-seekers remain vulnerable in Angola.”
  - UNHCR Submission to the UPR for the Angola Second Cycle
- “The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is a State party to the **1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees** and its **1967 Protocol** with no reservations. The DRC is also a State party to the **1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa** (OAU Convention). Most of the refugees currently residing in the DRC have been recognized as refugees on a *prima facie* basis, pursuant to Article 1.2 of the OAU Convention. ... The current asylum system was established by **Law no. 021/2002 ‘Portant statut des refugies en Republique Democratique du Congo’** (the Refugee Law) on 16 October 2002. The Refugee Law created the National Commission for Refugees which is responsible for examining requests for asylum on a case-by-case basis.”
  - UNHCR Submission to the UPR for the DRC Second Cycle
- “The Republic of South Sudan (‘South Sudan’) ... has not acceded yet to neither the **1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees** and its **1967 Protocol** ... nor the **1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa** ... South Sudan adopted the **2012 Refugee Act**, which, among other positive aspects, (a) **incorporates the refugee definition** established by the 1951 Convention and 1969 OAU Convention, and expressly **grants asylum for persecution on the grounds of tribe and gender discriminating practices**; (b) guarantees the enjoyment of the rights set out in Part Two (the bill of rights) of the 2011 Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan; (c) **entitles refugees to seek employment**; (d) **provides access to the same basic health services and primary education as nationals of South Sudan**. ... Prima facie RSD mechanisms and the provision of temporary protection to a specific group are established in Section 30 of the 2012 Refugee Act.”
  - UNHCR Submission to the UPR for the South Sudan Second Cycle


## Figure A.6: Policy Scores Over Time in Africa




Policy Index Over Time in Africa




Access Index Over Time in Africa




Services Index Over Time in Africa



Livelihoods Index Over Time in Africa




Movement Index Over Time in Africa



Participation Index Over Time in Africa


*Note:* Light gray lines represent individual country scores over time, and the thick black line captures the average index score for all DWRAP countries over time.

**Figure A.7: Policy Scores Over Time in the Middle East**




*Note:* Light gray lines represent individual country scores over time, and the thick black line captures the average index score for all DWRAP countries over time.


**Figure A.8: Policy Scores Over Time in South Asia**




Policy Index Over Time in S. Asia




Access Index Over Time in S. Asia




Services Index Over Time in S. Asia



Livelihoods Index Over Time in S. Asia



Movement Index Over Time in S. Asia



Participation Index Over Time in S. Asia

*Note:* Light gray lines represent individual country scores over time, and the thick black line captures the average index score for all DWRAP countries over time.

Figure A.9: Asylum Policy Over Time in North, Central, and South African Countries




Figure A.10: Asylum Policy Over Time in East and West African Countries




Figure A.11: Asylum Policy Over Time in Middle Eastern and West Asian Countries




Figure A.12: Asylum Policy Over Time in Central Asian and South Asian Countries





Figure A.13: Liberalizing and Restrictive Policy Changes Over Time



*Note:* Gray bars depict liberalizing policy changes of at least one standard deviation, while black bars depict restrictive policy changes of at least one standard deviation.

Table A.14: Asylum Policy Changes of +/- 1 Standard Deviation

COUNTRY	YEAR	CHANGE IN POLICY (in SD)	DESCRIPTION
Morocco	1957	+ 2.36	Morocco passes the Décret No. 2-57-1256 du 2 safar 1377 (29 août 1957) fixant les modalités d'application de la convention relative au statut des réfugiés signée à Genève le 28 juillet 1951.
Egypt	1960	+ 1.36	Egypt passes the Presidential Decree No. 89 of 1960 on the Residency and Entry of Foreigners.
Turkey	1961	- 3.79	The coup regime that deposed the ruling government in 1960 abrogated the 1924 Constitution and the laws of the former government and called a referendum. The previous Law on Settlement was correspondingly abrogated.
Lebanon	1962	+ 1.00	Lebanon passes the Law Regulating the Entry of Foreign Nationals Into, Their Residence in and Their Departure From Lebanon
Madagascar	1962	+ 2.26	Madagascar passed the Décret No. 1962-001 du 1962 portant création d'un bureau des réfugiés et apatrides au Ministère de l'Intérieur (Direction de la Sécurité Nationale)
Algeria	1963	+ 2.36	Algeria passed the Décret no. 1963-274 du 1963 fixant les modalités d'application de la Convention de Genève du 28 juillet 1951 relative au statut des Réfugiés
Iran	1963	+ 2.20	Iran passed the Regulations Relating to Refugees.
Turkey	1963	+ 3.79	Turkey reinstated the previous Law on Settlement.
Senegal	1968	+ 2.38	Senegal passed the Loi No. 68-27 du 1968 portant statut des réfugiés.
Tunisia	1968	+ 1.12	Tunisia passed the Loi n° 1968-0007 du 8 mars 1968, relative a la condition des e 'trangers en Tunisie.
Ethiopia	1969	+ 1.00	Ethiopia passed the Proclamation regulating the Issuance of Travel Documents and Visas, and Registration of Foreigners in Ethiopia, No. 271 of 1969
Mauritius	1970	+ 1.24	Mauritius passed the Immigration Act 13 of 1970.
Syria	1970	+1.31	Syria passed the Legislative Decree No. 29 of 15 January 1970 - The Entry and Exit of Aliens to and from the Syrian Arab Republic and Their Residence Therein.
Liberia	1973	+ 1.38	Liberia passed the Aliens and Nationality Law.
Benin	1975	+ 1.40	Benin passed the Ordonnance No. 75-41 du 1975 portant statut des réfugiés.
Gabon	1976	+ 1.37	Gabon passed the Ordonnance No. 64/1976 du 1976, créant une Délégation générale aux réfugiés.
Somalia	1979	+ 2.36	Somalia passed the Somalia Presidential Law No. 47 of 15 July 1979.
Lesotho	1983	+ 1.05	Lesotho passed the The Refugee Act of 1983.
Zimbabwe	1983	+ 2.04	Zimbabwe passed the Chapter 4:03 Refugees Act.
Somalia	1984	- 1.46	Somalia passed the Presidential Decree No. 25 of 1984 on Determination of Refugee Status.
Togo	1987	+ 1.06	Togo passed the Loi no. 1987-12 relative à la police des étrangers.
Guinea	1987	+ 1.29	Guinea passed the Ordonnance no 054/PRG/SG/87 du 22 juillet 1987 portant conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers en République de Guinée.
Comoros	1988	+ 1.16	Comoros passed the Loi n° 88-025 du 29 décembre 1988 portant modification de la loi n° 82-026 relative aux conditions d'entrée et de séjour des étrangers aux Comores.
Burkina Faso	1988	+ 1.81	Burkina Faso passed the Zatu n° AN V-0028/FP/PRES du 3 août 1988, portant statut des réfugiés.
Nigeria	1989	+ 2.19	Nigeria passed the National Commission for Refugees (Establishment, Etc.) Act.
Mozambique	1989	+ 1.45	Mozambique passed the Act No. 21/91.
Burundi	1989	+ 2.36	Burundi passed the De'cret-Loi n°1/007 du 20 mars 1989 portant réglementation de l'accès, du séjour, de l'établissement des e 'trangers sur le territoire du Burundi et de leur éloignement.
Angola	1990	+ 1.82	Angola passed the Law No. 8/90 of May 26.
Ivory Coast	1990	+ 1.29	Ivory Coast passed the Loi No. 90-437 du 29 mai 1990 relative a l'entrée de au séjour des étrangers en Côte d'Ivoire.
Yemen	1991	+ 1.66	Yemen passed the Law on the Entry and Residence of Aliens.
Ghana	1992	+ 1.63	Ghana passed the Refugee Law of 1992.
Azerbaijan	1992	+ 2.76	Azerbaijan passed the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan On the Status of Refugees and Forced Migrants.
Liberia	1993	+ 1.01	Liberia passed the Refugee Act of 1993.

Table A.14, continued: Asylum Policy Changes of +/- 1 Standard Deviation

COUNTRY	YEAR	CHANGE IN POLICY (in SD)	DESCRIPTION
Kyrgyzstan	1993	+ 3.32	Kyrgyzstan passed the Act of 14 December 1993 on the order for residence of aliens in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Tajikistan	1994	+ 2.22	Tajikistan passed the Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Refugees of 1994.
Kazakhstan	1995	+ 2.87	Kazakhstan passed the Decree of 19 June 1995 on Legal Status of Foreigners.
Oman	1995	+ 1.08	Oman passed the Foreigners' Residence Law.
Uzbekistan	1996	+ 1.08	Uzbekistan passed the Regulations on Entry to and Exit From the Republic of Uzbekistan for Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons.
Kazakhstan	1996	- 1.72	Kazakhstan passed the Presidential Decree On Granting of political asylum as of 15 July 1996.
Turkmenistan	1997	+ 2.11	Turkmenistan passed the Law of Turkmenistan on Refugees of 1997.
Kazakhstan	1997	+ 1.72	Kazakhstan passed the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 13 December 1997 No. 204-I on Population Migration.
Tanzania	1998	+ 1.99	Tanzania passed The Refugees Act of 1998.
Georgia	1998	+ 2.15	Georgia passed the Law of Georgia on Refugees.
Mali	1998	+ 1.61	Mali passed the Loi No. 1998-40 du 1998 portant sur le statut des réfugiés.
Armenia	1999	+ 7.07	Armenia passed The Law of the Republic of Armenia on Refugees.
Namibia	1999	+ 1.57	Namibia passed the Namibia Refugees (Recognition and Control) Act of 1999.
Togo	2000	+ 1.85	Togo passed the Loi No. 2000-019 Portant Statut des Refugies au Togo.
Cyprus	2000	+ 1.91	Cyprus passed The Refugee Law of 2000: A Law to provide for the recognition of refugees and for the better Implementation of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2002	+ 1.22	The DRC passed the Law no. 021/2002 "Portant statut des re 'fugie's en Re 'publique De 'mocratique du Congo."
Ethiopia	2004	+ 1.45	Ethiopia passed the Refugee Proclamation No. 409/2004.
Kazakhstan	2004	- 1.72	Kazakhstan amended the Presidential Decree On Granting of political asylum as of 15 July 1996.
Cameroon	2005	+ 2.92	Cameroon passed the Loi n°2005/006 du 27 juillet 2005 Portant statut des re 'fugie's au Cameroun.
Kenya	2006	+ 1.60	Kenya passed The Refugee Act of 2006.
Uganda	2006	+ 3.86	Uganda passed The Refugees Act of 2006.
Kenya	2007	- 1.64	Kenya amended the Kenya Immigration Act.
Sierra Leone	2007	+ 2.85	Sierra Leone passed The Refugees Protection Act of 2007.
Central African Republic	2007	+ 2.87	The CAR passed the Decret No. 07.019 du 28 Decembre 2007 portant Statut des Refugies en Republique Centrafricaine.
Burkina Faso	2008	+ 1.62	Burkina Faso passed the La loi n° 042-2008/AN du 23 octobre 2008 portant statut des re 'fugie's au Burkina Faso.
The Gambia	2008	+ 1.32	The Gambia passed the Refugee Act of 2008,
Kenya	2008	+ 1.64	Kenya amended The Refugee Act of 2006.
Guinea-Bissau	2008	+ 2.21	Guinea-Bissau passed the Lei No. 6/2008 de 2008, Aprovado o Estatuto do Refugiado.
Kazakhstan	2009	+ 1.37	Kazakhstan passed The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan On Refugees.
Armenia	2009	- 4.56	Armenia passed The Law of the Republic of Armenia on Refugees and Asylum.
South Sudan	2012	+ 2.47	South Sudan passed the Act No. 20 of 2012.
Azerbaijan	2013	- 2.45	Azerbaijan passed the Migration Code of the Azerbaijan Republic.
Turkey	2013	- 1.97	Turkey passed the Law on Foreigners and International Protection.
Sudan	2014	+ 2.09	Sudan passed The Asylum Regulation Act of 2014.
Nigeria	2015	- 1.58	Nigeria passed the Immigration Act of 2015.
Kenya	2017	+ 1.01	Kenya passed The Refugees Bill of 2016.
Zambia	2017	+ 4.15	Zambia passed The Refugees Act of 2017.
Djibouti	2017	+ 2.37	Djibouti passed the De 'cret N° 2017-410/PR/MI fixant les modalite's d'exercice des droits fondamentaux des re 'fugie's et demandeurs d'asile en Re 'publique de Djibouti.

## Table A.15: Variable Definitions and Sources

Descriptions and sources for all variables used in the analysis can be found here.

Table A.15: Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable	Definition	Source
<b>Dependent Variables</b>		
+/- 1 SD Policy Change	One standard deviation policy change	DWRAP
+ 1 SD Policy Liberalization	One standard deviation policy liberalization	DWRAP
- 1 SD Policy Restriction	One standard deviation policy restriction	DWRAP
<b>Independent Variables</b>		
Intense, Proximate Civil War	Civil conflict causing 1000+ battle deaths in a contiguous neighbor in the prior year	UCDP/PRIOR
Elite Kin Discrimination	National political elites (senior partner or above) have politically excluded kin in a country within 1500 km. of inter-capital distance	EPR and CShapes
Aid/GDP	Inverse hyperbolic sine of ( $\frac{\text{Bilateral DAC aid inflows}}{\text{PPP-adjusted GDP/capita}}$ )	WDI and PWT
Democracy	Electoral democracy index	V-DEM
<b>Control Variables</b>		
GDP/Capita	Inverse hyperbolic sine of PPP-adjusted GDP/capita	PWT
Negative GDP Shock	Negative change in PPP-adjusted GDP/capita in top 15 percentiles	PWT
Population	Inverse hyperbolic sine of population	PWT
Civil War in Policymaker	Occurrence of civil war (25+ battle deaths)	UCDP/PRIOR
Transnational Terrorism	Inverse hyperbolic sine of transnational terrorist attacks	ITERATE
Trade-to-GDP Ratio	Inverse hyperbolic sine of ( $\frac{\text{Trade revenue}}{\text{PPP-adjusted GDP}}$ )	WDI
Regional Liberalization	Country within 1500 km. of inter-capital distance liberalized in prior 3 years	CShapes and DWRAP
Common Legal Origins Liberalization	Country with common legal origins liberalized in prior 3 years	CEPII and DWRAP
Top Aid Recipient Liberalization	Country in 90 <sup>th</sup> percentile of DAC aid inflows liberalized in prior 3 years	WDI and DWRAP

## Table A.16: Descriptive Statistics

Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis can be found here.

Table A.16: Descriptive Statistics

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
<b>Dependent Variables:</b>					
+/- 1 SD Change	4548	.0156113	.1239795	0	1
+1 SD Liberalization	4548	.0136324	.1159719	0	1
-1 SD Restriction	4548	.0019789	.0444456	0	1
+/- 0.5 SD Change	4548	.0252858	.1570092	0	1
+0.5 SD Liberalization	4548	.0206684	.1422874	0	1
-0.5 SD Restriction	4548	.0046174	.067802	0	1
+/- 0.25 SD Change	4548	.0296834	.169731	0	1
+0.25 SD Liberalization	4548	.0239666	.1529618	0	1
-0.25 SD Restriction	4548	.0057168	.0754014	0	1
<b>Independent Variables:</b>					
Intense, Proximate Civil War	4453	.2423086	.4285281	0	1
Elite Kin Discrimination	4336	.4681734	.2490445	0	1
Aid/GDP	3318	.0648684	.0747464	-.0001421	.2715165
Democracy	4590	.2897037	.2047209	.0090806	.8628941
<b>Control Variables:</b>					
GDP/Capita	3764	8.076455	1.399621	5.124238	12.41238
Negative GDP Shock	3676	.1507073	.357812	0	1
Population	4270	16.25467	1.683151	11.63094	21.6972
Civil War in Policymaker	4607	.2059909	.4044677	0	1
Transnational Terrorism	3760	.3658112	.7771802	0	4.644484
Trade-to-GDP Ratio	3470	4.764886	.5860617	.0209977	6.621084
Regional Liberalization	4287	.2358293	.4245655	0	1
Legal Origins Liberalization	4454	.5904805	.4918004	0	1
Top Aid Liberalization	4369	.3254749	.4686057	0	1

## Figure A.17: Correlation of Variables

To allay concerns about collinearity, we plot the correlation matrix of our policy score and control variables. None of the control variables are too highly correlated, lending confidence in our specification.




Figure A.17: Correlogram of Key Variables in Policy Determinants Models

## Table A.18 Qualitative Interviews


We conducted a series of qualitative interviews with asylum-seekers, refugees, representatives from humanitarian organizations, and UN and government officials in Uganda between June 8 and July 19, 2017. All interviews were conducted with informed consent, and our field study was approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board (Protocol Number: 827614). We also received explicit permission for interviews from the Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda and the Uganda National Police Force. Interview responses quoted in the paper are anonymized to ensure participant privacy and safety. Demographic statistics on study participants are shown in Table A.19. A total of 100 interviewees were forced migrants residing in Uganda. These participants came from diverse national backgrounds, including: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, and Ethiopia; and ethnic backgrounds, including: Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda, Hutus and Tutsis, and Dinka, Nuer, and Equatorians. We also talked to 7 Ugandans who work at national NGOs, 5 non-Ugandans who work for international NGOs, 5 employees of the Government of Uganda, 7 representatives from United Nations organizations, and 2 other South Sudanese opposition politicians. Conversations took the form of semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, and fieldwork took place in Kampala, Mbarara, and the Nakivale Refugee Settlement. Figure A.20 displays our fieldsites and the forced migration environment in Uganda.

Table A.18: Demographic Statistics on Study Participants

	Activists and Officials					Forced Migrants						Totals
	Ugandans	Intl	Govt	UN	Non-Refugee SS	DRC	South Sudan	Burundi	Rwanda	Somalia	Ethiopia	
Men	2	2	5	4	2	36	13	7	0	3	1	75
Women	5	3	0	3	0	16	5	6	5	8	0	51
Total	7	5	5	7	2	52	18	13	5	11	1	126

Note: Ugandans refers to local Ugandan NGO advocates; Intl refers to international NGO advocates; Govt refers to Ugandan government officials; UN refers to United Nations officials; DRC refers to refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Non-Refugee SS refers to non-refugee South Sudanese opposition politicians.


Figure A.19: Uganda's Protection Environment and Qualitative Fieldsites



*Note:* Black stars on the map mark fieldsites in Kampala, Mbarara, and Nakivale. Red and blue marks note UNHCR-administered settlements, field units, and field offices. The map was produced by the UNHCR, and reflects Uganda's protection environment as of May 2017, one month before our fieldwork began. The map can be found at <https://www.ugandanetworks.org/Publisher/File.aspx?ID=191002>.

## Figure A.20: Forced Migration and Policy in Uganda

Figure A.20: Forced Migration and Asylum Policy in Uganda



*Note:* The solid black line represents forced migrant arrivals—prima facie refugee arrivals (Fearon and Shaver, 2020) plus asylum applications—to Uganda over time. Data on asylum applications are only available from 2000, so the black line only captures prima facie refugee arrivals between 1960 and 1999.

The dashed line captures the five-year lagged moving average of Uganda's policy index score.

## Table A.21: Correlates of Delegation to UN Agencies

An intuition underlying our theory is that policy reforms occur when factors like neighborhood civil war shift expectations of FDP inflows. Under these conditions, heightened salience of forced displacement makes countries more likely to prefer controlling their migration policies, rather than delegating to UN agencies like UNHCR and UNRWA. In contrast, when migration is less salient, developing countries may find it expedient to delegate refugee status determination (RSD) and other policies to UN partners (Norman, 2020; Abdelaaty, 2021). We collect data from UNHCR statistical yearbooks to code which countries allow UN partners to have a role in RSD (i.e. delegation) for each year from 2000 to 2017. Our focal variables—ethnic kin discrimination and aid dependence—do not significantly predict delegation.

Table A.21: Correlates of Delegation

VARIABLES	(1) UN Role in RSD	(2) UN Role in RSD
Elite Kin Discrimination	0.050 (0.114)	0.348 (0.636)
DAC Aid/GDP	-0.119 (0.819)	0.778 (4.532)
Democracy	-0.659*** (0.246)	-4.340** (1.886)
GDP/Capita	0.115** (0.047)	0.742** (0.322)
Negative GDP Shock	0.117 (0.101)	0.630 (0.544)
Population	0.125*** (0.041)	0.722*** (0.274)
Civil War in Policymaker	-0.001 (0.079)	-0.099 (0.477)
Transnational Terrorism	0.089** (0.034)	0.527** (0.227)
Trade-to-GDP Ratio	0.014 (0.116)	-0.079 (0.587)
Constant	-2.445** (1.025)	-16.789*** (6.345)
Observations	294	294

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses; we subset the sample to countries experiencing intense episodes of neighborhood civil war, our hypothesized impetus for policy change; the dependent variable is an indicator for countries that wholly or partially delegate RSD responsibilities to UN agencies; column 1 is estimated using OLS, and column 2 is estimated using logistic regression.

## Contingency Tables of Civil War and Policy Change

In all three tables, neighboring civil war refers to the occurrence of an intrastate armed conflict in a country's contiguous neighbor in the prior year. Intense, neighboring civil war refers to the occurrence of an intrastate armed conflict with at least 1000 battle deaths in a country's contiguous neighbor in the prior year.

Table A.22: Neighborhood Civil War and +/- 1.5 SD Changes

	Total Cases	Neighboring Civil War (Prior Year)	Intense Neighboring Civil War (Prior Year)
+/- 1.5 SD Change	47	30 (63.8%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 2.443	18 (38.2%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 5.120**
+1.5 SD Liberalization	39	24 (61.5%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 1.288	16 (41.0%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 6.045**
-1.5 SD Restriction	8	6 (75.0%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 1.626	2 (25.0%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0.003

Table A.23: Neighborhood Civil War and +/- 1 SD Changes


	Total Cases	Neighboring Civil War (Prior Year)	Intense Neighboring Civil War (Prior Year)
+/- 1 SD Change	71	45 (63.3%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 3.581*	28 (39.4%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 9.145***
+1 SD Liberalization	62	38 (62.3%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 2.059	25 (40.3%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 8.922***
-1 SD Restriction	9	7 (77.8%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 2.355	3 (33.3%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 0.411

Table A.24: Neighborhood Civil War and +/- 0.5 SD Changes

	Total Cases	Neighboring Civil War (Prior Year)	Intense Neighboring Civil War (Prior Year)
+/- 0.5 SD Change	115	73 (63.5%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 5.964**	45 (39.1%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 14.369***
+0.5 SD Liberalization	94	57 (60.6%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 2.059	36 (38.3%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 10.421***
-0.5 SD Restriction	21	16 (76.2%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 4.846**	9 (42.9%) Chi <sup>2</sup> = 4.0084**


## Figure A.25: Alternative Measures of Civil War

Figure A.25: Intense Episodes of Civil War Precipitate Policy Changes



*Note:* Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for models of +/- 1 standard deviation policy changes. Estimates in the third model (“Intense Recent Conflict”) correspond to column 1 in Table 3. Other models repeat this specification with the respective alternative definition of civil war. The dashed line denotes 0. Data on civil wars are from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Pettersson, Högladh and Öberg, 2019). Cumulative battle death totals refer to the sum of battle deaths over the duration of a conflict. Battle deaths in prior year refer to the annual number of battle deaths in year  $t - 1$ .

Figure A.26: Testing the Proportional Hazards Assumption




*Note:* Following the advice of Grambsch and Therneau (1994), we test the proportional hazards assumption (PHA) for the baseline conditional frailty specification in column 1 of Table 4. The global test is statistically insignificant, suggesting the PHA is satisfied. Plots depict each covariate's scaled Schoenfeld residuals over time. If the PHA is satisfied, we expect to see residuals clustered around 0 with a relatively flat, smooth fitted average. Black points are scaled Schoenfeld residuals. The blue line captures the smoothed, local average of residuals. Red lines are confidence bands marking +/- 2 standard errors from the mean.

## Figure A.27: Robustness to Additional Controls

Taking our core specification from column 2 of Table 4, the finding on elite kin discrimination holds when we control for: (1) an indicator for countries with a policy score in the top quartile; (2) a country's colonial history; (3) a country's unemployment rate; (4) a country's natural resource rents-to-GDP ratio; (5) Chinese development assistance to a country; (6) a country's ruling party's political orientation; (7) an indicator for strategic displacement in civil war in a country's neighborhood; (8) indicators for the Cold War and Post 9/11 eras; and (9) the number of displacement laws and policies a country has in effect. To verify that the results are not affected by our coding scheme, which assigns countries without any domestic laws or policies on migration a score of 0, we: (10) exclude country-years with no laws or policies enacted. To verify that the results are not driven by newly independent countries we: (11) exclude observations from the pre-1990 (decolonization) period; and (12) exclude observations within the first 10 years of each country's independence.

Figure A.27: The Effect of Elite Kin Discrimination Remains With Additional Controls




*Note:* Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for elite kin discrimination in models with additional controls. The dashed line marks 0. Unemployment is significant ( $p = 0.071$ ).

## Figure A.28: Changing Distance Thresholds

Our kin measure takes a value of 1 when political elites' co-ethnics are discriminated in countries within 1500 kilometers of inter-capital distance, and 0 otherwise. However, results are robust to the choice of distance threshold within which neighborhood kin discrimination is defined.

Figure A.28: The Effect of Elite Kin Discrimination Over Distance Thresholds




Note: Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for elite kin discrimination. Labels denote the distance threshold used in each model. The dashed line marks 0.

## Figure A.29: Dropping Large Liberalizing Countries

Taking our core specification from column 2 of Table 4, the finding on elite kin discrimination holds when we iteratively drop countries that have made large liberalizing asylum policy reforms, with large reformers defined as countries making changes in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of the annual difference in policy scores.

Figure A.31: The Effect of Elite Kin Discrimination Remains After Dropping Liberalizing Countries



Note: Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for elite kin discrimination. Labels denote the dropped country in each model. The dashed line marks 0.

## Table A.30: Competing Risks

Our primary modeling strategy is the conditional frailty approach. This is the preferred method to estimate repeated-failure duration models in the presence of event dependence and unit heterogeneity (Box-Steffensmeier and De Boef, 2006; Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef and Joyce, 2007). These benefits of the conditional frailty approach notwithstanding, conditional frailty models do not take competing risks into account. Competing risks occur when an event of interest (e.g. policy liberalization) can occur in various ways (e.g. one standard deviation, one-half standard deviation, or one-quarter standard deviation liberalizations). When any cause of failure can occur, but the occurrence of one cause alters the probability or precludes the observation of the other cause(s), competing risks models are required. In the presence of competing risks, standard Cox models are upwardly biased because they simply treat competing events as censored. By contrast, competing risks models estimate cause-specific hazards. The drawback of competing risks estimators is that they do not take repeated failures into account. In other words, selecting between conditional frailty and competing risks entails a trade-off: flexible handling of unit heterogeneity and event dependence but not competing risks, or flexible handling of competing risks but not unit heterogeneity or event dependence. We employ conditional frailty models in our main specification because of the large number of repeated failures in our models, and because event dependence and unit heterogeneity are both present. Nevertheless, in Table A.30 we show that our core results are robust to competing risks estimation. Competing risks models follow the approach outlined by Fine and Gray (1999), who describe a method of estimating the cumulative incidence function based on the subdistribution hazard.

Table A.30: Competing Risks Estimates

VARIABLES	Main Index		Equally-Weighted Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	+1 SD Liberalization	+1 SD Liberalization	+1 SD Liberalization	+1 SD Liberalization
Elite Kin Discrimination	1.170** (0.499)	1.084** (0.493)	1.619*** (0.591)	1.307*** (0.473)
Democracy	-0.635* (0.344)	-0.918* (0.475)	-0.546 (0.366)	-0.869** (0.374)
Civil Conflict in Neighbor (1000+ Battle Deaths in Prior Year)	1.108* (0.604)	1.471** (0.657)	1.253** (0.554)	1.361** (0.558)
DAC Aid/GDP	-5.964 (4.388)	-4.358 (5.536)	-8.624 (5.574)	-4.935 (5.414)
GDP/Capita	-1.112*** (0.244)	-0.848*** (0.294)	-1.157*** (0.233)	-0.770*** (0.225)
Negative GDP Shock	-1.512* (0.804)	-1.730** (0.837)	-16.012*** (0.578)	-15.672*** (0.572)
Population	-1.261*** (0.236)	-1.340*** (0.234)	-1.316*** (0.274)	-1.467*** (0.241)
Civil Conflict in Policymaker	-0.617 (0.567)	-1.079 (0.768)	-1.137 (0.716)	-1.106 (0.709)
Transnational Terrorism	-0.140 (0.414)	-0.159 (0.378)	0.076 (0.313)	-0.081 (0.354)
Trade-to-GDP Ratio	-1.305*** (0.313)	-1.793*** (0.315)	-1.091*** (0.398)	-1.598*** (0.346)
Number of 1 SD Liberalizations	3.613*** (0.357)	5.144*** (0.457)	3.459*** (0.359)	4.487*** (0.428)
Log-Likelihood	-147.794	-136.323	-133.860	-123.131
AIC	317.589	294.645	289.720	268.261
Observations	2624	2624	2624	2624

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; competing risks are defined as three-quarter, one-half and one-quarter standard deviation liberalizing changes in columns 1 and 3; competing risks are defined as any restrictive change of at least one-quarter standard deviation in columns 2 and 4.

## Table A.31: Non-Survival Modeling

Our main result, the positive effect of elite kin discrimination on asylum policy liberality, is robust to non-survival approaches. In panel A of Table A.31, we estimate two-stage Heckman and conditional mixed process (CMP) models. In columns 1 and 2 of panel A, the first-stage outcome is an indicator for whether a country made any policy change in a given year  $t$ , and the second-stage outcome is the magnitude of the difference in a country's policy score from year  $t-1$  to year  $t$ , conditional on any policy change. In columns 3 and 4 of panel A, the first-stage outcome is an indicator for whether one of a country's contiguous neighbors experienced an intense civil war in a given year  $t-1$ , and the second-stage outcome is the level of a country's policy score in year  $t$ , conditional on any intense, proximate civil war. In panel B of Table A.31, we estimate an OLS model with country-level random effects. The outcome variable is the magnitude of the difference in a country's policy score from year  $t-1$  to year  $t$ . We interact our hypothesized determinants with an indicator for intense, proximate civil war, the impetus for policy change. The effect of elite kin discrimination is nearly significant ( $p = 0.129$ ) in column 4 of panel A.

Table A.31: Non-Survival Models

Panel A: 2 Stage Heckman and Conditional Mixed Process Models				
VARIABLES	2 <sup>nd</sup> Stage: Difference in Policy Score; 1 <sup>st</sup> Stage: Policy Change		2 <sup>nd</sup> Stage: Policy Score; 1 <sup>st</sup> Stage: Intense, Proximate Civil War	
	(1) Heckman	(2) CMP	(3) Heckman	(4) CMP
Elite Kin Discrimination	0.070** (0.035)	0.059* (0.031)	0.025* (0.015)	0.041 (0.027)
2 <sup>nd</sup> Stage Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
2 <sup>nd</sup> Stage Constant	0.204* (0.115)	0.175*** (0.043)	-1.487*** (0.337)	-0.079 (0.401)
1 <sup>st</sup> Stage: Intense, Proximate Civil War	0.220** (0.097)	0.268*** (0.098)	—	—
1 <sup>st</sup> Stage Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
1 <sup>st</sup> Stage Constant	-1.962* (1.182)	-2.300* (1.204)	-3.965*** (1.121)	-2.580** (1.175)
Observations	2624	2645	3413	3667


Panel B: Random Effects OLS Model	
DV: Difference in Policy Score	
VARIABLES	(1) OLS
Elite Kin Discrimination x Intense, Proximate Civil War	0.009* (0.005)
Elite Kin Discrimination	-0.002 (0.002))
Intense, Proximate Civil War	.0001 (0.003))
Additional Controls	Y
Country Random Effects	Y
Constant	0.040*** (0.014)
Observations	2623

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses; covariates follow column 2 of Table 4.

## Figure A.32: Disaggregating Policy Liberalization

Taking our core specification from column 2 of Table 4 from the main text, the finding on elite kin discrimination holds for four of the five policy fields that comprise our full policy index: access ( $p = 0.075$ ), services ( $p = 0.036$ ), livelihoods ( $p < 0.0001$ ), and participation ( $p = 0.006$ ).

Figure A.32: The Effect of Elite Kin Discrimination Remains When We Disaggregate Policy Fields




*Note:* Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for elite kin discrimination across different policy fields. The sixth plot (“Full Index”) gives the estimate from column 2 of Table 4 for reference. The dashed line marks 0.

## Figure A.33: Aid Dependence Over Levels of Democracy

Taking the specification from column 6 of Table 4, we observe no variation in the effect of aid dependence over levels of democracy, defying our expectation in hypothesis 3B.

Figure A.33: The Effect of Aid Dependence Does Not Vary Over Levels of Democracy




*Note:* Standardized AMEs are based on column 6 of Table 5. Estimates are calculated using Gandrud’s `simPH` package based on 1000 simulations. 95% confidence intervals are composed of visually-weighted point estimates from each simulation. The dashed line marks 0.

## Figure A.34: Aid Dependence and Strategic Relevance

Taking our core specification from column 2 of Table 5, the null or negative effect of aid dependence holds when we control for: (1) US troops per capita in a country; and subset to (2) African countries only; (3) excluding country-years in the bottom quartile of aid dependence; (4) excluding Afghanistan; (5) excluding Egypt; (6) excluding Iraq; (7) excluding Israel; (8) excluding Jordan; (9) excluding Libya; and (10) excluding Pakistan.

Figure A.34: The Effect of Aid Dependence With Additional Controls



*Note:* Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for DAC aid/GDP in models with additional controls. The dashed line marks 0.

## Table A.35: Correlates of Restriction

Table A.35: Determinants of Restrictive Reforms

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	-1 SD Restriction	-1 SD Restriction	-1.5 SD Restriction	-0.75 SD Restriction	-0.5 SD Restriction	-0.25 SD Restriction
GDP/Capita	1.091*** (0.303)	1.115*** (0.298)	1.155*** (0.270)	0.429 (0.293)	0.225 (0.216)	0.167 (0.207)
Negative GDP Shock	-0.230 (0.621)	-0.200 (0.572)	-0.055 (0.571)	0.312 (0.432)	0.562 (0.405)	0.461 (0.292)
Population	0.786*** (0.191)	0.812*** (0.165)	0.851*** (0.149)	0.527*** (0.148)	0.309** (0.122)	0.224** (0.097)
Country Frailties	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Frailties	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Log-Likelihood	-17.115	-12.773	-9.083	-19.253	-43.577	-44.942
AIC	40.230	41.743	47.584	60.167	106.505	134.081
Observations	3543	3543	3543	3543	3543	3543

*Note:* \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; the models are stratified by the number of the respective magnitude standard deviation restrictive policy changes a country has made; Efron's method is used for ties; GDP/capita is standardized.

## Table A.36: Restriction With Equally-Weighted Index

Table A.36: Determinants of Restrictive Reforms With Equally-Weighted Index


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	-1 SD Restriction	-1 SD Restriction	-1.5 SD Restriction	-0.75 SD Restriction	-0.5 SD Restriction	-0.25 SD Restriction
GDP/Capita	0.649* (0.375)	0.648* (0.337)	1.155*** (0.270)	0.451 (0.288)	0.211 (0.223)	0.161 (0.216)
Negative GDP Shock	0.176 (0.465)	0.071 (0.387)	-0.055 (0.571)	0.291 (0.319)	0.594 (0.439)	0.895** (0.416)
Population	0.596*** (0.198)	0.613*** (0.168)	0.851*** (0.149)	0.457*** (0.144)	0.322*** (0.117)	0.158 (0.117)
Country Frailties	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year Frailties	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Log-Likelihood	-23.544	-16.723	-9.083	-32.186	-36.135	-52.166
AIC	53.087	56.735	47.584	78.429	100.738	127.214
Observations	3543	3543	3543	3543	3543	3543

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; robust standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses; the table displays standardized coefficients rather than hazard ratios; the models are stratified by the number of the respective magnitude standard deviation restrictive policy changes a country has made; Efron's method is used for ties; GDP/capita is standardized.

## Figure A.37: Iteratively Dropping Restrictive Countries

Taking our core specification from column 3 of Table A.35, the finding on GDP per capita holds when we iteratively drop countries that have made one standard deviation policy restrictions.

Figure A.37: The Effect of GDP/Capita Remains After Dropping Restrictive Countries



Note: Plots denote coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for GDP per capita. Labels denote the dropped country in each model. The dashed line marks 0.

## Table A.38: Validating the Policy Index

To validate our policy index we assess whether liberal policies correlate with policy flows (Goodman, 2015; Peters, 2015; Bearce and Hart, 2017). We argue that, even in the context of the developing world where distance considerations (i.e. cost of travel) loom large, policies affording refugees more expansive rights—such as the right to move freely within countries of asylum, to own property, to seek employment, and to access public services—pull asylum seekers to specific target countries. This is because *de jure* policies affect the prospects for migrant assimilation, security, and prosperity. Affording refugees and asylum-seekers rights such as employment and free movement (Betts et al., 2017), access to aid (Taylor et al., 2016), citizenship (Gathmann and Keller, 2018) and opportunities for political participation (Ferwerda, Finseraas and Bergh, 2020), bolster integration into host societies and magnify the positive effects of migrant inflows on fiscal performance in host countries (d’Albis, Boubtane and Coulibaly, 2018). Indeed, once exposed to relatively liberal policy environments, migrants prefer to remain in countries where they can access more and better services (Balcilar and Nugent, 2019), and mobilize to enhance opportunities for service access (Clarke, 2018). Liberal policy provisions facilitating access to the rights outlined above, then, should attract asylum-seekers, who prefer integration in the face of protracted displacement *ceteris paribus*. However, the “pull” of liberal policy provisions is conditional on policy knowledge and other facilitators of integration, such as co-ethnic networks (Martén, Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2019), which ease arrival and help new migrants realize *de jure* rights.

To test whether asylum and refugee policies matter in FDPs’ decisionmaking, we estimate Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) gravity models (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The dependent variable is the directed dyadic *arrival rate*, calculated as  $\frac{\text{Asylum Applications} + \text{Prima Facie Arrivals}}{\text{Country of Origin Population in Hundreds of Thousands}}$ . By taking the *arrival rate*, we capture the magnitude and intensity of forced displacement between countries. Comparable rates are used in prominent gravity models of voluntary migration (Mayda, 2010; Hanson and McIntosh, 2016). Our main independent variable is the five-year lagged moving average of a destination country’s asylum policy score. To capture the conditioning effects of knowledge and integration facilitators on liberal asylum policies, we interact our policy measure with three distinct variables. First, to proxy for information diffusion we interact our policy measure with an indicator for mobile penetration in countries of origin. Second, also to capture information diffusion, we interact our policy measure with an index of information openness (Dreher, 2006) in countries of origin. This index aggregates data on press freedom, internet bandwidth, and television and internet subscriptions. Finally, to capture both information diffusion and integration ease, we interact our policy measure with an indicator for the presence of transnational ethnic kin in a dyad; kin both communicate about policy environments and assist migrants in realizing their rights, for example by creating labor market opportunities (Munshi, 2003) where migrants have the right to work.

Table A.38 reports results from three gravity models representing the core of our empirical extension. In turn, we interact our asylum policy index with measures of mobile penetration in origin countries, information openness in origin countries, and transnational ethnic kinship ties between origin and destination countries. Interaction terms indicate the effect of liberal *de jure* asylum policy environments on forced migrant flows when information about policies in prospective destination countries is more readily

accessible (mobile penetration and information openness) and when co-ethnic networks are available, which facilitate both information diffusion and integration. Moving from a dyad without transnational ethnic kin to a dyad with transnational ethnic kin is associated with a 0.00016 increase in the predicted arrival rate as asylum policy increases in liberality from its 10<sup>th</sup> to 90<sup>th</sup> percentile, *ceteris paribus*. For the average origin country's population, this means that relative to dyads without transnational ethnic kin, dyads with transnational ethnic kin see an additional 4576 FDPs in a given year as asylum policy liberality increases from the 10<sup>th</sup> to 90<sup>th</sup> percentile in the country of asylum. This is comparable in magnitude to the effect of reducing dyadic inter-capital distance by nearly 1.5 standard deviations, and is 24% larger than the effect of moving from a dyad where no common official language is shared, to one with a common language.

Table A.38: Asylum Policy Liberality, Policy Facilitators, and Forced Migrant Flows

VARIABLES	(1) PPML	(2) PPML	(3) PPML
Asylum Policy Index x Mobile Penetration in CoO	2.184* (1.166)		
Mobile Penetration in CoO	-0.644 (0.503)		
Asylum Policy Index (5 Yr. MA) x Information Openness in CoO		1.414** (0.628)	
Information Openness in CoO		-1.009** (0.438)	
Asylum Policy Index (5 Yr. MA) x Transnational Ethnic Kin			3.238** (1.358)
Transnational Ethnic Kin	0.728*** (0.173)	0.625*** (0.203)	-0.022 (0.342)
Asylum Policy Index (5 Yr. MA)	-0.253 (1.849)	-6.866** (2.841)	-1.345 (1.287)
Baseline Controls	Y	Y	Y
Economic Controls	Y	Y	Y
Political Controls	Y	Y	Y
CoO FE	Y	Y	Y
CoA FE	Y	Y	Y
Year FE	Y	Y	Y
Constant	-18.127* (10.319)	-15.284 (10.384)	-15.373 (10.700)
Observations	119,399	119,238	119,719

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1; robust standard errors clustered by dyad are in parentheses;  
CoO refers to country of origin and CoA refers to country of asylum.

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