




PEA  MUN

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Joint Crisis Committee

Suez Crisis

PEAMUN VIII
October 30, 2016

July 27, 2016

Dear delegates,

My name is Hojoon Kim, and on behalf of Phillips Exeter Academy Model United Nations, we welcome you to PEAMUN VIII.

A Joint Crisis Committee will present to you a rather different experience from other typical committees you would find at MUN conferences. But once you catch the train and join the debate, I assure you that it will be one of the most exciting and fast-paced events you have ever done in MUN.

This year's JCC of PEAMUN will be the Suez Crisis of 1956. You will be assigned specific characters of history who, like many of us, have extensive life stories and their unique political visions. It is imperative that you research not only the Suez Crisis but also your character in order to play your role and provide necessary nuances in the debate.

The crisis will begin with the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt. The Tripartite committee must come up with a way to either address the problem or retaliate. Unique to our JCC will be the fact that extensive use of the military--war--will be, in fact, entertained.

With my good friend Matthew J. Robbins, Esq. we will be your chairs for the JCC. Matthew will chair the Tripartite committee, and I will chair Nasser's government.

For any questions, feel free to email us at hkim3@exeter.edu. We are excited to have you, and I hope you are excited for this opportunity. Brush up your military tactics--it may come in handy.

All the best,

Hojoon Kim '17

Matthew J. Robbins '17

PEAMUN VIII Directors of Joint Crisis Committee

Background

Egypt's Suez Canal (pictured right)¹ was opened in 1859. It facilitated global trade by linking the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, allowing access to the Indian Ocean. From its construction, it was operated by the Suez Canal Company, a joint British-French enterprise.² The Suez Canal Company maintained its hold on the Suez Canal even after the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, which saw the overthrow of Egypt's King Farouk by army leaders and members of the Revolutionary Command Council Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohammed Naguib. However, the leaders of the Egyptian Revolution sought to create an independent republic, pioneering the staunchly anti-imperialist Arab Nationalist ideology, which placed the Suez Canal Company at a risk of losing its grasp on the Suez Canal due to public animosity towards foreign influence in the region.³ These fears soon became reality when on, July 26th, 1954,



¹ <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6e/SuezCanal-EO.JPG>.

² <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>.

³ <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517252821627.html>.

Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt and past Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal.⁴ Nasser seized control of the canal in response to Britain and France's refusal to help finance the Aswan High Dam, intended to control annual flooding of the Nile River, due to Nasser's increasingly friendly relations with communist Czechoslovakia.⁵ Nasser believed that by nationalizing the Suez Canal, "the tolls collected from ships passing through [it] would pay for the [Aswan Dam's] construction."⁶

Britain and France had much to lose in light of the Suez Canal's nationalization, as the canal provided Britain and France's "main supplies" of oil.⁷ On July 27th, a day after Nasser's public announcement, Britain's government and military leaders formed the Egypt Committee, created to combat Britain's diminishing influence in Egypt and to retake the Suez Canal.⁸ After international attempts to appease Nasser through diplomatic offers failed, the Egypt Committee and France began secret meetings with Israel, a regional ally, which viewed Egypt's prevailing Arab Nationalist ideology as a threat to its national security.⁹ In response to British Prime Minister Anthony Eden's proclamation that he wanted Nasser "destroyed," Israel proposed a plan to British and French officials that could potentially save the latter two powers from global criticism for the lack of legal grounding that a conventional invasion would have: Israel would invade Egypt in an attempt to retake the Suez Canal, and French and British forces would follow, posing as "peacekeepers to separate the two sides," and hopefully guarantee free shipping through the canal as a result.¹⁰ Prime Minister Eden agreed with the plan, and a deeply divided British cabinet eventually agreed to go

⁴ <http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/projects/suez/suez.html>.

⁵ <https://www.britannica.com/event/Suez-Crisis>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ <http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk/dept/scwmss/projects/suez/suez.html>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ <http://www.economist.com/node/7218678>.

through it with much caution, so as to prevent the flimsy cover of a British and French peacekeeping force from unveiling the true intentions of the invasion.

On October 29th, 1956, Israeli paratroopers landed on the Sinai Peninsula, commencing its invasion of Egypt and further propelled the Suez Crisis into the international spotlight.¹¹ British and French forces “feigned surprise” and called for a ceasefire, which Nasser rejected. As a result, both countries invaded Egypt in an attempt to regain control of the Canal (see right: *French troops and Egyptian prisoners of war during the Suez Crisis [1956]*)¹² and overthrow Nasser.¹³



United States President Eisenhower was critical of Britain and France for their role in the ongoing crisis, and called for an end to the invasion. As Eisenhower’s administration viewed it, the actions undertaken by Israel, France and Britain would further drive the Middle East towards forming stronger ties with the Soviet Union, as was already evidenced by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's decision to help fund the Aswan Dam after Western nations refused to do so.¹⁴ Therefore, Eisenhower threatened the Israel, France and Britain tripartite with economic sanctions if

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/french_troops_and_egyptian_prisoners_of_war_during_the_suez_crisis_1956-en-ceed26a7-63d6-4bb5-9f76-1985d39d92cb.html.

¹³ <http://www.economist.com/node/7218678>.

¹⁴ <http://www.history.com/topics/cold-war/suez-crisis>.

they refused to withdraw from Egypt.¹⁵ As a result, the tripartite was successfully pressured into accepting a UN ceasefire on November 6th. Humiliated British and French troops left by December, and Israeli troops left in March of 1957, signifying the end of the Suez Crisis, a freshly damaged relationship between the United States, Britain and France, and most notably, an end to Britain and France's long-standing foreign influence in the Middle East.¹⁶

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

The Crisis

The Crisis for this JCC will begin after the nationalization of the Suez Canal and before military action taken by Israel, France, and Britain against Egypt.

Before the Anglo-Israeli-French invasion of Suez and the Sinai Peninsula, a secret meeting was held near Paris between the leaders of France, Britain, and Israel. During that meeting, the plan and terms of the Coalition invasion of Egypt were developed.

The Tripartite will begin as that very committee—you will be in the seats of the three nations' leaders who sought to counter Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal. On the other hand, Nasser's Government will have to defend its decision in whichever shape or form. Your role, as delegates to the Joint Crisis Committee is to act for the best interest of your delegate when confronted with Egypt's taking of the Suez Canal.

The goal of this committee isn't necessarily to reflect the historical reality of the situation, but rather to reach the best possible outcome for your committee. What happens in this committee can very well deviate drastically from what actually happened during the Suez Crisis. That is perfectly fine. What is most important is that the views of the delegate you are representing are heard and reflected throughout the committee. Your actions will both be political and military. You will have to appease your constituents back home while directing an effective military or diplomatic response.

This is a crisis committee, accordingly your actions will not only be speeches and resolutions, but they will mainly be through directives, internal memos, and press releases. The dais encourages and urges all delegates to familiarize themselves with parliamentary procedure in a crisis committee. Don't forget when preparing for this committee that the Suez Crisis occurred during the Cold War. The US, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations loom large over this committee and will through

the duration of the conference pull the JCC in many different directions. Many different conflicts during the Cold War became proxies for the US and the Soviet Union. The Suez crisis is no exception. Many of you will be representing very high-profiled delegates, many of you will be representing up and coming politicians and soldiers. Young Anwar Sadat, Golda Meir, and Shimon Peres appear in this committee.

During this time, they were relatively low ranking officials, but later in their lives they would achieve greatness as the leaders of their countries. Likewise, people like Anthony Eden and Rene Coty would have their political careers ruined by the crisis, their resumes thrown into the trash bin of history. Eden's name in Britain today is synonymous with the "great lie." Some in the aftermath of Suez achieved mixed success. Nasser tightened his grip on power. However, many of the reforms he wanted to put in place proved infeasible and his idealistic vision of the Middle East did not come to fruition. You all as a committee have a chance to keep these legacies the same or change them. The balance of the whole Middle East is in your hands.

The role of the Dais

The primary concern of the dais, composed of a Directing Chair and Vice-Chair(s) will be one of timekeeping, bureaucratic work. In other words, the dais wishes that the committee were steered by the delegates themselves.

The dais will work closely with the Crisis team to present realistic consequences to a committee's directive and/or press release. We expect the committee to be experienced in Model United Nations procedure and will serve as a helping hand to make debate highly effective and exciting.

Questions to Consider

- Can your committee's best interests be obtained through military action or diplomatic action?
- If military action is pursued, what degree of severity should that action be?
- How will military action affect international scrutiny?
- How did the global climate of the Cold War fit into the Suez Crisis?
- How can we make our actions appeal to your constituents?

List of Delegates, **Tripartite**

State of Israel:

David Ben-Gurion: Prime Minister of Israel

Golda Meir: Minister of Foreign Affairs

Yisrael Bar-Yehuda: Minister of Internal Affairs

Haim-Moshe Shapira: Minister of Religion

Levi Eshkol: Minister of Finance

Moshe Dayan: Chief of the General Staff, Commander-in-chief of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)

Shimon Peres: Director-General Ministry of Defense

Asaf Simhoni, Major General, IDF

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

Anthony Eden: Prime Minister of the UK

Harold Macmillan: Chancellor of the Exchequer

Selwyn Lloyd: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Lord Alec Douglas-Home: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs
Gwilym Lloyd George: Home Secretary

Richard Austen Butler (Rab): Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons

Hugh Gaitskell: Leader of the Opposition

Gerald Templer: Chief of the Imperial General Staff

Aneurin Bevan: Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

French Republic:

Rene Coty: President of France

Guy Mollet: Prime Minister of France

Christian Pineau: Minister for Foreign Affairs

François Mitterrand: Minister of Justice

Pierre Mendès France: Minister of State

List of Delegates, **Nasser's Government**

Arab Republic of Egypt:

Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein, President

Gamal Salem, Deputy Prime Minister

Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer, Commander of the Egyptian Army

Mahmud Fawzi, Foreign Minister

Husayn Dhu al-Fiqar Sabri, Deputy Foreign Minister

Anwar Sadat, Minister of State

Zakaria Mohieddin, Minister of Interior

Major Salah Salem, Chief editor of Al-Shab

Khaled Mohieddin, Chief editor of Al Messa'

Ali Sabri, head of Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate

Gen. Salahedin Moguy

Brig. Gen. Sami Yassa Boulos, commander of 6th Infantry Brig. of 3rd Infantry Div.

Brig. Gen Jaafar al-Abd

Col. Saadedden Mutawally

Mahmud Yunis, engineer of the Suez Canal Nationalization

Foreign Ambassadors Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Amb. Henry A. Byroade, US Ambassador to Egypt

Amb. Daniel Solob, USSR Ambassador to Egypt