

# GANs vs Bayesian Networks for Network Traffic Data Generation

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### Table of contents

- Introduction
- GANs for generating Network Traffic
- Bayesian Network for generating netflows
- **Proposals**
- Conclusion



01

## Introduction



# The need for benign traffic

#### **Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)**


NIDS : devices/applications that <u>monitor traffic inside a network</u> in order to <u>detect malicious activities</u>/policy violations.[Burton2003]

Anomaly-based NIDS: Compute (statistical) models for normal network traffic and **generate alarms when there is a large deviation from the normal model**. [Wang2004]

Many false positives.



## The evaluation of anomaly-based **NIDS**



To evaluate those NIDS, we need benign traffic in particular.



### The need for artificial traffic

Real benign traffic is <u>hard to collect and to share</u> for various reasons [Ring2018] :

- Recording is tedious,
- Sharing threatens privacy
- Data becomes obsolete fast
- Labeling is not certain

A solution is to use **synthetic** benign traffic instead.


Synthetic: Not a direct recording of user activities.



# What is traffic anyway...

#### Different scales of traffic

- Flow: unidirectional sequence of packets with some common properties that pass through a network device. Netflow format
- Packet: formatted unit of data carried by a packet-switched network. Packet repartition inside a flow.
- Binary: Actual content of the packets of the flow.





# 02

GANs for generating Network Traffic



# First try

#### Generative Adversarial Networks [Goodfellow2014]

GAN have been proposed for generating benign traffic[Ring2018]

A generative model composed of two neural networks.


The two networks train concurrently.

We have tried multiple global GAN architectures and multiple layer structures.

Src IP Addr Packets 192.168.220.15 80 192.168.220.15 54 0.000921 96.76.60.29 1581 0.002552 192.168.200.9 0.000017 192.168.220.4 192.168.220.6 445 740

Random vector

We can see that the result is incoherent (port issue).





Evaluating data generation is difficult

Question that was risen in other domains.

We extract 3 criteria from these domains:

- Realism: The produced synthetic network flows should be close to the real network flows
- Diversity: The network flows should have the same variability as the real flow
- Authenticity: A generated traffic flow should not be a simple mere copy of a real traffic flow

From Network generation, we extract another criterion:


• Compliance : A generated flow should be conformed to network protocol specifications.



#### Illustration of realism

#### Real

Generated



Duration	Protocol	Src IP Addr	Src Pt	Dst IP Addr	Dst IP Pt	Packets	Bytes
0.003	TCP	192.168.220.5	443	192.168.100.8	44870	2	174
0	ICP	192.168.100.8	44870	192.168.220.5	443	1	108
0.004	ICP	192.168.220.13	8080	192.168.100.7	59628	2	174
0	TCP	192.168.100.7	59628	192.168.220.13	8080	1	108
0.003	TCP	192.168.220.13	8080	192.168.100.7	59628	2	174
0.002	TCP	192.168.100.7	59628	192.168.220.13	8080	1	108
0	TCP	192.168.220.5	443	192.168.100.8	44870	1	108
0.01	TCP	192.168.220.13	8080	192.168.100.7	59628	1	108
0	TCP	192.168.100.8	44870	192.168.220.5	443	1	108
0.006	TCP	192.168.220.5	443	192.168.100.8	44870	3	286
0.004	TCP	192.168.100.8	44870	192.168.220.5	443	2	174

Duration	on Protocol	Src IP Addr	Src Pt	Dst IP Addr	Dst IP Pt	Packets	Bytes
0.	003 TCP	192.168.220.5	443	192.168.100.8	44870	2	174
	0 TCP	192.168.100.8	44870	192.168.220.5	443	1	108
0.	004 TCP	192.168.220.13	8080	192.168.100.7	59628	2	174
	0 TCP	192.168.100.7	59628	192.168.220.13	8080	1	108
0.	003 TCP	192.168.237.65	80	192.168.91.74	62933	2	174
0.	002 TCP	192.168.91.74	62933	192.168.237.65	80	1	108
	0 TCP	192.168.220.5	443	192.168.100.8	44870	1	108
	0.01 TCP	192.168.220.13	8080	192.168.100.7	59628	1	108
	0 TCP	192.168.100.8	44870	192.168.220.5	443	1	108
0.	006 TCP	192.168.220.5	443	192.168.100.8	44870	3	286
0.	004 TCP	192.168.100.8	44870	192.168.220.5	443	2	174





Duration	Protocol	Src IP Addr	Src Pt	Dst IP Addr	Dst IP Pt	Packets	Bytes
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0.004	ICP	192.168.220.13	8080	192.168.100.7	59628	2	174
0	TCP	192.168.100.7	59628	192.168.220.13	8080	1	108
0.003	TCP	192.168.220.13	8080	192.168.100.7	59628	2	174
0.002	TCP	192 168 100 7	59628	192 168 220 13	8080	1	108
0	TCP	192.168.220.5	443	192.168.100.8	44870	1	108
0.01	ICP	192.168.220.13	8080	192.168.100.7	59628	1	108
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#### Illustration of authenticity

#### Real Generated dstport proto pkt byt srcport dstport proto pkt byt srcport 576280 44140 53 2.0 96659 2.0 udp 116.0 35046 53 udp 86.0 44168 51073 310049 53910 80 tcp 7.0 1359.0 80 tcp 1.0 0.0 100181 42847 53 2.0 178.0 1040927 57783 53 udp 2.0 98.0 udp 68375 57820 80 3.0 233.0 881965 57839 53 udp 2.0 86.0 tcp 12856 1735.0 37396 80 tcp 18.0 201389 42847 53 udp 2.0 178.0 20671 53 116.0 44140 udp 2.0 943518 36153 80 6.0 604.0 tcp 52870 48028 443 tcp 3.0 0.0 303795 47369 18325 3.0 624.0 tcp 80140 53910 80 tcp 7.0 1359.0 1019824 35046 53 udp 2.0 86.0 103118 44474 53 udp 2.0 78.0 751289 55992 80 tcp 10.0 1318.0 43116 57783 53 qbu 2.0 98.0 358804 40909 53 udp 2.0 108.0 10140 50275 53 udp 2.0 116.0 816450 44474 53 2.0 78.0 abu 90343 55992 1318.0 80 tcp 10.0 728132 57820 80 3.0 233.0 tcp 60605 44494 7.0 80 tcp 0.0 112527 34221 443 157.0 27512.0 tcp 32768 57839 53 udp 2.0 86.0 641611 50275 53 udp 2.0 116.0 13514 40909 53 udp 2.0 108.0 320719 56276 443 tcp 6.0 654.0 8430 60654 80 tcp 3.0 0.0 171456 25847 15401



#### Illustration of compliance

ets	Bytes
2	174
1	108
2	174
1	108
2	174
1	108
1	32245
1	108
1	108
3	286
2	174
	1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 2



# 03

# Bayesian Network for generating netflows




# Generating Netflow traffic with Bayesian Networks (BNs)

Netflow traffic is similar to tabular data

Graphical models representing probabilistic relationships among variables[Heckermn1998]


Consists of nodes and directed edges in a directed acyclic graph

Each node has a conditional probability table (CPT)






# Comparing BNs and GANS





## Where are we

#### We can generate independent flow descriptor





04

# Proposals




# Generating sequences of Flow

#### Generate flow sequentially and compare the results with the real sequence

For the moment, we generate flow independently

This is quite unrealistic in a network context (DNS request before HTTP)



We would like to generate flow sequentially

We would have the challenge to see if temporal dependency is well-preserved



# Generating the sequence of headers


#### Exhibit patterns in a time series and generate those conditionally

For the moment, we have flow descriptor

If we want to go beyond, we need the ordering of the packet of the flow

We need to extract patterns of how packets are ordered inside a flow

We also need to study the repartition of some properties among packets





# Generating the payload of packet

#### Generate payload of packets.

Generate hex of the packet constituting the flow

Maybe using a GPT model, to generate a sequence of hex conditioned on the size

Not entire packets, because most of it is encrypted

Less interesting for you, I think



Flow N



05

## Conclusion



### To conclude

I'm working on generating synthetic benign traffic

I'm using machine learning for this task

I'm currently able to generate independent Netflows

There is room for improvement:

Including temporal dependencies in the generation

Generating packets inside a flow

Generating their ordering or their content



## References

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# Merci!

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