

CURRICULUM VITAE

PAUL JONES

CONTACT INFORMATION

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AOI

Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphilosophy, History of Analytic Philosophy.

EDUCATION

B.A. in Philosophy with Highest Honors.

Rutgers University, New Brunswick, January 2012 — May 2014.

Thesis “What are the Problems for Informatism?”

Supervisor Peter Klein

B.A. in Computer Science.

Rutgers University, New Brunswick, January 2012 — May 2014.

A.A. in Liberal Arts with High Honors.

Mercer County Community College, Mercerville, July 2010 — December 2012.

COURSEWORK

Graduate

Advanced Topics in Metaphysics	Barry Loewer	Spring 2014
Topics in the Philosophy of Psychology	Frances Egan	Spring 2014
Advanced Topics in Epistemology	Barry Loewer	Fall 2013

Undergraduate

Epistemology	Peter Klein	Fall 2013
Theory of Knowledge	Kurt Sylvan	Summer 2013
Aristotle	Robert Bolton	Spring 2013
Leibniz	Martha Bolton	Spring 2013
Topics in Social and Political Philosophy	Mark Colby	Fall 2012
Introduction to Logic	David Rose	Fall 2012
Introduction to Ethics	Holly Smith	Spring 2012
Knowledge and Assertion	Rodrigo Borges	Spring 2012

PRESENTATIONS

‘What are the Problems for Informatism?’ presented at Honors Thesis Symposium, Rutgers University, April 2014.

‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’ presented for Advanced Topics in Metaphysics seminar, Rutgers University, April 2014.

CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOPS

Philosophy of Cosmology Workshop, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, April 2014

Princeton-Rutgers Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, March 2014

LANGUAGES

English, French.

THESIS ABSTRACT

The purpose of this essay is to: (1) interpret infinitism and its objections, (2) to defend infinitism from those objections, and (3) to identify a new response which does not suffer from the same problems as those objections. First, this work will interpret infinitism and Peter Klein's Interrogation Argument. Specifically, as it is found in "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons" and "Infinitism is the Solution to the Regress Problem." Second, this work will interpret and respond to objections to the arguments found in those works. Specifically, the objections considered come from Carl Ginet's "Infinitism is not the Solution to the Regress Problem" and Michael Bergmann's "Is Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification?". Finally, this work will raise an objection to the Interrogation Argument and examine how this objection fits into the rest of the dialogue. Specifically, there may be meta-epistemological priors at the heart of the disagreement presented, and that there is reason to disagree.

REFERENCES

Peter Klein
Rutgers University