Interoperability between blockchain

How to bridge chains

Many L1 blockchains

Bitcoin: Bitcoin scripting language (with Taproot)


Ethereum: EVM. Currently: high Tx fees (better with Rollups)

EVM compatible blockchains: Avalanche, BSC, ...

- Higher Tx rate ⇒ lower Tx fees
- EVM compatibility \Rightarrow easy project migration and user support

Other fast non-EVM blockchains: Solana, Cosmos, ...

Higher Tx rate ⇒ lower Tx fees



Interoperability

Interoperability:

User owns funds or assets (NFTs) on one blockchain system
 Goal: enable user to move assets to another chain

Composability:

Enable a DAPP on one chain to call a DAPP on another

Not a problem if the entire world used Ethereum

- In reality: many blockchain systems that need to interoperate
- The solution: bridges

A first example: BTC in Ethereum


How to move BTC to Ethereum ?? Goal: enable BTC in DeFi.

⇒ need new ERC20 on Ethereum pegged to BTC (e.g., use it for providing liquidity in DeFi projects)

The solution: wrapped coins


- Asset X on one chain appear as wrapped-X on another chain
- For BTC: several solutions (e.g., wBTC, tBTC, ...)

wBTC and tBTC: a lock-and-mint bridge



Alice wants her 1 BTC back

Moving 1 wBTC back to the Bitcoin network:



wBTC

Example BTC → Ethereum:

```
Nov 26 2021 - 07:36

FUNDS SENT TO CUSTODIAN (Bitcoin Tx: ≈4,000 BTC)

c605b4f2f0948e7deae0c5d7c27b3256b97120be760e2b81136eb95c819570f6

MINT COMPLETED BY CUSTODIAN (Ethereum Tx: )

0x70475eca8be89b67143f1b52df013fc1df7d254e836c836c8f368fc516aca76b
```

Why two hours? ... make sure no Bitcoin re-org

The problem: trusted custodian

Can we do better?

tBTC: no single point of trust

Alice requests to mint tBTC:

random three registered custodians are selected and they generate P2PKH Bitcoin address for Alice signing key is 3-out-of-3 secret shared among three (all three must cooperate to sign a Tx)

Alice sends BTC to P2PKH address, and received tBTC.


Custodians must lock 1.5x ETH stake for the BTC they manage

If locked BTC is lost, Alice can claim staked ETH on Ethereum.

Bridging smart chains (with Dapp support)

A very active area:

- Many super interesting ideas
- Figure already outdated




https://medium.com/1kxnetwork/blockchain-bridges-5db6afac44f8

Bridging smart chains (with Dapp support)

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Two types of bridges

Type 1: a lock-and-mint bridge


- SRC → DEST: user locks funds on SRC side,
 wrapped tokens are minted on the DEST side
- DEST → SRC: funds are burned on the DEST side, and released from lock on the SRC Side

Type 2: a liquidity pool bridge

- Liquidity providers provide liquidity on both sides
- SRC → DEST: user sends funds on SRC side, equivalent amount released from pool on DEST side

Bridging smart chains (with Dapp support)

Step 1 (hard): a secure cross-chain messaging system



Step 2 (easier): build a bridge using messaging system

Bridging smart chains (with Dapp support)

Step 1 (hard): a secure cross-chain messaging system



Step 2 (easier): build a bridge using messaging system

- DAPP-X → DAPP-Y: "I received 3 CELO, ok to mint 3 wCELO"
- DAPP-Y → DAPP-X: "I burned 3 wCELO, ok to release 3 CELO"

If messaging system is secure, no one can steal locked funds at S

```
* @notice Burns or locks a specific amount of tokens from a sender's account based on the provided symbol.
   * @param sender Address of the account from which to burn the tokens
   * @param symbol Symbol of the token to burn
   * @param amount Amount of tokens to burn
   * @dev Depending on the token type (External, InternalBurnableFrom, or InternalBurnable), the function either
   * transfers the tokens to gateway contract itself or calls a burn function on the token contract.
   */
function burnTokenFrom(
      address sender.
      string memory symbol,
      uint256 amount
    internal {
       address tokenAddress = tokenAddresses(symbol);
fı
       if (tokenAddress == address(0)) revert TokenDoesNotExist(symbol);
       if (amount == 0) revert InvalidAmount();
      TokenType tokenType = _qetTokenType(symbol);
       if (tokenType == TokenType.External) {
          IERC20(tokenAddress).safeTransferFrom(sender, address(this), amount);
      } else if (tokenType == TokenType.InternalBurnableFrom) {
          IERC20(tokenAddress).safeCall(abi.encodeWithSelector(IBurnableMintableCappedERC20.burnFrom.selector, sender, amount));
      } else {
          IERC20(tokenAddress).safeTransferFrom(sender, IBurnableMintableCappedERC20(tokenAddress).depositAddress(bytes32(0)), amount);
          IBurnableMintableCappedERC20(tokenAddress).burn(bytes32(0));
```

/**

Axelar Gateway (sending side)

- To send token:
 - Approve the gateway contract as the spender of your ERC20 contract (e.g., call USDC.approve(gatewayAddr, amount))
 - E.g., on:
 - Ethereum: <u>0x4F4495243837681061C4743b74B3eEdf548D56A5</u>
 - Avalanche: ox5029C0EFf6C34351a0CEc334542cDb22c7928f78
 - 2. Call the gateway sendToken()

Axelar Gateway (sending side)

```
/**
 * @notice Calls a contract on the specified destination chain with a given payload and token amount.
 * This function is the entry point for general message passing with token transfer between chains.
 * @param destinationChain The chain where the destination contract exists. A registered chain name on Axelar must be used here
 * @param destinationContractAddress The address of the contract to call with tokens on the destination chain
 * @param payload The payload to be sent to the destination contract, usually representing an encoded function call with arguments
 * @param symbol The symbol of the token to be sent with the call
 * @param amount The amount of tokens to be sent with the call
*/
function callContractWithToken(
    string calldata destinationChain,
    string calldata destinationContractAddress,
   bytes calldata payload,
    string calldata symbol,
   uint256 amount
) external {
    burnTokenFrom(msg.sender, symbol, amount);
    emit ContractCallWithToken(msg.sender, destinationChain, destinationContractAddress, keccak256(payload), payload, symbol, amount);
```

generic cross-chain call

Axelar Gateway (receiving side)

```
function _mintToken(
     string memory symbol,
     address account,
     uint256 amount
) internal {
     address tokenAddress = tokenAddresses(symbol);
     if (tokenAddress == address(0)) revert TokenDoesNotExist(symbol);
     setTokenMintAmount(symbol, tokenMintAmount(symbol) + amount);
     if ( getTokenType(symbol) == TokenType.External) {
          IERC20(tokenAddress).safeTransfer(account, amount);
     } else {
          IBurnableMintableCappedERC20(tokenAddress).mint(account, amount);
                                             if (commandHash == SELECTOR DEPLOY TOKEN) {
                                                commandSelector = AxelarGateway.deployToken.selector;
                                             } else if (commandHash == SELECTOR_MINT_TOKEN) {
                                                commandSelector = AxelarGateway.mintToken.selector;
                                             } else if (commandHash == SELECTOR APPROVE CONTRACT_CALL) {
                                                commandSelector = AxelarGateway.approveContractCall.selector;
                                             } else if (commandHash == SELECTOR_APPROVE_CONTRACT_CALL_WITH_MINT) {
                                                commandSelector = AxelarGateway.approveContractCallWithMint.selector;
```

} else if (commandHash == SELECTOR BURN TOKEN) {




Axelar Gateway (receiving side)

- Who can call execute()?
 - Anyone: this is a public function!
- What prevents Mallory from just sending herself tokens?
 - On-chain, verify proof that message on the other chain is real (e.g., that token was actually burned)

```
contract AxelarAuthWeighted is Ownable, IAxelarAuthWeighted {
    uint256 public currentEpoch;
    mapping(uint256 => bytes32) public hashForEpoch;
    mapping(bytes32 => uint256) public epochForHash;
   uint256 internal constant OLD_KEY_RETENTION = 16;
    constructor(bytes[] memory recentOperators) Ownable(msg.sender) {
        uint256 length = recentOperators.length;
        for (uint256 i; i < length; ++i) {</pre>
           _transferOperatorship(recentOperators[i]);
    /*****************\
    |* External Functionality *|
    \*********************/
   /// @dev This function takes messageHash and proof data and reverts if proof is invalid
    /// @return True if provided operators are the current ones
    function validateProof(bytes32 messageHash, bytes calldata proof) external view returns (bool) {
        (address[] memory operators, uint256[] memory weights, uint256 threshold, bytes[] memory signatures) = abi.decode(
            proof,
            (address[], uint256[], uint256, bytes[])
        );
        bytes32 operatorsHash = keccak256(abi.encode(operators, weights, threshold));
        uint256 operatorsEpoch = epochForHash[operatorsHash];
        uint256 epoch = currentEpoch;
        if (operatorsEpoch == 0 || epoch - operatorsEpoch >= OLD_KEY_RETENTION) revert InvalidOperators();
        _validateSignatures(messageHash, operators, weights, threshold, signatures);
        return operatorsEpoch == epoch;
```

(1) Externally verified: external parties verify message on chain S



RelayerT dispatches only if all trustees signed

⇒ <u>if</u> DAPP-Y trusts trustees, it knows DAPP-X sent message


(1) Externally verified: external parties verify message on chain S



What if trustees sign and post a fake message to relayerT?


• anyone can send trustee's signature to relayerS \implies trustee slashed on S

(2) On-chain verified: chain T verifies block header of chain S




relayerT runs a light-client for chain S to verify that relayerS received messages D[]

assumes security of light client



Problem: high gas costs on chain T to verify state of source chain S.

Solution: zkBridge: use SNARK to reduce work for relayerT




zkBridge


Used with the LayerZero bridge

LayerZero V1 zkLightClient Oracle Addresses (Mainnets)

- Ethereum: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- BNB Chain: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- opBNB: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Polygon: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Arbitrum One: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Arbitrum Nova: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Optimism: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Base: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Mantle: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Linea: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Scroll: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Celo: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Core Dao: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Avalanche: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Fantom: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Moonbeam: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Metis: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC
- Gnosis: 0xE014fe8c4d5C23EDB7AC4011F226e869ac7Ef5CC

Activity (Layer Zero)







Bridging: the future vision

User can hold assets on any chain

- Assets move cheaply and quickly from chain to chain
- A project's liquidity is available on all chains
- Users and projects choose the chain that is best suited for their application and asset type

We are not there yet ... except on Avalanche & its subnets