

Cross–Database Ownership Chaining (CDOC) is a security feature in **SQL Server** that allows stored procedures, views, or functions in one database to access objects in another database *without requiring explicit permissions* on the underlying objects **as long as the owners of all involved objects are the same**.

It can simplify application logic, but if misused, it can also unintentionally expose data across databases. Understanding it deeply is important for DBAs and developers.

✓ What Is Ownership Chaining?

An **ownership chain** is created when SQL Server checks permissions on a sequence of objects that call each other.

Example (inside a single DB):

EXEC ProcA → SELECT from ViewB → SELECT from TableC

If **TableC**, **ViewB**, and **ProcA** share the **same owner** (usually dbo), SQL Server skips permission checks on the underlying objects. It only checks permission on the *initial* object (ProcA).

This is called **ownership chaining**.

🔗 Cross–Database Ownership Chaining

When this chain crosses **database boundaries**, it becomes a **cross-database ownership chain**.

Example:

DatabaseA.dbo.Proc1 → DatabaseB.dbo.Table1

SQL Server will allow this access **only if both objects have the same owner** (usually dbo *AND* both db owners match).

Otherwise, the chain is broken.

✓ Conditions for CDOC to Work

Condition	Required?	Notes
Same user owns objects in both DBs	Yes	In practice, both objects owned by dbo and both DBs owned by the <i>same login</i> .
Cross-database ownership chaining enabled	Maybe	At instance or per-database level.
User has permission on the <i>first</i> object	Yes	SQL Server doesn't check deeper objects.

⚙️ How to Enable or Disable Cross-DB Ownership Chaining

Server-wide (instance-level) setting

```
sp_configure 'cross db ownership chaining', 1;
RECONFIGURE;
```

Database-level

```
ALTER DATABASE DatabaseA SET DB_CHAINING ON;
ALTER DATABASE DatabaseB SET DB_CHAINING ON;
```

📘 Real-Time Example Scenario 1: Multi-Database Application (ERP/CRM)

🔗 Situation

A company has:

- **AppDB** → Contains stored procedures
- **AuditDB** → Stores transactional logs

Application users should **not have direct access** to AuditDB tables.

📘 Without CDOC (Default Behavior)

User calls a stored procedure:

```
EXEC AppDB.dbo.InsertOrder
Inside InsertOrder:
INSERT INTO AuditDB.dbo.OrderAuditLog (...)
SELECT ...
FROM AppDB.dbo.Orders
```

✗ This fails **unless the user has INSERT permission on AuditDB.dbo.OrderAuditLog**, which is undesirable (security risk).

■ With CDOC Enabled

- Both DBs owned by dbo.
- DB_CHAINING = ON.
- User only needs EXECUTE on the procedure.

Now:

```
EXEC AppDB.dbo.InsertOrder
```

- ✓ Successfully writes into AuditDB.dbo.OrderAuditLog
- ✓ User has **no direct access** to AuditDB tables
- ✓ Permissions simplified

■ Real-Time Example Scenario 2: Microservices Database Pattern

A company uses separate databases for each module:

- **BillingDB**
- **InventoryDB**
- **CustomerDB**

A stored procedure in BillingDB:

```
BillingDB.dbo.GetInvoiceForCustomer
```

...needs to read customer address from CustomerDB.

Without CDOC, you must grant Billing app users **SELECT on CustomerDB** tables → security issue.

With CDOC:

- Enable DB_CHAINING on both DBs
- Ensure same owner

Now:

```
EXEC BillingDB.dbo.GetInvoiceForCustomer 123
```

→ Procedure reads from CustomerDB.dbo.Customers

→ User has no direct access to CustomerDB

■ Real-Time Example 3: Shared Security Database

Large enterprise uses:

- **SecurityDB** → Stores users, roles, audit logs
- **ApplicationDB** → Regular OLTP

Stored procedures in ApplicationDB need to log authentication attempts in SecurityDB.

CDOC allows:

```
ApplicationDB.dbo.LogAttempt
```

→ writes to SecurityDB.dbo.LoginAttempts

No need to grant the application user direct rights.

⚠ Security Risks & Why Microsoft Recommends Caution



Risk 1: Implicit Access Your Admins Didn't Expect

If someone creates new objects owned by dbo in both DBs:

```
DB1.dbo.NewProc → DB2.dbo.SensitiveTable
```

The chain works automatically, potentially exposing sensitive data.

Risk 2: Database Owner = Login

If databases have different owners, cross-chaining **won't work**, but if accidentally changed to same owner, access suddenly becomes possible.

Risk 3: Privilege Escalation via “Trojan Horse” Stored Procedures

Malicious developer inserts:

```
CREATE PROCEDURE dbo.GetAllPayrollData AS  
SELECT * FROM PayrollDB.dbo.EmployeeSalary;
```

If both DBs are dbo-owned and chaining enabled → user may get sensitive data.

Best Practices

- ✓ Avoid enabling CDOC at server level
- ✓ Enable DB_CHAINING **only on specific trusted DB pairs**
- ✓ Ensure strict change management
- ✓ Audit cross-database access
- ✓ Prefer **signed stored procedures** or **module signing** (more secure)

Summary in Simple Words

Cross-DB Ownership Chaining lets SQL Server skip permission checks across databases, **as long as the same owner exists**. It is useful for multi-database applications but risky if misunderstood.

<https://www.sqldbachamps.com/>

Below is a **complete, hands-on, DBA-friendly guide** including:

1. **Step-by-step demo scripts** for Cross-Database Ownership Chaining
2. **Secure alternatives** (module signing with certificates)
3. **Troubleshooting broken ownership chains** with real causes + fixes

◆ 1. Step-by-Step Demo Scripts for Cross-Database Ownership Chaining

This demo uses two databases:

- **AppDB** — application code
- **AuditDB** — stores audit logs

Goal: A user executes a stored procedure in AppDB, which writes into AuditDB **without giving the user permissions on AuditDB**.

🔧 Step 1 — Create Database

```
CREATE DATABASE AppDB;
CREATE DATABASE AuditDB;
```

🔧 Step 2 — Enable DB Chaining on Both Databases

Required because we are crossing databases.

```
ALTER DATABASE AppDB SET DB_CHAINING ON;
ALTER DATABASE AuditDB SET DB_CHAINING ON;
```

🔧 Step 3 — Create Tables & Stored Procedures

In AppDB

```
USE AppDB;
GO
CREATE TABLE dbo.Orders
(
    OrderId INT IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
    CustomerName VARCHAR(50)
);
GO

CREATE PROCEDURE dbo.InsertOrder
(
    @CustomerName VARCHAR(50)
)
AS
BEGIN
    INSERT INTO dbo.Orders (CustomerName)
    VALUES (@CustomerName);

    -- Write audit log in other database
    INSERT INTO AuditDB.dbo.OrderAuditLog (OrderId, ActionTime)
    SELECT SCOPE_IDENTITY(), GETDATE();
END
GO
```

In AuditDB

```
USE AuditDB;
GO
```

```
CREATE TABLE dbo.OrderAuditLog
(
    AuditId INT IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
    OrderId INT,
    ActionTime DATETIME
);
GO
```

Step 4 — Create a Test User

```
USE master;
GO
CREATE LOGIN TestUser WITH PASSWORD = 'StrongPassword123!';
GO

USE AppDB;
CREATE USER TestUser FOR LOGIN TestUser;
GRANT EXECUTE ON dbo.InsertOrder TO TestUser;
GO
```

Important:

TestUser is **NOT** given any access to AuditDB.

Step 5 — Test Behavior

As TestUser:

```
EXEC AppDB.dbo.InsertOrder 'John Doe';
```

✓ This works successfully

- ✓ User inserts into AuditDB **without permissions** on AuditDB
- ✓ This is cross-database ownership chaining working properly

◆ 2. Security Alternatives (Better and Safer Than CDOC)

CDOC is convenient but risky.

The **recommended secure alternative** is:

★ Use Module Signing with Certificates

This allows stored procedures to access other databases **without enabling DB_CHAINING** and without granting users extra privileges.

Example: Replace CDOC with Module Signing

Goal: AppDB.dbo.InsertOrder should insert into AuditDB.dbo.OrderAuditLog **without granting user any permissions** on AuditDB.

✓ Step 1 — Create Certificate in AppDB

```
USE AppDB;
GO

CREATE CERTIFICATE AppDBCert
    ENCRYPTION BY PASSWORD = 'StrongPassword123!'
    WITH SUBJECT = 'Cross DB Access Certificate';
GO
```

✓ Step 2 — Create a Signing Login (Stored Procedure Identity)

```
CREATE LOGIN AppDBCertUser FROM CERTIFICATE AppDBCert;
GO
```

✓ Step 3 — Give Certificate Login Required Permissions in AuditDB

```
USE AuditDB;
GO
CREATE USER AppDBCertUser FOR LOGIN AppDBCertUser;
GRANT INSERT ON dbo.OrderAuditLog TO AppDBCertUser;
```

✓ Step 4 — Sign the Procedure with the Certificate

```
USE AppDB;
GO

ADD SIGNATURE TO dbo.InsertOrder
  BY CERTIFICATE AppDBCert
  WITH PASSWORD = 'StrongPassword123!';
GO
```

✓ Step 5 — Disable DB_CHAINING if you want maximum security

```
ALTER DATABASE AppDB SET DB_CHAINING OFF;
ALTER DATABASE AuditDB SET DB_CHAINING OFF;
GO
```



Result:

- User only needs EXECUTE on the stored procedure
- SQL Server impersonates the certificate user internally
- No cross-db chaining required
- No excessive permissions granted
- Secure and audit-friendly

◆ 3. Troubleshooting Broken Ownership Chains

Below are the **4 most common issues** that break CDOC and how to fix them.



Issue 1 — Databases Have Different Owners

Check owner:

```
SELECT name, SUSER_SNAME(owner_sid) FROM sys.databases;
```

Fix:

```
ALTER AUTHORIZATION ON DATABASE::AppDB TO sa;
ALTER AUTHORIZATION ON DATABASE::AuditDB TO sa;
```



Issue 2 — Object Owners Are Not the Same (dbo vs custom schema)

If object is owned by different schemas:

AppDB.dbo.Proc1 → AuditDB.audit.OrderAuditLog

Ownership chain **breaks**.

Fix: Use dbo schema on both sides:

```
ALTER SCHEMA dbo TRANSFER AuditDB.audit.OrderAuditLog;
```



Issue 3 — DB_CHAINING Is OFF

Check:

```
SELECT name, is_db_chaining_on
FROM sys.databases;
```

Fix:

```
ALTER DATABASE AppDB SET DB_CHAINING ON;
ALTER DATABASE AuditDB SET DB_CHAINING ON;
```

✗ Issue 4 — Dynamic SQL breaks ownership chaining

Example inside procedure:

```
EXEC('INSERT INTO AuditDB.dbo.OrderAuditLog VALUES (...);');
```

🚫 Dynamic SQL always breaks ownership chaining

SQL Server must check permissions again.

Fix options:

- Avoid dynamic SQL
- OR use module signing (recommended)
- OR explicitly grant permissions (less secure)

🔗 Final Summary

Method	Security	Maintenance	Risk	Recommended?
Cross-DB Ownership Chaining	Medium	Easy	High	✗ Only for trusted systems
Explicit Permissions	Low	Hard	Low	✗ Too much access given
Module Signing (Certificates)	High	Medium	Very Low	✓ Best practice
Application-level Security	High	App-dependent	Medium	Good alternative

<https://www.sqldbachamps.com/>

Below is a **ready-to-run auditing toolkit** that helps you identify **ALL cross-database ownership chains**, dangerous access patterns, broken chains, database owners, and objects referencing other databases.

These are DBA-level scripts for SQL Server audits.

✂ 1. Check Database-Level Cross-DB Chaining Settings

```
SELECT
    name AS DatabaseName,
    CASE WHEN is_db_chaining_on = 1 THEN 'ON' ELSE 'OFF' END AS DBChaining,
    SUSER_SNAME(owner_sid) AS DatabaseOwner
FROM sys.databases
ORDER BY name;
```

✓ Shows which databases have **DB_CHAINING ON**

✓ Lists **database owners** (must match for chaining to work)

✂ 2. Find Dangerous Cross-Database References (Views, Procedures, Functions)

This identifies objects in one DB referencing objects in another DB.

```
SELECT
    DB_NAME() AS CurrentDB,
    o.type_desc AS ObjectType,
    o.name AS ObjectName,
    referenced_database_name AS ReferencedDB,
    referenced_schema_name AS ReferencedSchema,
    referenced_entity_name AS ReferencedObject
FROM sys.sql_expression_dependencies d
JOIN sys.objects o
    ON d.reference_id = o.object_id
WHERE referenced_database_name IS NOT NULL
ORDER BY ReferencedDB, o.name;
```

✓ Shows **which objects call other databases**

✓ Helps detect **accidental or hidden cross-database calls**

✂ 3. Find Dynamic SQL That Breaks Ownership Chaining

Dynamic SQL breaks secure chaining and often introduces privilege escalation risks.

```
SELECT
    o.name AS ObjectName,
    o.type_desc AS ObjectType,
    m.definition AS Code
FROM sys.sql_modules m
JOIN sys.objects o ON m.object_id = o.object_id
WHERE m.definition LIKE '%EXEC(%'
    OR m.definition LIKE '%sp_executesql%'
    OR m.definition LIKE '%EXECUTE(%'
ORDER BY o.name;
```

✓ Flags risky code

✓ Useful for reviewing potential permission bypasses

✂ 4. Find Objects Owned by Non-dbo Owners

Mismatched owners break cross-database chains.

```
SELECT
    name AS ObjectName,
    type_desc AS ObjectType,
    USER_NAME(schema_id) AS SchemaName
FROM sys.objects
```



```
WHERE schema_id != SCHEMA_ID('dbo')
ORDER BY SchemaName, ObjectName;
```

- ✓ Identifies objects not owned by dbo
- ✓ Useful when chains mysteriously break

✂ 5. Check for Mixed Database Owners (Common Cause of Broken Chains)

Cross-db chaining requires databases to have **matching owners**.

```
SELECT
    name AS DatabaseName,
    SUSER_SNAME(owner_sid) AS Owner
FROM sys.databases
ORDER BY Owner, name;
```

- ✓ Helps you verify if databases involved in chaining have the same owner

✂ 6. Detect Dangerous Cross-Database Write Operations

Identifies procedures or views that **insert/update/delete** objects in other DBs.

```
SELECT
    o.name AS ObjectName,
    o.type_desc AS ObjectType,
    m.definition AS Definition
FROM sys.objects o
JOIN sys.sql_modules m ON o.object_id = m.object_id
WHERE m.definition LIKE '%insert into %.'
    OR m.definition LIKE '%update %.'
    OR m.definition LIKE '%delete from %.'
ORDER BY o.name;
```

- ✓ Helps find hidden or unapproved write operations across DBs

✂ 7. Comprehensive Cross-Database Dependency Map (Best Audit Script)

This creates a full dependency list with DB-to-DB links.

```
SELECT
    DB_NAME() AS SourceDB,
    SCHEMA_NAME(o.schema_id) AS SourceSchema,
    o.name AS SourceObject,
    o.type_desc AS SourceObjectType,
    d.referenced_database_name AS TargetDB,
    d.referenced_schema_name AS TargetSchema,
    d.referenced_entity_name AS TargetObject,
    d.referenced_class_desc AS ReferenceType
FROM sys.sql_expression_dependencies d
JOIN sys.objects o
    ON d.referencing_id = o.object_id
WHERE d.referenced_database_name IS NOT NULL
ORDER BY TargetDB, SourceObject;
```

- ✓ Full map of cross-database relationships
- ✓ Ideal for security audits and application dependency analysis

✂ 8. Show Which Objects Would Break If Chaining Was Disabled

```
SELECT
    o.name AS ObjectName,
    o.type_desc AS ObjectType,
    d.referenced_database_name AS ExternalDatabase,
```

```

    d.referenced_entity_name AS ExternalObject
FROM sys.objects o
JOIN sys.sql_expression_dependencies d
    ON o.object_id = d.referencing_id
WHERE d.referenced_database_name IS NOT NULL
ORDER BY ExternalDatabase;

```

- ✓ Identifies objects that depend on CDOC
- ✓ Useful before disabling DB_CHAINING

✂ 9. Find External Access via 3-Part Names

```

SELECT
    o.name AS ObjectName,
    o.type_desc AS ObjectType,
    m.definition
FROM sys.objects o
JOIN sys.sql_modules m ON o.object_id = m.object_id
WHERE m.definition LIKE '%[.].[%].[%]%'
    OR m.definition LIKE '%[A-Za-z0-9_]%.dbo.%'
ORDER BY o.name;

```

- ✓ Finds code using explicit 3-part names
- ✓ Helps locate cross-db calls buried in stored procedure code

✂ 10. DBA-Level Summary Report (Everything in One)

Paste and run in **master**:

```

EXEC sp_MSforeachdb '
USE [?];
PRINT "=== Database: [?] ===";

-- DB chaining
SELECT
    DB_NAME() AS DBName,
    is_db_chaining_on AS DBChaining,
    SUSER_SNAME(owner_sid) AS Owner
FROM sys.databases WHERE name = DB_NAME();

-- Cross-database references
SELECT
    o.name AS ObjectName,
    o.type_desc AS ObjectType,
    d.referenced_database_name AS RefDB,
    d.referenced_schema_name AS RefSchema,
    d.referenced_entity_name AS RefEntity
FROM sys.sql_expression_dependencies d
JOIN sys.objects o ON o.object_id = d.referencing_id
WHERE d.referenced_database_name IS NOT NULL;
';

```

- ✓ Scans *all databases*
- ✓ Produces a unified audit log
- ✓ Excellent for penetration testing and compliance