

# Paola Moscariello

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<b>Graduate Administrator</b>	Laura Hedden	<a href="mailto:lhedden@princeton.edu">lhedden@princeton.edu</a>	609-258-4006

## Office Contact Information

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Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building  
Department of Economics  
Princeton University  
Princeton, NJ 08544

## Graduate Studies

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<b>Princeton University</b>	<i>2019-present</i>
PhD Candidate in Economics	
Expected Completion Date: May 2025	

### REFERENCES

Professor Leeat Yariv (main advisor) Department of Economics Princeton University 609-258-4021 <a href="mailto:lyariv@princeton.edu">lyariv@princeton.edu</a>	Professor Pietro Ortoleva Department of Economics Princeton University 609-986-6895 <a href="mailto:pietro.ortoleva@princeton.edu">pietro.ortoleva@princeton.edu</a>
Professor Alessandro Lizzeri Department of Economics Princeton University 917-756-0238 <a href="mailto:lizzeri@princeton.edu">lizzeri@princeton.edu</a>	Professor Wolfgang Pesendorfer Department of Economics Princeton University 609-258-4017 <a href="mailto:pesendor@princeton.edu">pesendor@princeton.edu</a>

## Prior Education

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<b>Università Bocconi</b>	<i>2016-2018</i>
M.Sc. in Economic and Social Sciences (ESS)	
<b>Università Bocconi</b>	<i>2013-2016</i>
B.Sc. in International Economics, Management, and Finance (BIEMF)	

## Fields

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PRIMARY	Microeconomic Theory
SECONDARY	Political Economy, Behavioral Economics

## Publications (including accepted & forthcoming)

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1. “Information Avoidance in School Choice” *Games and Economic Behavior*, 2024.

## Job Market Paper

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### “Redistricting with Endogenous Candidates”

*I study partisan gerrymandering when district composition affects candidates’ policy positions and, consequently, voters’ behavior. In the U.S., primary elections determine which candidates compete in general elections, with a district’s ideological composition shaping who emerges as the nominee. Thus, redistricting affects not only which party wins but also the ideology of competing candidates. I find that classical gerrymandering strategies can backfire when candidates emerge endogenously, particularly in districts where extreme voters may select non-viable candidates. However, when properly designed to account for both voter affiliation and preference intensity, gerrymandering can be a more powerful instrument than traditional approaches that consider only party affiliation. I show how methods from optimal transport theory can be used to characterize the optimal redistricting plan, which creates districts that maximize ideological distance between competing candidates. Using these findings, I analyze two implications for the U.S. House of Representatives: how gerrymandering contributes to political polarization and its consequences for minority representation.*

## Work in Progress

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1. “Caution in the Face of Complexity”, with Geoffroy de Clippel, Pietro Ortoleva, and Kareen Rozen. 2024.
2. “Reputation in a Committee with Multiple Principals: the Case of the FOMC”, with Matias Iaryczower and Gabriel Lopez Moctezuma. 2024.
3. “Supply Responses to Redistricting”, with Clément Herman and Nicolas Longuet-Marx. 2024.

## Research Experience

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2021   Research Assistant to Prof. Pietro Ortoleva  
2020   Research Assistant to Prof. Roland Benabou  
2018   Research Assistant to Prof. Pierpaolo Battigalli

## Teaching

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*Princeton*   ECO 300: Intermediate Microeconomics (TA, Fall 2021-2024, Spring 2022-2024)  
*Bocconi*   Macroeconomics (TA, 2018)

## Professional Activities

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### Presentations and Seminars (including scheduled)

- 2024 Caltech CTESS Workshop on Theory Based Experiments, 35<sup>th</sup> Stony Brook International Conference in Game Theory, North American Meeting of the Economic Science Association in Columbus.
- 2023 Caltech CTESS Workshop on Theory Based Experiments, 34<sup>th</sup> Stony Brook International Conference in Game Theory, SWEET Conference at Columbia University.

### Refereeing

*American Economic Review, Econometrica, International Journal of Game Theory.*

### University and Departmental Service

International Student Affairs Chair at GSG (Graduate Student Government) *2022-present*

Organizer of the Political Economy Student Seminar *2021-2022*

## Honors, Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants

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Stephen Goldfeld Fellowship	<i>2023</i>
William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Summer Grant	<i>2021–2024</i>
Princeton University Graduate School Fellowship	<i>2019-2024</i>
UniCredit Foundation 17 <sup>th</sup> Crivelli Scholarship	<i>2019-2022</i>
Bocconi Graduate Merit Award	<i>2016–2018</i>

## Languages

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Italian (native), English

*Last updated: October 2024*