Paola Moscariello

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Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building

Department of Economics Princeton University

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Graduate Studies

Princeton University

2019-present

PhD Candidate in Economics

Expected Completion Date: May 2025

References

Professor Leeat Yariv Professor Pietro Ortoleva
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Princeton University Princeton University

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Professor Alessandro Lizzeri Professor Wolfgang Pesendorfer Department of Economics Department of Economics Princeton University Princeton University

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Prior Education

Università Bocconi 2016-2018

M.Sc. in Economic and Social Sciences (ESS)

Università Bocconi 2013-2016

B.Sc. in International Economics, Management, and Finance (BIEMF)

Fields

Primary Microeconomic Theory

Secondary Political Economy, Behavioral Economics

Publications (including accepted & forthcoming)

1. "Information Avoidance in School Choice" Games and Economic Behavior, 2024.

Job Market Paper

"Redistricting with Endogenous Candidates"

I study partisan gerrymandering when district composition affects candidates' policy positions and, consequently, voters' behavior. I show how traditional redistricting can backfire when voters favor extreme candidates in primary elections. However, sophisticated redistricting parties can leverage this dynamic and make gerrymandering an even more potent tool than previously thought. Using optimal transport theory, I characterize the optimal redistricting plan: create districts that drive ideological wedges between opponents, fostering extremism in primaries and turning voter diversity into electoral weakness. I use my results to investigate the impact of gerrymandering on polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives. By fostering the emergence of extreme opponents, gerrymandering creates a notable ideological gap in the distribution of district representatives. Notably, extreme candidates emerge in districts with many moderate voters, challenging the view that political extremism requires voter segregation.

Work in Progress

- 1. "Caution in the Face of Complexity" With Geoffroy de Clippel, Pietro Ortoleva, and Kareen Rozen. 2024.
- 2. "Reputation in Committees: the Case of the FOMC" With Matias Iaryczower and Gabriel Lopez Moctezuma. 2024.
- 3. "Supply Responses to Redistricting" With Clément Herman and Nicolas Longuet-Marx. 2024.

Research Experience

2021 Research Assistant to Prof. Pietro Ortoleva

2020 Research Assistant to Prof. Roland Benabou

Teaching

Princeton ECO 300: Intermediate Microeconomics (TA, Fall 2021-2024, Spring 2022-2024)

Bocconi Macroeconomics (TA, 2018)

Professional Activities

Presentations and Seminars (including scheduled)

- 2024 Caltech CTESS Workshop on Theory Based Experiments, 35^{th} Stony Brook International Conference in Game Theory, North American Meeting of the Economic Science Association in Columbus.
- 2023 Caltech CTESS Workshop on Theory Based Experiments, 34th Stony Brook International Conference in Game Theory, SWEET Conference at Columbia University.

Refereeing

American Economic Review, Econometrica, International Journal of Game Theory.

University and Departmental Service

International Student Affairs Chair at GSG (Graduate Student Government) 2022-present Organizer of the Political Economy Student Seminar 2021-2022

Honors, Scholarships, Fellowships, and Grants

Stephen Goldfeld Fellowship	2023
William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Summer Grant	2021-2024
Princeton University Graduate School Fellowship	2019-2024
UniCredit Foundation 17^{th} Crivelli Scholarship	2019-2022
Bocconi Graduate Merit Award	2016-2018

Languages

Italian (native), English

Last updated: September 2024